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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

NATIONAL EMERGENCY AND THE UNION


OF INDIA
INTRODUCTION

One of the notable provisions of the Constitution of India is the way in which the normal
federal government of times of peace can be adapted if an emergency situation arises in the country.
The framers of the Constitution were of the opinion that, in an emergency, the Centre should have
overriding powers to control and direct all aspects of administration and legislation throughout the
country. In other words, emergency provisions of our Constitution enables the federal government to
acquire the strength of a unitary system whenever the severity of the situation demands the same.

The provisions of the Constitution consists of three types of emergencies which call for a
departure from the normal governmental machinery set up by the Constitution:
(i) national emergency, that is emergency arising from a threat to the security of India like a war,
external aggression or armed rebellion (Article 352 of the Indian Constitution);
(ii) state emergency, which is caused by the breakdown of constitutional machinery in a state (Article
356 of the Indian Constitution); and
(iii) financial emergency (Article 360 of the Indian Constitution).

Proclamation of emergency is a very serious matter as it disturbs the normal fabric of the
Constitution and adversely affects the rights of the people. Therefore, such a proclamation should be
issued only in exceptional circumstances and should never be done to just keep an unpopular govern-
ment in office. The provisions regarding declaration of emergency have been extensively amended
in the forty-second and forty-fourth amendment with a view to introduce a number of safeguards
against the abuse of power by the executive in the name of emergency.
This article focuses on the state of emergency arising out of Article 352, that is, national
emergency.

PROCLAMATION OF EMERGENCY

Under Article 352(1), if the President is ‘satisfied’ that there is a grate emergency due to which
the security of India or any part of the country is threatened, whether it is caused by war, or external
aggression or armed rebellion, he/she may make a declaration to that effect by way of a proclamation.
According to clause (2) of Article 352, the President may revoke or vary his earlier proclamation by
a subsequent proclamation. The “satisfaction” of the President about the threatened security of India
for making a proclamation of emergency is “the subjective satisfaction” of the President and it cannot
be challenged in any court of law.
The President shall not issue a proclamation under clause (1) or a proclamation varying such
proclamation unless the decision of the Union Cabinet has been communicated to him in writing. It
means that the emergency can be declared only on the concurrence of the Cabinet and not merely on
the advice of the Prime Minister as was done by the then Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi in June,
1975. The proclamation of Emergency is to be laid before each House of the Parliament. It ceases to
operate at the expiry of two months unless in the mean time it has been approved by resolutions of
both Houses of Parliament.
If at the time of the issue of the proclamation or thereafter, the Lok Sabha is dissolved without
approving the proclamation, and the Rajya Sabha approves it, then the proclamation ceases to operate
only 30 days after the Lok Sabha sits again after fresh elections, unless in the meanwhile the new Lok
Sabha passes a resolution approving the proclamation. A resolution approving the proclamation must
be passed by special majority that is by a majority of the total members of each House. Prior to the
Constitution (44th Amendment) Act, 1978, such resolution could be passed by Parliament by a simple
majority.
According to clause (4) of Article 352, proclamation of emergency once approved by Parlia-
ment shall remain in force for a period of six months from the date of passing of the second resolution
approving it, unless it is revoked earlier. For the further continuance of the emergency beyond the
period of six months, approval by Parliament would be required every six months. If the dissolution
of the Lok Sabha takes place during the period of six months without approving the further continu-
ance of emergency, but it has been approved by the Rajya Sabha, the proclamation shall cease to
operate at the expiry of 30 days after the Lok Sabha sits after fresh election unless before the expiry
of the above period, it is approved by the Lok Sabha. The resolution is required to be passed by the
special majority in this case too.
According to clause (7) of Article 352, the President shall revoke a proclamation issued under
clause (1) or a proclamation varying such proclamation if the Lok Sabha passes a resolution disap-
proving, or as the case may be, the continuance in force of, such proclamation. Clause (8) of Article
352 provides that where a notice in writing signed by not less than one-tenth of the total number of
members of the Lok Sabha, have been given their intention to move a resolution for disapproving the
discontinuance of a proclamation of emergency :
(a) To the speaker, if the House is in session; or
(b) To the President, if the House is not in session, a special sitting of the Lok Sabha shall be held
within 14 days from the date on which such a notice is received by the Speaker or the President
for the purpose of considering the resolution. In such a case, the session must be convened for
considering the resolution.
Clause (9) of Article 352 provides that the power conferred shall include the power on the
President to issue different proclamations on different grounds, being war or external aggression or
firmed rebellion or imminent danger thereof, whether or not, there is a proclamation already issued
by the President under clause (1) and such proclamation is in operation.

INVOCATION OF ARTICLE 352

In India, national emergency has been invoked three times so far.


First time, on October 26, 1962, in the wake of clash with china. It remained in force during the Indo-
Pak conflict in 1965, and was revoked only in January, 1968.
Second time, on December, 1971, as a result of the India and Pakistan dispute on the ground of ex-
ternal aggression.
While the 1971 was still effective, another proclamation was issued on June 26, 1975. This time the
proclamation was issued on the ground of “internal disturbance” threatening the security of India.
Both these proclamations were revoked in March 1977. This is the most famous period of emergency
in the history of India so far.
The Indian Emergency of 26th June 1975-21st March 1977 was a 21 month period, when
President Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed, upon advice by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, declared a state of
emergency under Article 352 of the Constitution of India, effectively bestowing on her the power to
rule by decree, suspending elections and civil liberties. This was a dramatic turn in the Indian polit-
ical affairs. The democracy was brought to a grinding halt and all the fundamental rights and legal
remedies protected by the Constitution of The Republic of India were suspended. Indira Gandhi tried
to defend the emergency on the grounds that she was trying to protect the State and the Indian peo-
ple. Nevertheless, her emergency rule faced immense criticism and is undoubtedly one of the most
controversial periods of the political history of Independent India.

EFFECTS OF PROCLAMATION OF EMERGENCY (executive, legislative and


financial)
The following drastic consequences follow from the proclamation of national emergency un-
der Article 352.
When a proclamation of emergency has been made, during the operation of such proclama-
tion, the executive power of the Union shall extend to the giving of directions to any state as to the
manner in which the executive power is to be exercised during the period. This is according to the
provision laid down in Article 353(a). During times of peace, the Union executive has the power to
give directions to a state only in matters specified in articles 256 and 257, that is, obligations of States
and Union and control of the Union over states in certain cases, respectively. But under a proclama-
tion of emergency, the Government of India acquires the power to give directions to a state on any
matter, so that, though the State Government will not be suspended, it will be under the complete
control of the Union Executive, and the country will function as under a unitary system with local
sub-divisions during the period of emergency.
While the proclamation of emergency is in operation, the Parliament may extend the life of
the Lok Sabha by a year each time up to a period not exceeding beyond six months after the procla-
mation of emergency ceases to operate. This is as per the provision to Article 83(2).
As soon as the proclamation is made, the legislative competence of the Union Parliament shall
be automatically widened and the limitation imposed as regards List II, by Article 246(3), shall be
removed. That is, during the period of emergency, Parliament shall have the power to legislate the
State list as well [Article 250(1)]. Though the proclamation will not suspend the State Legislature, it
suspends the distribution of power between the Union and the State.
According to the provision laid down in clause (b) of Article 353, he Parliament also has the
power to make laws conferring powers, or imposing duties upon the Executive of the Union in respect
of any matter even though such matter normally belongs to the State jurisdiction if it is to carry out
the laws made by the Union Parliament under the extended jurisdiction under period of emergency.
During the operation of proclamation of emergency, the President shall have the constitutional
power to modify the provisions of the Constitution relating to the allocation of financial resources
[Article 268-279] between the Union and the States by his order. But no such Order shall have effect
beyond the financial year in which the the Proclamation itself ceases to exist, and such Order of the
President shall be subject to the approval of the Parliament, as stated under Article 354.

EFFECT OF PROCLAMATION OF EMERGENCY ON THE FUNDAMEN-


TAL RIGHTS OF CITIZENS
Article 358 lays down that the six fundamental freedoms guaranteed to the citizens by Article
19 of the Constitution, are suspended during emergency. It provides that while a proclamation of
emergency is in operation, nothing in Article 19 shall restrict the powers of the State to make any law
or to take away any executive action bridging or taking away the rights guaranteed by Article 19 of
the Constitution. It means that soon after proclamation of emergency, the freedoms guaranteed under
Article 19 are automatically suspended.
The Constitution (44th Amendment) Act, 1978 has made two important changes in Article
358. Firstly, Article 19 will be suspended only when a proclamation of emergency is declared on the
ground of war or external aggression but not on the ground when emergency is declared due to armed
rebellion.
It has inserted a new clause (2) in Article 358 which provides that nothing in clause (1) shall
apply to: (a) any law which does not contain a recital to the effect that such law is in relation to
proclamation of emergency, or (b) to any executive action taken otherwise than under a law contain-
ing such recital. This clause makes it clear that Article 358 will only protect emergency laws from
being challenged in a court of law and not other laws which are not related to emergency. However,
the proclamation of emergency does not invalidate a law which was valid before the proclamation of
emergency.
Article 359 empowers the President to suspend the right to enforce fundamental rights guar-
anteed by Part III of the Constitution. It provides that while the right to move any court for the en-
forcement of such of the fundamental rights as may be mentioned in the order (except Articles 20 and
21) and all proceedings pending in any court for the enforcement of such rights, shall remain sus-
pended during the period of proclamation is in force or for such shorter period as may be specified in
the order.
The Constitution (38th Amendment) Act, 1975 has made two significant changes by adding
a new clause (1A) in Article 359. Firstly, it provides that under Article 359, the President does not
have the power to suspend the enforcement of fundamental rights guaranteed in Articles 20 and 21
of the Constitution.
It provides that suspension of any fundamental rights under Article 359 will not apply In
relation to any law which does not contain a declaration that such a law is in relation to the procla-
mation of emergency in operation when it is made or to any executive action taken otherwise than
under a law containing such a recital. Thus, laws not related to the emergency can be challenged in a
Court of law even during emergency.

EFFECT OF 1975 EMERGENCY ON FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

The President Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed proclaimed an emergency under Article 352(1) of the
Constitution on the advice of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1975. Later, he issued a proclamation
suspending the right to approach the courts for the enforcement of the fundamental rights guaranteed
under Articles 14, 21 and 22. The imposition of emergency was necessitated, according to Mrs. Gan-
dhi, because of the turmoil and incipient rebellion in the country. Besides the maintenance of order
justification, the government pointed to the imperatives of saving democracy, protecting the social
revolution and preserving national integrity - all of which together compelled the resort to such a
drastic step. On the contrary, for the critics, the emergency was nothing short of a scandal on the
Constitution, and smacked of Mrs. Gandhi's dictatorial ambitions. The justifications notwithstanding,
some of its tangible consequences on the ground were the following: detention of nearly 1,11,000
persons, a significant number of whom belonged to the opposition, under the Maintenance of Internal
Security Act, 1971 and the Defence of India Act/Rules, 1961; infliction of torture on many of these
detainees ; press censorship and curbs on the freedom of speech and expression; demolition of shanty
towns in and around Delhi; and the subjection of rural and urban poor, and the lower middle class in
North India to forced sterilisation programs. Fortunately for those who suffered, the emergency was
revoked and normalcy restored in eighteen months and for the first time in the history of independent
India, a non-Congress government came to power at the centre after the Parliamentary elections in
1977.
While the National Emergency of 1975 was in operation, the government made following
attempts to suppress Fundamental Rights through various statutory provisions they are (Shah Com-
mission,1977):
a. The Defence of India (Amendment) Act, 1975.

b. The Maintenance of Internal Security (Amendment) Act, 1975.

c. The Constitution (Thirty-eighth Amendment) Act, 1975.

d. The Constitution (Thirty-ninth Amendment) Act, 1975.

e. The Press Council (Repeal) Act, 1976.

f. The Prevention of Publication of Objectionable Matter act, 1976.

g. Parliamentary Proceedings (Protection of Publication) Repeal Act, 1976.

h. The Constitution (Forty Second Amendment) Act, 1976.

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS ON PROCLAMATION


OF EMERGENCY
The discussion of cases falls into two parts: Cases decided during the emergency created by
war or external aggression and cases decided during the Emergency proclaimed on 25th June 1975 on
the ground of “internal disturbance”.
During first two emergencies which were declared in October 1962 and December 1971 on
ground of “External Aggression”, no attempt had been made to impair permanently the fundamental
rights embodied in our Constitution. Under the circumstances, the courts considered the effect of
proclamation of emergency in a number of cases: (1) On Preventive Detention, (2) On the effect of
the “suspension” of Article 19 following on a proclamation of emergency and (3) on the effect of the
President’sOrder under Article 359.
In Mohan Chowdhary v. Chief Commr. Tripura (1946) the Defence of India Ordinance and
the rules made there under were challenged. On a preliminary objection being taken that in view of
the President’s Order made under Article 359, the petitioner was not entitled to move the court or the
enforcement of his fundamental rights, the petitioner contended that as Article 32 itself conferred a
fundamental right and as the President’s Order had not suspended that rights, the petitioner was enti-
tled to move the court under Article 32. The Supreme Court held that the right to move that court
under Article 32 was subject to Article 32(4) under which the right could be suspended in accordance
with the provisions of the Constitution. Article 359 enabled the President to suspend the right to move

any court for the enforcement of the fundamental rights which may be named by the President. The
President’s Order did not suspend all rights vested in a citizen to move the Supreme Court but only
his right to enforce the provisions of Articles 21 and 22 in respect of anything done under the Defence
of India Act.
Thus, the validity of the statutory provisions authorising the detention could not be chal-
lenged in view of the Presidential Order. The Court, however, held that the pleas which were open
to a detainee were that the mandatory provisions of the Defence of India Act and rules had not
been observed and the plea not merely alleged but proved that the detention was mala fide.

In Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar (1966) it was held unanimously that the
President’s Order suspended the enforcement of a person’s rights under Articles 21 and 22 if he
had been deprived of those rights by an order passed under the Defence of India Act, 1962 or the
rules made there under. But it was open to him to show that the order under the said Act and rules
was a mala fide, or an invalid, order, and in either event, he was entitled to move a court for the

for the enforcement of his rights under Articles 21 and 22.

What constitutes Mala fide has been interpreted in case of Jaichand Lal v. State of West
Bengal (1966) “…in this context…a mala fide exercise of power does not necessarily imply any
moral turpitude as a matter of law. It only means that the statutory power is exercised for purposes
foreign to those for which it is in law intended… i.e. for some indirect purposes not connected with
the object of the statute or the mischief it seeks to remedy.”

In, ADM Jabalpur vs. Shivkant Shukla (1976), famously known as the Habeas Corpus
Case, the appeals decide by the Supreme Court in the Habeas Corpus case arose out of habeas corpus
applications filed by several detainees who prayed for their release from illegal preventive detention.
A preliminary objection was raised by the Union that in view of the President’s Order under Article
359 suspending the right of any person (including a foreigner) to move any court for the enforcement
of his fundamental rights under Articles 14, 19, 21 and 22, the petitioners had no locus standi to
maintain the petition, because, in substance, the detainees were seeking to enforce their fundamental
right under Article 21, namely, that they should not be deprived of their personal liberty except by
procedure established by law. The High Court of Allahabad, Andhra Pradesh, Bombay, Delhi, Kar-
nataka, Madras, Madhya Pradesh, Punjab and Haryana and Rajasthan, rejected this contention and
held that though the petitioners could not move the court to enforce their fundamental right under
Article 21, they were entitled to show that the order of detention was not under or in compliance
with the law or was mala fide.

However, the Supreme Court held that:

“In view of the Presidential Order dated 27 June 1975, no person has any locus standi to move the
High Court for habeas corpus or any other writ order or direction to challenge the legality of an

order of detention on the ground that the order is not under or in compliance with the Act (Mainte-
nance of Internal Security Act, 1971) or is illegal or is vitiated by mala fides factual or legal or is
based on extraneous consideration.”

The Order was passed as the result of four majority judgments delivered by Ray C.J., Beg,
Chandrachud and Bhagwati JJ. Justice Khanna gave dissenting judgment but he signed the
Court’s order.

44th AMENDMENT ACT AND ITS RELEVANCE TO NATIONAL EMERGENCY


Emergency provisions under Indian Constitution prior to passing of Forty-Fourth Amend-
ment Act:

Part XVIII of the Indian Constitution deals with the Emergency provisions. The relevant provisions
prior to passing of 44th Amendment Act are as following:

Article 352: Proclamation of Emergency.

(1) If the President is satisfied that a grave emergency exists whereby the security of India or of
any part of the territory thereof is threatened, whether by war or external aggression or internal
disturbance, he may, by Proclamation, make a declaration to that effect in respect of the whole of
India or of such part of the territory thereof as may be specified in the Proclamation.

Article 353: Effect of Proclamation of Emergency.

While a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation, then


(a) Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, the executive power of the Union shall extend
to the giving of directions to any State as to the manner in which the executive power thereof is
to be exercised;

(b) the power of Parliament to make laws with respect to any matter shall include power to make
laws conferring powers and imposing duties, or authorising the conferring of powers and the im-
position of duties, upon the Union or officers and authorities of the Union as respects that matter,
notwithstanding that it is one which is not enumerated in the Union List;

Provided that where a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation only in any part of the territory
of India,

(i) the executive power of the Union to give directions under clause (a), and

(ii) the power of Parliament to make laws under clause (b), shall also extend to any State other
than a State in which or in any part of which the Proclamation of Emergency is in operation if and
in so far as the security of India or any part of the territory thereof is threatened by activities in or
in relation to the part of the territory of India in which the Proclamation of Emergency is in
operation.

Article 358: Suspension of provisions of Article 19 during emergencies.

(1) While a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation, nothing in Article 19 shall restrict the
power of the State as defined in Part III to make any law or to take any executive action which the
State would but for the provisions contained in that Part be competent to make or to take, but any
law so made shall, to the extent of the in competency, cease to have effect as soon as the Procla-
mation ceases to operate, except as respects things done or omitted to be done before the law so
ceases to have effect:

Provided that where a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation only in any part of the territory
of India, any such law may be made, or any such executive action may be taken, under this article
in relation to or in any State or Union territory in which or in any part of which the Proclamation
of Emergency is not in operation, if and in so far as the security of India or any part of the territory
thereof is threatened by activities in or in relation to the part of the territory of India in which the
Proclamation of Emergency is in operation

Article 359: Suspension of the enforcement of the rights conferred by Part III during
emergencies.

(1) Where a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation, the President may by order declare that
the right to move any court for the enforcement of such of the rights conferred by Part III as may
be mentioned in the order and all proceedings pending in any court for the enforcement of the
rights so mentioned shall remain suspended for the period during which the Proclamation is in
force or for such shorter period as may be specified in the order

(1A) While an order made under clause ( 1 ) mentioning any of the rights conferred by Part III
is in operation, nothing in that Part conferring those rights shall restrict the power of the State as
defined in the said Part to make any law or to take any executive action which the State would
but for the provisions containing in that Part be competent to make or to take, but any law so
made shall, to the extent of the in competency, cease to have effect as soon as the order aforesaid
ceases to operate, except as respects things done or omitted to be done before the law so ceases
to have effect.

Provided that where a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation only in any part of the territory
of India, any such law may be made, or any such executive action may be taken, under this article
in relation to or in any State or Union territory in which or in any part of which the Proclamation
of Emergency is not in operation, if and in so far as the security of India or any part of the territory
thereof is threatened by activities in or in relation to the part of the territory of India in which the
Proclamation of Emergency is in operation

(2) An order made as aforesaid may extend to the whole or any part of the territory of India:

Provided that where a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation only in a part of the territory of
India, any such order shall not extend to any other part of the territory of India unless the President,
being satisfied that the security of India or any part of the territory thereof is threatened by activities
in or in relation to the part of the territory of India in which the Proclamation of Emergency is in
operation, considers such extension to be necessary

(3) Every order made under clause (1) shall, as soon may be after it is made, be laid before each
House of Parliament

Justice Khanna dissenting in ADM Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla (Habeas Corpus case), ended
his judgment with this note:

“A dissent in a Court of last resort is an appeal to the brooding spirit of the law, to the
intelligence of a future day, when a later decision may possible correct the error into which the
dissenting Judge believes the court to have been betrayed."

On 18th January 1977, 19 months after Emergency was declared, Indira Gandhi announced
dissolution of Parliament, called fresh elections and released all political prisoners. The emer-
gency officially ended on 23rd March 1977.
Recent experience had shown that the fundamental rights, including those of life and lib-
erty, granted to citizens by the Constitution were capable of being taken away by a transient
majority. It was, therefore, necessary to provide adequate safeguards against the recurrence of
such a contingency in the future and to ensure to the people themselves an effective voice in
determining the form of government under which they were to live.13

Thus, newly formed Janata Party government appointed the Shah Commission on 28th May
1977 under Section 3 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 to inquire into all the excesses
committed during Indian Emergency (1975-77). It was headed by Justice J.C.Shah, a former Chief
Justice of India. The commission published its report on the illegal events during the emergency
and the persons responsible in three volumes totalling 525 pages. The first interim report was
submitted on 11 March 1978, dealing with the lead-up to the declaration of the Emergency and the
way in which the press was prevented from speaking out. The second interim report discussed
police actions and the role of Sanjay Gandhi at the Turkman Gate incident in which police fired
on a crowd of people protesting against demolition of their houses. The final report was issued on
6 August 1978 and covered prison conditions, torture and family planning atrocities.

In May 1978, after the second interim report of the commission had been issued, some lead-
ers of the Janata party began demanding that special courts be set up to ensure speedy trial of cases
related to the emergency. Parliament eventually passed an act establishing two special courts on 8
May 1979. However, it was too late. The government fell on 16 July 1979. After Indira Gandhi
returned to power in January 1980 the Supreme Court found that the special courts were not legally
constituted, so no trials were conducted.

LANDMARK JUDGEMENTS RELATING TO PROCLAMATION OF NATIONAL EMER-


GENCY

Some of the landmark judgements relating to the proclamation of emergency under Article 352 are as
follows.

In the case of Minerva Mills v Union of India (AIR 1980 SC 1789), it has been held that
there is no bar to judicial review of the validity of the proclamation of emergency issued by the
president under Article 352(1). However, court's power is limited only to examining whether the
limitations conferred by the Constitution have been observed or not. It can check if the satisfaction
of the president is valid or not. If the satisfaction is based on mala fide or absurd or irrelevant grounds,
it is no satisfaction at all.
While interpreting the scope of imposition of financial emergency and Proclamation under
Article 352, the Supreme Court in the case S.R. Bommai v Union of India (AIR 1994 SC 1918 =
1994 (3) SCC 1), held that Article 355 is not an independent source of power for interference with
the functioning of the State Governments but it is the nature of justification for the measures to be
adopted under Article 356 and 357.
In Babu Rao Allias P.b. Samant V. Union Of India & Ors (AIR 1988 SC 440 = 1988 Supp.
SCC 401), two important questions arose for consideration regarding the Indira Gandhi Emergency
of 1975, which were: (1) whether the two proclamations of emergency were validly issued not, and (2)
whether each of the said proclamation had ceased to be at the expiration of two months from the date on
which each of them were issued as the resolutions of the Houses of Parliament approving each of them had
not been published in the Official Gazette. The Supreme Court held that there is no rule which requires the
resolution of the Houses of the Parliament approving the Proclamation of Emergency should be published
in the Official Gazette. Non-publication in the Official Gazette would not make it ineffective.

CONCLUSION
Where the Constitution provides for execution of power which may lead to infringement of funda-
mental rights of the individual during Emergency, judicially guaranteed by Constitution of India, there
must also be effective control mechanism to ensure limitation of this power within the ambit of the Con-
stitution. The validity of actions must be reviewed to deter political gains and give way to public interest.
Despite the abuse of power the Emergency provisions still have a role to play under conditions prevailing
in India, though it still remains a controversial issue in the country.

REFERENCES:
1. Dr. DD Basu, Introduction to the Constitution of India, 20th Edition
2. M.P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, 7th Edition
3. 3, H.M. Seervai, Constitutional Law of India, Fourth Edition
4. Dr. Nuzhat Parveen Khan, Comparative Constitutional Law, First Edition
5. http://www.legalservicesindia.com/article/1769/Emergency-Provisions:-Effects-and-Im-
pact..html
6. https://www.lawteacher.net/free-law-essays/administrative-law/emergency-provisions-under-
constitution-of-india-administrative-law-essay.php
7. https://www.mtholyoke.edu/~ghosh20p/
8. http://14.139.60.114:8080/jspui/bitstream/123456789/735/25/National%20Emer-
gency%20and%20the%20Constitution%20of%20India.pdf

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