Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
ANTARA
DAN
Antara
Dan
CORAM:
Introduction
[1] After a full trial before the High Court, judgment was entered in
favour of the respondent (the plaintiff before the High Court) with costs of
The parties
land known as Geran Mukim No: 3607, Lot No: 2391 (“Lot 2391”), Geran
Mukim No: 2954, Lot No: 4197 (“Lot 4197”) and Geran Mukim No: 3608,
Lot No: 2392 (“Lot 2392”) and they are all located at Mukim Ayer Putih,
built the highway just next to the lands belonging to the respondent.
[4] There is a hill known as Bukit Jenun on the lands belonging to the
respondent. At the material time, the lands were planted with oil palm trees.
within the side of the appellant’s right of the way. The appellant entered
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into the lands belonging to the respondent to carry out remedial works as a
the terms of the Tol agreement and damaged the lands belonging to the
[6] ln the Statement of Claim, the respondent sought for the following
Butir-Butir
[8] On 16.8.2000, the respondent and the appellant entered into a Tol
occupy part of Lot 2391 for a period of six (6) months from
(b) The appellant has to furnish an “as-built” drawing for the works
(c) A final joint inspection has to be conducted within seven (7) days
(d) The appellant has to demobilize and remove from Lot 2391 all
to the scale prescribed within sixty (60) days from the date of the
(a) That the appellant had entered and occupied Lot 2391 more than
respondent.
(b) That the appellant failed to provide an “as-built” drawing for the
(c) That the appellant failed to carry out a joint final inspection which
was to be done within seven (7) days from the date of the
(d) That the appellant failed to remove the excavated earth from Lot
2391 and the earth was also dumped all over Lot 2391, Lot 4197
Butir-Butir
[11] And the entire losses which the respondent sustained have been
[12] In its defence, the appellant addressed each and every breach
which the respondent had itemised in the Statement of Claim and argued
that the High Court Judge erred in law and in fact in allowing the
evidence and the facts which clearly showed that the entire claim of the
respondent was not sustainable in law and the appeal ought to be allowed
with costs.
Analysis
[13] Learned counsel for the respondent argued that the appellant
had entered into the lands belonging to the respondent and started “slope
(hereinafter referred to as “GFE”) had cut the top of the hill and dumped all
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the earth onto the east side of the hill. Naturally this would cause damage
to the respondent’s lands. It was to remedy this damage that the Tol
agreement was entered into. Earlier there was a separate agreement dated
The aforesaid Earthwork Disposal to Lot No. 2391, 2392, 4197 of Mr.
Khor Kok Seng have been discussed on 23/05/2000 after the joint
inspection on the same date amongst the following parties:
(1) Mr. Khor Kok Seng – LAND OWNER representative of Kim Seng
Enterprise (Kedah) Sdn Bhd (Lot 2391, 2392 & 4197).
(2) Greenfield Engineering Sdn Bhd referred as G.F. represented by
Mr. Tan Ka Chong.
(3) PLUS represented by Ir. K. S. Soo, Ir. Ahmad Faidzal Fudil and
Norehsan Abu Bakar.
For the proposed slope Rehabilitation works to cut slope at
KM72.9 SB. Bukit Jenun, herein referred as PROJECT.
(1) Mr. K. S. Khor agreed to absord all disposed earth quantity from
the PROJECT for the land – filing at the said lots and build up to
satisfactory formation platform, export of earth is not allowed by
G.F. except the owner.
(2) PLUS agreed to maximize the cutting down top hill platform level
(within the PROJECT budget) in order to cater for a wider platform
and stable slope formation.
(3) Upon completion of the earth platform by G.F. to the LAND
OWNER, G.F. shall furnish a Licensed Survey drawing as-built
complete with (c/w) spot level to the completed earth platform for
the LAND OWNER’S perusal.
9
LAND OWNER
Sgd. Illegible
Mr. Khor Kok Seng
I/C: 671109-02-5365
Date: 28/8/2000.”
[14] There is no clause in the Tol agreement that says that the June
agreement is being superceded by the Tol agreement. That being the case,
the disputes between both the parties bearing in mind that the June
agreement was also alluded to in paragraphs 8.17, 8.18 and 8.19 of the
Shipping Ltd And Others v. BTP Tioxide Ltd [1982] AC 724, HL, at 736:
agreed to absord all earth excavated for the project from the lands. The
respondent also agreed that GFE shall fill the earth excavated from Lot
2391 for the purpose of the project at Lot 2391 as well as Lot 4197 and Lot
[17] At this juncture, it is ideal to address each and every breach that
the respondent has itemised in the Statement of Claim and deal with them
accordingly. But before I do so, I must categorically state that the parties
are bound by their pleadings. The parties are required to state the issues of
fact and frame the questions of law in order to give notice of the case
the trial. The material facts must be pleaded but the legal consequences
20 MLJ 141, CA, at 142; Koh Siak Poo v Sayang Plantation Bhd [2002]
1 MLJ 65, CA; Quah Swee Khoon v Sime Darby Bhd [2000] 2 MLJ 600,
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CA; and Lever Brothers, Limited, And Others v. Bell And Another
[1931] 1 KB 557).
[18] What this amounts to is this. That the Court is not entitled and
should not decide a suit on an issue which is not pleaded. In short, the trial
of the suit must be confined to the pleadings (Yew Wan Leong v Lai Kok
Chye [1990] 2 MLJ 152, SC, at 154) and the pleadings operate to
effectively define and delimit with absolute clarity and precision the real
matters in controversy between the parties. In this way, the parties could
prepare their respective cases and the Court too will adjudicate on those
issues and no more (Asia Hotel Sdn Bhd v Malayan Insurance (M) Sdn
Bhd [1992] 2 MLJ 615; S Manickam & Ors v Ismail bin Mohamad & Ors
Ammal & Anor v. Abdul Kareem [1969] 1 MLJ 22, FC; Muniandy &
Anor v Muhammad Abdul Kader & Ors [1989] 2 MLJ 416, SC, at 418;
393, SC; Gimstern Corporation (M) Sdn Bhd & Anor v. Global
Insurance Co Sdn Bhd [1987] 1 MLJ 302, SC; and Tan Ah Chim & Sons
Sdn Bhd v Ooi Bee Tat & Anor [1993] 3 MLJ 633).
[19] It is a correct statement of the law to state that where the case
has been decided on an issue that is not raised in the pleadings, the
[20] Having explained the legal semantics briefly, I will now proceed
Statement of Claim.
That the appellant had entered and occupied Lot 2391 more than the
authorised six (6) months without the approval of the respondent
Claim that the six (6) months as reflected in the Tol agreement started from
clause 2.1 of the Tol agreement to justify their contention that the appellant
had entered and occupied Lot 2391 exceeding the six (6) months period
without the approval of the respondent. Clause 2.1 of the Tol agreement
reads as follows:
5(2) of the Statement of Defence, quite apart from the six (6) months that
the appellant was permitted to be on Lot 2391, the appellant was also
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permitted to be on Lot 2391 during the Defects Liability Period. And clause
1.1 of the Tol agreement defined the “Defects Liability Period” to mean
[24] It is crystal clear that the contention by the respondent that the
exceeding the six (6) months without the written authority of the respondent
rectification works, it was done within the ambit and scope of the Tol
agreement.
letter dated 26.3.2002, a survey plan showing the actual affected land area
for the works done under the Tol agreement. That letter can be seen at
page 226 of the appeal record at Jilid “C” and it was worded as follows:
“NORTH-SOUTH EXPRESSWAY
SLOPE REHABILITATION WORKS TO CUT SLOPE AT KM 72.9
SOUTHBOUND BUKIT JENUN
-As-Built Survey Plan
[26] The appellant’s witness by the name of Faisal bin Abd Rahman
(SD2) confirmed the presence of the “as-built” plan. And at page 227 of
the appeal record at Jilid “C”, the “as-built” plan bore the following
That being the case, the appellant had complied with the terms of the Tol
agreement by advancing the “as-built” plan. Yet the respondent was not
happy with the plan prepared by the appellant and refused to accept the
same. The respondent then appointed its own surveyors by the name of
respondent’s witness by the name of Ong Tai Ngee (SP2) when his
submitted by the appellant could not be used as it did not include the
original and the “as-built” contour, and it did not show enough bearings to
enable a detailed and meaningful verification, despite the terms of the Tol
[28] SP2 had this to say about the “as-built” drawing plan
[29] And the High Court Judge made a finding in regard to the “as-
which was complied with, the High Court Judge further made a finding that
actual compensation. This was what his Lordship wrote in his judgment at
[31] It is wrong to say that the appellant failed to provide the “as-
built” drawing for the works to be done on Lot 2391. In fact, the appellant
complied with clause 3.1.9 of the Tol agreement by providing the “as-built”
appellant.
through Messrs TNO Consultants. This was what SD1 said in his witness
That the appellant failed to carry out a joint final inspection which was
to be done within seven (7) days from the date of the completion of
the works
Tol agreement which sets out the obligation of the appellant (see page 165
[34] The respondent argued that no joint final inspection was ever
held.
[35] The appellant argued to the contrary and submitted that the
issue of joint final inspection must be tied up with the issue of disagreement
the joint final inspection commenced when the respondent prepared the
made to conduct the joint final inspection but they did not materialise.
Finally, on 29.10.2002, the parties had a discussion at the site. Since the
parties could not agree as to the actual affected area pertaining to the
dumping (filling) of the earth, the joint final inspection came to naught.
That the appellant failed to remove the excavated earth from Lot 2391
and the earth was also dumped all over Lot 2391, Lot 4197 as well as
Lot 2392
[37] The respondent alleged that the appellant was responsible for
the areas where the earth was dumped. The appellant, on the other hand,
submitted that the dumping of the earth did not come within the scope of
works of the appellant and, consequently, the appellant should not be held
liable.
the Tol agreement which reads as follows (see pages 165 to 166 of the
(d) Defendan perlu memindah keluar dari Lot 2391 tersebut semua
jentera, alat-alat, sampah-sarap dan bahan-bahan berlebihan
bila kerja-kerja tersebut disiapkan dan dengan khususnya
bahan-bahan yang digali (excavated material) dari Lot 2391
tersebut perlu dibuangkan di luar hartanah tersebut.”
[40] By way of a rebuttal, the appellant relied on clause 3.3 of the Tol
agreement which reads as follows (see page 166 of the appeal record at
Jilid “C”):
“3.3 The Owner shall be entitled to take and sell any severed trees
and/or earth in the area of the said Property on condition that
the said trees and/or earth are personally taken by the Owner
without any interference, interruption or disturbance by any
third party as soon as possible and its removal does not
disturb, interfere or delay work to be done by PLUS for the
purposes of the Works. If the Owner does not take the said
trees and/or earth within fourteen (14) days, PLUS may take
the said trees and/or earth either for sale or disposal,
whichever PLUS may deem fit.”
[41] Now, it cannot be denied that by virtue of clause 3.3 of the Tol
removed or transported out of the said Lot. And this very averment can be
[42] The June agreement favoured the appellant in that the appellant
cannot be held responsible for the filling of the earth on Lot 2391 that was
done pursuant to the June agreement entered between the respondent and
GFE.
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[43] In the context of taking and selling of the earth including the act
of dumping, GFE was the agent of the respondent by virtue of the June
agreement.
regard to the Tol agreement and the June agreement. It was SP3 who
signed both the agreements for the respondent. SP3 testified that he knew
the contents of both the agreements but he was not aware of the
consequences of the filling (dumping) of the earth onto the other Lots,
namely, Lot 4197 and Lot 2392. It is germane, at this juncture, to refer to
MLJ 113, where Chua J had this to say at pages 114 to 115 of the report:
“It would appear that the learned magistrate was unduly influenced
by the fact that no evidence was produced to show that the
document was explained to the respondent who knows no English. If
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that was his reason or one of his reasons for dismissing the action,
in my opinion he was wrong. For my saying so I find support in the
following statement of the law, with which I respectfully agree, in the
judgment of Wood Ag CJ., in Ismail bin Savoosah & Ors v. Hajee
Ismail [1889] 4 Ky 453, 458:
‘It was argued that the defendant being ignorant of the English
language he is to be excused on that account from the performance of
his contract, but it is to my mind clear that in the common principles
which govern the law of contract, the person who contracts by a written
document, whether or not he understands the language in which it is
written, is bound, in the absence of fraud or misrepresentation, by the
terms of that contract, as to which proposition no objection was
authoritatively sustained’.”
Statement of Claim that the appellant filled the excavated earth from Lot
2391 onto Lots 2391, 2392 and 4197, particularly the East facing slope,
without taking adequate measures to stabilise the slope. The original Malay
[47] But the East facing slope is not within the scope and
scope of work is confined to the West facing slope of Bukit Jenun facing the
[49] The June agreement between the respondent and GFE listed the
slope. Clause 3.1 of the June agreement stipulates that, “GF (referring to
Green Field Engineering Sdn Bhd) shall construct back the slope
platform as per PROJECT design profile, i.e. 1:2 ratio slope complete
with (c/w) proper compaction”. While clause 3.2 of the June agreement
furnish with cover crops turfing to all at fill slope area”. These two
and raise the issue that the respondent had objected to the dumping and
did not know about the consequence of the dumping after having
[1995] CLJ 283, a decision of the Federal Court. There, Gopal Sri Ram
JCA writing for the Federal Court, had this to say at page 294 of the report:
“The time has come for this Court to recognise that the doctrine of
estoppel is a flexible principle by which justice is done according to
the circumstances of the case. It is a doctrine of wide utility and has
been resorted to in varying fact patterns to achieve justice. Indeed,
the circumstances in which the doctrine may operate are endless.”
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testified that the actual land slide in the area happened earlier than the year
2000. He testified that as soon as the land slide occurred, the appellant
[51] The evidence led and the documents referred to in the course of
the trial showed that the respondent’s representatives were aware of the
actions of the appellant and GFE and it would appear that the respondent
respondent and GFE, the respondent has the option of suing GFE. But this
[53] The High Court Judge erred in law and in fact when he ruled that
the appellant failed to remove the excavated earth from Lot 2391 and that
the appellant had dumped the earth on Lots 2391, 2392 and 4197 without
taking adequate measure to stabilise the slope. His Lordship also erred in
law and in fact when he ruled that the excavation and the dumping by the
categorically states that the onus was on the respondent to dispose of the
earth, failing which the appellant may sell and dispose of the earth.
[54] The High Court Judge further erred in law and in fact when he
failed to address his mind to the fact that the respondent, in discharging its
obligation pursuant to clause 3.3 of the Tol agreement, had entered into the
respondent had instructed GFE to dump the excavated earth on Lots 2391,
[55] The High Court Judge also erred in law and in fact when he ruled
that GFE was acting on behalf of the appellant when GFE dumped the
earth on Lots 2391, 2392 and 4197. In so doing, his Lordship had, with
the respondent and GFE and failed to take note that the appellant was
present at the signing of the June agreement. The last sentence of the
[56] The High Court Judge also erred in law and in fact when he ruled
that the June agreement between the respondent and GFE included the
appellant without fully appreciating clause 3.3 of the Tol agreement and the
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[57] The High Court Judge also erred in law and in fact when he ruled
that since June agreement between the respondent and GFE included the
appellant as a party, then the appellant was vicariously liable for the
negligence of GFE in dumping the earth on Lots 2391, 2392 and 4197
without fully appreciating the fact that the dumping was done on the
[58] The High Court Judge further erred in law and in fact when he
ruled that the appellant was vicariously liable for the acts of GFE without
taking into account that the respondent was using GFE as a channel to
[59] ln so holding that the appellant was vicariously liable for the acts
of GFE in negligently dumping the excavated earth, the High Court Judge
overlooked the fact that by virtue of the June agreement, GFE was the
agent of the respondent. In his written grounds of judgment, the High Court
Judge had this to say at page 30 of the appeal record at Jilid “A”:
employers benefit from the work of their employees and so the employers
should be liable for any damage that the employee may cause in the
course of its performance. But there are cases where the employees may
have technical skills and knowledge not shared by their employers and in
such a case, the employers cannot be held vicariously liable for the
[61] In the majority of cases, the present case is not an exception, the
employers are financially strong and would be able to meet any claim. But
“on a frolic of their own”. A classic example would be the case of Hilton
v. Thomas Burton (Rhodes) Ltd And Another [1961] 1 WLR 705. That
was a case where four workmen were out in their employer’s van, which
demolition site way out in the country. After only half a day’s work, the four
workmen decided to stop and proceed to a café some seven (7) or eight (8)
miles away for tea. They proceeded to the café and were nearly there when
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they changed their minds and decided to return. On their return journey,
there was an accident, and one of them was killed through the negligent
driving of another. The Court held that the employer was not to be
vicariously responsible because the four workmen were not acting in the
course of their employment. The Court described what the four workmen
LR 4 QB 476. In that case, the facts showed that some employees had
finished delivering wine for their employers and were on their way back
after their official work hours were over. They decided to take a detour for
the purpose of visiting a relation of one of the employees. On the way, they
negligently ran over the claimant. The claimant’s attempt to sue the
and independent journey” from their work trip at the time of the accident.
contractor was employed to clean telephones. While carrying out his duty,
he used the telephones to make private long distance calls from client’s
premises. The Court held that the defendants were not vicarously liable
because the unauthorised use of the telephone was not connected with
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authorised manner.
vicarious liability cases simpliciter. The first two (2) cases relate to vicarious
[65] The case of Rose v. Plenty And Another [1976] 1 WLR 141,
had been told by his employer to neither permit passengers on his float, nor
allow children help him deliver the milk. He disregarded those orders and
paid the claimant, who was thirteen (13) years of age, to help him deliver
the milk. The claimant was injured while riding on the vehicle because of
the milkman’s negligent driving. The defendants were held vicariously liable
because the prohibition did not affect the job which the milkman had to do,
it was only in relation to the way in which he should do it. The Court further
held that the boy was helping with the deliveries and that was construed as
influenced by the fact that compensation for the boy could only be secured
insurance.
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[66] The High Court Judge in his written grounds of judgment cited
Kuching Utara & Anor [2007] 9 CLJ 314; Ng Kim Cheng v. Naigai Nitto
Singapore Pte Ltd & Anor [1991] 4 CLJ (Rep) 1009; and Wilsons &
Clyde Coal Company Limited v. English [1938] AC 57, HL. These are
negligently and the employer was held vicariously liable for the negligence
(a) that the defendant owes the claimant plaintiff a duty of care;
[70] The Caparo test derived from the case of Caparo Industries
situation?
[71] These brief insights into the law are certainly thought provoking.
Even the dullest individual would be stirred to think and ponder. But,
unfortunately, the respondent has not pleaded negligence nor have they
pleaded vicarious liability in their pleadings. It is trite law that the Court
Claim. Here too, the principles of negligence have not been proved by the
respondent.
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[72] Be that as it may, the High Court Judge erred in law and in fact
when he concluded that there was an act of negligence by GFE and the
appellant was vicariously liable for what GFE did without taking into
account that all acts of dumping of the excavated earth were done on the
borne in mind that the obligation to remove the excavated earth under the
[73] The High Court Judge also erred in law and in fact when he ruled
that the respondent had proved negligence on the part of the appellant on
the balance of probability without considering the salient fact that it was the
put the party whose rights have been violated in the same position, so
[75] What Lord Blackburn said in the context of tort and contract in
“....that sum of money which will put the party who has been injured,
or who has suffered, in the same position as he would have been in if
he had not sustained the wrong for which he is now getting his
compensation or reparation.”
[76] This short and brief statement of the law by Lord Blackburn has
Lord Upjohn;
(e) General Tire & Rubber Co v. Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co Ltd
“.... to put the person whose right has been invaded in the same
position as if it had been respected so far as the award of a sum of
money can do so.”
[78] At the local scene, Ong Hock Thye FJ in Guan Soon Tin Mining
Co v. Wong Fook Kum [1969] 1 MLJ 99, FC, spoke of the burden of proof
spoken of, but that has no existence in point of quantity” per Maule J
[80] A token sum is usually awarded for nominal damages and the
[82] Under this paragraph, the respondent based its claim for Lots
2391, 2392 and 4197 based on the letter dated 31.12.2002 from Messrs
TNO Consultants as seen at page 246 of the appeal record at Jilid “C”.
compensated for the “cut” and “fill” for the said works. But the appellant
contracting with GFE under the June agreement for the earth to be neither
removed nor used to “fill” those Lots. It seems that the appellant only
of the appeal record at Jilid “B” which reads as follows in the original
to 280 of the appeal record at Jilid “C” using the system known as
the calculation using the system “planimeter” and the system “autocad”
is minimal.
[85] The High Court Judge erred in law and in fact when he ruled that
being more accurate, despite the fact that the appellant’s consultant had
considered the “cut” and “fill” areas affected by the dumping which the
[86] The High Court Judge also erred in law and in fact when he
directing his mind to the fact that Plot 3 measurement was in fact the area
affected by the issue of dumping which the appellant alleged was done on
because it was a filled area where the earth was dumped. The defence of
the appellant was quite simple. It was the responsibility of the respondent
to take out the earth from the work area pursuant to clause 3.3 of the Tol
[88] A question may be posed. After the cutting, where would the
earth be disposed of? The answer would be by the side and the Tol
agreement allows the respondent as the owner of the lands to take the
earth and the trees out. Filling is actually dumping. According to SD1, at
“Runtuhan tanah berlaku dalam bulan Januari 2000” and the appellant
undertook temporary remedial works and then the June agreement was
[89] In regard to the issue of dumping, the learned High Court Judge
erred in law and in fact when he accepted the evidence of SP1 and SP2 on
this issue, notwithstanding the fact that both these two witnesses testified
that they have not seen the Tol agreement and the June agreement. That
being the case, these two witnesses had no knowledge and were not privy
to how he arrived at the quantum for the costs per cubic metre for the
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restoration of the slope except that he based the quantum which he quoted
purely from his own experience. Yet the High Court Judge accepted the
[91] Under this paragraph, the High Court Judge allowed the
part of the respondent to lead any evidence during the trial as to how this
amount was arrived at and the basis for the measurement of the area as
by the respondent and the appellant were derived from the plan of Messrs
TNO Consultants.
[93] While the respondent insisted and is adamant that the affected
areas were confined to the “cut” and “fill” portions, the appellant insisted
that the area affected was confined to the “cut” portion only.
Consequently, the appellant avers that the respondent is only entitled to the
sum of RM188,760.33 being the additional area affected and I agree that it
damages and it must be specifically pleaded and prayed for. And such
991, CA).
Federal Court case of Lim Eng Kay v. Jaafar bin Mohamed Said [1982] 2
MLJ 156, where the Federal Court held at page 160 that, “prayer (e) in
paragraph (7), ‘Any other relief which this Honourable Court deem fit
“Any other relief or consequential order that the Court deems fit.”
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[98] Now, while acknowledging that a prayer of this nature should not
“consequential order that the Court deems fit”. With respect, it is not
mandatory for the Court to make the consequential order if the Court does
not feel inclined to do so. With respect, the rule that the parties are bound
procedural law and it is captured in our Order 18 of the Rules of Court 2012
(previously Order 18 of the Rules of the High Court 1980). I have in the
early part of this judgment alluded to the object of pleadings which calls for
the parties to plead the material facts so that neither party will be taken by
surprise at the trial. And the Court too will only decide the suit based on the
pleadings. To put it in another way, the trial of the suit is confined to the
pleadings.
[99] Factually speaking, the facts in Lim Eng Kay (supra) are poles
apart from the present appeal. There, the respondent was injured in an
the appellant. He sued the appellant for general and special damages.
Liability was agreed between the parties in the ratio of 90% against the
appellant and 10% against the respondent. The respondent was a trained
sustained a severe brain injury and fractures of the right thigh bone and jaw
demonstrated in the early part of this judgment, the facts are entirely
different and the High Court Judge decided the case contrary to the
pleadings.
inclined nor does it deem fit to make any consequential order in favour of
RM11,846,694.00. But learned counsel for the respondent pointed out that
no work was done to support this claim because the respondent had no
should not be allowed. At any rate, the respondent failed to plead this claim
of Claim did not allude to negligence and vicarious liability, yet it made
42
reference to the acts of stabilising the hill slope at the East (“menstabilkan
cerun bukit yang berhala Timur”). Learned counsel for the respondent
argued that paragraph 13C of the Statement of Claim should fall under the
category of general damages which could happen in the future. SP1 and
SP2 testified that the slope was already unstable. And SP1 quantified the
sum of RM7,710,000.00 being the total estimate cost of the remedial works
sums are mere estimates for the future and nothing else (Tanjung Tiara
Sdn Bhd v Southwind Development Sdn Bhd [2011] 4 MLJ 593, CA).
[105] SP3 also testified that the sum of RM99,487.50 was the
estimated fees of the consultant and yet the High Court Judge allowed the
[106] Again, the High Court Judge erred in law and in fact when he
[110] SP3, in his witness statement at page 123 of the appeal record
trespass in this way. At paragraph 13(c) of the appeal record at Jilid “B”,
SP3 said:
[112] The High Court Judge in his grounds of judgment under sub-
Jilid “A”, did not consider whether the principle of Rylands v. Fletcher
was applicable to the factual matrix of the case. His Lordship too did not
not pleaded at all. His Lordship decided the case purely on the breach of
45
situation.
1865 and it is a common law rule of strict liability. It has been applied in
Singapore way back in 1957 in the case of Ang Hock Hai v. Tan Sum Lee
& Anor [1957] 23 MLJ 135, a case concerning the escape of petrol or
other inflammable material which caught fire. Ang Hock Hai’s case
on his land to supply water for his factory. The contractors negligently failed
to block a disused mineshaft and when the reservoir was filled to the brim,
“We think that the true rule of law is, that the person who, for his
own purposes, brings on his land and collects and keeps there
anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his
peril; and if he does not do so, is prima facie answerable for all the
damage which is the natural consequence of its escape. He can
excuse himself by shewing that the escape was owing to the
plaintiff’s default; or, perhaps, that the escape was the consequence
of vis major, or the act of God; but as nothing of this sort exists here,
it is unnecessary to inquire what excuse would be sufficient. The
general rule, as above stated, seems on principle just. The person
whose grass or corn is eaten down by the escaping cattle of his
neighbour, or whose mine is flooded by the water from his
neighbour’s reservoir, or whose cellar is invaded by the filth of his
neighbour’s privy, or whose habitation is made unhealthy by the
fumes and noisome vapours of his neighbour’s alkali works, is
damnified without any fault of his own; and it seems but reasonable
and just that the neighbour who has brought something on his own
property (which was not naturally there), harmless to others so long
as it is confined to his own property, but which he knows will be
mischievous if it gets on his neighbour’s, should be obliged to make
good the damage which ensues if he does not succeed in confining
it to his own property. But for his act in bringing it there no mischief
could have accrued, and it seems but just that he should at his peril
keep it there, so that no mischief may accrue, or answer for the
natural and anticipated consequence. And upon authority this we
think is established to be the law, whether the things so brought be
beasts, or water, or filth, or stenches.”
subject to the addition of the requirement that the defendant’s user of his
[1994] 1 All ER 53, the House of Lords examined the rule in Rylands v.
plaintiff there brought an action for injunctive relief and damages in respect
from using water pumped from his borehole for the purpose of supplying
47
PCE had entered the water supply and this resulted in the plaintiff to cease
pumping water for public supply because the level of PCE contravened a
traced to the defendant’s premises who used the chemical called PCE in its
there was no non-natural user. The nuisance action also failed because the
ownership of the land. This right relate to naturally occurring water which
That the chemical PCE was spilt by accident by the defendant was held to
be irrelevant.
Fletcher. And that liability arose only if the defendant knew or ought
cause damage. It was also held that the same test applies in nuisance.
48
[121] The House of Lords in Cambridge Water further held that the
defendant could not have reasonably foreseen that the seepage of the
chemical PCE through the tannery floor could have caused the pollution of
the plaintiff’s borehole and therefore was held not to be liable under the
rule in Rylands v. Fletcher. And by way of per incuriam, it was also held
[122] So, the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher in all its splendour was not
judgment.
[123] Next, in regard to nuisance, I have this to say. There are three
Court will balance each party’s right to use the land as they wish.
claimant to prove that the defendant has caused an interference with the
49
O’Callaghan And Others [1940] AC 880, HL, where water flooded onto
[1995] 2 All ER 697, CA, where the smell caused the nuisance.
where the interference must have caused damage to the claimant like the
William Tipping [1865] 11 HL Cas 642 where the fumes from the copper-
smelting works seriously damaged the trees and shrubs that grew on the
claimant’s land.
50
criminal law. However, in some cases where the parties who have suffered
[131] Trespass was not canvassed by the High Court Judge in his
is placed on the claimant’s land, the trespass will continue until the object is
Wilson And Two Others [1839] 10 AD & E 502 where the highway
and trespass which were not alluded to by the High Court Judge in his
enjoyed by the High Court Judge by reason of his having seen and heard
51
conclusion. The High Court Judge has not taken proper advantage of his
enviable position of having seen and heard the witnesses and such failure
has put the matter at large for this Court to peruse and dissect the facts
and the law based on the appeal records. A non-direction of this magnitude
[134] For the varied reasons alluded to in this judgment, the appeal of
the High Court Judge must be set aside forthwith. The deposit lodged to be
[135] Through the evidence of SD1, the appellant agreed that a sum
accordingly.
brothers A. Samah Nordin, JCA and Linton Albert, JCA and it is the
Counsel
(1) Pioneer Shipping Ltd And Others v. BTP Tioxide Ltd [1982] AC
724, 736, HL.
(3) Wong See Leng v. C Saraswathy Ammal [1954] 20 MLJ 141, 142,
CA.
(4) Koh Siak Poo v Sayang Plantation Bhd [2002] 1 MLJ 65, CA.
(5) Quah Swee Khoon v Sime Darby Bhd [2000] 2 MLJ 600, CA.
(6) Lever Brothers, Limited, And Others v. Bell And Another [1931] 1
KB 557.
(7) Yew Wan Leong v Lai Kok Chye [1990] 2 MLJ 152, 154, SC.
53
(8) Asia Hotel Sdn Bhd v Malayan Insurance (M) Sdn Bhd [1992] 2
MLJ 615.
(9) S Manickam & Ors v Ismail bin Mohamad & Ors [1997] 2 MLJ 90.
(11) Anjalai Ammal & Anor v. Abdul Kareem [1969] 1 MLJ 22, FC.
(12) Muniandy & Anor v Muhammad Abdul Kader & Ors [1989] 2 MLJ
416, 418, SC.
(14) Gimstern Corporation (M) Sdn Bhd & Anor v. Global Insurance Co
Sdn Bhd [1987] 1 MLJ 302, SC.
(15) Tan Ah Chim & Sons Sdn Bhd v Ooi Bee Tat & Anor [1993] 3 MLJ
633.
(16) Serangoon Garden Estate Ltd v Marian Chye [1959] 25 MLJ 113,
115.
(19) Hilton v. Thomas Burton (Rhodes) Ltd And Another [1961] 1 WLR
705.
(23) Mohamad Khalid Yusuf v. Datuk Bandar Kuching Utara & Anor
[2007] 9 CLJ 314.
(24) Ng Kim Cheng v Naigai Nitto Singapore Pte Ltd & Anor [1991] 4
CLJ (Rep) 1009.
54
(25) Wilsons & Clyde Coal Company Limited v. English [1938] AC 57,
HL.
(27) Caparo Industries Plc v. Dickman And Others [1990] 2 AC 605, HL.
(34) General Tire & Rubber Co v Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co [1975] 1
WLR 819, 824C, HL.
(38) Guan Soon Tin Mining Co v Wong Fook Kum [1969] 1 MLJ 99, 100,
FC.
(43) Hayward And Another v. Pullinger & Partners, Ltd [1950] 1 All ER
581.
55
(45) Lim Eng Kay v Jaafar bin Mohamed Said [1982] 2 MLJ 156, 160,
FC.
(46) Tanjung Tiara Sdn Bhd v Southwind Development Sdn Bhd [2011]
4 MLJ 593, CA.
(47) John Rylands and Jehu Horrocks v Thomas Fletcher [1865] 3 H &
C 774; [1868] LR 3 HL 330.
(48) Ang Hock Hai v. Tan Sum Lee & Anor [1957] 23 MLJ 135.
(55) Wheeler and another v J J Saunders Ltd and others [1996] Ch 19,
[1995] 2 All ER 697.
(58) Susanna Holmes v. Wilson And Two Others [1839] 10 AD & E 502.