22 Janua r y 2003, the Region al Trial Court of
1. 1 DISTI NCTIO N BETWEE N VIOD AND
VOIDABLE MARRIAGE
G.R. No. 18 9 6 0 7
RENATO A. CASTILLO, Petition e r,
vs.
LEA P. DE LEON CASTILLO, Respo n d e n t .
D E C I S I O N
SERE N O , CJ:
Before this Cour t is a Petition for Review
on Certiorari unde r Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, assailing the Court of Appeals (CA)
Decision 1 in CA-GR. CV No. 90153 and the
Resolution 2 that affirm e d the sam e. The CA
reve r s e d the Decision 3 dat e d 23 Marc h 2007
issue d by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City, Branc h 84.
The RTC had gra n t e d the Petition for Declar a t io n
of Nullity of Mar ri a g e bet w e e n the par ti e s on the
groun d that respo n d e n t had a previous valid
mar ri a g e before she mar ri e d petition e r . The CA
believes on the othe r han d, that respo n d e n t was
not preve n t e d from cont r a c t i n g a secon d
mar ri a g e if the first one was an absolut ely
nullity, and for this pur po s e she did not have to
await a final decr e e of nullity of the first
mar ri a g e .
The only issue that must be resolve d by the
Court is whet h e r the CA was corr e c t in holding
thus and conse q u e n t i a lly reve r si n g the RTC's
decla r a t i o n of nullity of the secon d mar ri a g e .
FACTUAL ANTECEDE N T S
On 25 May 1972, respo n d e n t Lea P. De Leon
Castillo (Lea) mar ri e d Benja mi n Bautist a
(Bautist a ). On 6 Janua r y 1979, respo n d e n t
mar ri e d her ei n petition e r Rena t o A. Castillo
(Rena t o).
On 28 May 2001, Rena t o filed befor e the RTC a
Petition for Decla r a t i o n of Nullity of
Mar ri a g e , 4 praying that his mar ri a g e to Lea be
decla r e d void due to her subsisti n g mar ri a g e to
Bautist a and her psychologic al inca p a ci ty und e r
Article 36 of the Family Code. The CA stat e s in
its Decision that petition e r did not purs u e the
groun d of psychologic al inca p a ci ty in the RTC.
The reaso n for this finding by the CA while
uncle a r, is irrel eva n t in this Petition.
Respon d e n t oppos e d the Petition, and cont e n d e d
amon g other s that her mar ri a g e to Bautist a was
null and void as they had not secu r e d any licens e
ther efo r, and neith e r of the m was a mem b e r of
the deno mi n a t i o n to which the sole m nizi ng
officer belong e d . 5
On 3 Janua ry 2002, respo n d e n t filed an action to
decla r e her first mar ri a g e to Baustist a void. On
Par a ñ a q u e City, Branc h 260 rend e r e d its
Decision 6 decl a ri n g that Lea's first mar ri a g e to
Bautist a was inde e d null and void ab
initio. There a ft e r , the sam e court issue d a
Certificat e of Finality saying that the Decision
dat e d 22 Janua ry 2003 had beco m e final and
execu t o ry. 7
On 12 August 2004, respo n d e n t filed a Dem u r r e r
to Eviden c e 8 claimin g that the proof addu c e d by
petition e r was insufficie nt to warr a n t a
decla r a t i o n of nullity of their mar ri a g e on the
groun d that it was biga m o u s . In his
Opposition, 9 petition e r count e r e d that whet h e r
or not the first mar ri a g e of respo n d e n t was valid,
and reg a r dl e s s of the fact that she had belat e dly
man a g e d to obt ain a judicial decla r a t i o n of
nullity, she still could not deny that at the time
she ent e r e d into mar ri a g e with him, her previous
mar ri a g e was valid and subsisti n g. The RTC
ther e af t e r denie d respo n d e n t ' s dem u r r e r in its
Orde r 10 dat e d 8 Marc h 2005.
In a Decision 11 dat e d 23 Marc h 2007, the RTC
decla r e d the mar ri a g e betw e e n petition e r and
respo n d e n t null and void ab initio on the grou n d
that it was a biga m o u s mar ri a g e und e r Article 41
of the Family Code. 12 The dispositive portion
rea d s:
WHERE FOR E, in the light of the foregoin g
conside r a t i o n s , the Court her e by decla r e s the
mar ri a g e betw e e n RENATO A. CASTILLO and
LEA P. DE LEON- CASTILLO cont r a c t e d on
Janua r y 6, 1979, at the Mary the Quee n Parish
Chur c h, San Juan, Met ro Manila, is her e by
decla r e d NULL AND VOID AB INITIO base d on
biga m o u s mar ri a g e , unde r Article 41 of the
Family Code. 13
The RTC said that the fact that Lea's mar ri a g e to
Bautist a was subsistin g whe n she marri e d
Rena t o on 6 Janua ry 1979, make s her mar ri a g e
to Rena t o biga m o u s , thus ren d e ri n g it void ab
initio. The lower court dismiss e d Lea's argu m e n t
that she need not obtain a judicial decr e e of
nullity and could pres u m e the nullity of a prior
subsisti n g mar ri a g e . The RTC str es s e d that so
long as no judicial decla r a t io n exists, the prior
mar ri a g e is valid and existin g. Lastly, it also said
that even if respo n d e n t event u ally had her first
mar ri a g e judicially decla r e d void, the fact
rem ai n s that the first and secon d mar ri a g e were
subsisti n g befor e the first marri a g e was
annulle d, since Lea failed to obt ain a judicial
dec r e e of nullity for her first mar ri a g e to
Bautist a before cont r a c ti n g her secon d mar ri a g e
with Rena t o. 14
Petition e r moved for reconsi d e r a t i o n insofa r as
the dist rib u t io n of thei r prope r ti e s were
conce r n e d . 15 His motion, howev e r, was denie d
by the RTC in its Orde r 16 dat e d 6 Sept e m b e r
2007. There af t e r , both petition e r 17 and
Respon d e n t 18 filed their resp e c tiv e Notice s of
Appeal.
In a Decision 19 dat e d 20 April 2009, the CA
reve r s e d and set aside the RTC's Decision and
Orde r and uph el d the validity of the partie s '
mar ri a g e . In reve r si n g the RTC, the CA said that
since Lea's marri a g e s wer e sole m niz e d in 1972
and in 1979, or prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code on 3 August 1988, the Civil Code is
the applica bl e law since it is the law in effect at
the time the mar ri a g e s were celebr a t e d , and not
the Family Code. 20 Furt h e r m o r e , the CA ruled
that the Civil Code does not stat e that a judicial
dec r e e is nece s s a r y in orde r to est a blish the
nullity of a marri a g e . 21
Petition e r ' s motion for reconsi d e r a t i o n of the
CA's Decision was likewise denie d in the
ques tio n e d CA Resolution 22 dat e d 16 Sept e m b e r
2009.
Henc e, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Respon d e n t filed her Com m e n t 23 praying that the
CA Decision finding her mar ri a g e to petition e r
valid be affirm e d in toto, and that all prop e r t i e s
acqui r e d by the spous e s durin g their mar ri a g e
be decla r e d conjug al. In his Reply to the
Com m e n t , 24 petition e r reit e r a t e d the alleg a tio n s
in his Petition.
OUR RULING
We de n y th e Pe t i t i o n .
The validity of a mar ri a g e and all its incide n t s
must be det e r m i n e d in accor d a n c e with the law
in effect at the time of its celeb r a t i o n. 25 In this
case, the law in force at the time Lea cont r a c t e d
both marri a g e s was the Civil Code. The childr e n
of the partie s wer e also born while the Civil Code
was in effect i.e. in 1979, 1981, and 1985.
Henc e, the Court must resolve this case using
the provisions unde r the Civil Code on void
mar ri a g e s , in partic ul a r , Articles
80, 26 81, 27 82, 28 and 83 (first par a g r a p h ); 29 and
thos e on voida bl e mar ri a g e s are Articles 83
(secon d par a g r a p h ) , 30 85 31 and 86. 32
Unde r the Civil Code, a void mar ri a g e differs
from a voida bl e mar ri a g e in the following ways:
(1) a void mar ri a g e is nonexist e n t - i.e., the r e
was no mar ri a g e from the begi nni n g - while in a
voida bl e mar ri a g e , the mar ri a g e is valid until
annulle d by a com p e t e n t court; (2) a void
mar ri a g e cannot be ratified, while a voidable
mar ri a g e can be ratified by coha bi t a t io n; (3)
being nonexist e n t , a void mar ri a g e can be
collat e r ally att a c k e d, while a voidabl e mar ri a g e
cannot be collat e r a lly att a c k e d; (4) in a void
mar ri a g e , ther e is no conjug al par t n e r s h i p and
the offspri n g are nat u r al childr e n by legal fiction,
while in voida bl e mar ri a g e the r e is conjug al
par t n e r s h i p and the childre n conc eive d befor e
the dec r e e of ann ul m e n t are conside r e d
legiti m a t e ; and (5) "in a void mar ri a g e no judicial
dec r e e to est a blish the invalidity is nec e s s a r y,"
while in a voidable marri a g e ther e must be a
judicial dec r e e. 33
Emph a si zi n g the fifth differe n c e , this Court has
held in the case s
of People v. Me n do z a, 34 People v. Aragon, 35 and
Odayat v. Amant e , 36 that the Civil Code cont ai n s
no expr e s s provision on the nec e s si ty of a
judicial decla r a t i o n of nullity of a void
mar ri a g e . 37
In Men d o z a (1954), app ella n t cont r a c t e d thre e
mar ri a g e s in 1936, 1941, and 1949. The secon d
mar ri a g e was cont r a c t e d in the belief that the
first wife was alre a dy dea d, while the third
mar ri a g e was cont r a c t e d afte r the deat h of the
secon d wife. The Court rule d that the first
mar ri a g e was dee m e d valid until ann ulle d, which
made the secon d mar ri a g e null and void for
being biga m o u s. Thus, the third mar ri a g e was
valid, as the secon d mar ri a g e was void from its
perfor m a n c e , henc e , nonexist e n t withou t the
nee d of a judicial decr e e decla ri n g it to be so.
This doct ri n e was reite r a t e d in Aragon (1957),
which involved subst a n t i ally the sam e fact u al
ant e c e d e n t s . In Odayat ( 1977),
citing Me n do z a and Aragon, the Cour t likewise
rule d that no judicial decr e e was nece s s a r y to
est a blis h the invalidity of void mar ri a g e s unde r
Article 80 of the Civil Code.
It must be em ph a siz e d that the enac t m e n t of the
Family Code ren d e r e d the rulings in Odayat,
Men d o z a, and Aragon inapplic a bl e to mar ri a g e s
celeb r a t e d afte r 3 August 1988. A judicial
decla r a t i o n of absolut e nullity of marri a g e is now
expr e s sly req ui r e d wher e the nullity of a
previous mar ri a g e is invoke d for pur pos e s of
cont r a c t i n g a secon d mar ri a g e . 38 A secon d
mar ri a g e cont r a c t e d prior to the issua n c e of this
decla r a t i o n of nullity is thus conside r e d
biga m o u s and void. 39 In Domi ng o v. Court of
Appeals, we explai n e d the policy behin d the
instit ution of this req ui r e m e n t :
Mar ri a g e , a sacro s a n c t instit u tio n, decla r e d by
the Constit u tio n as an "inviolabl e social
instit ution, is the found a ti o n of the family;" as
such, it "shall be prot e c t e d by the Stat e." In
more explicit ter m s, the Family Code
cha r a c t e r i z e s it as "a speci al contr a c t of
per m a n e n t union betw e e n a man and a wom a n
ent e r e d into in accor d a n c e with law for the
est a blis h m e n t of conjug al and family life." So
cruci al are mar ri a g e and the family to the
stability and peac e of the nation that their
"nat u r e , cons e q u e n c e s , and incide n t s are
gover n e d by law and not subjec t to
stipul a tion." As a mat t e r of poli c y, th er e f o r e ,
th e nullifi c a t i o n of a marri a g e for th e
purp o s e of con tr a c t i n g ano t h e r can n o t be
acc o m p l i s h e d me r e l y on th e basi s of th e
perc e p t i o n of bot h parti e s or of on e that
th ei r uni o n is so def e c t i v e with resp e c t to
th e es s e n t i a l req u i s i t e s of a con tr a c t of
marri a g e as to ren d e r it void ipso jure and
with no le g a l eff e c t - an d not h i n g mor e .
Wer e thi s so, thi s invi ol a b l e so ci a l
inst i t u t i o n wou l d be red u c e d to a mo c k e r y
and wou l d rest on very sh a ky fou n d a t i o n s
ind e e d . And the grou n d s for nullifying mar ri a g e
would be as divers e and far- ran gi n g as hum a n
inge n ui ty and fancy could conceive. For su c h a
so c i a l l y sig n i f i c a n t insti t u t i o n , an offi ci a l
stat e pron o u n c e m e n t thro u g h th e cou r t s ,
and not h i n g les s , will sati s fy th e exa c t i n g
nor m s of soc i e t y . Not only wou l d su c h an
op e n and pu bli c de c l ar a t i o n by th e co ur t s
defi n i t i v e l y con fi r m th e null i ty of th e
co n tr a c t of marri a g e , but th e sa m e woul d be
eas i l y verifi a b l e thr o u g h rec or d s acc e s s i b l e
to every o n e . 40 (Emph a s e s supplie d)
Howev e r, as this Court clarified
in Apiag v. Cant ero 41 and Ty v. Court of
Appeals, 42 the req ui r e m e n t of a judicial decr e e
of nullity does not apply to mar ri a g e s that were
celeb r a t e d before the effectivity of the Family
Code, partic ul a rly if the childr e n of the partie s
were born while the Civil Code was in force.
In Ty, this Court clarified that those case s
continu e to be gover n e d by Odayat, Me n do z a,
and Aragon, which em bo di e d the then- prevailing
rule:
x x x. In Apiag v. Cant e r o, (1997) the first wife
cha r g e d a munici pal trial judge of immor ality for
ent e ri n g into a secon d marri a g e . The judge
claim e d that his first mar ri a g e was void since he
was mer ely force d into mar ryi n g his first wife
whom he got preg n a n t . On the issue of nullity of
the first marri a g e , we applied Odaya t, Mendoz a
and Aragon. We held that since the secon d
mar ri a g e took plac e and all the childr e n
ther e u n d e r wer e born befor e the prom ul g a ti o n
of Wiegel and the effectivity of the Family Code,
ther e is no need for a judicial declar a ti o n of
nullity of the first mar ri a g e pur su a n t to
prevailing jurispr u d e n c e at that time.
Simila rly, in the pre se n t case, the secon d
mar ri a g e of privat e respo n d e n t was ent e r e d into
in 1979, befor e Wiegel. At that time, the
prevailing rule was found in Odaya t, Mendoz a
and Aragon. The first mar ri a g e of privat e
respo n d e n t being void for lack of licens e and
conse n t , ther e was no nee d for judicial
decla r a t i o n of its nullity befor e he could cont r a c t
a secon d mar ri a g e . In this case, ther efo r e , we
conclud e that privat e respo n d e n t ' s secon d
mar ri a g e to petition e r is valid.
Moreov e r, we find that the provision s of the
Family Code canno t be ret ro a c tiv ely applie d to
the pres e n t case, for to do so would preju dic e
the veste d right s of petition e r and of her
childr e n. As held in Jison v. Court of Appeals, the
Family Code has retr o a c t ive effect unless ther e
be impai r m e n t of veste d right s. In the pre s e n t
case, that impair m e n t of vest e d right s of
petition e r and the childr e n is pat e n t x x x.
(Citations omitt e d)
As earlier explaine d , the rule in Odayat,
Men d o z a, and Aragon is applica bl e to this case.
The Court thus conclud e s that the subse q u e n t
mar ri a g e of Lea to Rena t o is valid in view of the
invalidity of her first mar ri a g e to Bautist a
bec a u s e of the abse n c e of a mar ri a g e license .
That ther e was no judicial decla r a t i o n that the
first mar ri a g e was void ab initio befor e the
secon d mar ri a g e was cont r a c t e d is imm a t e r i al as
this is not a requir e m e n t und e r the Civil Code.
None t h e l e s s, the subs e q u e n t Decision of the RTC
of Par a ñ a q u e City decla ri n g the nullity of Lea's
first mar ri a g e only serve s to str e n g t h e n the
conclusion that her subs e q u e n t mar ri a g e to
Rena t o is valid.
In view of the foregoi n g, it is evide n t that the CA
did not err in uphol din g the validity of the
mar ri a g e betw e e n petition e r and respo n d e n t .
Henc e, we find no rea so n to distur b its ruling.
WHEREFORE, pre m is e s conside r e d , the
Petition is DENIE D. The Cour t of Appe als
Decision dat e d 20 April 2009 and Resolution
dat e d 16 Sept e m b e r 2009 in CA-G.R. CV No.
90153 are AFFIRME D.
[G.R. NO. 17361 4 : Sept e m b e r 28, 2007]
LOLITA D. ENRICO, Petition e r , v. HEIRS OF
SPS. EULOGIO B. MEDINACELI AND TRINIDAD
CATLI- MEDINACELI, REPRESE NT ED BY VILMA
M. ARTICULO, Respo n d e n t s .
DE C IS IO N
CHICO- NAZARIO, J.:
The inst a n t Petition for Certiorari filed unde r
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Proce d u r e
assails the Orde r, 1 dat e d 3 May 2006 of the
Region al Trial Cour t (RTC) of Apar ri, Cagay a n,
Branc h 6, in Civil Case No. II-4057, gra n ti n g
recon si d e r a t i o n of its Orde r, 2 dat e d 11 Octobe r
2005, and reinst a t i n g respo n d e n t s ' Compl ain t for
Decla r a t i o n of Nullity of Mar ri a g e .
On 17 Marc h 2005, respo n d e n t s, heirs of
Spous e s Eulogio B. Medin a c eli (Eulogio) and
Trinida d Catli- Medin a c eli (Trinid a d) filed with
the RTC, an action for decla r a t io n of nullity of
mar ri a g e of Eulogio and petition e r Lolita D.
Enrico. Subs t a n t i ally, the compl ai nt alleg e d,
inte r alia, that Eulogio and Trinida d wer e
mar ri e d on 14 June 1962, in Lal- lo,
Cagaya n. 3 They begot seven childr e n, her ei n
respo n d e n t s , nam ely: Edua r d o, Evelyn, Vilma,
Mary Jane, Haizel, Michelle and Josep h
Lloyd. 4 On 1 May 2004, Trinida d died. 5 On 26
August 2004, Eulogio mar ri e d petition e r before
the Municipal Mayor of Lal- lo, Cagay a n. 6 Six
mont h s later, or on 10 Feb r u a r y 2005, Eulogio
pass e d away. 7
In impug ni n g petition e r ' s mar ri a g e to Eulogio,
respo n d e n t s aver r e d that the sam e was ent e r e d
into withou t the requisi t e marri a g e licens e. They
arg u e d that Article 34 8 of the Family Code,
which exe m p t s a man and a wom a n who have
bee n living toget h e r for at least five years
without any legal impe di m e n t from secu ri n g a
mar ri a g e licens e, was not applica bl e to
petition e r and Eulogio beca u s e they could not
have lived toget h e r unde r the circu m s t a n c e s
requi r e d by said provision. Respon d e n t s posit e d
that the mar ri a g e of Eulogio to Trinida d was
dissolve d only upon the latte r' s deat h, or on 1
May 2004, which was bar ely thr e e mont h s from
the date of mar ri a g e of Eulogio to petition e r .
Ther efor e , petition e r and Eulogio could not have
lived toget h e r as husb a n d and wife for at least
five year s. To furt h e r their caus e, respo n d e n t s
raise d the addition al groun d of lack of mar ri a g e
cere m o ny due to Eulogio's serious illness which
made its perfor m a n c e impossi bl e.
In her Answe r, petition e r maint ai n e d that she
and Eulogio lived toget h e r as husb a n d and wife
und e r one roof for 21 years openly and publicly;
henc e , they were exe m p t e d from the
requi r e m e n t of a mar ri a g e licens e. From their
union were born Elvin Enrico and Marco Enrico,
all sur n a m e d Medin a c e li, on 28 Octob e r 1988
and 30 Octobe r 1991, resp e c t ively. She furt h e r
cont e n d e d that the mar ri a g e cer e m o n y was
perfor m e d in the Municip al Hall of Lal- lo,
Cagaya n, and solem niz e d by the Municipal
Mayor. As an affirm a t iv e defe ns e , she sough t the
dismiss al of the action on the grou n d that it is
only the cont r a c t i n g parti e s while living who can
file an action for decla r a t i o n of nullity of
mar ri a g e .
On 11 Octob e r 2005, the RTC issue d an
Orde r , 9 gra n ti n g the dismiss al of the Compl ain t
for lack of caus e of action. It cited A.M. No. 02-
11- 10- SC, 10 dat e d 7 Marc h 2003, prom ul g a t e d by
the Supr e m e Cour t En Banc as basis. The RTC
elucid a t e d on its position in the following
man n e r :
The Compl ai nt should be dismiss e d.
1) Administ r a t iv e Matt e r No. 02- 11- 10- SC
prom ul g a t e d by the Supr e m e Cour t which took
effect on Marc h 15, 2003 provide s in Section 2,
par. (a) 11 that a petition for Declar a ti o n of
Absolut e Nullity of a Void Marri a g e may be filed
solely by the husb a n d or the wife. The lang u a g e
of this rule is plain and simple which stat e s that
such a petition may be filed solely by the
husb a n d or the wife. The rule is clear and
une q uivoc al that only the husb a n d or the wife
may file the petition for Decla r a t io n of Absolut e
Nullity of a Void Mar ri a g e . The rea di n g of this
Court is that the right to bring such petition is
exclusive and this right solely belon g s to
the m . Conse q u e n t ly, the heirs of the dece a s e d
spous e canno t substi t u t e their late fathe r in
bringi n g the action to decla r e the mar ri a g e null
and void. 12 (Emp h a si s supplie d .)
The dispositive portion of the Orde r, thus, rea d s:
WHERE FOR E, [the] Motion to Dismiss raise d as
an affirm a tive defen s e in the answ e r is her e by
GRANTED. Accordi n gly, the Complai nt filed by
the [respo n d e n t s ] is her e by DISMISS ED with
cost s de officio. 13
Respon d e n t s filed a Motion for Recon si d e r a t i o n
ther e of. Following the filing by petition e r of her
Com m e n t to the said motion, the RTC rend e r e d
an Orde r 14 dat e d 3 May 2006, reve r si n g its Orde r
of 11 Octobe r 2005. Henc e, the RTC reinst a t e d
the compl ai nt on the ratiocin a t io n that the
assaile d Orde r ignor e d the ruling in Niñal v.
Bayado g, 15 which was on the autho ri ty for
holding that the heirs of a dece a s e d spous e have
the stan di n g to assail a void marri a g e even after
the dea t h of the latt e r. It held that Section 2(a)
of A.M. No. 02- 11- 20- SC, which provide s that a
petition for decla r a t i o n of absolut e nullity of void
mar ri a g e may be filed solely by the husb a n d or
the wife, applies only whe r e both parti e s to a
void marri a g e are still living. 16 Wher e one or
both par ti e s are dec e a s e d , the RTC held that the
heirs may file a petition to decla r e the mar ri a g e
void. The RTC expou n d e d on its stanc e , thus:
The ques tio n e d Orde r disr e g a r d e d the case of
Niñal v. Bayado g, 328 SCRA 122 (Marc h 14,
2000) in which the Supr e m e Cour t, First
Division, held that the heirs of a dec e a s e d perso n
may file a petition for the decla r a ti o n of his
mar ri a g e after his dea t h. The Orde r subjec t of
this motion for recon si d e r a t i o n held that the case
of Niñal v. Bayado g is now supe r s e d e d by the
new Rule on Decla r a t i o n of Absolut e Nullity of
Mar ri a g e s (herei n aft e r refe r r e d to as the Rule)
bec a u s e the Supr e m e Cour t has rejec t e d the
case of Niñal v. Bayado g by app rovi ng the Rule
on Nullity of Void Marri a g e s . The Orde r furt h e r
held that it is only the husb a n d or the wife who is
(sic) the only parti es allowe d to file an action for
decla r a t i o n of nullity of their mar ri a g e and such
right is purely perso n al and is not tran s m i s si bl e
upon the dea t h of the parti e s.
It is admit t e d that ther e see m s to be a conflict
betw e e n the case of Niñal v. Bayado g and
Section 2(a) of the Rule. In view of this, the
Court shall try to reconcil e the case of Niñal v.
Bayado g and the Rule. To reconcil e, the Court
will have to det e r m i n e [the] basic right s of the
par ti e s. The right s of the legiti m a t e heirs of a
per so n who ent e r e d into a void marri a g e will be
preju dic e d partic ul a rly with resp e c t to their
succe s sio n a l right s. During the lifetim e of the
par e n t[,] the heirs have only an inchoa t e right
over the prope r t y of the said par e n t s . Henc e,
durin g the lifetim e of the par e n t , it would be
prope r that it should solely be the par e n t who
shoul d be allowe d to file a petition to decl a r e his
mar ri a g e void. Howeve r, upon the deat h of the
par e n t his heirs have alre a dy a vest e d right over
wha t e v e r prope r t y left by the par e n t . Such
vest e d right should not be frust r a t e d by any
rules of proce d u r e such as the Rule. Rules of
Proc e d u r e cannot repe a l right s gra n t e d by
subst a n ti ve law. The heirs, the n, have a legal
sta n di n g in Court.
If the heirs are prohibit e d from questioni n g the
void marri a g e ent e r e d by their par e n t , especi ally
when the mar ri a g e is illegal and feloniously
ent e r e d into, it will give pre mi u m to such union
bec a u s e the guilty parti e s will seldo m, if ever at
all, ask for the ann ul m e n t of the mar ri a g e . Such
void marri a g e will be given a sem bl a n c e of
validity if the heirs will not be allowe d to file the
petition afte r the dea t h of the par e n t .
For thes e rea so n s, this Court believes that Sec.
2(a) of the Rules on Decla r a t io n of Absolut e
Nullity of Marri a g e is applica bl e only whe n both
par ti e s to a (sic) void mar ri a g e are still living.
Upon the deat h of anyon e of the guilty party to
the void mar ri a g e , his heirs may file a petition to
decla r e the the (sic) marri a g e void, but the Rule
is not applica bl e as it was not filed b the husb a n d
or the wife. It shall be the ordina r y rule of civil
proce d u r e which shall be applica bl e. 17
Perforc e, the decr e t a l portion of the RTC Orde r
of 3 May 2006 stat e s:
In view of the foregoi n g, the Court gra n t s the
motion for reconsi d e r a t i o n dat e d Octob e r 31,
2005 and reinst a t e this case. 18
Aggrieve d, petition e r filed a Motion for
Reconsi d e r a t i o n of the foregoi n g Orde r;
howeve r, on 1 June 2006, the RTC denie d the
said motion on the groun d that no new mat t e r
was raise d the r ei n. 19
Henc e, the insta n t Petition unde r Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Proc e d u r e on the sole
ques tio n of whet h e r the case law as em bo di e d in
Niñal, or the Rule on Declar a ti o n of Absolut e
Nullity of Void Marri a g e s and Annul m e n t of
Voidabl e Mar ri a g e s , as specified in A.M. No. 02-
11- 10- SC of the Supr e m e Court applies to the
case at bar.
At the outse t , we note that petition e r took an
abb r evi a t e d rout e to this Court, count e n a n c i n g
the hier a r c h y of court s.
We have earlie r emp h a siz e d that while the
Supr e m e Court has the conc u r r e n t jurisdiction
with the Cour t of Appeals and the RTCs (for
writs enfor c e a b l e within thei r resp e c t ive
regions), to issue writs of man da m u s , prohibition
or certiorari , the litigan t s are well advise d
again s t taking a direc t recou r s e to this
Court. 20 Inst e a d, they should initially seek the
prope r relief from the lower court s. As a court of
last resor t, this Cour t should not be burd e n e d
with the task of dealing with caus e s in the first
inst a n c e . Wher e the issua n c e of an extra o r di n a r y
writ is conc u r r e n t l y within the comp e t e n c e of the
Court of Appeals or the RTC, litigan t s must
obse rv e the principl e of hier a r c h y of
court s. 21 Howev e r, it cannot be gains ai d that this
Court has the discr e ti o n a r y powe r to brus h aside
proce d u r a l lapse s if comp elling reaso n s, or the
nat u r e and impor t a n c e of the issue s raise d,
warr a n t the imm e di a t e exercis e of its
jurisdic tion. 22 Moreov e r, notwit h s t a n d i n g the
dismissibility of the inst a n t Petition for its failur e
to obse rv e the doct rin e on the hier a r c h y of
court s, this Court will proc e e d to ente r t a i n the
case groun d e d as it is on a pur e ques tio n of law.
Petition e r maint ai n s that A.M. No. 02- 11- 10- SC
gover n s the insta n t case. A cont r a ri o,
respo n d e n t s posit that it is Niñal which is
applica bl e, whe r e by the heirs of the dec e a s e d
per so n wer e gra n t e d the right to file a petition
for the decla r a ti o n of nullity of his mar ri a g e after
his dea t h.
We gra n t the Petition.
In reinst a t i n g respo n d e n t s ' Compl ai nt for
Decla r a t i o n of Nullity of Mar ri a g e , the RTC acte d
with grave abus e of discre tio n.
While it is true that Niñal in no unce r t a i n term s
allowe d the r ei n petition e r s to file a petition for
the decla r a t i o n of nullity of their fathe r ' s
mar ri a g e to ther ei n respo n d e n t afte r the deat h
of their fathe r, we cannot , howeve r, apply its
ruling for the reaso n that the impu g n e d mar ri a g e
ther ei n was solem niz e d prior to the effectivity of
the Family Code. The Court in Niñal recog niz e d
that the applic a bl e law to det e r m i n e the validity
of the two mar ri a g e s involved ther ei n is the Civil
Code, which was the law in effect at the time of
their celebr a t i o n. 23 What we have befor e us
belon gs to a differe n t milieu, i.e., the mar ri a g e
sough t to be declar e d void was ent e r e d into
durin g the effectivity of the Family Code. As can
be glea n e d from the facts, petition e r ' s mar ri a g e
to Eulogio was celeb r a t e d in
2004. ςηα ñr ο bl ε š νι r† υα l lαω lι br α rÿ
The Rule on Declar a ti o n of Absolut e Nullity of
Void Mar ri a g e s and Annulm e n t of Voidabl e
Mar ri a g e s as cont ai n e d in A.M. No. 02- 11- 10- SC
is explicit in its scope, to wit:
Section 1. Scop e. - This Rule shall gove r n
petition s for decla r a t i o n of absolut e nullity of
void marri a g e s and annul m e n t of voida bl e
mar ri a g e s und e r the Family Code of the
Philippin e s.
The Rules of Court shall apply suppl e t o rily.
(Emp ha si s supplie d .)
The cat e g o ri c al langu a g e of A.M. No. 02- 11- 10-
SC leave s no room for doubt. The cover a g e
exte n d s only to those mar ri a g e s ent e r e d into
durin g the effectivity of the Family Code which
took effect on 3 August 1988. 24
Moreov e r, A.M. No. 02- 11- 10- SC took effect on
15 Marc h 2003, following its publica tio n in a
news p a p e r of gene r al circul a tion. Thus, cont r a r y
to the opinion of the RTC, ther e is no need to
recon cile the provision s of A.M. No. 02- 11- 10- SC
with the ruling in Niñal, beca u s e they vary in
scope and applic ation. As has bee n emp h a siz e d ,
A.M. No. 02- 11- 10- SC cover s mar ri a g e s unde r
the Family Code of the Philippin e s, and is
prosp e c tive in its applica tion. The mar ri a g e of
petition e r to Eulogio was celeb r a t e d on 26
August 2004, and it squa r ely falls within the
am bit of A.M. No. 02- 11- 10- SC.
Henc e, in resolving the issue befor e us, we
reso r t to Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02- 11- 10- SC,
which provides:
Section 2. Petition for decla r a ti o n of absolut e
nullity of void marri a g e s .'
(a) Who may file. - A petition for decl ar a ti o n of
absol ut e nullity of void mar ri a g e may be filed
solely by the husb a n d or the wife. (n) (Emp h a si s
supplied .)
Ther e is no am big ui ty in the Rule. Absolut e
sent e n til expositor e non indige t. When the
langu a g e of the law is clea r, no expla n a ti o n of it
is requi r e d . Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02- 11- 10-
SC, makes it the sole right of the husb a n d or the
wife to file a petition for declar a ti o n of absol ut e
nullity of void marri a g e .
The Ration al e of the Rules on Annul m e n t of
Voidabl e Mar ri a g e s and Declar a ti o n of Absolut e
Nullity of Void Marri a g e s , Legal Sepa r a t i o n and
Provision al Orde r s explica t e s on Section 2(a) in
the following man n e r , viz:
1. Only an aggriev e d or injure d spous e may file
petition s for annul m e n t of voida bl e mar ri a g e s
and decla r a t i o n of absolut e nullity of void
mar ri a g e s . Such petition s canno t be filed by the
comp ul so r y or intest a t e heirs of the spous e s or
by the Stat e. [Section 2; Section 3, par a g r a p h a]
Only an aggriev e d or injure d spous e may file a
petition for ann ul m e n t of voidabl e mar ri a g e s or
decla r a t i o n of absolut e nullity of void mar ri a g e s .
Such petition cannot be filed by com p ul so ry or
intest a t e heirs of the spous e s or by the Stat e .
The Com mit t e e is of the belief that they do not
have a legal right to file the petition. Compul so ry
or intest a t e heirs have only inchoa t e right s prior
to the deat h of their pred e c e s s o r , and henc e can
only ques tio n the validity of the mar ri a g e of the
spous e s upon the deat h of a spous e in a
proce e di n g for the settle m e n t of the esta t e of the
dec e a s e d spous e filed in the regul a r court s. On
the othe r hand, the conc e r n of the Stat e is to
pre s e r v e mar ri a g e and not to seek its
dissolution. 25 (Emp ha si s supplie d .)
Respon d e n t s clea rly have no caus e of action
befor e the court a quo. None t h el e s s , all is not
lost for respo n d e n t s . While A.M. No. 02- 11- 10- SC
decla r e s that a petition for decla r a t i o n of
absol ut e nullity of void mar ri a g e may be filed
solely by the husb a n d or the wife, it does not
mea n that the com p ul so ry or intest a t e heirs are
alre a dy withou t any recou r s e und e r the law.
They can still prot e c t their succe ssio n a l right,
for, as stat e d in the Ration al e of the Rules on
Annul m e n t of Voidabl e Mar ri a g e s and
Decla r a t i o n of Absolut e Nullity of Void
Mar ri a g e s , Legal Sepa r a t i o n and Provision al
Orde r s, comp ul so ry or intest a t e heirs can still
ques tio n the validity of the mar ri a g e of the
spous e s, not in a proc e e di n g for decl a r a t io n of
nullity, but upon the dea t h of a spous e in a
proce e di n g for the settle m e n t of the esta t e of the
dec e a s e d spous e filed in the regul a r court s.
WHERE FOR E, the Petition is GRANTED. Civil
Case No. II-4057 filed before the Region al Trial
Court of Aparri, Cagaya n, Branc h 6, is ORDERED
DISMISS ED withou t prejudi c e to challe n gi n g the
validity of the mar ri a g e of Lolita D. Enrico to
Eulogio B. Medin a c eli in a proc e e di n g for the
settle m e n t of the est a t e of the latte r. No costs.
G.R. No. 16 0 1 7 2 Febr u a ry 13, 20 0 8
REINEL ANTHO NY B. DE
CASTRO, petition e r,
vs.
ANNAB ELLE ASSIDAO- DE
CASTRO, respo n d e n t .
D E C I S I O N
TINGA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the Decision 1 of
the Cour t of Appeal s in CA-GR CV. No.
69166, 2 decl a ri n g that (1) Reiann a Tricia A. De
Cast ro is the legiti m a t e child of the petition e r ;
and (2) that the mar ri a g e betw e e n petition e r and
respo n d e n t is valid until prope rly nullified by a
comp e t e n t court in a proc e e di n g instit ut e d for
that purpo s e .
The facts of the case, as culled from the recor d s ,
follow.
Petition e r and respo n d e n t met and bec a m e
swe et h e a r t s in 1991. They plann e d to get
mar ri e d, thus they applie d for a marri a g e licens e
with the Office of the Civil Regist r a r of Pasig City
in Sept e m b e r 1994. They had their first sexual
relation som e ti m e in Octobe r 1994, and had
regul a rly eng a g e d in sex the r e af t e r . When the
coupl e went back to the Office of the Civil
Regist r a r , the mar ri a g e licens e had alre a dy
expire d. Thus, in orde r to push throu g h with the
plan, in lieu of a mar ri a g e license , they exec ut e d
an affidavit date d 13 Marc h 1995 stati ng that
they had been living toget h e r as husb a n d and
wife for at least five years. The couple got
mar ri e d on the sam e date, with Judge Jose C.
Bern a b e , presi di n g judge of the Met ro p olit a n
Trial Court of Pasig City, admi nist e r i n g the civil
rites. Neve r t h e l e s s, after the cer e m o n y,
petition e r and respo n d e n t went back to their
resp e c tiv e hom e s and did not live toge t h e r as
husb a n d and wife.
On 13 Nove m b e r 1995, respo n d e n t gave birth to
a child nam e d Reinn a Tricia A. De Cast r o. Since
the child’s birth, respo n d e n t has bee n the one
suppo r ti n g her out of her incom e as a
gover n m e n t dentist and from her privat e
prac tic e.
On 4 June 1998, respo n d e n t filed a compl ai n t for
suppo r t agains t petition e r befor e the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City (trial cour t. 3 In her
compl ai n t, respo n d e n t allege d that she is
mar ri e d to petition e r and that the latt e r has
"rene g e d on his respo n si bility/obliga tio n to
financi ally suppo r t her "as his wife and Reinna
Tricia as his child." 4
Petition e r deni e d that he is mar ri e d to
respo n d e n t , claimin g that their mar ri a g e is void
ab initio since the mar ri a g e was facilita t e d by a
fake affidavit; and that he was mer ely prevaile d
upon by respo n d e n t to sign the mar ri a g e
cont r a c t to save her from emb a r r a s s m e n t and
possible admi ni st r a ti ve pros e c u ti o n due to her
pre g n a n t stat e; and that he was not able to get
par e n t a l advice from his par e n t s befor e he got
mar ri e d. He also aver r e d that they neve r lived
toge t h e r as husb a n d and wife and that he has
neve r see n nor acknowl e d g e d the child.
In its Decision dat e d 16 Octobe r 2000, 5 the trial
court ruled that the mar ri a g e betw e e n petition e r
and respo n d e n t is not valid bec a u s e it was
solem niz e d withou t a mar ri a g e licens e . Howev e r,
it decla r e d petition e r as the natu r a l fathe r of the
child, and thus oblige d to give her suppo r t.
Petition e r elevat e d the case to the Court of
Appeals, argui n g that the lower court com mit t e d
grave abuse of discr e ti on when, on the basis of
mer e belief and conject u r e , it orde r e d him to
provide suppo r t to the child when the latt e r is
not, and could not have bee n, his own child.
The Court of Appeals deni ed the appe al.
Prom p t e d by the rule that a mar ri a g e is
pre s u m e d to be subsisti n g until a judicial
decla r a t i o n of nullity has been made, the
app ellat e cour t decla r e d that the child was born
durin g the subsist e n c e and validity of the
par ti e s’ marri a g e . In addition, the Court of
Appeals frown e d upon petition e r’s refus al to
und e r g o DNA testi ng to prove the pate r ni t y and
filiation, as well as his refusal to stat e with
cert ai n t y the last time he had carn al knowle d g e
with respo n d e n t , saying that petition e r’s
"forge tful n e s s shoul d not be used as a vehicle to
relieve him of his obliga tion and rew a r d him of
his being irres p o n si bl e." 6 Moreov e r, the Cour t of
Appeals note d the affidavit dat e d 7 April 1998
execu t e d by petition e r , whe r ei n he volunt a rily
admi tt e d that he is the legitim a t e fathe r of the
child.
The app ellat e cour t also ruled that since this
case is an action for suppo r t , it was impro p e r for
the trial court to decla r e the mar ri a g e of
petition e r and respo n d e n t as null and void in the
very sam e case. Ther e was no par tici p a ti o n of
the Stat e, throu g h the prose c u t i n g attor n e y or
fiscal, to see to it that ther e is no collusion
betw e e n the parti e s, as requi r e d by the Family
Code in actions for decla r a t i o n of nullity of a
mar ri a g e . The bur d e n of proof to show that the
mar ri a g e is void rest s upon petition e r , but it is a
mat t e r that can be raise d in an action for
decla r a t i o n of nullity, and not in the inst a n t
proce e di n g s. The proce e di n g s before the trial
court shoul d have bee n limite d to the obligatio n
of petition e r to suppo r t the child and his wife on
the basis of the mar ri a g e app a r e n t l y and
volunt a rily ent e r e d into by petition e r and
respo n d e n t . 7 The dispositive portion of the
decision rea d s:
WHEREFORE, pre m is e s conside r e d , the
Decision dat e d 16 Octobe r 2000, of the
Region al Trial Cour t of Pasig City,
Nation al Capit al Judicial Region, Brach
70, in JDRC No. 4626, is AFFIRME D with
the MODIFICATIO N S (1) decla ri n g
Reiann a Tricia A. De Cast ro, as the
legiti m a t e child of the appella n t and the
app elle e and (2) decla ri n g the mar ri a g e
on 13 Marc h 1995 bet w e e n the appella n t
and the app elle e valid until prop e rly
annulle d by a com p e t e n t court in a
proce e di n g institu t e d for that purpo s e .
Costs agains t the app ell a n t. 8
Petition e r filed a motion for recon si d e r a t i o n, but
the motion was denie d by the Court of
Appeals. 9 Henc e this petition.
Before us, petition e r cont e n d s that the trial court
prope r ly ann ulle d his marri a g e with respo n d e n t
bec a u s e as show n by the evide n c e and
admi ssion s of the partie s, the mar ri a g e was
celeb r a t e d withou t a mar ri a g e licens e. He
stre s s e s that the affidavit they execut e d , in lieu
of a mar ri a g e license , cont ai n e d a false nar r a t io n
of facts, the trut h being that he and respo n d e n t
neve r lived toget h e r as husb a n d and wife. The
false affidavit should neve r be allowe d or
admi tt e d as a substi t u t e to fill the abse n c e of a
mar ri a g e licens e. 10 Petition e r addition ally argu e s
that ther e was no nee d for the app e a r a n c e of a
pros e c u ti n g attor n e y in this case bec a u s e it is
only an ordina r y action for suppo r t and not an
action for annul m e n t or decla r a t i o n of absolut e
nullity of mar ri a g e . In any case, petition e r
arg u e s that the trial court had jurisdiction to
det e r m i n e the invalidity of their mar ri a g e since it
was validly invoke d as an affirm a tiv e defe ns e in
the inst a n t action for suppo r t . Citing seve r al
aut ho ri tie s, 11 petition e r claims that a void
mar ri a g e can be the subjec t of a collat e r a l
att a c k. Thus, the r e is no nece s si ty to instit ut e
anot h e r indep e n d e n t proc e e di n g for the
decla r a t i o n of nullity of the mar ri a g e betw e e n
the parti es. The refiling of anot h e r case for
decla r a t i o n of nullity wher e the sam e eviden c e
and parti e s would be pres e n t e d would entail
enor m o u s expe n s e s and anxieti es, would be
time- consu m i n g for the par ti e s, and would
incre a s e the burd e n of the cour t s. 12 Finally,
petition e r claims that in view of the nullity of his
mar ri a g e with respo n d e n t and his vigoro u s
denial of the child’s pate r ni t y and filiation, the
Court of Appeals gravely err e d in decl ari n g the
child as his legitim a t e child.
In a resolutio n date d 16 Febr u a r y 2004, the
Court requi r e d respo n d e n t and the Office of the
Solicitor Gene r a l (OSG) to file their resp e c tiv e
com m e n t s on the petition. 13
In her Com m e n t , 14 respo n d e n t claims that the
inst a n t petition is a mer e dilatory tactic to thwa r t
the finality of the decision of the Court of
Appeals. Echoin g the finding s and rulings of the
app ellat e cour t, she arg u e s that the legiti m a cy of
their marri a g e canno t be att a c k e d collat e r a lly,
but can only be repu di a t e d or cont e s t e d in a
direct suit specifically broug h t for that purpo s e .
With rega r d to the filiation of her child, she
point e d out that com p a r e d to her candi d and
strai g h t fo r w a r d testi m o ny, petition e r was
unce r t ai n, if not evasive in answ e ri n g ques tio n s
about their sexu al encou n t e r s . More ove r , she
adds that despit e the challe n g e from her and
from the trial court , petition e r stron gly object e d
to being subjec t e d to DNA testin g to prove
pat e r ni t y and filiation. 15
For its par t, the OSG aver s that the Court of
Appeals err e d in holding that it was impro p e r for
the trial court to decla r e null and void the
mar ri a g e of petition e r and respo n d e n t in the
action for suppo r t . Citing the case of Niñal v.
Bayado g , 16 it stat e s that court s may pass upon
the validity of a mar ri a g e in an action for
suppo r t , since the right to suppo r t from
petition e r hinge s on the exist e n c e of a valid
mar ri a g e . Moreov e r , the evide n c e prese n t e d
durin g the proc e e di n g s in the trial court show e d
that the mar ri a g e betw e e n petition e r and
respo n d e n t was solem niz e d withou t a mar ri a g e
licens e , and that thei r affidavit (of a man and
wom a n who have lived toget h e r and exclusively
with each othe r as husb a n d and wife for at least
five year s) was false. Thus, it conclud e s the trial
court corr e c t ly held that the mar ri a g e betw e e n
petition e r and respo n d e n t is not valid. 17 In
addition, the OSG agr e e s with the findings of the
trial court that the child is an illegiti m a t e child of
petition e r and thus entitle d to suppo r t . 18
Two key issue s are pres e n t e d befor e us. First,
whet h e r the trial cour t had the jurisdiction to
det e r m i n e the validity of the mar ri a g e betw e e n
petition e r and respo n d e n t in an action for
suppo r t and secon d, whet h e r the child is the
dau g h t e r of petition e r .
Anent the first issue, the Court holds that the
trial court had jurisdiction to det e r m i n e the
validity of the mar ri a g e bet w e e n petition e r and
respo n d e n t . The validity of a void marri a g e may
be collat e r ally atta c k e d . 19 Thus, in Niñal v.
Bayado g , we held:
Howev e r, othe r than for purpo s e s of
rem a r r i a g e , no judicial action is nec es s a r y
to decla r e a mar ri a g e an absolut e nullity.
For othe r purpo s e s, such as but not
limited to det e r m i n a t i o n of heirshi p,
legiti m a cy or illegitim a cy of a child,
settle m e n t of est at e, dissolution of
prope r t y regi m e, or a criminal case for
that mat t e r , the court may pass upon the
validity of marri a g e even in a suit not
directly instit u t e d to que stio n the sam e so
long as it is esse n ti al to the det e r m i n a t i o n
of the case. This is withou t preju dic e to
any issue that may arise in the case.
When such nee d arise s, a final judg m e n t
of decla r a t i o n of nullity is nece s s a r y even
if the pur pos e is othe r tha n to rem a r r y.
The claus e "on the basis of a final
judg m e n t decla ri n g such previou s
mar ri a g e void" in Article 40 of the Family
Code connot e s that such final judg m e n t
nee d not be obtai n e d only for purpo s e of
rem a r r i a g e . 20
Likewise, in Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño , 21 the
Court rule d that it is clothe d with sufficien t
aut ho ri ty to pass upon the validity of two
mar ri a g e s despit e the main case being a claim
for deat h benefits. Reiter a ti n g Niñal , we held
that the Cour t may pass upon the validity of a
mar ri a g e even in a suit not direc tly institu t e d to
ques tio n the validity of said mar ri a g e , so long as
it is esse n t i al to the dete r m i n a t i o n of the case.
Howev e r, evide nc e must be addu c e d , testi m o ni al
or docu m e n t a r y, to prove the exist e n c e of
groun d s rend e r i n g such a mar ri a g e an absolut e
nullity. 22
Unde r the Family Code, the abse n c e of any of
the esse n ti al or form al req ui sit e s shall ren d e r
the mar ri a g e void ab initio , whe r e a s a defect in
any of the esse n ti al requisi t e s shall rend e r the
mar ri a g e voidable. 23 In the inst a n t case, it is
clear from the evide n c e pre se n t e d that petition e r
and respo n d e n t did not have a mar ri a g e licens e
when they cont r a c t e d their mar ri a g e . Inst e a d ,
they pres e n t e d an affidavit statin g that they had
bee n living toget h e r for more tha n five
year s. 24 Howeve r , respo n d e n t hers elf in effect
admi tt e d the falsity of the affidavit whe n she was
aske d durin g cross- exami n a t i o n, thus—
ATTY. CARPIO:
Q But despit e of (sic) the fact that you
have not been living toget h e r as husb a n d
and wife for the last five years on or
befor e Marc h 13, 1995, you signe d the
Affidavit, is that corre c t ?
A Yes, sir. 25
The falsity of the affidavit cannot be consid e r e d
as a mer e irreg ul a ri t y in the form al req ui sit e s of
mar ri a g e . The law dispe n s e s with the mar ri a g e
licens e requi r e m e n t for a man and a wom a n who
have lived toget h e r and exclusively with each
othe r as husb a n d and wife for a contin uo u s and
unbr ok e n period of at least five years befor e the
mar ri a g e . The aim of this provision is to avoid
exposin g the parti e s to humiliation, sha m e and
em ba r r a s s m e n t conco m it a n t with the scan d al o u s
coha bi t a t io n of perso n s outsid e a valid mar ri a g e
due to the publica tio n of every applica n t’s nam e
for a mar ri a g e licens e . 26 In the inst a n t case,
ther e was no "scan d a l o u s coha bi t a t io n" to
prot e c t; in fact, ther e was no coha bi t a ti o n at all.
The false affidavit which petition e r and
respo n d e n t execu t e d so they could push throu g h
with the mar ri a g e has no value what s o e v e r ; it is
a mer e scra p of pap e r . They were not exe m p t
from the mar ri a g e licens e req ui r e m e n t . Their
failure to obtain and pres e n t a mar ri a g e licens e
rend e r s their mar ri a g e void ab initio.
Anent the secon d issue, we find that the child is
petition e r’s illegiti m a t e daug h t e r , and ther efo r e
entitle d to suppo r t.
Illegitim a t e childr e n may est a blish thei r
illegiti m a t e filiation in the sam e way and on the
sam e evide n c e as legitim a t e childr e n. 27 Thus, one
can prove illegiti m a t e filiation thro u g h the
reco r d of birt h appe a r i n g in the civil regist e r or a
final judg m e n t , an admi ssion of legitim a t e
filiation in a public docu m e n t or a privat e
hand w ri t t e n inst r u m e n t and signe d by the pare n t
conce r n e d , or the open and contin uo u s
posse s sio n of the stat u s of a legitim a t e child, or
any othe r mea n s allowe d by the Rules of Court
and speci al laws. 28
The Certificat e of Live Birth 29 of the child lists
petition e r as the fathe r. In addition, petition e r , in
an affidavit waiving addition al tax exem p t io n in
favor of respo n d e n t , admi tt e d that he is the
fathe r of the child, thus stati ng:
1. I am the legitim a t e fathe r of REIANNA
TRICIA A. DE CASTRO who was born on
Nove m b e r 3, 1995 at Bett e r Living,
Par a ñ a q u e , Met ro Manila; 30
We are likewise inclined to agr e e with the
following findings of the trial cour t:
That Reinna Tricia is the child of the
respo n d e n t with the petition e r is
suppo r t e d not only by the testim o ny of the
latt e r , but also by respo n d e n t’s own
admi ssion in the cours e of his testi m o ny
whe r ei n he conc e d e d that petition e r was
his form e r girlfrien d. While they wer e
swe et h e a r t s , he use d to visit petition e r at
the latt e r’s house or clinic. At time s, they
would go to a motel to have sex. As a
result of thei r sexual dallianc e s, petition e r
bec a m e pre g n a n t which ultim a t e ly led to
their marri a g e , thoug h invalid, as earlie r
rule d. While respo n d e n t claims that he
was mer ely force d to unde r g o the
mar ri a g e cere m o n y, the pictur e s take n of
the occasion reve al othe r wi s e (Exhs. "B,"
"B-1," to "B-3," "C," "C-1" and "C-2," "D,"
"D-1" and "D-2," "E," "E- 1" and "E-2," "F,"
"F- 1" and "F- 2," "G," "G-1" and "G-2" and
"H," "H- 1" to "H- 3"). In one of the pictur e s
(Exhs. "D," "D-1" and "D-2"), defen d a n t is
see n put ti ng the weddi n g ring on
petition e r’s finge r and in anot h e r pictu r e
(Exhs. "E," "E- 1" and "E- 2") respo n d e n t is
see n in the act of kissing the petition e r . 31
WHEREFORE, the petition is gra n t e d in part.
The assaile d Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 6916 6
are SET ASIDE and the decision of the Region al
Trial Court Branc h 70 of Pasig City in JDRC No.
4626 dat e d 16 Octobe r 2000 is
her e by REIN STATE D .
1. 2 NEE D FOR COURT DECLARATIO N
G.R. No. 13 7 1 1 0 Aug u s t 1, 20 0 0
VINCE NT PAUL G. MERCADO a.k.a.
VINCE NT G. MERCADO, petition e r,
vs.
CONS U ELO TAN, respo n d e n t .
DE C IS IO N
PANGA NI BA N , J.:
A judicial decla r a t i o n of nullity of a previous
mar ri a g e is nece s s a r y befor e a subse q u e n t one
can be legally cont r a c t e d . One who ent e r s into a
subs e q u e n t mar ri a g e withou t first obtainin g such
judicial decla r a t i o n is guilty of biga my. This
principle applies even if the earlie r union is
cha r a c t e r i z e d by stat u t e as "void."
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review
on Certiorari assailing the July 14, 1998 Decision
of the Cour t of Appeals (CA) 1 in CA-GR CR No.
19830 and its Janua ry 4, 1999 Resolution
denying reconsi d e r a t i o n . The assaile d Decision
affirm e d the ruling of the Region al Trial Court
(RTC) of Bacolod City in Crimin al Case No.
13848, which convict e d herei n petition e r of
biga my as follows:
"WHEREF OR E, finding the guilt of accus e d Dr.
Vincen t Paul G. Merc a d o a.k.a. Dr. Vince nt G.
Merc a d o of the crim e of Bigamy punish a bl e
und e r Article 349 of the Revise d Penal Code to
have bee n prove n beyond reaso n a b l e doubt, [the
court her e by rend e r s] judg m e n t imposing upon
him a prison ter m of thr e e (3) year s, four (4)
mont h s and fiftee n (15) days of prision
corr e c cio n al, as minim u m of his indet e r m i n a t e
sent e n c e , to eight (8) years and twe nty- one (21)
days of prision mayor, as maxim u m , plus
acce s so r y pen altie s provide d by law.
Costs agains t accus e d ." 2
The Fact s
The facts are quot e d by Court of Appeal s (CA)
from the trial court’s judg m e n t , as follows:
"From the evide n c e addu c e d by the partie s,
ther e is no disput e that accus e d Dr. Vincen t
Merc a d o and complai n a n t Ma. Consu elo Tan got
mar ri e d on June 27, 1991 befor e MTCC- Bacolod
City Br. 7 Judge Gorgo nio J. Ibañ ez [by reaso n of]
which a Marri a g e Cont r a c t was duly exec ut e d
and signe d by the parti e s. As ent e r e d in said
docu m e n t , the stat u s of accus e d was ‘single’.
Ther e is no dispu t e eithe r that at the time of the
celeb r a t io n of the weddi n g with com pl ai n a n t ,
accus e d was actu ally a mar ri e d man, having
bee n in lawful wedlock with Ma. Thelm a Oliva in
a marri a g e cere m o ny solem niz e d on April 10,
1976 by Judge Leona r d o B. Caña r e s , CFI- Br. XIV,
Cebu City per Marri a g e Certificat e issue d in
conne c t io n ther e wi t h, which mat ri m o n y was
furth e r bless e d by Rev. Fath e r Arthur Baur on
Octobe r 10, 1976 in religious rites at the Sacr e d
Hea r t Churc h, Cebu City. In the sam e man n e r ,
the civil mar ri a g e bet w e e n accus e d and
compl ai n a n t was confir m e d in a chur c h
cere m o ny on June 29, 1991 officiat e d by Msgr.
Victorino A. Rivas, Judicial Vicar, Dioces e of
Bacolod City. Both mar ri a g e s were consu m m a t e d
when out of the first consor ti u m , Ma. Thelm a
Oliva bore accus e d two childr e n , while a child,
Vincen t Paul, Jr. was sired by accus e d with
compl ai n a n t Ma. Consu elo Tan.
"On Octobe r 5, 1992, a lette r- complai n t for
biga my was filed by com pl ai n a n t thro u g h
couns el with the City Prose c u t o r of Bacolod City,
which event u ally result e d [in] the institu tio n of
the pres e n t case befor e this Court agains t said
accus e d , Dr. Vincen t G. Merc a d o, on Marc h 1,
1993 in an Infor m a t io n dat e d Janua ry 22, 1993.
"On Nove m b e r 13, 1992, or more tha n a mont h
after the biga my case was lodge d in the
Prose c u t o r’s Office, accus e d filed an action for
Decla r a t i o n of Nullity of Mar ri a g e agai ns t Ma.
Thelm a V. Oliva in RTC- Br. 22, Cebu City, and in
a Decision dat e d May 6, 1993 the mar ri a g e
betw e e n Vincent G. Merc a d o and Ma. Thelm a V.
Oliva was decla r e d null and void.
"Accuse d is char g e d [with] biga m y und e r Article
349 of the Revise d Penal Code for having
cont r a c t e d a secon d mar ri a g e with her ei n
compl ai n a n t Ma. Consu elo Tan on June 27, 1991
when at that time he was previou sly unite d in
lawful mar ri a g e with Ma. Thelm a V. Oliva on
April 10, 1976 at Cebu City, withou t said first
mar ri a g e having bee n legally dissolve d. As
show n by the evide nc e and admit t e d by accus e d,
all the esse n t i al elem e n t s of the crime are
pre s e n t , nam ely: (a) that the offend e r has bee n
previously legally mar ri e d; (2) that the first
mar ri a g e has not bee n legally dissolve d or in
case the spous e is abse n t , the abse n t spous e
could not yet be pres u m e d dead accor di n g to the
Civil Code; (3) that he cont r a c t [ e d] a secon d or
subs e q u e n t mar ri a g e ; and (4) that the secon d or
subs e q u e n t mar ri a g e ha[d] all the esse n ti al
requi sit e s for validity. x x x
"While acknowl e d gi n g the existe n c e of the two
mar ri a g e [ s], accus e d posit e d the defe ns e that his
previous mar ri a g e ha[d] bee n judicially declar e d
null and void and that the privat e compl ain a n t
had knowle d g e of the first mar ri a g e of accus e d.
"It is an admi tt e d fact that whe n the secon d
mar ri a g e was ent e r e d into with Ma. Consu elo
Tan on June 27, 1991, accu s e d’s prior mar ri a g e
with Ma. Thelm a V. Oliva was subsisti n g, no
judicial action having yet bee n initiat e d or any
judicial decla r a t i o n obt ain e d as to the nullity of
such prior mar ri a g e with Ma. Thelm a V. Oliva.
Since no decla r a t i o n of the nullity of his first
mar ri a g e ha[d] yet been made at the time of his
secon d mar ri a g e , it is clear that accus e d was a
mar ri e d man when he contr a c t e d such secon d
mar ri a g e with compl ai n a n t on June 27, 1991. He
was still at the time validly mar ri e d to his first
wife." 3
Ruling of the Court of Appe al s
Agreei n g with the lower cour t, the Court of
Appeals stat e d:
"Und e r Article 40 of the Family Code, ‘the
absol ut e nullity of a previous mar ri a g e may be
invoke d for pur pos e s of rem a r r i a g e on the basis
solely of a final judg m e n t decla ri n g such
previous mar ri a g e void.’ But her e, the final
judg m e n t decla ri n g null and void accus e d’s
previous mar ri a g e cam e not befor e the
celeb r a t io n of the secon d mar ri a g e , but afte r,
when the case for biga m y agai ns t accu s e d was
alre a dy tried in cour t. And what constit u t e s the
crime of biga m y is the act of any perso n who
shall cont r a c t a secon d subse q u e n t mar ri a g e
‘before’ the form e r mar ri a g e has bee n legally
dissolve d." 4
Henc e, this Petition. 5 judicial decla r a t i o n of nullity of his first mar ri a g e
The Issue s
In his Memo r a n d u m , petition e r raise s the
following issue s:
"A
Whet h e r or not the elem e n t of previous
legal marri a g e is pre s e n t in orde r to
convict petition e r .
"B
Whet h e r or not a liber al inter p r e t a t i o n in
favor of petition e r of Article 349 of the
Revise d Penal Code punishi n g biga m y, in
relation to Articles 36 and 40 of the
Family Code, nega t e s the guilt of
petition e r.
"C
Whet h e r or not petition e r is entitl ed to an
acqui tt al on the basis of reaso n a bl e
doubt." 6
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition is not meritorio u s.
Main Issue:Effec t of Nullity of Previous Marri a g e
Petition e r was convict e d of biga m y und e r Article
349 of the Revise d Penal Code, which provides:
"The penalty of prision mayor shall be impose d
upon any perso n who shall cont r a c t a secon d or
subs e q u e n t mar ri a g e befor e the form e r mar ri a g e
has bee n legally dissolve d, or before the abse n t
spous e has bee n decla r e d pres u m p t iv ely dead by
mea n s of a judgm e n t rend e r e d in the prope r
proce e di n g s."
The elem e n t s of this crim e are as follows:
"1. That the offend e r has been legally
mar ri e d;
2. That the mar ri a g e has not bee n legally
dissolve d or, in case his or her spous e is
abse n t , the abse n t spous e could not yet
be pres u m e d dea d accor di n g to the Civil
Code;
3. That he contr a c t s a secon d or
subs e q u e n t mar ri a g e ;
4. That the secon d or subs e q u e n t
mar ri a g e has all the esse n ti al requisit e s
for validity." 7
When the Inform a t i o n was filed on Janua ry 22,
1993, all the elem e n t s of biga m y were prese n t . It
is undisp u t e d that petition e r mar ri e d Thelm a G.
Oliva on April 10, 1976 in Cebu City. While that
mar ri a g e was still subsisti n g, he cont r a c t e d a
secon d mar ri a g e , this time with Respo n d e n t Ma.
Consu elo Tan who subse q u e n t ly filed the
Compl ai nt for biga my.
Petition e r cont e n d s , howev e r , that he obtai n e d a
und e r Article 36 of the Family Code, ther e b y
rend e ri n g it void ab initio . Unlike voidabl e
mar ri a g e s which are consid e r e d valid until set
aside by a com p e t e n t court, he argu e s that a void
mar ri a g e is dee m e d never to have take n plac e at
all. 8 Thus, he conclud e s that the r e is no first
mar ri a g e to spe ak of. Petition e r also quot e s the
com m e n t a r i e s 9 of form e r Justice Luis Reyes that
"it is now settle d that if the first mar ri a g e is void
from the begin ni n g, it is a defen s e in a biga my
cha r g e . But if the first mar ri a g e is voida bl e, it is
not a defe ns e ."
Respon d e n t , on the othe r hand, admit s that the
first mar ri a g e was decla r e d null and void und e r
Article 36 of the Family Code, but she points out
that that decla r a t io n cam e only after the
Inform a t i o n had bee n filed. Henc e, by the n, the
crime had alre a d y been consu m m a t e d . She
arg u e s that a judicial declar a ti o n of nullity of a
void previou s mar ri a g e must be obtain e d befor e
a perso n can mar ry for a subse q u e n t time.
We agr e e with the respo n d e n t .
To be sur e, jurisp r u d e n c e reg a r di n g the nee d for
a judicial decl ar a ti o n of nullity of the previou s
mar ri a g e has bee n cha r a c t e r i z e d as
"conflicting." 10 In People v. Men d o z a, 11 a biga m y
case involving an accus e d who mar ri e d thr e e
times, the Court ruled that ther e was no nee d for
such decla r a t i o n. In that case, the accus e d
cont r a c t e d a secon d mar ri a g e durin g the
subsist e n c e of the first. When the first wife died,
he marri e d for the third time. The secon d wife
then char g e d him with biga m y. Acquittin g him,
the Cour t held that the secon d mar ri a g e was
void ab initio beca u s e it had bee n cont r a c t e d
while the first mar ri a g e was still in effect. Since
the secon d marri a g e was obviously void and
illegal, the Court ruled that ther e was no need
for a judicial decla r a t i o n of its nullity. Henc e, the
accus e d did not com mit biga my when he mar ri e d
for the third time. This ruling was affirm e d by
the Cour t in People v. Aragon , 12 which involved
subst a n ti ally the sam e facts.
But in subse q u e n t case s, the Court impr e s s e d
the nee d for a judicial decla r a t i o n of nullity.
In Vda de Consu e g ra v. GSIS, 13 Jose Consu e g r a
mar ri e d for the secon d time while the first
mar ri a g e was still subsisti n g. Upon his dea t h,
the Cour t awa r d e d one half of the proc e e d s of
his retir e m e n t benefits to the first wife and the
othe r half to the secon d wife and her childr e n,
notwit h s t a n d i n g the manifes t nullity of the
secon d mar ri a g e . It held: "And with resp e c t to
the right of the secon d wife, this Court obse rv e s
that althou g h the secon d marri a g e can be
pre s u m e d to be void ab initio as it was
celeb r a t e d while the first marri a g e was still
subsisti n g, still there is need for judicial
declaration of such nullity."
In Tolentino v. Paras, 14 howeve r, the Court again
held that judicial decla r a t i o n of nullity of a void
mar ri a g e was not nec es s a r y. In that case, a man
mar ri e d twice. In his Deat h Certificat e, his
secon d wife was nam e d as his surviving spous e.
The first wife then filed a Petition to corr e c t the
said entry in the Deat h Certifica t e . The Cour t
rule d in favor of the first wife, holding that "the
secon d mar ri a g e that he cont r a c t e d with privat e
respo n d e n t durin g the lifetim e of the first spous e
is null and void from the beginni n g and of no
force and effect. No judicial decre e is nec e s sary
to establish the invalidity of a void marriag e."
In Wieg el v. Se m pi o- Diy, the Court stre s s e d the
15
nee d for such decla r a t i o n. In that case, Karl
Heinz Wiegel filed an action for the decla r a t i o n
of nullity of his mar ri a g e to Lilia Olivia Wiegel on
the grou n d that the latt e r had a prior existing
mar ri a g e . After pre t ri al, Lilia aske d that she be
allowe d to pres e n t evide nc e to prove, amon g
othe r s, that her first husb a n d had previou sly
bee n marri e d to anot h e r wom a n. In holding that
ther e was no nee d for such evide nc e , the Court
rule d: "x x x Ther e is likewise no nee d of
introd u ci n g evide nc e about the existing prior
mar ri a g e of her first husb a n d at the time they
mar ri e d each other , for then such a marriag e
thoug h void still need s, accordi n g to this Court,
a judicial declaration of such fact and for all
legal inten t s and purpo s e s she would still be
rega r d e d as a mar ri e d wom a n at the time she
cont r a c t e d her mar ri a g e with respo n d e n t Karl
Heinz Wiegel; x x x."
Subs e q u e n t ly, in Yap v. CA , 16 the Court reve r t e d
to the ruling in People v. Men d o z a , holding that
ther e was no nee d for such decla r a t io n of nullity.
In Domin go v. CA, 17 the issue raise d was whet h e r
a judicial decl ar a ti o n of nullity was still
nece s s a r y for the recove ry and the sepa r a t i o n of
prope r ti e s of erst w hil e spous e s. Ruling in the
affirm a t ive, the Court decla r e d : "The Family
Code has settl e d once and for all the conflicting
jurisp r u d e n c e on the mat t e r . A declaration of the
absolut e nullity of a marriage is now explicitly
require d either as a cause of action or a groun d
for defe n s e; in fact, the requi r e m e n t for a
decla r a t i o n of absolut e nullity of a mar ri a g e is
also for the prot ec tio n of the spous e who,
believing that his or her marri a g e is illegal and
void, mar ri e s again. With the judicial decla r a t i o n
of the nullity of his or her first mar ri a g e , the
per so n who marri e s again cannot be cha r g e d
with biga my." 18
Unlike Me n do z a and Aragon, Domin go as well as
the othe r case s herei n cited was not a crimin al
pros e c u ti o n for biga m y.
None t h e l e s s, Domi ng o unde r s c o r e d the nee d for
a judicial decl ar a ti o n of nullity of a void mar ri a g e
on the basis of a new provision of the Family
Code, which cam e into effect sever al year s afte r
the prom ul g a ti o n of Men d o z a and Aragon .
In Men d o z a and Aragon , the Court relied on
Section 29 of Act No. 3613 (Mar ri a g e Law),
which provide d:
"Illegal marriag e s . — Any mar ri a g e subse q u e n t ly
cont r a c t e d by any perso n duri ng the lifetim e of
the first spous e shall be illegal and void from its
perfor m a n c e , unless:
(a) The first mar ri a g e was ann ulle d or
dissolve d;
(b) The first spous e had been abse n t for
seven conse c u t ive years at the time of the
secon d mar ri a g e withou t the spous e
pre s e n t having news of the abse n t e e
being alive, or the abse n t e e being
gen e r a lly consid e r e d as dead and
believe d to be so by the spous e pres e n t at
the time of cont r a c t i n g such subs e q u e n t
mar ri a g e , the mar ri a g e as cont r a c t e d
being valid in eithe r case until decla r e d
null and void by a comp e t e n t court."
The Court held in those two case s that the said
provision "plainly make s a subse q u e n t mar ri a g e
cont r a c t e d by any perso n duri ng the lifetim e of
his first spous e illegal and void from its
perfor m a n c e , and no judicial decre e is nece s sar y
to establish its invalidity, as disting ui s h e d from
mere annulabl e marriag e s. " 19
The provision appe a r e d in subst a n t i ally the sam e
form unde r Article 83 of the 1950 Civil Code and
Article 41 of the Family Code. Howeve r, Article
40 of the Family Code, a new provision,
expr e s sly req ui r e s a judicial decla r a t i o n of nullity
of the previou s marri a g e , as follows:
"ART. 40. The absolut e nullity of a previou s
mar ri a g e may be invoke d for purpo s e s of
rem a r r i a g e on the basis solely of a final
judg m e n t decla ri n g such mar ri a g e void."
In view of this provision, Domi ng o str es s e d that
a final judg m e n t decla ri n g such marri a g e void
was nec e s s a r y. Verily, the Family Code
and Domin go affirm the earlier ruling in Wieg el .
Thus, a Civil Law aut ho ri ty and mem b e r of the
Civil Code Revision Commit e e has obse rv e d:
"[Article 40] is also in line with the rec e n t
decision s of the Supr e m e Cour t that the
mar ri a g e of a perso n may be null and void but
ther e is nee d of a judicial decla r a t io n of such fact
befor e that perso n can marry again; othe r wi s e ,
the secon d marri a g e will also be void (Wiegel v.
Sem pio- Diy, Aug. 19/86, 143 SCRA 499, Vda. De
Consu e g r a v. GSIS, 37 SCRA 315). This
provision chang e s the old rule that wher e a
marriag e is illegal and void from its
perfor m a n c e , no judicial decre e is nece s sar y to
establish its validity (Peopl e v. Men d o z a, 95 Phil.
843; People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033) ." 20
In this light, the stat u t o r y moorin g of the ruling
in Me n do z a and Aragon – that the r e is no nee d
for a judicial decla r a t i o n of nullity of a void
mar ri a g e -- has been cast aside by Article 40 of
the Family Code. Such decla r a t i o n is now
nece s s a r y befor e one can cont r a c t a secon d
mar ri a g e . Absen t that decla r a t i o n, we hold that
one may be cha r g e d with and convict e d of
biga my.
The pre s e n t ruling is consist e n t with our
prono u n c e m e n t in Terre v. Terre, 21 which
involved an administ r a t iv e Com plai n t agai nst a
lawyer for mar ryin g twice. In rejecti n g the
lawyer’s argu m e n t that he was free to ente r into
a secon d mar ri a g e bec a u s e the first one was
void ab initio , the Cour t ruled: "for purpo s e s of
det e r m i ni n g whet h e r a per so n is legally free to
cont r a c t a secon d mar ri a g e , a judicial
decla r a t i o n that the first mar ri a g e was null and
void ab initio is esse n tial ." The Court furt h e r
note d that the said rule was "cast into stat u t o ry
form by Article 40 of the Family Code."
Significa n tly, it obse rv e d that the secon d
mar ri a g e , cont r a c t e d withou t a judicial
decla r a t i o n that the first mar ri a g e was void, was
"biga m o u s and crimi nal in cha r a c t e r ."
Moreov e r, Justice Reyes, an aut ho ri ty in Criminal
Law whose earlie r work was cited by petition e r ,
cha n g e d his view on the subjec t in view of Article
40 of the Family Code and wrot e in 1993 that a
per so n must first obt ain a judicial decla r a t io n of
the nullity of a void marri a g e befor e contr a c t i n g
a subs e q u e n t marri a g e : 22
"It is now set tl e d that the fact that the first
marriag e is void from the begin ni n g is not a
defe n s e in a biga m y charge. As with a voidabl e
marriag e, there mus t be a judicial declaration of
the nullity of a marriag e before contrac tin g the
secon d marriag e . Article 40 of the Family Code
stat e s that x x x. The Code Com mission believe s
that the parti es to a mar ri a g e should not be
allowe d to assu m e that their mar ri a g e is void,
even if such is the fact, but must first secur e a
judicial decla r a t i o n of nullity of thei r mar ri a g e
befor e they should be allowe d to mar ry agai n. x x
x."
In the inst a n t case, petition e r contr a c t e d a
secon d mar ri a g e altho u g h the r e was yet no
judicial decla r a t i o n of nullity of his first
mar ri a g e . In fact, he instit u t e d the Petition to
have the first mar ri a g e decla r e d void only after
compl ai n a n t had filed a lette r- com pl ai nt
cha r gi n g him with biga my. By cont r a c t i n g a
secon d mar ri a g e while the first was still
subsisti n g, he com mit t e d the acts punis h a bl e
und e r Article 349 of the Revise d Penal Code.
That he subse q u e n t ly obt ain e d a judicial
decla r a t i o n of the nullity of the first mar ri a g e
was imm a t e ri al. To repe a t , the crim e had alre a dy
bee n consu m m a t e d by then. Moreov e r, his view
effectively encou r a g e s delay in the pros e c u ti o n
of biga my cases; an accus e d could simply file a
petition to decla r e his previous mar ri a g e void
and invoke the pend e n c y of that action as a
preju dici al ques tio n in the crimi nal case. We
cannot allow that.
Unde r the circu m s t a n c e s of the pre s e n t case, he
is guilty of the char g e agai ns t him.
Damag e s
In her Memo r a n d u m , respo n d e n t prays that the
Court set aside the ruling of the Cour t of Appeals
insofar as it denie d her claim of dam a g e s and
attor n e y’s fees. 23
Her praye r has no merit. She did not app e al the
ruling of the CA agains t her; henc e , she canno t
obtai n affirm a t ive relief from this Court. 24 In any
event, we find no reaso n to reve r s e or set aside
the perti n e n t ruling of the CA on this point,
which we quot e her e u n d e r :
"We are convinc e d from the totality of the
evide n c e pres e n t e d in this case that Consu elo
Tan is not the innoce n t victim that she claims to
be; she was well awa r e of the exist e n c e of the
previous mar ri a g e when she cont r a c t e d
mat ri m o n y with Dr. Merc a d o. The testi m o ni e s of
the defen s e witne s s e s prove this, and we find no
reaso n to doubt said testi m o ni e s.
xxx xxx xxx
"Inde e d, the claim of Consu elo Tan that she was
not awa r e of his previou s marri a g e does not
inspire belief, espe ci ally as she had seen that Dr.
Merc a d o had two (2) childr e n with him. We are
convinc e d that she took the plung e anyway,
relying on the fact that the first wife would no
longe r ret u r n to Dr. Merc a d o, she being by the n
alre a dy living with anot h e r man.
"Consu el o Tan can the r efo r e not claim dam a g e s
in this case wher e she was fully conscious of the
conse q u e n c e s of her act. She should have known
that she would suffer humiliation in the event the
trut h [would] com e out, as it did in this case,
ironically bec a u s e of her perso n a l instig a tio n. If
ther e are inde e d dam a g e s caus e d to her
repu t a t i o n, they are of her own willful making." 25
WHEREFORE , the Petition is DENIED and the
assaile d Decision AFFIRM ED . Costs agains t
petition e r.
G.R. No. 12 6 7 4 6 Nov e m b e r 29,
20 0 0
ARTHU R TE, petition e r,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, and LILIANA
CHOA, respon d e n t s .
DE C IS IO N
KAPU NA N , J.:
Before us is a petition for review
on certiorari which seeks to rever s e the Decision
of the Cour t of Appeals Tent h Division, dat e d 31
August 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No. 2397 1 1 and CA-
G.R. SP No. 2617 8 2 and the Resolution dat e d
Octobe r 18, 1996 denying petition e r’s motion for
recon si d e r a t i o n .
The facts of the case are as follows:
Petition e r Arthu r Te and privat e respo n d e n t
Liliana Choa were mar ri e d in civil rites on
Sept e m b e r 14, 1988. They did not live toge t h e r
after the mar ri a g e altho u g h they would mee t
each other reg ul a rly. Not long after privat e
respo n d e n t gave birt h to a girl on April 21, 1989,
petition e r stopp e d visiting her. 3
On May 20, 1990, while his marri a g e with
privat e respo n d e n t was subsisti n g, petition e r
cont r a c t e d a secon d mar ri a g e with a cert ai n
Juliet a Sant ella (Sant ella). 4
On the basis of a compl ain t- affidavit filed by
privat e respo n d e n t som e ti m e in June 1990, when
she lear n e d about petition e r’s marri a g e to
Sant ella, an inform a t i o n char gi n g petition e r with
biga my was filed with the Region al Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City on August 9, 1990. 5 This
case was docke t e d as Criminal Case No. Q-90-
14409. 6
Mea n w hil e, on July 20, 1990, petition e r filed in
the RTC of Quezon City an action for the
annul m e n t of his mar ri a g e to privat e respo n d e n t
on the groun d that he was force d to mar ry her.
He allege d that privat e respo n d e n t conc e al e d
her preg n a n c y by anot h e r man at the time of
their marri a g e and that she was psychologic ally
incap a ci t a t e d to perfor m her esse n ti al marit al
obliga tion s. 7
On Nove m b e r 8, 1990, privat e respo n d e n t also
filed with the Profession al Regul a tio n
Com mis sio n (PRC) an admi nist r a t iv e case
again s t petition e r and Sant ell a for the revoc a ti on
of their resp e c tiv e engi ne e r i n g licens e s on the
groun d that they com mit t e d acts of immor ality
by living toget h e r and subs e q u e n t l y mar ryin g
each other despit e their knowle d g e that at the
time of their mar ri a g e , petition e r was alre a dy
mar ri e d to privat e respo n d e n t . With resp e c t to
petition e r, privat e respo n d e n t adde d that he
com mit t e d an act of falsification by statin g in his
mar ri a g e cont r a c t with Sant ell a that he was still
singl e. 8
After the prose c u t io n rest e d its case in the
criminal case for biga my, petition e r filed a
dem u r r e r to eviden c e with leave of court and
motion to inhibit the trial court judge for
showin g ant a g o ni s m and animosi ty towa r d s
petition e r’s couns el durin g the hea ri n g s of said
case.
The trial court denie d petition e r’s dem u r r e r to
evide n c e in an Orde r dat e d Nove m b e r 28, 1990
which stat e d that the sam e could not be gra n t e d
bec a u s e the prose c u t i o n had sufficie ntly
est a blis h e d a pri ma facie case agai ns t the
accus e d . 9 The RTC also denie d petition e r’s
motion to inhibit for lack of legal basis. 10
Petition e r the n filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari , allegi ng grave abus e of
discr e tio n on the part of the trial court judge,
Judge Ceza r C. Per al ejo, for (1) exhibitin g
ant a g o ni s m and anim osity towar d s petition e r’s
couns el; (2) violatin g the req ui r e m e n t s of due
proce s s by denying petition e r’s [motion for
recon si d e r a t i o n and] dem u r r e r to evide n c e even
befor e the filing of the sam e; (3) disr e g a r d i n g
and failing to comply with the appr o p ri a t e
guidelin e s for judge s prom ul g a t e d by the
Supr e m e Court; and (4) ruling that in a crimin al
case only "prim a facie eviden c e " is sufficien t for
conviction of an accus e d . This case was docke t e d
as CA-G.R. SP No. 2397 1. 11
Petition e r also filed with the Boar d of Civil
Engin e e r i n g of the PRC (PRC Boar d), wher e the
admi nist r a t iv e case for the revoc a tio n of his
engin e e r i n g licens e was pendi n g, a motion to
susp e n d the proce e di n g s ther ei n in view of the
pend e n c y of the civil case for ann ul m e n t of his
mar ri a g e to privat e respo n d e n t and crimi nal
case for biga m y in Branc h e s 106 and 98,
resp e c tiv ely of the RTC of Quezon City. 12 When
the Boar d denie d the said motion in its Orde r
dat e d July 16, 1991, 13 petition e r filed with the
Court of Appeals anot h e r petition for certiorari ,
cont e n di n g that the Board gravely abus e d its
discr e tio n in: (1) failing to hold that the
resolution of the annul m e n t case is preju dici al to
the outco m e of the admi nist r a t ive case pendi n g
befor e it; (2) not holding that the conti nu a t i o n of
proce e di n g s in the admi ni st r a t i ve case could
rend e r nug a t o r y petition e r’s right again st self-
incrimi n a ti o n in this crimin al case for biga m y
again s t him; and (3) making an overly- swee pi n g
inte r p r e t a t i o n that Section 32 of the Rules and
Regul a tion s Gover ni n g the Regul a tion and
Practic e of Professio n a l s does not allow the
susp e n sio n of the admi ni st r a ti ve proc e e di n g
befor e the PRC Boar d despit e the pend e n c y of
criminal and/or admini st r a t iv e proc e e di n g s
again s t the sam e respo n d e n t involving the sam e
set of facts in othe r court s or tribun a l s. This
petition was docke t e d as CA-G.R. SP No.
26178. 14
The two petition s for certiorari wer e
consolid a t e d since they arose from the sam e set
of facts.
On 31 August 1994, the Court of Appeals, Tenth
Division, rend e r e d the assaile d decision in the
consolid a t e d petition s. The app ella t e court
uph el d the RTC’s denial of the motion to inhibit
due to petition e r’s failur e to show any conc r e t e
evide n c e that the trial court judge exhibit e d
par ti ality and had preju d g e d the case. It also
rule d that the denial of petition e r’s motion to
susp e n d the proce e di n g s on the grou n d of
preju dici al ques tio n was in accor d with law. 15 The
Court of Appeals likewise affirm e d the RTC’s
denial of the dem u r r e r to evide nc e filed by
petition e r for his failure to set forth pers u a si ve
groun d s to suppo r t the sam e, consid e ri n g that
the prose c u t io n was able to adduc e evide n c e
showin g the exist e n c e of the elem e n t s of
biga my. 16
Neit h e r did the appella t e cour t find grave abuse
of discr e tio n on the par t of the Board’s Orde r
denying petition e r’s motion to susp e n d
proce e di n g s in the admi ni st r a t i ve case on the
groun d of prejudici al question. Respo n d e n t cour t
held that no preju di ci al question exist e d since
the action soug h t to be susp e n d e d is
admi nist r a t iv e in nat u r e , and the othe r action
involved is a civil case. 17
Petition e r the r e af t e r filed a motion for
recon si d e r a t i o n of the decision of the Court of
Appeals but the sam e was denie d. 18
Henc e, petition e r filed the inst a n t petition
raising the following issue s:
I no bea ri n g upon the dete r m i n a ti o n of
PUBLIC RESPOND E N T COMMITTED A
SERIOUS ERROR IN REFUSI NG TO
SUSPE ND THE LEGAL [CRIMINAL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE] PROCEEDI NG S
DESPITE THE PENDEN CY OF THE CIVIL
CASE FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY
OF MARRIAGE.
II
PUBLIC RESPOND E N T GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND
COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW IN
NOT HOLDING THAT THE DEMURRER
TO EVIDENC E SHOULD HAVE BEEN
GIVEN DUE COURSE.
III
PUBLIC RESPOND E N T COMMITTED A
SERIOUS LEGAL ERROR IN NOT
HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL JUDGE A
QUO SHOULD HAVE INHIBITED
HIMS ELF. 19
The petition has no merit.
While the ter mi n a t i o n of Civil Case No. Q-90-
6205 for annul m e n t of petition e r’s mar ri a g e to
privat e respo n d e n t has rend e r e d the issue of the
propri e t y of suspe n di n g both the crimin al case
for biga m y befor e the RTC of Quezon City,
Branc h 98 and the admi ni st r a ti ve cas e for
revoc a ti on of petition e r’s engin e e r i n g licens e
befor e the PRC Boar d moot and aca d e m i c, the
Court shall discus s the issue of prejudici al
ques tio n to emp h a siz e the gua r di n g and
cont r olling prec e p t s and rules. 20
A preju dici al ques tio n has bee n define d as one
base d on a fact distinct and sepa r a t e from the
crime but so intim a t e ly conne c t e d with it that it
det e r m i n e s the guilt or innoce n c e of the accus e d,
and for it to susp e n d the crimin al action, it must
app e a r not only that said case involves facts
intim a t e ly relat e d to those upon which the
criminal prose c u t io n would be base d but also
that in the resolution of the issue or issue s raise d
in the civil case, the guilt or innoc e n c e of the
accus e d would nec e s s a r ily be det e r m i n e d . 21 The
ration al e behin d the princi ple of susp e n di n g a
criminal case in view of a prejudi ci al question is
to avoid two conflictin g decision s. 22
The Court of Appeals did not err when it rule d
that the pend e n c y of the civil case for ann ul m e n t
of mar ri a g e filed by petition e r agains t privat e
respo n d e n t did not pose a prejudici al ques tio n
which would nece s si t a t e that the criminal case
for biga m y be susp e n d e d until said civil case is
ter mi n a t e d .
The outco m e of the civil case for annul m e n t of
petition e r’s mar ri a g e to privat e respo n d e n t had
petition e r’s innoce n c e or guilt in the crimin al
case for biga m y, beca u s e all that is requi r e d for
the cha r g e of biga my to prosp e r is that the first
mar ri a g e be subsisti n g at the time the secon d
mar ri a g e is cont r a c t e d . 23 Petition e r’s argu m e n t
that the nullity of his mar ri a g e to privat e
respo n d e n t had to be resolve d first in the civil
case befor e the crimin al proce e di n g s could
continu e , bec a u s e a decla r a ti o n that their
mar ri a g e was void ab initio would nec e s s a r ily
absolve him from crimin al liability, is unt e n a b l e .
The ruling in People vs. Men d o z a 24 and People
vs. Aragon 25 cited by petition e r that no judicial
dec r e e is nece s s a r y to est a blis h the invalidity of
a marri a g e which is void ab initio has bee n
overt u r n e d . The prevailing rule is found in
Article 40 of the Family Code, which was alre a d y
in effect at the time of petition e r’s mar ri a g e to
privat e respo n d e n t in Sept e m b e r 1988. Said
articl e stat e s that the absolut e nullity of a
previous mar ri a g e may not be invoke d for
purpo s e s of rem a r ri a g e unless the r e is a final
judg m e n t decla ri n g such previou s mar ri a g e void.
Thus, und e r the law, a mar ri a g e , even one which
is void or voidable, shall be dee m e d valid until
decla r e d othe r wi s e in a judicial
proce e di n g. 26 In Landic ho vs. Relova, 27 we held
that:
Parti e s to a marri a g e shoul d not be per mi t t e d to
judge for the m s elv e s its nullity, for this must be
submi t t e d to the judgm e n t of comp e t e n t court s
and only when the nullity of a mar ri a g e is so
decla r e d can it be held as void, and so long as
ther e is no such decla r a t i o n the pres u m p t i o n of
mar ri a g e exists. 28
It is clea r from the foregoi n g that the pend e n cy
of the civil case for ann ul m e n t of petition e r’s
mar ri a g e to privat e respo n d e n t did not give rise
to a prejudi ci al ques tio n which warr a n t e d the
susp e n sio n of the proce e di n g s in the crimin al
case for biga m y since at the time of the allege d
com mis sio n of the crim e, thei r mar ri a g e was,
und e r the law, still valid and subsisti n g.
Neit h e r did the filing of said civil case for
annul m e n t nec es si t a t e the susp e n si o n of the
admi nist r a t iv e proce e di n g s befor e the PRC
Board. As discus s e d above, the conce p t of
preju dici al ques tio n involves a civil and a
criminal case. We have previously rule d that
ther e is no preju dici al question whe r e one case is
admi nist r a t iv e and the othe r is civil. 29
Furt h e r m o r e , Section 32 of the Rules and
Regul a tion s Gover ni n g the Regul a tion and
Practic e of Professio n a l s of the PRC Boar d
expr e s sly provide s that the admini st r a t iv e
proce e di n g s befor e it shall not be suspe n d e d
notwit h s t a n d i n g the exist e n c e of a criminal
and/or civil case again st the respo n d e n t
involving the sam e facts as the administ r a t iv e
case:
The filing or pend e n c y of a crimin al and/or civil
case s in the court s or an admi nist r a t iv e case in
anot h e r judicial body again st an exami n e e or
regist e r e d profes sio n a l involving the sam e facts
as in the administ r a t i ve case filed or to be filed
befor e the Boar d shall neith e r susp e n d nor bar
the proce e di n g of the latte r case. The Board
shall proc e e d indep e n d e n t l y with the
investi g a ti o n of the case and shall rend e r ther ei n
its decision withou t awaitin g for the final
decision of the court s or quasi- judicial body.
It must also be note d that the alleg a t ion s in the
admi nist r a t iv e compl ai nt befor e the PRC Board
are not confine d to the issue of the allege d
biga m o u s mar ri a g e cont r a c t e d by petition e r and
Sant ella. Petition e r is also char g e d with immor al
cond u c t for conti nu e d failure to perfor m his
obliga tion s as husb a n d to privat e respo n d e n t and
as fathe r to their child, and for coha bi ti n g with
Sant ella withou t the benefit of mar ri a g e . 30 The
exist e n c e of thes e othe r char g e s justified the
continu a t i o n of the proc e e di n g s befor e the PRC
Board.
Petition e r also cont e n d s that the Court of
Appeals err e d in uphol din g the trial court’s
denial of his dem u r r e r to evide nc e in the
criminal case for biga my, argui n g that the
pros e c u ti o n failed to est a blis h the exist e n c e of
both the first and secon d mar ri a g e s beyon d
reaso n a b l e doubt. Petition e r claim s that the
original copy of mar ri a g e cont r a c t betw e e n him
and privat e respo n d e n t was not pres e n t e d , the
signa t u r e s ther ei n wer e not prope rly identified
and the r e was no showin g that the requisit e s of a
valid mar ri a g e were complied with. He alleg e s
furth e r that the original copy of the mar ri a g e
cont r a c t betw e e n him and Sant ella was not
pre s e n t e d , that no proof that he signe d said
cont r a c t was addu c e d , and that ther e was no
witne s s pres e n t e d to show that a secon d
mar ri a g e cere m o n y particip a t e d in by him ever
took place. 31
We are not pers u a d e d . The gra n t or deni al of a
dem u r r e r to eviden c e is left to the sound
discr e tio n of the trial cour t, and its ruling on the
mat t e r shall not be distu r b e d in the abse n c e of a
grave abuse of such discre tio n. 32 In this case, the
Court of Appeals did not find any grave abus e of
discr e tio n on the part of the trial court, which
base d its denial of the dem u r r e r on two grou n d s:
first, the prose c u t io n est a blish e d a pri ma
facie case for biga m y agains t the petition e r ; and
secon d, petition e r’s alleg a tio n s in the dem u r r e r
were insufficie nt to justify the gra n t of the sam e.
It has bee n held that the appell at e court will not
review in a special civil action for certiorari the
pros e c u ti o n’s evide n c e and decid e in adva n c e
that such eviden c e has or has not yet est a blis h e d
the guilt of the accus e d beyon d rea so n a bl e
doubt. 33 In view of the trial cour t’s finding that
a pri ma facie case agai ns t petition e r exists, his
prope r recou r s e is to addu c e evide n c e in his
defe ns e. 34
The Court also finds it nece s s a r y to corr e c t
petition e r’s misim p r e s s i o n that by denyin g his
dem u r r e r to eviden c e in view of the exist e n c e of
a pri ma facie case agai ns t him, the trial cour t
was alrea d y making a prono u n c e m e n t that he is
liable for the offense cha r g e d . As corr e c tly held
by the Court of Appeals, the orde r of the RTC
denying the dem u r r e r was not an adjudic a ti o n on
the merits but mer ely an evalua ti on of the
sufficiency of the pros ec u t i o n’s evide n c e to
det e r m i n e whe t h e r or not a full- blown trial would
be nece s s a r y to resolve the case. 35 The RTC’s
obse rv a tio n that ther e was a pri ma facie case
again s t petition e r only mea n t that the
pros e c u ti o n had pre s e n t e d sufficie nt evide n c e to
sust ai n its proposition that petition e r had
com mit t e d the offense of biga m y, and unless
petition e r prese n t s evide n c e to rebu t the sam e,
such would be the conclusio n. 36 Said decla r a ti o n
by the RTC should not be const r u e d as a
prono u n c e m e n t of petition e r’s guilt. It was
precis ely bec a u s e of such finding that the trial
court deni e d the dem u r r e r , in orde r that
petition e r may pres e n t evide nc e in his defen s e
and allow said court to resolve the case base d on
the evide n c e addu c e d by both partie s.
Lastly, petition e r cont e n d s that his motion to
inhibit Judge Peral ejo in Crimin al Case No. Q-90-
14409 should have bee n gra n t e d since said judge
exhibit e d parti ality and bias again st him in
sever al inst a n c e s . First, when petition e r
manifes t e d that he would file a motion for
recon si d e r a t i o n of the deni al of his motion to
susp e n d the proce e di n g s in said case, the judge
said such motion was dilatory and would be
denie d even thoug h the motion for
recon si d e r a t i o n had not yet been filed. Secon d,
when petition e r’s couns el manife st e d that he had
just recove r e d from an accide n t and was not
physically fit for trial, the judge com m e n t e d that
couns el was mer ely trying to delay the case and
requi r e d said couns el to produ c e a medic al
certifica t e to suppo r t his stat e m e n t . Third, when
petition e r manife st e d that he was going to file a
dem u r r e r to eviden c e , the judge char a c t e r i z e d
the sam e as dilatory and decla r e d that he would
deny the sam e. Accordi n g to petition e r , the
judge’s hostile attit u d e towa r d s petition e r’s
couns el as show n in the foregoi n g insta n c e s
justified the gra n t of his motion to inhibit.
We agr e e with the app ell at e court that the
groun d s raise d by petition e r agains t Judge
Peral ejo did not conclusively show that the latte r
was biase d and had prejud g e d the
case. 37 In People of the Philippi ne s vs. Court of
Appeals, 38 this Cour t held that while bias and
preju dic e have been recog niz e d as valid reaso n s
for the volunt a r y inhibition of a judge unde r
Section 1, Rule 137, the rudi m e n t a r y rule is that
the mer e suspicion that a judge is parti al is not
enoug h. Ther e should be clear and convincing
evide n c e to prove the char g e of bias and
par ti ality. 39
Furt h e r m o r e , since the groun d s raise d by
petition e r in his motion to inhibit are not amon g
thos e expr e s sly mentio n e d in Section 1, Rule 137
of the Revise d Rules of Court, the decision to
inhibit himself lay within the sound discr e ti on of
Judge Peral ejo. Said provision of law stat e s:
Section 1. Disqualification of judge s. – No judge
or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which
he, or his wife or child, is pecu ni a rily inter e s t e d
as heir, legat e e , cre dit or or othe r wis e, or in
which he is relat e d to eithe r party within the
sixth degr e e of cons a n g u i ni ty or affinity, or to
couns el within the fourt h deg r e e , comp u t e d
accor di n g to the rules of the civil law, or in
which he has bee n exec ut o r , admi nist r a t o r ,
gua r di a n , trust e e or couns el, or in which he has
pre si d e d in any inferior court whe n his ruling or
decision is the subjec t of review, without the
writt e n conse n t of all parti e s in inte r e s t , signe d
by the m and ent e r e d upon the recor d.
A judge may, in the exer cise of his soun d
discr e tio n, disqu alify himself from sitting in the
case, for just and valid rea so n s othe r than those
mention e d above.
Thus, it was not man d a t o r y that the judge inhibit
himself from hea ri n g and decidi ng the case.
This Court does not find any abus e of discr e ti o n
by respo n d e n t judge in denying petition e r’s
motion to inhibit. The test for det e r m i ni n g the
propri e t y of the denial of said motion is whet h e r
petition e r was deprive d a fair and impa r ti al
trial. 40 The inst a n c e s whe n Judge Peral ejo
allege dly exhibit e d ant a g o ni s m and par ti ality
again s t petition e r and/or his couns el did not
deprive him of a fair and impar ti al trial. As
discus s e d earlier, the deni al by the judge of
petition e r’s motion to susp e n d the crimin al
proce e di n g and the dem u r r e r to evide n c e are in
accor d with law and jurisp r u d e n c e . Neith e r was
ther e anyt hi n g unr e a s o n a b l e in the requi r e m e n t
that petition e r’s couns el sub mi t a medic al
certifica t e to suppo r t his claim that he suffer e d
an accide n t which rend e r e d him unpr e p a r e d for
trial. Such requi r e m e n t was evide n tly impos e d
upon petition e r’s couns el to ensu r e that the
resolution of the case was not ham p e r e d by
unn ec e s s a r y and unjustified delays, in keepi n g
with the judge’s duty to disposin g of the court’s
busine s s prom p tly. 41
WHEREFORE, the petition is her e by DENIED
for lack of merit.
G.R. No. 16 4 4 3 5 Se p t e m b e r 29,
20 0 9
VICTORIA S. JARILLO, Petition e r,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPI N E S , Respo n d e n t .
DE C IS IO N
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This resolves the Petition for Review
on Certiorari unde r Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, prayin g that the Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA), date d July 21, 2003, and its
Resolution 2 dat e d July 8, 2004, be reve r s e d and
set aside.
On May 31, 2000, petition e r was char g e d with
Bigamy befor e the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasay City, Branc h 117 unde r the following
Inform a t i o n in Criminal Case No. 00- 08- 11:
INFORMATION
The und e r si g n e d Assist a n t City Prose c u t o r
accus e s VICTORIA S. JARILLO of the crim e of
BIGAMY, com mit t e d as follows:
That on or about the 26th day of Nove m b e r
1979, in Pasay City, Met ro Manila, Philippin e s
and within the jurisdic tion of this Honor a bl e
Court, the above- nam e d accus e d , Victori a S.
Jarillo, being previou sly unit e d in lawful
mar ri a g e with Rafael M. Alocillo, and withou t the
said mar ri a g e having been legally dissolve d, did
then and the r e willfully, unlawf ully and
feloniously cont r a c t a secon d mar ri a g e with
Emm a n u e l Ebor a Santo s Uy which mar ri a g e was
only discove r e d on Janua r y 12, 1999.
Cont r a r y to law.
On July 14, 2000, petition e r plea d e d not guilty
durin g arr ai g n m e n t and, ther e a ft e r , trial
proce e d e d .
The undisp u t e d facts, as accu r a t e ly sum m a r iz e d
by the CA, are as follows.
On May 24, 1974, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael
Alocillo were mar ri e d in a civil weddi n g
cere m o ny solem nize d by Hon. Monico C. Tanya g,
then Municip al Mayor of Taguig, Rizal (Exhs. A,
A-1, H, H- 1, H- 2, O, O-1, pp. 20- 21, TSN date d
Nove m b e r 17, 2000).
On May 4, 1975, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael
Alocillo again celeb r a t e d marri a g e in a chur c h
weddin g cer e m o ny befor e Rev. Angel Result ay in
San Carlos City, Pang a si n a n (pp. 25- 26, TSN
dat e d Nove m b e r 17, 2000). Out of the marit al
union, appell a n t begot a daug h t e r , Rachelle J.
Alocillo on Octobe r 29, 1975 (Exhs. F, R, R-1).
Appella nt Victoria Jarillo the r e af t e r cont r a c t e d a
subs e q u e n t mar ri a g e with Emm a n u e l Ebora
Sant os Uy, at the City Court of Pasay City,
Branc h 1, before then Hon. Judge Nicano r Cruz
on Nove m b e r 26, 1979 (Exhs. D, J, J-1, Q, Q-1,
pp. 15- 18, TSN date d Novem b e r 22, 2000).
On April 16, 1995, app ell a n t and Em m a n u e l Uy
exch a n g e d marit al vows anew in a churc h
weddin g in Manila (Exh. E).
In 1999, Emm a n u e l Uy filed again s t the
app ella n t Civil Case No. 99- 93582 for ann ul m e n t
of mar ri a g e befor e the Region al Trial Court of
Manila.
Ther e af t e r , app ella n t Jarillo was cha r g e d with
biga my befor e the Region al Trial Cour t of Pasay
City x x x.
xxxx
Pare n t h e t i c ally, accus e d- appella n t filed agains t
Alocillo, on Octobe r 5, 2000, before the Region al
Trial Court of Maka ti, Civil Case No. 00- 1217, for
decla r a t i o n of nullity of their mar ri a g e .
On July 9, 2001, the court a quo prom ul g a t e d the
assaile d decision, the disposi tive portion of
which stat e s:
WHERE FOR E, upon the foregoi n g pre mi s e s, this
court her e by finds accus e d Victoria Soria no
Jarillo GUILTY beyond reaso n a b l e doubt of the
crime of BIGAMY.
Accordi n gly, said accus e d is her e by sent e n c e d to
suffer an indet e r m i n a t e pen al ty of SIX (6) YEARS
of prision corr e c cio n a l, as minim u m , to TEN (10)
YEARS of prision mayor, as maxim u m .
This court makes no prono u n c e m e n t on the civil
aspe c t of this case, such as the nullity of
accus e d’s biga m o u s mar ri a g e to Uy and its effect
on thei r childr e n and their prop e r t y. This aspe c t
is being det e r m i n e d by the Region al Trial Court
of Manila in Civil Case No. 99- 93582.
Costs agains t the accus e d.
The motion for reconsi d e r a t i o n was likewise
denie d by the sam e court in that assaile d Orde r
dat e d 2 August 2001. 3
For her defen s e , petition e r insist e d that (1) her
1974 and 1975 mar ri a g e s to Alocillo were null
and void beca u s e Alocillo was allege dly still
mar ri e d to a cert ai n Lorett a Tillma n at the time
of the celeb r a t i o n of thei r mar ri a g e ; (2) her
mar ri a g e s to both Alocillo and Uy wer e null and
void for lack of a valid mar ri a g e licens e; and (3)
the action had presc ri b e d , since Uy knew about
her mar ri a g e to Alocillo as far back as 1978.
On appe al to the CA, petition e r’s conviction was
affirm e d in toto. In its Decision dat e d July 21,
2003, the CA held that petition e r com mit t e d
biga my when she cont r a c t e d mar ri a g e with
Emm a n u e l Sant o s Uy bec a u s e , at that time, her
mar ri a g e to Rafael Alocillo had not yet bee n
decla r e d null and void by the court. This being
so, the pres u m p t i o n is, her previou s mar ri a g e to
Alocillo was still existing at the time of her
mar ri a g e to Uy. The CA also struc k down, for
lack of sufficien t evide nc e , petition e r’s
cont e n ti o n s that her marri a g e s wer e celeb r a t e d
without a mar ri a g e licens e, and that Uy had
notice of her previous mar ri a g e as far back as
1978.
In the mea n ti m e , the RTC of Maka ti City, Branc h
140, rend e r e d a Decision dat e d Marc h 28, 2003,
decla ri n g petition e r’s 1974 and 1975 mar ri a g e s
to Alocillo null and void ab initio on the groun d
of Alocillo’s psychologic al incap a ci ty. Said
decision beca m e final and exec ut o ry on July 9,
2003. In her motion for recon si d e r a t i o n ,
petition e r invoke d said decla r a t io n of nullity as a
groun d for the reve r s al of her conviction.
Howev e r, in its Resolution date d July 8, 2004,
the CA, citing Tene b r o v. Cour t of
Appeals, 4 denie d recon si d e r a t i o n and ruled that
"[t]he subs e q u e n t decla r a t i o n of nullity of her
first mar ri a g e on the grou n d of psychologi c al
incap a ci ty, while it ret ro a c t s to the dat e of the
celeb r a t io n of the mar ri a g e insofa r as the
vinculu m bet w e e n the spous e s is conce r n e d , the
said mar ri a g e is not withou t legal conse q u e n c e s ,
amon g which is incur ri n g crimin al liability for
biga my." 5
Henc e, the pre s e n t petition for review on
certior a ri und e r Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
whe r e petition e r allege s that:
V.1. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN PROCEEDING WITH
THE CASE DESPITE THE PENDE NCY OF A
CASE WHICH IS PREJUDICIAL TO THE
OUTCOME OF THIS CASE.
V.2. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE
CONVICTION OF PETITIONER FOR THE CRIME
OF BIGAMY DESPITE THE SUPERVENI NG
PROOF THAT THE FIRST TWO MARRIAGES OF
PETITIONER TO ALOCILLO HAD BEEN
DECLARED BY FINAL JUDGMENT NULL AND
VOID AB INITIO.
V.3. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT CONSIDERING
THAT THERE IS A PENDING ANNULME NT OF
MARRIAGE AT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
BRANCH 38 BETWEEN EMMANUEL SANTOS
AND VICTORIA S. JARILLO.
V.4. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT CONSIDERING
THAT THE INSTANT CASE OF BIGAMY HAD
ALREADY PRESCRIBED.
V.5. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT CONSIDERING
THAT THE MARRIAGE OF VICTORIA JARILLO
AND EMMANUEL SANTOS UY HAS NO VALID
MARRIAGE LICENS E.
V.6. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT ACQUITTING THE
PETITIONER BUT IMPOSED AN ERRONEOU S
PENALTY UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE
AND THE INDETERMINATE SENTE NC E LAW.
The first, secon d, third and fifth issue s, being
closely relat e d , shall be discuss e d jointly. It is
true that right after the pre se n t a t i o n of the
pros e c u ti o n evide nc e , petition e r moved for
susp e n sio n of the proce e di n g s on the grou n d of
the pend e n c y of the petition for decla r a t i o n of
nullity of petition e r’s mar ri a g e s to Alocillo,
which, petition e r claim e d involved a preju dici al
ques tio n. In her appe al, she also asse r t e d that
the petition for decl ar a ti o n of nullity of her
mar ri a g e to Uy, initiat e d by the latt e r, was a
groun d for suspe n si o n of the proc e e di n g s. The
RTC deni e d her motion for susp e n si o n, while the
CA struc k down her argu m e n t s . In Marb ell a-
Bobis v. Bobis, 6 the Court cat e g o ri c ally stat e d
that:
x x x as rule d in Landic ho v. Relova , he who
cont r a c t s a secon d mar ri a g e befor e the judicial
decla r a t i o n of nullity of the first marri a g e
assu m e s the risk of being pros e c u t e d for biga my,
and in such a case the crimin al case may not be
susp e n d e d on the grou n d of the pend e n c y of a
civil case for decla r a t i o n of nullity. x x x
xxxx
x x x The rea so n is that, withou t a judicial
decla r a t i o n of its nullity, the first mar ri a g e is
pre s u m e d to be subsisti n g. In the case at bar,
respo n d e n t was for all legal inten t s and pur pos e s
rega r d e d as a mar ri e d man at the time he
cont r a c t e d his secon d marri a g e with petition e r.
Against this legal backd r o p , any decision in the
civil action for nullity would not eras e the fact
that respo n d e n t ent e r e d into a secon d mar ri a g e
durin g the subsist e n c e of a first mar ri a g e . Thus,
a decision in the civil case is not esse n ti al to the
det e r m i n a t i o n of the crimin al cha r g e . It is,
ther efo r e , not a prejudici al ques tio n. x x x 7
The foregoin g ruling had bee n reit e r a t e d in
Abuna d o v. People, 8 whe r e it was held thus:
The subs e q u e n t judicial decla r a t i o n of the nullity
of the first mar ri a g e was imm a t e r i al beca u s e
prior to the decl ar a ti o n of nullity, the crim e had
alre a dy bee n consu m m a t e d . Moreov e r,
petition e r’s asse r t io n would only delay the
pros e c u ti o n of biga m y case s consid e ri n g that an
accus e d could simply file a petition to decla r e his
previous mar ri a g e void and invoke the pend e n c y
of that action as a preju dicial que stio n in the
criminal case. We canno t allow that.
The outco m e of the civil case for annul m e n t of
petition e r’s mar ri a g e to [privat e compl ai n a n t ]
had no bea ri n g upon the det e r m i n a t i o n of
petition e r’s innoce n c e or guilt in the crimin al
case for biga m y, beca u s e all that is requi r e d for
the cha r g e of biga my to prosp e r is that the first
mar ri a g e be subsisti n g at the time the secon d
mar ri a g e is cont r a c t e d .
Thus, und e r the law, a mar ri a g e , even one which
is void or voidable, shall be dee m e d valid until
decla r e d othe r wi s e in a judicial proce e di n g . In
this case, even if petition e r event u ally obt ain e d a
decla r a t i o n that his first mar ri a g e was void ab
initio, the point is, both the first and the secon d
mar ri a g e wer e subsistin g befor e the first
mar ri a g e was annulle d. 9
For the very sam e reaso n s elucid a t e d in the
above- quot e d case s, petition e r’s conviction of the
crime of biga m y must be affirm e d. The
subs e q u e n t judicial decla r a t i o n of nullity of
petition e r’s two mar ri a g e s to Alocillo canno t be
conside r e d a valid defe ns e in the crim e of
biga my. The mom e n t petition e r cont r a c t e d a
secon d mar ri a g e withou t the previou s one
having bee n judicially decla r e d null and void, the
crime of biga m y was alrea d y consu m m a t e d
bec a u s e at the time of the celeb r a t i o n of the
secon d mar ri a g e , petition e r’s mar ri a g e to
Alocillo, which had not yet been decla r e d null
and void by a court of comp e t e n t jurisdiction,
was dee m e d valid and subsisti n g. Neith e r would
a judicial decl ar a ti o n of the nullity of petition e r’s
mar ri a g e to Uy make any differ e n c e . 10 As held in
Tene b r o, "[s]ince a mar ri a g e cont r a c t e d durin g
the subsist e n c e of a valid mar ri a g e is
auto m a t i c a lly void, the nullity of this secon d
mar ri a g e is not per se an arg u m e n t for the
avoida n c e of crimin al liability for biga my. x x x A
plain rea di n g of [Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code], ther efo r e , would indica t e that the
provision penalize s the mer e act of cont r a c t i n g a
secon d or subs e q u e n t mar ri a g e durin g the
subsist e n c e of a valid mar ri a g e ." 11
Petition e r’s defen s e of presc ri p ti on is likewise
doom e d to fail.
Unde r Article 349 of the Revise d Penal Code,
biga my is punish a bl e by prision mayor, which is
classified unde r Article 25 of said Code as an
afflictive pen al ty. Article 90 the r e of provide s that
"[c]rim e s punish a bl e by othe r afflictive penalti e s
shall presc ri b e in fiftee n years," while Article 91
stat e s that "[t]he period of pre sc ri p tio n shall
com m e n c e to run from the day on which the
crime is discove r e d by the offend e d party, the
aut ho ri tie s, or thei r age n t s x x x ."
Petition e r asse r t s that Uy had known of her
previous mar ri a g e as far back as 1978; henc e ,
pre sc ri p tio n beg a n to run from that time. Note
that the party who raise s a fact as a mat t e r of
defe ns e has the burd e n of proving it. The
defe n d a n t or accus e d is oblige d to produ c e
evide n c e in suppo r t of its defen s e; other wi s e,
failing to est a blish the sam e, it rem ai n s self-
serving. 12 Thus, for petition e r’s defe ns e of
pre sc ri p tio n to prosp e r , it was incu m b e n t upon
her to addu c e evide nc e that as early as the year
1978, Uy alre a dy obtai n e d knowle d g e of her
previous mar ri a g e .
A close exami n a ti o n of the recor d s of the case
reve al s that petition e r utte rly failed to pres e n t
sufficient evide nc e to suppo r t her alleg a tio n.
Petition e r’s testi m o ny that her own mot h e r told
Uy in 1978 that she (petition e r ) is alre a dy
mar ri e d to Alocillo does not inspir e belief, as it is
totally unsu p p o r t e d by any corro bo r a t i n g
evide n c e. The trial cour t corr e c tly obse rv e d that:
x x x She did not call to the witne s s stan d her
mot h e r – the perso n who allege dly act u ally told
Uy about her previous mar ri a g e to Alocillo. It
must be obvious that withou t the confir m a t o r y
testi m o ny of her moth e r, the att rib u tio n of the
latt e r of any act which she allege dly did is
hea r s a y. 13
As ruled in Ser m o ni a v. Court of Appeals, 14 "the
pre sc ri p tive period for the crim e of biga m y
shoul d be count e d only from the day on which
the said crim e was discove r e d by the offend e d
par ty, the aut ho ri ti e s or their [age n t s]," as
oppos e d to being count e d from the dat e of
regist r a t i o n of the biga m o u s mar ri a g e . 15 Since
petition e r failed to prove with cert ai n t y that the
period of presc ri p t io n bega n to run as of 1978,
her defen s e is, the r efo r e , ineffect u al.
Finally, petition e r avers that the RTC and the CA
impos e d an erron e o u s pen alty unde r the Revise d
Penal Code. Again, petition e r is mist a k e n.
The Indet e r m i n a t e Sent e n c e Law provide s that
the accus e d shall be sent e n c e d to an
indet e r m i n a t e pen al ty, the maxim u m ter m of
which shall be that which, in view of the
att e n di n g circu m s t a n c e s , could be prop e rly
impos e d und e r the Revise d Penal Code, and the
minim u m of which shall be within the ran g e of
the pen alty next lower tha n that presc ri b e d by
the Code for the offens e, without first
conside ri n g any modifying circu m s t a n c e
att e n d a n t to the com mis sion of the crime. The
Indet e r m i n a t e Sent e n c e Law leaves it entir ely
within the sound discr e tio n of the court to
det e r m i n e the minim u m penal ty, as long as it is
anyw h e r e within the ran g e of the pen alty next
lower withou t any refer e n c e to the periods into
which it might be subdivide d. The modifying
circu m s t a n c e s are conside r e d only in the
imposition of the maxim u m ter m of the
indet e r m i n a t e sent e n c e . 16
Applying the foregoi n g rule, it is clear that the
pen al ty impose d on petition e r is prope r . Unde r
Article 349 of the Revise d Penal Code, the
impos a bl e penal ty for biga my is prision mayor.
The pen al ty next lowe r is prision corr e c cion a l,
which ran g e s from 6 mont h s and 1 day to 6
year s. The minim u m pen al ty of six year s impose d
by the trial court is, the r efo r e , corr e c t as it is
still within the dur a ti on of prision corr e c cio n al. ther e u p o n made inqui rie s in the cour s e of which
Ther e being no mitiga ti n g or aggr a v a t i n g she obt ain e d Patrick's birt h certificat e 6 from the
circu m s t a n c e s prove n in this case, the Local Civil Regist r a r of Hima m a yl a n City, Negr o s
pre sc ri b e d pen al ty of prision mayor should be Occide n t al with the following entri e s:
impos e d in its medi u m period, which is from 8
year s and 1 day to 10 year s. Again, the trial Nam e of Child : PATRICK ALVIN
court corr e c t ly impose d a maxim u m penalty of CELESTIAL TITULAR
10 years. Date of Birth : 01 Janua ry 1996
Howev e r, for hum a ni t a r i a n purpo s e s, and
conside ri n g that petition e r’s mar ri a g e to Alocillo Moth e r : Lucille Celesti al
has afte r all bee n decla r e d by final judg m e n t 17 to Titular
be void ab initio on accou n t of the latte r’s Fath e r : Pablito S. Braza
psychologic al incap a ci ty, by reaso n of which,
petition e r was subjec t e d to manip ul a tive abus e, Date Received at Janua ry 13, 1997
the Cour t dee m s it prop e r to reduc e the penal ty the Local Civil
impos e d by the lower cour t s. Thus, petition e r Regist r a r :
shoul d be sent e n c e d to suffer an indet e r m i n a t e
Annot ati on : "Late Regist r a t i o n "
pen al ty of impriso n m e n t from Two (2) years,
Four (4) mont h s and One (1) day of prision Annot ati on/R e m a "Ackn o w l e d g e (si c )
corr e c cio n al, as minim u m , to 8 years and 1 day rks : by th e fath e r
of prision mayor, as maxim u m . Pabl i t o Braz a
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOIN G , the petition on Janu ary 13,
is PARTLY GRANTED . The Decision of the 19 9 7 "
Court of Appeals dat e d July 21, 2003, and its Rem a r k s : Legi ti m a t e d by
Resolution dat e d July 8, 2004 are her e by
virtu e of
MODIFIED as to the penal ty impos e d , but
su b s e q u e n t
AFFIRMED in all othe r resp e c t s. Petition e r is
marri a g e of
sent e n c e d to suffer an indet e r m i n a t e pen alty of
par e n t s on April
imprison m e n t from Two (2) year s, Four (4)
22, 19 9 8 at Mani l a .
mont h s and One (1) day of prision corr e c ci o n al,
Henc efor t h , the child
as mini m u m , to Eight (8) years and One (1) day
shall be know n
of prision mayor, as maxim u m .
as Patri c k Alvin
MA. CRISTINA TORRE S BRAZA, PAOLO Titul ar
JOSEF T. BRAZA an d JANELLE ANN T. Braz a (Emp h a si s
BRAZA, Petition e r s , and und e r s c o r i n g
vs. supplie d)
THE CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR OF
HIMAMAYLAN CITY, NEGRO S Ma. Cristina likewise obtain e d a copy 7 of a
OCCIDE NTAL, mi n o r PATRICK ALVIN mar ri a g e cont r a c t showing that Pablo and Lucille
TITULAR BRAZA, repr e s e n t e d by LEON were marri e d on April 22, 1998, drawi n g her and
TITULAR, CECILIA TITULAR and LUCILLE her co- petition e r s to file on Dece m b e r 23, 2005
C. TITULAR, Respon d e n t s . befor e the Region al Trial Court of Hima m a yl a n
City, Negr o s Occide n t a l a petition 8 to corre c t the
DE C IS IO N ent rie s in the birt h recor d of Pat rick in the Local
CARPIO MORALES , J.: Civil Regist e r .
Petition e r Ma. Cristin a Torre s (Ma. Cristina) and Cont e n di n g that Patrick could not have bee n
Pablo Sicad Braza, Jr. (Pablo), also known as legiti m a t e d by the suppos e d mar ri a g e bet w e e n
"Pablito Sicad Braza," were mar ri e d 1 on Janua ry Lucille and Pablo, said mar ri a g e being biga m o u s
4, 1978. The union bore Ma. Cristina’s co- on accou n t of the valid and subsisti n g mar ri a g e
petition e r s Paolo Josef 2 and Janelle Ann 3 on May betw e e n Ma. Cristin a and Pablo, petition e r s
8, 1978 and June 7, 1983, resp e c t ively, and Gian praye d for (1) the correc tion of the entri es in
Carlo 4 on June 4, 1980. Patrick's birt h recor d with resp e c t to his
legiti m a tio n, the nam e of the fathe r and
Pablo died 5 on April 15, 2002 in a vehicul a r
his acknowl e d g m e n t , and the use of the last
accid e n t in Bandu n g , West Java, Indon e si a.
nam e "Braza"; 2) a directive to Leon, Cecilia and
During the wake following the rep a t ri a ti o n of his Lucille, all sur n a m e d Titula r, as gua r di a n s of the
rem ai n s to the Philippin e s, respo n d e n t Lucille minor Patrick, to sub m i t Parick to DNA testing to
Titular (Lucille) bega n introd u ci n g her co- det e r m i n e his pat e r ni ty and filiation; and 3) the
respo n d e n t minor Pat rick Alvin Titula r Braza decla r a t i o n of nullity of the legitim a ti o n of
(Pat rick) as her and Pablo's son. Ma. Cristin a Patrick as stat e d in his birth certifica t e and, for
this purpo s e , the declaration of the marriag e of
Lucille and Pablo as biga m o u s .
On Patrick’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
Jurisdic tion, the trial cour t, by Orde r 9 of
Sept e m b e r 6, 2007, dismiss e d the petition
without prejudic e, it holding that in a speci al
proce e di n g for corre c t io n of entry, the cour t,
which is not acting as a family court unde r the
Family Code, has no jurisdiction over an action
to annul the mar ri a g e of Lucille and Pablo,
impu g n the legitim a cy of Patrick, and orde r
Patrick to be subjec t e d to a DNA test, henc e , the
cont r ov e r sy should be ventilat e d in an ordina r y
adve r s a r i al action.
Petition e r s’ motion for recon si d e r a t i o n having
bee n denie d by Orde r 10 of Nove m b e r 29, 2007,
they filed the pres e n t petition for review.
Petition e r s maint ai n that the cour t a quo may
pass upon the validity of mar ri a g e and que stio n s
on legitim a c y even in an action to corre c t ent ri e s
in the civil regist r a r . Citing Cariño v.
Cariño, 11 Lee v. Court of Appeals 12 and Repu blic
v. Kho , 13 they cont e n d that even subst a n t i al
error s, such as those sough t to be corre c t e d in
the pres e n t case, can be the subjec t of a petition
und e r Rule 108. 14
The petition fails. In a speci al proc e e di n g for
corr e c ti o n of entry und e r Rule 108 (Canc ella tion
or Corr e c ti on of Ent ri e s in the Original Regist ry),
the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify
mar ri a g e s and rule on legitim a cy and filiation.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Cour t vis a vis Article
412 of the Civil Code 15 char t s the proc e d u r e by
which an ent ry in the civil regist r y may be
canc ell e d or corr e c t e d . The proce e di n g
cont e m pl a t e d ther ei n may gene r a lly be used only
to corre c t clerical, spelling, typog r a p h i c a l and
othe r innoc uo u s erro r s in the civil regist r y. A
clerical erro r is one which is visible to the eyes
or obvious to the unde r s t a n d i n g ; an erro r mad e
by a clerk or a tra n sc ri b e r ; a mist a k e in copying
or writing, or a har ml e s s cha n g e such as a
corr e c ti o n of nam e that is clea rly missp ell e d or
of a misst a t e m e n t of the occup a t io n of the
par e n t . Subst a n ti al or cont e n t io u s alte r a t i o n s
may be allowe d only in adve r s a r i al proce e di n g s,
in which all inter e s t e d par ti e s are imple a d e d and
due proc e s s is prope r ly obse rv e d. 16
The allega tion s of the petition filed befor e the
trial court clea rly show that petition e r s seek to
nullify the marri a g e bet w e e n Pablo and Lucille
on the groun d that it is biga m o u s and impug n
Patrick’s filiation in conn e c tio n with which they
ask the cour t to orde r Patrick to be subjec t e d to
a DNA test.
Petition e r s insist, howeve r , that the main caus e
of action is for the corr e c tio n of Patrick’s birt h
reco r d s 17 and that the rest of the praye r s are
mer ely incide n t a l ther e t o.
Petition e r s’ position does not lie. Their caus e of
action is act u ally to seek the decla r a t i o n of Pablo
and Lucille’s marri a g e as void for being
biga m o u s and impu g n Pat rick’s legiti m a cy,
which cause s of action are gove r n e d not by Rule
108 but by A.M. No. 02- 11- 10- SC which took
effect on Marc h 15, 2003, and Art. 171 18 of the
Family Code, resp e c t ively, henc e, the petition
shoul d be filed in a Family Cour t as expr e s sly
provide d in said Code.
It is well to em ph a si z e that, doct ri n ally, validity
of mar ri a g e s as well as legiti m a cy and filiation
can be question e d only in a direc t action
seaso n a bly filed by the prop e r par ty, and not
thro u g h collat e r al att a c k such as the petition
filed befor e the cour t a quo .
Petition e r s’ relianc e on the case s they cited is
misplac e d.
Cariño v. Cariño was an action filed by a secon d
wife agains t the first wife for the ret u r n of one-
half of the dea t h ben efits received by the first
after the deat h of the husb a n d . Since the secon d
wife contr a c t e d mar ri a g e with the husb a n d while
the latt e r’s mar ri a g e to the first wife was still
subsisti n g, the Court rule d on the validity of the
two mar ri a g e s , it being esse n ti al to the
det e r m i n a t i o n of who is rightfully entitle d to the
dea t h benefits.
In Lee v. Court of Appeals , the Cour t held that
cont r a r y to the cont e n t i o n that the petitions filed
by the ther ei n petition e r s befor e the lower court s
were actions to impug n legitim a c y, the praye r
was not to decla r e that the petition e r s are
illegiti m a t e childre n of Keh Shiok Chen g as
stat e d in thei r recor d s of birth but to est a blis h
that they are not the latte r’s childr e n, henc e,
ther e was nothin g to impu g n as ther e was no
blood relation at all betw e e n
the petition e r s and Keh Shiok Chen g. That is
why the Court orde r e d the canc ell a tio n of the
nam e of Keh Shiok Chen g as the petition e r s’
mot h e r and the substit u tio n ther e of with "Tiu
Chua n" who is their biological mot h e r . Thus, the
collat e r al att a c k was allowe d and the petition
dee m e d as adve rs a r i al proce e di n g cont e m p l a t e d
und e r Rule 108.
In Repu blic v. Kho , it was the petition e r s
the m s elv e s who soug h t the corr e c t io n of the
ent rie s in their resp e c tiv e birt h recor d s to reflect
that they wer e illegitim a t e and that thei r
citize ns hi p is "Filipino," not Chine s e , bec a u s e
their par e n t s wer e never legally mar ri e d . Again,
conside ri n g that the cha n g e s soug h t to be made
were subst a n t i al and not mer ely innocuo u s , the
Court, finding the proc e e di n g s unde r Rule 108 to
be adver s a r i a l in nat u r e , uph el d the lowe r
court’s gra n t of the petition.
It is thus clea r that the facts in the above- cited
case s are vastly differ e n t from those obt ainin g in
the pres e n t case.
WHEREFORE , the petition is DENIE D .
1. 3 WHO MAY FILE ACTION FOR
DECLARATIO N OF NULLITY
G.R. No. 17 9 9 2 2 De c e m b e r 16, 20 0 8
JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS, petition e r ,
vs.
FELICIDAD SANDOVAL, als o kno w n as
FELICIDAD S. VDA. DE CARLOS or
FELICIDAD SANDOVAL CARLOS or
FELICIDAD SANDOVAL VDA. DE CARLOS,
and TEOFILO CARLOS II, respo n d e n t s .
D E C I S I O N
REYES, R.T., J.:
ONLY a spous e can initiat e an action to seve r the
marit al bond for mar ri a g e s solem niz e d durin g
the effectivity of the Family Code, except case s
com m e n c e d prior to Marc h 15, 2003. The nullity
and annul m e n t of a mar ri a g e canno t be decla r e d
in a judg m e n t on the plea di n g s, sum m a r y
judg m e n t , or confession of judg m e n t .
We prono u n c e thes e princi pl es as We review
on certiorari the Decision 1 of the Cour t of
Appeals (CA) which reve r s e d and set aside the
sum m a r y judg m e n t 2 of the Region al Trial Court
(RTC) in an action for decla r a ti o n of nullity of
mar ri a g e , stat u s of a child, recove ry of prope r t y,
reconvey a n c e , sum of money, and dam a g e s .
The Fact s
The event s that led to the instit ution of the
inst a n t suita r e unveiled as follows:
Spous e s Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemi a died
intest a t e . They left six parc el s of land to their
comp ul so r y heirs, Teofilo Carlos and petition e r
Juan De Dios Carlos. The lots are partic ul a rly
desc ri b e d as follows:
Parc el No. 1
Lot No. 162 of the MUNTINLUPA
ESTATE SUBDIVISION, Case No. 6137 of
the Cour t of Land Regist r a t i o n.
Exem p tio n from the provision s of Article
567 of the Civil Code is specifically
rese rv e d.
Area: 1 hect a r e , 06 ares, 07 cent a r e s.
Parc el No. 2
A parc el of land (Lot No. 159- B), being a
portion of Lot 159, situa t e d in the Bo. of
Alaba n g, Municip ality of Munti nl u p a ,
Provinc e of Rizal, x x x cont aini n g an are a
of Thirte e n Thous a n d Four Hund r e d Forty
One (13,441) squa r e met e r s.
Parc el No. 3
A parc el of land (Lot 159- B-2 of the subd.
plan [LRC] Psd- 32590 3, approve d as a
non- subd. projec t), being a portion of Lot
159- B [LRC] Psd- Alaban g, Mun. of
Munti nlu p a , Met ro Manila, Island of
Luzon. Bound e d on the NE, points 2 to 4
by Lot 155, Muntinl u p a Esta t e ; on the SE,
point 4 to 5 by Lot 159- B-5; on the S,
points 5 to 1 by Lot 159- B-3; on the W,
points 1 to 2 by Lot 159- B-1 (Road
wideni n g) all of the subd. plan, cont ai ni n g
an are a of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY (130)
SQ. METERS, more or less.
PARCEL No. 4
A parc el of land (Lot 28- C of the subd.
plan Psd- 13- 00709 0, being a portion of
Lot 28, Muntinl u p a Estat e , L.R.C. Rec.
No. 6137), situat e d in the Bo. of Alaban g,
Mun. of Munti nl u p a , Met ro Manila.
Bound e d on the NE, along lines 1- 2 by Lot
27, Munti nl u p a Est at e; on the East & SE,
along lines 2 to 6 by Mang a n g a t a River;
and on the West., along line 6- 1, by Lot
28- B of the subd. plan x x x cont ai nin g an
are a of ONE THUSAND AND SEVENTY-
SIX (1,076) SQUARE METERS.
PARCEL No. 5
PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 50, Manza n a
No. 18, de la subd. de Soloca n. Linda por
el NW, con la parc el a 49; por el NE, con
la parc el a 36; por el SE, con la parc el a
51; y por el SW, con la calle Dos Castillas.
Parti e n d o de un punt o marc a d o 1 en el
plano, el cual se halla a S. gds. 01'W,
72.50 mts. Desd e el punt o 1 de esta
manz a n a , que es un mojon de concr e t o de
la Ciuda d de Manila, situa d o on el
esqui n a E. que form a n las Calles Laong
Laan y Dos. Castillas, continie n d o un
exte n sio n supe rfici al de CIENTO
CINCUE NTA (150) METROS
CUADRADOS.
PARCEL No. 6
PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 51, Manza n a
No. 18, de la subd. De Solocon. Linda por
el NW, con la parc el a 50; por el NE, con
la parc el a 37; por el SE, con la parc el a
52; por el SW, con la Calle Dos Castillas.
Parti e n d o de un punt o Marc a d o 1 en el
plano, el cual se halla at S. 43 gds. 01'E,
82.50 mts. Desd e el punt o 1 de esta
manz a n a , que es un mojon de concr e t o de
la Ciuda d de Manila, situa d o on el
 esqui n a E. que form a n las Calles Laong
Laan y Dos. Castillas, continie n d o una
exte n sio n supe rfici al de CIENTO
CINCUE NTA (150) METROS
CUADRADOS. 3
During the lifetim e of Felix Carlos, he agr e e d to
tra n sf e r his est a t e to Teofilo. The agr e e m e n t was
made in orde r to avoid the paym e n t of
inhe rit a n c e taxes. Teofilo, in turn, und e r t o o k to
deliver and turn over the shar e of the othe r legal
heir, petition e r Juan De Dios Carlos.
Event u ally, the first thre e (3) parc el s of land
were tran sf e r r e d and regist e r e d in the nam e of
Teofilo. These thre e (3) lots are now cover e d by
Transfe r Certificat e of Title (TCT) No. 2348 2 4
issue d by the Regist ry of Deeds of Maka ti City;
TCT No. 13906 1 issue d by the Regist ry of Deeds
of Maka ti City; and TCT No. 13905 8 issue d by
the Regist ry of Deeds of Maka ti City.
Parc el No. 4 was regist e r e d in the nam e of
petition e r. The lot is now cover e d by TCT No.
16040 1 issue d by the Regist ry of Deeds of
Maka ti City.
On May 13, 1992, Teofilo died intest a t e . He was
survive d by respo n d e n t s Felicida d and their son,
Teofilo Carlos II (Teofilo II). Upon Teofilo's
dea t h, Parc el Nos. 5 & 6 were regist e r e d in the
nam e of respo n d e n t Felicida d and co-
respo n d e n t , Teofilo II. The said two (2) parc el s of
land are cover e d by TCT Nos. 21987 7 and
21087 8, resp e c tiv ely, issue d by the Regist ry of
Deeds of Manila.
In 1994, petition e r instit u t e d a suit again st
respo n d e n t s befor e the RTC in Munti nl u p a City,
docke t e d as Civil Case No. 94- 1964. In the said
case, the parti e s sub mit t e d and caus e d the
app roval of a partial comp r o m i s e agr e e m e n t .
Unde r the comp r o m i s e , the parti es
acknowl e d g e d thei r resp e c tive sha r e s in the
proce e d s from the sale of a portion of the first
parc el of land. This includ e s the rem ai ni n g
6,691- squa r e- met e r portion of said land.
On Sept e m b e r 17, 1994, the parti e s execut e d a
dee d of extr aj u di ci al par tition, dividing the
rem ai ni n g land of the first parc el betw e e n the m .
Mea n w hil e, in a sepa r a t e case entitle d Rillo v.
Carlos , 4 2,331 squa r e met e r s of the secon d
parc el of land wer e adjudic a t e d in favor of
plaintiffs Rillo. The rem ai ni n g 10,000- squa r e
met e r portion was later divide d betw e e n
petition e r and respo n d e n t s .
The division was incorp o r a t e d in a suppl e m e n t a l
comp r o m i s e agr e e m e n t exec ut e d on August 17,
1994, with resp e c t to Civil Case No. 94- 1964.
The par ti e s sub mi t t e d the suppl e m e n t a l
comp r o m i s e agr e e m e n t , which was appr ov e d
accor di n gly.
Petition e r and respo n d e n t s ent e r e d into two
more cont r a c t s in August 1994. Unde r the
cont r a c t s, the parti es equ ally divided betw e e n
the m the third and fourt h parc el s of land.
In August 1995, petition e r com m e n c e d an action,
docke t e d as Civil Case No. 95- 135, again s t
respo n d e n t s befor e the cour t a quo with the
following cause s of action: (a) decla r a t i o n of
nullity of mar ri a g e ; (b) stat u s of a child; (c)
recove ry of prope r t y; (d) reconvey a n c e ; and (e)
sum of money and dam a g e s . The compl ai n t was
raffled to Branc h 256 of the RTC in Muntinl u p a .
In his compl ai n t, petition e r asse r t e d that the
mar ri a g e betw e e n his late brot h e r Teofilo and
respo n d e n t Felicida d was a nullity in view of the
abse n c e of the requi r e d mar ri a g e licens e. He
likewise maint ai n e d that his dece a s e d brot h e r
was neit h e r the nat u r al nor the adoptive fathe r
of respo n d e n t Teofilo Carlos II.
Petition e r likewise soug h t the avoida n c e of the
cont r a c t s he ent e r e d into with respo n d e n t
Felicida d with resp e c t to the subjec t real
prope r ti e s. He also praye d for the canc ella tio n of
the certifica t e s of title issue d in the nam e of
respo n d e n t s . He argu e d that the prope r ti e s
cover e d by such certificat e s of title, includi ng
the sum s receive d by respo n d e n t s as proc e e d s ,
shoul d be reconvey e d to him.
Finally, petition e r claim e d inde m nifica tio n as
and by way of moral and exe m pl a r y dam a g e s ,
attor n e y ' s fees, litigation expe n s e s , and costs of
suit.
On Octob e r 16, 1995, respo n d e n t s sub mi t t e d
their answ e r . They deni e d the mat e ri al
aver m e n t s of petition e r ' s com pl ai nt .
Respon d e n t s conte n d e d that the dea r t h of det ails
rega r di n g the requisit e mar ri a g e licens e did not
invalida t e Felicida d ' s mar ri a g e to Teofilo.
Respon d e n t s decla r e d that Teofilo II was the
illegiti m a t e child of the dece a s e d Teofilo Carlos
with anot h e r wom a n.
On the grou n d s of lack of caus e of action and
lack of jurisdiction over the subjec t mat t e r ,
respo n d e n t s praye d for the dismiss al of the case
befor e the trial court. They also aske d that their
count e r c l ai m s for mor al and exem pl a ry dam a g e s ,
as well as attor n e y ' s fees, be gra n t e d .
But befor e the partie s could even proce e d to pre-
trial, respo n d e n t s moved for sum m a r y judg m e n t .
Attach e d to the motion was the affidavit of the
justice of the peac e who sole m niz e d the
mar ri a g e . Respo n d e n t s also submi t t e d the
Certificat e of Live Birth of respo n d e n t Teofilo II.
In the certifica t e , the late Teofilo Carlos and
respo n d e n t Felicida d were desig n a t e d as
par e n t s .
On Janua r y 5, 1996, petition e r oppos e d the
motion for sum m a r y judgm e n t on the groun d of
irre g ul a ri ty of the cont r a c t evide n ci n g the
mar ri a g e . In the sam e bre a t h, petition e r lodge d
his own motion for sum m a r y judgm e n t .
Petition e r pres e n t e d a certifica tion from the
Local Civil Regist r a r of Calum pi t , Bulac a n,
certifying that the r e is no reco r d of birt h of
respo n d e n t Teofilo II.
Petition e r also incor po r a t e d in the count e r-
motion for sum m a r y judgm e n t the testi m o ny of
respo n d e n t Felicida d in anot h e r case. Said
testi m o ny was made in Civil Case No. 89- 2384,
entitle d Carlos v. Gorosp e , befor e the RTC
Branc h 255, Las Piñas. In her testi mo ny,
respo n d e n t Felicida d nar r a t e d that co-
respo n d e n t Teofilo II is her child with Teofilo. 5
Subs e q u e n t ly, the Office of the City Prose c u t o r
of Muntinlu p a sub mi t t e d to the trial court its
repor t and manifest a t i o n, discou n t i n g the
possibility of collusion betw e e n the parti es.
RTC and CA Disp o s i t i o n s
On April 8, 1996, the RTC ren d e r e d judg m e n t ,
disposin g as follows:
WHEREFORE, pre m is e s conside r e d ,
defe n d a n t ' s (respo n d e n t ' s ) Motion for
Sum m a r y Judgm e n t is her e by denie d.
Plaintiff's (petition e r ' s) Count e r- Motion
for Sum m a r y Judg m e n t is here by gran t e d
and sum m a r y judg m e n t is her e by
rend e r e d in favor of plaintiff as follows:
1. Decla rin g the mar ri a g e bet w e e n
defe n d a n t Felicida d Sandov al and Teofilo
Carlos solem niz e d at Silang, Cavite on
May 14, 1962, eviden c e d by the Mar ri a g e
Certificat e submi t t e d in this case, null
and void ab initio for lack of the requi sit e
mar ri a g e licens e;
2. Decla rin g that the defe n d a n t minor,
Teofilo S. Carlos II, is not the nat u r a l,
illegiti m a t e , or legally adopt e d child of
the late Teofilo E. Carlos;
3. Orde ri n g defen d a n t Sandoval to pay
and restit u t e to plaintiff the sum
of P 18,924, 8 0 0 . 0 0 toget h e r with the
inte r e s t the r e o n at the legal rat e from
dat e of filing of the insta n t complai n t until
fully paid;
4. Decla rin g plaintiff as the sole and
exclusive owne r of the parc el of land, less
the portion adjudic a t e d to plaintiffs in
Civil Case No. 1197 5, cover e d by TCT No.
13906 1 of the Regist e r of Deeds of Maka ti
City, and orde ri n g said Regist e r of Deeds
to canc el said title and to issue anot h e r
title in the sole nam e of plaintiff her ei n;
5. Decla rin g the Cont r a c t , Annex "K" of
compl ai n t, bet w e e n plaintiff and
defe n d a n t Sandoval null and void, and
orde ri n g the Regist e r of Deeds of Maka ti
City to canc el TCT No. 13905 8 in the
nam e of Teofilo Carlos, and to issue
anot h e r title in the sole nam e of plaintiff
her ei n;
6. Decla rin g the Cont r a c t , Annex M of the
compl ai n t, bet w e e n plaintiff and
defe n d a n t Sandoval null and void;
7. Orde ri n g the canc ella tion of TCT No.
21087 7 in the nam e s of defen d a n t
Sandov al and defen d a n t minor Teofilo S.
Carlos II and orde ri n g the Regist e r of
Deeds of Manila to issue anot h e r title in
the exclusive nam e of plaintiff her ei n;
8. Orde ri n g the canc ella tion of TCT No.
21087 8 in the nam e of defe n d a n t
Sandov al and defen d a n t Minor Teofilo S.
Carlos II and orde ri n g the Regist e r of
Deeds of Manila to issue anot h e r title in
the sole nam e of plaintiff her ein.
Let this case be set for hea ri n g for the
rec e p tio n of plaintiff's evide nc e on his
claim for mor al dam a g e s , exem pl a r y
dam a g e s, attor n e y ' s fees, app e a r a n c e
fees, and litiga tion expen s e s on June 7,
1996 at 1:30 o'clock in the after n oo n.
6
Dissa tisfie d, respo n d e n t s appe al e d to the CA. In
the app e al, respo n d e n t s arg u e d, inter alia, that
the trial court acte d withou t or in excess of
jurisdic tion in rend e ri n g sum m a r y judg m e n t
annulling the mar ri a g e of Teofilo, Sr. and
Felicida d and in decla ri n g Teofilo II as not an
illegiti m a t e child of Teofilo, Sr.
On Octob e r 15, 2002, the CA reve r s e d and set
aside the RTC ruling, disposi n g as follows:
WHERE FOR E, the sum m a r y judg m e n t
app e al e d from is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and in lieu the r e of, a new one is
ent e r e d REMANDING the case to the
court of origin for furt h e r proce e di n g s .
7
The CA opine d:
We find the ren di tion of the her ei n
app e al e d sum m a r y judgm e n t by the
court a quo cont r a r y to law and public
policy as ensco n c e d in the afore s a i d
safeg u a r d s . The fact that it was
app ella n t s who first sough t sum m a r y
judg m e n t from the trial court, did not
justify the gra n t ther e of in favor of
app elle e. Not being an action "to recove r
upon a claim" or "to obtain a decla r a t o r y
relief," the rule on sum m a r y judg m e n t
apply (sic) to an action to annul a
mar ri a g e . The mer e fact that no genuin e
issue was pres e n t e d and the desir e to
expe di t e the disposition of the case
cannot justify a misint e r p r e t a t i o n of the
rule. The first para g r a p h of Article 88 and
101 of the Civil Code expre s sly prohibit
the ren di tion of decr e e of ann ul m e n t of a
mar ri a g e upon a stipul a tio n of facts or a
confession of judgm e n t . Yet, the affidavits
annex e d to the petition for sum m a r y
judg m e n t practic ally amou n t to thes e
met h o d s explicitly prosc ri b e d by the law.
We are not unmi n df ul of app ell e e ' s
arg u m e n t that the foregoi n g safeg u a r d s
have tradition ally bee n applied to preve n t
collusion of spous e s in the mat t e r of
dissolution of mar ri a g e s and that the
dea t h of Teofilo Carlos on May 13, 1992
had effectively dissolve d the mar ri a g e
her ei n impu g n e d . The fact, howev e r, that
app elle e ' s own brot h e r and app ella n t
Felicida d Sandoval lived toget h e r as
husb a n d and wife for thirty years and that
the ann ul m e n t of their mar ri a g e is the
very mea n s by which the latt e r is soug h t
to be dep rive d of her particip a ti o n in the
est a t e left by the form e r call for a close r
and mor e thorou g h inqui ry into the
circu m s t a n c e s surr o u n d i n g the case.
Rath e r that the sum m a r y nat u r e by which
the court a quo resolve d the issue s in the
case, the rule is to the effect that the
mat e ri al facts alleg e d in the com pl ai nt for
annul m e n t of mar ri a g e should always be
prove d. Section 1, Rule 19 of the Revise d
Rules of Court provides:
"Section 1. Judg m e n t on the
pleadin g s. - Wher e an answ e r fails
to tend e r an issue, or othe r wi s e
admi ts the mat e ri al allega ti on s of
the adve r s e party's plea di n g, the
court may, on motion of that par ty,
direct judg m e n t on such pleadi n g.
But in actions for ann ul m e n t of
mar ri a g e or for legal sepa r a t i o n,
the mat e ri al facts allege d in the
compl ai n t shall always be prove d ."
(Und e r s c o ri n g supplie d)
Moreov e r, even if We were to sust ai n the
applica bility of the rules on sum m a r y
judg m e n t to the case at benc h, Our
per u s a l of the recor d shows that the
finding of the court a quo for app elle e
would still not be war r a n t e d . While it may
be rea dily conce d e d that a valid mar ri a g e
licens e is amon g the form al requisit e s of
mar ri a g e , the abse n c e of which rend e r s
the mar ri a g e void ab initio purs u a n t to
Article 80(3) in relation to Article 58 of
the Civil Code the failur e to reflect the
serial num b e r of the mar ri a g e licens e on
the mar ri a g e contr a c t evide nci n g the
mar ri a g e betw e e n Teofilo Carlos and
app ella n t Felicida d Sandoval, althou g h
irre g ul a r, is not as fatal as appelle e
repr e s e n t s it to be. Aside from the dea r t h
of eviden c e to the cont r a r y, app ella n t
Felicida d Sandoval's affirm a tio n of the
exist e n c e of said mar ri a g e licens e is
corro bo r a t e d by the following stat e m e n t
in the affidavit execu t e d by Godofr e d o
Fojas, then Justice of the Peace who
officiat e d the impug n e d mar ri a g e , to wit:
"That as far as I could rem e m b e r ,
ther e was a mar ri a g e licens e
issue d at Silang, Cavite on May 14,
1962 as basis of the said mar ri a g e
cont r a c t execu t e d by Teofilo
Carlos and Felicida d Sandoval, but
the num b e r of said mar ri a g e
licens e was inadve r t e n t ly not
place d in the mar ri a g e cont r a c t for
the rea so n that it was the Office
Clerk who filled up the blanks in
the Marri a g e Cont r a c t who in tur n,
may have overlook e d the sam e."
Rath e r tha n the infere n c e s mer ely draw n
by the trial court, We are of the
conside r e d view that the veracity and
credibility of the foregoin g stat e m e n t as
well as the motivation s unde rlying the
sam e should be prop e rly thr es h e d out in a
trial of the case on the merit s.
If the non- pres e n t a t i o n of the mar ri a g e
cont r a c t - the prim a ry evide nc e of
mar ri a g e - is not proof that a mar ri a g e did
not take plac e, neith e r should appella n t s '
non- prese n t a t i o n of the subjec t mar ri a g e
licens e be take n as proof that the sam e
was not procu r e d . The burd e n of proof to
show the nullity of the mar ri a g e , it must
be em ph a siz e d, rest s upon the plaintiff
and any doubt should be resolve d in favor
of the validity of the mar ri a g e .
Consid e ri n g that the burd e n of proof also
rest s on the party who dispu t e s the
legiti m a cy of a par tic ul a r party, the sam e
may be said of the trial court 's rejectio n
of the relation s hi p betw e e n app ella n t
Teofilo Carlos II and his put a tive fathe r
on the basis of the inconsi st e n c i e s in
app ella n t Felicida d Sandoval's
stat e m e n t s . Althoug h it had effectively
disavow e d appella n t ' s prior claims
rega r di n g the legitim a c y of appella n t
Teofilo Carlos II, the aver m e n t in the
answ e r that he is the illegitim a t e son of
app elle e ' s brot h e r , to Our mind, did not
altoge t h e r foreclos e the possibility of the
said app ell a n t ' s illegitim a t e filiation, his
right to prove the sam e or, for that
 mat t e r , his entitle m e n t to inherit a n c e
right s as such.
Withou t trial on the merit s having been
cond u c t e d in the case, We find appelle e ' s
bar e alleg a tio n that appella n t Teofilo
Carlos II was mer ely purc h a s e d from an
indige n t coupl e by app ella n t Felicida d
Sandov al, on the whole, insufficien t to
suppo r t what could well be a minor' s total
forfeitu r e of the right s arising from his
puta tive filiation. Inconsis t e n t thoug h it
may be to her previous stat e m e n t s ,
app ella n t Felicida d Sandoval's decla r a t i o n
rega r di n g the illegiti m a t e filiation of
Teofilo Carlos II is more credi bl e when
conside r e d in the light of the fact that,
durin g the last eight years of his life,
Teofilo Carlos allowe d said appella n t the
use of his nam e and the shelt e r of his
house h ol d. The least that the trial court
could have done in the pre mi s e s was to
cond u c t a trial on the meri ts in orde r to
be able to thoro u g hly resolve the issue s
pert ai ni n g to the filiation of app ella n t
Teofilo Carlos II. 8
On Nove m b e r 22, 2006, petition e r moved for
recon si d e r a t i o n and for the inhibition of
the pone n t e , Justice Rebe c c a De Guia- Salvado r.
The CA denie d the twin motions.
Iss u e s
In this petition unde r Rule 45, petition e r hoists
the following issue s:
1. That, in reve r si n g and settin g aside the
Sum m a r y Judgm e n t unde r the Decision,
Annex A her e of, and in denyin g
petition e r ' s Motion for recon si d e r a t i o n
und e r the Resolution, Annex F her e of,
with resp e c t to the nullity of the
impu g n e d mar ri a g e , petition e r
resp e c tf ully submi t s that the Court of
Appeals com mi t t e d a grave
reve r si bl e error in applying Articles 88
and 101 of the Civil Code , despi t e the fact
that the circu m s t a n c e s of this case are
differe n t from that conte m p l a t e d and
inte n d e d by law, or has othe r wi s e decid e d
a question of subst a n c e not ther e t ofor e
decide d by the Supr e m e Cour t, or has
decide d it in a mann e r prob a bly not in
accor d with law or with the applica bl e
decision s of this Honor a bl e Court;
2. That in setting aside and reve r si n g the
Sum m a r y Judgm e n t and, in lieu ther e of,
ent e ri n g anot h e r rem a n di n g the case to
the court of origin for furt h e r
proce e di n g s, petition e r most resp e c t f ully
submi t s that the Court of Appeals
com mit t e d a serious reve r si bl e erro r in
applying Section 1, Rule 19 (now Section
1, Rule 34) of the Rules of Court
providing for judgm e n t on the plea din g s,
inste a d of Rule 35 gover ni n g Sum m a r y
Judg m e n t s ;
3. That in reve r si n g and settin g aside the
Sum m a r y Judgm e n t and, in lieu ther e of,
ent e ri n g anot h e r rem a n di n g the case to
the court of origin for furt h e r
proce e di n g s, petition e r most resp e c t f ully
submi t s that the Court of
Appeals com mit t e d grave abus e of
discr e tio n, disre g a r d e d judicial
admi ssion s, mad e findings on groun d of
spec ul a ti o n s, sur mi s e s, and conject u r e s ,
or othe r wi s e com mit t e d misa p plic a t io n s
of the laws and misa p p r e h e n s i o n of the
facts . 9 (Und e r s c o ri n g supplie d)
Esse n ti ally, the Cour t is task e d to resolve
whet h e r a mar ri a g e may be decla r e d void ab
initio thro u g h a judgm e n t on the plea din g s or a
sum m a r y judg m e n t and withou t the benefit of a
trial. But ther e are othe r proc e d u r a l issue s,
includi n g the capa city of one who is not a spous e
in bringi n g the action for nullity of mar ri a g e .
Our Ruli n g
I. The gro u n d s for dec l a r a t i o n of abs o l u t e
nulli ty of marri a g e mu s t be prov e d . Nei t h e r
jud g m e n t on th e ple a d i n g s nor su m m a r y
jud g m e n t is allo w e d . So is co nf e s s i o n of
jud g m e n t disal l o w e d .
Petition e r faults the CA in applying Section 1,
Rule 19 10 of the Revise d Rules of Court, which
provide s:
SECTION 1. Judg m e n t on the pleadi ng s . -
Wher e an answ e r fails to tend e r an issue,
or othe r wi s e admit s the mat e ri al
allega tion s of the adve r s e party's
plea din g, the court may, on motion of that
par ty, direc t judg m e n t on such pleadi n g.
But in actions for annul m e n t of mar ri a g e
or for legal sepa r a t i o n, the mat e ri al facts
allege d in the com pl ai nt shall always be
prove d.
He arg u e s that the CA should have applie d Rule
35 of the Rules of Cour t gove r ni n g sum m a r y
judg m e n t , inste a d of the rule on judg m e n t on the
plea din g s.
Petition e r is misguid e d. The CA did not limit its
finding solely within the provisions of the Rule
on judgm e n t on the pleadi n g s . In disag r e e i n g
with the trial court, the CA likewise consid e r e d
the provisions on sum m a r y judgm e n t s , to wit:
Moreov e r, even if We are to sust ai n the
applica bility of the rules on sum m a r y
judg m e n t to the case at benc h, Our
per u s a l of the recor d shows that the
 finding of the court a quo for app elle e
would still not be war r a n t e d . x x x 11
But whet h e r it is base d on judgm e n t on the
plea din g s or sum m a r y judg m e n t , the CA was
corr e c t in reve r si n g the sum m a r y judgm e n t
rend e r e d by the trial court . Both the rules on
judg m e n t on the plea di n g s and sum m a r y
judg m e n t s have no place in cases of decla r a t i o n
of absolut e nullity of mar ri a g e and even in
annul m e n t of mar ri a g e .
With the adve n t of A.M. No. 02- 11- 10- SC, known
as "Rule on Declaration of Absolut e Nullity of
Void Marriag e s and Annul m e n t of Voidable
Marriag e s ," the ques tio n on the applic ation of
sum m a r y judg m e n t s or even judg m e n t on the
plea din g s in case s of nullity or ann ul m e n t of
mar ri a g e has bee n sta m p e d with clarity. The
significa n t princi ple laid down by the said Rule,
which took effect on Marc h 15, 2003 12 is found in
Section 17, viz .:
SEC. 17. Trial . - (1) The presi di n g judge
shall perso n ally cond u c t the trial of the
case. No deleg a ti o n of evide nc e to a
com mis sio n e r shall be allowe d excep t as
to matt e r s involving prop e r t y relation s of
the spous e s .
(2) The grou n d s for decla r a ti o n of
absol ut e nullity or ann ul m e n t of mar ri a g e
must be prove d . No judgm e n t on the
plea din g s, sum m a r y judg m e n t , or
confession of judgm e n t shall be allowed .
(Und e r s c o ri n g supplie d)
Likewise instr u c t ive is the Cour t' s
prono u n c e m e n t in Repu blic v.
Sandi ga n b a y a n . 13 In that case, We exclud e d
actions for nullity or annul m e n t of mar ri a g e from
the applica tion of sum m a r y judg m e n t s .
Prescin di n g from the foregoi n g
discus sio n, save for annul m e n t of
mar ri a g e or decla r a t i o n of its nullity or
for legal sepa r a t i o n, sum m a r y judg m e n t is
applica bl e to all kinds of
actions. 14 (Unde r s c o ri n g supplie d)
By issuing said sum m a r y judg m e n t , the trial
court has divest e d the Stat e of its lawful right
and duty to interve n e in the case. The
par tici p a t io n of the Stat e is not ter mi n a t e d by
the decla r a t i o n of the public pros e c u t o r that no
collusion exists bet w e e n the par ti e s. The Stat e
shoul d have bee n given the oppor t u ni ty to
pre s e n t cont rove r ti n g evide nc e befor e the
judg m e n t was rend e r e d . 15
Both the Civil Code and the Family Code ordai n
that the court should orde r the prose c u t i n g
attor n e y to app e a r and interve n e for the Stat e. It
is at this stag e whe n the public prose c u t o r sees
to it that the r e is no supp r e s si o n of evide n c e .
Conco mi t a n t ly, even if the r e is no supp r e s si o n of
evide n c e, the public prose c u t o r has to make sure
that the evide n c e to be prese n t e d or laid down
befor e the court is not fabric a t e d .
To furt h e r bolst e r its role towa r d s the
pre s e r v a t io n of mar ri a g e , the Rule on
Decla r a t i o n of Absolut e Nullity of Void Marri a g e s
reite r a t e s the duty of the public pros e c u t o r , viz. :
SEC. 13. Effec t of failure to appear at the
pre- trial. - (a) x x x
(b) x x x If ther e is no collusion, the court
shall requi r e the public pros ec u t o r to
inte rve n e for the Stat e duri ng the trial on
the merits to preve n t supp r e s si o n or
fabric a ti on of evide nc e . (Unde r s c o ri n g
supplied)
Truly, only the active particip a ti o n of the public
pros e c u t o r or the Solicitor Gene r a l will ensu r e
that the inter e s t of the Stat e is repr e s e n t e d and
prot e c t e d in proc e e di n g s for decla r a t i o n of
nullity of mar ri a g e s by preve n t i n g the fabrica tion
or supp r e s si o n of evide nc e . 16
II. A peti t i o n for de c l a r a t i o n of abs o l u t e
nulli ty of void marri a g e may be file d sol e l y
by th e hu s b a n d or wife. Exc e p t i o n s : (1)
Nulli ty of marri a g e cas e s co m m e n c e d bef or e
th e eff e c t i vi ty of A.M. No. 02- 11- 10- SC; and
(2) Marri a g e s cel e b r a t e d duri n g th e
eff e c t i v i t y of th e Civil Cod e.
Unde r the Rul e on De c l ar a t i o n of Absol u t e
Nulli ty of Void Marri a g e s and Annulm e n t of
Voidabl e Mar ri a g e s , the petition for declar a ti o n
of absolut e nullity of mar ri a g e may not be filed
by any par ty outsid e of the mar ri a g e . The Rule
made it exclusively a right of the spous e s by
statin g:
SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of
absolut e nullity of void marriage s . -
(a) Who may file . - A petition for
decla r a t i o n of absolut e nullity of void
mar ri a g e may be filed solely by the
husb a n d or the wife . (Unde r s c o ri n g
supplied)
Section 2(a) of the Rule make s it the sole right of
the husb a n d or the wife to file a petition for
decla r a t i o n of absolut e nullity of void mar ri a g e .
The ration al e of the Rule is enlight e ni n g, viz. :
Only an aggriev e d or injure d spous e may
file a petition for annul m e n t of voida bl e
mar ri a g e s or decla r a t i o n of absolut e
nullity of void marri a g e s . Such petition
cannot be filed by comp ul so ry or intest a t e
heirs of the spous e s or by the Stat e . The
Com mit t e e is of the belief that they do not
have a legal right to file the
petition. Comp ulso r y or intest a t e heirs
have only inchoa t e right s prior to the
dea t h of their pred e c e s s o r , and, henc e,
 can only question the validity of the
mar ri a g e of the spous e s upon the deat h of
a spous e in a proc e e di n g for the
settle m e n t of the est a t e of the dec e a s e d
spous e filed in the regul a r court s . On the
othe r han d, the conce r n of the Stat e is to
pre s e r v e mar ri a g e and not to seek its
dissolution. 17 (Und e r s c o ri n g supplie d)
The new Rule recog niz e s that the husb a n d and
the wife are the sole archit e c t s of a healt hy,
loving, peac ef ul mar ri a g e . They are the only ones
who can decide when and how to build the
found a t io n s of mar ri a g e . The spous e s alone are
the engine e r s of thei r marit al life. They are
simult a n e o u s ly the direc t o r s and actor s of their
mat ri m o ni al true- to- life play. Henc e , they alone
can and should decide when to take a cut, but
only in accor d a n c e with the groun d s allowe d by
law.
The innova tion incorp o r a t e d in A.M. No. 02- 11-
10- SC sets fort h a dem a r c a t i o n line betw e e n
mar ri a g e s cover e d by the Family Code and those
solem niz e d unde r the Civil Code. The Rule
exte n d s only to mar ri a g e s ent e r e d into durin g
the effectivity of the Family Code which took
effect on August 3, 1988. 18
The adve n t of the Rule on Decla r a t i o n of
Absolut e Nullity of Void Mar ri a g e s mark s the
begin ni n g of the end of the right of the heirs of
the dec e a s e d spouse to bring a nullity of
mar ri a g e case agai ns t the surviving spous e. But
the Rule never inte n d e d to deprive the
comp ul so r y or intest a t e heirs of their
succe s sio n a l right s.
While A.M. No. 02- 11- 10- SC decla r e s that a
petition for decla r a t i o n of absolut e nullity of
mar ri a g e may be filed solely by the husb a n d or
the wife, it does not mea n that the comp ulso r y or
intest a t e heirs are withou t any recou r s e und e r
the law. They can still prot e c t their succ e s si o n al
right, for, as stat e d in the Ration al e of the Rules
on Annulm e n t of Voidabl e Marri a g e s and
Decla r a t i o n of Absolut e Nullity of Void
Mar ri a g e s , com p ulso r y or intest a t e heirs can still
ques tio n the validity of the mar ri a g e of the
spous e s, not in a proc e e di n g for decl a r a t io n of
nullity but upon the deat h of a spous e in a
proce e di n g for the settle m e n t of the esta t e of the
dec e a s e d spous e filed in the regul a r court s. 19
It is emp h a siz e d , howev e r , that the Rule does not
apply to case s alre a d y com m e n c e d befor e March
15, 2003 althou g h the mar ri a g e involved is
within the cover a g e of the Family Code. This is
so, as the new Rule which beca m e effective on
Marc h 15, 2003 20 is prosp e c t iv e in its
applica tio n. Thus, the Cour t held in Enrico v.
Heirs of Sps. Medi nac eli , 21 viz. :
As has bee n emph a si z e d, A.M. No. 02- 11-
10- SC covers mar ri a g e s und e r the Family
Code of the Philippin e s, and is
prosp e c tive in its
applica tio n . 22 (Und e r s c o ri n g supplie d)
Petition e r com m e n c e d the nullity of mar ri a g e
case again s t respo n d e n t Felicida d in 1995. The
mar ri a g e in cont rove r s y was celeb r a t e d on May
14, 1962. Which law would gover n depe n d s upon
when the mar ri a g e took plac e. 23
The mar ri a g e having bee n sole m niz e d prior to
the effectivity of the Family Code, the applica bl e
law is the Civil Code which was the law in effect
at the time of its celeb r a t io n. 24 But the Civil Code
is silent as to who may bring an action to decla r e
the mar ri a g e void. Does this mea n that any
per so n can bring an action for the decl a r a t io n of
nullity of mar ri a g e ?
We respo n d in the nega tive. The abse n c e of a
provision in the Civil Code cannot be const r u e d
as a licens e for any perso n to institu t e a nullity of
mar ri a g e case. Such perso n must app e a r to be
the party who stan d s to be benefite d or injur e d
by the judg m e n t in the suit, or the par ty entitle d
to the avails of the suit. 25 Elsewi se stat e d ,
plaintiff must be the real party- in- inte r e s t . For it
is basic in proce d u r a l law that every action must
be pros e c u t e d and defe n d e d in the nam e of the
real par ty- in- inter e s t . 26
Inte r e s t within the mea ni n g of the rule mea n s
mat e ri al inte r e s t or an inter e s t in issue to be
affect e d by the dec r e e or judgm e n t of the case,
as disting ui s h e d from mer e curiosity about the
ques tio n involved or a mer e incide n t a l inter e s t .
One having no mat e ri al inter e s t to prot e c t
cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as
plaintiff in an action. When plaintiff is not the
real par ty- in- inter e s t , the case is dismissi bl e on
the grou n d of lack of cause of action. 27
Illumin a t i n g on this point is Amor- Catalan v.
Court of Appeals , 28 whe r e the Cour t held:
True, unde r the New Civil Code which is
the law in force at the time the
respo n d e n t s wer e mar ri e d , or even in the
Family Code, the r e is no specific
provision as to who can file a petition to
decla r e the nullity of mar ri a g e ; howeve r,
only a party who can
demo n s t r a t e "proper intere st " can file the
sam e. A petition to decla r e the nullity of
mar ri a g e , like any othe r actions, must be
prose c u t e d or defe n d e d in the nam e of
the real party- in- intere s t and mus t be
base d on a cause of action . Thus, in Niñal
v. Badayog, the Cour t held that the
childr e n have the perso n a lity to file the
petition to decla r e the nullity of mar ri a g e
of their dece a s e d fathe r to thei r
step m o t h e r as it affects their succ e s sio n al
right s .
 In fine, petition e r ' s perso n a lity to file the
petition to decla r e the nullity of mar ri a g e
cannot be asce r t a i n e d bec a u s e of the
abse n c e of the divorc e decr e e and the
foreign law allowing it. Henc e, a rem a n d
of the case to the trial court for rece p tio n
of addition al evide n c e is nece s s a r y to
det e r m i n e whe t h e r respo n d e n t Orland o
was gra n t e d a divorc e decr e e and
whet h e r the foreign law which gra n t e d
the sam e allows or rest ric t s rem a r r i a g e . If
it is prove d that a valid divorce decr e e
was obtain e d and the sam e did not allow
respo n d e n t Orland o' s rem a r ri a g e , the n
the trial court shoul d decla r e
respo n d e n t ' s mar ri a g e as biga m o u s and
void ab initio but redu c e d the amou n t of
mor al dam a g e s from P 300,00 0. 0 0
to P 50,00 0.0 0 and exe m pl a r y dam a g e s
from P 200,0 0 0. 0 0 to P 25,000. 0 0 . On the
cont r a r y, if it is prove d that a valid
divorc e decr e e was obtain e d which
allowe d Orlan do to rem a r r y, then the trial
court must dismiss the insta n t petition to
decla r e nullity of mar ri a g e on the groun d
that petition e r Felicita s Amor- Catal a n
lacks legal perso n ali ty to file the
sam e. 29 (Und e r s c o ri n g supplie d)
III. The cas e mu s t be re m a n d e d to
det e r m i n e wh e t h e r or not peti ti o n e r is a
real- party- in- int er e s t to se e k th e de c l a r a t i o n
of null ity of th e marri a g e in con t r o v e r s y .
In the case at benc h, the recor d s reve al that
when Teofilo died intes t a t e in 1992, his only
surviving comp ul so ry heirs are respo n d e n t
Felicida d and thei r son, Teofilo II. Unde r the law
on succ e s si o n, succe s sio n a l right s are
tra n s m i t t e d from the mom e n t of deat h of the
dec e d e n t and the comp ul so r y heirs are called to
succe e d by oper a tio n of law. 30
Upon Teofilo's deat h in 1992, all his prop e r t y,
right s and obliga tion s to the exte nt of the value
of the inhe rit a n c e are trans m i t t e d to his
comp ul so r y heirs. These heirs were respo n d e n t s
Felicida d and Teofilo II, as the surviving spous e
and child, resp e c t ively.
Article 887 of the Civil Code outline d who are
comp ul so r y heirs, to wit:
(1) Legiti m a t e childr e n and desc e n d a n t s ,
with resp e c t to their legiti m a t e par e n t s
and asce n d a n t s ;
(2) In default of the foregoi n g, legiti m a t e
par e n t s and asce n d a n t s , with resp e c t to
their legitim a t e childr e n and desc e n d a n t s ;
(3) The widow or widowe r ;
(4) Acknowle d g e d nat u r al childr e n , and
nat u r al childr e n by legal fiction;
(5) Othe r illegiti m a t e childr e n refe r r e d to
in Article 287 of the Civil Code. 31
Clearly, a brot h e r is not amon g those conside r e d
as comp ul so ry heirs. But althou g h a collat e r a l
relative, such as a brot h e r , does not fall within
the ambit of a comp ul so ry heir, he still has a
right to succe e d to the esta t e. Articles 1001 and
1003 of the New Civil Code provide:
ART. 1001. Should brot h e r s and siste r s or
their childr e n survive with the widow or
widow e r, the latt e r shall be entitl e d to
one- half of the inhe rit a n c e and the
brot h e r s and siste r s or their childre n to
the othe r half .
ART. 1003. If the r e are no desc e n d a n t s ,
asce n d a n t s , illegitim a t e childr e n, or a
surviving spous e , the collat e r a l relative s
shall succe e d to the entir e est a t e of the
dec e a s e d in accor d a n c e with the
following article s. (Unde r s c o ri n g
supplied)
Inde e d, only the pre s e n c e of desc e n d a n t s ,
asce n d a n t s or illegitim a t e childr e n exclud e s
collat e r al relative s from succ e e di n g to the est a t e
of the dece d e n t . The pres e n c e of legiti m a t e ,
illegiti m a t e , or adopt e d child or childr e n of the
dec e a s e d precl u d e s succ e s sio n by collat e r a l
relative s. 32 Conve r s e ly, if the r e are no
desc e n d a n t s , asce n d a n t s , illegiti m a t e childr e n,
or a surviving spous e, the collat e r a l relatives
shall succe e d to the entir e est a t e of the
dec e d e n t . 33
If respo n d e n t Teofilo II is decla r e d and finally
prove n not to be the legiti m a t e , illegitim a t e , or
adopt e d son of Teofilo, petition e r would then
have a perso n a lity to seek the nullity of marri a g e
of his dece a s e d brot h e r with respo n d e n t
Felicida d. This is so, consi de ri n g that collat e r a l
relative s, like a brot h e r and siste r, acqui r e
succe s sio n a l right over the esta t e if the dece d e n t
dies without issue and withou t asce n d a n t s in the
direct line.
The reco r d s reve al that Teofilo was pred e c e a s e d
by his pare n t s. He had no othe r siblings but
petition e r. Thus, if Teofilo II is finally found and
prove n to be not a legiti m a t e , illegitim a t e , or
adopt e d son of Teofilo, petition e r succ e e d s to the
othe r half of the est a t e of his brot h e r , the first
half being allott e d to the widow purs u a n t to
Article 1001 of the New Civil Code. This make s
petition e r a real- par ty- inter e s t to seek the
decla r a t i o n of absolut e nullity of marri a g e of his
dec e a s e d brot h e r with respo n d e n t Felicida d. If
the subjec t mar ri a g e is found to be void ab initio ,
petition e r succ e e d s to the entir e est a t e .
It bea r s stre s si n g, howeve r , that the legal
per so n ali ty of petition e r to bring the nullity of
mar ri a g e case is contin g e n t upon the final
decla r a t i o n that Teofilo II is not a legitim a t e ,
adopt e d, or illegiti m a t e son of Teofilo.
If Teofilo II is prove n to be a legitim a t e ,
illegiti m a t e , or legally adopt e d son of Teofilo,
then petition e r has no legal perso n a lity to ask for
the nullity of mar ri a g e of his dece a s e d brot h e r
and respo n d e n t Felicida d. This is base d on the
groun d that he has no succ e s si o n al right to be
prot e c t e d , henc e , does not have prop e r inte r e s t .
For althou g h the mar ri a g e in cont rov e r sy may be
found to be void from the begi nni n g, still,
petition e r would not inherit. This is beca u s e the
pre s e n c e of desc e n d a n t , illegitim a t e , 34 or even an
adopt e d child 35 exclud e s the collat e r a l relatives
from inhe ritin g from the dece d e n t .
Thus, the Court finds that a rem a n d of the case
for trial on the merit s to det e r m i n e the validity
or nullity of the subjec t mar ri a g e is called
for. But th e RTC is stri c t l y instr u c t e d to
dis m i s s the nulli ty of marri a g e cas e for lac k
of cau s e of acti o n if it is prov e n by evid e n c e
that Teofil o II is a le gi t i m a t e , ille g i t i m a t e ,
or le g a l l y ado p t e d so n of Teofi l o Carlo s , th e
de c e a s e d brot h e r of peti t i o n e r .
IV. Re m a n d of th e cas e reg ar d i n g th e
qu e s t i o n of filiat i o n of resp o n d e n t Teofil o II
is prop e r and in ord e r. Ther e is a n eed to
vacat e the disposition of the trial court as to the
othe r caus e s of action befor e it.
Petition e r did not assign as erro r or inter p o s e as
issue the ruling of the CA on the rem a n d of the
case conce r ni n g the filiation of respo n d e n t
Teofilo II. This notwit h s t a n d i n g , We should not
leave the mat t e r hangi n g in limbo.
This Court has the autho ri t y to review mat t e r s
not specifically raise d or assig n e d as erro r by the
par ti e s, if their consid e r a t i o n is nece s s a r y in
arriving at a just resol ution of the case. 36
We agr e e with the CA that withou t trial on the
merit s having been condu c t e d in the case,
petition e r ' s bar e allega ti on that respo n d e n t
Teofilo II was adopt e d from an indige n t coupl e is
insufficie nt to suppo r t a total forfeit u r e of right s
arising from his put a tive filiation. Howev e r , We
are not incline d to suppo r t its prono u n c e m e n t
that the decla r a t i o n of respo n d e n t Felicida d as to
the illegitim a t e filiation of respo n d e n t Teofilo II
is more credible. For the guida n c e of the
app ellat e cour t, such decla r a ti o n of respo n d e n t
Felicida d should not be afford e d cred e n c e . We
remin d the CA of the gua r a n t y provide d by
Article 167 of the Family Code to prot e c t the
stat u s of legiti m a cy of a child, to wit:
ARTICLE 167. The child shall be
conside r e d legitim a t e althou g h the
mot h e r may have decla r e d again s t its
legiti m a cy or may have bee n sent e n c e d as
an adult e r e s s . (Unde r s c o r i n g supplie d)
It is stre s s e d that Felicida d' s decla r a t io n again st
the legitim a t e stat u s of Teofilo II is the very act
that is prosc ri b e d by Article 167 of the Family
Code. The lang u a g e of the law is unmist a k a b l e .
An asse r tio n by the moth e r agains t the
legiti m a cy of her child cannot affect the
legiti m a cy of a child born or conc eive d within a
valid mar ri a g e . 37
Finally, the disposition of the trial court in favor
of petition e r for caus e s of action conc e r ni n g
reconvey a n c e , recove r y of prop e r t y, and sum of
money must be vacat e d. This has to be so, as
said disposi tion was mad e on the basis of its
finding that the mar ri a g e in cont rove r sy was null
and void ab initio .
WHEREFORE, the appe al e d Decision
is MODIFIE D as follows:
1. The case is REMAN D E D to the
Region al Trial Cour t in reg a r d to the
action on the stat u s and filiation of
respo n d e n t Teofilo Carlos II and the
validity or nullity of marri a g e bet w e e n
respo n d e n t Felicida d Sandov al and the
late Teofilo Carlos;
2. If Teofilo Carlos II is prove n to be the
legiti m a t e , or illegitim a t e , or legally
adopt e d son of the late Teofilo Carlos, the
RTC is
strictly INSTR UCTE D to DISMI S S the
action for nullity of mar ri a g e for lack of
caus e of action;
3. The disposition of the RTC in Nos. 1 to
8 of the fallo of its decision is VACATED
AND SET ASIDE .
The Region al Trial Cour t is ORDERED to
cond u c t trial on the merit s with dispa t c h and to
give this case priority in its calen d a r .
No costs.
G.R. No. 13 3 7 7 8 Marc h 14, 20 0 0
ENGRACE NIÑAL for Her s e l f an d as
Guard i a n ad Lit e m of th e mi n o r s BABYLINE
NIÑAL, INGRID NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL &
PEPITO NIÑAL, JR., petition e r s,
vs.
NORMA BAYADOG, respo n d e n t .
YNARE S- SANTIAGO, J.:
May the heirs of a dece a s e d perso n file a petition
for the decla r a ti o n of nullity of his mar ri a g e after
his dea t h ?
Pepito Niñal was mar ri e d to Teodulfa Bellone s
on Sept e m b e r 26, 1974. Out of their mar ri a g e
were born her ei n petition e r s . Teodulfa was shot
by Pepito resultin g in her deat h on April 24,
1985. One year and 8 mont h s the r e af t e r or on
Dece m b e r 11, 1986, Pepito and respo n d e n t
Nor m a Badayo g got mar ri e d withou t any
mar ri a g e licens e. In lieu ther e of, Pepito and
Nor m a execut e d an affidavit dat e d Dece m b e r 11,
1986 statin g that they had lived toget h e r as
husb a n d and wife for at least five years and were
thus exe m p t from secu ri n g a mar ri a g e license .
On Febr u a r y 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car
accid e n t . After their fathe r ' s deat h, petition e r s
filed a petition for decla r a t i o n of nullity of the
mar ri a g e of Pepito to Nor m a allegi ng that the
said mar ri a g e was void for lack of a mar ri a g e
licens e . The case was filed unde r the assu m p ti o n
that the validity or invalidity of the secon d
mar ri a g e would affect petition e r ' s succe s sio n al
right s. Norm a filed a motion to dismiss on the
groun d that petition e r s have no caus e of action
since they are not amon g the perso n s who could
file an action for "ann ul m e n t of mar ri a g e" unde r
Article 47 of the Family Code.
Judge Ferdin a n d J. Marcos of the Region al Trial
Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branc h 59, dismiss e d
the petition after finding that the Family Code is
"rath e r silent, obscu r e , insufficient" to resolve
the following issue s:
(1) Whet h e r or not plaintiffs have a caus e
of action again st defe n d a n t in asking for
the decla r a t i o n of the nullity of mar ri a g e
of their dece a s e d fathe r, Pepito G. Niñal,
with her speci ally so when at the time of
the filing of this inst a n t suit, their fathe r
Pepito G. Niñal is alre a dy dea d;
(2) Whet h e r or not the secon d marri a g e of
plaintiffs' dece a s e d fathe r with defe n d a n t
is null and void ab initio ;
(3) Whet h e r or not plaintiffs are estop p e d
from assailing the validity of the secon d
mar ri a g e after it was dissolve d due to
their fathe r ' s deat h. 1
Thus, the lower cour t ruled that petition e r s
shoul d have filed the action to decla r e null and
void their fathe r ' s mar ri a g e to respo n d e n t befor e
his dea t h, applying by analogy Article 47 of the
Family Code which enu m e r a t e s the time and the
per so n s who could initiat e an action for
annul m e n t of mar ri a g e . 2 Henc e, this petition for
review with this Court grou n d e d on a pur e
ques tio n of law.
This petition was origin ally dismisse d for non-
complia n c e with Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Proc e d u r e , and bec a u s e "the
verificatio n failed to stat e the basis of
petition e r ' s aver m e n t that the alleg a tio n s in the
petition are "true and corre c t "." It was thus
tre a t e d as an unsig n e d plea di n g which produ c e s
no legal effect und e r Section 3, Rule 7, of the
1997 Rules. 3 Howeve r , upon motion of
petition e r s, this Cour t recon si d e r e d the dismiss al
and reinst a t e d the petition for review. 4
The two mar ri a g e s involved her ei n having bee n
solem niz e d prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code (FC), the applica bl e law to det e r m i n e their
validity is the Civil Code which was the law in
effect at the time of their celeb r a t i o n. 5 A valid
mar ri a g e licens e is a requisit e of marri a g e unde r
Article 53 of the Civil Code, 6 the abse n c e of
which rend e r s the mar ri a g e void ab
initio purs u a n t to Article 80(3) 7 in relation to
Article 58. 8 The req ui r e m e n t and issua n c e of
mar ri a g e licens e is the Stat e ' s dem o n s t r a t i o n of
its involve m e n t and particip a t io n in every
mar ri a g e , in the maint e n a n c e of which the
gen e r a l public is inte r e s t e d . 9 This inte r e s t
proce e d s from the constit u t ion a l man d a t e that
the Stat e recog niz e s the sanc tity of family life
and of affordin g prot e c t io n to the family as a
basic "autono m o u s social
instit ution." 10 Specifically, the Constit u ti on
conside r s mar ri a g e as an "inviolabl e social
instit ution," and is the found a tio n of family life
which shall be prot e c t e d by the Stat e. 11 This is
why the Family Code consid e r s mar ri a g e as "a
speci al cont r a c t of per m a n e n t union" 12 and case
law conside r s it "not just an adven t u r e but a
lifetim e com mit m e n t ." 13
Howev e r, ther e are sever al inst a n c e s recog niz e d
by the Civil Code whe r ei n a mar ri a g e licens e is
dispe n s e d with, one of which is that provide d in
Article 76, 14 refer ri n g to the mar ri a g e of a man
and a wom a n who have lived toget h e r and
exclusively with eac h othe r as husb a n d and wife
for a contin uo u s and unbr ok e n period of at least
five year s befor e the mar ri a g e . The ration al e
why no licens e is req ui r e d in such case is to
avoid exposin g the par ti e s to humiliation, sha m e
and em ba r r a s s m e n t conco mi t a n t with the
sca n d al o u s coha bit a ti o n of per so n s outside a
valid mar ri a g e due to the publica tion of every
applica n t ' s nam e for a mar ri a g e licens e . The
publicity att e n di n g the mar ri a g e licens e may
discou r a g e such per so n s from legiti mizin g their
stat u s. 15 To pre s e r v e peac e in the family, avoid
the pee pin g and suspicious eye of public
exposu r e and cont ai n the sourc e of gossip
arising from the publica tio n of thei r nam e s, the
law dee m e d it wise to pres e rv e their privacy and
exem p t the m from that requir e m e n t .
Ther e is no dispu t e that the mar ri a g e of
petition e r s ' fathe r to respo n d e n t Nor m a was
celeb r a t e d withou t any mar ri a g e licens e. In lieu
ther e of, they execu t e d an affidavit statin g that
"they have attai n e d the age of majority, and,
being unm a r r i e d, have lived toge t h e r as husb a n d
and wife for at least five years, and that we now
desir e to mar ry each othe r." 16 The only issue
that nee d s to be resolve d pert ai n s to what nat u r e
of coha bit a ti o n is cont e m p l a t e d unde r Article 76
of the Civil Code to warr a n t the counti n g of the
five year period in orde r to exe m p t the futur e
spous e s from secu ri n g a mar ri a g e license .
Should it be a coha bi t a ti o n wher ei n both partie s
are capa cit a t e d to mar ry each othe r durin g the
entir e five- year conti nu o u s period or should it be
a coha bi t a ti o n wher ei n both parti es have lived
toge t h e r and exclusively with each othe r as
husb a n d and wife duri ng the entir e five- year
continu o u s period reg a r dl e s s of whet h e r ther e is
a legal impe di m e n t to their being lawfully
mar ri e d, which impedi m e n t may have eithe r
disa p p e a r e d or interv e n e d som e ti m e duri ng the
coha bi t a t io n period?
Working on the assu m p t i o n that Pepito and
Nor m a have lived toget h e r as husb a n d and wife
for five year s withou t the ben efit of mar ri a g e ,
that five- year period should be com p u t e d on the
basis of a coha bi t a ti o n as "husb a n d and wife"
whe r e the only missing factor is the speci al
cont r a c t of mar ri a g e to valida t e the union. In
othe r words, the five- year com m o n- law
coha bi t a t io n period, which is count e d back from
the date of celeb r a t io n of mar ri a g e , should be a
period of legal union had it not bee n for the
abse n c e of the mar ri a g e . This 5- year period
shoul d be the years imm e di a t e ly before the day
of the mar ri a g e and it should be a period of
coha bi t a t io n cha r a c t e ri z e d by exclusivity —
mea ni n g no third par ty was involved at anyti m e
within the 5 years and contin ui ty — that is
unbr ok e n . Othe r wi s e , if that contin uo u s 5- year
coha bi t a t io n is comp u t e d without any distinctio n
as to whet h e r the parti e s wer e capa ci t a t e d to
mar ry eac h othe r durin g the entir e five years,
then the law would be sanctioni n g immor ali ty
and encou r a gi n g parti es to have com m o n law
relation s hi p s and placin g the m on the sam e
footing with those who lived faithfully with thei r
spous e. Marri a g e being a speci al relation s hi p
must be resp e c t e d as such and its req ui r e m e n t s
must be strictly obse rv e d. The pres u m p t i o n that
a man and a woma n depor ti n g the m s elv e s as
husb a n d and wife is base d on the app roxi m a t i o n
of the req ui r e m e n t s of the law. The par ti e s
shoul d not be afforde d any excus e to not comply
with every single requir e m e n t and later use the
sam e missing elem e n t as a pre- conceive d esca p e
groun d to nullify their mar ri a g e . There should be
no exe m p ti o n from secu ri n g a mar ri a g e licens e
unless the circu m s t a n c e s clearly fall within the
am bit of the exce ptio n. It should be note d that a
licens e is requi r e d in orde r to notify the public
that two perso n s are abou t to be unit e d in
mat ri m o n y and that anyon e who is awa r e or has
knowle d g e of any impe di m e n t to the union of the
two shall make it known to the local civil
regist r a r . 17 The Civil Code provide s:
Art. 63: . . . This notice shall requ e s t all
per so n s having knowl e d g e of any
impe di m e n t to the mar ri a g e to advice the
local civil regist r a r ther e of. . . .
Art. 64: Upon being advise d of any
allege d impe di m e n t to the mar ri a g e , the
local civil regist r a r shall forth wit h make
an investi g a ti o n, exami nin g perso n s
und e r oath. . . .
This is reite r a t e d in the Family Code thus:
Art. 17 provide s in par t: . . . This notice
shall requ e s t all perso n s having
knowle d g e of any impe di m e n t to the
mar ri a g e to advise the local civil regist r a r
ther e of. . . .
Art. 18 rea d s in part: . . . In case of any
impe di m e n t know n to the local civil
regist r a r or brou g h t to his atte n ti o n, he
shall note down the partic ul a r s the r e of
and his finding s the r e o n in the applica tio n
for a mar ri a g e licens e . . . .
This is the sam e rea so n why our civil laws, past
or prese n t , absolut ely prohibit e d the
concu r r e n c e of multiple marri a g e s by the sam e
per so n duri ng the sam e period. Thus, any
mar ri a g e subs e q u e n t l y contr a c t e d duri ng the
lifetim e of the first spous e shall be illegal and
void, 18 subjec t only to the excep tion in case s of
abse n c e or wher e the prior mar ri a g e was
dissolve d or annull e d. The Revise d Penal Code
compl e m e n t s the civil law in that the contr a c t i n g
of two or mor e mar ri a g e s and the having of
extr a m a r i t al affairs are consid e r e d felonies, i.e .,
biga my and conc u bi n a g e and adult e ry. 19 The law
sanc tion s mono g a m y.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and
respo n d e n t ' s mar ri a g e , it cannot be said that
they have lived with each othe r as husb a n d and
wife for at least five years prior to their weddi n g
day. From the time Pepito's first mar ri a g e was
dissolve d to the time of his mar ri a g e with
respo n d e n t , only abou t twe nt y mont h s had
elaps e d . Even assu mi n g that Pepito and his first
wife had sepa r a t e d in fact, and the r e af t e r both
Pepito and respo n d e n t had star t e d living with
each other that has alre a dy last e d for five years,
the fact rem ai n s that their five- year period
coha bi t a t io n was not the coha bi t a t io n
cont e m pl a t e d by law. It shoul d be in the nat u r e
of a perfec t union that is valid unde r the law but
rend e r e d impe rf e c t only by the abse n c e of the
mar ri a g e cont r a c t . Pepito had a subsisti n g
mar ri a g e at the time whe n he sta r t e d coha bi ti n g
with respo n d e n t . It is imma t e r i al that whe n they
lived with eac h othe r, Pepito had alre a dy bee n
sepa r a t e d in fact from his lawful spous e. The
subsist e n c e of the mar ri a g e even whe r e ther e
was actu al seve r a n c e of the filial com p a ni o n s hi p
betw e e n the spous e s canno t make any
coha bi t a t io n by eithe r spous e with any third
par ty as being one as "husb a n d and wife".
Having det e r m i n e d that the secon d mar ri a g e
involved in this case is not cover e d by the
excep tion to the requi r e m e n t of a mar ri a g e dee m e d as if it neve r exist e d at all and the dea t h
licens e , it is void ab initio beca u s e of the abse n c e of eithe r exting ui s h e d nothi n g.
of such elem e n t . Jurispr u d e n c e unde r the Civil Code stat e s that
The next issue to be resolve d is: do petition e r s no judicial decr e e is nece s s a r y in orde r to
have the per so n ali ty to file a petition to decla r e est a blis h the nullity of a mar ri a g e . 24 "A void
their fathe r ' s mar ri a g e void afte r his dea t h? mar ri a g e does not req ui r e a judicial decr e e to
resto r e the parti e s to their original right s or to
Cont r a r y to respo n d e n t judge 's ruling, Article 47
make the marri a g e void but thou g h no sent e n c e
of the Family Code 20 cannot be applied even by
of avoida n c e be absol ut ely nece s s a r y, yet as well
analogy to petitions for decla r a t i o n of nullity of
for the sake of good orde r of society as for the
mar ri a g e . The secon d grou n d for ann ul m e n t of
pea c e of mind of all conce r n e d , it is expe di e n t
mar ri a g e relied upon by the trial cour t, which
that the nullity of the mar ri a g e shoul d be
allows "the sane spous e" to file an annul m e n t
asce r t a i n e d and decla r e d by the decr e e of a
suit "at anytim e befor e the deat h of eithe r par ty"
court of com p e t e n t jurisdiction." 25 "Und e r
is inapplic a bl e. Article 47 pert ai n s to the
ordin a ry circu m s t a n c e s , the effect of a void
groun d s , period s and perso n s who can file an
mar ri a g e , so far as conce r n s the confer ri n g of
annul m e n t suit, not a suit for decla r a t i o n of
legal right s upon the par ti e s, is as thoug h no
nullity of mar ri a g e . The Code is silent as to who
mar ri a g e had ever take n plac e. And ther efo r e ,
can file a petition to decla r e the nullity of a
being good for no legal pur po s e , its invalidity can
mar ri a g e . Voidable and void mar ri a g e s are not
be maint ai n e d in any proc e e di n g in which the
identic al. A mar ri a g e that is ann ul a bl e is valid
fact of mar ri a g e may be mat e ri al, eithe r direct or
until othe r wi s e decla r e d by the court; wher e a s a
collat e r al , in any civil court betw e e n any parti es
mar ri a g e that is void ab initio is consid e r e d as
at any time, whe t h e r befor e or afte r the deat h of
having neve r to have take n place 21 and canno t
eithe r or both the husb a n d and the wife, and
be the sourc e of right s. The first can be gen e r a lly
upon mer e proof of the facts rend e r i n g such
ratified or confir m e d by free coha bi t a ti o n or
mar ri a g e void, it will be disre g a r d e d or trea t e d
pre sc ri p tio n while the othe r can neve r be
as non- exist e n t by the cour t s." It is not like a
ratified. A voida bl e marri a g e canno t be assaile d
voida bl e mar ri a g e which canno t be collat e r a lly
collat e r ally exce pt in a direct proc e e di n g while a
att a c k e d except in direct proce e di n g instit u t e d
void marri a g e can be atta c k e d collate r ally.
durin g the lifetim e of the par ti e s so that on the
Conse q u e n t l y, void mar ri a g e s can be ques tio n e d
dea t h of eithe r , the mar ri a g e cannot be
even afte r the deat h of eithe r par ty but voidabl e
impe a c h e d , and is made good ab initio . 26 But
mar ri a g e s can be assaile d only duri ng the
Article 40 of the Family Code expr e s sly provide s
lifetim e of the partie s and not after deat h of
that ther e must be a judicial decla r a t i o n of the
eithe r , in which case the parti e s and their
nullity of a previou s mar ri a g e , thou g h void,
offspri n g will be left as if the mar ri a g e had bee n
befor e a par ty can ent e r into a secon d
perfec tly valid. 22 That is why the action or
mar ri a g e 27 and such absolut e nullity can be
defe ns e for nullity is impre s c ri p ti bl e, unlike
base d only on a final judg m e n t to that
voida bl e mar ri a g e s whe r e the action presc ri b e s .
effect. 28 For the sam e rea so n, the law make s
Only the parti e s to a voida bl e marri a g e can
eithe r the action or defe ns e for the decla r a ti o n of
assail it but any prope r inte r e s t e d party may
absol ut e nullity of mar ri a g e
att a c k a void mar ri a g e . Void mar ri a g e s have no
impr e s c ri p t i bl e. 29 Corolla rily, if the deat h of
legal effect s excep t those decla r e d by law
eithe r party would exting ui sh the caus e of action
conce r ni n g the prop e r t i e s of the alleg e d spous e s,
or the grou n d for defe ns e , then the sam e cannot
rega r di n g co- owne r s hi p or owne r s hi p throu g h
be conside r e d impr e s c ri p t i bl e.
act u al joint cont ri b u ti o n, 23 and its effect on the
childr e n born to such void mar ri a g e s as provide d Howev e r, othe r than for purpo s e s of rem a r r i a g e ,
in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as no judicial action is nece s s a r y to decla r e a
well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. mar ri a g e an absolut e nullity. For othe r pur pos e s,
On the cont r a r y, the prope r t y regi m e gover ni n g such as but not limited to det e r m i n a t i o n of
voida bl e mar ri a g e s is gene r ally conjug al heirshi p, legitim a cy or illegitim a cy of a child,
par t n e r s h i p and the childre n conc eive d befor e its settle m e n t of est at e, dissolution of prope r t y
annul m e n t are legitim a t e . regi m e , or a crimin al case for that mat t e r , the
court may pass upon the validity of mar ri a g e
Cont r a r y to the trial court 's ruling, the deat h of
even in a suit not direc tly instit ut e d to ques tio n
petition e r ' s fathe r exting ui s h e d the alleg e d
the sam e so long as it is esse n ti al to the
marit al bond bet w e e n him and respo n d e n t . The
det e r m i n a t i o n of the case. This is without
conclusion is erron e o u s and proce e d s from a
preju dic e to any issue that may arise in the case.
wrong pre mis e that ther e was a mar ri a g e bond
When such nee d arise s, a final judg m e n t of
that was dissolve d betw e e n the two. It should be
decla r a t i o n of nullity is nece s s a r y even if the
note d that their mar ri a g e was void henc e it is
purpo s e is othe r than to rem a r r y. The claus e "on
the basis of a final judg m e n t decla ri n g such
previous mar ri a g e void" in Article 40 of the
Family Code connot e s that such final judg m e n t
nee d not be obtai n e d only for purpo s e of
rem a r r i a g e .
WHERE FOR E, the petition is GRANTED. The
assaile d Orde r of the Regional Trial Court,
Toledo City, Cebu, Branc h 59, dismissin g Civil
Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The said case is orde r e d REINSTATED.
2.1 VOID MARRIAGES
G.R. No. 94053 Marc h 17, 1993
REPU BLIC OF THE PHILIPPI N E S ,
peti ti o n e r ,
vs.
GREGORIO NOLASCO, resp o n d e n t .
The Soli c i t o r Gen e r a l for plai n t i f f- app e l l e e .
Warl o o G. Card e n a l for resp o n d e n t .
R E S O LU TIO N
FELICIANO, J.:
On 5 August 1988, respo n d e n t Grego rio Nolasc o
filed befor e the Region al Trial Court of Antique,
Branc h 10, a petition for the decla r a t i o n of
pre s u m p t iv e deat h of his wife Janet Monica
Park e r , invoking Article 41 of the Family Code.
The petition praye d that respo n d e n t ' s wife be
decla r e d pres u m p t i v ely dea d or, in the
alter n a t iv e, that the mar ri a g e be decla r e d null
and void.1
The Repu blic of the Philippine s oppose d the
petition thro u g h the Provincial Prose c u t o r of
Antiqu e who had been depu tiz e d to assist the
Solicitor- Gene r a l in the insta n t case. The
Repu blic argu e d , first, that Nolasc o did not
posse s s a "well- found e d belief that the abse n t
spous e was alre a dy dea d," 2 and secon d,
Nolasc o's att e m p t to have his mar ri a g e annulle d
in the sam e proc e e di n g was a "cunni n g att e m p t "
to circu m v e n t the law on mar ri a g e . 3
During trial, respo n d e n t Nolasco testified that he
was a sea m a n and that he had first met Janet
Monica Parke r , a British subjec t , in a bar in
Engla n d durin g one of his ship's port calls. From
that cha nc e mee tin g onwa r d s, Janet Monica
Park e r lived with respo n d e n t Nolasc o on his ship
for six (6) mont h s until they ret u r n e d to
respo n d e n t ' s hom et o w n of San Jose, Antiqu e on
19 Nove m b e r 1980 afte r his sea m a n ' s cont r a c t
expire d. On 15 Janua r y 1982, respo n d e n t
mar ri e d Janet Monica Parke r in San Jose,
Antiqu e, in Catholic rites officiat e d by Fr. Henry
van Tilborg in the Cathe d r a l of San Jose.
Respon d e n t Nolasco furt h e r testified that afte r
the mar ri a g e celeb r a t io n, he obt ain e d anot h e r
em ploy m e n t cont r a c t as a sea m a n and left his
wife with his pare n t s in San Jose, Antique.
Some ti m e in Janua ry 1983, while workin g
overs e a s , respo n d e n t rec eive d a lett e r from his
mot h e r infor mi n g him that Janet Monica had
given birt h to his son. The sam e lette r inform e d
him that Janet Monica had left Antique.
Respon d e n t claim e d he then imme di a t e ly aske d
per mi ssio n to leave his ship to retu r n hom e. He
arrive d in Antique in Nove m b e r 1983.
Respon d e n t furt h e r testified that his efforts to
look for her hims elf whe n e v e r his ship docke d in
Engla n d prove d fruitless. He also stat e d that all
the lette r s he had sent to his missing spous e at
No. 38 Raven a Road, Allerto n, Liverpool,
Engla n d, the addr e s s of the bar wher e he and
Janet Monica first met, wer e all retu r n e d to him.
He also claim e d that he inquir e d from amon g
friends but they too had no news of Janet
Monica.
On cross- examin a t io n, respo n d e n t stat e d that he
had lived with and later marri e d Janet Monica
Park e r despi t e his lack of knowle d g e as to her
family backg r o u n d . He insist e d that his wife
continu e d to refus e to give him such inform a t i o n
even afte r they wer e mar ri e d. He also testified
that he did not repor t the mat t e r of Janet
Monica' s disap p e a r a n c e to the Philippi ne
gover n m e n t autho ri ti e s.
Respon d e n t Nolasco pres e n t e d his moth e r , Alicia
Nolasc o, as his witne s s. She testified that her
dau g h t e r- in- law Janet Monica had expre s s e d a
desir e to ret u r n to Engla n d even befor e she had
given birt h to Gerry Nolasc o on 7 Dece m b e r
1982. When aske d why her daug h t e r- in- law
might have wishe d to leave Antiqu e,
respo n d e n t ' s moth e r replie d that Janet Monic a
neve r got use d to the rural way of life in San
Jose, Antiqu e. Alicia Nolasc o also said that she
had tried to dissu a d e Janet Monic a from leaving
as she had given birt h to her son just fiftee n days
befor e, but whe n she (Alicia) failed to do so, she
gave Janet Monica P22,0 0 0. 0 0 for her expe n s e s
befor e she left on 22 Dece m b e r 1982 for
Engla n d. She furt h e r claim e d that she had no
inform a ti o n as to the missing perso n' s pres e n t
whe r e a b o u t s.
The trial court gra n t e d Nolasco' s petition in a
Judg m e n t dat e d 12 Octob e r 1988 the dispositive
portion of which rea d s:
Wher efo r e , und e r Article 41, par a g r a p h 2 of the
Family Code of the Philippine s (Exec utive Orde r
No. 209, July 6, 1987, as ame n d e d by Execu tive
Orde r No. 227, July 17, 1987) this Court here by
decla r e s as pres u m p t iv ely dead Janet Monica
Park e r Nolasc o, withou t preju dic e to her
rea p p e a r a n c e . 4
The Repu blic app e al e d to the Cour t of Appe als
cont e n di n g that the trial court err e d in decla ri n g
Janet Monica Parke r pres u m p t i v ely dea d
bec a u s e respo n d e n t Nolasc o had failed to show
that ther e existe d a well found e d belief for such
decla r a t i o n.
The Court of Appeals affirm e d the trial court 's
decision, holding that respo n d e n t had sufficien tly
est a blis h e d a basis to form a belief that his
abse n t spous e had alre a d y died.
The Repu blic, throu g h the Solicitor- Gene r al, is
now befor e this Court on a Petition for Review
whe r e the following alleg a tio n s are mad e:
1. The Cour t of Appeals err e d in affirmin g the
trial court ' s finding that the r e exist e d a well-
found e d belief on the part of Nolasc o that Janet
Monica Parke r was alre a dy dea d; and
2. The Cour t of Appeals err e d in affirmin g the
trial Cour t' s decla r a ti o n that the petition was a
prope r case of the decla r a t i o n of pres u m p t i v e
dea t h unde r Article 41, Family Code.5
The issue befor e this Court, as form ul a t e d by
petition e r is "[w]he t h e r or not Nolasc o has a
well- found e d belief that his wife is alre a dy
dea d." 6
The pre s e n t case was filed befor e the trial cour t
purs u a n t to Article 41 of the Family Code which
provide s that:
Art. 41. A mar ri a g e cont r a c t e d by any perso n
durin g the subsist e n c e of a previou s marri a g e
shall be null and void, unless befor e the
celeb r a t io n of the subs e q u e n t mar ri a g e , the
prior spous e had bee n abse n t for four
conse c u t ive year s and the spous e pres e n t had a
well- found e d belief that the abse n t spouse was
alre a dy dea d. In case of disap p e a r a n c e wher e
ther e is dang e r of deat h und e r the circu m s t a n c e s
set fort h in the provision of Article 391 of the
Civil Code, an abse n c e of only two years shall be
sufficient .
For the purpo s e of cont r a c t i n g the subse q u e n t
mar ri a g e unde r the prec e di n g para g r a p h , the
spous e pres e n t must instit u t e a sum m a r y
proce e di n g as provide d in this Code for the
decla r a t i o n of pres u m p t i v e dea t h of the
abse n t e e , withou t preju dic e to the effect of
rea p p e a r a n c e of the abse n t spous e . (Emph a si s
supplied).
When Article 41 is comp a r e d with the old
provision of the Civil Code, which it
supe r s e d e d , 7 the following crucial differ e n c e s
em e r g e . Unde r Article 41, the time requir e d for
the pres u m p t i o n to arise has bee n shor t e n e d to
four (4) years; howev e r, ther e is nee d for a
judicial decla r a t i o n of pres u m p t iv e deat h to
ena bl e the spous e pres e n t to rem a r r y. 8 Also,
Article 41 of the Family Code impos e s a strict e r
sta n d a r d than the Civil Code: Article 83 of the
Civil Code mer ely requir e s eithe r that ther e be
no news that such abse n t e e is still alive; or the
abse n t e e is gen e r a lly conside r e d to be dea d and
believe d to be so by the spous e pres e n t , or is
pre s u m e d dea d unde r Article 390 and 391 of the
Civil Code.9 The Family Code, upon the othe r
hand, presc ri b e s as "well found e d belief" that the
abse n t e e is alre a dy dea d befor e a petition for
decla r a t i o n of pres u m p t i v e dea t h can be gra n t e d .
As point e d out by the Solicitor- Gener al, ther e are
four (4) req ui sit e s for the decla r a t i o n of
pre s u m p t iv e deat h und e r Article 41 of the Family
Code:
1. That the abse n t spous e has bee n missing for
four conse c u t ive years, or two conse c u tiv e years
if the disap p e a r a n c e occur r e d whe r e the r e is
dan g e r of dea t h unde r the circu m s t a n c e s laid
down in Article 391, Civil Code;
2. That the pres e n t spous e wishe s to rem a r r y;
3. That the pres e n t spous e has a well- found e d
belief that the abse n t e e is dea d; and
4. That the pres e n t spous e files a sum m a r y
proce e di n g for the decla r a t i o n of pres u m p t iv e
dea t h of the abse n t e e . 10
Respon d e n t nat u r a lly asse r t s that he had
complie d with all thes e requi r e m e n t s . 1 1
Petition e r ' s arg u m e n t , upon the othe r han d, boils
down to this: that respo n d e n t failed to prove that
he had com plie d with the third requir e m e n t , i.e.,
the exist e n c e of a "well- found e d belief" that the
abse n t spous e is alre a dy dea d.
The Court believes that respo n d e n t Nolasco
failed to condu c t a sear c h for his missin g wife
with such diligen c e as to give rise to a "well-
found e d belief" that she is dead.
Unite d Stat e s v. Biasba s, 12 is instr u c tiv e as to
degr e e of diligen c e requir e d in sea rc hi n g for a
missin g spous e. In that case, defen d a n t Maca rio
Biasba s was char g e d with the crim e of biga my.
He set- up the defen s e of a good faith belief that
his first wife had alre a dy died. The Court held
that defen d a n t had not exercis e d due dilige nc e
to asce r t a i n the whe r e a b o u t s of his first wife,
noting that:
While the defe n d a n t testified that he had mad e
inquiri e s conce r ni n g the wher e a b o u t s of his wife,
he fails to stat e of whom he mad e such inquiri es.
He did not even writ e to the par e n t s of his first
wife, who lived in the Provinc e of Pam p a n g a , for
the purpo s e of secu ri n g inform a ti o n conce r ni n g
her whe r e a b o u t s . He admit s that he had a
suspicion only that his first wife was dea d. He
admi ts that the only basis of his suspicion was
the fact that she had bee n abse n t . . . . 13
In the case at bar, the Court consid e r s that the
investi g a ti o n allege dly cond u c t e d by respo n d e n t
in his att e m p t to asce r t ai n Janet Monica Parke r ' s
whe r e a b o u t s is too sket c hy to form the basis of a
reaso n a b l e or well- found e d belief that she was
alre a dy dea d. When he arrive d in San Jose,
Antiqu e afte r lear ni n g of Janet Monica' s
dep a r t u r e , inst e a d of seeki ng the help of local
aut ho ri tie s or of the British Emb a s sy, 14 he
secu r e d anot h e r sea m a n ' s cont r a c t and went to
London, a vast city of many millions of
inha bit a n t s , to look for her ther e .
Q After arriving her e in San Jose, Antique, did
you exert effort s to inquir e the wher e a b o u t s of
your wife?
A Yes, Sir.
Court:
How did you do that ?
A I secu r e d anot h e r cont r a c t with the ship and
we had a trip to London and I went to London to
look for her I could not find her (sic). 15
(Emp h a si s supplie d)
Respon d e n t ' s testim o ny, howeve r, show e d that
he confus e d London for Liverpool and this casts
doubt on his suppo s e d efforts to locat e his wife
in Engla n d. The Cour t of Appeal's justificatio n of
the mist ak e , to wit:
. . . Well, while the cognosc e n t e (sic) would
rea dily know the geogr a p h i c al differ e n c e
betw e e n London and Liverpool, for a hum bl e
sea m a n like Grego rio the two plac e s could mea n
one — place in Engla n d, the port wher e his ship
docke d and whe r e he found Janet. Our own
provincial folks, every time they leave hom e to
visit relatives in Pasay City, Kalooka n City, or
Par a ñ a q u e , would annou n c e to friend s and
relative s, "We'r e going to Manila." This app a r e n t
error in nami n g of place s of destin a ti o n does not
app e a r to be fatal. 16
is not well take n. Ther e is no analogy bet w e e n
Manila and its neigh b o ri n g cities, on one hand,
and London and Liverpool, on the othe r, which,
as point e d out by the Solicitor- Gene r al, are
arou n d thre e hund r e d fifty (350) kilom et e r s
apa r t. We do not conside r that walking into a
major city like Liverpool or London with a simple
hope of some h o w bum pi n g into one partic ul a r
per so n the r e — which is in effect what Nolasc o
says he did — can be rega r d e d as a rea so n a bly
diligen t sea r c h.
The Court also views respo n d e n t ' s claim that
Janet Monica decline d to give any inform a t i o n as
to her perso n al backg r o u n d even after she had
mar ri e d respo n d e n t 17 too conveni e n t an excus e
to justify his failur e to locat e her. The sam e can
be said of the loss of the allege d lette r s
respo n d e n t had sent to his wife which
respo n d e n t claim s were all ret u r n e d to him.
Respon d e n t said he had lost thes e ret u r n e d
lette r s, und e r unsp e cified circu m s t a n c e s .
Neit h e r can this Cour t give much cred e n c e to
respo n d e n t ' s bar e asse r tio n that he had inquir e d
from their friends of her whe r e a b o u t s ,
conside ri n g that respo n d e n t did not identify
thos e friends in his testi m o ny. The Court of
Appeals rule d that since the prose c u t o r failed to
rebu t this evide n c e duri ng trial, it is good
evide n c e. But this kind of evide nc e cannot , by its
nat u r e , be rebu t t e d . In any case, admissi bility is
not synony m o u s with cre di bility. 18 As note d
befor e, the r e are serious doubt s to respo n d e n t ' s
credibility. Moreov e r, even if admit t e d as
evide n c e, said testi m o ny mer ely tend e d to show
that the missing spous e had chose n not to
com m u ni c a t e with thei r com m o n acqu ai n t a n c e s ,
and not that she was dea d.
Respon d e n t testified that imme di a t e ly afte r
rec eiving his moth e r ' s lette r som e ti m e in Janua ry
1983, he cut short his employ m e n t cont r a c t to
ret u r n to San Jose, Antiqu e. Howeve r , he did not
explain the delay of nine (9) mont h s from
Janua r y 1983, when he alleg e dly aske d leave
from his capt ai n, to Nove m b e r 1983 when be
finally rea c h e d San Jose. Respon d e n t , moreove r ,
claim e d he mar ri e d Janet Monica Park e r without
inquiri ng about her pare n t s and their plac e of
resid e n c e . 19 Also, respo n d e n t failed to explain
why he did not even try to get the help of the
police or other autho ri ti e s in London and
Liverpool in his effort to find his wife. The
circu m s t a n c e s of Janet Monica' s depa r t u r e and
respo n d e n t ' s subs e q u e n t beh avior make it very
difficult to reg a r d the claim e d belief that Janet
Monica was dea d a well- found e d one.
In Goitia v. Cam pos- Rued a, 20 the Court stre s s e d
that:
. . . Mar ri a g e is an instit ution, the maint e n a n c e
of which in its purity the public is deeply
inte r e s t e d . It is a relation s hi p for life and the
par ti e s cannot ter mi n a t e it at any short e r period
by virtue of any cont r a c t they make. . . . . 21
(Emp h a si s supplie d)
By the sam e token, the spous e s shoul d not be
allowe d, by the simpl e expe di e n t of agre e i n g that
one of them leave the conjug al abod e and neve r
to retu r n again, to circu m v e n t the policy of the
laws on marri a g e . The Court notes that
respo n d e n t even tried to have his mar ri a g e
annulle d befor e the trial court in the sam e
proce e di n g.
In In Re Szat r a w , 22 the Cour t war n e d agains t
such collusion betw e e n the parti e s when they
find it impossibl e to dissolve the marit al bonds
thro u g h existing legal mea n s.
While the Cour t unde r s t a n d s the nee d of
respo n d e n t ' s young son, Gerry Nolasc o, for
mat e r n a l care, still the requi r e m e n t s of the law
must prevail. Sinc e respo n d e n t failed to satisfy
the clea r requi r e m e n t s of the law, his petition for
a judicial decl ar a ti o n of pres u m p t i v e deat h must
be deni e d. The law does not view mar ri a g e like
an ordin a r y cont r a c t . Article 1 of the Family
Code emp h a siz e s that.
. . . Mar ri a g e is a special cont r a c t of per m a n e n t
union bet w e e n a man and a wom a n ent e r e d into
in accor d a n c e with law for the est a blish m e n t of
conjug al and family life. It is the found a t i o n of
the family and an inviolabl e social instit ution
whose nat u r e , conse q u e n c e s , and incide n t s are
gover n e d by law and not subjec t to stipul a tio n,
excep t that mar ri a g e settl e m e n t s may fix the
prope r t y relations during the mar ri a g e within
the limits provide d by this Code. (Emp h a si s
supplied)
In Arroyo, Jr. v. Court of Appe al s, 23 the Court
stre s s e d stron gly the need to prot e c t .
. . . the basic social instit ution s of mar ri a g e and
the family in the prese r v a ti o n of which the Stat e
bas the stron g e s t inter e s t ; the public policy her e
involved is of the most funda m e n t a l kind. In
Article II, Section 12 of the Constit u t ion the r e is
set fort h the following basic stat e policy:
The Stat e recog niz e s the sancti ty of family life
and shall prot e c t and stre n g t h e n the family as a
basic autono m o u s social instit ution. . . .
The sam e senti m e n t bas been expr e s s e d in the
Family Code of the Philippine s in Article 149:
The family, being the found a tio n of the nation, is
a basic social instit ution which public policy
che rish e s and prot e c t s . Conse q u e n t ly, family
relation s are gover n e d by law and no custo m ,
prac tic e or agr e e m e n t dest r u c t ive of the family
shall be recog niz e d or given effect. 24
In fine, respo n d e n t failed to est a blish that he had
the well- found e d belief requi r e d by law that his
abse n t wife was alre a dy dea d that would sust ai n
the issua n c e of a court orde r decla ri n g Janet
Monica Parke r pres u m p t iv ely dea d.
WHERE FOR E, the Decision of the Court of
Appeals dat e d 23 Febr u a r y 1990, affirmin g the
trial court ' s decision decla ri n g Janet Monic a
Park e r pre s u m p t iv ely dea d is her e by REVERSED
and both Decisions are here by NULLIFIED and
SET ASIDE. Costs agai ns t respo n d e n t .
Bidin, Davide, Jr., Rome r o and Melo, JJ., conc u r.
Gutie r r e z, Jr. J., is on leave.
A.M. No. MTJ-92- 706 Marc h 29, 1995
LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA, co m p l a i n a n t ,
vs.
JUDGE FRANCI SCO F. BRILLANTE S , JR.,
Metr o p o l i t a n Trial Court, Bra n c h 28,
Man il a , resp o n d e n t .
QUIASON, J.:
This is a complai n t by Lupo A. Atienz a for Gross
Immor a lity and Appea r a n c e of Improp ri e t y
again s t Judge Fran ci s co Brillant e s, Jr., Presi di n g
Judge of the Metr o polit a n Trial Court, Branc h
20, Manila.
Compl ai n a n t alleg e s that he has two childre n
with Yoland a De Cast ro, who are living toget h e r
at No. 34 Galaxy Stre e t , Bel- Air Subdivision,
Maka ti, Metr o Manila. He stays in said house,
which he purc h a s e d in 1987, when ev e r he is in
Manila.
In Dece m b e r 1991, upon openi n g the door to his
bedr oo m , he saw respo n d e n t slee pi n g on his
(com pl ai n a n t ' s ) bed. Upon inquiry, he was told
by the hous e b oy that respo n d e n t had been
coha bi ti n g with De Cast r o. Com pl ai n a n t did not
bothe r to wake up respo n d e n t and inst e a d left
the house after giving instr u c ti o n s to his
house b oy to take care of his childr e n .
Ther e af t e r , respo n d e n t preve n t e d him from
visiting his childr e n and even aliena t e d the
affection of his childr e n for him.
Compl ai n a n t claims that respo n d e n t is marri e d
to one Zenai d a Ongkiko with whom he has five
childr e n, as app e a r i n g in his 1986 and 1991
sworn stat e m e n t s of asse t s and liabilities.
Furt h e r m o r e , he allege s that respo n d e n t caus e d
his arr e s t on Janua ry 13, 1992, afte r he had a
hea t e d arg u m e n t with De Cast r o inside the
latt e r ' s office.
For his part, respo n d e n t allege s that
compl ai n a n t was not mar ri e d to De Cast ro and
that the filing of the administ r a t iv e action was
relat e d to complai n a n t ' s claim on the Bel- Air
resid e n c e , which was dispu t e d by De Cast r o.
Respon d e n t denie s that he caus e d compl ai n a n t ' s
arr e s t and claim s that he was even a witnes s to
the withd r a w a l of the compl ai nt for Grave
Sland e r filed by De Cast r o again s t complai n a n t .
Accordi n g to him, it was the sist e r of De Cast ro
who called the police to arr e s t compl ai n a n t .
Respon d e n t also deni es having bee n mar ri e d to
Ongkiko, altho u g h he admit s having five childr e n
with her. He allege s that while he and Ongkiko
went throu g h a marri a g e cere m o n y befor e a
Nueva Ecija town mayor on April 25, 1965, the
sam e was not a valid mar ri a g e for lack of a
mar ri a g e licens e. Upon the req u e s t of the
par e n t s of Ongkiko, respo n d e n t went thro u g h
anot h e r marri a g e cere m o ny with her in Manila
on June 5, 1965. Again, neith e r party applie d for
a marri a g e licens e . Ongkiko aba n d o n e d
respo n d e n t 17 years ago, leaving their childr e n
to his car e and custody as a single par e n t .
Respon d e n t claims that when he mar ri e d De
Cast ro in civil rites in Los Angele s, Californi a on
Dece m b e r 4, 1991, he believe d, in all good faith
and for all legal inten t s and purpo s e s, that he
was single beca u s e his first mar ri a g e was
solem niz e d withou t a licens e.
Unde r the Family Code, the r e must be a judicial
decla r a t i o n of the nullity of a previou s mar ri a g e
befor e a par ty ther e t o can ent e r into a secon d
mar ri a g e . Article 40 of said Code provide s:
The absol ut e nullity of a previous mar ri a g e may
be invoke d for the purpo s e s of rem a r r i a g e on the
basis solely of a final judg m e n t decla ri n g such
previous mar ri a g e void.
Respon d e n t arg u e s that the provision of Article
40 of the Family Code does not apply to him
conside ri n g that his first mar ri a g e took plac e in
1965 and was gove r n e d by the Civil Code of the
Philippin e s; while the secon d mar ri a g e took
place in 1991 and gover n e d by the Family Code.
Article 40 is applica bl e to rem a r r i a g e s ente r e d
into after the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988 rega r dl e s s of the dat e of the first
mar ri a g e . Beside s, unde r Article 256 of the
Family Code, said Article is given "ret ro a c tiv e
effect insofa r as it does not preju dic e or impai r
vest e d or acquir e d right s in accor d a n c e with the
Civil Code or othe r laws." This is partic ul a rly
true with Article 40, which is a rule of proc e d u r e .
Respon d e n t has not shown any veste d right that
was impair e d by the applica tion of Article 40 to
his case.
The fact that proc e d u r a l stat u t e s may som e h o w
affect the litigan t s ' right s may not preclu d e their
ret ro a c tiv e applic ation to pendi n g actions. The
ret ro a c tiv e applic ation of proc e d u r a l laws is not
violative of any right of a per so n who may feel
that he is adve r s ely affect e d (Grego rio v. Court
of Appeal s, 26 SCRA 229 [1968]). The rea so n is
that as a gene r al rule no vest e d right may att a c h
to, nor arise from, proc e d u r a l laws (Billone s v.
Court of Indus t ri al Relations, 14 SCRA 674
[1965]).
Respon d e n t is the last perso n allowe d to invoke
good faith. He mad e a mocke ry of the instit ution
of mar ri a g e and employe d dec eit to be able to
coha bi t with a wom a n, who bege t him five
childr e n.
Respon d e n t passe d the Bar examin a ti o n s in 1962
and was admit t e d to the prac ti c e of law in 1963.
At the time he went thro u g h the two mar ri a g e
cere m o ni e s with Ongkiko, he was alre a dy a
lawyer. Yet, he neve r secu r e d any mar ri a g e
licens e . Any law stud e n t would know that a
mar ri a g e licens e is nec e ss a r y befor e one can get
mar ri e d. Respon d e n t was given an oppor t u ni t y
to corre c t the flaw in his first mar ri a g e when he
and Ongkiko were mar ri e d for the secon d time.
His failur e to secu r e a mar ri a g e licens e on thes e
two occasion s bet r ay s his sinist e r motives and
bad faith.
It is evide n t that respo n d e n t failed to meet the
sta n d a r d of mor al fitnes s for me m b e r s h i p in the
legal profes sion.
While the deceit em ploye d by respo n d e n t exist e d
prior to his appoin t m e n t as a Met r o polit a n Trial
Judge, his immor al and illegal act of coha bi ti n g
with De Cast ro bega n and conti nu e d whe n he
was alrea d y in the judicia ry.
The Code of Judicial Ethics mand a t e s that the
cond u c t of a judge must be free of a whiff of
improp ri e t y, not only with resp e c t to his
perfor m a n c e of his judicial dutie s but also as to
his beh avior as a privat e individu al. Ther e is no
duality of mor ality. A public figur e is also judge d
by his privat e life. A judge, in orde r to promo t e
public confide n c e in the inte g rity and
impa r ti ality of the judiciary, must behav e with
propri e t y at all time s, in the perfor m a n c e of his
judicial dutie s and in his everyd a y life. These are
judicial guide p o s t s too self- evide n t to be
overlook e d. No position exact s a gre a t e r dem a n d
on mor al right e o u s n e s s and uprigh t n e s s of an
individu al than a seat in the judiciary (Imbin g v.
Tiongzon, 229 SCRA 690 [1994]).
WHERE FOR E, respo n d e n t is DISMIS S ED from
the service with forfeit u r e of all leave and
retir e m e n t benefits and with preju dic e to
rea p p oi n t m e n t in any bra nc h , instr u m e n t a li t y, or
age n cy of the gove r n m e n t , includi n g
gover n m e n t - owne d and cont r olle d corpo r a t i o n s.
This decision is imm e di a t ely exec ut o r y.
G.R. No. 10 8 7 6 3 Febr u a ry 13, 19 9 7
REPU BLIC OF THE PHILIPPI N E S ,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL
OLAVIANO MOLINA, resp o n d e n t s .
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Family Code of the Philippine s provide s an
entir ely new groun d (in addition to those
enu m e r a t e d in the Civil Code) to assail the
validity of a mar ri a g e , na m ely, "psychologic al
incap a ci ty." Since the Code's effectivity, our
court s have bee n swa m p e d with various petitions
to decla r e mar ri a g e s void base d on this groun d.
Althoug h this Court had inte r p r e t e d the mea ni n g
of psychologi c al incap a ci ty in the rece n t case of
Sant os vs. Cour t of Appeal s, still many judges
and lawye r s find difficulty in applying said novel
provision in specific case s. In the pres e n t case
and in the cont ext of the her ei n assaile d Decision
of the Cour t of Appeals, the Solicitor Gene r al has
labelled — exag g e r a t e d to be sure but
none t h e l e s s expre s siv e of his frust r a t i o n —
Article 36 as the "most liber al divorc e proc e d u r e
in the world." Henc e, this Court in addition to
resolving the pres e n t case, finds the nee d to lay
down specific guidelin e s in the inte r p r e t a t i o n
and applica tio n of Article 36 of the Family Code.
Before us is a petition for review on certior a ri
und e r Rule 45 challen gi n g the Janua ry 25, 1993
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals 2 in CA-G.R. CV
No. 3485 8 affirmin g in toto the May 14, 1991
decision of the Region al Trial Court of La
Trinida d, 3 Bengu e t , which decla r e d the mar ri a g e
of respo n d e n t Roridel Olaviano Molina to
Reynaldo Molina void ab initio, on the groun d of
"psychologi c al incap a ci ty" unde r Article 36 of the
Family Code.
The Fact s
This case was com m e n c e d on August 16, 1990
with the filing by respo n d e n t Roridel O. Molina
of a verified petition for declar a ti o n of nullity of
her mar ri a g e to Reynaldo Molina. Esse n ti ally,
the petition alleg e d that Roridel and Reynaldo
were marri e d on April 14, 1985 at the San
Agusti n Churc h 4 in Manila; that a son, Andre O.
Molina was born; that after a year of mar ri a g e ,
Reynaldo show e d signs of "imm a t u ri t y and
irres p o n si bility" as a husb a n d and a fathe r since
he prefe r r e d to spen d mor e time with his pee r s
and friend s on whom he squa n d e r e d his money;
that he depe n d e d on his par e n t s for aid and
assist a n c e , and was neve r hone s t with his wife in
rega r d to their financ e s, resulti n g in frequ e n t
qua r r el s betw e e n the m; that some ti m e in
Febr u a r y 1986, Reynal do was relieve d of his job
in Manila, and since then Roridel had been the
sole bre a d wi n n e r of the family; that in Octob e r
1986 the couple had a very inte ns e qua r r el, as a
result of which their relation s hi p was est r a n g e d ;
that in Marc h 1987, Roridel resig n e d from her
job in Manila and went to live with her par e n t s in
Baguio City; that a few weeks late r, Reynaldo left
Roridel and their child, and had since the n
aba n d o n e d the m; that Reynaldo had thus show n
that he was psychologic ally incap a bl e of
complying with esse n ti al marit al obliga tion s and
was a highly imma t u r e and habit u ally qua r r e l
som e individu al who thou g h t of himself as a king
to be serve d; and that it would be to the coupl e's
best inter e s t to have their mar ri a g e decla r e d null
and void in orde r to free the m from what
app e a r e d to be an incom p a t i bl e mar ri a g e from
the star t.
In his Answe r filed on August 28, 1989, Reynal do
admi tt e d that he and Roridel could no longe r live
toge t h e r as husb a n d and wife, but cont e n d e d
that their misun d e r s t a n d i n g s and frequ e n t
qua r r el s wer e due to (1) Roridel's str a n g e
beh avior of insisti ng on maint ai ni n g her grou p of
friends even after their mar ri a g e; (2) Roridel's
refusal to perfor m som e of her marit al duties
such as cooking me als; and (3) Roridel's failure
to run the hous e h ol d and han dl e their financ e s.
During the pre- trial on Octobe r 17, 1990, the
following were stipul at e d :
1. That the partie s herei n were legally mar ri e d
on April 14, 1985 at the Chur c h of St. Augusti n e,
Manila;
2. That out of their mar ri a g e , a child nam e d
Albert Andre Olaviano Molina was born on July
29, 1986;
3. That the partie s are sepa r a t e d- in- fact for more
than thre e years;
4. That petition e r is not asking suppo r t for her
and her child;
5. That the respo n d e n t is not asking for
dam a g e s;
6. That the com m o n child of the par ti e s is in the
custody of the petition e r wife.
Evide nc e for herei n respo n d e n t wife consist e d of
her own testi m o ny and that of her friend s
Rose m a r i e Vent u r a and Maria Leono r a Padilla as
well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worke r, and of
Dr. Teresit a Hidalgo- Sison, a psychia t ri s t of the
Baguio Gene r a l Hospit al and Medic al Cent e r .
She also submi t t e d docu m e n t s mark e d as
Exhibit s "A" to "E- 1." Reynaldo did not pres e n t
any evide n c e as he appe a r e d only durin g the pre-
trial confer e n c e .
On May 14, 1991, the trial cour t rend e r e d
judg m e n t decla ri n g the mar ri a g e void. The
app e al of petition e r was denie d by the Court of
Appeals which affirm e d in toto the RTC's
decision. Henc e, the pres e n t recou r s e .
The Issue
In his petition, the Solicitor Gene r al insist s that
"the Cour t of Appe als made an erro n e o u s and
incor r e c t inter p r e t a t i o n of the phr a s e
'psychologic al inca p a ci ty' (as provide d unde r Art.
36 of the Family Code) and made an incor r e c t
applica tio n ther e of to the facts of the case,"
addin g that the appe al e d Decision tend e d "to
est a blis h in effect the most liberal divorc e
proce d u r e in the world which is ana t h e m a to our
cultu r e ."
In denying the Solicitor Gene r al 's app e al, the
respo n d e n t Court relied 5 heavily on the trial
court ' s findings "that the mar ri a g e betw e e n the
par ti e s broke up bec a u s e of their opposi n g and
conflictin g perso n aliti es." Then, it adde d it sown
opinion that "the Civil Code Revision Com mi t t e e
(her ei n af t e r refer r e d to as Commit t e e) inte n d e d
to liber alize the applica tio n of our civil laws on
per so n al and family right s. . . ." It conclud e d
that:
As grou n d for ann ul m e n t of mar ri a g e , We view
psychologic ally incap a ci ty as a broa d rang e of
ment al and beh avior al cond uc t on the part of one
spous e indica tive of how he or she reg a r d s the
marit al union, his or her perso n al relations hi p
with the othe r spous e, as well as his or her
cond u c t in the long haul for the attai n m e n t of the
princip al objective s of mar ri a g e . If said condu c t ,
obse rv e d and consid e r e d as a whole, tends to
caus e the union to self- dest r u c t beca u s e it
defe a t s the very objective s of marri a g e , the n
ther e is enoug h reaso n to leave the spous e s to
their individu al fates.
In the case at bar, We find that the trial judg e
com mit t e d no indiscr e t i o n in analyzing and
deciding the insta n t case, as it did, henc e, We
find no coge n t rea so n to dist u r b the finding s and
conclusion s thus mad e.
Respon d e n t , in her Memo r a n d u m , adopt s thes e
discus sio n s of the Cour t of Appe als.
The petition e r, on the othe r hand, argu e s that
"opposi n g and conflictin g perso n a liti e s" is not
equival e n t to psychologic al incap a ci ty,
explainin g that such groun d "is not simply the
negle c t by the partie s to the mar ri a g e of their
respo n si bilitie s and duties, but a defect in their
psychologic al nat u r e which rend e r s the m
incap a bl e of perfor m i n g such marit al
respo n si bilitie s and duties."
The Court 's Ruling
The petition is merito ri ou s.
In Leouel Sant os vs. Court of Appeal s6 this
Court, spea ki n g thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug,
rule d that "psychologic al incap a ci ty shoul d refer
to no less tha n a men t al (nor physic al) incap a ci ty
. . . and that (t)he r e is hardly any doub t that the
inte n d m e n t of the law has been to confine the
mea ni n g of 'psychologic al inca p a ci t y' to the most
seriou s case s of perso n ali ty disor d e r s clea rly
demo n s t r a t i v e of an utte r insen sitivity or
inability to give mea ni n g and significa n c e to the
mar ri a g e . This psychologic condition must exist
at the time the marri a g e is celeb r a t e d ." Citing
Dr. Gera r d o Veloso, a form e r presidi n g judge of
the Metro p olit a n Mar ri a g e Tribun al of the
Catholic Archdioc e s e of Manila,7 Justice Vitug
wrot e that "the psychologic al incap a ci ty must be
cha r a c t e r i z e d by (a) gravity, (b) juridic al
ant e c e d e n c e , and (c) incur a bility."
On the othe r hand, in the prese n t case, ther e is
no clea r showi ng to us that the psychologic al
defect spoke n of is an inca p a ci ty. It app e a r s to us
to be more of a "difficulty," if not outri gh t
"refus al" or "neglec t " in the perfor m a n c e of som e
marit al obligatio n s. Mere showi ng of
"irrec o n cilia bl e differ e n c e s" and "conflictin g
per so n ali ti e s" in no wise constit u t e s
psychologic al incap a ci ty. It is not enou g h to
prove that the parti e s failed to mee t their
respo n si bilitie s and duties as mar ri e d perso n s; it
is esse n t i al that they must be shown to be
incap a bl e of doing so, due to som e psychologic al
(nor physical) illness.
The evide n c e adduc e d by respo n d e n t mer ely
show e d that she and her husb a n d could nor get
along with each other . Ther e had been no
showin g of the gravity of the proble m ; neithe r its
juridical ant ec e d e n c e nor its incur a bility. The
expe r t testi m o ny of Dr. Sison show e d no
incur a bl e psychi a t ri c disor d e r but only
incom p a t i bility, not psychologic al inca p a ci t y. Dr.
Sison testified: 8
COURT
Q It is the r efo r e the reco m m e n d a t i o n of the
psychi a t ri s t base d on your finding s that it is
bett e r for the Cour t to ann ul (sic) the mar ri a g e ?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Ther e is no hope for the mar ri a g e ?
A Ther e is no hope, the man is also living with
anot h e r wom a n.
Q Is it also the stan d of the psychi a t ri s t that the
par ti e s are psychologic ally unfit for each othe r
but they are psychologi c ally fit with othe r
par ti e s?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Neith e r are they psychologic ally unfit for their
professio n s?
A Yes, Your Honor.
The Court has no mor e que stio n s.
In the case of Reynaldo, ther e is no showi ng that
his alleg e d per so n ali ty trait s were consti t u tive of
psychologic al incap a ci ty existing at the time of
mar ri a g e celeb r a ti o n. While som e effort was
made to prove that ther e was a failur e to fulfill
pre- nupti al impr e s si o n s of "thou g h tf ul n e s s and
gentl e n e s s " on Reynal do' s part of being
"conse rv a t iv e, hom ely and intellige n t " on the
par t of Roridel, such failure of expec t a t io n is nor
indicative of ante c e d e n t psychologic al
incap a ci ty. If at all, it mer ely shows love's
tem p o r a r y blindn e s s to the faults and blemis h e s
of the beloved.
During its delibe r a t i o n s, the Court decide d to go
beyond mer ely ruling on the facts of this case
vis- a- vis existin g law and jurispr u d e n c e . In view
of the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family Code and
the difficulty expe ri e n c e d by many trial court s
inte r p r e t i n g and applying it, the Court decide d to
invite two amici curia e, nam ely, the Most
Rever e n d Osca r V. Cruz,9 Vicar Judicial
(Presidi n g Judge) of the Nation al Appellat e
Mat ri m o ni al Tribun al of the Catholic Churc h in
the Philippi n e s, and Justice Ricar d o C. Puno, 10
a me m b e r of the Family Code Revision
Com mit t e e . The Cour t takes this occa sion to
than k thes e friends of the Court for their
inform a tiv e and inte r e s t i n g discussio n s during
the oral argu m e n t on Dece m b e r 3, 1996, which
they followe d up with writt e n mem o r a n d a .
From their sub mi ssion s and the Cour t' s own
delibe r a ti o n s, the following guidelin e s in the
inte r p r e t a t i o n and applic a tio n of Art. 36 of the
Family Code are here by hand e d down for the
guida n c e of the benc h and the bar:
(1) The burd e n of proof to show the nullity of the
mar ri a g e belong s to the plaintiff. Any doubt
shoul d be resolved in favor of the existe n c e and
continu a t i o n of the mar ri a g e and agains t its
dissolution and nullity. This is root e d in the fact
that both our Constit u tio n and our laws che ri sh
the validity of mar ri a g e and unity of the family.
Thus, our Constit u t io n devot e s an entir e Article
on the Family, 11 recog nizin g it "as the
found a t io n of the nation." It dec r e e s mar ri a g e as
legally "inviolabl e," ther e by prot e c ti n g it from
dissolution at the whim of the parti e s. Both the
family and mar ri a g e are to be "prot e c t e d " by the
stat e .
The Family Code 12 echo e s this consti t u tio n al
edict on marri a g e and the family and emp h a si z e s
the per m a n e n c e , inviolability and solida ri ty
(2) The root caus e of the psychologi c al
incap a ci ty must be (a) medic ally or clinically
identifie d, (b) allege d in the compl ai nt , (c)
sufficiently prove n by expe r t s and (d) clea rly
explain e d in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code req ui r e s that the incap a ci ty must be
psychologic al — not physical. altho u g h its
manifes t a t i o n s and/or sympto m s may be
physical. The evide nc e must convinc e the court
that the parti es, or one of the m, was men t ally or
physically ill to such an exte n t that the perso n
could not have know n the obligatio n s he was
assu m i n g , or knowin g the m , could not have
given valid assu m p t io n ther e of. Althoug h no
exam pl e of such incap a ci ty need be given her e
so as not to limit the applica tio n of the provision
und e r the princi pl e of ejusd e m gen e ri s, 13
neve r t h e l e s s such root caus e must be identified
as a psychologi c al illness and its incap a cit a t i n g
nat u r e explaine d . Expe r t eviden c e may be given
qualified psychi a t ri s t and clinical psychologist s.
(3) The inca p a ci ty must be prove n to be existin g
at "the time of the celeb r a t i o n" of the mar ri a g e .
The evide n c e must show that the illness was
existing whe n the par ti e s exch a n g e d their "I
do's." The manifest a t i o n of the illness nee d not
be perc eiva bl e at such time, but the illness itself
must have att a c h e d at such mom e n t , or prior
ther e t o.
(4) Such inca p a ci ty must also be shown to be
medically or clinically per m a n e n t or incur a bl e.
Such incur a bility may be absolut e or even
relative only in rega r d to the othe r spous e, not
nece s s a r ily absolut ely agai ns t everyon e of the
sam e sex. Furt h e r m o r e , such incap a ci ty must be
releva n t to the assu m p t i o n of mar ri a g e
obliga tion s, not nece s s a r ily to those not relat e d
to mar ri a g e , like the exer ci se of a profes sio n or
em ploy m e n t in a job. Henc e, a pedia t ri ci a n may
be effective in diagno si n g illness e s of childr e n
and presc ri bi n g medici n e to cure the m but may
not be psychologic ally capa cit a t e d to procr e a t e ,
bea r and raise his/he r own childr e n as an
esse n ti al obligation of mar ri a g e .
(5) Such illness must be grave enoug h to bring
about the disa bility of the party to assu m e the
esse n ti al obligation s of mar ri a g e . Thus, "mild
cha r a c t e r i ol ogic al peculia ri ti e s, mood chan g e s,
occasion al emotion al outbu r s t s " cannot be
acce p t e d as root caus e s. The illness must be
show n as down ri g h t inca p a ci t y or inability, nor a
refusal, negle c t or difficulty, muc h less ill will. In
othe r words, the r e is a nat al or supe r v e ni n g
disa blin g factor in the perso n, an adve r s e
inte g r al elem e n t in the perso n ali ty stru ct u r e that
effectively inca p a ci t a t e s the per so n from really
acce p ti n g and ther e b y complying with the
obliga tion s esse n ti al to mar ri a g e .
(6) The esse n ti al marit al obliga tion s must be
thos e embr a c e d by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as rega r d s the husb a n d and wife as
well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the sam e
Code in reg a r d to pare n t s and their childr e n.
Such non- complie d marit al obligatio n(s) must
also be stat e d in the petition, prove n by evide nc e
and includ e d in the text of the decision.
(7) Inte r p r e t a t i o n s given by the Nation al
Appellat e Mat ri m o ni al Tribun al of the Catholic
Chur c h in the Philippin e s, while not cont rolling
or decisive, should be given gre a t resp e c t by our
court s. It is clear that Article 36 was take n by
the Family Code Revision Commit t e e from Canon
1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which
bec a m e effective in 1983 and which provide s:
The following are inca p a bl e of cont r a c t i n g
mar ri a g e : Those who are una bl e to assu m e the
esse n ti al obligation s of mar ri a g e due to caus e s
of psychologi c al nat u r e . 14
Since the pur pos e of includi ng such provision in
our Family Code is to har m o niz e our civil laws
with the religious faith of our peopl e, it sta n d s to
reaso n that to achieve such har m o niz a tio n, gre a t
per s u a sive weight shoul d be given to decision of
such appell a t e tribun a l. Ideally — subjec t to our
law on evide n c e — what is decr e e d as
canonic ally invalid should also be decr e e d civilly
void.
This is one insta n c e wher e, in view of the evide n t
sourc e and pur pos e of the Family Code
provision, cont e m p o r a n e o u s religious
inte r p r e t a t i o n is to be given pers u a sive effect.
Her e, the Stat e and the Chur c h — while
rem ai ni n g inde p e n d e n t , sepa r a t e and apa r t from
each other — shall walk toge t h e r in synod al
cade n c e towar d s the sam e goal of prot e c ti n g and
che rishi n g mar ri a g e and the family as the
inviolabl e base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must orde r the pros e c u t i n g
attor n e y or fiscal and the Solicitor Gene r al to
app e a r as couns el for the stat e. No decision shall
he han d e d down unless the Solicitor Gene r al
issue s a certification, which will be quot e d in the
decision, briefly sta ri n g ther ei n his rea so n s for
his agr e e m e n t or opposition, as the case may be,
to the petition. The Solicitor Gene r al, along with
the prose c u t i n g attor n e y, shall submit to the
court such certificatio n within fiftee n (15) days
from the dat e the case is dee m e d submit t e d for
resolution of the court. The Solicitor Gene r a l
shall disch a r g e the equivale n t function of the
defe ns o r vinculi cont e m p l a t e d und e r Canon
1095.
In the inst a n t case and applying Leouel Sant o s,
we have alre a dy ruled to gra n t the petition. Such
ruling beco m e s even more cogen t with the use of
the foregoi n g guidelin e s.
WHERE FOR E, the petition is GRANTED. The
assaile d Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The mar ri a g e of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo
Molina subsist s and rem ai n s valid.
Narva s a , C.J., Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno
Fra nci sc o, Her m o si si m a , Jr., and Torre s, Jr., JJ.,
concu r .
Regal a d o, Kapun a n and Mendoz a , JJ., conc u r s in
the resul t.
MARCOS VS. MARCOS
SUPREME COURT
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 13649 0 Octobe r 19, 2000
BRENDA B. MARCOS, petition e r,
vs.
WILSON G. MARCOS, respo n d e n t .
DE C IS IO N
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Psychologic al incap a ci ty, as a groun d for
decla ri n g the nullity of a mar ri a g e , may be
est a blis h e d by the totality of eviden c e pres e n t e d .
Ther e is no requir e m e n t , howeve r, that the
respo n d e n t should be examin e d by a physici an or
a psychologist as a conditio sine qua non for
such decla r a t i o n.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certior a ri
und e r Rule 45 of the Rules of Cour t, assailing the
July 24, 1998 Decision 1 of the Cour t of Appeal s
(CA) in CA-GR CV No. 55588, which dispos e d as
follows:
"WHEREF OR E, the cont e s t e d decision is set
aside and the mar ri a g e bet w e e n the par ti e s is
her e by decla r e d valid."2
Also challen g e d by petition e r is the Dece m b e r 3,
1998 CA Resolutio n denyin g her Motion for
Reconsi d e r a t i o n .
Earlie r, the Region al Trial Court (RTC) had ruled
thus:
"WHEREF OR E, the mar ri a g e bet w e e n petition e r
Bren d a B. Marcos and respo n d e n t Wilson G.
Marco s, sole m niz e d on Sept e m b e r 6, 1982 in
Pasig City is decla r e d null and void ab initio
purs u a n t to Art. 36 of the Family Code. The
conjug al prop e r t i e s , if any, is dissolve d [sic] in
accor d a n c e with Articles 126 and 129 of the
sam e Code in relation to Articles 50, 51 and 52
relative to the delivery of the legitim e of [the]
par ti e s' childr e n. In the best inter e s t and welfar e
of the minor childr e n, their custo dy is gra n t e d to
petition e r subjec t to the visitation right s of
respo n d e n t .
"Upon finality of this Decision, furnish copy each
to the Office of the Civil Regist r a r of Pasig City
whe r e the mar ri a g e was solem niz e d , the
Nation al Censu s and Statistic s Office, Manila
and the Regist e r of Deeds of Mand al uyo n g City
for their appro p ri a t e action consist e n t with this
Decision.
""
The Fact s
The facts as found by the Court of Appeal s are as
follows:
"It was est a blish e d during the trial that the
par ti e s wer e marri e d twice: (1) on Sept e m b e r 6,
1982 which was solem niz e d by Judge Eribe r t o H.
Espirit u at the Municip al Court of Pasig (Exh. A);
and (2) on May 8, 1983 which was sole m niz e d by
Rev. Edua r d o L. Eleaz a r, Comm a n d Chapl ai n, at
the Presi d e n ti al Secu ri ty Com m a n d Chap el in
Malac a ñ a n g Park, Manila (Exh. A-1). Out of their
mar ri a g e , five (5) childr e n wer e born (Exhs. B, C,
D, E and F).
"Appellan t Wilson G. Marcos joined the Arme d
Forc e s of the Philippine s in 1973. Later on, he
was tran sf e r r e d to the Presid e n t i al Security
Com m a n d in Malaca ñ a n g during the Marcos
Regim e . Appellee Bren d a B. Marco s, on the
othe r han d, joined the Wome n ' s Auxilliary Corps
und e r the Philippi ne Air Forc e in 1978. After the
Edsa Revolution, both of the m sough t a
disch a r g e from the milita ry service.
"They first met som e ti m e in 1980 whe n both of
the m were assign e d at the Malac a ñ a n g Palac e,
she as an escor t of Imee Marco s and he as a
Presid e n t i al Guar d of Presid e n t Ferdi n a n d
Marco s. Throu g h telep h o n e conve r s a ti o n s , they
bec a m e acqu ai n t e d and event u a lly beca m e
swe et h e a r t s .
"After their mar ri a g e on Sept e m b e r 6, 1982, they
resid e d at No. 1702 Daisy Str e e t , Hulo Bliss,
Mand al uyo n g, a housin g unit which she acqui r e d
from the Bliss Develop m e n t Corpor a t io n when
she was still single.
"After the downf all of Presid e n t Marco s, he left
the milita ry servic e in 1987 and the n eng a g e d in
differe n t busin e s s vent u r e s that did not howev e r
prosp e r . As a wife, she always urg e d him to look
for work so that their childr e n would see him,
inste a d of her, as the hea d of the family and a
good provide r. Due to his failur e to enga g e in
any gainful employm e n t , they would often
qua r r el and as a conse q u e n c e , he would hit and
bea t her. He would even force her to have sex
with him despi t e her weari n e s s . He would also
inflict physical har m on thei r childr e n for a slight
mist ak e and was so sever e in the way he
chastis e d the m. Thus, for sever al time s duri ng
their coha bi t a ti o n, he would leave their house. In
1992, they wer e alrea d y living sepa r a t e ly.
"All the while, she was engro s s e d in the busin e s s
of selling "magic uling" and chicke n s. While she
was still in the military, she would first make
deliveri e s early in the morni n g befor e going to
Malac a ñ a n g . When she was disch a r g e d from the
military service, she conce n t r a t e d on her
busine s s. Then, she bec a m e a supplier in the
Armed Forc e s of the Philippin e s until she was
able to put up a tradin g and const r u c ti o n
comp a ny, NS Ness Trading and Const r u c t i o n
Develop m e n t Corpor a ti o n.
"The 'stra w that broke the cam el's back' took
place on Octobe r 16, 1994, whe n they had a
bitte r qua r r e l. As they wer e alre a dy living
sepa r a t e ly, she did not want him to stay in their
house anymo r e . On that day, whe n she saw him
in their house, she was so ang ry that she
lamb a s t e d him. He then turn e d violent, inflicting
physical har m on her and even on her moth e r
who cam e to her aid. The following day, Octob e r
17, 1994, she and their childr e n left the house
and soug h t refug e in her siste r ' s house.
"On Octobe r 19, 1994, she submit t e d hers elf [to]
medical exami n a t i o n at the Mand al uyo n g
Medic al Cent e r wher e her injuries wer e
diagno s e d as cont u sio n s (Exh. G, Recor d s, 153).
"Som e ti m e in August 1995, she toge t h e r with her
two siste r s and driver, went to him at the Bliss
unit in Mand al uyo n g to look for thei r missin g
child, Niko. Upon seein g the m , he got mad. After
knowing the rea so n for their unexp e c t e d
pre s e n c e , he ran after the m with a sam u r a i and
even [beat] her drive r.
"At the time of the filing of this case, she and
their childr e n were renti n g a house in Cam ella,
Par a ñ a q u e , while the appella n t was residin g at
the Bliss unit in Mand al uyo n g .
"In the case study condu c t e d by Social Worke r
Sonia C. Millan, the childr e n desc ri b e d their
fathe r as cruel and physically abusive to them
(Exh. UU, Recor d s, pp. 85- 100).
"The appelle e submi t t e d her s elf to psychologist
Nativida d A. Dayan, Ph.D., for psychologic al
evalu a tio n (Exh. YY, Recor d s, pp. 207- 216), while
the app ell a n t on the othe r han d, did not.
"The court a quo found the appella n t to be
psychologic ally incap a ci t a t e d to perfor m his
marit al obligatio n s mainly beca u s e of his failur e
to find work to suppo r t his family and his violent
attit u d e towa r d s appell e e and their childre n , x x
x."3
Ruling of the Court of Appe al s
Rever si n g the RTC, the CA held that
psychologic al incap a ci ty had not bee n
est a blis h e d by the totality of the evide n c e
pre s e n t e d . It ratiocin a t e d in this wise:
"Esse n ti al in a petition for annul m e n t is the
allega tion of the root caus e of the spous e ' s
psychologic al incap a ci ty which shoul d also be
medically or clinically identifie d, sufficie ntly
prove n by expe r t s and clearly explain e d in the
decision. The incap a ci ty must be prove n to be
existing at the time of the celeb r a ti o n of the
mar ri a g e and shown to be medic ally or clinically
per m a n e n t or incur a bl e . It must also be grave
enoug h to bring about the disa bility of the
par ti e s to assu m e the esse n ti al obligation s of
mar ri a g e as set fort h in Articles 68 to 71 and
Articles 220 to 225 of the Family Code and such
non- complie d marit al obliga tion s must similarly
be allege d in the petition, est a blish e d by
evide n c e and explain e d in the decision.
"In the case befor e us, the appella n t was not
subjec t e d to any psychologic al or psychia t ri c
evalu a tio n. The psychologic al findings about the
app ella n t by psychi a t ri s t Nativida d Daya n wer e
base d only on the intervie w s condu c t e d with the
app elle e. Expe r t eviden c e by qualified
psychi a t ri s t s and clinical psychologi st s is
esse n ti al if only to prove that the partie s wer e or
any one of the m was ment ally or psychic ally ill to
be truly incognitive of the marit al obliga tion s he
or she was assu m i n g, or as would make him or
her x x x una bl e to assu m e the m . In fact, he
offere d testi m o ni al evide n c e to show that he
[was] not psychologic ally incap a ci t a t e d . The root
caus e of his suppos e d incap a ci ty was not alleg e d
in the petition, nor medic ally or clinically
identifie d as a psychologic al illness or
sufficiently prove n by an expe r t . Similarly, ther e
is no evide nc e at all that would show that the
app ella n t was sufferin g from an incap a ci ty which
[was] psychologic al or ment al - not physic al to
the exte nt that he could not have know n the
obliga tion s he was assu mi n g : that the incap a ci ty
[was] grave, ha[d] prec e d e d the mar ri a g e and
[was] incur a bl e ." 4
Henc e, this Petition.5
Issue s
In her Memo r a n d u m , 6 petition e r pres e n t s for
this Court 's consid e r a t i o n the following issue s:
"I. Whet h e r or not the Honor a bl e Court of
Appeals could set aside the finding s by the
Region al Trial Cour t of psychologi c al incap a cit y
of a respo n d e n t in a Petition for decla r a t i o n of
nullity of mar ri a g e simply beca u s e the
respo n d e n t did not subject hims elf to
psychologic al evalua ti on.
II. Whet h e r or not the totality of evide n c e
pre s e n t e d and the dem e a n o r of all the witne s s e s
shoul d be the basis of the det e r m i n a t io n of the
merit s of the Petition."7
The Court 's Ruling
We agr e e with petition e r that the perso n a l
medical or psychologic al exa mi n a t io n of
respo n d e n t is not a req ui r e m e n t for a decl ar a ti o n
of psychologi c al incap a ci ty. Neve r t h e l e s s , the
totality of the evide nc e she pres e n t e d does not
show such incap a ci ty.
Prelimin a r y Issue: Nee d for Perso n al Medic al
Exami n a tio n
Petition e r cont e n d s that the testi m o ni e s and the
result s of various test s that wer e sub mit t e d to
det e r m i n e respo n d e n t ' s psychologi c al inca p a cit y
to perfor m the obliga tion s of mar ri a g e should
not have been brus h e d aside by the Court of
Appeals, simply beca u s e respo n d e n t had not
take n those test s hims elf. Petition e r adds that
the CA should have realize d that unde r the
circu m s t a n c e s , she had no choice but to rely on
othe r sour c e s of infor m a t io n in orde r to
det e r m i n e the psychologi c al capa ci ty of
respo n d e n t , who had refus e d to sub mi t himself
to such test s.
In Republic v. CA and Molina,8 the guidelin e s
gover ni n g the applica tio n and the inter p r e t a t i o n
of psychologi c al incap a ci ty refe r r e d to in Article
36 of the Family Code 9 wer e laid down by this
Court as follows:
"1) The burd e n of proof to show the nullity of the
mar ri a g e belong s to the plaintiff. Any doubt
shoul d be resolved in favor of the existe n c e and
continu a t i o n of the mar ri a g e and agains t its
dissolution and nullity. This is root e d in the fact
that both our Constit u tio n and our laws che ri sh
the validity of mar ri a g e and unity of the family.
Thus, our Constit u t io n devot e s an entir e Article
on the Family, recog nizin g it 'as the found a ti o n
of the nation.' It decr e e s mar ri a g e as legally
'inviolabl e,' the r e by prot e c t i n g it from
dissolution at the whim of the parti e s. Both the
family and mar ri a g e are to be 'prot e c t e d ' by the
stat e .
xxx xxx xxx
2) The root caus e of the psychologic al incap a ci ty
must be: (a) medic ally or clinically identified, (b)
allege d in the com pl ai nt , (c) sufficien tly prove n
by expe r t s and (d) clea rly explaine d in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requi r e s
that the inca p a ci t y must be psychologi c al - not
physical, altho u g h its manifest a t i o n s and/or
sympt o m s may be physical. The evide n c e must
convinc e the court that the parti e s, or one of
the m , was ment ally or psychic ally ill to such an
exte n t that the perso n could not have known the
obliga tion s he was assu mi n g , or knowin g the m ,
could not have given valid assu m p ti o n ther e of.
Althoug h no exa m pl e of such inca p a cit y nee d be
given here so as not to limit the applica tio n of
the provision unde r the principl e of ejusd e m
gen e ri s, neve r t h e l e s s such root caus e must be
identifie d as a psychologic al illness and its
incap a ci t a t i n g nat u r e fully explain e d. Expe r t
evide n c e may be given by qualified psychia t ri s t s
and clinical psychologis t s.
3) The incap a ci ty must be prove n to be existin g
at 'the time of the celeb r a t i o n ' of the mar ri a g e .
The evide n c e must show that the illness was
existing whe n the par ti e s exch a n g e d their 'I
do's.' The manife st a t io n of the illness nee d not be
perc eiv a bl e at such time, but the illness itself
must have att a c h e d at such mom e n t , or prior
ther e t o.
4) Such incap a ci ty must also be shown to be
medically or clinically per m a n e n t or incur a bl e.
Such incur a bility may be absolut e or even
relative only in rega r d to the othe r spous e, not
nece s s a r ily absolut ely agai ns t everyon e of the
sam e sex. Furt h e r m o r e , such incap a ci ty must be
releva n t to the assu m p t i o n of mar ri a g e
obliga tion s, not nece s s a r ily to those not relat e d
to mar ri a g e , like the exer ci se of a profes sio n or
em ploy m e n t in a job. Henc e, a pedia t ri ci a n may
be effective in diagno si n g illness e s of childr e n
and presc ri bi n g medici n e to cure the m but not
be psychologic ally capacit a t e d to proc r e a t e , bea r
and raise his/he r own childre n as an esse n ti al
obliga tion of mar ri a g e .
5) Such illness must be grave enoug h to bring
about the disa bility of the party to assu m e the
esse n ti al obligation s of mar ri a g e . Thus, 'mild
cha r a c t e r i ol ogic al peculia ri ti e s, mood chan g e s,
occasion al emotion al outbu r s t s canno t be
acce p t e d as root caus e s. The illness must be
show n as down ri g h t inca p a ci t y or inability, not a
refusal, negle c t or difficulty, muc h less ill will. In
othe r words, the r e is a nat al or supe r v e ni n g
disa blin g factor in the perso n, an adve r s e
inte g r al elem e n t in the perso n ali ty stru ct u r e that
effectively inca p a ci t a t e s the per so n from really
acce p ti n g and ther e b y complying with the
obliga tion s esse n ti al to mar ri a g e .
6) The esse n ti al marit al obliga tion s must be
thos e embr a c e d by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as rega r d s the husb a n d and wife as
well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the sam e
Code in reg a r d to pare n t s and their childr e n.
Such non- complie d marit al obligatio n(s) must
also be stat e d in the petition, prove n by evide nc e
and includ e d in the text of the decision.
7) Inte r p r e t a t i o n s given by the Nation al
Appellat e Mat ri m o ni al Tribun al of the Catholic
Chur c h in the Philippin e s, while not cont rolling
or decisive, should be given gre a t resp e c t by our
court s.
xxx xxx xxx
(8) The trial court must orde r the pros e c u t i n g
attor n e y or fiscal and the Solicitor Gene r al to
app e a r as couns el for the stat e. No decision shall
be hand e d down unless the Solicitor Gene r a l
issue s a certification, which will be quot e d in the
decision, briefly statin g the r ei n his reaso n s for
his agr e e m e n t or opposition, as the case may be,
to the petition. The Solicitor Gene r al, along with
the prose c u t i n g attor n e y, shall submit to the
court such certificatio n within fiftee n (15) days
from the dat e the case is dee m e d submit t e d for
resolution of the court. The Solicitor Gene r a l
shall disch a r g e the equivale n t function of the
defe ns o r vinculi cont e m p l a t e d und e r Canon
1095."10
The guidelin e s incorp o r a t e the thre e basic
requi r e m e n t s earlie r man d a t e d by the Court in
Sant os v. Court of Appeals:1 1 "psychologi c al
incap a ci ty must be cha r a c t e ri z e d by (a) gravity
(b) juridic al ant e c e d e n c e , and (c) incur a bility."
The foregoin g guideline s do not requi r e that a
physicia n exa mi n e the perso n to be decl a r e d
psychologic ally incap a ci t a t e d . In fact, the root
caus e may be "medically or clinically identifie d."
What is impor t a n t is the pres e n c e of evide n c e
that can adeq u a t e l y est a blis h the party's
psychologic al condition. For indee d, if the
totality of evide nc e pres e n t e d is enoug h to
sust ai n a finding of psychologic al incap a ci ty,
then actu al medic al exami n a ti o n of the perso n
conce r n e d need not be resor t e d to.
Main Issue: Totality of Eviden c e Pres e n t e d
The main question, the n, is whet h e r the totality
of the evide nc e pres e n t e d in the pres e n t case --
includi n g the testi m o ni e s of petition e r , the
com m o n childr e n, petition e r ' s siste r and the
social worke r -- was enoug h to sust ai n a finding
that respo n d e n t was psychologi c ally
incap a ci t a t e d .
We rule in the neg a tive. Althoug h this Court is
sufficiently convinc e d that respo n d e n t failed to
provide mat e ri al suppo r t to the family and may
have resor t e d to physic al abus e and
aba n d o n m e n t , the totality of his acts does not
lead to a conclusio n of psychologic al inca p a ci ty
on his part. Ther e is absol ut ely no showi ng that
his "defec t s" were alre a dy pre s e n t at the
inception of the mar ri a g e or that they are
incur a bl e .
Verily, the behavior of respo n d e n t can be
att rib u t e d to the fact that he had lost his job and
was not gainfully employe d for a period of more
than six year s. It was duri ng this period that he
bec a m e inter m i t t e n t ly drunk, failed to give
mat e ri al and mor al suppo r t, and even left the
family hom e.
Thus, his allege d psychologic al illness was
trac e d only to said period and not to the
inception of the mar ri a g e . Equally impor t a n t ,
ther e is no evide n c e showin g that his condition is
incur a bl e , espe ci ally now that he is gainfully
em ploye d as a taxi drive r.
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stre s s, is not to
be confus e d with a divorc e law that cuts the
marit al bond at the time the caus e s ther efo r
manifes t the m s e lve s. It refer s to a seriou s
psychologic al illness afflicting a party even
befor e the celeb r a t i o n of the mar ri a g e . It is a
mala dy so grave and so per m a n e n t as to deprive
one of awa r e n e s s of the duties and
respo n si bilitie s of the mat ri m o ni al bond one is
about to assu m e . These mari t al obligatio n s are
thos e provide d unde r Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221
and 225 of the Family Code.
Neit h e r is Article 36 to be equ a t e d with legal
sepa r a t i o n, in which the grou n d s nee d not be
root e d in psychologic al incap a ci ty but on
physical violenc e, mor al pres s u r e , mor al
corr u p t i o n, civil inter di c tion, drug addiction,
habit u al alcoholism , sexual infidelity,
aba n d o n m e n t and the like.12 At best, the
evide n c e pres e n t e d by petition e r refer s only to
groun d s for legal sepa r a t i o n, not for decla ri n g a
mar ri a g e void.
Becau s e Article 36 has bee n abus e d as a
conve ni e n t divorc e law, this Court laid down the
proce d u r a l requi r e m e n t s for its invocation in
Molina. Petition e r, howeve r , has not faithfully
obse rv e d the m .
In sum, this Cour t cannot decla r e the dissolutio n
of the mar ri a g e for failur e of petition e r to show
that the alleg e d psychologic al incap a ci ty is
cha r a c t e r i z e d by gravity, juridical ant e c e d e n c e
and incur a bility; and for her failur e to obse rv e
the guideline s outline d in Molina.
WHERE FOR E, the Petition is DENIED and
assaile d Decision AFFIRMED, except that
portion requiri n g per so n al medic al examin a ti o n
as a conditio sine qua non to a finding of
psychologic al incap a ci ty. No costs.
G.R. No. 16 4 4 9 3 : Mar c h 10, 20 1 0
JOCELYN M. SUAZO, Peti t i o n e r , v.
ANGELITO SUAZO and REPU B LIC OF THE
PHILIP PI N E S , Res p o n d e n t s .
DE C IS IO N
BRION, J.:
We resolve the appe al filed by petition e r Jocelyn
Suazo (Jocelyn) from the July 14, 2004 Decision
of the Cour t of Appeals (CA)1c Ѓ a in CA-G.R. CV
No. 6244 3, which reve r s e d the Janua r y 29, 1999
judg m e n t of the Region al Trial Court (RTC),
Branc h 119, Pasay City in Civil Case No. 97-
1282.2c Ѓ a The rever s e d RTC decision nullified
Jocelyns marri a g e with respo n d e n t Angelito
Suazo (Angelito) on the groun d of psychologic al
incap a ci ty.
THE FACTS
Jocelyn and Angelito were 16 years old whe n
they first met in June 1985; they were resid e n t s
of Lagun a at that time. After mont h s of
court s hi p, Jocelyn went to Manila with Angelito
and som e friends. Having been gone for thre e
days, their par e n t s soug h t Jocelyn and Angelito
and afte r finding the m, broug h t the m back to
Biñan, Lagu n a . Soon ther e a f t e r , Jocelyn and
Angelitos mar ri a g e was arr a n g e d and they wer e
mar ri e d on Marc h 3, 1986 in a cere m o ny
officiat e d by the Mayor of
Biñan.c h a n r o b l e svi r t u a | a w li b a r y
Withou t any mea n s to suppo r t the m s elv e s,
Jocelyn and Angelito lived with Angelitos par e n t s
after their mar ri a g e . They had by this time
stopp e d schooling. Jocelyn took odd jobs and
worke d for Angelitos relative s as house h ol d help.
Angelito, on the othe r hand, refus e d to work and
was most of the time drun k. Jocelyn urge d
Angelito to find work and violent qua r r e l s often
result e d beca u s e of Jocelyns
effort s.c h a n r o b l e s vi r t u a | a w li b a r y
Jocelyn left Angelito som e ti m e in July 1987.
Angelito ther e af t e r found anot h e r wom a n with
whom he has since lived. They now have
childr e n. c h a n r o bl e svi r t u a | a w l i b a r y
Ten year s after thei r sepa r a t i o n, or on Octobe r 8,
1997, Jocelyn filed with the RTC a petition for
decla r a t i o n of nullity of mar ri a g e und e r Article
36 of the Family Code, as am e n d e d . She claim e d
that Angelito was psychologic ally incap a ci t a t e d
to com ply with the esse n t i al obligatio n s of
mar ri a g e . In addition to the above historic al
nar r a t ive of their relation s hi p, she allege d in her
compl ai n t:
xxxx
8. That from the time of thei r mar ri a g e up to
their sepa r a t i o n in July 1987, their relations hi p
had been mar r e d with bitte r quar r e l s which
caus e d unb e a r a b l e physical and emotion al pains
on the part of the plaintiff bec a u s e defen d a n t
inflicte d physical injuries upon her every time
they had a trou bl e s o m e encou n t e r ;
9. That the main reaso n for their qua r r e l was
always the refus al of the defen d a n t to work or
his indole nc e and his exces sive drinki ng which
make s him psychologic ally inca p a ci t a t e d to
perfor m his mari t al obligatio n s making life
unb e a r a b ly bitte r and intole r a bl e to the plaintiff
causi n g thei r sepa r a t io n in fact in July 1987;
10. That such psychologic al incap a ci ty of the
defe n d a n t star t e d from the time of thei r
mar ri a g e and bec a m e very app a r e n t as time
went and proves to be conti nu o u s, per m a n e n t
and incur a bl e;
xxxx
crala wAng elit o did not answ e r the
petition/co m pl ai n t . Neith e r did he sub mi t himself
to a psychologic al exami n a ti o n with psychologis t
Nedy Tayag (who was pre s u m a b l y hire d by
Jocelyn).ch a n r o b l e s vi r t u a | a w li b a r y
The case proce e d e d to trial on the merit s after
the trial court found that no collusion exist e d
betw e e n the parti e s. Jocelyn, her aunt Maryja n e
Serr a n o, and the psychologist testified at the
trial.ch a n r o bl e svi r t u a | a w l i b a r y
In her testi m o ny, Jocelyn esse n ti ally rep e a t e d the
allega tion s in her petition, includi n g the alleg e d
incide n t s of physical beati n g she receive d from
Angelito. On cross- exa mi n a t i o n, she rem ai n e d
firm on thes e decla r a t i o n s but significa n tly
decla r e d that Angelito had not trea t e d her
violently befor e they wer e mar ri e d.
crala wAsst. Sol. Gen. Kim Brigue r a :
Q. Can you desc ri b e your relation s hi p with the
respo n d e n t before you got mar ri e d ?
A. He always go (sic) to our house to court
me.c h a n r o bl e svi r t u a | a w l i b a r y
Q. Since you cited violenc e, after celeb r a ti o n of
mar ri a g e , will you desc ri b e his beh aviou r a l (sic)
patt e r n befor e you got mar ri e d ?
A. He show (sic) kindn e s s , he always come (sic)
to the house.c h a n r o b l e svi r t u a | a w li b a r y
Q. So you canno t say his behavior al patt e r n
compo si n g of violent nat u r e befor e you got
mar ri e d (sic), is the r e any signs (sic) of violenc e ?
A. None maa m (sic), bec a u s e we were not
swe et h e a r t s . c h a n r o b l e s vi r t u a | a w li b a r y
Q. Even to othe r people?
A. He also qua r r el (sic).3c Ѓ a
crala w M a r yj a n e Ser r a n o corro bo r a t e d part s of
Jocelyns testi m o ny.c h a n r o bl e svi r t u a | a w li b a r y
When the psychologis t took the witne s s sta n d,
she decla r e d :
crala wQ. What about the respo n d e n t , did you
also make clinical inter p r e t a t i o n of his behavior?
A. Appar e n t ly, the behavior and act u a tio n of the
respo n d e n t durin g the time of the mar ri a g e the
respo n d e n t is sufferin g from anti- social
per so n ali ty Disor d e r this is a seriou s and sever e
app a r e n t ly incur a bl e (sic). This disord e r is
chroni c and long- stan di n g before the
mar ri a g e . c h a n r o b l e s vi r t u a | a w li b a r y
Q. And you base d your inter p r e t a t i o n on the
repor t given by the petition e r ?
A. Based on the psychologi c al exa mi n a ti o n
whe r ei n the r e is no patt e r n of lying when I
examin e d her, the petition e r was found to be
very respo n sive, cohe r e n t , releva n t to marit al
relation s hi p with respo n d e n t . c h a n r o b l e s vi r t u a |
awliba ry
Q. And the last page of Exhibit "E" which is your
repor t the r e is a stat e m e n t rat h e r on the last
pag e, last para g r a p h which stat e: It is the
clinical opinion of the und e r si g n e d that mar ri a g e
betw e e n the two, had alre a d y hit botto m rock
(sic) even befor e the actu al celeb r a t i o n of
mar ri a g e . Respo n d e n t ( s) imm a t u r e , irres p o n si bl e
and callous emotion ality practic ally har bo r s (sic)
the possibility of having blissful relation s hi p. His
gen e r a l behavior fulfill(s) the diagno s t ic crite ri a
for a per so n sufferin g from Anti Social
Perso n a lity Disor d e r . Such disord e r is serious
and seve r e and it interfe r r e d (sic) in his capa city
to provide love, carin g, conc e r n and
respo n si bility to his family. The disor d e r is
chroni c and long- stan di n g in propor tio n and
app e a r ( s) incur a bl e . The disord e r was pre se n t at
the time of the weddin g and bec a m e manifes t
ther e af t e r due to stre s s e s and pres s u r e of
mar ri e d life. He appa r e n t ly gre w up in a
dysfunc tio n al family. Could you explain what
does chronic mea n ?
A. Chroni c is a clinical langu a g e which mea n s
incur a bl e it has bee n ther e long befor e he
ent e r e d mar ri a g e app a r e n t ly, it cam e duri ng
early develop m e n t a l (sic) Basic trust was not
develop (sic).ch a n r o bl e svi r t u a | a w li b a r y
Q. And this long sta n di n g propor tio n
(sic).ch a n r o bl e svi r t u a | a w li b a r y
A. That no amou n t of psychologi c al behavior al
help to cure such bec a u s e psychologic al disor d e r
are not det ri m e n t a l to men but to othe r s
par tic ul a rly and this (sic) beca u s e the perso n
who have this kind of disor d e r do not know that
they have this kind of disor d e r . c h a n r o b l e svi r t u a |
awliba ry
Q. So in othe r words, per m a n e n t ?
A. Per m a n e n t and incur a bl e. c h a n r o b l e s vi r t u a |
awliba ry
Q. You also said that this psychologic al disor d e r
is pres e n t durin g the weddi n g or at the time of
the weddi n g or beca m e manifest ther e af t e r ?
A. Yes, maa m . c r a | a w "
xxxx
Court:
Q. Is the r e a clinical findings (sic)?
A. That is the clinical findings. Perso n ality
Disor d e r labele d on Anti- Social Person ality
Disor d e r (sic).ch a n r o bl e svi r t u a | a w l i b a r y
Q. How was shown durin g the mar ri a g e (sic)?
A. The physic al abus e s on the petition e r also
corr el a t e d withou t any employ m e n t exploit a tive
and silent (sic) on the part of the respo n d e n t is
clearly Anti- Social Disord e r . c h a n r o bl e s vi r t u a |
awliba ry
Q. Do the respo n d e n t know that he has that kind
of psychologi c al disor d e r (sic)?
A. Usually a perso n sufferin g that psychologi c al
disor d e r will not admi t that they are sufferin g
that kind of disor d e r (sic).ch a n r o b l e svi r t u a |
awliba ry
Court:
Q. So beca u s e of this Anti- Social Disord e r the
petition e r suffers a lot (sic)?
A. Yes, beca u s e the petition e r is a victim of
har ds hi p s of marit al relation to the respo n d e n t
(sic).ch a n r o bl e svi r t u a | a w li b a r y
Court:
Q. Was the Anti- Social Perso n a lity Disord e r also
show n to the par e n t s (sic)?
A. Yes, accor di n g to the petition e r , respo n d e n t
neve r give due resp e c t mor e often than not he
even shout e d at the m for no app a r e n t reaso n
(sic).ch a n r o bl e svi r t u a | a w li b a r y
Court:
Q. Did you say Anti- Social Disord e r incur a bl e
(sic)?
A. Yes, sir.ch a n r o bl e svi r t u a | a w li b a r y
Court:
Q. Is the r e a physical violenc e (sic)?
A. Actually, I could see the petition e r is tort u r e d
ment ally of the respo n d e n t
(sic).ch a n r o bl e svi r t u a | a w li b a r y
Court:
Q. How was the petition e r tort u r e d ?
A. She was able to count e r- act by the tim e she
was sepa r a t e d by the respo n d e n t
(sic).ch a n r o bl e svi r t u a | a w li b a r y
Court:
Q. Do you mea n to tell us that Anti- Social
disor d e r is incur a bl e ?
A. Yes, sir.ch a n r o bl e svi r t u a | a w li b a r y
Court:
Q. Why did you know?
A. Anti- Social disord e r is incur a bl e again
bec a u s e the perso n itself, the respo n d e n t is not
awa r e that this kind of perso n ality affect the
othe r party (sic).cha n r o b l e svi r t u a | a w l i b a r y
Court:
Q. This Anti- Social beh avior is nat u r a lly affect e d
the petition e r (sic)?
A. They do not have childr e n bec a u s e more often
than not the respo n d e n t is unde r the influen c e of
alcohol, they do not have pea c ef ul har m o ni o u s
relation s hi p during the less tha n one year and
one thing what is significa n t , respo n d e n t allowe d
wife to work as hous e m a i d inste a d of he who
shoul d provide and the petition e r neve r receive
and enjoy her ear ni n g for the five mont h s that
she work and it is also the petition e r who took
sust ai n a n c e of the vices. (sic)
Q. And beca u s e of that Anti- Social disor d e r he
had not shown love to the petition e r ?
A. From the very star t the respo n d e n t has no
emotion to sust ai n the marit al relation s hi p but
wha t he need is to sust ai n his vices thru the
petition e r (sic).ch a n r o b l e svi r t u a | a w li b a r y
Court:
Q. What are the vices?
A. Alcohol and gam blin g.c h a n r o bl e svi r t u a |
awliba ry
Court:
Q. And this affect e d psychologic al inca p a ci ty to
perfor m marit al obligatio n?
A. Not only that up to this time from my clinical
analysis of Anti- Social Perso n a lity Disord e r , he is
good for nothin g perso n. 4 c Ѓ a
crala wT h e psychologist also identified the
Psychologic al Repor t she prep a r e d . The Report
pertin e n t ly stat e s: 5 c Ѓ a
Repor t on the psychologic al condition of
JOCELYN M. SUAZO, a petition e r for "Nullity of
Mar ri a g e " versu s ANGELITO D. SUAZO
GENERAL DATA
This pert ai n s to Jocelyns]
BRIEF MARITAL HISTORY
xxxx
Husb a n d is Angelito D. Suazo, 28 years old
reac h e d 3rd year high school, a part time
tricycle driver, eldes t amon g 4 siblings. Fat h e r is
a machin e oper a t o r, desc ri b e d to be an alcoholic,
wom a niz e r and a heavy gam bl e r . While mot h e r is
a sales age n t . It was a com m o n knowle d g e
within thei r vicinity that she was also involved in
an illicit relation s hi p. Familial relations hi p was
desc ri b e d to be stor my, chaotic whos e bicke ri n g
and squa b bl e s were part and parc el of their day
to day living.
TEST RESULTS AND EVALUATION
Projec tive dat a reve al an introve r t perso n whose
impulse life is ade q u a t e ly supp r e s s e d so muc h so
that it does not crea t e inne r tension and anxiety.
She is fully equipp e d in ter m s of drives and
motivatio n partic ul a rly in uplifting not, only her
socio- emotion al image but was as her mor ale.
She may be sensi tive yet capa bl e of cont aini n g
the effect of such sensitiven e s s; in orde r to
rem ai n in goodst e a d (sic) with her imm e di a t e
environ m e n t . c h a n r o b l e svi r t u a | a w li b a r y
She is pict ur e d as a har d- workin g man (sic) who
looks forwa r d for a bett e r futur e in spite of
difficulti es she had gone throu g h in the past. She
is fully awa r e of exte r n al realities of life that she
set simple life goals which is (sic) com m e n s u r a t e
with her capa bilities and limitatio ns. Howev e r,
she nee d s to prioritize her inter e s t in orde r to
direct her ene r gy towar d specific goals. Her
toler a n c e for frust r a t i o n app e a r s to be at par
with her coping mec h a ni s m that she is able to
disch a r g e nega tive tre n d s appr o p ri a t e l y.
REMARKS :
Alrea dy cited in full in the psychologis t s
testi m o ny quot e d above]6c Ѓ a
The Office of the Solicitor Gener al repr e s e n t i n g
the Republic of the Philippin e s stron gly oppos e d
the petition for decl ar a ti o n of nullity of the
mar ri a g e . Throug h a Certifica tio n filed with the
RTC, it arg u e d that the psychologist failed to
examin e and test Angelito; thus, what she said
about him was pur ely hea r s a y.
THE RTC RULING
The RTC ann ulle d the mar ri a g e und e r the
following rea so ni n g:
While the r e is no par tic ul a r insta n c e setfort h
(sic) in the law that a per so n may be consid e r e d
as psychologi c ally incap a ci t a t e d , ther e as (sic)
som e admi tt e d groun d s that would rend e r a
per so n to be unfit to com ply with his marit al
obliga tion, such as "imm a t u r i ty, i.e., lack of an
effective sens e of ration al judg m e n t and
respo n si bility, othe r wi s e peculia r to infant s (like
refusal of the husb a n d to suppo r t the family or
excessive depe n d e n c e on par e n t s or pee r grou p
app roval) and habit u al alcoholism , or the
condition by which a perso n lives for the next
drink and the next drinks" (The Family Code of
the Phils, Alicia Sem pio- Diy, p.39, 1988 ed.)
The evide n c e pres e n t e d by the petition e r and the
testi m o ny of the petition e r and Dr. Tayag, points
(sic) to one thing that the petition e r failed to
est a blis h a har m o ni o u s family life with the
respo n d e n t . On the cont r a r y, the respo n d e n t has
not shown love and resp e c t to the petition e r
manifes t e d by the form e r s being irres po n si bl e,
imma t u r e , jobless, gam bl e r , drun k a r d and worst
of all a wife beat e r . The petition e r , una bl e to
bea r any longe r the misbe h a vior and attit u d e of
the respo n d e n t , decide d, after one year and four
mont h s of messy days, to leave the
respo n d e n t . c h a n r o b l e s vi r t u a | a w l i b a r y
In this rega r d , the petition e r was able to prove
that right from the star t of her mar ri e d life with
the respo n d e n t , she alre a dy suffere d from
maltr e a t m e n t , due to physic al injurie s inflicte d
upon her and that she was the one who worke d
as a hous e m a i d of a relative of her husb a n d to
sust ai n the latte r s niece (sic) and bec a u s e they
were living with her husb a n d s family, she was
oblige d to do the house h ol d chore s an indicatio n
that she is a bat t e r e d wife couple d with the fact
that she serve d as a serva n t in his (sic) husb a n d s
family.ch a n r o bl e svi rt u a | a w l i b a r y
This situa tion that the petition e r had und e r w e n t
may be att ri b u t e d to the fact that at the time of
their marri a g e , she and her husb a n d are still
young and was force d only to said mar ri a g e by
her relative s. The petition e r and the respo n d e n t
had never develop e d the feeling of love and
resp e c t , inste a d , the respo n d e n t blam e d the
petition e r s family for said early mar ri a g e and not
to his own liking.c h a n r o b l e s vi r t u a | a w l i b a r y
Applying the principl e s and the requi sit e s of
psychologic al incap a ci ty enu nci a t e d by this
Court in Sant os v. Court of Appeals,7 c Ѓ a the
RTC conclu d e d:
The above finding s of the psychologist [refer ri n g
to the psychologist testi m o ny quot e d above]
would only tend to show that the respo n d e n t
was, inde e d, sufferi n g from psychologic al
incap a ci ty which is not only grave but also
incur a bl e .c h a n r o bl e s vi r t u a | a w li b a r y
Likewise, applying the princi ple s set forth in the
case of Repu blic vs. Court of Appe als and
Molina, 268 SCRA 198, whe r ei n the Supr e m e
Court held that:
x x x x [At this point, the RTC cited the perti n e n t
Molina ruling]
The Court is satisfied that the evide n c e
pre s e n t e d and the testi m o ny of the petition e r
and Dr. Familiar (sic) [the psychologis t who
testified in this case was Nedy Tayag, not a Dr.
Familiar] att e s ti n g that ther e is psychologic al
incap a ci ty on the part of the respo n d e n t to
comply with the esse n ti al marit al obliga tion s has
bee n sufficien tly and clearly prove n and,
ther efo r e , petition e r is entitle d to the relief
praye d for.cha n r o b l e svi r t u a | a w l i b a r y
A claim that the mar ri a g e is valid as ther e is no
psychologic al incap a ci ty of the respo n d e n t is a
spec ul a ti o n and conject u r e and withou t moral
cert ai n t y. This will enha n c e d (sic) a gre a t e r
tra g e d y as the bat t e r e d wife/peti tion e r will still
be using the surn a m e of the respo n d e n t ,
althou g h they are now sep a r a t e d , and a grim and
sad remi n d e r of her husb a n d who made her e a
slave and a punc hi n g bag duri ng the short spa n
of her mar ri a g e with him. The law on ann ul m e n t
shoul d be liberally const r u e d in favor of an
innoce n t sufferin g petition e r othe r wi s e said law
will be an instr u m e n t to prot e c t perso n s with
ment al illness like the seriou s anti- social
beh avior of her ei n respo n d e n t . 8 c Ѓ a
THE CA RULING
The Repu blic app e al e d the RTC decision to the
CA. The CA reve r s e d the RTC decision, ruling
that:
True, as stat e d in Marcos vs Marcos 343 SCRA
755, the guidelin e s set in Sant os vs Court of
Appeals and Repu blic vs Court of Appeal s do not
requi r e that a physicia n perso n ally exa mi n e the
per so n to be decla r e d psychologic ally
incap a ci t a t e d . The Supr e m e Court adopt e d the
totality of evide nc e app ro a c h which allows the
fact of psychologic al inca p a ci ty to be dra w n from
evide n c e that medic ally or clinically identify the
root caus e s of the illness. If the totality of the
evide n c e is enoug h to sust ai n a finding of
psychologic al incap a ci ty, the n actu al medical
examin a t io n of the perso n conc e r n e d nee d not be
reso r t e d to. Applied in Marcos, howev e r, the
agg r e g a t e testi m o ny of the aggri ev e d spous e,
childr e n, relative s and the social worke r wer e
not found to be sufficie nt to prove psychologic al
incap a ci ty, in the abse n c e of any evalua tion of
the respo n d e n t himself, the perso n whose ment al
and psychologic al capa city was in
ques tio n.c h a n r o b l e s vi r t u a | a w li b a r y
In the case at benc h, ther e is much scarc e r
evide n c e to hold that the respo n d e n t was
psychologic ally incap a bl e of ent e ri n g into the
mar ri a g e stat e, that is, to assu m e the esse n ti al
dutie s of mar ri a g e due to an unde rlyin g
psychologic al illness. Only the wife gave first-
hand testi m o ny on the beh avior of the husb a n d ,
and it is inconclu sive. As obse rv e d by the Court
in Marco s, the respo n d e n t may have failed to
provide mat e ri al suppo r t to the family and has
reso r t e d to physic al abus e, but it is still
nece s s a r y to show that they wer e manifes t a t i o n s
of a dee p e r psychologic al malaise that was
clinically or medically identifie d. The theory of
the psychologis t that the respo n d e n t was
sufferi ng from an anti- social perso n ali ty
syndr o m e at the time of the mar ri a g e was not
the prod u c t of any ade q u a t e medic al or clinical
investi g a ti o n. The evide n c e that she got from the
petition e r, ane c d o t a l at best, could equally show
that the beh avior of the respo n d e n t was due
simply to caus e s like imm a t u r i ty or
irres p o n si bility which are not equivale n t to
psychologic al incap a ci ty, Pesc a vs Pesc a 356
SCRA 588, or the failure or refusal to work could
have bee n the resul t of reb ellious n e s s on the
par t of one who felt that he had bee n force d into
a loveless mar ri a g e . In any event, the respo n d e n t
was not unde r a per m a n e n t comp ul sio n beca u s e
he had later on show n his ability to enga g e in
produ c tiv e work and mor e stabl e relations hi p s
with anot h e r . The elem e n t of per m a n e n c e or
incur a bility that is one of the defining
cha r a c t e r i s ti c of psychologic al inca p a ci ty is not
pre s e n t . c h a n r o b l e svi r t u a | a w li b a r y
Ther e is no doubt that for the shor t period that
they wer e unde r the sam e roof, the mar ri e d life
of the petition e r with the respo n d e n t was an
unh a p p y one. But the mar ri a g e cannot for this
reaso n be exting ui s h e d . As the Supr e m e Court
intim a t e s in Pesc a, our strict handlin g of Article
36 will be a remi n d e r of the inviolability of the
mar ri a g e instit u tio n in our count r y and the
found a t io n of the family that the law seeks to
prot e c t . The conc e p t of psychologic al inca p a ci t y
is not to be a mant r a to legalize what in reality
are conve ni e n t excus e s of parti e s to sepa r a t e
and divorc e.
THE PETITION
Jocelyn now com e s to us via the pres e n t petition
to challe n g e and seek the reve r s al of the CA
ruling base d on the following arg u m e n t s :
crala w 1. The Court of Appe als went beyon d what
the law says, as it totally disre g a r d e d the legal
basis of the RTC in decla ri n g the mar ri a g e null
and void Tuason v. Tuaso n (256 SCRA 158; to be
accu r a t e , should be Tuaso n v. Court of Appe als)
holds that "the finding of the Trial Court as to
the exist e n c e or non- existe n c e of petition e r s
psychologic al incap a ci ty at the time of the
mar ri a g e is final and binding on us (the Supr e m e
Court); petition e r has not sufficie ntly shown that
the trial court s factu al finding s and evalua ti on of
the testi m o ni e s of privat e respo n d e n t s witne s s e s
vis- à- vis petition e r s defe ns e s are clea rly and
manifes tly erron e o u s ";
2. Article 36 of the Family Code did not define
psychologic al incap a ci ty; this omission was
inte ntio n a l to give the court s a wider discr e t io n
to inte r p r e t the term withou t being shackle d by
stat u t o r y par a m e t e r s . Article 36 thoug h was
take n from Canon 1095 of the New Code of
Canon Law, which gives thre e conditions that
would make a per so n una bl e to cont r a c t
mar ri a g e from ment al incap a ci ty as follows:
"1095. They are incap a bl e of cont r a c t i n g
mar ri a g e :
crala w( 1) who lack the sufficie nt use of rea so n;
(2) who suffer from grave lack of discre tio n of
judg m e n t conce r ni n g esse n t i al mat ri m o ni al
right s and duties which are to be mut u ally given
and acce p t e d ;
(3) who are not capa bl e of assu mi n g the
esse n ti al obligation s of mat ri m o ny due to caus e s
of a psychic natu r e . c r a | a w "
crala wT h e decision of the RTC, Jocelyn claims,
intellige n t ly confor m s to thes e crite ri a. The RTC,
being cloth e d with discre tio n a r y functions,
applied its finding of psychologic al incap a ci ty
base d on existing jurispr u d e n c e and the law
itself which gave lowe r court magist r a t e s enou g h
latit ud e to define what consti t u t e s psychologic al
incap a ci ty. On the cont r a r y, she furth e r claim s,
the OSG relied on gene r ali ti e s withou t being
specific on why it is oppose d to the dissolution of
a marri a g e that actu ally exists only in
nam e .c h a n r o bl e svi r t u a | a w li b a r y
Simply stat e d, we face the issue of whet h e r the r e
is basis to nullify Jocelyns mar ri a g e with Angelito
und e r Article 36 of the Family Code.
THE COURTS RULING
We find the petition devoid of merit. The CA
com mit t e d no rever si bl e error of law in settin g
aside the RTC decision, as no basis exists to
decla r e Jocelyns mar ri a g e with Angelito a nullity
und e r Article 36 of the Family Code and its
relat e d jurisp r u d e n c e .
The Law, Molina and Te
Article 36 of the Family Code provide s that a
mar ri a g e cont r a c t e d by any par ty who, at the
time of the celebr a t i o n, was psychologic ally
incap a ci t a t e d to com ply with the esse n ti al
marit al obligatio n s of mar ri a g e , shall likewise be
void even if such incap a ci ty beco m e s manifes t
only afte r its sole m niz a ti o n.c h a n r o b l e s vi r t u a |
awliba ry
A uniqu e featu r e of this law is its inten d e d open-
end e d applica tion, as it mer ely introd u c e d an
abst r a c t conc e p t psychologic al incap a ci ty that
disa bl e s complia n c e with the contr a c t u a l
obliga tion s of marri a g e withou t any concr e t e
definition or, at the very least, an illust r a t ive
exam pl e. We must ther efo r e apply the law base d
on how the conce p t of psychologic al incap a ci ty
was sha p e d and develop e d in
jurisp r u d e n c e . c h a n r o b l e s vi r t u a | a w li b a r y
Sant os v. Court of Appeals 9 c Ѓ a decla r e d that
psychologic al incap a ci ty must be cha r a c t e ri z e d
by (a) gravity; (b) juridical ant e c e d e n c e ; and (c)
incur a bility. It should refe r to "no less than a
ment al (not physical) incap a ci ty that cause s a
par ty to be truly incognitive of the basic marit al
coven a n t s that conco mi t a n tl y must be assu m e d
and disch a r g e d by the par ti e s to the mar ri a g e ."
It must be confine d to "the most serious case s of
per so n ali ty disor d e r s clea rly dem o n s t r a t iv e of an
utt e r insen si tivity or inability to give mea ni n g
and significa n c e to the mar ri a g e ." 1 0 c Ѓ a
The Court laid down more definitive guidelin e s
in the inter p r e t a t i o n and applica tion of the law in
Repu blic v. Court of Appe als1 1 c Ѓ a (Molina) as
follows:
crala w( 1) The burd e n of proof to show the nullity
of the mar ri a g e belon gs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolve d in favor of the
exist e n c e and contin u a t i o n of the mar ri a g e and
again s t its dissolution and nullity. This is root e d
in the fact that both our Constit u tio n and our
laws cheris h the validity of mar ri a g e and unity of
the family. Thus, our Constit u tio n devot e s an
entir e Article on the Family, recog nizi ng it "as
the found a t i o n of the nation." It decr e e s
mar ri a g e as legally "inviolable," the r e by
prot e c ti n g it from dissolution at the whim of the
par ti e s. Both the family and marri a g e are to be
"prot e c t e d " by the stat e.c h a n r o bl e svi r t u a |
awliba ry
The Family Code echo e s this consti t u tio n a l edict
on mar ri a g e and the family and emp h a siz e s their
per m a n e n c e , inviolability and
solidari ty.c h a n r o b l e svi r t u a | a w li b a r y
(2) The root caus e of the psychologi c al
incap a ci ty must be (a) medic ally or clinically
identifie d, (b) allege d in the compl ai nt , (c)
sufficiently prove n by expe r t s and (d) clea rly
explain e d in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code req ui r e s that the incap a ci ty must be
psychologic al - not physic al, altho u g h its
manifes t a t i o n s and/or sympto m s may be
physical. The evide nc e must convinc e the court
that the parti es or one of the m was ment ally or
psychic ally ill to such an exte n t that the perso n
could not have know n the obligatio n s he was
assu m i n g , or knowin g the m , could not have
given valid assu m p t io n ther e of. Althoug h no
exam pl e of such incap a ci ty need be given her e
so as not to limit the applica tio n of the provision
und e r the princi pl e of ejusd e m gen e ri s,
neve r t h e l e s s such root caus e must be identified
as a psychologi c al illness and its incap a cit a t i n g
nat u r e fully explain e d. Expe rt evide n c e may be
given by qualified psychia t ri s t s and clinical
psychologis t s.c h a n r o bl e s vi r t u a | a w li b a r y
(3) The inca p a ci ty must be prove n to be existin g
at "the time of the celeb r a t i o n" of the mar ri a g e .
The evide n c e must show that the illness was
existing whe n the par ti e s exch a n g e d their "I
do's." The manifest a t i o n of the illness nee d not
be perc eiva bl e at such time, but the illness itself
must have att a c h e d at such mom e n t , or prior
ther e t o.c h a n r o b l e svi r t u a | a w li b a r y
(4) Such inca p a ci ty must also be shown to be
medically or clinically per m a n e n t or incur a bl e.
Such incur a bility may be absolut e or even
relative only in rega r d to the othe r spous e, not
nece s s a r ily absolut ely agai ns t everyon e of the
sam e sex. Furt h e r m o r e , such incap a ci ty must be
releva n t to the assu m p t i o n of mar ri a g e
obliga tion s, not nece s s a r ily to those not relat e d
to mar ri a g e , like the exer ci se of a profes sio n or
em ploy m e n t in a job. x x x
(5) Such illness must be grave enoug h to bring
about the disa bility of the party to assu m e the
esse n ti al obligation s of mar ri a g e . Thus, "mild
cha r a c t e r i ol ogic al peculia ri ti e s, mood chan g e s,
occasion al emotion al outbu r s t s " cannot be
acce p t e d as root caus e s. The illness must be
show n as down ri g h t inca p a ci t y or inability, not a
refusal, negle c t or difficulty, muc h less ill will. In
othe r words, the r e is a nat al or supe r v e ni n g
disa blin g factor in the perso n, an adve r s e
inte g r al elem e n t in the perso n ali ty stru ct u r e that
effectively inca p a ci t a t e s the per so n from really
acce p ti n g and ther e b y complying with the
obliga tion s esse n ti al to
mar ri a g e . c h a n r o b l e s vi r t u a | a w li b a r y
(6) The esse n ti al marit al obliga tion s must be
thos e embr a c e d by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as rega r d s the husb a n d and wife as
well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the sam e
Code in reg a r d to pare n t s and their childr e n.
Such non- complie d marit al obligatio n(s) must
also be stat e d in the petition, prove n by evide nc e
and includ e d in the text of the
decision.c h a n r o bl e s vir t u a | a w li b a r y
(7) Inte r p r e t a t i o n s given by the Nation al
Appellat e Mat ri m o ni al Tribun al of the Catholic
Chur c h in the Philippin e s, while not cont rolling
or decisive, should be given gre a t resp e c t by our
court s x x x
(8) The trial court must orde r the pros e c u t i n g
attor n e y or fiscal and the Solicitor Gene r al to
app e a r as couns el for the stat e. No decision shall
be hand e d down unless the Solicitor Gene r a l
issue s a certification, which will be quot e d in the
decision, briefly statin g the r ei n his reaso n s for
his agr e e m e n t or opposition, as the case may be,
to the petition. The Solicitor Gene r al, along with
the prose c u t i n g attor n e y, shall submit to the
court such certificatio n within fiftee n (15) days
from the dat e the case is dee m e d submit t e d for
resolution of the court. The Solicitor Gene r a l
shall disch a r g e the equivale n t function of the
defe ns o r vinculi cont e m p l a t e d und e r Canon
1095.1 2 c Ѓ a
crala w M olin a, subs e q u e n t jurisp r u d e n c e holds,
mer ely expou n d e d on the basic requi r e m e n t s of
Sant os.1 3 c Ѓ a
A late r case, Marco s v. Marcos,1 4 c Ѓ a furt h e r
clarified that ther e is no requir e m e n t that the
defe n d a n t / r e s p o n d e n t spous e should be
per so n ally exami n e d by a physicia n or
psychologis t as a condition sine qua non for the
decla r a t i o n of nullity of mar ri a g e base d on
psychologic al incap a ci ty. Accordi n gly, it is no
longe r nec e s s a r y to introd u c e expe r t opinion in a
petition unde r Article 36 of the Family Code if
the totality of evide nc e shows that psychologi c al
incap a ci ty exists and its gravity, juridical
ant e c e d e n c e , and incur a bility can be duly
est a blis h e d . 1 5 c Ѓ a
Pesc a v. Pesc a 1 6 c Ѓ a clarifies that the Molina
guidelin e s apply even to case s then alre a d y
pendi n g, unde r the rea so ni n g that the court s
inte r p r e t a t i o n or const r u c t i o n est a blis h e s the
cont e m p o r a n e o u s legisla tive inten t of the law;
the latt e r as so inter p r e t e d and const r u e d would
thus constit u t e a part of that law as of the dat e
the stat u t e is enac t e d . It is only when a prior
ruling of this Court finds itself later overr ul e d,
and a differ e n t view is adopt e d , that the new
doct ri n e may have to be applie d prosp e c t ively in
favor of parti e s who have relied on the old
doct ri n e and have act e d in good faith in
accor d a n c e ther e wi t h unde r the familiar rule of
"lex prospi cit, non respicit.c r a | a w "
On Marc h 15, 2003, the Rule on Declar a ti o n of
Absolut e Nullity of Void Mar ri a g e s and
Annul m e n t of Voidabl e Mar ri a g e s (A.M. No. 08-
11- 10 SC, Rules) prom ul g a t e d by the Court took
effect. Section 2(d) of the Rules pertin e n t ly
provide s:
(d) What to alleg e. A petition unde r Article 36 of
the Family Code shall specifically alleg e the
compl et e facts showin g that eithe r or both
par ti e s wer e psychologic ally inca p a cit a t e d from
complying with the esse n t i al mari t al obligatio n s
of mar ri a g e at the time of the celeb r a ti o n of
mar ri a g e even if such incap a ci ty beco m e s
manifes t only afte r its
celeb r a t io n. c h a n r o bl e s vi r t u a | a w li b a r y
The compl et e facts shoul d alleg e the physical
manifes t a t i o n s , if any, as are indica tive of
psychologic al incap a ci ty at the time of the
celeb r a t io n of the mar ri a g e but expe r t opinion
nee d not be alleg e d.c h a n r o b l e svi r t u a | a w l i b a r y
Section 12(d) of the Rules requir e s a pre- trial
brief cont ai ni n g all the evide n c e pres e n t e d ,
includi n g expe r t opinion, if any, briefly stati ng or
desc ri bi n g the nat u r e and purpo s e of thes e
piece s of evide nc e . Section 14(b) req ui r e s the
court to consid e r durin g the pre- trial confer e n c e
the advisa bility of rec eiving expe r t testi m o ny and
such othe r matt e r s as may aid in the prom p t
disposition of the petition. Unde r Section 17 of
the Rules, the groun d s for the decla r a t i o n of the
absol ut e nullity or ann ul m e n t of mar ri a g e must
be prove d.c h a n r o b l e s vi r t u a | a w l i b a r y
All case s involving the applica tion of Article 36 of
the Family Code that cam e to us were invari a bly
decide d base d on the principl e s in the cited
case s. This was the stat e of law and
jurisp r u d e n c e on Article 36 when the Court
decide d Te v. Yu-Te17c Ѓ a (Te) which revisite d
the Molina guidelin e s.c h a n r o bl e svi r t u a | a w li b a r y
Te begi ns with the observ a ti o n that the
Com mit t e e that draft e d the Family Code did not
give any exam pl e s of psychologi c al inca p a cit y for
fear that by so doing, it would limit the
applica bility of the provision unde r the principle
of ejusd e m gen e ri s; that the Com mi t t e e desire d
that the court s should inter p r e t the provision on
a case- to- case basis, guide d by expe ri e n c e , by
the findings of expe r t s and rese a r c h e r s in
psychologic al disciplin es, and by decision s of
chur c h tribu n al s that, altho u g h not bindin g on
the civil cour t s, may be given pers u a sive effect
since the provision itself was take n from the
Canon Law.18 c Ѓ a Te thus assu m e s it a basic
pre mi s e that the law is so desig n e d to allow
som e resilien cy in its applica tio n. 1 9 c Ѓ a
Te the n sust ai n e d Sant os doct rin al value, saying
that its inter p r e t a t i o n is consist e n t with that of
the Canon Law.
Going back to its basic pre mi s e, Te said:
Consciou s of the laws inte ntio n that it is the
court s, on a case- to- case basis, that should
det e r m i n e whe t h e r a par ty to a mar ri a g e is
psychologic ally incap a ci t a t e d , the Court, in
sust ai ni n g the lower cour t s judg m e n t of
annul m e n t in Tuason v. Court of Appe als, ruled
that the findings of the trial court are final and
bindi ng on the appella t e court s.c h a n r o b l e svi r t u a |
awliba ry
Again, upholdi ng the trial cour t s findings and
decla ri n g that its decision was not a judg m e n t on
the plea di n g s , the Court, in Tsoi v. Court of
Appeals, explain e d that whe n privat e respo n d e n t
testified unde r oath befor e the lower cour t and
was cross- exami n e d by the adve rs e party, she
ther e b y pres e n t e d evide n c e in the form of
testi m o ny. Impor t a n t ly, the Court, awa r e of
par all el decision s of Catholic marri a g e tribu n a l s,
rule d that the sens el e s s and prot r a c t e d refus al of
one of the parti e s to fulfill the marit al obliga tion
of proc r e a ti n g childr e n is equival e n t to
psychologic al incap a ci ty.c h a n r o bl e svi r t u a |
awliba ry
With this as backd r o p, Te launc h e d an att a c k on
Molina. It said that the resiliency with which the
conce p t should be applie d and the case- to- case
basis by which the provision shoul d be
inte r p r e t e d , as so inten d e d by its fram e r s , had,
som e h o w, bee n ren d e r e d ineffect u a l by the
imposition of a set of strict stan d a r d s in Molina.
Molina, to Te, has beco m e a strai t- jacket, forcing
all sizes to fit into and be bound by it; wittingly
or unwitti n gly, the Cour t, in conve ni e n tly
applying Molina, has allowe d diagno s e d
sociop a t h s, schizop h r e n i c s, nymp h o m a n i a c s ,
narcissi st s and the like, to conti nu o u sly deba s e
and perve r t the sancti ty of
mar ri a g e . c h a n r o b l e s vi r t u a | a w li b a r y
Te the n enu nci a t e d the principle that eac h case
must be judge d, not on the basis of a priori
assu m p ti o n s, pre dilec tio n s or gene r aliza tion s,
but accor di n g to its own facts. Court s should
inte r p r e t the provision on a case- to- case basis,
guide d by expe ri e n c e , the findings of expe r t s and
rese a r c h e r s in psychologic al discipline s, and by
decision s of chur c h tribu n al s.c h a n r o b l e s vi r t u a |
awliba ry
As a final not e thou g h, Te expr e s sly stat e d that it
is not sugg e s t i n g the aba n d o n m e n t of Molina,
but that, following Antonio v. Reyes, it mer ely
looke d at othe r persp e c t iv e s that should also
gover n the disposition of petitions for decla r a t i o n
of nullity und e r Article 36. The subs e q u e n t Ting
v. Velez- Ting20 c Ѓ a follows Tes lead whe n it
reite r a t e d that Te did not aba n d o n Molina; far
from aba n d o ni n g Molina, it simply sugg e s t e d the
relaxa tion of its string e n t req ui r e m e n t s ,
cogniz a n t of the explan a t io n given by the
Com mit t e e on the Revision of the Rules on the
ration al e of the Rule on Declar a ti o n of Absolut e
Nullity of Void Marri a g e s and Annul m e n t of
Voidabl e Mar ri a g e s : 2 1 c Ѓ a
To req ui r e the petition e r to alleg e in the petition
the particul a r root caus e of the psychologic al
incap a ci ty and to att a c h the r e t o the verified
writt e n repo r t of an accr e di t e d psychologis t or
psychi a t ri s t have prove d to be too expen sive for
the parti es. They adve r s e ly affect acce s s to
justice of poor litiga nt s. It is also a fact that
ther e are provinc e s wher e thes e expe r t s are not
availabl e. Thus, the Com mit t e e dee m e d it
nece s s a r y to relax this string e n t requi r e m e n t
enu nci a t e d in the Molina Case. The nee d for the
examin a t io n of a party or par ti e s by a
psychi a t ri s t or clinical psychologis t and the
pre s e n t a t i o n of psychi a t ri c expe r t s shall now be
det e r m i n e d by the court duri ng the pre- trial
confer e n c e . c h a n r o b l e svi r t u a | a w li b a r y
Te, the r efo r e , inste a d of subst a n ti ally depa r t i n g
from Molina,2 2 c Ѓ a mer ely stan d s for a more
flexible appr o a c h in conside r i n g petitions for
decla r a t i o n of nullity of mar ri a g e s base d on
psychologic al incap a ci ty. It is also note w o r t h y
for its evide n t i a r y app ro a c h in these cases, which
it expou n d e d on as follows:
By the very nat u r e of Article 36, court s, despit e
having the prim a r y task and burd e n of decision-
makin g, must not discou n t but, inst e a d , must
conside r as decisive evide nc e the expe r t opinion
on the psychologi c al and ment al tem p e r a m e n t s
of the partie s.c h a n r o b l e s vi r t u a | a w l i b a r y
xxxx
Her n a n d e z v. Cour t of Appeal s em ph a siz e s the
impor t a n c e of pres e n t i n g expe r t testi m o ny to
est a blis h the precis e caus e of a partys
psychologic al incap a ci ty, and to show that it
exist e d at the inception of the marri a g e . And as
Marco s v. Marco s asse r t s, ther e is no
requi r e m e n t that the perso n to be decla r e d
psychologic ally incap a ci t a t e d be perso n a lly
examin e d by a physicia n, if the totality of
evide n c e pres e n t e d is enoug h to sust ai n a
finding of psychologic al inca p a ci ty. Verily, the
evide n c e must show a link, medical or the like,
betw e e n the acts that manifes t psychologi c al
incap a ci ty and the psychologic al disor d e r
itself.ch a n r o bl e s vi rt u a | a w li b a r y
This is not to mention, but we mentio n
neve r t h e l e s s for em ph a si s, that the pres e n t a t i o n
of expe r t proof pres u p p o s e s a thoro u g h and in-
dept h asse s s m e n t of the partie s by the
psychologis t or expe r t , for a conclusive diagn osi s
of a grave, seve r e and incur a bl e pres e n c e of
psychologic al incap a ci ty.2 3 c Ѓ a U n d e r s c o r i n g
supplied]
This eviden ti a r y appr o a c h is repe a t e d in Ting v.
Velez- Ting.24c Ѓ a
Unde r this evolution a ry develop m e n t , as shown
by the curr e n t string of case s on Article 36 of the
Family Code, what shoul d not be lost on us is the
inte ntio n of the law to confine the applica tion of
Article 36 to the most seriou s case s of
per so n ali ty disor d e r s , clearly demo n s t r a t iv e of
an utte r insen si tivity or inability to give mea ni n g
and significa n c e to the mar ri a g e ; that the
psychologic al illness that must have afflicte d a
par ty at the inception of the mar ri a g e shoul d be
a malady so grave and per m a n e n t as to deprive
one of awa r e n e s s of the duties and
respo n si bilitie s of the mat ri m o ni al bond he or
she is about to assu m e . 2 5 c Ѓ a It is not enou g h
that the respo n d e n t , alleg e d to be
psychologic ally incap a ci t a t e d , had difficulty in
complying with his mari t al obligatio n s, or was
unwilling to perfor m these obliga tion s. Proof of a
nat al or supe rv e ni n g disabling factor an adve r s e
inte g r al elem e n t in the respo n d e n t s perso n ality
stru ct u r e that effectively inca p a ci t a t e d him from
complying with his esse n t i al mari t al obligatio n s
must be shown.2 6 c Ѓ a Mere difficulty, refusal or
negle c t in the perfor m a n c e of marit al obligatio n s
or ill will on the par t of the spous e is differ e n t
from inca p a ci ty root e d in som e debilita ti n g
psychologic al condition or illness; irrec o n cil a bl e
differe n c e s , sexual infidelity or perve r sio n,
emotion al imm a t u ri t y and irre s po n si bility and
the like, do not by the m s e lve s warr a n t a finding
of psychologi c al incap a ci ty unde r Article 36, as
the sam e may only be due to a perso n s refusal or
unwilling n e s s to assu m e the esse n ti al obligation s
of mar ri a g e . 2 7 c Ѓ a
If all thes e soun d familiar, they do, for they are
but itera ti on s of Sant os juridic al ant ec e d e n c e ,
gravity and incur a bility requisi t e s. This is proof
of Sant o s conti nui n g doct ri n al validity.
The Pres e n t Case
As the CA did, we find Jocelyns evide n c e
insufficie nt to est a blish Angelitos psychologi c al
incap a ci ty to perfor m esse n ti al marit al
obliga tion s. We so conclu d e base d on our own
examin a t io n of the evide nc e on recor d, which we
were com p ell e d to unde r t a k e bec a u s e of the
differe n c e s in the trial court and the appella t e
court s appr e ci a tio n and evalu a tio n of Jocelyns
pre s e n t e d evide n c e .
a. The Exper t Opinion Eviden c e
Both the psychologis t s testi m o ny and the
psychologic al repor t did not conclusively show
the root caus e, gravity and incur a bility of
Angelitos allege d psychologi c al
condition.c h a n r o bl e s vi r t u a | a w li b a r y
We first note a critic al factor in appr e ci a ti n g or
evalu a ti n g the expe r t opinion evide n c e the
psychologis t s testi m o ny and the psychologi c al
evalu a tio n repor t that Jocelyn pres e n t e d . Base d
on her decla r a t i o n s in open court, the
psychologis t evalua t e d Angelitos psychologic al
condition only in an indir e c t man n e r she derive d
all her conclusion s from inform a t i o n comin g
from Jocelyn whos e bias for her caus e canno t of
cours e be doubt e d . Given the sourc e of the
inform a ti o n upon which the psychologi st heavily
relied upon, the court must evalua t e the
evide n ti a r y wort h of the opinion with due car e
and with the applica tion of the more rigid and
strin g e n t set of stan d a r d s outline d above, i.e.,
that ther e must be a thoro u g h and in- dept h
asse s s m e n t of the parti e s by the psychologis t or
expe r t, for a conclusive diagno si s of a
psychologic al incap a ci ty that is grave, sever e
and incur a bl e. c h a n r o bl e svi r t u a | a w li b a r y
In saying this, we do not sugg e s t that a perso n al
examin a t io n of the party allege d to be
psychologic ally incap a ci t a t e d is mand a t o r y;
jurisp r u d e n c e holds that this type of exa mi n a t i o n
is not a man d a t o r y requi r e m e n t . While such
examin a t io n is desir a bl e, we recog niz e that it
may not be prac tic al in all inst a n c e s given the
oftenti m e s estr a n g e d relation s bet w e e n the
par ti e s. For a det e r m i n a t io n thou g h of a par tys
compl et e perso n ali ty profile, inform a t i o n coming
from perso n s intim a t ely relat e d to him (such as
the partys close relative s and friend s) may be
helpful. This is an app ro a c h in the applic a tio n of
Article 36 that allows flexibility, at the sam e time
that it avoids, if not totally oblite r a t e , the
credibility gaps spa w n e d by suppo s e dly expe r t
opinion base d entir ely on doubtful sourc e s of
inform a ti o n. c h a n r o bl e svi r t u a | a w l i b a r y
From thes e pers p e c tiv e s, we conclu d e that the
psych ` ologi s t, using mea g e r inform a ti o n coming
from a directly inter e s t e d party, could not have
secu r e d a comple t e perso n ality profile and could
not have concl usively form e d an objective
opinion or diagnosi s of Angelitos psychologic al
condition. While the repor t or evalu a tio n may be
conclusive with resp e c t to Jocelyns psychologic al
condition, this is not true for Angelitos. The
met h o d olo gy employe d simply canno t satisfy the
requi r e d dept h and com p r e h e n s iv e n e s s of
examin a t io n requir e d to evalua t e a party allege d
to be sufferi ng from a psychologic al disor d e r . In
shor t, this is not the psychologic al repo r t that
the Cour t can rely on as basis for the conclusion
that psychologic al incap a ci ty
exists.c h a n r o bl e s vi r t u a | a w li b a r y
Other than this cre di bility or reliability gap, both
the psychologis t s repor t and testi m o ny simply
provide d a gene r al descri p ti on of Angelitos
purpo r t e d anti- social perso n ali ty disor d e r ,
suppo r t e d by the char a c t e r iz a t i o n of this
disor d e r as chronic, grave and incur a bl e. The
psychologis t was conspic u o u sly silent, howeve r ,
on the base s for her concl usion or the partic ul a r s
that gave rise to the cha r a c t e r i z a t io n she gave.
These par tic ul a r s are simply not in the Repor t,
and neith e r can they be found in her
testi m o ny.c h a n r o b l e s vi r t u a | a w li b a r y
For insta n c e , the psychologis t testified that
Angelitos perso n ality disor d e r is chronic or
incur a bl e ; Angelito has long bee n afflict e d with
the disor d e r prior to his mar ri a g e with Jocelyn or
even durin g his early develop m e n t a l stag e , as
basic trus t was not develop e d. Howev e r, she did
not suppo r t this decla r a t i o n with any factu al
basis. In her Report , she base d her conclusio n on
the pres u m p t i o n that Angelito app a r e n t ly gre w
up in a dysfunc tion a l family. Quite notice a bl e,
thoug h, is the psychologi st s own equivoc a tio n on
this point she was not firm in her conclusio n for
she her self may have realized that it was simply
conjec t u r a l. The veracity, too, of this finding is
highly susp e c t , for it was base d entir ely on
Jocelyns assu m e d knowle d g e of Angelitos family
backg r o u n d and upb ri n gi n g .c h a n r o b l e s vi r t u a |
awliba ry
Addition ally, the psychologi st mer ely gene r a liz e d
on the ques tio n s of why and to what exte n t was
Angelitos perso n ality disor d e r grave and
incur a bl e , and on the effect s of the disor d e r on
Angelitos awar e n e s s of and his capa bility to
und e r t a k e the duties and respo n si bilitie s of
mar ri a g e . c h a n r o b l e s vi r t u a | a w li b a r y
The psychologis t ther efo r e failed to provide the
answ e r s to the mor e impor t a n t conc e r n s or
requi sit e s of psychologi c al incap a ci ty, all of
which are critical to the succ e s s of Jocelyns
caus e .
b. Jocelyns Testim o ny
The inade q u a c y and/or lack of prob a tive value of
the psychologic al repo r t and the psychologist s
testi m o ny impel us to proce e d to the evalua ti on
of Jocelyns testi m o ny, to find out whet h e r she
provide d the court with sufficient facts to
suppo r t a finding of Angelitos psychologic al
incap a ci ty.c h a n r o bl e svi r t u a | a w li b a r y
Unfort u n a t e l y, we find Jocelyns testi m o ny to be
insufficie nt . Jocelyn mer ely testified on Angelitos
habit u al drun k e n n e s s , gam blin g, refus al to seek
em ploy m e n t and the physical beatin g s she
rec eive d from him all of which occur r e d afte r the
mar ri a g e . Significa n tly, she decl ar e d in her
testi m o ny that Angelito show e d no signs of
violent behavior, assu mi n g this to be indica tive
of a perso n ality disor d e r , durin g the court s hi p
stag e or at the earlies t stag e s of her relation s hi p
with him. She testified on the allege d physic al
bea ti n g s after the mar ri a g e , not before or at the
time of the celebr a t i o n of the mar ri a g e . She did
not clarify whe n thes e bea ti n g s exactly took
place whe t h e r it was nea r or at the time of
celeb r a t io n of the mar ri a g e or mont h s or years
after. This is a clear evide n ti a r y gap that
mat e ri ally affect s her caus e, as the law and its
relat e d jurisp r u d e n c e requi r e that the
psychologic al incap a ci ty must exist at the time of
the celebr a t i o n of the mar ri a g e . c h a n r o b l e svi r t u a |
awliba ry
Habit u al drun k e n n e s s , gam blin g and refus al to
find a job, while indicative of psychologic al
incap a ci ty, do not, by the m s e lve s, show
psychologic al incap a ci ty. All thes e simply
indicat e difficulty, neglec t or mer e refus al to
perfor m marit al obligatio n s that, as the cited
jurisp r u d e n c e holds, cannot be conside r e d to be
constit u tive of psychologic al incap a ci ty in the
abse n c e of proof that thes e are manife st a t i o n s of
an incap a ci ty root e d in som e debilitati n g
psychologic al condition or
illness.c h a n r o bl e svi r t u a | a w li b a r y
The physical violenc e allege dly inflict e d on
Jocelyn dese r v e s a differe n t tre a t m e n t . While we
may conce d e that physical violenc e on wom e n
indicat e s abno r m a l beh avior al or perso n ali ty
patt e r n s , such violenc e , sta n di n g alone, does not
constit u t e psychologic al inca p a ci ty.
Jurispr u d e n c e holds that ther e must be evide n c e
showin g a link, medic al or the like, bet w e e n the
acts that manifes t psychologic al incap a ci ty and
the psychologic al disor d e r itself. The evide nc e of
this nexus is irre t ri ev a bly lost in the pre se n t case
und e r our finding that the opinion of the
psychologis t cannot be relied upon. Even
assu m i n g , ther efo r e , that Jocelyns accou n t of the
physical bea ti n g s she receive d from Angelito
were true, this evide nc e does not satisfy the
requi r e m e n t of Article 36 and its relat e d
jurisp r u d e n c e , specifically the Sant os
requi sit e s. c h a n r o bl e s vi r t u a | a w li b a r y
On the whole, the CA corre c t ly reve r s e d the RTC
judg m e n t , whose factu al base s we now find to be
clearly and manife stly erro n e o u s . Our ruling in
Tuaso n recog nizi ng the finality of the fact u al
findings of the trial cour t in Article 36 case s
(which is Jocelyns main ancho r in her pres e n t
app e al with us) does not the r efo r e apply in this
case. We find that, on the contr a r y, the CA
corr e c tly applied Article 36 and its relat e d
jurisp r u d e n c e to the facts and the evide n c e of
the pres e n t case.c h a n r o bl e s vi r t u a | a w li b a r y
WHERE FOR E, pre m is e s consi de r e d , we DENY
the petition for lack of merit. We AFFIRM the
app e al e d Decision of the Court of Appe als in CA-
G.R. CV No. 6244 3. Costs again s t the petition e r .
PAZ VS. PAZ
Rep u b l i c of the Phili p p i n e s
SUPRE M E COURT
Man il a
SECO N D DIVISIO N
G.R. No. 17 0 0 2 2 Janu ary 9, 20 1 3
REPU BLIC OF THE PHILIPPI N E S ,
Peti t i o n e r ,
vs.
CESAR ENCELAN, Res p o n d e n t .
DE C IS IO N
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certior a ri 1
filed by petition e r Repu blic of the Philippi n e s
challen gi n g the Octob e r 7, 2005 am e n d e d
decision 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) that
recon si d e r e d its Marc h 22, 2004 decision 3
(original decision) in CA-G.R. CV No. 7558 3. In
its original decision, the CA set aside the June 5,
2002 decision 4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Manila, Branc h 47, in Civil Case No. 95- 74257,
which The Fact u a l Antec e d e n t s
On August 25, 1979, Cesa r mar ri e d Lolita5 and
the union bore two childr e n , Maric a r and
Man ny.6 To suppo r t his family, Cesa r went to
work in Saudi Arabia on May 15, 1984. On June
12, 1986, Cesa r, while still in Saudi Arabia,
learn e d that Lolita had been having an illicit
affair with Alvin Perez. Som e ti m e in 1991,7
Lolita allege dly left the conjug al hom e with her
childr e n and lived with Alvin. Since then, Cesa r
and Lolita had bee n sepa r a t e d . On June 16,
1995, Cesa r filed with the RTC a petition agains t
Lolita for the decla r a t i o n of the nullity of his
mar ri a g e base d on Lolita’s psychologi c al
incap a ci ty.8
Lolita deni e d that she had an affair with Alvin;
she cont e n d e d that Alvin used to be an associ a t e
in her prom otio n s busine s s. She insist e d that she
is not psychologic ally incap a ci t a t e d and that she
left their home beca u s e of irreco n cil a bl e
differe n c e s with her moth e r- in- law.9
At the trial, Cesa r affirm e d his alleg a tio n s of
Lolita’s infidelity and subse q u e n t aba n d o n m e n t
of the family hom e.1 0 He testified that he
continu e d to provide financi al suppo r t for Lolita
and their childr e n even after he lear n e d of her
illicit affair with Alvin.11
Cesa r pres e n t e d the psychologi c al evalua ti on
repor t 1 2 on Lolita prep a r e d by Dr. Fare d a
Fati m a Flore s of the Nation al Cent e r for Ment al
Healt h. Dr. Flore s found that Lolita was "not
sufferi ng from any form of major psychi a t ri c
illness,"13 but had been "una bl e to provide the
expe c t a t i o n s expec t e d of her for a good and
lasting marit al relation s hi p"; 14 her "tra nsf e r r i n g
from one job to the othe r depict s som e
inte r p e r s o n a l proble m s with co- worke r s as well
as her impati e n c e in att ai ni n g her am bition s";1 5
and "her refus al to go with her husb a n d abro a d
signifies her reluct a n c e to work out a good
marit al and family relation s hi p."1 6
The RTC Ruling
In its June 5, 2002 decision,1 7 the RTC decla r e d
Cesa r’s mar ri a g e to Lolita void, finding sufficien t
basis to decla r e Lolita psychologic ally
incap a ci t a t e d to com ply with the esse n ti al
marit al obligatio n s.
The petition e r, throu g h the Office of the Solicitor
Gene r al (OSG), appe al e d to the CA.
The CA Ruling
The CA origin ally18 set aside the RTC’s verdict,
finding that Lolita’s aba n d o n m e n t of the conjug al
dwelling and infidelity wer e not serious case s of
per so n ali ty disor d e r / p sy c h olo gic al illness. Lolita
mer ely refuse d to comply with her marit al
obliga tion s which she was capa bl e of doing. The
CA significa n t ly obse rv e d that infidelity is only a
groun d for legal sepa r a t io n, not for the
decla r a t i o n of the nullity of a mar ri a g e .
Cesa r sough t recon si d e r a t i o n 1 9 of the CA’s
decision and, in due cours e, attai n e d his
objective. The CA set aside its original decision
and ent e r e d anot h e r , which affirm e d the RTC’s
decision. In its ame n d e d decision,2 0 the CA
found two circu m s t a n c e s indicative of Lolita’s
seriou s psychologi c al incap a ci ty that result e d in
her gross infidelity: (1) Lolita’s unwa r r a n t e d
refusal to perfor m her mari t al obligatio n s to
Cesa r; and (2) Lolita’s willful and delibe r a t e act
of aba n d o ni n g the conjug al dwelling.
The OSG then filed the pres e n t petition.
The Petition
The OSG arg u e s that Dr. Flore s’ psychologic al
evalu a tio n repor t did not disclose that Lolita had
bee n sufferin g from a psychologic al illness nor
did it est a blish its juridic al ante c e d e n c e , gravity
and incur a bility; infidelity and aba n d o n m e n t do
not consti t u t e psychologic al incap a ci ty, but are
mer ely grou n d s for legal sepa r a t i o n.
The Case for the Respo n d e n t
Cesa r sub mi t s that Lolita’s infidelity and refus al
to perfor m her marit al obligation s est a blish e d
her grave and incur a bl e psychologi c al
incap a ci ty.
The Issue
The case pres e n t s to us the legal issue of
whet h e r the r e exists sufficie nt basis to nullify
Cesa r’s mar ri a g e to Lolita on the groun d of
psychologic al incap a ci ty.
The Court’s Ruling
We gra n t the petition. No sufficie nt basis exists
to annul Cesa r’s mar ri a g e to Lolita on the
groun d of psychologic al inca p a ci ty.
Applicable Law and Jurispr u d e n c e
on Psychologi c al Incap a ci ty
Article 36 of the Family Code gove r n s
psychologic al incap a ci ty as a groun d for
decla r a t i o n of nullity of mar ri a g e . It provide s
that "a mar ri a g e cont r a c t e d by any par ty who, at
the time of the celeb r a t io n, was psychologi c ally
incap a ci t a t e d to com ply with the esse n ti al
marit al obligatio n s of mar ri a g e , shall likewise be
void even if such incap a ci ty beco m e s manifes t
only afte r its sole m niz a ti o n."
In inter p r e t i n g this provision, we have
repe a t e d ly str es s e d that psychologic al inca p a ci ty
cont e m pl a t e s "down ri g h t incap a ci ty or inability
to take cogniza n c e of and to assu m e the basic
marit al obligatio n s";2 1 not mer ely the refus al,
negle c t or difficulty, muc h less ill will, on the
par t of the err a n t spous e. 2 2 The plaintiff bea r s
the burd e n of proving the juridical ant e c e d e n c e
(i.e., the exist e n c e at the time of the celeb r a t io n
of mar ri a g e ), gravity and incur a bility of the
condition of the erra n t spous e . 2 3
Cesa r failed to prove Lolita’s
psychologic al incap a ci ty
In this case, Cesa r’s testi m o ny failed to prove
Lolita’s alleg e d psychologic al incap a ci ty. Cesa r
testified on the dat e s when he lear n e d of Lolita’s
allege d affair and her subs e q u e n t aba n d o n m e n t
of their hom e, 2 4 as well as his contin u e d
financi al suppo r t to her and their childre n even
after he lear n e d of the affair,2 5 but he mer ely
mention e d in passin g Lolita’s allege d affair with
Alvin and her aba n d o n m e n t of the conjug al
dwelling.
In any event, sexual infidelity and aba n d o n m e n t
of the conjug al dwelling, even if true, do not
nece s s a r ily constit u t e psychologi c al inca p a cit y;
thes e are simply groun d s for legal sepa r a ti o n. 2 6
To consti t u t e psychologic al incap a ci ty, it must be
show n that the unfait hful n e s s and aba n d o n m e n t
are manife st a t i o n s of a disor d e r e d perso n a lity
that compl et ely preve n t e d the errin g spous e
from disch a r gi n g the esse n ti al marit al
obliga tion s. 2 7 No evide n c e on recor d exists to
suppo r t Cesa r’s allega tion that Lolita’s infidelity
and aba n d o n m e n t were manifes t a t i o n s of any
psychologic al illness.
Cesa r mist ak e nl y relied on Dr. Flore s’
psychologic al evalua ti on repor t on Lolita to
prove her alleg e d psychologic al incap a ci ty. The
psychologic al evalua ti on, in fact, est a blish e d that
Lolita did not suffer from any major psychia t ri c
illness.2 8 Dr. Flore s’ obse rv a t io n on Lolita’s
inte r p e r s o n a l proble m s with co- worke r s, 2 9 to
our mind, does not suffice as a consid e r a t i o n for
the conclusion that she was – at the time of her
mar ri a g e – psychologic ally inca p a cit a t e d to ente r
into a marit al union with Cesa r. Aside from the
time elem e n t involved, a wife’s psychologi c al
fitnes s as a spous e canno t simply be equa t e d
with her professio n a l/ wo r k relation s hi p;
workpla c e obligatio n s and respo n si bilitie s are
poles apa r t from their marit al count e r p a r t s .
While both sprin g from hum a n relation s hi p, thei r
relat e d n e s s and releva n c e to one anot h e r should
be fully esta blis h e d for the m to be com p a r e d or
to serve as mea s u r e s of comp a ri s o n with one
anot h e r . To be sur e, the evalua tio n repor t Dr.
Flore s prep a r e d and sub mi t t e d cannot serve this
purpo s e . Dr. Flore s’ furt h e r belief that Lolita’s
refusal to go with Cesa r abroa d signified a
reluct a n c e to work out a good marit al
relation s hi p 3 0 is a mer e gene r aliz a tio n
unsu p p o r t e d by facts and is, in fact, a rash
conclusion that this Court canno t suppo r t .
In sum, we find that Cesa r failed to prove the
exist e n c e of Lolita’s psychologic al inca p a ci t y;
thus, the CA com mi t t e d a reve r si bl e error when
it recon si d e r e d its original decision.
Once agai n, we stre s s that mar ri a g e is an
inviolabl e social institu tio n 3 1 prot e c t e d by the
Stat e . Any doubt should be resolve d in favor of
its existe n c e its exist e n c e and contin u a ti o n and
again s t its dissolution and nullity.32 It canno t be
dissolve d at the whim of the partie s nor by
tra n s g r e s si o n s mad e by one party to the othe r
durin g the mar ri a g e .
WHERE FOR E, we GRANT the petition and SET
ASIDE the Octobe r 7, 2005 ame n d e d decision of
the Cour t of Appeal s in CA-G.R. CV No. 7558 3.
Accordi n gly, we DISMISS respo n d e n t Cesa r
Encel a n' s petition for decla r a t i o n of nullity of his
mar ri a g e to Lolita Castillo- Encel a n.
Costs agains t the respo n d e n t .
HERNA N D E Z VS. CA
SUPRE M E COURT
SECO N D DIVISIO N
[G.R. No. 12 6 0 1 0 . Dec e m b e r 8, 19 9 9 ]
LUCITA ESTRELLA HER NA N D E Z , peti t i o n e r
vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MARIO C.
HERNA N D E Z , Res p o n d e n t s .
DE C IS IO N
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certior a ri of the
decision 1 of the Court of Appeals, date d Janua r y
30, 1996, affirmi ng the decision of the Region al
Trial Court, Branc h 18, Tagayt ay City, dat e d
April 10, 1993, which dismiss e d the petition for
annul m e n t of mar ri a g e filed by petition e r .
Petition e r Lucit a Estr ell a Hern a n d e z and privat e
respo n d e n t Mario C. Hern a n d e z were mar ri e d at
the Silang Catholic Parish Churc h in Silang,
Cavite on Janua r y 1, 1981 (Exh. A).2 Thre e
childr e n wer e born to the m , nam ely, Maie, who
was born on May 3, 1982 (Exh. B),3 Lyra, born
on May 22, 1985 (Exh. C),4 and Mari a n, born on
June 15, 1989 (Exh. D).5
On July 10, 1992, petition e r filed befor e the
Region al Trial Cour t, Branc h 18, Tagayt a y City, a
petition seekin g the annul m e n t of her mar ri a g e
to privat e respo n d e n t on the grou n d of
psychologic al incap a ci ty of the latte r. She
allege d that from the time of thei r mar ri a g e up
to the time of the filing of the suit, privat e
respo n d e n t failed to perfor m his obliga tion to
suppo r t the family and cont ri b u t e to the
man a g e m e n t of the house h ol d, devoti ng most of
his time enga gi n g in drinking spr e e s with his
friends. She furt h e r claim e d that privat e
respo n d e n t , afte r they wer e mar ri e d, coha bi t e d
with anot h e r wom a n with whom he had an
illegiti m a t e child, while having affairs with
differe n t wom e n, and that, beca u s e of his
promisc ui ty, privat e respo n d e n t enda n g e r e d her
healt h by infecting her with a sexually
tra n s m i s si bl e disea s e (STD). She aver r e d that
privat e respo n d e n t was irre s po n si bl e, imm a t u r e
and unpr e p a r e d for the duties of a mar ri e d life.
Petition e r praye d that for having aba n d o n e d the
family, privat e respo n d e n t be orde r e d to give
suppo r t to their thre e childre n in the total
amou n t of P9,00 0. 0 0 every mont h; that she be
awa r d e d the custo dy of their childre n; and that
she be adjud g e d as the sole owne r of a parc el of
land locat e d at Don Gregorio Subdivision I in Bo.
Bucal, Dasm a ri a s, Cavite, purc h a s e d durin g the
mar ri a g e , as well as the jeep which privat e
respo n d e n t took with him whe n he left the
conjug al hom e on June 12, 1992.6
On Octob e r 8, 1992, beca u s e of privat e
respo n d e n t s failure to file his answ e r , the trial
court issue d an orde r direc tin g the assist a n t
provincial prose c u t o r to condu c t an investi g a ti o n
to det e r m i n e if ther e was collusion bet w e e n the
par ti e s. 7 Only petition e r appe a r e d at the
investi g a ti o n on Nove m b e r 5, 1992.
Neve r t h e l e s s, the prose c u t o r found no evide n c e
of collusion and reco m m e n d e d that the case be
set for trial.8
Based on the evide nc e pres e n t e d by the
petition e r, the facts are as follows:9
Petition e r and privat e respo n d e n t met in 1977 at
the Philippi n e Christi a n Unive rsi ty in Dasm a r i a s,
Cavite. Petition e r , who is five year s older tha n
privat e respo n d e n t , was the n in her first year of
teac hi n g zoology and bot a ny. Privat e respo n d e n t ,
a colleg e fresh m a n , was her stud e n t for two
conse c u t ive sem e s t e r s . They bec a m e
swe et h e a r t s in Febr u a r y 1979 when she was no
longe r privat e respo n d e n t s teac h e r . On Janua ry
1, 1981, they wer e mar ri e d.
Privat e respo n d e n t conti nu e d his studi e s for two
more years. His par e n t s paid for his tuition fees,
while petition e r provide d his allowa n c e s and
othe r financi al nee d s. The family incom e cam e
from petition e r s sala ry as a faculty mem b e r of
the Philippi n e Christi a n Unive rsi ty. Petition e r
aug m e n t e d her ear ni n g s by selling Tupp e r w a r e
produ c t s, as well as eng a gi n g in the buy- and- sell
of coffee, rice and polvoron.
From 1983 up to 1986, as privat e respo n d e n t
could not find a stabl e job, it was agre e d that he
would help petition e r in her busine s s e s by
deliveri n g orde r s to custo m e r s . Howeve r,
bec a u s e her husb a n d was a spe n d t h rift and had
othe r wom e n, petition e r s busine s s suffer e d.
Privat e respo n d e n t often had smokin g and
drinking spr e e s with his friends and bet t e d on
fighting cocks. In 1982, afte r the birt h of their
first child, petition e r discove r e d two love lett e r s
writt e n by a cert ai n Realita Villena to privat e
respo n d e n t . She knew Villena as a mar ri e d
stud e n t whos e husb a n d was working in Saudi
Arabi a. When petition e r confro n t e d privat e
respo n d e n t , he admit t e d having an extr a- marit al
affair with Villena. Petition e r then plead e d with
Villena to end her relation s hi p with privat e
respo n d e n t . For his part, privat e respo n d e n t said
he would end the affairs, but he did not keep his
promis e. Inst e a d , he left the conjug al hom e and
aba n d o n e d petition e r and their child. When
privat e respo n d e n t cam e back, howev e r,
petition e r acce p t e d him, despit e privat e
respo n d e n t s infidelity in the hope of saving their
mar ri a g e .
Upon the reco m m e n d a t i o n of a family friend,
privat e respo n d e n t was able to get a job at
Reynolds Philippin e s, Inc. in San Agusti n,
Dasm a ri a s , Cavite in 1986. Howeve r , privat e
respo n d e n t was employe d only until Marc h 31,
1991, bec a u s e he availed himself of the early
retir e m e n t plan offere d by the comp a ny. He
rec eive d P53,0 0 0. 0 0 in retir e m e n t pay, but
inste a d of spen di n g the amou n t for the nee d s of
the family, privat e respo n d e n t spen t the mon ey
on hims elf and consu m e d the enti re amou n t
within four mont h s of his retire m e n t .
While privat e respo n d e n t worke d at Reynolds
Philippin e s, Inc., his smoking, drinkin g, gam blin g
and woma nizin g beca m e wors e. Petition e r
discove r e d that privat e respo n d e n t carrie d on
relation s hi p s with differ e n t wom e n. He had
relation s with a cert ai n Edna who worke d at
Yazaki; Angie, who was an oper a t o r of a billiard
hall; Tess, a Japayuki; Myrna Mac a t a n g a y, a
secr e t a r y at the Road Mast e r Drivers School in
Bayan, Dasm a ri a s , Cavite, with whom he
coha bi t e d for quite a while; and, Ruth Oliva, by
whom he had a daug h t e r nam e d Margi e P. Oliva,
born on Sept e m b e r 15, 1989 (Exh. E).10 When
petition e r confron t e d privat e respo n d e n t about
his relations hi p with Tess, he bea t her up, as a
result of which she was confine d at the De la
Salle Univer sity Medical Cent e r in Dasm a ri a s,
Cavite on July 4- 5, 1990 beca u s e of cere b r a l
concu s sio n (Exh. F).11
Accordi n g to petition e r , privat e respo n d e n t
eng a g e d in extr e m e promisc u o u s cond u c t during
the latt e r part of 1986. As a result, privat e
respo n d e n t cont r a c t e d gonor r h e a and infect e d
petition e r. They both receive d trea t m e n t at the
Zapot e Medic al Specialist s Cent e r in Zapot e,
Bacoor, Cavite from Octob e r 22, 1986 until
Marc h 13, 1987 (Exhs. G & H).12
Petition e r aver r e d that on one occasion of a
hea t e d arg u m e n t , privat e respo n d e n t hit their
eldest child who was then barely a year old.
Privat e respo n d e n t is not close to any of their
childr e n as he was never affection a t e and har dly
spen t time with the m.
On July 17, 1979, petition e r ente r e d into a
cont r a c t to sell (Exh. J)13 with F & C Realty
Corpo r a t i o n wher e b y she agr e e d to buy from the
latt e r a parc el of land at the Don Gregorio
Height s Subdivision I in Bo. Bucal, Dasm a r i a s,
Cavite and plac e d a par ti al paym e n t of
P31,33 0. 0 0. On May 26, 1987, after full paym e n t
of the amou n t of P51,0 6 7. 1 0 , inclusive of
inte r e s t s from mont hly install m e n t s , a dee d of
absol ut e sale (Exh. K)14 was execut e d in her
favor and TCT No. T-22152 9 (Exh. M)15 was
duly issue d.
Accordi n g to petition e r , on August 1, 1992, she
sent a hand w ri t t e n lett e r 1 6 to privat e
respo n d e n t expr e s si n g her frust r a t i o n over the
fact that her effort s to save thei r mar ri a g e
prove d futile. In her lette r, petition e r also stat e d
that she was allowing him to sell their owne r-
type jeepn ey 1 7 and to divide the proc e e d s of the
sale betw e e n the two of them . Petition e r also
told privat e respo n d e n t of her inten ti on to file a
petition for the annul m e n t of their mar ri a g e .
It does not appe a r that privat e respo n d e n t ever
replied to petition e r s lett e r . By this time, he had
alre a dy aba n d o n e d petition e r and their childr e n.
In Octobe r 1992, petition e r lear n e d that privat e
respo n d e n t left for the Middle East. Since then,
privat e respo n d e n t s whe r e a b o u t s had bee n
unkno w n .
Este r Alfaro, petition e r s childhoo d friend and co-
teac h e r at the Philippine Christi a n Univer sity,
testified during the hea ri n g on the petition for
annul m e n t . She said that som eti m e in June 1979,
petition e r introd u c e d privat e respo n d e n t to her
(Alfaro) as the form e r s swee t h e a r t . Alfaro said
she was not impr e s s e d with privat e respo n d e n t
who was her stud e n t in accou n t i n g. She
obse rv e d privat e respo n d e n t to be fun- loving,
spen di n g most of his time with cam p u s friend s.
In Nove m b e r 1980, whe n petition e r aske d Alfaro
to be one of the secon d a r y sponso r s at her
forthco m i n g weddin g, Alfaro want e d to dissu a d e
petition e r from going thro u g h with the weddi n g
bec a u s e she thou g h t privat e respo n d e n t was not
rea dy for mar ri e d life as he was then
une m pl oy e d. True enou g h , altho u g h the coupl e
app e a r e d happy durin g the early par t of their
mar ri a g e , it was not long the r e af t e r that privat e
respo n d e n t star t e d drinkin g with his friends and
going hom e late at night. Alfaro corrob o r a t e d
petition e r s claim that privat e respo n d e n t was a
habit u al drun k a r d who carri e d on relation s hi p s
with differe n t wom e n and continu e d han gi n g out
with his friend s. She also confir m e d that
petition e r was once hospit alize d beca u s e she
was beat e n up by privat e respo n d e n t . After the
first year of petition e r s mar ri a g e , Alfaro tried to
talk to privat e respo n d e n t , but the latt e r accus e d
her of meddling with their marit al life. Alfaro
said that privat e respo n d e n t was not close to his
childr e n and that he had aba n d o n e d
petition e r. 1 8
On April 10, 1993, the trial court ren d e r e d a
decision 1 9 dismissi n g the petition for annul m e n t
of mar ri a g e filed by petition e r. The perti n e n t
portion of the decision rea d s: 2 0
The Court can unde r s c o r e the fact that the
circu m s t a n c e s mention e d by the petition e r in
suppo r t of her claim that respo n d e n t was
psychologic ally incap a ci t a t e d to mar ry her are
amon g the grou n d s cited by the law as valid
reaso n s for the gran t of legal sepa r a t i o n (Article
55 of the Family Code) - not as grou n d s for a
decla r a t i o n of nullity of mar ri a g e s or ann ul m e n t
ther e of. Thus, Article 55 of the sam e code rea d s
as follows:
Art. 55. A petition for legal sepa r a t i o n may be
filed on any of the following groun d s :
(1) Repe a t e d physic al violenc e or grossly abusive
cond u c t direct e d again st the petition e r , a
com m o n child, or a child of the petition e r ;
....
(5) Drug addiction or habit u al alcoholism of the
respo n d e n t ;
....
(8) Sexu al infidelity or perve r sio n;
....
(10) Abando n m e n t of petition e r by respo n d e n t
without justifiabl e caus e for more tha n one year.
....
If indee d Article 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippin e s, which mentio n s psychologic al
incap a ci ty as a groun d for the decla r a t i o n of the
nullity of a marri a g e , has inte n d e d to includ e the
above- stat e d circu m s t a n c e s as constit u tive of
such incap a ci ty, then the sam e would not have
bee n enu m e r a t e d as grou n d s for legal
sepa r a t i o n.
In the sam e mann e r , this Court is not dispos e d to
gra n t relief in favor of the petition e r unde r
Article 46, para g r a p h (3) of the Family Code of
the Philippi n e s, as the r e is no dispu t e that the
gonor r h e a tran s m i t t e d to the petition e r by
respo n d e n t occu r r e d some ti m e in 1986, or five
(5) year s after petition e r s mar ri a g e with
respo n d e n t was celeb r a t e d in 1981. The
provision s of Article 46, par a g r a p h (3) of the
sam e law should be take n in conjunc ti on with
Article 45, para g r a p h (3) of the sam e code, and a
careful rea di n g of the two (2) provisions of the
law would requi r e the exist e n c e of this grou n d
(frau d) at the time of the celeb r a ti o n of the
mar ri a g e . Henc e , the ann ul m e n t of petition e r s
mar ri a g e with the respo n d e n t on this grou n d , as
allege d and proved in the insta n t case, canno t be
legally acce p t e d by the Cour t.
Petition e r appe al e d to the Court of Appeals
which, on Janua ry 30, 1996, rend e r e d its
decision affirmin g the decision of the trial court .
Citing the ruling in Sant os v. Court of Appeals,2 1
the Cour t of Appeal s held:2 2
It is clea r in the above law and jurispr u d e n c e
that the psychologic al inca p a ci t y of a spous e , as
a grou n d for decla r a t i o n of nullity of marri a g e ,
must exist at the time of the celeb r a t i o n of
mar ri a g e . More so, chronic sexual infidelity,
aba n d o n m e n t , gam blin g and use of prohibi t e d
drug s are not groun d s per se, of psychologi c al
incap a ci ty of a spous e.
We agr e e with the Solicitor Gene r al that
petition e r- appell a n t failed to prove that her
respo n d e n t- husb a n d was psychologic ally
incap a ci t a t e d at the time of the celeb r a ti o n of
the mar ri a g e . Cert ai nly, petition e r- appella n t s
decla r a t i o n that at the time of their mar ri a g e her
respo n d e n t- husb a n d s cha r a c t e r was on the
bord e rli n e bet w e e n a respo n si bl e perso n and the
happy- go- lucky, could not constit u t e the
psychologic al incap a ci ty in cont e m p l a t i o n of
Article 36 of the Family Code. In fact, petition e r-
app ella n t hers elf ascrib e d said attit u d e to her
respo n d e n t- husb a n d s yout h and very good looks,
who was admi t t e dly seve r al years young e r tha n
petition e r- appell a n t who, hers elf, happ e n e d to be
the college profess o r of her respo n d e n t- husb a n d .
Petition e r- appella n t even desc ri b e d her
respo n d e n t- husb a n d not as a proble m stud e n t
but a nor m al one (p. 24, tsn, Dec. 8, 1992).
The acts and attit u d e s com pl ai n e d of by
petition e r- appell a n t happ e n e d afte r the mar ri a g e
and the r e is no proof that the sam e have alre a d y
exist e d at the time of the celeb r a t i o n of the
mar ri a g e to constit u t e the psychologi c al
incap a ci ty und e r Article 36 of the Family Code.
Henc e, this petition. Petition e r cont e n d s that the
respo n d e n t Court of Appe al s err e d
I. IN FINDING THAT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY OF THE PRIVATE RESPO ND E NT
TO COMPLY WITH HIS ESSE NTIAL MARITAL
OBLIGATIONS DID NOT EXIST FROM THE
TIME OF THE CELEBRATION OF THE
MARRIAGE.
II. IN RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPON DE NT
WAS NOT PSYCHOLOGICALLY
INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH HIS
ESSE NTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS.
III. IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE
TRIAL COURT DENYING THE AWARD OF
PERMANE NT CUSTODY OF THE CHILDREN TO
PETITIONER.
IV. IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE
TRIAL COURT DENYING THE PRAYER FOR
ISSUANCE OF AN ORDER REQUIRING
PRIVATE RESPOND E N T TO GIVE SUPPORT TO
THE THREE CHILDREN IN THE AMOUNT OF
P3,000.0 0 PER CHILD.
V. IN NOT DECLARING THE REAL PROPERTY
ACQUIRED BY PETITIONER AS HER
EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY.
The issue in this case is whet h e r or not the
mar ri a g e of petition e r and privat e respo n d e n t
shoul d be annull e d on the grou n d of privat e
respo n d e n t s psychologi c al inca p a cit y.
Petition e r allege s that the Court of Appe al s err e d
in holding that petition e r failed to show that
privat e respo n d e n t s psychologic al inca p a ci ty
exist e d at the time of the celeb r a t i o n of the
mar ri a g e . She argu e s that the fact that the acts
of incap a ci ty of privat e respo n d e n t beca m e
manifes t only afte r the celeb r a t io n of their
mar ri a g e should not be a bar to the annul m e n t of
their marri a g e .
Art. 36 of the Family Code stat e s:
A mar ri a g e cont r a c t e d by any party who, at the
time of the celebr a t i o n, was psychologic ally
incap a ci t a t e d to com ply with the esse n ti al
marit al obligatio n s of mar ri a g e , shall likewise be
void even if such incap a ci ty beco m e s manifes t
only afte r its sole m niz a ti o n.2 3
In Sant os v. Court of Appe als,2 4 we held:
Psychologic al incap a ci ty should refer to no less
than a ment al (not physical) inca p a ci t y that
caus e s a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marit al coven a n t s that conco mi t a n t ly must be
assu m e d and disch a r g e d by the parti e s to the
mar ri a g e which, as so expr e s s e d by Article 68 of
the Family Code, includ e thei r mut u al
obliga tion s to live toget h e r , obse rv e love, resp e c t
and fidelity and rend e r help and suppo r t . Ther e
is hardly any doubt that the inten d m e n t of the
law has bee n to confine the mea ni n g of
psychologic al incap a ci ty to the most serious
case s of perso n ality disor d e r s clearly
demo n s t r a t i v e of an utte r insen sitivity or
inability to give mea ni n g and significa n c e to the
mar ri a g e . This psychologic al condition must
exist at the time the mar ri a g e is celeb r a t e d . The
law does not evide n tly envision, upon the othe r
hand, an inability of the spous e to have sexual
relation s with the othe r. This conclusion is
implicit unde r Article 54 of the Family Code
which consid e r s childr e n conceive d prior to the
judicial decla r a t i o n of nullity of the void
mar ri a g e to be legiti m a t e .
The othe r forms of psycho s e s , if existing at the
inception of mar ri a g e , like the stat e of a party
being of unsou n d mind or conce al m e n t of drug
addic tion, habit u al alcoholism, homos ex u ality or
lesbia ni s m , mer ely ren d e r s the mar ri a g e
cont r a c t voida bl e purs u a n t to Article 46, Family
Code. If drug addiction, habit u al alcoholis m,
lesbia ni s m or homos ex u a lity shoul d occur only
durin g the mar ri a g e , they beco m e mer e groun d s
for legal sepa r a t i o n und e r Article 55 of the
Family Code. These provision s of the Code,
howeve r, do not nece s s a r ily precl u d e the
possibility of thes e various circu m s t a n c e s being
the m s elv e s, depe n di n g on the degr e e and
severity of the disor d e r , indicia of psychologic al
incap a ci ty.
Until furt h e r stat u t o r y and jurisp r u d e n t i al
par a m e t e r s are esta blis h e d , every circu m s t a n c e
that may have som e bea ri n g on the deg r e e ,
exte n t , and othe r conditions of that incap a ci ty
must, in every case, be car ef ully exa mi n e d and
evalu a t e d so that no precipit a t e and
indiscri mi n a t e nullity is pere m p t o r ily dec r e e d .
The well- consid e r e d opinions of psychi a t ri s t s,
psychologis t s, and perso n s with expe r ti s e in
psychologic al disciplin es might be helpful or
even desir a bl e .
In the inst a n t case, othe r tha n her self- serving
decla r a t i o n s , petition e r failed to est a blis h the
fact that at the time they wer e mar ri e d, privat e
respo n d e n t was sufferin g from a psychologic al
defect which in fact deprive d him of the ability to
assu m e the esse n t i al dutie s of mar ri a g e and its
conco m it a n t respo n si bilities. As the Court of
Appeals point e d out, no evide nc e was pres e n t e d
to show that privat e respo n d e n t was not
cogniz a n t of the basic mari t al obliga tion s. It was
not sufficien tly prove d that privat e respo n d e n t
was really incap a bl e of fulfilling his duties due to
som e incap a ci ty of a psychologic al nat u r e , and
not mer ely physic al. Petition e r says that at the
outs e t of their mar ri a g e , privat e respo n d e n t
show e d lack of drive to work for his family.
Privat e respo n d e n t s par e n t s and petition e r
suppo r t e d him thro u g h colleg e. After his
schooling, althou g h he event u ally found a job, he
availed hims elf of the early retir e m e n t plan
offere d by his em ploye r and spen t the entir e
amou n t he receive d on hims elf. For a gre a t e r
par t of their marit al life, privat e respo n d e n t was
out of job and did not have the initiative to look
for anot h e r . He indulge d in vices and eng a g e d in
philan d e r i n g, and later aban d o n e d his family.
Petition e r conclu d e s that privat e respo n d e n t s
condition is incur a bl e , causi n g the disint e g r a t i o n
of their union and defea ti n g the very objective s
of mar ri a g e .
Howev e r, privat e respo n d e n t s allege d habit u al
alcoholism , sexual infidelity or perve r si o n, and
aba n d o n m e n t do not by the m s el ve s constit u t e
groun d s for finding that he is sufferin g from a
psychologic al incap a ci ty within the
cont e m pl a t i o n of the Family Code. It must be
show n that thes e acts are manifes t a ti o n s of a
disor d e r e d perso n ali ty which make privat e
respo n d e n t com pl e t ely una bl e to disch a r g e the
esse n ti al obligation s of the marit al stat e, and not
mer ely due to privat e respo n d e n t s yout h and
self- conscious feeling of being han d so m e , as the
app ellat e cour t held. As pointe d out in Republic
of the Philippine s v. Court of Appe als: 2 5
The root caus e of the psychologi c al inca p a cit y
must be: (a) medic ally or clinically identified, (b)
allege d in the com pl ai nt , (c) sufficien tly prove n
by expe r t s and (d) clea rly explaine d in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requi r e s
that the inca p a ci t y must be psychologi c al not
physical, altho u g h its manifest a t i o n s and/or
sympt o m s may be physical. The evide n c e must
convinc e the court that the parti e s, or one of
the m , was ment ally or physically ill to such an
exte n t that the perso n could not have known the
obliga tion s he was assu mi n g , or knowin g the m ,
could not have given valid assu m p ti o n ther e of.
Althoug h no exa m pl e of such inca p a cit y nee d be
given here so as not to limit the applica tio n of
the provision unde r the principl e of ejusd e m
gen e ri s (citing Salita v. Magtolis, supr a)
neve r t h e l e s s such root caus e must be identified
as a psychologi c al illness and its incap a cit a t i n g
nat u r e fully explain e d. Expe rt evide n c e may be
given by qualified psychia t ri s t s and clinical
psychologis t s.
Moreov e r, expe r t testi m o ny should have bee n
pre s e n t e d to est a blis h the precis e caus e of
privat e respo n d e n t s psychologic al inca p a ci ty, if
any, in orde r to show that it exist e d at the
inception of the mar ri a g e . The burd e n of proof to
show the nullity of the mar ri a g e rest s upon
petition e r. The Court is mindful of the policy of
the 1987 Constit u tio n to prot e c t and str e n g t h e n
the family as the basic auto no m o u s social
instit ution and mar ri a g e as the found a ti o n of the
family.26 Thus, any doubt shoul d be resolve d in
favor of the validity of the mar ri a g e . 2 7
We, ther efo r e , find no reaso n to reve r s e the
ruling of respo n d e n t Court of Appe als whose
conclusion s, affirmin g the trial court s finding
with reg a r d to the non- existe n c e of privat e
respo n d e n t s psychologi c al inca p a cit y at the tim e
of the mar ri a g e , are entitle d to gre a t weight and
even finality.28 Only whe r e it is show n that such
findings are whim sic al, capriciou s, and arbit r a r y
can thes e be overt u r n e d .
The conclusion we have rea c h e d make s it
unn ec e s s a r y for us to pass upon petition e r s
cont e n ti o n s on the issue of per m a n e n t custo dy of
childr e n, the amou n t for their resp e c t iv e
suppo r t , and the decla r a t i o n of exclusive
owne r s hi p of petition e r over the real prop e r t y.
These mat t e r s may mor e appro p ri a t e ly be
litiga t e d in a sepa r a t e proce e di n g for legal
sepa r a t i o n, dissolution of prop e r t y regi m e ,
and/or custo dy of childr e n which petition e r may
bring.
WHERE FOR E, the decision of the Cour t of
Appeals is AFFIRMED.
2. 2 Crit er i a for Pysc h o l o g i c a l Disor d e r s
G.R. No. 17 6 4 6 4 Febr u a r y 4, 20 1 0
EDWARD N. LIM, Peti t i o n e r ,
vs.
MA. CHERYL STA. CRUZ- LIM, Re s p o n d e n t .
DE C IS IO N
NACHURA, J.:
This petition raise s a far- from- novel issue, i.e.,
the invalidity of a mar ri a g e on the groun d of
eithe r or both of the parti e s’ psychologi c al
incap a ci ty. Howev e r, similar petitions continu e
to houn d the lower court s, even with the
strin g e n t requi r e m e n t s for the gra n t of
decla r a t i o n of nullity of mar ri a g e on the groun d
of psychologi c al incap a ci ty, given the facility
with which mar ri e d perso n s are diagno s e d with
per so n ali ty disor d e r s .
The inst a n t petition for review on certior a ri
assails the decision1 of the Cour t of Appeal s (CA)
in CA-G.R. CV No. 74822, which reve r s e d the
decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branc h 140, Maka ti City, in Civil Case No. 99-
1852.
First, the all too familiar ant e c e d e n t s of man-
mee t s- wom a n; they get mar ri e d after a
whirlwi nd relation s hi p; and, not sur p ri sin gly, the
mar ri a g e goes awry.
Petition e r Edwa r d N. Lim and respo n d e n t Maria
Cheryl Sta. Cruz- Lim met in 1978 in Cebu, whe r e
petition e r, who reside s in Maka ti City, spen t a
sem e s t r a l brea k from college; and respo n d e n t ,
who reside s in Gingoog City, Cagaya n de Oro,
was a boar d e r in petition e r’s uncle’s hous e. At
that time, petition e r was twen ty- six (26) year s
old, a colleg e stud e n t , and worki ng in the family
busine s s, while respo n d e n t was a secr e t a r i al
stud e n t .
After less than a year of court s hi p via long
dista n c e phone calls, petition e r and respo n d e n t
bec a m e swee t h e a r t s in early 1979. Within that
year, or on Dece m b e r 8, 1979, the two were wed
at the Don Bosco Churc h in Maka ti City, with a
rec e p tio n at Midtow n Ram a d a Hot el.
As is custo m a r y amon g those of Chines e desce n t ,
petition e r and respo n d e n t took up reside n c e with
the form e r’s gra n d p a r e n t s and par e n t s in Forb e s
Park, Maka ti City. The coupl e was bless e d with
thre e (3) childre n: Lest e r Edwa r d , 3 Candic e
Grac e,4 and Maria n o III.5
During their stay in Forb e s Park, all living,
house h ol d and medic al expe n s e s wer e paid and
provide d by petition e r’s gra n d p a r e n t s .
Petition e r’s salary of ₱ 6,000.0 0 for workin g in
the family distillery went strai g h t to respo n d e n t .
Despit e all thes e am e ni ti e s, the setu p and living
arr a n g e m e n t rankle d respo n d e n t , who contin u e d
to insist that they live sepa r a t e ly and
inde p e n d e n t l y from petition e r’s family.
Octobe r 14, 1990 prove d to be a black- lette r day
for the union of petition e r and respo n d e n t . That
morni n g, respo n d e n t regist e r e d a com pl ai nt ,
which was recor d e d in the police blott e r of the
Maka ti City police, about a prior incide n t wher e
she caug h t petition e r in their house in a
comp r o m i si n g situa tion with the stay- in
care giv e r of petition e r’s gra n d m o t h e r . This
incide n t lande d on the pag e s of a tabloid
news p a p e r , Abant e, wher e petition e r , his
gra n d p a r e n t s’ hous e and the family busine s s
were all nam e d and identified. Nat u r a lly, this
caus e d emb a r r a s s m e n t and humiliation to
petition e r and to the rest of his family and
relative s.
Also, on that sam e day, respo n d e n t finally left
petition e r and brou g h t with her their thre e (3)
childr e n. Respo n d e n t forcibly open e d their
cabin e t and clean e d out the cont e n t s ther e of,
which includ e d petition e r’s passp o r t , jewelry,
and a land title in petition e r’s nam e .
Respon d e n t likewise filed a criminal compl ai n t
for Conc u bi n a g e and Physical Injuries agai ns t
petition e r which was event u ally dismiss e d by the
investi g a ti n g prose c u t o r for lack of merit.
Subs e q u e n t ly, respo n d e n t filed with the RTC of
Maka ti City an action for suppo r t agai ns t
petition e r and petition e r’s par e n t s . There a ft e r ,
the trial court direct e d petition e r to give a
mont hly suppo r t of ₱ 6,000. 0 0 and, in case of his
inability to do so, petition e r’s par e n t s wer e also
dec r e e d to give a mont hly suppo r t for the thre e
minor childr e n in the amou n t of ₱34,00 0.0 0. 6
On Octob e r 29, 1999, petition e r filed a petition
and soug h t the decla r a t i o n of nullity of his
mar ri a g e to respo n d e n t on the groun d of the
latt e r’s psychologi c al inca p a cit y unde r Article 36
of the Family Code. Thre e years ther e af t e r , on
July 22, 2002, petition e r filed an ame n d e d
petition includin g an alleg a tio n of his own
psychologic al incap a ci ty, as both he and
respo n d e n t were diagno s e d with perso n ality
disor d e r s— d e p e n d e n t perso n ali ty disor d e r and
histrionic perso n ality disor d e r , resp e c tively.
Followin g the exch a n g e of pleadi n g s betw e e n
the parti es, petition e r pre s e n t e d eviden c e , which
consist e d of the testim o ni e s of Dr. Cecilia C.
Villegas, a psychia t ri s t; and Maxim a Adato,
petition e r’s co- employe e in the distillery. In
addition, petition e r offere d in evide n c e Dr.
Villegas’ Psychia t ri c Report , which concl ud e d
that the parti es were sufferin g from perso n a lity
disor d e r s . Respo n d e n t , despit e filing an Answe r
to the petition denyin g the allega tio n s ther ei n,
waived her right to pres e n t evide n c e .
Based on the foregoi n g, prim a rily on the
Psychi a t ri c Repor t, the RTC decla r e d the
mar ri a g e betw e e n petition e r and respo n d e n t null
and void as the two wer e psychologic ally
incap a ci t a t e d to com ply with the esse n ti al
marit al obligatio n s. The RTC dispos e d of the
case, to wit:
WHERE FOR E, pre m is e s consi de r e d , the Court
her e by DECLARES the mar ri a g e of EDWARD N.
LIM and MA. CHERYL STA. CRUZ on Dece m b e r
8, 1979 in Maka ti City VOID AB INITIO on
groun d of psychologic al inca p a ci ty of both
par ti e s purs u a n t to Article 36 of the Family Code
with all the effect s and conse q u e n c e s of all the
existing provisions of law.
As reg a r d s the custo dy of the childr e n ,
conside ri n g that all of the m are over seven (7)
year s of age, the Court shall take into accou n t
the choice of each of the child, unless the Court
finds com p elling reaso n s to orde r othe r wi s e .
Let copies the r e of be sent to the Office of Local
Civil Regist r a r of Maka ti City and the Nation al
Statistic s Office, Quezon City who are direc t e d to
CANCEL from their resp e c tive Civil Regist ri e s
the mar ri a g e of EDWARD N. LIM and CHERYL
STA. CRUZ on Dece m b e r 8, 1979 in Maka ti City.
The Conjug al Part n e r s hi p of the Spous e s shall be
liquida t e d , par tition e d , and dist rib u t e d in
accor d a n c e with the provision s of Articles 50 and
51 of the Family Code.7
Disagr e e i n g compl e t ely with the RTC’s
disposition, the Office of the Solicitor Gene r a l
(OSG) appe al e d to the CA, questioni n g the RTC’s
finding that the parti e s wer e psychologic ally
incap a ci t a t e d to com ply with the esse n ti al
marit al obligatio n s. The appella t e cour t gra n t e d
the OSG’s appe al and rever s e d the trial court. It
rule d thus:
WHERE FOR E, pre m is e s consi de r e d , the inst a n t
app e al is GRANTED. Accordi n gly, the assaile d
Decision dat e d Marc h 25, 2002 is her e by
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The mar ri a g e
betw e e n her ei n parti e s is her e by decla r e d
subsisti n g and valid.8
Henc e, this petition for review on certior a ri
positin g the singul a r issue of whet h e r the
mar ri a g e betw e e n petition e r and respo n d e n t is
null and void on the grou n d of the par ti e s’
psychologic al incap a ci ty.
We deny the petition.
The semin al ruling in Sant os v. Court of
Appeals 9 cites thre e (3) factor s char a c t e r i zi n g
psychologic al incap a ci ty to perfor m the esse n t i al
marit al obligatio n s: (1) gravity, (2) juridic al
ant e c e d e n c e , (3) incur a bility. We expou n d e d on
the foregoi n g, to wit:
The incap a ci ty must be grave or seriou s such
that the party would be incap a bl e of car ryin g out
the ordina r y duties requir e d in mar ri a g e ; it must
be root e d in the history of the party ante d a t i n g
the mar ri a g e , althou g h the overt manife st a ti o n s
may eme r g e only after the mar ri a g e ; and it must
be incur a bl e or, even if it were othe r wi s e, the
cur e would be beyond the mea n s of the party
involved.
Given the foregoi n g string e n t requisit e s and
without going into the non- exclusive list found in
Repu blic v. Court of Appe als,1 0 petition e r , as the
par ty allegin g his own psychologic al incap a ci ty
and that of his spous e, had the special albat r o s s
to prove that he and his wife wer e sufferi n g from
"the most serious case s of perso n a lity disor d e r s
clearly demo n s t r a t iv e of an utt e r inse nsi tivity or
inability to give mea ni n g and significa n c e to the
mar ri a g e ." 1 1
Inst e a d, petition e r pres e n t e d the Psychi a t ri c
Repor t of Dr. Villegas, the conclusio n s draw n are
reprin t e d in full:
PSYCHODYNAMICS OF THE CASE:
Edwa r d is of Chines e desce n t , born and grew up
in a Philippi n e environ m e n t . He was raise d and
educ a t e d in Philippi n e school. Howev e r, despi t e
his promi n e n t Filipino exposu r e , his imm e di a t e
family still prac tic e a stron g cultur al Chine s e
tra dition within his hom e. Very clanni s h, all
family me m b e r s has to stay in one roof, in a
com m u n a l style of living, with the elder s in this
case, the gra n d p a r e n t s are recog niz e d as the
aut ho ri ty. Most of the family mem b e r s tend to
rebel, but at the end, tend e n c y to be submi ssive
and passive were develop e d . But despit e physical
close n e s s, Edw a r d did not build close
att a c h m e n t s to his pare n t s. The fathe r was
excep tion ally tem p e r a m e n t a l and moody, while
the moth e r was extr e m e ly asocial, isolat e d,
withd r a w n and seclusive, that rep elle d him from
both of the m .
Surr o g a t e par e n t i n g from his gra n d p a r e n t s
satisfied his depe n d e n c y nee d s. He develop e d
into a kind, obedi e n t , sub mi s sive and passive
adult, which beca m e the cent e r of jealousy and
rivalry amon g the siblings. Unde r str e ssf ul
situati on, he beca m e depr e s s e d and had suicidal
inte ntio n s. He felt so secur e with his
gra n d p a r e n t s , that he subor di n a t e d his nee d s to
the m . He allowe d them to assu m e
respo n si bilitie s for major are a s of his life, as in
his family decision and inde p e n d e n c e . He has
difficulty expr e s si n g disag r e e m e n t s with othe r s,
espe ci ally with his wife, beca u s e of fear of loss of
suppo r t or appr ov al. So that even an abusive
spous e may be toler a t e d for long period s, in
orde r not to dist ur b the sens e of att a c h m e n t s . A
per s ev e r i n g worke r, he had difficulties initiatin g
cha n g e due to lack of self- confide n c e in
judg m e n t or abilities, rat h e r than lack of
motivatio n or ene r gy. Within 10 years in
mar ri a g e , he tried har d to gra n t his wife’s
wishe s, but to no avail. His wife left him in
Octobe r , 1990 toge t h e r with thei r thr e e childr e n ,
whom he misse d very much. The deat h of his
gra n df a t h e r in 1994 was a big blow to him, but
he finds solace and secu ri ty in visiting his grave
every Sund a y since then.
On the othe r hand, Cheryl was initially
cong e ni al, which laste d only for a short period of
time. Late r, her imma t u ri ty interfe r e d with her
beh avior al patt e r n and adjust m e n t . Appar e n t ly,
she could not recog niz e realitie s in their family
set- up and will insist on her fant a siz e d wishe s.
When not gra n t e d , she’ll go into tant r u m s ,
moodin e s s , ange r, hostilities, exhibitions and
dra m a t i z a ti o n s, just to get atte n t io n and to
em ph a siz e her want s. Her att e n t io n- gettin g
devices will be endl e ss and her sugg e s ti bility to
the influe nc e of othe r s is very fertile.
Based on the family backg r o u n d , patt e r n of
beh avior, and outco m e of thei r mar ri a g e , clinical
evide n c e show e d that Mr. Edwa r d Lim is
sufferi ng from a Depe n d e n t Perso n ali ty Disord e r,
while Cheryl is sufferi n g from Hist rio ni c
Perso n a lity Disor d e r associ a t e d with imm a t u r i ty,
that rend e r both of the m psychologic ally
incap a ci t a t e d to perfor m the duties and
respo n si bilitie s of marri a g e .
The root caus e of the above clinical condition on
the part of Edwa r d was due to overin d ul g e n c e
and overp r o t e c t i o n of his surro g a t e pare n t s, that
left no room for him to develop his own abilities,
encou r a gi n g too muc h depe n d e n c e , lack of self-
confide n c e , self- doubt, passivity, pessi mis m , and
depr e s si o n. How much of the Depe n d e n t
Disor d e r was due to develop m e n t a l defect and
how much was due to stron g Chine s e cultu r e and
tra dition s, will be difficult to asse s s.
On the par t of Cheryl, the root caus e was due to
unsa ti sfie d depe n d e n c y need s that finds
gra tifica tion in adult stag e , in the form of
att e n t io n- seekin g device s, manifes t e d in her
clinical sympt o m s. Both exist e d prior to
mar ri a g e , but bec a m e obviously manifes t e d only
after the celeb r a ti o n, due to marit al stre s s e s and
dem a n d s . Both disor d e r s are consid e r e d
per m a n e n t and incur a bl e , beca u s e they star t e d
early in their develop m e n t a l stag e and ther efo r e
bec a m e so engr ai n e d in their perso n a lity
stru ct u r e . Both are seve r e and grave in deg r e e ,
bec a u s e they ham p e r e d their nor m al functioni n g,
specifically relat e d to a difficult het e r o s e x u a l
adjust m e n t . 1 2
In addition, Dr. Villega s testified in the lowe r
court as to the findings cont ai n e d in the
Psychi a t ri c Repor t. Thus, on direct exami n a ti o n,
Dr. Villegas’ testi m o ny consist e d of the
following:
Q- Can you tell the Cour t how you happ e n e d to
know the petition e r ?
A- He was refe r r e d to me by his couns el for
psychologic al and psychi a t ri c evalu a tio n relat e d
to his applica tion for nullity of mar ri a g e in this
Honor a bl e Cour t, ma’a m.
Q- And wer e you able to actu ally cond u c t an
examin a t io n for the purpo s e s that you have
stat e d ?
A- Yes, ma’am .
Q- How many times wer e you able to exa mi n e or
mee t the petition e r ?
A- I met him thr e e (3x) times, ma’a m. That was
on Janua ry 10, Janu a r y 14 and Janua ry 17, year
2000.
Q- And is the r e any other witne s s or perso n that
you have met for the purpos e of evalu a ti n g the
beh avior and perso n ality of petition e r ?
A- Yes, ma’am . I was able to intervi ew a long
time em ploye e that they have in their comp a n y
in the perso n of Mrs. Emmy Adato who hers elf
know the petition e r since he was eight (8) years
old, ma’am .
xxxx
Q- Do you affirm befor e this Honor a bl e Cour t the
conclusion s that you have arrive d at to be
corr e c t ?
A- Yes, ma’am .
Q- And what was the conclusio n afte r you
cond u c t e d the evalua tio n of the cha r a c t e r of
petition e r, as well as that of the respo n d e n t ?
A- After my inte nsive intervi ew about the
circu m s t a n c e s of their mar ri a g e , family
backg r o u n d of the petition e r and also the family
backg r o u n d of the respo n d e n t , it is the opinion of
the exami n e r that the petition e r Mr. Edwa r d Lim
is sufferi n g from DEPENDE NT PERSO NALITY
DISORDER that rend e r s him psychologic ally
incap a ci t a t e d to perfor m the duties and
respo n si bilitie s of marri a g e , ma’a m. On the othe r
hand, base d on the infor m a t i o n s and clinical dat a
gat h e r e d from the petition e r and my othe r
inform a n t , Ms. Emmy Adato, it is the opinion of
the exami n e r that the respo n d e n t is sufferin g
from HISTRIONIC PERSONALITY DISORDER
associa t e d with an imm a t u r i ty that rend e r s her
psychologic ally incap a ci t a t e d to perfor m the
dutie s and respo n si bilities of mar ri a g e .
Q- In your capa ci ty as exper t , a psychi a t ri s t of
forty (40) year s, can you conclud e that this
deficien ci e s or defect s that you found are
sufficient grou n d to nullify the mar ri a g e unde r
Article 36?
A- Yes, ma’am .
Q- Do you conclu d e also thes e deficien ci e s are
continu o u s and per m a n e n t ?
A- Yes, ma’am .
Q- Would you conclu d e ther efo r e – would you
conside r it as valid groun d for the annul m e n t of
the mar ri a g e ?
A- Yes, ma’am .1 3
On cross exami n a ti o n by the pros ec u t o r , Dr.
Villegas testified as follows:
Q- Doctor, you have testified that it was only the
petition e r whom you have exami n e d and
evalu a t e d with (sic)?
A- Yes, ma’am .
Q- And the othe r perso n whom you have
inte rvie w e d was the employe e of the petition e r ?
A- Yes, ma’am .
Q- No other perso n whom you have inte rvie w e d ?
A- None, ma’am.
Q- You did not inte rvie w the surr o g a t e par e n t s of
petition e r ?
A- No, ma’a m.
Q- Did you att e m p t to com m u ni c a t e with the
respo n d e n t of this case for the purpo s e of
inte rvie wi n g her?
A- Yes, ma’am . [A]nd I have made this thro u g h
the petition e r who has cont a c t e d his childr e n in
Cagaya n De Oro, ma’am.
Q- So you are telling us, Doctor, that the
respo n d e n t is in Cagay a n De Oro?
A- Yes, ma’am .
Q- And despit e your invitation, she did not
app e a r to you?
A- Yes, ma’am .
Q- So base d from your Repor t on the
circu m s t a n c e s of mar ri a g e , the infor m a t i o n
rega r di n g the mar ri a g e of partie s in this case
cam e from the petition e r ?
A- Yes, sir.
Q- And the family backg r o u n d you have mad e on
Cheryl, the respo n d e n t also cam e from the
petition e r ?
A- Yes, ma’am .
Q- And the intervie w you have mad e on Adato,
the employe e of petition e r , she gave you some
backg r o u n d of the respo n d e n t her e ?
A- Yes, ma’am .
Q- But most of the inform a ti o n s you have
gat h e r e d from her were pert ai ni n g to the
petition e r ?
A- Yes, ma’am .
Q- So prac tic ally, the evalua ti on you have made
were base d on the inte rvie w only on both the
em ploye e and the petition e r himself?
A- Yes, ma’am .
Q- You did not condu c t a serie s of test s to
det e r m i n e or evalu a t e furt h e r ?
A- No, ma’a m.
Q- You have not collabo r a t e d with any
psychologis t s so as to get some psychologic al
evalu a tio n on petition e r ?
A- No, ma’a m. But the clea r e r pict ur e of the case
pre s e n t e d to me is a very clear pictu r e alre a dy of
the psychi a t ri c disor d e r which did not
nece s sit a t e d (sic) the assist a n c e of a
psychologis t beca u s e it is obvious, the signs and
sympt o m s are obviously manife st e d by the
par ti e s.
Q- How many times did you meet the petition e r ?
A- Thre e (3) times ma’am.
Q- And the dur a ti on of intervie w or examin a t io n
on petition e r is how long?
A- It last e d for about one and a half hour s to two
and a half hour s.
Q- For each session?
A- For each session.
Q- So you wer e able to exa mi n e him for a
dur a tio n of six (6) hour s, more or less. In the six
(6) or seve n (7) hour s, you were able to make the
conclusion s which you have made in your repor t ?
A- Yes, ma’am . A psychi at ric intervie w is a very
stru ct u r e d intervi ew…
Q- When did you find out that you don’t have to
reso r t to psychologic al evalu a tio n?
A- Even on my inte rvie w, I alre a dy kn[e]w that I
will not be refe r ri n g this case to a psychologic al
evalu a tio n beca u s e the signs and sympto m s are
alre a dy very clea r.
Q- What are thes e signs and sympt o m s ?
A- The family backg r o u n d , for exam pl e, which
gave the rootc a u s e , of this case are very, very
typical groun d that can bring about…
Q- Did you not have any suspicion that the
petition e r might be giving you some inform a t i o n s
which would given (sic) som e pres u m p t i o n to
nullifying his mar ri a g e ?
A- I have no basis to doubt that kind of
inform a ti o n that he might be lying. During the
one and a half to two hour s of inte rvie w base d on
his rea c tio n s, the way he answ e r s me, the way he
grim a c e s and also, his stat e m e n t s that he has
bee n giving me are very since r e on his par t, that
he even, despit e the fact that that happ e n e d
alre a dy about eleve n years ago, I could still
app r e ci a t e how muc h he feels, so devas t a t e d , so
frust r a t e d and disa p poi n t e d about family life.
Q- You made a conclusion about the perso n ali ty
of both the petition e r and the respo n d e n t . Would
you say that even if petition e r would mar ry
again, the sam e manife st a ti o n s would exist in the
secon d mar ri a g e ?
A- It would depe n d again on the perso n a lity
profile of the would be part n e r that he will be
having. So it is not really absolut e in his case, in
a perso n ality profile, but it would again depe n d
on the perso n a lity profile of the would- be part n e r
that he will be having, ma’a m.1 4
It was folly for the trial cour t to acce p t the
findings and conclusion s of Dr. Villegas with
nary a link draw n betw e e n the "psycho dy n a m i c s
of the case" and the factor s char a c t e r izi n g the
psychologic al incap a ci ty. Dr. Villegas’ spar s e
testi m o ny does not lead to the inevit a bl e
conclusion that the partie s wer e psychologic ally
incap a ci t a t e d to com ply with the esse n ti al
marit al obligatio n s. Even on questioni n g from
the trial court, Dr. Villega s’ testi m o ny did not
illumin a t e on the parti e s’ allege d perso n a lity
disor d e r s and their incap a ci t a t i n g effect on their
mar ri a g e :
Q- Doctor a , you gave a conclusion that the
respo n d e n t is sufferin g from Hist rioni c
Perso n a lity Disor d e r associ a t e d with imm a t u r i ty.
Did you discove r the ant e c e d e n t s of this
disor d e r ?
A- Yes, your honor.
Q- What did you find out?
A- I found out from her family backg r o u n d that
the par e n t s were sepa r a t e d . She lived with a
stepfa t h e r and ther efo r e their family relation s hi p
were only preoc c u pi e d by earni n g a living and no
att e n t io n were given to the childre n . When the
childr e n wer e growing up, specifically Cheryl –
(inte r r u p t e d ) .
Q- By the way, who supplie d you this
inform a ti o n ?
A- The petition e r.
Q- You neve r discuss e d the mat t e r with the
respo n d e n t or any of her relatives, exce pt the
husb a n d ?
A- None, ma’am.
Q- Now, you have intervie w e d Mr. Lim thre e (3)
times. What test s did you give to him aside from
the intervie w?
A- I did not give him any test beca u s e a
psychologic al examin a t io n is given by a
psychologis t who acts as a labor a t o r y aide to a
psychi a t ri s t and ther efor e, if ther e are som e
doubt s in our clinical inte rvie w s, that is the time
we refer the case to a psychologi st for a sort of
clarifica tion in our clinical intervie w s.
Q- As far as the gravity of the disor d e r of
petition e r is conce r n e d do you have any
sugg e s t i o n s as to the cure of the sam e ?
A- Becau s e the psychologic al/p syc hi a t ri c
incap a ci ty has bee n form e d or develop e d durin g
his early year s of develop m e n t , I would say that
it is ingrai n e d in his perso n a lity and ther efo r e ,
no amou n t of psychi a t ri c assist a n c e or medicin e s
can help him improve his perso n a lity, your
honor. 1 5
The Diagnos ti c and Statisti c al Manu al of Ment al
Disor d e r s , Fourt h Edition (DSM IV),16 provide s
gen e r a l diagno st i c crite ri a for perso n a lity
disor d e r s :
A. An endu ri n g patt e r n of inne r expe ri e n c e and
beh avior that deviat e s mark e dly from the
expe c t a t i o n s of the individu al’s cultur e . This
patt e r n is manife st e d in two (2) or more of the
following are a s:
(1) cognition (i.e., ways of perc eivin g and
inte r p r e t i n g self, othe r peopl e, and event s)
(2) affectivity (i.e., the ran g e , inten si ty, lability,
and appro p ri a t e n e s s of emotion al respo n s e )
(3) inter p e r s o n a l functioni n g
(4) impulse cont rol
B. The endu ri n g patt e r n is inflexible and
perva sive acros s a broa d rang e of perso n al and
social situa tio n s.
C. The endu ri n g patt e r n leads to clinically
significa n t dist r e s s or impair m e n t in social,
occup a t i o n al or othe r impor t a n t are a s of
functioni n g.
D. The patt e r n is stabl e and of long dur a tio n, and
its onse t can be trac e d back at least to
adole sc e n c e or early adult hoo d.
E. The endu ri n g patt e r n is not bet t e r accou n t e d
for as a manifest a t i o n or a conse q u e n c e of
anot h e r ment al disor d e r .
F. The endu ri n g patt e r n is not due to the direc t
physiologic al effect s of a subst a n c e (i.e., a drug
of abus e, a medic a tio n) or a gene r al medic al
condition (e.g., hea d trau m a ).
The allege d per so n a lity disor d e r s of the par ti e s
have the following specified diagno s ti c crite ri a:
301.6 DEPENDE NT PERSONALITY DISORDER
A perva sive and excessive nee d to be take n car e
of that leads to sub mi s sive and clinging behavior
and fears of sepa r a t i o n, begin ni n g by early
adult h oo d and pres e n t in a variety of cont ext s, as
indicat e d by five (or more) of the following:
(1) has difficulty making everyd a y decisions
without an excessive amou n t of advice and
reas s u r a n c e from othe r s;
(2) nee d s othe r s to assu m e respo n si bility for
most major area s of his or her life;
(3) has difficulty expre s si n g disag r e e m e n t with
othe r s beca u s e of fear of loss of suppo r t or
app roval. Note: do not includ e realistic fears of
ret ri b u ti o n;
(4) has difficulty intiati ng project s or doing
things on his or her own (bec a u s e of a lack of
self- confide n c e in judg m e n t or abilities rat h e r
than a lack of motiva tion or ene r gy);
(5) goes to exces sive lengt h s to obtai n
nurt u r a n c e and suppo r t from othe r s, to the point
of volunt e e r i n g to do things that are unpl e a s a n t ;
(6) feels unco mfo r t a bl e or helple ss whe n alone
bec a u s e of exag g e r a t e d fears of being una bl e to
care for himself or hers elf;
(7) urge n t ly seeks anot h e r relations hi p as a
sourc e of care and suppo r t whe n a close
relation s hi p ends;
(8) is unr e alisti c ally preoc c u pi e d with fears of
being left to take car e of himself or hers elf.
301.5 HISTRIONIC PERSONALITY DISORDER
A perva sive pat t e r n of exces sive emotion ality
and att e n t io n seekin g, begin ni n g by early
adult h oo d and pres e n t in a variety of cont ext s, as
indicat e d by five (or more) of the following:
(1) is unco mfo r t a bl e in situa tion s in which he or
she is not the cent e r of att e n ti o n;
(2) inter a c ti o n with othe r s is often cha r a c t e r iz e d
by inapp r o p r i a t e sexually sedu c tive or
provoc a tive behavior;
(3) displ ays rapidly shifting and shallow
expr e s si n g of emotion s;
(4) consist e n t ly uses physic al appe a r a n c e to
dra w att e n t io n to self;
(5) has a style of spe e c h that is excessively
impr e s si o ni stic and lacking in detail;
(6) shows self- dra m a t i z a ti o n, thea t ri c ali ty, and
exagg e r a t e d expr e s si o n of emotion;
(7) is sugg e s ti bl e, i.e., easily influen c e d by othe r s
or circu m s t a n c e s ; and
(8) consid e r s relations hi p s to be mor e intim a t e
than they act u ally are.
Significa n tly, nowh e r e in Dr. Villega s’
Psychi a t ri c Repor t and in her testi m o ny does she
link partic ul a r acts of the parti e s to the DSM IV’s
list of crite ri a for the specific perso n ali ty
disor d e r s .
Curiously, Dr. Villegas’ global conclusio n of both
par ti e s’ perso n ality disord e r s was not suppo r t e d
by psychologic al test s prope rly administ e r e d by
clinical psychologis t s specifically train e d in the
test s’ use and inte r p r e t a t i o n. The suppos e d
per so n ali ty disor d e r s of the par ti e s, consid e ri n g
that such diagno s e s wer e mad e, could have been
fully est a blish e d by psycho m e t r i c and
neu r olo gic al tests which are desig n e d to
mea s u r e specific aspe c t s of people’s intellige n c e ,
thinkin g, or perso n ality.17
Conc e d e dl y, a copy of DSM IV, or any of the
psychology text book s, does not tran sfor m a
lawyer or a judge into a profession al
psychologis t. A judge shoul d not substit u t e his
own psychologi c al asse s s m e n t of the partie s for
that of the psychologist or the psychi a t ri st .
Howev e r, a judge has the boun d e n duty to rule
on what the law is, as applied to a cert ai n set of
facts. Cert ai nly, as in all othe r litigation s
involving techni c al or speci al knowle d g e , a judge
must first and fore m o s t resolve the legal
ques tio n base d on law and jurispr u d e n c e .
The expe r t opinion of a psychi a t ri s t arrive d at
after a maxi m u m of seve n (7) hour s of inte rvie w,
and unsu p p o r t e d by sepa r a t e psychologic al test s,
cannot tie the hand s of the trial court and
preve n t it from making its own factu al finding on
wha t happ e n e d in this case. The prob a t ive force
of the testi m o ny of an expe r t does not lie in a
mer e stat e m e n t of his theo ry or opinion, but
rat h e r in the assist a n c e that he can rend e r to the
court s in showin g the facts that serve as a basis
for his crite rio n and the reaso n s upon which the
logic of his conclusio n is found e d. 1 8
WHERE FOR E, the petition is here by DENIED.
The Decision of the Cour t of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 74822 is her e by AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 16 6 7 3 8 Aug u s t 14, 20 0 9
ROWE NA PADILLA- RUM BA UA, Peti t i o n e r ,
vs.
EDWARD RUM BA UA, Res p o n d e n t .
DE C IS IO N
BRION, J.:
Petition e r Rowe n a Padilla- Rum b a u a (petition e r )
challen g e s , throu g h her petition for review on
certior a ri ,1 the decision dat e d June 25, 20042
and the resol ution date d Janua ry 18, 20053 of
the Cour t of Appeal s (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
75095. The challe n g e d decision reve r s e d the
decision 4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
decla ri n g the mar ri a g e of the petition e r and
respo n d e n t Edwa r d Rum b a u a (respo n d e n t ) null
and void on the groun d of the latt e r’s
psychologic al incap a ci ty. The assaile d resol ution,
on the other han d, denie d the petition e r’s motion
for recon si d e r a t i o n.
ANTECEDE NT FACTS
The pre s e n t petition trac e s its roots to the
petition e r’s compl ai n t for the decla r a ti o n of
nullity of mar ri a g e agai nst the respo n d e n t befor e
the RTC, docke t e d as Civil Case No. 767. The
petition e r allege d that the respo n d e n t was
psychologic ally incap a ci t a t e d to exerci se the
esse n ti al obligation s of mar ri a g e as shown by the
following circu m s t a n c e s : the respo n d e n t ren e g e d
on his promi s e to live with her unde r one roof
after finding work; he failed to exte n d financi al
suppo r t to her; he blam e d her for his mot h e r’s
dea t h; he rep r e s e n t e d himself as single in his
tra n s a c t i o n s; and he pret e n d e d to be worki ng in
Davao, altho u g h he was coha bi ti n g with anot h e r
wom a n in Novalich e s, Quezon City.
Sum m o n s was serve d on the respo n d e n t throu g h
substit u t e d servic e, as perso n al servic e prove d
futile.5 The RTC orde r e d the provinci al
pros e c u t o r to investi g a t e if collusion existe d
betw e e n the parti e s and to ensu r e that no
fabric a ti on or supp r e s si o n of evide n c e would
take plac e.6 Prose c u t o r Melvin P. Tiongso n’s
repor t nega t e d the pres e n c e of collusion
betw e e n the parti e s.7
The Repu blic of the Philippine s (Repu blic),
thro u g h the office of the Solicitor Gene r al (OSG),
oppos e d the petition.8 The OSG ente r e d its
app e a r a n c e and depu tiz e d the Provinci al
Prose c u t o r of Nueva Vizcaya to assist in all
hea ri n g s of the case.9
The petition e r prese n t e d testi m o ni al and
docu m e n t a r y evide n c e to subst a n t i a t e her
cha r g e s.
The petition e r relat e d that she and the
respo n d e n t were childhood neigh b o r s in Dupax
del Nort e, Nueva Vizcaya. Som e ti m e in 1987,
they met again and beca m e swee t h e a r t s but the
respo n d e n t’s family did not app rov e of thei r
relation s hi p. After grad u a t io n from colleg e in
1991, the respo n d e n t promis e d to mar ry the
petition e r as soon as he found a job. The job
cam e in 1993, when the Philippine Air Lines
(PAL) acce p t e d the respo n d e n t as a com p u t e r
engin e e r . The respo n d e n t propos e d to the
petition e r that they first have a "secr e t
mar ri a g e " in orde r not to ant a g o niz e his par e n t s.
The petition e r agr e e d; they wer e mar ri e d in
Manila on Febr u a r y 23, 1993. The petition e r and
the respo n d e n t , howeve r, neve r lived toge t h e r ;
the petition e r staye d with her siste r in Fairview,
Quezon City, while the respo n d e n t lived with his
par e n t s in Novalich e s.
The petition e r and respo n d e n t saw eac h othe r
every day durin g the first six mont h s of their
mar ri a g e . At that point, the respo n d e n t refuse d
to live with the petition e r for fear that public
knowle d g e of their mar ri a g e would affect his
applica tio n for a PAL schola r s hi p. Seve n mont h s
into thei r mar ri a g e , the coupl e’s daily meeti n g s
bec a m e occasion al visits to the petition e r’s
house in Fairview; they would have sexual tryst s
in motel s. Later that year, the respo n d e n t
enrolle d at FEATI Unive rsi ty after he lost his
em ploy m e n t with PAL.10
In 1994, the par ti e s’ resp e c t ive families
discove r e d their secr e t mar ri a g e . The
respo n d e n t’s moth e r tried to convinc e him to go
to the Unite d Stat e s, but he refuse d . To app e a s e
his moth e r , he contin u e d living sepa r a t e l y from
the petition e r . The respo n d e n t forgot to gre e t
the petition e r duri ng her birt h d a y in 1992 and
likewise failed to send her gre e ti n g car ds on
speci al occasion s. The respo n d e n t indicat e d as
well in his visa applica tion that he was single.
In April 1995, the respo n d e n t’s moth e r died. The
respo n d e n t blam e d the petition e r , associ a ti n g his
mot h e r’s deat h to the pain that the discove ry of
his secr e t mar ri a g e brou g h t . Paine d by the
respo n d e n t’s action, the petition e r sever e d her
relation s hi p with the respo n d e n t . They
event u a lly recon cile d thro u g h the help of the
petition e r’s fathe r , altho u g h they still lived
sepa r a t e ly.
In 1997, the respo n d e n t infor m e d the petition e r
that he had found a job in Davao. A year later,
the petition e r and her moth e r went to the
respo n d e n t’s house in Novalich e s and found him
coha bi ti n g with one Cynthi a Villanu ev a
(Cynthi a). When she confro n t e d the respo n d e n t
about it, he denie d having an affair with
Cynt hi a. 1 1 The petition e r appa r e n t ly did not
believe the respo n d e n t s and move d to to Nueva
Vizcaya to recove r from the pain and ang ui s h
that her discove ry brou g h t . 1 2
The petition e r disclose d duri ng her cross-
examin a t io n that com m u ni c a t i o n betw e e n her
and respo n d e n t had ceas e d. Aside from her oral
testi m o ny, the petition e r also pres e n t e d a
certifie d true copy of their mar ri a g e cont r a c t ; 1 3
and the testi m o ny, curric ul u m vitae,1 4 and
psychologic al repor t 1 5 of clinical psychologis t
Dr. Nedy Lorenz o Tayag (Dr. Tayag).
Dr. Tayag decla r e d on the witne ss stan d that she
admi nist e r e d the following test s on the
petition e r: a Revise d Beta Exami n a ti o n; a Bende r
Visual Motor Gestal t Test; a Rorsc h a c h
Psychodi a g n o s t i c Test; a Draw a Perso n Test; a
Sach’s Sent e n c e Compl e tio n Test; and MMPI.16
She ther e a f t e r pre p a r e d a psychologi c al repor t
with the following finding s:
TEST RESULTS AND EVALUATION
Psycho m e t r i c tests data reveal petition e r to
oper a t e in an aver a g e intellec t u a l level. Logic
and rea so ni n g rem ai n e d intac t. She is seen to be
the type of wom a n who adjust s fairly well into
most situa tion s espe ci ally if it is within her
inte r e s t s. She is pictu r e d to be faithful to her
com mit m e n t s and had rese rv a ti o n s from
neg a t ive criticism s such that she nor m ally
adh e r e s to social nor m s, behavior- wise. Her age
spea k s of mat u ri ty, both intellec t u ally and
emotion ally. Her one fault lies in her com plia n t
attit u d e which make s her a subjec t for
manip ul a t io n and dece p t io n such that of
respo n d e n t . In all the years of their relation s hi p,
she opte d to endu r e his irres po n si bility larg ely
bec a u s e of the mer e belief that som e d a y things
will be muc h bett e r for the m. But upon the
adve n t of her husb a n d’s infidelity, she gra d u ally
lost hope as well as the sense of self- resp e c t ,
that she has finally take n her tool to be asse r t iv e
to the point of being agg r e s siv e and very
cautious at time s – so as to fight with the
frust r a t i o n and insec u ri ty she had espe ci ally
rega r di n g her failed mar ri a g e .
Respon d e n t in this case, is reveal e d to oper a t e in
a very self- cent e r e d man n e r as he believes that
the world revolves arou n d him. His egoce n t ri s m
made it so easy for him to dec eitfully use othe r s
for his own adva nc e m e n t with an extre m e air of
confide n c e and domin a n c e . He would do actions
without any rem o r s e or guilt feelings towa r d s
othe r s espe ci ally to that of petition e r .
REMARKS
Love happ e n s to everyon e. It is dubb e d to be
boundl e s s as it goes beyon d the expe c t a t i o n s
people tagg e d with it. In love, "age does mat t e r ."
People love in orde r to be secu r e that one will
sha r e his/he r life with anot h e r and that he/sh e
will not die alone. Individu al s who are in love
had the powe r to let love grow or let love die – it
is a choice one had to face when love is not the
love he/sh e expec t e d .
In the case pre s e n t e d by petition e r , it is very
app a r e n t that love really happ e n e d for her
towar d s the young respo n d e n t – who used "love"
as a disguise or dece p tive tactic for exploiting
the confide n c e she exten d e d towa r d s him. He
made her believe that he is respo n si bl e, true,
caring and thoug h tf ul – only to reve al himself
cont r a r y to what was mention e d . He lacke d the
com mit m e n t , faithfuln e s s, and rem o r s e that he
was able to enga g e himself to promisc u o u s acts
that made petition e r look like an innoc e n t fool.
His char a c t e r traits reveal him to suffer
Narcissi sti c Perso n a lity Disord e r - decla r e d to be
grave, sever e and incur a bl e . 1 7 [Emph a si s
supplied.]
The RTC Ruling
The RTC nullified the partie s’ mar ri a g e in its
decision of April 19, 2002. The trial cour t saw
merit in the testi m o ni e s of the petition e r and Dr.
Tayag, and conclu d e d as follows:
xxxx
Respon d e n t was neve r solicitous of the welfar e
and wishe s of his wife. Respon d e n t impos e d
limited or block [sic] out com m u ni c a t i o n with his
wife, forge t ti n g speci al occa sion s, like
petition e r’s birt h d a y s and Valenti n e’s Day; going
out only on occasion s despit e their living
sepa r a t e ly and to go to a motel to have sexu al
inte rc o u r s e .
It would app e a r that the foregoi n g nar r a t i o n are
the atte n d a n t facts in this case which show the
psychologic al incap a ci ty of respo n d e n t , at the
time of the celebr a t i o n of the mar ri a g e of the
par ti e s, to ent e r into lawful mar ri a g e and to
disch a r g e his marit al respo n si bilities (See
Articles 68 to 71, Family Code). This incap a ci ty
is "decla r e d grave, seve r e and incur a bl e."
WHERE FOR E, in view of the foregoi n g, the
mar ri a g e betw e e n petition e r Rowen a Padilla
Rum b a u a and respo n d e n t Edwin Rum b a u a is
her e by decla r e d ann ulle d.
18
The CA Decision
The Repu blic, throu g h the OSG, appe al e d the
RTC decision to the CA.19 The CA decision of
June 25, 2004 rever s e d and set aside the RTC
decision, and denie d the nullification of the
par ti e s’ marri a g e . 2 0
In its ruling, the CA obse rv e d that Dr. Tayag’s
psychi a t ric repor t did not mentio n the cause of
the respo n d e n t ’s so- called "narcissisti c
per so n ali ty disor d e r ;" it did not discus s the
respo n d e n t’s childhoo d and thus failed to give
the court an insight into the respo n d e n t’s
develop m e n t a l years. Dr. Tayag likewise failed to
explain why she cam e to the conclusio n that the
respo n d e n t’s inca p a ci t y was "dee p- seat e d" and
"incur a bl e."
The CA held that Article 36 of the Family Code
requi r e s the incap a ci ty to be psychologic al,
althou g h its manifes t a t io n s may be physic al.
Moreov e r, the evide nc e pres e n t e d must show
that the inca p a ci t a t e d party was ment ally or
physically ill so that he or she could not have
known the marit al obliga tion s assu m e d , knowi ng
the m , could not have assu m e d the m. In othe r
words, the illness must be shown as down ri g h t
incap a ci ty or inability, not a refus al, negl ec t , or
difficulty to perfor m the esse n t i al obligatio n s of
mar ri a g e . In the pres e n t case, the petition e r
suffer e d beca u s e the respo n d e n t ada m a n t ly
refuse d to live with her beca u s e of his pare n t s’
objection to their mar ri a g e .
The petition e r moved to recon si d e r the decision,
but the CA denie d her motion in its resolutio n of
Janua r y 18, 2005. 21
The Petition and the Issue s
The petition e r argu e s in the pre se n t petition that
–
1. the OSG certifica tio n requi r e m e n t unde r
Repu blic v. Molina 2 2 (the Molina case) canno t
be dispe n s e d with beca u s e A.M. No. 02- 11- 10-
SC, which relaxe d the requi r e m e n t , took effect
only on Marc h 15, 2003;
2. vacatin g the decision of the court s a quo and
rem a n di n g the case to the RTC to recall her
expe r t witne s s and cure the defect s in her
testi m o ny, as well as to pre s e n t addition al
evide n c e, would tem p e r justic e with mer cy; and
3. Dr. Tayag’s testim o ny in cour t cur e d the
deficien ci e s in her psychi a t ri c repo r t .
The petition e r prays that the RTC’s and the CA’s
decision s be reve r s e d and set aside, and the case
be rem a n d e d to the RTC for furt h e r proce e di n g s ;
in the event we cannot gran t this praye r, that the
CA’s decision be set aside and the RTC’s decision
be reinst a t e d .
The Repu blic maint ai n e d in its com m e n t that: (a)
A.M. No. 02- 11- 10- SC was applica bl e altho u g h it
took effect afte r the prom ul g a t i o n of Molina; (b)
invalida ti n g the trial court’s decision and
rem a n di n g the case for furt h e r proce e di n g s wer e
not prop e r; and (c) the petition e r failed to
est a blis h respo n d e n t’ s psychologic al
incap a ci ty.2 3
The par ti e s simply reite r a t e d their argu m e n t s in
the mem o r a n d a they filed.
THE COURT’S RULING
We resolve to deny the petition for lack of merit.
A.M. No. 02- 11- 10- SC is applica bl e
In Molina, the Court emph a si z e d the role of the
pros e c u ti n g attor n e y or fiscal and the OSG; they
are to appe a r as couns el for the Stat e in
proce e di n g s for ann ul m e n t and decla r a t i o n of
nullity of mar ri a g e s:
(8) The trial court must orde r the pros e c u t i n g
attor n e y or fiscal and the Solicitor Gene r al to
app e a r as couns el for the stat e. No decision shall
be hand e d down unless the Solicitor Gene r a l
issue s a certification, which will be quot e d in the
decision, briefly statin g the r ei n his reaso n s for
his agr e e m e n t or opposition, as the case may be,
to the petition. The Solicitor Gene r al, along with
the prose c u t i n g attor n e y, shall submit to the
court such certificatio n within fiftee n (15) days
from the dat e the case is dee m e d submit t e d for
resolution of the court. The Solicitor Gene r a l
shall disch a r g e the equivale n t function of the
defe ns o r vinculi cont e m p l a t e d und e r Canon
1095. [Emp h a si s supplie d.]
A.M. No. 02- 11- 10- SC24 -- which this Court
prom ul g a t e d on Marc h 15, 2003 and duly
publish e d -- is gea r e d towa r d s the relaxa tion of
the OSG certification that Molina requir e d.
Section 18 of this rem e di al regul a ti on provide s:
SEC. 18. Memo r a n d a . – The court may requir e
the parti es and the public pros e c u t o r , in
consult a ti o n with the Office of the Solicitor
Gene r al, to file thei r resp e c tive mem o r a n d a in
suppo r t of their claims within fiftee n days from
the date the trial is termi n a t e d .l a w p h il.n e t It may
requi r e the Office of the Solicitor Gene r a l to file
its own mem o r a n d u m if the case is of significa n t
inte r e s t to the Stat e. No othe r plea di n g s or
pap e r s may be submi t t e d without leave of court.
After the lapse of the period herei n provide d, the
case will be conside r e d sub mit t e d for decision,
with or withou t the mem o r a n d a .
The petition e r argu e s that the RTC decision of
April 19, 2002 should be vacat e d for
pre m a t u r i t y, as it was rend e r e d despit e the
abse n c e of the requi r e d OSG certifica tio n
specified in Molina. Accordin g to the petition e r ,
A.M. No. 02- 11- 10- SC, which took effect only on
Marc h 15, 2003, canno t overt u r n the
requi r e m e n t s of Molina that was prom ul g a t e d as
early as Febr u a r y 13, 1997.
The petition e r’s arg u m e n t lacks merit.
The am e n d m e n t introd u c e d und e r A.M. No. 02-
11- 10- SC is proc e d u r a l or rem e di al in cha r a c t e r ;
it does not crea t e or rem ove any vest e d right,
but only ope r a t e s as a rem e dy in aid of or
confir m a ti o n of alre a dy existing right s. The
settle d rule is that proc e d u r a l laws may be given
ret ro a c tiv e effect,2 5 as we held in De Los Sant o s
v. Vda. de Mang u b a t : 2 6
Proc e d u r a l Laws do not com e within the legal
conce p t io n of a ret ro a c t ive law, or the gen e r a l
rule agai ns t the ret ro a c t ive oper a t io n of stat u e s -
they may be given ret ro a c t ive effect on actions
pendi n g and unde t e r m i n e d at the time of thei r
pass a g e and this will not violat e any right of a
per so n who may feel that he is adve r s ely
affect e d , insom u c h as ther e are no vest e d right s
in rules of proc e d u r e .
A.M. No. 02- 11- 10- SC, as a rem e di al mea s u r e ,
rem ov e d the mand a t o r y nat u r e of an OSG
certifica tio n and may be applie d ret ro a c t iv ely to
pendi n g mat t e r s . In effect, the mea s u r e cur e s in
any pendi n g mat t e r any proce d u r a l lapse on the
certifica tio n prior to its prom ul g a t i o n. Our
rulings in Antonio v. Reyes2 7 and Naval e s v.
Navale s 2 8 have since confir m e d and clarified
that A.M. No. 02- 11- 10- SC has dispe n s e d with
the Molina guidelin e on the mat t e r of
certifica tio n, althou g h Article 48 man d a t e s the
app e a r a n c e of the prose c u t i n g attor n e y or fiscal
to ensu r e that no collusion betw e e n the parti e s
would take plac e. Thus, what is impor t a n t is the
pre s e n c e of the prose c u t o r in the case, not the
rem e di al requir e m e n t that he be certified to be
pre s e n t . From this pers p e c t iv e, the petition e r’s
objection rega r di n g the Molina guidelin e on
certifica tio n lacks merit.
A Rem a n d of the Case to the RTC is Improp e r
The petition e r maint ai n s that vacati n g the lowe r
court s’ decisions and the rem a n d of the case to
the RTC for furt h e r rec e p t io n of evide n c e are
proce d u r a lly per mi s si bl e. She argu e s that the
inade q u a c y of her evide n c e during the trial was
the fault of her form e r couns el, Atty. Richa r d
Tabag o, and asse r t s that rem a n di n g the case to
the RTC would allow her to cure the evide n ti a r y
insufficie nci e s. She posits in this rega r d that
while mist ak e s of couns el bind a party, the rule
shoul d be liberally const r u e d in her favor to
serve the ends of justice.
We do not find her argu m e n t s convincin g.
A rem a n d of the case to the RTC for furt h e r
proce e di n g s amou n t s to the gra n t of a new trial
that is not proc e d u r a l ly prope r at this stag e .
Section 1 of Rule 37 provide s that an aggri ev e d
par ty may move the trial court to set aside a
judg m e n t or final orde r alre a dy ren d e r e d and to
gra n t a new trial within the period for taking an
app e al. In addition, a motion for new trial may be
filed only on the grou n d s of (1) fraud, accide n t ,
mist ak e or excus a bl e neglige n c e that could not
have bee n gua r d e d agains t by ordin a ry
prud e n c e , and by reaso n of which the aggriev e d
par ty’s right s have proba bly bee n impair e d; or
(2) newly discove r e d evide n c e that, with
reaso n a b l e diligen c e , the aggri eve d party could
not have discove r e d and prod u c e d at the trial,
and that would proba bly alte r the resul t if
pre s e n t e d .
In the pre s e n t case, the petition e r cites the
inade q u a c y of the evide nc e pres e n t e d by her
form e r couns el as basis for a rem a n d . She did
not, howev e r , specify the inade q u a c y. That the
RTC gra n t e d the petition for decla r a ti o n of
nullity prim a facie shows that the petition e r’s
couns el had not bee n neglig e n t in handli ng the
case. Granti n g argu e n d o that the petition e r’s
couns el had bee n neglige n t , the neglige n c e that
would justify a new trial must be excus a bl e, i.e.
one that ordin a r y diligen c e and prud e n c e could
not have gua r d e d agains t . The neglige n c e that
the petition e r appa r e n t ly adve r t s to is that cited
in Uy v. First Met ro Integ r a t e d Steel Corpor a t i o n
whe r e we explaine d: 2 9
Blund e r s and mist ak e s in the condu c t of the
proce e di n g s in the trial court as a result of the
ignor a n c e , inexpe ri e n c e or incom p e t e n c e of
couns el do not qualify as a groun d for new trial.
If such were to be admit t e d as valid reaso n s for
re- openi n g case s, ther e would never be an end to
litiga tion so long as a new couns el could be
em ploye d to allege and show that the prior
couns el had not bee n sufficiently diligen t ,
expe ri e n c e d or learn e d . This will put a pre mi u m
on the willful and inten tion al com mis sio n of
error s by couns el, with a view to secu ri n g new
trials in the event of conviction, or an adve r s e
decision, as in the insta n t case.
Thus, we find no justifiabl e reaso n to gra n t the
petition e r’s requ e s t e d rem a n d .
Petition e r failed to est a blish the
respo n d e n t’s psychologic al inca p a ci ty
A petition for decla r a t i o n of nullity of mar ri a g e is
anc ho r e d on Article 36 of the Family Code which
provide s that "a mar ri a g e cont r a c t e d by any
par ty who, at the time of its celeb r a t i o n, was
psychologic ally incap a ci t a t e d to comply with the
esse n ti al marit al obligatio n s of mar ri a g e , shall
likewise be void even if such inca p a ci t y beco m e s
manifes t only afte r its sole m niz a tio n." In Sant os
v. Court of Appeals,3 0 the Cour t first declar e d
that psychologic al incap a ci ty must be
cha r a c t e r i z e d by (a) gravity; (b) juridic al
ant e c e d e n c e ; and (c) incur a bility. The defect
shoul d refe r to "no less than a ment al (not
physical) inca p a ci t y that caus e s a party to be
truly incognitive of the basic marit al coven a n t s
that conco m it a n t ly must be assu m e d and
disch a r g e d by the parti e s to the mar ri a g e ." It
must be confine d to "the most seriou s case s of
per so n ali ty disor d e r s clea rly dem o n s t r a t iv e of an
utt e r insen si tivity or inability to give mea ni n g
and significa n c e to the mar ri a g e ."
We laid down more definitive guidelin e s in the
inte r p r e t a t i o n and applic a tio n of Article 36 of the
Family Code in Repu blic v. Court of Appe als
whe r e we said:
(1) The burd e n of proof to show the nullity of the
mar ri a g e belong s to the plaintiff. Any doubt
shoul d be resolved in favor of the existe n c e and
continu a t i o n of the mar ri a g e and agains t its
dissolution and nullity. This is root e d in the fact
that both our Constit u tio n and our laws che ri sh
the validity of mar ri a g e and unity of the family.
Thus, our Constit u t io n devot e s an entir e Article
on the Family, recog nizin g it "as the found a t io n
of the nation." It decr e e s mar ri a g e as legally
"inviolable," the r e by prot e c ti n g it from
dissolution at the whim of the parti e s. Both the
family and mar ri a g e are to be "prot e c t e d " by the
stat e .
The Family Code echo e s this consti t u tio n a l edict
on mar ri a g e and the family and emp h a siz e s their
per m a n e n c e , inviolability and solidari ty.
(2) The root caus e of the psychologi c al
incap a ci ty must be (a) medic ally or clinically
identifie d, (b) allege d in the compl ai nt , (c)
sufficiently prove n by expe r t s and (d) clea rly
explain e d in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code req ui r e s that the incap a ci ty must be
psychologic al - not physic al, altho u g h its
manifes t a t i o n s and/or sympto m s may be
physical. The evide nc e must convinc e the court
that the parti es, or one of the m, was men t ally or
psychic ally ill to such an exte n t that the perso n
could not have know n the obligatio n s he was
assu m i n g , or knowin g the m , could not have
given valid assu m p t io n ther e of. Althoug h no
exam pl e of such incap a ci ty need be given her e
so as not to limit the applica tio n of the provision
und e r the princi pl e of ejusd e m gen e ri s,
neve r t h e l e s s such root caus e must be identified
as a psychologi c al illness and its incap a cit a t i n g
nat u r e fully explain e d. Expe rt evide n c e may be
given by qualified psychia t ri s t s and clinical
psychologis t s.
(3) The inca p a ci ty must be prove n to be existin g
at "the time of the celeb r a t i o n" of the mar ri a g e .
The evide n c e must show that the illness was
existing whe n the par ti e s exch a n g e d their "I
do's." The manifest a t i o n of the illness nee d not
be perc eiva bl e at such time, but the illness itself
must have att a c h e d at such mom e n t , or prior
ther e t o.
(4) Such inca p a ci ty must also be shown to be
medically or clinically per m a n e n t or incur a bl e.
Such incur a bility may be absolut e or even
relative only in rega r d to the othe r spous e, not
nece s s a r ily absolut ely agai ns t everyon e of the
sam e sex. Furt h e r m o r e , such incap a ci ty must be
releva n t to the assu m p t i o n of mar ri a g e
obliga tion s, not nece s s a r ily to those not relat e d
to mar ri a g e , like the exer ci se of a profes sio n or
em ploy m e n t in a job. x x x
(5) Such illness must be grave enoug h to bring
about the disa bility of the party to assu m e the
esse n ti al obligation s of mar ri a g e . Thus, "mild
cha r a c t e r i ol ogic al peculia ri ti e s, mood chan g e s,
occasion al emotion al outbu r s t s " cannot be
acce p t e d as root caus e s. The illness must be
show n as down ri g h t inca p a ci t y or inability, not a
refusal, negle c t or difficulty, muc h less ill will. In
othe r words, the r e is a nat al or supe r v e ni n g
disa blin g factor in the perso n, an adve r s e
inte g r al elem e n t in the perso n ali ty stru ct u r e that
effectively inca p a ci t a t e s the per so n from really
acce p ti n g and ther e b y complying with the
obliga tion s esse n ti al to mar ri a g e .
(6) The esse n ti al marit al obliga tion s must be
thos e embr a c e d by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as rega r d s the husb a n d and wife as
well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the sam e
Code in reg a r d to pare n t s and their childr e n.
Such non- complie d marit al obligatio n(s) must
also be stat e d in the petition, prove n by evide nc e
and includ e d in the text of the decision.
(7) Inte r p r e t a t i o n s given by the Nation al
Appellat e Mat ri m o ni al Tribun al of the Catholic
Chur c h in the Philippin e s, while not cont rolling
or decisive, should be given gre a t resp e c t by our
court s…
(8) The trial court must orde r the pros e c u t i n g
attor n e y or fiscal and the Solicitor Gene r al to
app e a r as couns el for the stat e. No decision shall
be hand e d down unless the Solicitor Gene r a l
issue s a certification, which will be quot e d in the
decision, briefly statin g the r ei n his reaso n s for
his agr e e m e n t or opposition, as the case may be,
to the petition. The Solicitor Gene r al, along with
the prose c u t i n g attor n e y, shall submit to the
court such certificatio n within fiftee n (15) days
from the dat e the case is dee m e d submit t e d for
resolution of the court. The Solicitor Gene r a l
shall disch a r g e the equivale n t function of the
defe ns o r vinculi cont e m p l a t e d und e r Canon
1095.
These Guideline s incor po r a t e the basic
requi r e m e n t s we esta blis h e d in Sant os. To
reite r a t e , psychologic al inca p a ci t y must be
cha r a c t e r i z e d by: (a) gravity; (b) juridical
ant e c e d e n c e ; and (c) incur a bility.3 1 These
requi sit e s must be strictly com plie d with, as the
gra n t of a petition for nullity of mar ri a g e base d
on psychologic al incap a ci ty must be confine d
only to the most serious case s of perso n ali ty
disor d e r s clea rly demo n s t r a t iv e of an utt e r
inse nsi tivity or inability to give mea ni n g and
significa n c e to the mar ri a g e . Furt h e r m o r e , since
the Family Code does not define "psychologic al
incap a ci ty," fleshing out its ter m s is left to us to
do so on a case- to- case basis throu g h
jurisp r u d e n c e . 3 2 We emph a siz e d this app ro a c h
in the rece n t case of Ting v. Velez- Ting33 when
we explai n e d:
It was for this reaso n that we found it nec es s a r y
to em ph a si z e in Ngo Te that eac h case involving
the applica tion of Article 36 must be tre a t e d
distinctly and judge d not on the basis of a priori
assu m p ti o n s, pre dilec tio n s or gene r aliza tion s but
accor di n g to its own att e n d a n t facts. Court s
shoul d inte r p r e t the provision on a case- to- case
basis, guide d by expe ri e n c e , the finding s of
expe r t s and rese a r c h e r s in psychologic al
disciplin e s, and by decision s of chur c h tribu n al s.
In the pre s e n t case and using the above
sta n d a r d s and appro a c h , we find the totality of
the petition e r’s evide nc e insufficie nt to prove
that the respo n d e n t is psychologi c ally unfit to
disch a r g e the duties expec t e d of him as a
husb a n d .
a. Petition e r’s testi m o ny did not prove the root
caus e , gravity and incur a bility of respo n d e n t’s
condition
The petition e r’s evide n c e mer ely showe d that the
respo n d e n t : (a) ren e g e d on his promi s e to
coha bi t with her; (b) visited her occasion ally
from 1993 to 1997; (c) forgot her birt h d a y in
1992, and did not send her gre e ti n g card s during
speci al occasion s; (d) rep r e s e n t e d himself as
singl e in his visa applica tion; (e) blam e d her for
the dea t h of his moth e r ; and (f) told her he was
workin g in Davao whe n in fact he was coha biti n g
with anot h e r wom a n in 1997.
These acts, in our view, do not rise to the level of
the "psychologic al inca p a ci ty" that the law
requi r e s, and shoul d be disting ui s h e d from the
"difficulty," if not outri gh t "refus al" or "neglec t "
in the perfor m a n c e of some marit al obliga tion s
that cha r a c t e r i z e som e mar ri a g e s. In Bier v.
Bier,34 we ruled that it was not enoug h that
respo n d e n t , allege d to be psychologi c ally
incap a ci t a t e d , had difficulty in complying with
his marit al obliga tion s, or was unwilling to
perfor m thes e obligatio n s. Proof of a nat al or
supe r v e ni n g disabling factor – an adver s e
inte g r al elem e n t in the respo n d e n t ' s per so n a lity
stru ct u r e that effectively inca p a ci t a t e d him from
complying with his esse n t i al mari t al obligatio n s –
had to be shown and was not show n in this cited
case.
In the pre s e n t case, the respo n d e n t’s stub bo r n
refusal to coha bi t with the petition e r was
doubtl e ssly irres p o n si bl e, but it was never
prove n to be root e d in some psychologic al
illness. As the petition e r’s testi mo ny reve al s,
respo n d e n t mer ely refuse d to coha bi t with her
for fear of jeopa r di zin g his applica tion for a
schol a r s hi p, and late r due to his fear of
ant a g o nizi n g his family. The respo n d e n t’s failur e
to gre e t the petition e r on her birt h d a y and to
send her card s duri ng speci al occasion s, as well
as his acts of blami n g petition e r for his moth e r’s
dea t h and of repr e s e n t i n g himself as single in his
visa applic ation, could only at best amou n t to
forge tf uln e s s , insen sitivity or emotion al
imma t u ri t y, not nec e ss a r ily psychologic al
incap a ci ty. Likewise, the respo n d e n t’s act of
living with anot h e r wom a n four years into the
mar ri a g e cannot auto m a t i c a lly be equa t e d with a
psychologic al disor d e r , especi ally whe n no
specific evide nc e was shown that promisc ui ty
was a trait alre a d y existing at the inception of
mar ri a g e . In fact, petition e r hers elf admi tt e d
that respo n d e n t was caring and faithful whe n
they wer e going stea dy and for a time after their
mar ri a g e ; their probl e m s only cam e in later.
To be sur e, the respo n d e n t was far from perfec t
and had som e cha r a c t e r flaws. The pres e n c e of
thes e impe rf e c t io n s, howeve r, does not
nece s s a r ily warr a n t a conclusion that he had a
psychologic al mala dy at the time of the mar ri a g e
that rend e r e d him inca p a bl e of fulfilling his
dutie s and obligatio n s. To use the words of
Navale s v. Naval e s: 3 5
Article 36 conte m p l a t e s downri g h t incap a ci ty or
inability to take cogniza n c e of and to assu m e
basic marit al obliga tion s. Mere "difficulty,"
"refus al" or "neglec t " in the perfor m a n c e of
marit al obligatio n s or "ill will" on the part of the
spous e is differ e n t from "inca p a ci ty" roote d on
som e debilita ti n g psychologic al condition or
illness. Inde e d, irreco n cila bl e differ e n c e s , sexu al
infidelity or perve r sio n, emotion al imm at u r i t y
and irres p o n si bility, and the like, do not by
the m s elv e s warr a n t a finding of psychologic al
incap a ci ty und e r Article 36, as the sam e may
only be due to a per so n ' s refusal or unwilling n e s s
to assu m e the esse n ti al obligatio n s of mar ri a g e
and not due to som e psychologic al illness that is
cont e m pl a t e d by said rule.
b. Dr. Tayag’s psychologic al repo r t and court
testi m o ny
We cannot help but note that Dr. Tayag’s
conclusion s abou t the respo n d e n t’ s psychologi c al
incap a ci ty were base d on the infor m a t io n fed to
her by only one side – the petition e r – whose bias
in favor of her caus e cannot be doubt e d . While
this circu m s t a n c e alone does not disqu alify the
psychologis t for rea so n s of bias, her repor t ,
testi m o ny and conclusio n s dese rv e the
applica tio n of a more rigid and strin g e n t set of
sta n d a r d s in the man n e r we discus s e d above.3 6
For, effectively, Dr. Tayag only diagn os e d the
respo n d e n t from the prism of a third par ty
accou n t ; she did not actu ally hea r, see and
evalu a t e the respo n d e n t and how he would have
reac t e d and respo n d e d to the doctor’s probe s.
Dr. Tayag, in her repo r t , mer ely sum m a r i z e d the
petition e r’s nar r a t i o n s, and on this basis
cha r a c t e r i z e d the respo n d e n t to be a self-
cent e r e d , egoc e n t r i c, and unre m o r s e f ul perso n
who "believes that the world revolves arou n d
him"; and who "used love as a…dec e p t ive tactic
for exploiting the confide n c e [petition e r ]
exte n d e d towa r d s him." Dr. Tayag the n
incor po r a t e d her own idea of "love"; mad e a
gen e r a liz a tio n that respo n d e n t was a perso n who
"lacke d com mi t m e n t , faithfuln e s s , and rem o r s e ,"
and who eng a g e d "in promisc u o u s acts that
made the petition e r look like a fool"; and finally
conclud e d that the respo n d e n t ’s char a c t e r trait s
reve al "him to suffer Narcissistic Perso n ali ty
Disor d e r with trac e s of Antisoci al Perso n ality
Disor d e r declar e d to be grave and incur a bl e."
We find thes e obse rv a t io n s and conclusio n s
insufficie ntly in- dept h and com p r e h e n s i v e to
warr a n t the conclusio n that a psychologic al
incap a ci ty exist e d that preve n t e d the respo n d e n t
from complying with the esse n t i al obligatio n s of
mar ri a g e . It failed to identify the root cause of
the respo n d e n t ' s narcissis tic per so n a lity disor d e r
and to prove that it existe d at the incep tio n of
the mar ri a g e . Neith e r did it explain the
incap a ci t a t i n g nat u r e of the alleg e d disor d e r , nor
show that the respo n d e n t was really incap a bl e of
fulfilling his dutie s due to som e inca p a ci t y of a
psychologic al, not physical, natu r e . Thus, we
cannot avoid but concl ud e that Dr. Tayag’s
conclusion in her Repor t – i.e., that the
respo n d e n t suffer e d "Nar cissis tic Person ality
Disor d e r with trac e s of Antisoci al Perso n ality
Disor d e r declar e d to be grave and incur a bl e" – is
an unfoun d e d stat e m e n t , not a nece s s a r y
infere n c e from her previou s cha r a c t e r i z a ti o n and
port r a y al of the respo n d e n t . While the various
test s administ e r e d on the petition e r could have
bee n used as a fair gaug e to asse s s her own
psychologic al condition, this sam e stat e m e n t
cannot be mad e with resp e c t to the respo n d e n t’ s
condition. To make conclusio n s and
gen e r a liz a tio n s on the respo n d e n t’s
psychologic al condition base d on the inform a t i o n
fed by only one side is, to our mind, not differ e n t
from admit ti n g hea r s a y evide n c e as proof of the
trut hf ul n e s s of the cont e n t of such evide n c e .
Petition e r none t h el e s s cont e n d s that Dr. Tayag’s
subs e q u e n t testi m o ny in court cure d what e v e r
deficien ci e s att e n d e d her psychologic al repo r t .
We do not shar e this view.
A caref ul rea di n g of Dr. Tayag’s testi m o ny
reve al s that she failed to est a blish the fact that
at the time the par ti e s were mar ri e d , respo n d e n t
was alrea d y sufferin g from a psychologic al
defect that deprive d him of the ability to assu m e
the esse n ti al duties and respo n si bilitie s of
mar ri a g e . Neith e r did she adeq u a t e l y explai n
how she cam e to the conclusio n that
respo n d e n t’s condition was grave and incur a bl e.
To direc tly quot e from the reco r d s:
ATTY. RICHARD TABAGO:
Q: I would like to call your att e n tio n to the
Repor t alre a dy mark e d as Exh. "E- 7", ther e is a
stat e m e n t to the effect that his char a c t e r trait s
begin to suffer narcissis ti c perso n a lity disor d e r
with trac e s of antisoci al perso n a lity disor d e r .
What do you mea n? Can you pleas e explain in
laym a n’s word, Mad a m Witness ?
DR. NEDY LORENZO TAYAG:
A: Actually, in a laym a n’s ter m, narcissi sti c
per so n ali ty disor d e r cannot acce p t that the r e is
som e t hi n g wrong with his own beh avior al
manifes t a t i o n. [sic] They feel that they can rule
the world; they are ecce n t ri c; they are
exem pl a r y, dem a n di n g financi al and emotion al
suppo r t , and this is clearly manifes t e d by the fact
that respo n d e n t abus e d and used petition e r’s
love. Along the line, a narcissis tic perso n cannot
give emp a t h y; cannot give love simply bec a u s e
they love the m s e lv e s more tha n anybo dy else;
and thirdly, narcissi sti c per so n canno t suppo r t
his own perso n al nee d and gratifica tion withou t
the help of other s and this is whe r e the
petition e r set in.
Q: Can you plea s e desc ri b e the perso n al [sic]
disor d e r ?
A: Clinically, conside ri n g that label, the
respo n d e n t beh avior al manifes t a t io n unde r
per so n ali ty disor d e r [sic] this is alre a dy
conside r e d grave, serious, and tre a t m e n t will be
impossi bl e [sic]. As I say this, a kind of
develop m e n t a l disor d e r whe r ei n it all star t e d
durin g the early form a tive years and brou g h t
about by one familiar relations hi p the way he
was rea r e d and care d by the family.
Environ m e n t a l exposu r e is also part and parc el
of the child disor d e r . [sic]
Q: You mea n to say, from the form a tive [year s]
up to the pres e n t ?
A: Actually, the respo n d e n t behavior al man n e r
was [pre se n t ] long befor e he ent e r e d marri a g e .
[Un]fort u n a t e l y, on the par t of the petition e r , she
neve r realize d that such behavior al
manifes t a t i o n of the respo n d e n t connot e s
pat hology. [sic]
xxxx
Q: So in the rep r e s e n t a t i o n of the petition e r that
the respo n d e n t is now lying [sic] with som e b o d y
else, how will you desc ri b e the char a c t e r of this
respo n d e n t who is living with som e bo dy else?
A: This is whe r e the antisoci al perso n ality trait of
the respo n d e n t [sic] beca u s e an antisoci al perso n
is one who indulg e in philan d e ri n g activities,
who do not have any feeling of guilt at the
expe n s e of anot h e r perso n, and this [is] again a
buy- prod u c t of deep seat e d psychologic al
incap a ci ty.
Q: And this psychologic al inca p a ci ty base d on
this par tic ul a r deep seat e d [sic], how would you
desc ri b e the psychologic al inca p a ci ty? [sic]
A: As I said ther e is a dee p seat e d psychologi c al
dilem m a , so I would say incur a bl e in nat u r e and
at this time and agai n [sic] the psychologic al
pat hology of the respo n d e n t . One plays a major
factor of not being able to give mea ni n g to a
relation s hi p in ter m s of since ri ty and endu r a n c e .
Q: And if this psychologic al disor d e r exists
befor e the mar ri a g e of the respo n d e n t and the
petition e r, Mada m Witne ss ?
A: Clinically, any disord e r are usually root e d
from the early form a tive years and so if it takes
enoug h that such psychologic al incap a ci ty of
respo n d e n t alre a dy exist e d long befor e he
ent e r e d mar ri a g e , beca u s e if you analyze how he
was rea r e d by her par e n t s par tic ul a rly by the
mot h e r , the r e is alre a dy an unh e al t hy symbiosis
develop e d betw e e n the two, and this crea t e s a
major emotion al havoc when he rea c h e d adult
age.
Q: How about the gravity?
A: This is alre a dy grave simply bec a u s e from the
very star t respo n d e n t neve r had an inkling that
his beh avior al manifest a t i o n conno t e s pathology
and secon d grou n d [sic], respo n d e n t will neve r
admi t again that such beh avior of his connot e s
again pathology simply bec a u s e the disor d e r of
the respo n d e n t is not det ri m e n t a l to hims elf but,
more often tha n not, it is det ri m e n t a l to othe r
par ty involved.
xxxx
PROSEC UTOR MELVIN TIONGSON:
Q: You wer e not able to perso n ally exa mi n e the
respo n d e n t her e?
DR. NEDY TAYAG:
A: Efforts wer e mad e by the psychologis t but
unfort u n a t e ly, the respo n d e n t neve r app e a r e d at
my clinic.
Q: On the basis of those exa mi n a ti o n s cond u c t e d
with the petitioni n g wife to ann ul their mar ri a g e
with her husb a n d in gene r a l, what can you say
about the respo n d e n t ?
A: That from the very sta r t respo n d e n t has no
emotion al inten t to give mea ni n g to their
relation s hi p. If you analyze their marit al
relation s hi p they never lived und e r one room.
From the very star t of the [mar ri a g e ], the
respo n d e n t to have petition e r to eng a g e in secr e t
mar ri a g e until that time thei r family knew of
their marri a g e [sic]. Respon d e n t compl e t ely
refuse d, com pl e t ely relinqui s h e d his mari t al
obliga tion to the petition e r.
xxxx
COURT:
Q: Beca u s e you have intervi e w e d or you have
ques tio n e d the petition e r, can you really
enu m e r a t e the specific traits of the respo n d e n t ?
DR. NEDY TAYAG:
A: One is the happy- go- lucky attitu d e of the
respo n d e n t and the depe n d e n t attit u d e of the
respo n d e n t .
Q: Even if he is alre a dy eligible for employm e n t ?
A: He rem ai n s to be at the mercy of his moth e r .
He is a happy- go- lucky simply bec a u s e he never
had a set of respo n si bility. I think that he
finishe d his educ a ti o n but he never had a stabl e
job beca u s e he compl e t ely relied on the suppo r t
of his moth e r.
Q: You give a more thoro u g h intervie w so I am
asking you some t hi n g specific?
A: The happy- go- lucky attitu d e ; the overly
dep e n d e n t attit u d e on the part of the moth e r
mer ely bec a u s e respo n d e n t happ e n e d to be the
only son. I said that the r e is a unhe al t hy
symbiosis relation s hi p [sic] develop e d betw e e n
the son and the moth e r simply beca u s e the
mot h e r always pam p e r e d comple t ely, pam p e r e d
to the point that respo n d e n t failed to develop his
own sens e of asse r tio n or respo n si bility
par tic ul a rly duri ng that sta g e and ther e is also
pre s e n c e of the simple lying act particul a rly his
respo n si bility in term s of handlin g emotion al
imbal a n c e and it is clearly manife st e d by the fact
that respo n d e n t refus e d to build a hom e toge t h e r
with the petition e r when in fact they are legally
mar ri e d. Thirdly, respo n d e n t neve r felt or
compl et ely ignor e d the feelings of the petition e r ;
he neve r felt guilty hur ti n g the petition e r
bec a u s e on the part of the petition e r , knowi ng
that respo n d e n t indulg e with anot h e r wom a n it is
very, very trau m a t i c on her part yet respo n d e n t
neve r had the gut s to feel guilty or to atone said
act he com mit t e d in their relations hi p, and
clinically this falls unde r antisoci al perso n ali ty.
37
In ter m s of incur a bility, Dr. Tayag’s answ e r was
very vagu e and inconclu sive, thus:
ATTY. RICHARD TABAGO
Q: Can this perso n ally be cure d, mad a m witne s s ?
DR. NEDY TAYAG
A: Clinically, if perso n s sufferin g from
per so n ali ty disor d e r cura bl e, up to this very
mom e n t , no scientific could be uphel d to
alleviat e their kind of perso n ality disor d e r;
Secon dly, again respo n d e n t or othe r perso n
sufferi ng from any kind of disord e r partic ul a rly
narcissi sti c perso n ali ty will never admi t that they
are sufferi n g from this kind of disor d e r , and then
again cura bility will always be a question. [sic]38
This testi m o ny shows that while Dr. Tayag
initially descri b e d the gene r a l char a c t e ri s ti c s of
a perso n sufferi ng from a narci ssis tic perso n a lity
disor d e r , she did not really show how and to
wha t exte n t the respo n d e n t exhibit e d thes e
traits. She mentio n e d the buzz words that
jurisp r u d e n c e requir e s for the nullity of a
mar ri a g e – nam ely, gravity, incur a bility,
exist e n c e at the time of the mar ri a g e ,
psychologic al incap a ci ty relati n g to mar ri a g e –
and in her own limite d way, relat e d thes e to the
medical condition she gene r ally desc ri b e d. The
testi m o ny, toget h e r with her repo r t , howeve r,
suffers from very basic flaws.
First, what she medic ally desc rib e d was not
relat e d or linked to the respo n d e n t’s exact
condition excep t in a very gene r a l way. In shor t,
her testi m o ny and repo r t were rich in
gen e r a li ti e s but disast r o u sly short on partic ul a r s ,
most nota bly on how the respo n d e n t can be said
to be sufferi ng from narci ssis tic perso n ali ty
disor d e r ; why and to what exten t the disor d e r is
grave and incur a bl e; how and why it was alre a dy
pre s e n t at the time of the mar ri a g e ; and the
effect s of the disor d e r on the respo n d e n t’s
awa r e n e s s of and his capa bility to unde r t a k e the
dutie s and respo n si bilities of mar ri a g e . All thes e
are critical to the succ e s s of the petition e r’s
case.
Secon d, her testim o ny was short on factu al basis
for her diagno si s beca u s e it was wholly base d on
wha t the petition e r relat e d to her. As the doctor
admi tt e d to the prose c u t o r , she did not at all
examin e the respo n d e n t , only the petition e r .
Neit h e r the law nor jurispr u d e n c e requi r e s , of
cours e , that the perso n soug h t to be decla r e d
psychologic ally incap a ci t a t e d shoul d be
per so n ally exami n e d by a physicia n or
psychologis t as a condition sine qua non to arrive
at such decla r a t io n. 3 9 If a psychologi c al disord e r
can be proven by inde p e n d e n t mea n s, no rea so n
exists why such indep e n d e n t proof canno t be
admi tt e d and given cre di t.4 0 No such
inde p e n d e n t evide n c e , howeve r, app e a r s on
reco r d to have bee n gat h e r e d in this case,
par tic ul a rly about the respo n d e n t’s early life and
associa tio n s, and about event s on or abou t the
time of the marri a g e and imm e di a t e ly the r e af t e r .
Thus, the testim o ny and repo r t appe a r to us to
be no more tha n a diagn osi s that revolves arou n d
the one- side d and mea g e r facts that the
petition e r relat e d , and wer e all slant e d to
suppo r t the conclusio n that a grou n d exists to
justify the nullification of the mar ri a g e . We say
this bec a u s e only the base r qualitie s of the
respo n d e n t’s life were exami n e d and given focus;
none of thes e qualities wer e weigh e d and
bala nc e d with the bet t e r qualitie s, such as his
focus on having a job, his det e r m i n a t i o n to
improve himself thro u g h studi e s, his care and
att e n t io n in the first six mont h s of the mar ri a g e ,
amon g other s. The evide nc e fails to mentio n also
wha t cha r a c t e r and qualities the petition e r
broug h t into her marri a g e , for exam pl e, why the
respo n d e n t’s family oppos e d the mar ri a g e and
wha t event s led the respo n d e n t to blam e the
petition e r for the deat h of his moth e r , if this
allega tion is at all corr e c t . To be sur e, thes e are
impor t a n t beca u s e not a few mar ri a g e s have
failed, not bec a u s e of psychologi c al incap a ci ty of
eithe r or both of the spous e s, but beca u s e of
basic incom p a t i bilities and mari t al develop m e n t s
that do not amou n t to psychologi c al incap a cit y.
The continu e d sepa r a t i o n of the spous e s likewise
neve r appe a r e d to have bee n factor e d in. Not a
few marri e d couple s have likewise per m a n e n t ly
sepa r a t e d simply beca u s e they have "fallen out
of love," or have outg r o w n the attr a c ti o n that
dre w the m toge t h e r in their young e r years.
Thus, on the whole, we do not blam e the
petition e r for the move to secu r e a rem a n d of
this case to the trial court s for the introd u c ti o n
of addition al evide n c e; the petition e r’s evide n c e
in its pre se n t stat e is woefully insufficien t to
suppo r t the conclusio n that the petition e r’s
mar ri a g e to the respo n d e n t should be nullified
on the groun d of the respo n d e n t’s psychologic al
incap a ci ty.
The Court com mis e r a t e s with the petition e r’s
marit al predic a m e n t . The respo n d e n t may inde e d
be unwilling to disch a r g e his marit al obligatio n s,
par tic ul a rly the obliga tion to live with one’s
spous e. None t h e l e s s , we cannot pres u m e
psychologic al defect from the mer e fact that
respo n d e n t refuse s to com ply with his mari t al
dutie s. As we ruled in Molina, it is not enoug h to
prove that a spous e failed to mee t his
respo n si bility and duty as a mar ri e d perso n; it is
esse n ti al that he must be shown to be inca p a bl e
of doing so due to som e psychologic al illness.
The psychologic al illness that must afflict a par ty
at the inception of the mar ri a g e shoul d be a
mala dy so grave and per m a n e n t as to deprive the
par ty of his or her awa r e n e s s of the duties and
respo n si bilitie s of the mat ri m o ni al bond he or
she was the n about to assu m e . 4 1
WHERE FOR E, in view of thes e consid e r a t i o n s,
we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the decision
and resolutio n of the Court of Appe als date d June
25, 2004 and Janua ry 18, 2005, resp e c t iv ely, in
CA-G.R. CV No. 75095.
G.R. No. 16 6 3 5 7 Janu ary 14, 20 1 5
VALERIO E. KALAW, Peti t i o n e r ,
vs.
MA. ELENA FERNA N D E Z, Res p o n d e n t .
R E S O LU TIO N
BERSAMIN, J.:
In our decision prom ul g a t e d on Sept e m b e r 19,
2011,1 the Court dismiss e d the compl ain t for
decla r a t i o n of nullity of the mar ri a g e of the
par ti e s upon the following ratioci n a ti o n, to wit:
The petition has no merit. The CA com mi t t e d no
reve r si bl e error in setti ng aside the trial court 's
Decision for lack of legal and factu al basis.
xxxx
In the case at bar, petition e r failed to prove that
his wife (respo n d e n t ) suffer s from psychologi c al
incap a ci ty. He pre s e n t e d the testi m o ni e s of two
suppos e d expe r t witne s s e s who concl ud e d that
respo n d e n t is psychologic ally incap a ci t a t e d , but
the conclusion s of thes e witne s s e s wer e
pre mi s e d on the allege d acts or behavior of
respo n d e n t which had not been sufficiently
prove n. Petition e r’s expe r t s heavily relied on
petition e r’s alleg a t ion s of respo n d e n t’s const a n t
mahjon g session s, visits to the bea u t y parlor,
going out with friend s, adult e ry, and negle c t of
their childr e n. Petition e r’s expe r t s opine d that
respo n d e n t’s alleg e d habit s, whe n perfor m e d
const a n t ly to the det ri m e n t of quality and
qua n ti ty of time devot e d to her dutie s as moth e r
and wife, constit u t e a psychologic al incap a ci ty in
the form of NPD.
But petition e r’s alleg a t ion s, which serve d as the
base s or unde rlyin g pre mi s e s of the conclusion s
of his expe r t s, wer e not actu ally prove n. In fact,
respo n d e n t pre se n t e d cont r a r y evide n c e refuti ng
thes e allega tion s of the petition e r .
For insta n c e , petition e r alleg e d that respo n d e n t
const a n t ly playe d mahjon g and neglec t e d their
childr e n as a result. Respon d e n t admit t e dly
played mahjon g, but it was not prove n that she
eng a g e d in mahjon g so frequ e n t ly that she
negle c t e d her duti es as a mot h e r and a wife.
Respon d e n t refut e d petition e r’s alleg a tio n s that
she played four to five time s a week. She
maint ai n e d it was only two to thr e e times a week
and always with the per m is sion of her husb a n d
and withou t aba n d o ni n g her childr e n at hom e.
The childr e n corrob o r a t e d this, saying that they
were with thei r moth e r whe n she played
mahjon g in their relative’s hom e. Petition e r did
not pre se n t any proof, othe r than his own
testi m o ny, that the mahjon g session s were so
frequ e n t that respo n d e n t negl ec t e d her family.
While he intim a t e d that two of his sons repe a t e d
the secon d gra d e , he was not able to link this
episod e to respo n d e n t’s mahjon g- playing. The
least that could have been done was to prove the
frequ e n c y of respo n d e n t’s mahjon g- playing
durin g the years when thes e two childr e n wer e
in secon d gra d e. This was not done. Thus, while
ther e is no disput e that respo n d e n t played
mahjon g, its allege d debilita tin g frequ e n c y and
adve r s e effect on the childr e n were not prove n.
Also unprove n was petition e r’s claim about
respo n d e n t’s alleg e d const a n t visits to the
bea u t y parlor, going out with friends, and
obses sive need for att e n tio n from othe r men. No
proof what so e v e r was pres e n t e d to prove her
visits to bea u t y salons orhe r frequ e n t par tyin g
with friends. Petition e r pres e n t e d Mario (an
allege d comp a ni o n of respo n d e n t durin g thes e
night s- out) in orde r to prove that respo n d e n t had
affairs with othe r men, but Mario only testified
that respo n d e n t app e a r e d to be dating othe r
men. Even assu m i n g argu e n d o t h a t petition e r
was able to prove that respo n d e n t had an
extr a m a r i t al affair with anot h e r man, that one
inst a n c e of sexual infidelity cannot, by itself, be
equ a t e d with obse ssive need for att e n ti o n from
othe r men. Sexu al infidelity per seis a groun d for
legal sepa r a t i o n, but it does not nec e s s a r ily
constit u t e psychologic al inca p a ci ty.
Given the insufficien cy of evide nc e that
respo n d e n t actu ally eng a g e d in the behavior s
desc ri b e d as constit u t ive of NPD, the r e is no
basis for concl udi n g that she was inde e d
psychologic ally incap a ci t a t e d . Inde e d, the
totality of the evide nc e points to the opposit e
conclusion. A fair asses s m e n t of the facts would
show that respo n d e n t was not totally remi ss and
incap a bl e of appr e ci a ti n g and perfor m i n g her
marit al and par e n t a l dutie s. Not once did the
childr e n stat e that they wer e negl ec t e d by their
mot h e r . On the cont r a r y, they narr a t e d that she
took care of the m , was arou n d when they wer e
sick, and cooke d the food they like. It app e a r s
that respo n d e n t made real effort s tose e and take
care of her childr e n despit e her estr a n g e m e n t
from their fathe r. Ther e was no testi m o ny
wha t so ev e r that shows aba n d o n m e n t and neglec t
of familial duties. While petition e r cites the fact
that his two sons, Rio and Miggy, both failed the
secon d elem e n t a r y level despi t e having tutors,
ther e is nothi ng to link their aca d e m i c shor t
coming s to Malyn’s actions.
After poring over the recor d s of the case, the
Court finds no factu al basis for the conclusion of
psychologic al incap a ci ty. There is no error in the
CA’s reve r s a l of the trial court’s ruling that ther e
was psychologic al incap a ci ty. The trial court’s
Decision mer ely sum m a r i z e d the alleg a tio n s,
testi m o ni e s, and evide n c e of the resp e c t ive
par ti e s, but it did not act u ally asse s s the veracity
of thes e allega ti on s, the credi bility of the
witne s s e s , and the weight of the evide n c e . The
trial court did not make factu al finding s which
can serve as base s for its legal conclusio nof
psychologic al incap a ci ty.
What tra ns pi r e d betw e e n the par ti e s is acri m o ny
and, per h a p s , infidelity, which may have
const r ai n e d the m from dedic a ti n g the best of
the m s elv e s to each othe r and to their childr e n .
Ther e may be grou n d s for legal sepa r a t i o n, but
cert ai nly not psychologi c al incap a cit y that voids
a marri a g e .
WHERE FOR E, pre m is e s consi de r e d , the petition
is DENIED. The Court of Appeals’ May 27, 2004
Decision and its Dece m b e r 15, 2004 Resolution
in CA-G.R. CV No. 64240 are AFFIRMED. 2
In his Motion for Reconsi d e r a t i o n, 3 the
petition e r implor e s the Cour t to take a thorou g h
secon d look into what constit u t e s psychologic al
incap a ci ty; to uphold the finding s of the trial
court as suppo r t e d by the testi mo ni e s of thre e
expe r t witne s s e s ; and cons e q u e n t ly to find that
the respo n d e n t , if not both parti es, wer e
psychologic ally incap a ci t a t e d to perfor m their
resp e c tiv e esse n ti al mari t al obligatio n.
Upon an assiduo u s review of the recor d s, we
resolve to gra n t the petition e r’s Motion for
Reconsi d e r a t i o n .
I
Psychologic al incap a ci ty as a groun d for the
nullity of mar ri a g e unde r Article 36 of the Family
Code refer s to a seriou s psychologi c al illness
afflicting a party even prior to the celebr a t i o n of
the mar ri a g e that is per m a n e n t as to deprive the
par ty of the awa r e n e s s of the duties and
respo n si bilitie s of the mat ri m o ni al bond he or
she was about to assu m e . Althou g h the Family
Code has not define d the term psychologi c al
incap a ci ty, the Cour t has usually looked up its
mea ni n g by reviewin g the delibe r a t i o n s of the
sessions of the Family Code Revision Commit t e e
that had draft e d the Family Code in orde r to gain
an insight on the provision. It appe a r e d that the
mem b e r s of the Family Code Revision Com mit t e e
were not una ni m o u s on the mea ni n g, and in the
end they decid e d to adopt the provision "with
less specificity tha n expec t e d" in orde r to have
the law "allow some resiliency in its
applica tio n." 4 Illust r a tiv e of the "less specificity
than expec t e d" has bee n the omission by the
Family Code Revision Com mi t t e e to give any
exam pl e s of psychologic al incap a ci ty that would
have limited the applica bility of the provision
confor m a b ly with the principl e of ejusd e m
gen e ri s, bec a u s e the Com mi t t e e desir e d that the
court s should inte r p r e t the provision on a case-
to- case basis, guide d by expe ri e n c e , the findings
of expe r t s and rese a r c h e r s in psychologic al
disciplin e s, and the decision s of churc h tribu n al s
that had pers u a sive effect by virtue of the
provision itself having bee n take n from the
Canon Law.5
On the othe r hand, as the Court has obse rv e d in
Sant os v. Court of Appeals,6 the delibe r a t io n s of
the Family Code Revision Commit t e e and the
releva n t mat e ri als on psychologic al incap a ci ty as
a grou n d for the nullity of mar ri a g e have
rend e r e d it obvious that the term psychologi c al
incap a ci ty as used in Article 36 of the Family
Code" h a s not bee n mea n t to comp r e h e n d all
such possible case s of psychos e s as, likewise
mention e d by some ecclesi a s ti c al aut ho ri ti e s,
extr e m e ly low intellige n c e , imm a t u ri ty, and like
circu m s t a n c e s ," and could not be take n and
const r u e d indep e n d e n t l y of "but must stan d in
conjun c tio n with, existin g prec e p t s in our law on
mar ri a g e ." Thus corr el a t e d :-
x x x "psychologic al incap a ci ty" should refer to
no less than a ment al (not physical) inca p a ci t y
that caus e s a party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marit al coven a n t s that conco mi t a n t ly must
be assu m e d and disch a r g e d by the parti e s to the
mar ri a g e which, as so expr e s s e d by Article 68 of
the Family Code, includ e thei r mut u al
obliga tion s to live toget h e r , obse rv e love, resp e c t
and fidelity and rend e r help and suppo r t . Ther e
is hardly any doubt that the inten d m e n t of the
law has bee n to confine the mea ni n g of
"psychologi c al incap a ci ty" to the most serious
case s of perso n ality disor d e r s clearly
demo n s t r a t i v e of an utte r insen sitivity or
inability to give mea ni n g and significa n c e to the
mar ri a g e . This psychologic condition must exist
at the time the marri a g e is celeb r a t e d . The law
does not evide n t ly envision, upon the othe r hand,
an inability of the spous e to have sexual relation s
with the othe r. This conclusio n is implicit unde r
Article 54 of the Family Code which consid e r s
childr e n conceive d prior to the judicial
decla r a t i o n of nullity of the void mar ri a g e to be
"legitim a t e ." 7
In time, in Republic v. Cour t of Appeals,8 the
Court set som e guideline s for the inter p r e t a t i o n
and applica tio n of Article 36 of the Family Code,
as follows:
(1) The burd e n of proof to show the nullity of the
mar ri a g e belong s to the plaintiff. Any doubt
shoul d be resolved in favor of the existe n c e and
continu a t i o n of the mar ri a g e and agains t its
dissolution and nullity. This is root e d in the fact
that both our Constit u tio n and our laws che ri sh
the validity of mar ri a g e and unity of the family.
Thus, our Constit u t io n devot e s an entir e Article
on the Family, recog nizin g it "as the found a t io n
of the nation." It decr e e s mar ri a g e as legally
"inviolable," the r e by prot e c ti n g it from
dissolution at the whim of the parti e s. Both the
family and mar ri a g e are to be "prot e c t e d " by the
stat e .
The Family Code echo e s this consti t u tio n a l edict
on mar ri a g e and the family and emp h a siz e s their
per m a n e n c e , inviolability and solidari ty.
(2) The root caus e of the psychologi c al
incap a ci ty must be (a) medic ally or clinically
identifie d, (b) allege d in the compl ai nt , (c)
sufficiently prove n by expe r t s and (d) clea rly
explain e d in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code req ui r e s that the incap a ci ty must be
psychologic al — not physical, altho u g hi t s
manifes t a t i o n s and/or sympto m s may be
physical. The evide nc e must convinc e the court
that the parti es, or one of the m, was men t ally or
psychic ally ill to such an exte n t that the perso n
could not have know n the obligatio n s he was
assu m i n g , or knowin g the m , could not have
given valid assu m p t io n ther e of. Althoug h no
exam pl e of such incap a ci ty need be given her e
so as not to limit the applica tio n of the provision
und e r the princi pl e of ejusd e m gen e ri s,
neve r t h e l e s s such root caus e must be identified
as a psychologi c al illness and its incap a cit a t i n g
nat u r e fully explain e d. Expe rt evide n c e may be
given by qualified psychia t ri s t s and clinical
psychologis t s.
(3) The inca p a ci ty must be prove n tobe existing
at "the time of the celeb r a t i o n" of the mar ri a g e .
The evide n c e must show that the illness was
existing whe n the par ti e s exch a n g e d their "I
do’s." The manifes t a t i o n of the illness nee d not
be perc eiva bl e at such time, but the illness itself
must have att a c h e d at such mom e n t , or prior
ther e t o.
(4) Such inca p a ci ty must also be shown to be
medically or clinically per m a n e n t or incur a bl e.
Such incur a bility may be absolut e or even
relative only in rega r d to the othe r spous e, not
nece s s a r ily absolut ely agai ns t everyon e of the
sam e sex. Furt h e r m o r e , such incap a ci ty must be
releva n t to the assu m p t i o n of mar ri a g e
obliga tion s, not nece s s a r ily to those not relat e d
to mar ri a g e , like the exer ci se of a profes sio n or
em ploy m e n t in a job. Henc e, a pedia t ri ci a n may
be effective in diagno si n g illness e s of childr e n
and presc ri bi n g medici n e to cure the m but may
not be psychologic ally capa cit a t e d to procr e a t e ,
bea r and raise his/he r own childr e n as an
esse n ti al obligation of mar ri a g e .
(5) Such illness must be grave enoug h to bring
about the disa bility of the party to assu m e the
esse n ti al obligation s of mar ri a g e . Thus, "mild
cha r a c t e r i ol ogic al peculia ri ti e s, mood chan g e s,
occasion al emotion al outbu r s t s " cannot be
acce p t e d as root caus e s. The illness must be
show n as down ri g h t inca p a ci t y or inability, not a
refusal, negle c t or difficulty, muc h less ill will. In
othe r words, the r e is a nat al or supe r v e ni n g
disa blin g factor in the perso n, an adve r s e
inte g r al elem e n t in the perso n ali ty stru ct u r e that
effectively inca p a ci t a t e s the per so n from really
acce p ti n g and ther e b y complying with the
obliga tion s esse n ti al to mar ri a g e .
(6) The esse n ti al marit al obliga tion s must be
thos e embr a c e d by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as rega r d s the husb a n d and wife as
well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the sam e
Code in reg a r d to pare n t s and their childr e n.
Such non- complie d marit al obligatio n(s) must
also be stat e d in the petition, prove n by evide nc e
and includ e d in the text of the decision.
(7) Inte r p r e t a t i o n s given by the Nation al
Appellat e Mat ri m o ni al Tribun al of the Catholic
Chur c h in the Philippin e s, while not cont rolling
or decisive, should be given gre a t resp e c t by our
court s. It is clear that Article 36 was take n by
the Family Code Revision Commit t e e from Canon
1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which
bec a m e effective in 1983 and which provide s:
"The following are incap a bl e of cont r a c ti n g
mar ri a g e : Those who are una bl e to assu m e the
esse n ti al obligation s of mar ri a g e due to caus e s
of psychologi c al nat u r e ."
Since the pur pos e of includi ng such p r ovi sion in
our Family Code is to har m o niz e our civil laws
with the religious faith of our peopl e, it sta n d s to
reaso n that to achieve such har m o niz a tio n, gre a t
per s u a sive weight shoul d be given to decision s of
such appell a t e tribun a l. Ideally — subjec t to our
law on evide n c e — whatis decr e e d as canonic ally
invalid should also be decr e e d civilly void.
This is one insta n c e wher e, inview of the evide n t
sourc e and pur pos e of the Family Code
provision, cont e m p o r a n e o u s religious
inte r p r e t a t i o n is to be given pers u a sive effect.
Her e, the Stat e and the Chur c h — while
rem ai ni n g inde p e n d e n t , sepa r a t e and apa r t from
each other — shall walk toge t h e r in synod al
cade n c e towar d s the sam e goal of prot e c ti n g and
che rishi n g mar ri a g e and the family as the
inviolabl e base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must orde r the pros e c u t i n g
attor n e y or fiscal and the Solicitor Gene r al to
app e a r as couns el for the stat e. No decision shall
be hand e d down unless the Solicitor Gene r a l
issue s a certification, which will be quot e d in the
decision, briefly statin g the r ei n his reaso n s for
his agr e e m e n t or opposition, as the case may be,
to the petition. The Solicitor Gene r al, along with
the prose c u t i n g attor n e y, shall submit to the
court such certificatio n within fiftee n (15) days
from the dat e the case is dee m e d submit t e d for
resolution of the court. The Solicitor Gene r a l
shall disch a r g e the equivale n t function of the
defe ns o r vinculi cont e m p l a t e d und e r Canon
1095.9
The foregoin g guideline s have turn e d out to be
rigid, such that their applica tio n to every
inst a n c e prac tic ally conde m n e d the petition s for
decla r a t i o n of nullity to the fate of cert ai n
rejec tion. But Article 36 of the Family Code must
not be so strictly and too liter ally rea d and
applied given the clea r inte n d m e n t of the
draft e r s to adopt its ena c t e d version of "less
specificity" obviously to ena ble "som e resilien cy
in its applica tion." Inst e a d, every cour t shoul d
app ro a c h the issue of nullity "not on the basis of
a priori assu m p ti o n s , pre dilec tio n s or
gen e r a liz a tio n s, but accor di n g to its own facts"
in recog ni tio n of the verity that no case would be
on "all fours" with the next one in the field of
psychologic al incap a ci ty as a groun d for the
nullity of mar ri a g e ; henc e, every "trial judge
must take pains in examini n g the factu al milieu
and the app ella t e court must, asm u c h as
possible, avoid substit u ti n g its own judg m e n t for
that of the trial court."10
In the task of asce r t a i ni n g the pres e n c e of
psychologic al incap a ci ty as a groun d for the
nullity of mar ri a g e , the court s, which are
conce d e dly not endo w e d with expe r ti s e in the
field of psychology, must of nece s sity rely on the
opinions of expe r t s in orde r to infor m the m s elv e s
on the mat t e r , and thus ena bl e the m s elv e s to
arrive at an intellige n t and judicious judg m e n t .
Inde e d, the conditions for the mala dy of being
grave, ante c e d e n t and incur a bl e dem a n d the in-
dept h diagno si s by expe r t s. 1 1
II
The findings of the Region al Trial Court (RTC) on
the exist e n c e or non- existe n c e of a party’s
psychologic al incap a ci ty shoul d be final and
bindi ng for as long as such findings and
evalu a tio n of the testi m o ni e s of witne s s e s and
othe r evide n c e are not shown to be clea rly and
manifes tly erron e o u s . 1 2 In every situa tio n wher e
the findings of the trial court are sufficien tly
suppo r t e d by the facts and eviden c e pres e n t e d
durin g trial, the appellat e cour t shoul d rest r a i n
itself from substit u ti n g its own judgm e n t . 1 3 It is
not enoug h reaso n to ignor e the finding s and
evalu a tio n by the trial court and substit u t e our
own as an appella t e tribu n al only beca u s e the
Consti t u ti on and the Family Code reg a r d
mar ri a g e as an inviolabl e social instit u tio n. We
have to str e ss that the fulfilme n t of the
constit u tio n al mand a t e for the Stat e to prot ec t
mar ri a g e as an inviolabl e social instit u tio n 1 4
only relat e s to a valid mar ri a g e . No prot e c ti on
can be accor d e d t o a mar ri a g e that is null and
void ab initio, beca u s e such a mar ri a g e has no
legal existe n c e . 1 5
In decla ri n g a mar ri a g e null and void ab initio,
ther efo r e , the Court s really assidu o u sly defe n d
and prom o t e the sancti ty of mar ri a g e as an
inviolabl e social institu tio n. The found a tio n of
our society is ther e by mad e all the mor e stron g
and solid.
Her e, the finding s and evalua tion by the RTC as
the trial court dese rv e d cred e n c e bec a u s e it was
in the bet t e r position to view and exami n e the
dem e a n o r of the witne s s e s while they wer e
testifying.1 6 The position and role of the trial
judge in the appr e ci a t io n of the evide nc e
showin g the psychologic al incap a ci ty wer e not to
be downpl ay e d but should be accor d e d due
impor t a n c e and resp e c t .
Yet, in the Sept e m b e r 19, 2011 decision, the
Court brus h e d aside the opinions tend e r e d by
Dr. Cristina Gates,a psychologis t, and Fr. Gera r d
Healy on the groun d that their concl usion s wer e
solely base d on the petition e r’s version of the
event s.
After a long and har d secon d look, we conside r it
improp e r and unw a r r a n t e d to give to such expe r t
opinions a mer ely gene r a lize d consid e r a t i o n and
tre a t m e n t , least of all to dismiss their value as
inade q u a t e basis for the decl a r a t io n of the nullity
of the mar ri a g e . Inste a d , we hold that said
expe r t s sufficien tly and comp e t e n t l y desc ri b e d
the psychologic al inca p a ci ty of the respo n d e n t
within the stan d a r d s of Article 36 of the Family
Code. We uphol d the conclusio n s rea c h e d by the
two expe r t witne s s e s bec a u s e they were largely
dra w n from the case recor d s and affidavits, and
shoul d not anymo r e be disput e d after the RTC
itself had acce p t e d the veracity of the
petition e r’s factu al pre m is e s . 1 7
Admitt e dly, Dr. Gates base d her finding s on the
tra n sc ri p t of the petition e r’s testi m o ny, as well
as on her inte rvi e w s of the petition e r , his siste r
Trinida d, and his son Miguel. Althou g h her
findings would see m to be unilat e r al unde r such
circu m s t a n c e s , it was not right to disre g a r d the
findings on that basis alone. After all, her expe r t
opinion took into conside r a t i o n othe r factor s
exta n t in the recor d s, includi n g the own opinions
of anot h e r expe r t who had analyze d the issue
from the side of the respo n d e n t hers elf.
Moreov e r, it is alre a dy settle d that the court s
must accor d weigh t to expe r t testi m o ny on the
psychologic al and men t al stat e of the parti e s in
case s for the decla r a ti o n of the nullityof
mar ri a g e s , for by the very nat u r e of Article 36 of
the Family Code the cour t s, "despit e having the
prim a ry task and burd e n of decision- makin g,
must not discou n t but, inst e a d , must conside r as
decisive evide n c e the expe r t opinion on the
psychologic al and men t al tem p e r a m e n t s of the
par ti e s."1 8
The expe r t opinion of Dr. Gate s was ultim a t e ly
nece s s a r y herei n to ena bl e the trial court to
prope r ly det e r m i n e the issue of psychologic al
incap a ci ty of the respo n d e n t (if not alsoof the
petition e r). Conse q u e n t ly, the lack of perso n a l
examin a t io n and intervie w of the perso n
diagno s e d with perso n ality disord e r , like the
respo n d e n t , did not per se invalida t e the findings
of the expe r t s. The Court has stre s s e d in Marcos
v. Marco s 1 9 that ther e is no req ui r e m e n t for one
to bede cl a r e d psychologic ally incap a ci t a t e d to be
per so n ally exami n e d by a physicia n, beca u s e
wha t is impor t a n t is the pres e n c e of evide n c e
that ade q u a t el y esta blis h e s the party’s
psychologic al incap a ci ty. Henc e, "if the totality
of eviden c e pres e n t e d is enou g h to sust ai n a
finding of psychologic al inca p a ci ty, then actu al
medical exami n a t i o n of the perso n conce r n e d
nee d not be reso r t e d to."20
Verily, the totality of the evide n c e must show a
link, medic al or the like, betw e e n the acts that
manifes t psychologic al incap a ci ty and the
psychologic al disor d e r itself. If othe r eviden c e
showin g that a cert ai n condition could possibly
result from an assu m e d stat e of facts existe d in
the recor d, the expe r t opinion shoul d be
admi ssi bl e and be weigh e d as an aid for the
court in inter p r e t i n g such othe r evide n c e on the
caus a ti o n.2 1 Inde e d, an expe r t opinion on
psychologic al incap a ci ty shoul d be consi de r e d as
conjec t u r a l or spec ul a tive and without any
proba tive value only in the abse n c e of othe r
evide n c e to esta blis h causa ti o n. The expe r t’s
findings unde r such circu m s t a n c e s would not
constit u t e hea r s a y that would justify their
exclusion as evide nc e . 2 2 This is so, consid e ri n g
that any ruling that bran d s the scientific and
techni c al proc e d u r e adopt e d by Dr. Gates as
weake n e d by bias should be esch e w e d if it was
clear that her psychi a t ri c evalu a tion had bee n
base d on the par ti e s’ upbri n gi n g and
psycho dy n a m i c s . 2 3 In that cont ext, Dr. Gates’
expe r t o pi ni on should be consid e r e d not in
isolation but along with the othe r evide n c e
pre s e n t e d here.
Moreov e r, in its det e r m i n a t i o n of the issue of
psychologic al incap a ci ty, the trial cour t was
expe c t e d t o comp a r e the expe r t findings and
opinion of Dr. Nativida d Dayan, the respo n d e n t’ s
own witnes s, and those of Dr. Gates.
In her Psychologic al Evalua tion Report ,2 4 Dr.
Daya n impr e s s e d that the respo n d e n t had
"com p ulsive and dep e n d e n t tend e n ci e s" to the
exte n t of being "relations hi p depe n d e n t ." Base d
from the respo n d e n t’s psychologic al data, Dr.
Daya n indicat e d that:
In her relation s hi p with peopl e, Malyne is likely
to be rese rv e d and see mi n gly det a c h e d in her
ways. Althou g h she likes to be arou n d people,
she may kee p her emotion al dist a n c e . She, too,
value s her relation s hi p but she may not be that
demo n s t r a t i v e of her affection s. Intim a cy may be
quite difficult for her since she tries to maint ai n
a cert ai n dist a n c e to minimize oppor t u ni ti e s for
rejec tion. To othe r s, Malyne may appe a r , critical
and dem a n di n g in her ways. She can be asse r tive
when opinions cont r a r y to those of her own are
expr e s s e d . And yet, she is apt to be a depe n d e n t
per so n. At a less consciou s level, Malyne fear s
that othe r s will aba n d o n her. Malyne, who
always felt a bit lonely, plac e d an enor m o u s
value on having significa n t othe r s would depe n d
on most time s.
xxxx
But the minut e she star t e d to care, she bec a m e a
differe n t per so n— clingy and imm a t u r e , doubti n g
his love, const a n t ly dem a n d i n g reass u r a n c e that
she was the most import a n t perso n in his life.
She bec a m e relations hi p- depe n d e n t . 2 5
Dr. Dayan was able to clearly inter p r e t the
result s of the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Invent o r y
test 2 6 cond u c t e d on the respo n d e n t , obse rvi n g
that the respo n d e n t obtai n e d high scor e s on
dep e n d e n c y, narcissi s m and comp ul sive n e s s, to
wit:
Atty. Bret a ni a
Q : How about this Millon Clinical Multiaxial
Invent o ry?
A : Sir, the cut of the score which is suppo s e d to
be nor m al is 73 perc e n t a l roun d and ther e are
sever al score s wher ei n Mrs. Kalaw obt ain e d very
high score and thes e are on the scor e of
dep e n d e n c y, narcissi s m and comp ul sion.
Q : Would you pleas e tell us again, Mad a m
Witness, what is the acce p t a bl e scor e?
A : When your score is 73 and above, that mea n s
that it is very significan t . So, if 72 and below, it
will be conside r e d as acce p t a bl e .
Q : In what are a did Mrs. Kalaw obtain high
scor e?
A : Unde r depe n d e n c y, her score is 78; und e r
narcissi s m , is 79; unde r com p ul sive n e s s , it is
84.27
It is not a bl e that Dr. Dayan’s finding s did not
cont r a di c t but corro bo r a t e d the findings of Dr.
Gate s to the effect that the respo n d e n t had bee n
afflicte d with Narci ssis tic Perso n ality Disord e r as
well as with AntiSocial Disord e r . Dr. Gates
releva n tly testified:
ATTY. GONONG
Q : Could you pleas e repe a t for clarity. I myself
is [sic] not quite familiar with psychology ter m s.
So, more or less, could you pleas e tell me in
more laym a n’s ter m s how you arrive d at your
findings that the respo n d e n t is self- cent e r e d or
narcissi sti c?
A : I move d into this partic ul a r conclusion.
Basically, if you ask about her childhoo d
backg r o u n d , her fathe r di e d in a vehicul a r
accid e n t whe n she was in her teen s and
ther e af t e r she was prom p t e d to look for a job to
par tly assu m e the bre a d wi n n e r’s role in her
family. I gat h e r e d that pat e r n a l gra n d m o t h e r
par tly took car e of her and her siblings agai nst
the fact that her own mot h e r was una bl e to carry
out her resp e c t ive duties and respo n si bilities
towar d s Elena Fern a n d e z and her siblings
conside ri n g that the husb a n d died pre m a t u r e l y.
And ther e was an indicatio n that Elena
Fer n a n d e z on sever al occasions ever told
petition e r that he cannot blam e her for being
neglig e n t as a moth e r bec a u s e she hers elf never
expe ri e n c e d the care and affection of her own
mot h e r her self. So, ther e is a prec e d e n t in her
backg r o u n d , in her childhood, and indee d this
see m s to indica t e a partic ul a r script, we call it in
psychology a script, the tend e n cy to repe a t
som ekin d of expe ri e n c e or the lack of care, let’s
say som e kind of depriva tio n, the r e is a tend e n c y
to sust ai n it even on to your own life when you
have your own family. I did intervi e w the son
bec a u s e I was not satisfied with what I gat h e r e d
from both Trinida d and Valerio and even thoug h
as a young son at the age of fourt e e n alre a dy
expr e s s e d the he could not see, accor di n g to the
child, the since ri ty of mat e r n a l care on the par t
of Elena and that he prefe r r e d to live with the
fathe r actu ally.
Q : Taking thes e all out, you cam e to the
conclusion that respo n d e n t is self- cent e r e d and
narcissi sti c?
A : Actually respo n d e n t has som e need s which
tem p t s [sic] from a deprive d childhood and she is
still insea r c h of this. In her sever al boyfrien d s, it
see m s that she would jump from one boyfrien d to
anot h e r . Ther e is this nee d for att e n ti o n, this
nee d for love on othe r people.
Q : And that led you to conclu d e ?
A : And ther efo r e I conclud e d that she is self-
cent e r e d to the point of negle c ti n g her duty as a
wife and as a moth e r . 2 8
The proba tive force of the testi m o ny of an expe r t
does not lie in a mer e stat e m e n t of her theo ry or
opinion, but rath e r in the assist a n c e that she can
rend e r to the cour t s in showi ng the facts that
serve as a basis for her crite rion and the reaso n s
upon which the logic of her conclusio n is
found e d . 2 9 Henc e , we should weigh and
conside r the prob a t ive value of the finding s of
the expe r t witne s s e s vis- à- vis the othe r evide n c e
availabl e.
The othe r expe r t of the petition e r was Fr. Healy,
a canon law expe r t , an advoc a t e before the
Manila Archdioc e s e and Mat ri m o ni al Tribun al,
and a consult a n t of the Family Code Revision
Com mit t e e . Rega r di n g Fat h e r Healy’s exper t
testi m o ny, we have once decla r e d that judicial
und e r s t a n d i n g of psychologic al inca p a ci ty could
be inform e d by evolving sta n d a r d s , taking into
accou n t the partic ul a r s of eac h case, by curr e n t
tre n d s in psychologi c al and even by canonic al
thoug h t , and by expe ri e n c e . 3 0 It is prud e n t for
us to do so beca u s e the conce p t of psychologic al
incap a ci ty adopt e d unde r Article 36 of the
Family Code was derive d from Canon Law.
Fath e r Healy tend e r e d his opinion onwhe t h e r or
not the respo n d e n t’s level of imm a t u r i t y and
irres p o n si bility with rega r d to her own childre n
and to her husb a n d constit u t e d psychologi c al
incap a ci ty, testifying thusly:
ATTY. MADRID
Q : Now, respo n d e n t Ma. Elena Fer n a n d e z
claims that she is not psychologic ally
incap a ci t a t e d . On the facts as you rea d it base d
on the recor d s of this case before this Hono r a bl e
Court, what can you say to that claim of
respo n d e n t ?
A : I would say it is a clear case of psychologic al
incap a ci ty bec a u s e of her imm a t u ri ty and
tra u m a t i c irres po n si bility with rega r d s to her
own childr e n .
Q : So what you are saying is that, the claim of
respo n d e n t that she is not psychologi c ally
incap a ci t a t e d is not true ?
A : Yes. It should be reject e d .
Q : Why do you say so?
A : Beca u s e of what she has manife st e d in her
whole lifestyle, inconsist e n t patt e r n has bee n
manifes t e d runni n g throu g h their life made a
doubt that this is imm a t u ri t y and irre s po n si bility
bec a u s e her family was dysfunc tio n al and then
her being a model in her early life and being the
bre a d winne r of the family put her in an unus u al
position of promi n e n c e and the n begu n to inflat e
her own ego and she begu n to conc e n t r a t e her
own bea u ty and that bec a m e an obse ssio n and
that led to her few respo n si bility of
subor di n a t i n g to her childr e n to this lifestyle that
she had emb r a c e d .
Q : You only mentio n e d her relation s hi p with the
childr e n, the impac t. How about the impac t on
the relations hi p of the respo n d e n t with her
husb a n d ?
A : Also the sam e thing. It just did notfit in to her
lifestyle to fulfill her obligatio n to her husb a n d
and tohe r childr e n. She had her own prioritie s,
her bea u ty and her going out and her mahjon g
and associa ti n g with friends. They wer e the
priorities of her life.
Q : And what you are saying is that, her family
was mer ely secon d a r y?
A : Secon d a r y.
Q : And how does that relat e to psychologi c al
incap a ci ty?
A : That she could not app r e ci a t e or absor b or
fulfill the obligatio n s of mar ri a g e which
everybo dy takes for gran t e d . The conce n t r a t i o n
on the husb a n d and the childr e n before
everyt hi n g else would be subo r di n a t e d to the
mar ri a g e withh e r. It’s the othe r way arou n d.
Her bea u ty, her going out, her bea u t y parlor and
her mahjon g, they were their priorities in her
life.
Q : And in medical or clinical parla n c e , what
specifically do you call this?
A : That is narcissi s m whe r e the perso n falls in
love with hims elf is from a myt[h]ical case in
Roma n history.
Q : Could you pleas e define tous wha t narcissis m
is?
A : It’s a self- love, falling in love with ones elf to
make up for the loss of a dea r friend as in the
case of Narci ss u s , the myth, and then that
bec a m e know n in clinical ter mi nolo gy as
narcissi s m . When a perso n is so conce r n [ e d ] with
her own bea u ty and prolongi n g and prot e c ti n g it,
then it beco m e s the top priority in her life.
xxxx
Q : And you stat e d that circu m s t a n c e s that prove
this narcissis m . How do you consid e r this
narcissi s m afflicting respo n d e n t , it is grave,
slight or ….?
A : I would say it’s grave from the actu al case s of
negle c t of her family and that caus e s seriou s
obliga tion s which she has ignor e d and not
prope r ly este e m e d beca u s e she is so conc e r n[ e d]
with hers elf in her own lifestyle. Very seriou s.
Q : And do you have an opinion whe t h e r or not
this narcissis m afflicting respo n d e n t was alre a dy
existing at the time or mar ri a g e or even
ther e af t e r ?
xxxx
A : When you get mar ri e d you don’t develop
narcissi s m or psychologic al incap a ci ty. You bring
with you into the mar ri a g e and the n it beco m e s
manifes t e d bec a u s e in mar ri a g e you acce p t thes e
respo n si bilitie s. And now you show that you
don’t acce p t the m and you are not capa bl e of
fulfilling the m and you don’t care abou t the m.
Q : Is this narcissi s m , Fr. Healy, acqui r e d by
accid e n t or cong e ni t al or what?
A : No. The lifestyle gene r a t e s it. Once you
becom e a model and still the family was
dep e n d e d [sic] upon her and she was a model at
Hyatt and then Rust a n’s, it beg a n to inflat e her
ego so much that this beca m e the top priority in
her life. It’s her lifestyle.
Q : What you are saying is that, the narcissis m of
respo n d e n t even expa n d e d afte r the mar ri a g e ?
A : That could have expa n d e d beca u s e it beca m e
very obvious afte r the mar ri a g e bec a u s e she was
negle c ti n g such funda m e n t a l obliga tion s.
Q : And how about the matt e r of cura bility, is
this medic ally or clinically cur a bl e, this
narcissi s m that you mention e d ?
A : Let’s say, it was manife st e d for so many years
in her life. It was found in her family backg r o u n d
situati on. Say, almost for sure would be
incur a bl e now.
Q : What specific backg r o u n d are you refe r ri n g
to?
A : Well, the fact when the fathe r died and she
was the brea d wi n n e r and her bea u t y was so
impor t a n t to give in her job and money and
influen c e and so on. But this is a very unus u a l
situati on for a young girl and her position in the
family was exalt e d in a very very unus u al man n e r
and the r efo r e she had that pre ss u r e on her and
in her acce p ti n g the press u r e , in going along
with it and puttin g it in top priority.31
Given his cre d e n t i al s and conc e d e d expe r t i s e in
Canon Law, Fat h e r Healy’s opinions and findings
com m a n d e d resp e c t . The cont ri b u t io n that his
opinions and findings could add to the judicial
det e r m i n a t i o n of the par ti e s’ psychologic al
incap a ci ty was subst a n ti ve and instr u c tive. He
could ther e by infor m the trial court on the
degr e e s of the mala dy that would warr a n t the
nullity of mar ri a g e , and he could as well the r e by
provide t o the trial court an analytic al insight
upon a subjec t as esot e ri c to the cour t s as
psychologic al incap a ci ty has bee n. We could not
justly disre g a r d his opinions and findings.
Appre ci a ti n g the m toget h e r with those of Dr.
Gate s and Dr. Dayan would advan c e more the
caus e of justice. The Court obse rv e d in Ngo Te v.
Yu-Te:32
By the very nat u r e of Article 36, court s, despit e
having the prim a r y task and burd e n of decision-
makin g, must not discou n t but, inst e a d , must
conside r as decisive evide nc e the expe r t opinion
on the psychologi c al and ment al tem p e r a m e n t s
of the partie s.
Justice Rome ro explain e d this in Molina, as
follows:
Furt h e r m o r e , and equ ally significa n t, the
professio n a l opinion of a psychologi c al expe r t
bec a m e incre a si n gly impor t a n t in such case s.
Data about the perso n ' s entir e life, both befor e
and afte r the cere m o ny, wer e pres e n t e d to thes e
expe r t s and they wer e aske d togive profes sio n al
opinions about a party's ment al capacity at the
time of the weddi n g. These opinions were rarely
challen g e d and tend e d to be acce p t e d as decisive
evide n c e of lack of valid conse n t .
The Chur c h took pains to point out that its new
open n e s s in this are a did not amou n t to the
addition of new groun d s for ann ul m e n t , but
rat h e r was an acco m m o d a t i o n by the Chur c h to
the adva n c e s made in psychology durin g the past
dec a d e s. There was now the expe r t is e to provide
the all- import a n t conne c ti n g link bet w e e n a
mar ri a g e bre a k d o w n and pre m a r i t a l caus e s.
During the 1970s, the Chur c h broa d e n e d its
whole idea of marri a g e from that of a legal
cont r a c t to that of a coven a n t . The resul t of this
was that it could no longe r be assu m e d in
annul m e n t case s that a perso n who could
intellect u a lly und e r s t a n d the conce p t of
mar ri a g e could nece s s a r ily give valid conse n t to
mar ry. The ability to both gra s p and assu m e the
real obligatio n s of a mat u r e , lifelong
com mit m e n t a r e now conside r e d a nece s s a r y
pre r e q ui sit e to valid mat ri m o ni al conse n t .
Rotal decision s continu e d applying the conc e p t
of incipie n t psychologi c al incap a ci ty, "not only to
sexual anom ali e s but to all kinds ofpe rs o n a li ty
disor d e r s that inca p a ci t a t e a spouse or both
spous e s from assu mi n g or car ryin g out the
esse n ti al obligation s of mar ri a g e . For
mar ri a g e . . . is not mer ely coha bi t a t i o n or the
right of the spous e s to eac h othe r ' s body for
het e r o sexual acts, but is, in its totality the right
to the com m u n i ty of the whole of life; i.e., the
right to a developi n g lifelong relation s hi p. Rotal
decision s since 1973 have refine d the mea ni n g of
psychologic al or psychic capa city for mar ri a g e as
pre s u p p o si n g the develop m e n t of an adult
per so n ali ty; as mea ni n g the capa ci ty of the
spous e s to give the m s elv e s to each othe r and to
acce p t the othe r as a distinc t per so n; that the
spous e s must be `oth e r orient e d ' since the
obliga tion s of marri a g e are roote d in a self-
giving love; and that the spous e s must have the
capa ci ty for inter p e r s o n a l relation s hi p beca u s e
mar ri a g e is mor e tha n just a physic al reality but
involves a true inter t wi ni n g of perso n ali ti e s. The
fulfillme n t of the obliga tion s ofma r ri a g e
dep e n d s, accor di n g to Churc h decision s, on the
stre n g t h of this inte r p e r s o n a l relation s hi p. A
seriou s incap a ci ty for inter p e r s o n a l sharin g and
suppo r t is held to impai r the relation s hi p and
conse q u e n t l y, the ability to fulfill the esse n ti al
marit al obligatio n s. The mari t al capa ci ty of one
spous e is not consid e r e d in isolation but in
refer e n c e to the funda m e n t a l relations hi p to the
othe r spous e .
Fr. Gree n, in an article in Cat holic Mind, lists six
elem e n t s nece s s a r y to the mat u r e marit al
relation s hi p:
"The court s consid e r the following elem e n t s
cruci al to the marit al com mit m e n t : (1) a
per m a n e n t and faithful com mi t m e n t to the
mar ri a g e par t n e r ; (2) open n e s s to childr e n and
par t n e r ; (3) stability; (4) emotion al mat u rit y; (5)
financi al respo n si bility; (6) an ability to cope
with the ordina r y stre s s e s and str ain s of
mar ri a g e , etc."
Fr. Gree n goes on to spe ak about some of the
psychologic al condition s that might lead to the
failure of a mar ri a g e :
"At stake is a type of constit u ti on a l impair m e n t
precl u di n g conjug al com m u ni o n even with the
best inten ti on s of the parti e s. Among the psychic
factor s possibly giving rise to his orhe r inability
to fulfill marit al obligation s are the following: (1)
antisoci al perso n ality with its fund a m e n t a l lack
of loyalty to perso n s or sense of mor al values; (2)
hyper e s t h e s i a , wher e the individu al has no real
freedo m of sexual choice; (3) the inad e q u a t e
per so n ali ty whe r e perso n a l respo n s e s
consist e n t ly fall short of reaso n a bl e expe c t a t i o n s.
xxxx
The psychologic al groun d s are the best appro a c h
for anyon e who doub t s whet h e r he or she has a
case for an ann ul m e n t on any othe r ter m s. A
situati on that does not fit into any of the more
tra dition al cate go ri e s often fits very easily into
the psychologic al cate go r y.
As new as the psychologic al grou n d s are, expe r t s
are alre a d y det e c ti n g a shift in their use.
Wher e a s originally the em ph a si s was on the
par ti e s' inability to exerci se prop e r judgm e n t at
the time of the mar ri a g e (lack of due discr e t io n),
rec e n t cases see m to be conce n t r a t i n g on the
par ti e s' inca p a ci ty to assu m e or car ry out their
respo n si bilitie s and obliga tion s as promis e d (l a ck
of due comp e t e n c e ). An adva n t a g e to using the
groun d of lack of due comp e t e n c e is that at the
time the mar ri a g e was ent e r e d into civil divorc e
and bre a k u p of the family almost always is proof
of som eo n e ' s failure to car ry out marit al
respo n si bilitie s as promis e d a t the time the
mar ri a g e was ent e r e d into."
Her n a n d e z v. Cour t of Appeal s em ph a siz e s the
impor t a n c e of pres e n t i n g expe r t testi m o ny to
est a blis h the precis e caus e of a party's
psychologic al incap a ci ty, and to show that it
exist e d at the inception of the marri a g e . And as
Marco s v. Marco s a s s e r t s , the r e is no
requi r e m e n t that the perso n to be decla r e d
psychologic ally incap a ci t a t e d be perso n a lly
examin e d by a physicia n, if the totalityof
evide n c e pres e n t e d is enoug h to sust ai n a
finding of psychologic al inca p a ci ty. Verily, the
evide n c e must show a link, medical or the like,
betw e e n the acts that manifes t psychologi c al
incap a ci ty and the psychologic al disor d e r itself.
This is not to mention, but we mentio n
neve r t h e l e s s for em ph a si s, that the pres e n t a t i o n
of expe r t proof pres u p p o s e s a thoro u g h and in-
dept h asse s s m e n t of the partie s by the
psychologis t or expe r t , for a conclusive diagn osi s
of a grave, seve r e and incur a bl e pres e n c e of
psychologic al incap a ci ty.3 3
Ngo Tealso em ph a si z e d that in light of the
unint e n d e d conse q u e n c e s of strictly applying the
sta n d a r d s set in Molina,3 4 the court s should
conside r the tot ality of evide n c e in adjudic a ti n g
petition s for decla r a t i o n of nullity of mar ri a g e
und e r Article 36 of the Family Code, viz:
The resiliency with which the conce p t should be
applied and the case- to- case basis by which the
provision shoul d be inter p r e t e d , as so inten d e d
by its fram e r s, had, som e h o w, bee n rend e r e d
ineffec t u a l by the imposition of a set of strict
sta n d a r d s in Molina, thus:
xxxx
Not ew o r t h y is that in Molina, while the majority
of the Cour t’s me m b e r s h i p concu r r e d in the
pone n ci a of then Associat e Justice (late r Chief
Justice) Arte mio V. Pang a ni b a n , thr e e justice s
concu r r e d "in the resul t" and anot h e r thr e e- -
includi n g, as afore s ai d, Justice Rome r o- -took
pains to com pos e their individu al sepa r a t e
opinions. Then Justice Teodoro R. Padilla even
em ph a siz e d that "each case must be judge d, not
on the basis of a priori assu m p ti o n s ,
pre dilec tio n s or gene r aliza tion s, but accor di n g to
its own facts. In the field of psychologi c al
incap a ci ty as a groun d for ann ul m e n t of
mar ri a g e , it is trite to say that no case is on ‘all
fours’ with anot h e r case. The trial judge must
take pains in exa mi ni n g the factu al milieu and
the app ell at e court must, as muc h as possible,
avoid substit u ti n g its own judgm e n t for that of
the trial court."
Predict a bly, howeve r, in resolving subs e q u e n t
case s, the Cour t has applied the afore s a i d
sta n d a r d s , withou t too much reg a r d for the law's
clear inten tion that eac h case is to be tre a t e d
differe n tly, as "court s should inte r p r e t the
provision on a case- to- case basis; guide d by
expe ri e n c e , the finding s of expe r t s and
rese a r c h e r s in psychologic al discipline s, and by
decision s of chur c h tribu n al s."
In hindsig h t , it may have been inapp r o p r i a t e for
the Cour t to impose a rigid set of rules, as the
one in Molina, in resolving all case s of
psychologic al incap a ci ty. Unde r s t a n d a b l y, the
Court was the n alar m e d by the delug e of
petition s for the dissolution of marit al bonds, and
was sensi tive to the OSG's exagg e r a t i o n of
Article 36 as the "most liber al divorc e proc e d u r e
in the world." The unint e n d e d conse q u e n c e s of
Molina, howev e r , has take n its toll on people
who have to live with devian t behavior, mor al
insa nity and sociop a t hi c perso n a lity anom aly,
which, like ter mi t e s , consu m e little by little the
very found a ti o n of their families, our basic social
instit ution s. Far fromw h a t was inten d e d by the
Court, Molina has becom e a strait- jacke t, forcing
all sizes to fit into and be bound by it. Wittingly
or unwitti n gly, the Cour t, in conve ni e n tly
applying Molina, has allowe d diagno s e d
sociop a t h s, schizop h r e n i c s, nymp h o m a n i a c s ,
narcissi st s and the like, toconti n u o u sly deb a s e
and perve r t the sancti ty of mar ri a g e . Ironically,
the Rom a n Rota has ann ulle d mar ri a g e s on
accou n t of the per so n ali ty disor d e r s of the said
individu al s.
The Court need not worry about the possible
abus e of the rem e dy provide d by Article 36, for
ther e are am pl e safeg u a r d s agai ns t this
conting e n c y, amon g which is the interve n ti o n by
the Stat e, throu g h the public prose c u t o r , to
gua r d agains t collusion betw e e n the partie s
and/or fabric a tio n of evide n c e . The Court should
rat h e r be alar m e d by the rising num b e r of case s
involving marit al abus e, child abus e , dom e s t ic
violenc e and incest u o u s rap e.
In dissolving marit al bonds on accou n t of eithe r
par ty's psychologic al inca p a ci ty, the Court isnot
demolishi n g the found a ti o n of families, but it is
act u ally prot e c ti n g the sanc ti ty of mar ri a g e ,
bec a u s e it refus e s to allow a perso n afflicte d
with a psychologic al disor d e r , who cannot
comply with or assu m e the esse n t i al marit al
obliga tion s, from rem ai ni n g in that sacr e d bond.
It may be stre s s e d that the infliction of physic al
violenc e, constit u ti o n al indole nc e or lazines s,
drug dep e n d e n c e or addiction, and psycho sexual
anom aly are manifes t a t io n s of a sociopa t hi c
per so n ali ty anom aly. Let itbe note d that in
Article 36, ther e is no mar ri a g e to spe a k of in the
first place, as the sam e is void from the very
begin ni n g. To indulg e in image r y, the decla r a ti o n
of nullity und e r Article 36 will simply provide a
dec e n t buri al to a stillbor n marri a g e .
xxxx
Lest it be misun d e r s t o o d , we are not sugg e s t i n g
the aba n d o n m e n t of Molina in this case. We
simply decla r e that, as aptly stat e d by Justice
Dant e O. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes, the r e is nee d
to em ph a si z e othe r pers p e c t ive s as well which
shoul d gove r n the disposi tion of petition s for
decla r a t i o n of nullity unde r Article 36. At the risk
of being redu n d a n t , we reite r a t e once more the
principle that eac h case must be judge d, not on
the basis of a priori assu m p t i o n s, predile c tion s
or gene r a liza tion s but accor di n g to its own facts.
And, to rep e a t for emp h a si s, court s should
inte r p r e t the provision on a case- to- case basis;
guide d by expe ri e n c e , the findings of expe r t s and
rese a r c h e r s in psychologic al discipline s, and by
decision s of chur c h tribu n al s. 3 5
III
In the decision of Sept e m b e r 19, 2011,t h e Court
decla r e d as follows:
Respon d e n t admit t e dly played mahjon g, but it
was not prove n that she eng a g e d in mahjon g so
frequ e n t ly that she negl ec t e d her duties as a
mot h e r and a wife. Respon d e n t refut e d
petition e r’s alleg a t ion s that she played four to
five time s a week. She maint ai n e d it was only
two to thre e time s a week and always witht h e
per mi ssio n of her husb a n d and withou t
aba n d o ni n g her childr e n at hom e. The childr e n
corro bo r a t e d this, saying that theyw e r e with
their moth e r when she playe d mahjon g in their
relative s hom e.P e ti tion e r did not pres e n t any
proof, othe r tha n his own testim o ny, that the
mahjon g session s wer e so frequ e n t that
respo n d e n t neglec t e d her family. While he
intim a t e d that two of his sons rep e a t e d the
secon d grad e, he was not able to link this
episod e to respo n d e n t’s mahjon g- playing. The
least that could have been done was to prove the
frequ e n c y of respo n d e n t’s mahjon g- playing
durin g the years when thes e two childr e n wer e
in secon d gra d e. This was not done. Thus, while
ther e is no disput e that respo n d e n t played
mahjon g, its allege d debilita tin g frequ e n c y and
adve r s e effect on the childr e n were not
prove n. 3 6 (Emph a si s supplie d)
The frequ e n c y of the respo n d e n t’s mahjon g
playing shoul d not have delimit e d our
det e r m i n a t i o n of the pre s e n c e or abse n c e of
psychologic al incap a ci ty. Inst e a d, the
det e r m i n a n t should be her obvious failure to
fully appr e ci a t e the duties and respo n si bilitie s of
par e n t h o o d at the time she mad e her marit al
vows. Had she fully appr e ci a t e d such duties and
respo n si bilitie s, she would have known that
bringi n g along her childr e n of very tend e r age s
to her mahjon g session s would expos e the m to a
cultu r e of gam blin g and othe r vices that would
erod e their mor al fiber.
None t h e l e s s, the long- ter m effect s of the
respo n d e n t’s obse ssive mahjon g playing surely
impac t e d on her family life, particul a rly on her
very young childr e n . We do find to be reve alin g
the disclosu r e s made by Valerio Teodoro
Kalaw3 7 – the parti es’ eldes t son – in his
deposition, wher e by the son confirm e d the claim
of his fathe r that his moth e r had been hooke d on
playing mahjon g, viz:
ATTY. PISON: From the time befor e your
par e n t’s sepa r a ti o n, do you rem e m b e r any habit
or activity or prac tic e which your moth e r
eng a g e d in, befor e the sepa r a t i o n?
WITNES S: Yeah, habit? She was a heavy smoke r
and she likes to play mahjon g a lot, and I can’t
rem e m b e r .
xxxx
ATTY. PISON: You said that your moth e r playe d
mahjon g frequ e n t l y. How frequ e n t , do you
rem e m b e r ?
WITNES S : Not really, but it was a lot. Not
act u ally, I can’t, I can’t…
ATTY. PISON: How long would she stay playing
mahjon g say one session?
WITNES S : Really long cuz’we would go to my
aunt’s house in White Plains and I think we
would get ther e by lunch the n leave, we fall
asle e p. I think it was like one in the morni n g.
ATTY. PISON: You, you went ther e ? She brou g h t
you?
WITNES S : Yeah, to play with my cousins, yeah
and my brot h e r s & siste r s.
ATTY. PISON: Were you broug h t all the time?
WITNES S: Yeah, almost all the time but
som e ti m e s , I guess she’d go out by hers elf.3 8
The fact that the respo n d e n t brou g h t her
childr e n with her to her mahjon g sessions did
not only point to her negle c t of par e n t a l duties,
but also manife st e d her tend e n c y to expose the m
to a cultur e of gam blin g. Her willfully exposin g
her childr e n to the cultu r e of gam bli ng on every
occasion of her mahjon g sessions was a very
grave and serious act of subo r di n a t i n g their
nee d s for par e n t i n g to the gratifica tio n of her
own perso n al and esca pi st desire s. This was the
obse rv a tio n of Fat h e r Healy hims elf. In that
rega r d , Dr. Gates and Dr. Dayan both explai ne d
that the curr e n t psychologic al stat e of the
respo n d e n t had bee n root e d on her own
childhood expe ri e n c e .
The respo n d e n t reveal e d her want o n disr e g a r d
for her childr e n’s moral and ment al
develop m e n t . This disre g a r d violat e d her duty as
a par e n t to safeg u a r d and prot e c t her childr e n,
as expr e s sly define d unde r Article 209 and
Article 220 of the Family Code, to wit:
Article 209. Purs u a n t to the natu r a l right and
duty of pare n t s over the perso n and prop e r t y of
their une m a n c i p a t e d childr e n , par e n t a l aut ho rit y
and respo n si bility shall include t h e caring for and
rea ri n g of such childr e n for civic consciou s n e s s
and efficiency and the develop m e n t of their
mor al, ment al and physic al char a c t e r and well-
being.
Article 220. The par e n t s and those exer cisin g
par e n t a l autho ri t y shall have with resp e c t to
their une m a n c i p a t e d childr e n or ward s the
following right s and duties:
(1) To keep the m in their comp a n y, to suppo r t ,
educ a t e and instr u c t the m by right prec e p t and
good exa m pl e, and to provide for their
upbri n gi n g in keepin g with their mea n s;
(2) x x x x
(3) To provide them with mor al and spiritu al
guida n c e , inculca t e in the m hone s t y, integ ri ty,
self- discipline, self- relian c e , indus t ry and thrift,
stimul a t e their inte r e s t in civic affairs, and
inspire in the m complia n c e with the duties of
citize ns hi p;
(4) To enha n c e , prot e c t , pres e rv e and maint ai n
their physical and ment al healt h at all times;
(5) To furnish the m with good and wholeso m e
educ a t io n al mat e ri al s, supe rvis e their activities,
rec r e a t i o n and associ a tio n with othe r s, prot e c t
the m from bad com p a ny, and preve n t the m from
acqui ri n g habit s detri m e n t a l to their healt h,
studi es and mor als;
(6) x x x x
(7) x x x x
(8) x x x x
(9) x x x x (emp h a si s supplie d)
The Sept e m b e r 19, 2011 decision did not
prope r ly take into conside r a t i o n the finding s of
the RTC to the effect that both the petition e r and
the respo n d e n t had bee n psychologic ally
incap a ci t a t e d , and thus could not assu m e the
esse n ti al obligation s of mar ri a g e . The RTC would
not have found so withou t the allega ti on to that
effect by the respo n d e n t in her answ e r , 3 9
whe r e by she aver r e d that it was not she but the
petition e r who had suffer e d from psychologic al
incap a ci ty.
The allega tion of the petition e r’sp syc h olo gic al
incap a ci ty was subst a n ti a t e d by Dr. Daya n, as
follows:
ATTY. BRETAÑA:
Q : You stat e d earlie r that both parti es were
beh avior ally imma t u r e ?
A : Yes, sir.
Q : And that the mar ri a g e was a mist a k e ?
A : Yes, sir.
Q : What is your basis for your stat e m e n t that
respo n d e n t was beh avior ally imm a t u r e ?
A : Sir, for the rea so n that even befor e the
mar ri a g e Malyn had notice d alre a dy som e of
thos e short tem p e r of the petition e r but she was
very much in love and so she lived- in with him
and even the time that they were toget h e r , that
they wer e living in, she also had notic e d som e of
his psychologic al deficits if we may say so. But as
I said, bec a u s e she is also depe n d e n t and she
was one who dete r m i n e d to make the
relation s hi p work, she was denyin g even those
kinds of proble m s that she had see n.
Q : To make it clea r, Mada m witne s s, I’m talking
her e of the petition e r, Mr. Kalaw. What led you
to conclud e that Mr. Kalaw was behavior ally
imma t u r e ?
A : I think he also mentio n e d that his conce p t of
mar ri a g e was not duly stable the n. He was not
really thinki ng of marri a g e excep t that his wife
got preg n a n t and so he thou g h t that he had to
mar ry her. And even that time he was not also a
monog a m o u s perso n.
Q : Are you saying, Mada m Witnes s, that
ultim a t e ly the decision to mar ry lied on the
petition e r ? A : I think so, Sir.
Q : Now, in your repor t, Mada m Witne ss, you
mention e d here that the petition e r admit t e d to
you that in his young e r years he was often out
seeki ng othe r wom e n. I’m refer ri n g specifically
to page 18. He also admit t e d to you that the
thoug h t of com mi t m e n t scar e d him, the
petition e r. Now, given thes e admissio n s by
petition e r to you, my question s is, is it possible
for such a perso n to ent e r into mar ri a g e despit e
this fear of com mi t m e n t and given his admission
that he was a woma niz e r ? Is it possible for this
per so n to stop his wom a nizin g ways during the
mar ri a g e ?
A : Sir, it’s difficult.
Q : It would be difficult for that per so n ?
A : Yes, Sir.
Q : What is the prob a bility of this perso n giving
up his wom a nizin g afte r marri a g e ?
A : Sir, I would say the proba bility of his giving
up is almost only 20%.
Q : So, it is entir ely possible that the respo n d e n t
wom a niz e d durin g his mar ri a g e with the
respo n d e n t ?
A : Yes, Sir.
Q : What is the bea ri n g of this fearof
com mit m e n t on the part of the petition e r insofar
as his psychologic al capa ci ty to perfor m his
dutie s as a husb a n d is conce r n e d ?
A : Sir, it would impai r his ability to have sexual
inte g ri ty and also to be fully com mit t e d to the
role of husb a n d to Malyn.
Q : Mad a m Witnes s, you neve r direc tly answ e r e d
my ques tio n on whet h e r the petition e r was
psychologic ally incap a ci t a t e d to perfor m his duty
as a husb a n d . You only said that the petition e r
was behavior ally imm a t u r e and that the
mar ri a g e was a mist a k e. Now, may I aske d [sic]
you that ques tio n again and requ e s t you to
answ e r that directly?
A : Sir, he is psychologi c ally incap a ci t a t e d . 4 0
Althoug h the petition e r, as the plaintiff, car ri e d
the burd e n to prove the nullity of the mar ri a g e ,
the respo n d e n t , as the defe n d a n t spous e, could
est a blis h the psychologic al incap a ci ty of her
husb a n d beca u s e she raise d the mat t e r in her
answ e r . The court s are justified in decla ri n g a
mar ri a g e null and void und e r Article 36 of the
Family Code reg a r dl e s s of whet h e r it is the
petition e r or the respo n d e n t who imput e s the
psychologic al incap a ci ty to the othe r as long as
the imput a ti o n is fully subst a n t i a t e d with proof.
Inde e d, psychologi c al inca p a cit y may exist in one
par ty alone or in both of the m, and if
psychologic al incap a ci ty of eithe r or both is
est a blis h e d , the mar ri a g e has to be dee m e d null
and void.
More tha n twen ty (20) year s had passe d since
the parti es par t e d ways. By now, they must have
alre a dy accep t e d and com e to term s with the
awful trut h that their marri a g e , assu m i n g it
exist e d in the eyes of the law, was alre a dy
beyond rep ai r. Both parti e s had inflicte d so
muc h dam a g e not only to the m s elv e s, but also to
the lives and psyche of their own childr e n. It
would be a gre a t e r injustice shoul d we insist on
still recog nizi ng thei r void marri a g e , and the n
force the m and their childr e n to endu r e som e
more dam a g e . This was the very sam e injustic e
that Justice Rome ro decri e d in her eru di t e
disse n ti n g opinion in Sant os v. Court of
Appeals: 41
It would be gre a t injustice, I believe, to
petition e r for this Court to give a much too
rest ri ctive inter p r e t a t i o n of the law and comp el
the petition e r to continu e to be mar ri e d to a wife
who for purpo s e s of fulfilling her marit al dutie s
has, for all prac tic al purpo s e s , ceas e d to exist.
Beside s, ther e are public policy consid e r a t i o n s
involved in the ruling the Court make s today. It
is not, in effect, direc tly or indir e c tly, facilitatin g
the tran sfor m a t i o n of petition e r into a "habit u al
tryst e r " or one forced to maint ai n illicit relation s
with anot h e r wom a n or wom e n with eme r gi n g
proble m s of illegiti m a t e childre n , simply beca u s e
he is denie d by privat e respo n d e n t , his wife, the
comp a nio n s hi p and conjug al love which he has
sough t from her and towhich he is legally
entitle d?
I do not go as far as to sugg e s t that Art. 36 of the
Family Code is a sanc tion for absol ut e divorc e
but I submi t that we should not const ri c t it to
non- recog ni tion of its evide n t purpo s e and thus
deny to one like petition e r, an oppor t u ni ty to
turn a new leaf in his life by decla ri n g his
mar ri a g e a nullity by rea so n of his wife’s
psychologic al incap a ci ty to perfor m an esse n ti al
marit al obligatio n. In this case, the mar ri a g e
neve r exist e d from the begin ni n g beca u s e the
respo n d e n t was afflict e d with psychologic al
incap a ci ty at and prior to the time of the
mar ri a g e . Henc e , the Cour t shoul d not hesit a t e
to decla r e the nullity of the mar ri a g e bet w e e n
the parti es.
To str e ss, our man d a t e to prot e c t the
inviolability of mar ri a g e as the basic found a t i o n
of our society does not precl u d e strikin g down a
marit al union that is "ill-equip p e d to promo t e
family life," thus:
Now is also the oppor t u n e time to com m e n t on
anot h e r com m o n legal guide utilized in the
adjudica tio n of petition s for decla r a t i o n of nullity
in the adjudic a tio n of petition s for decla r a t i o n of
nullity und e r Article 36. All too frequ e n t ly, this
Court and lowe r court s, in denying petition s of
the kind, have favora bly cited Sections 1 and 2,
Article XV of the Constit u tio n, which resp e c tiv ely
stat e that "[t]he Stat e recog niz e s the Filipino
family as the found a t io n of the nation.
Accordi n gly, it shall stre n g t h e n its solidari ty and
actively prom ot e its total develop m e n t [ t]," and
that [m]ar ri a g e , as an inviolable social
instit ution, is the found a ti o n of the family and
shall be prot e c t e d by the Stat e." These
provision s highligh t the impor t a n c e of the family
and the consti t u tio n al prot e c ti on accor d e d to the
instit ution of mar ri a g e .
But the Constit u t io n itself does not est a blish the
par a m e t e r s of stat e prot e c t io n to mar ri a g e as a
social instit ution and the found a t io n of the
family. It rem ai n s the provinc e of the legisla t u r e
to define all legal aspe c t s of mar ri a g e and
pre sc ri b e the str a t e g y and the modalities to
prot e c t it, base d on wha t e v e r socio- political
influen c e s it dee m s prope r , and subjec t of cours e
to the qualificatio n that such legislative
ena c t m e n t itself adh e r e s to the Consti t u ti on and
the Bill of Right s. This being the case, it also falls
on the legislat u r e to put into oper a ti o n the
constit u tio n al provisions that prot e c t marri a g e
and the family. This has bee n accom plis h e d at
pre s e n t thro u g h the enac t m e n t of the Family
Code, which defines marri a g e and the family,
spells out the corr e s p o n d i n g legal effect s,
impos e s the limitation s that affect mar ri e d and
family life, as well as presc ri b e s the groun d s for
decla r a t i o n of nullity and those for legal
sepa r a t i o n. While it may app e a r that the judicial
denial of a petition for decla r a t i o n of nullity is
reflective of the consti t u tio n al mand a t e to
prot e c t mar ri a g e , such action in fact mer ely
enforc e s a stat u t o r y definition of mar ri a g e , not a
constit u tio n ally ordain e d decr e e of wha t
mar ri a g e is. Inde e d, if circu m s t a n c e s warr a n t ,
Section s 1 and 2 of Article XV nee d not be the
only constit u ti o n al consid e r a t i o n s to be take n
into accou n t in resolving a petition for
decla r a t i o n of nullity. Inde e d, Article 36 of the
Family Code, in classifying mar ri a g e s cont r a c t e d
by a psychologic ally incap a ci t a t e d per so n as a
nullity, should be dee m e d as an imple m e n t of
this constit u t ion a l prot e c t io n of mar ri a g e . Given
the avowe d Stat e inter e s t in prom o ti n g mar ri a g e
as the found a t io n of the family, which in tur n
serve s as the found a tio n of the nation, ther e is a
corr e s p o n d i n g inte r e s t for the Stat e to defe n d
again s t mar ri a g e s ill-equipp e d to prom o t e family
life. Void ab initio mar ri a g e s unde r Article 36 do
not furt h e r the initiative s of the Stat e conce r ni n g
mar ri a g e and family, as they prom ot e wedlock
amon g perso n s who, for rea so n s inde p e n d e n t of
their will, are not capa cit a t e d to und e r s t a n d or
comply with the esse n ti al obligation s of
mar ri a g e . 4 2 (Emph a si s supplie d)
WHERE FOR E, the Court GRANTS the Motion for
Reconsi d e r a t i o n; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE
the decision prom ul g a t e d on Sept e m b e r 19,
2011; and REINSTATES the decision ren d e r e d
by the Regional Trial Court decla ri n g the
mar ri a g e betw e e n the petition e r and the
respo n d e n t on Nove m b e r 4, 1976 as NULL AND
VOID AB INITIO due to the psychologic al
incap a ci ty of the partie s purs u a n t to Article 36 of
the Family Code.
No prono u n c e m e n t on costs of suit.
G.R. No. 19 2 7 1 8 Febr u a r y 18, 20 1 5
ROBERT F. MALLILIN, Peti t i o n e r ,
vs.
LUZ G. JAMESOLAMI N and th e REPU BLIC
OF THE PHILIPPI N E S , Res p o n d e n t s .
DE C IS IO N
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certior a ri unde r
Rule 45 of the Revise d Rules of Cour t assailing
the Nove m b e r 20, 2009 Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) and its June 1, 2010 Resolutio n, 2 in
CA-G.R. CV No. 78303- MIN, which rever s e d and
set aside the Sept e m b e r 20, 2002 Decision of the
Region al Trial Cour t, Branc h 37, Cagaya n de Oro
City(RTC- Br.37), decla ri n g the mar ri a g e bet w e e n
petition e r Rober t F. Mallilin (Robe r t) and privat e
respo n d e n t Luz G. Jame sol a mi n (Luz) null and
void.
The Fact s:
Robe r t and Luz wer e mar ri e d on Sept e m b e r 6,
1972. They begot thre e (3) childr e n.
On Marc h 16, 1994, Rober t filed a compl ai nt for
decla r a t i o n of nullity of mar ri a g e befor e the RTC,
Branc h 23, Cagaya n de Oro City (RTC- Br. 23).
On Marc h 7, 1996, RTC- Br. 23 deni e d the
petition. Rober t appe al e d this judg m e n t befor e
the CA wher e it was docke t e d as CA-G.R. CV No.
54261. On Janu a ry 29, 1999, the CA rever s e d the
RTC- Br. 23 decision "due to lack of particip a t io n
of the Stat e as requir e d unde r Article 48 of the
Family Code."3 The case was rem a n d e d to the
RTC for furt h e r proce e di n g s and its recor d s wer e
ther e af t e r tran sfe r r e d from RTC- Br. 23 to RTC-
Br. 37, as the latt e r was design a t e d as Family
Court purs u a n t to the Family Code Act of 1997.
In the compl ai n t, Robe r t allege d that at the time
of the celeb r a t i o n of thei r mar ri a g e , Luz was
sufferi ng from psychologic al and ment al
incap a ci ty and unpr e p a r e d n e s s to ente r into
such mari t al life and to comply with its esse n ti al
obliga tion s and respo n si bilities. Such incap a ci ty
bec a m e even more app a r e n t durin g their
mar ri a g e when Luz exhibit e d clea r manife st a t io n
of imm a t u ri t y, irres p o n si bility, deficien cy of
inde p e n d e n t ration al judg m e n t , and inability to
cope with the heavy and often ti m e s dem a n di n g
obliga tion of a par e n t .
Luz filed her Answe r with Count e r cl ai m
cont e s ti n g the com pl ai nt. She aver r e d that it was
Robe r t who manifest e d psychologi c al inca p a cit y
in their mar ri a g e . Despit e due notice, howev e r,
she did not appe a r durin g the trial. Assista n t City
Prose c u t o r Isab elo Sab a n al appe a r e d for the
Stat e . When Rober t testified, he disclose d that
Luz was alrea d y living in Californi a, USA, and
had mar ri e d an America n. He also reve al e d that
when they were still enga g e d , Luz continu e d
seei ng and dating anot h e r boyfrie n d, a cert ai n
Lt. Liwag. He also claim e d that from the outs et ,
Luz had bee n remi ss in her dutie s both as a wife
and as a mot h e r as shown by the following
circu m s t a n c e s : (1) it was he who did the
cleanin g of the room bec a u s e Luz did not know
how to keep orde r; (2) it was her mot h e r who
pre p a r e d their meal while her siste r was the one
who wash e d their cloth e s beca u s e she did not
want her polishe d nails dest roy e d; (3) it was also
her sist e r who took care of their childr e n while
she spen t her tim e sleepi n g and looking at the
mirror; (4) whe n she resu m e d her schooling, she
dat e d differ e n t men; (5) he receive d anony m o u s
lette r s repor t i n g her loiteri n g with male
stud e n t s ; (6) when he was not hom e, she would
rec eive male visitor s; (7) a cert ai n Romy Padu a
slept in their house whe n he was away; and (6)
she would cont r a c t loans without his knowle d g e .
In addition, Rober t pres e n t e d the testi m o ny of
Myrna Delos Reyes Villanu ev a (Villanu ev a ),
Guidan c e Psychologi st II of Nort h e r n Minda n a o
Medic al Cent e r.
On May 8, 2000, while the case was pendi n g
befor e the trial court, Robe r t filed a petition for
mar ri a g e ann ul m e n t with the Met ro p olit a n
Tribun al of First Inst a n c e for the Archdioc e s e of
Manila (Met ro p olit a n Tribun al).
On Octob e r 10, 2002, the Met ro polit a n Tribun al
hand e d down a decision decla ri n g their mar ri a g e
invalid ab initio on the groun d of grave lack of
due discre tio n on the par t of both parti e s as
cont e m pl a t e d by the secon d para g r a p h of
Canon 1 0 9 5 . This decision was affirm e d by the
Nation al Appellat e Matri m o ni al Tribun al
(NAMT).
Prior to that, on Sept e m b e r 20, 2002,t h e RTC
had rend e r e d a decision declari n g the mar ri a g e
null and void on the grou n d of psychologi c al
incap a ci ty on the part of Luz as she failed to
comply with the esse n ti al marit al obliga tion s.
The Stat e , repr e s e n t e d by the Office of the
Solicitor Gene r a l (OSG), inter p o s e d an appe al
with the CA. The OSG arg u e d that Robe r t failed
to make a case for decla r a t i o n of nullity of his
mar ri a g e with Luz. It point e d out that the real
caus e of the marit al discor d was the sexual
infidelity of Luz. Such groun d, the OSG
cont e n d e d , shoul d not result in the nullification
of the mar ri a g e unde r the law, but mer ely
constit u t e d a groun d for legal sepa r a ti o n.
The CA, in its Nove m b e r 20, 2009 Decision,4
gra n t e d the petition and reve r s e d the RTC
decision. The decision, includi n g the decr e t al
portion, par ti ally rea d s:
[W]e find that the trial cour t com mi t t e d a
reve r si bl e error. Closer scruti ny of the reco r d s
reve al s, as corr e c tly note d by the Solicitor
Gene r al, sexu al infidelity are not root e d on some
debilita ti n g psychologic al condition but a mer e
refusal or unwilling n e s s to assu m e the esse n ti al
obliga tion s of marri a g e . x x x.
xxxx
In the case at bar, apa r t from his self- servin g
decla r a t i o n s , the evide n c e addu c e d by Robe r t
fell shor t of est a blishi n g the fact that at the time
of their mar ri a g e , Luz was sufferi n g from a
psychologic al defect which in fact deprive d [her]
of the ability to assu m e the esse n ti al duties of
mar ri a g e and its conco mi t a n t respo n si biliti es.
xxxx
We com mis e r a t e with the plaintiff- appell e e’s
und e s e r v e d marit al plight. Yet, Our par a m o u n t
duty as a court comp el s Us to apply the law at all
cost s, howeve r hars h it may be on whom so ev e r is
called upon to bea r its unbias e d brun t .
FOR THESE REASONS, the app e al e d Decision
dat e d Sept e m b e r 20, 2002 in Civil Case No. 94-
178 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.
5
Robe r t filed a motion for recon si d e r a t i o n, but it
was deni e d by the CA in its June 1, 2010
Resolution, 6 stati ng that the argu m e n t s of
Robe r t were mer e reha s h of the sam e grou n d ,
arg u m e n t s and discussio n previously point e d out
by him, and that no new subst a n c e was brou g h t
out to war r a n t the recon si d e r a t i o n or reve r s a l of
its decision.
Henc e, this petition.
ASSIGNME NT OF ERROR:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS’
HOLDING THAT THE ABSENCE OF THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL EXAMINATION OF THE WIFE
UNDERS COR E S THE EVIDENTIAL GAP TO
SUSTAIN THE DECISION OFTHE RTC
DECLARING THE MARRIAGE OF PETITIONER
TO RESPO NDE NT NULL AND VOID ON THE
GROUND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY IS
CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDE N C E.
II
THE RESPO ND E NT WIFE WAS ALSO
DECLARED BY THE NATIONAL APPELLATE
MATRIMONIAL TRIBUNAL OF THE CATHOLIC
BISHOP’S CONFER E N C E OF THE PHILIPPIN E S
AS GUILTY OF GRAVE LACKOF DUE
DISCRETION.
III
THE RESPO ND E NT WIFE WAS ALSO FOUND
BY THE LOWER COURT AS PSYCHOLOGICALLY
INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH THE
ESSE NTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS.
Robe r t now argu e s that he has sufficie ntly
prove n the nullity of his mar ri a g e even in the
abse n c e of any medic al, psychi a t ri c or
psychologic al examin a t io n of the wife by a
comp e t e n t and qualified profe ssion al. To bolste r
his claim, he avers that the Met ro p olit a n
Tribun al alre a dy decla r e d that Luz exhibit e d
grave lack of discr e t io n in judg m e n t conc e r ni n g
the esse n ti al right s and obligatio n s mut u ally
given and acce p t e d in mar ri a g e . The said
decision was affirm e d by the NAMT.
Robe r t furt h e r arg u e s that the sexu al
indiscr e ti o n of Luz with differe n t men coupl e d
with the fact that she failed to function as a
hom e make r to her family and as a hous e wife to
him incap a ci t a t e d her from accep t i n g and
complying with her esse n t i al marit al obliga tion s.
For said reaso n, he asse r t s that the case of Luz
was not a mer e case of sexu al infidelity, but
clearly an illness that was root e d on some
debilita ti n g psychologic al condition which
incap a ci t a t e d her to car ry out the respo n si bilitie s
of a mar ri e d wom a n. Rober t avers that a sex
mani ac is not just a mer e sexu al infidel but one
who is suffering from a deep psychologic al
proble m .
Position of the Stat e
The OSG arg u e s that the CA corr e c t ly ruled that
the totality of evide nc e pres e n t e d by Robe rt was
not sufficien t to suppo r t a finding that Luz was
psychologic ally incap a ci t a t e d . His eviden c e fell
shor t of esta blis hi n g his asse r t io n that at the
time of their mar ri a g e , Luz was suffering from a
psychologic al defect which deprive d her of the
ability to assu m e the esse n ti al duties of mar ri a g e
and its conco m it a n t respo n si bilities.
With rega r d to the findings of the Met ro p olit a n
Tribun al and the NAMT, the OSG claims that the
sam e wer e only given persu a sive value and were
not cont rolling or decisive in case s of nullity of
mar ri a g e . Furt h e r , the decision was base d on
grave lack of discr e t io n of judgm e n t conce r ni n g
mat ri m o ni al right s and obliga tion s due to outsid e
factor s othe r tha n psychologi c al incap a ci ty as
cont e m pl a t e d in Article 36 of the Family Code.
The OSG also raise s the stron g possibility of
collusion betw e e n the parti e s as show n by the
event s that took place afte r the issua n c e of the
Marc h 7, 1996 RTC Decision. The OSG wrot e:
Significa n tly, the chronologi c al event s after the
trial court issue d its Marc h 7, 1996 Decision
unmi st a k a b ly show the collusion bet w e e n the
par ti e s to obtain the reliefs plead e d . Among
othe r s, respo n d e n t’ s Retr a c t io n of Testim o ny
was exec ut e d withou t the pres e n c e of couns el
som e ti m e in 1998, a few mont h s befor e she
mar ri e d an Americ a n. This irre g ul a ri ty was even
notice d by the Cour t of Appeal s in CA-G.R. CV
No. 5426 1:
xxxx
The involve m e n t and active partici p a tio n of the
Solicitor Gene r a l beca m e indisp e n s a b l e , in the
pre s e n t recou r s e , whe n, in a whirlwin d turn of
event s, the Appellee mad e a VOLTE FACE
execu t e d a "Retr a c tio n of Testi m o ny" and a
"Waiver of Custo dy" waiving custo dy of Fran co
Mark J Mallillin, still a minor, her son by the
Appella nt . It bea r s str es si n g that the Appellee, in
the Cour t a quo, obdur a t e l y denie d the mat e ri al
allega tion s of the Appellant’s complai n t and
decla r e d that it was the Appella n t who was
psychologic ally incap a ci t a t e d . The sudd e n turn-
about of the app ell e e, in the pres e n t recou r s e , to
the exte nt of disowni n g her testi m o ny in the
Court a quo and even praying for the reve r s al of
the Decision of the Trial Court is stron gly
sugg e s t ive, if not constit u t ive, of collusion or a
modus vivendi betw e e n the parti e s, outla w e d by
the Family Code of the Philippin e s and the
Consti t u ti on. x x x
The Court’s Ruling
The main issue is whet h e r the totality of the
evide n c e adduc e d prove s that Luz was
psychologic ally incap a ci t a t e d to comply with the
esse n ti al obligation s of mar ri a g e war r a n t i n g the
annul m e n t of their marri a g e unde r Article 36 of
the Family Code.
The petition is ber eft of merit.
A petition for decla r a t i o n of nullity of mar ri a g e is
anc ho r e d on Article 36 of the Family Code which
provide s:
Art. 36. A mar ri a g e cont r a c t e d by any party who,
at the time of the celebr a t i o n, was
psychologic ally incap a ci t a t e d to comply with the
esse n ti al marit al obligatio n of mar ri a g e , shall
likewise be void even if such inca p a ci t y beco m e s
manifes t only afte r its sole m niz a tio n.
"Psychologic al incap a ci ty," as a groun d to nullify
a marri a g e unde r Article 36 of the Family Code,
shoul d refe r to no less than a ment al – not
mer ely physical – inca p a ci t y that caus e s a par ty
to be truly incogni tive of the basic marit al
coven a n t s that conco mi t a n tl y must be assu m e d
and disch a r g e d by the par ti e s to the mar ri a g e
which, as so expr e s s e d in Article 68 of the
Family Code, amon g othe r s, includ e thei r mutu al
obliga tion s to live toget h e r ; obse rv e love, resp e c t
and fidelity; and rend e r help and suppo r t . There
is hardly a doub t that the inten d m e n t of the law
has bee n to confine the mea ni n g of
"psychologi c al incap a ci ty" to the most serious
case s of perso n ality disor d e r s clearly
demo n s t r a t i v e of an utte r insen sitivity or
inability to give mea ni n g and significa n c e to the
mar ri a g e . 7
Psychologic al incap a ci ty as requi r e d by Article
36 must be cha r a c t e ri z e d by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical ant ec e d e n c e and (c) incur a bility. The
incap a ci ty must be grave or seriou s such that the
par ty would be inca p a bl e of car ryin g out the
ordin a ry dutie s requi r e d in mar ri a g e . It must be
root e d in the history of the par ty ant e d a t i n g the
mar ri a g e , altho u g h the overt manife st a t i o n s may
only em e r g e afte r the mar ri a g e . It must be
incur a bl e or, even if it were other wi s e, the cure
would be beyond the mea n s of the par ty
involved.8
In Republic v. Court of Appeals and Edua r d o C.
De Quintos, Jr.,9 the Cour t reite r a t e d the well-
settle d guideline s in resolving petitions for
decla r a t i o n of nullity of mar ri a g e , em bo di e d in
Repu blic v. Court of Appe als and Molina,1 0
base d on Article 36 of the Family Code. Thus:
(1) The burd e n of proof to show the nullity of the
mar ri a g e belong s to the plaintiff. Any doubt
shoul d be resolved in favor of the existe n c e and
continu a t i o n of the mar ri a g e and agains t its
dissolution and nullity. x x x.
xxxx
(2) The root caus e of the psychologi c al
incap a ci ty must be (a) medic ally or clinically
identifie d, (b) allege d in the compl ai nt , (c)
sufficiently prove n by expe r t s and (d) clea rly
explain e d in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code req ui r e s that the incap a ci ty must be
psychologic al — not physical, altho u g h its
manifes t a t i o n s and/or sympto m s may be
physical. x x x.
xxxx
(3) The inca p a ci ty must be prove n to be existin g
at "the time of the celeb r a t i o n" of the mar ri a g e . x
x x.
xxxx
(4) Such inca p a ci ty must also be shown to be
medically or clinically per m a n e n t or incur a bl e. x
x x.
xxxx
(5) Such illness must be grave enoug h to bring
about the disa bility of the party to assu m e the
esse n ti al obligation s of mar ri a g e . Thus, "mild
cha r a c t e r i ol ogic al peculia ri ti e s, mood chan g e s,
occasion al emotion al outbu r s t s " cannot be
acce p t e d as root caus e s. x x x.
xxxx
(6) The esse n ti al marit al obliga tion s must be
thos e embr a c e d by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as rega r d s the husb a n d and wife as
well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the sam e
Code in reg a r d to pare n t s and their childr e n.
Such non- complie d marit al obligatio n(s) must
also be stat e d in the petition, prove n by evide nc e
and includ e d in the text of the decision.
(7) Inte r p r e t a t i o n s given by the Nation al
Appellat e Mat ri m o ni al Tribun al of the Catholic
Chur c h in the Philippin e s, while not cont rolling
or decisive, should be given gre a t resp e c t by our
court s.
x x x.
xxxx
(8) The trial court must orde r the pros e c u t i n g
attor n e y or fiscal and the Solicitor Gene r al to
app e a r as couns el for the stat e. x x x.
Guide d by thes e prono u n c e m e n t s , the Court is of
the consid e r e d view that Rober t’s evide n c e failed
to est a blish the psychologic al incap a ci ty of Luz.
First, the testim o ny of Rober t failed to overco m e
the burd e n of proof to show the nullity of the
mar ri a g e . Othe r than his self- serving testim o ny,
no othe r evide n c e was addu c e d to show the
allege d incap a ci ty of Luz. He pres e n t e d no othe r
witne s s e s to corro bo r a t e his alleg a tio n s on her
beh avior. Thus, his testi m o ny was self- serving
and had no seriou s value as evide n c e .
Secon d, the root caus e of the allege d
psychologic al incap a ci ty of Luz was not
medically or clinically identifie d, and sufficie ntly
prove n during the trial. Based on the recor d s,
Robe r t failed to prove that her disposi tion of not
cleanin g the room, prep a r i n g their meal,
washin g the cloth e s, and prop e n si ty for dating
and rec eiving differ e n t male visitors, was grave,
dee ply root e d, and incur a bl e within the
par a m e t e r s of jurispr u d e n c e on psychologi c al
incap a ci ty.
The allege d failure of Luz to assu m e her duties
as a wife and as a moth e r, as well as her
emotion al imm a t u ri t y, irres p o n si bility and
infidelity, canno t rise to the level of
psychologic al incap a ci ty that justifies the
nullification of the par ti e s' mar ri a g e . The Court
has rep e a t e d ly stre s s e d that psychologic al
incap a ci ty cont e m pl a t e s "down ri g h t incap a ci ty
or inability to take cogniz a n c e of and to assu m e
the basic mari t al obligatio n s," not mer ely the
refusal, negle c t or difficulty, muc h less ill will, on
the part of the err a n t spous e . 1 1 Inde e d, to be
decla r e d clinically or medic ally incur a bl e is one
thing; to refus e or be reluct a n t to perfor m one's
dutie s is anot h e r . Psychologi cal inca p a ci ty refer s
only to the most serious case s of perso n ali ty
disor d e r s clea rly demo n s t r a t iv e of an utt e r
inse nsi tivity or inability to give mea ni n g and
significa n c e to the mar ri a g e . 1 2
As corr e c t ly found by the CA, sexual infidelity or
perve r sio n and aba n d o n m e n t do not, by
the m s elv e s, constit u t e grou n d s for decla ri n g a
mar ri a g e void base d on psychologic al incap a ci ty.
Robe r t argu e s that the series of sexual
indiscr e ti o n of Luz were exter n a l manifes t a t io n s
of the psychologic al defec t that she was sufferin g
within her per so n, which could be consid e r e d as
nymp h o m a n i a or "excessive sex hung e r ." Othe r
than his allega tion s, howeve r, no othe r
convincin g evide n c e was adduc e d to prove that
thes e sexual indiscr e ti o n s wer e consid e r e d as
nymp h o m a n i a , and that it was grave, deeply
root e d, and incur a bl e within the term of
psychologic al incap a ci ty em bo di e d in Article 36.
To str e ss, Rober t’s testim o ny alone is insufficien t
to prove the exist e n c e of psychologic al
incap a ci ty.
In Sivino A. Liger al d e v. May Ascensio n A.
Patalin g h u g and the Repu blic of the
Philippin e s, 1 3 the Court ruled that the
respo n d e n t’s act of living an adult e r o u s life
cannot auto m a ti c ally be equa t e d with a
psychologic al disor d e r , especi ally whe n no
specific evide nc e was shown that promisc ui ty
was a trait alre a d y existing at the inception of
mar ri a g e . The petition e r must be able to
est a blis h that the respo n d e n t ’s unfait hful n e s s
was a manifes t a t i o n of a disor d e r e d perso n a lity,
which mad e her compl e t ely una ble to disch a r g e
the esse n ti al obliga tion s of the marit al stat e.
Third, the psychologic al repo r t of Villanu ev a ,
Guidan c e Psychologi st II of the Nort h e r n
Minda n a o Medic al Cent e r , Cagaya n deOro City,
was insufficien t to prove the psychologi c al in
capa ci ty of Luz. There was nothin g in the
reco r d s that would indicat e that Luz had eithe r
bee n intervie w e d or was subjec t e d to a
psychologic al examin a t io n. The finding as to her
psychologic al incap a ci ty was base d entir ely on
hea r s a y and the self- servin g inform a t i o n
provide d by Robe r t.
Four t h, the decision of the Metr o polit a n Tribun al
is insufficien t to prove the psychologic al
incap a ci ty of Luz. Althoug h it is true that in the
case of Repu blic v. Cour t of Appe als and
Molina,1 4 the Court stat e d that inte r p r e t a t i o n s
given by the NAMT of the Cat holic Chur c h in the
Philippin e s, while not contr olling or decisive,
shoul d be given gre a t resp e c t by our court s, still
it is subjec t to the law on evide n c e . Thus:
Since the pur pos e of includi ng such provision in
our Family Code is to har m o niz e our civil laws
with the religious faith of our peopl e, it sta n d s to
reaso n that to achieve such har m o niz a tio n, gre a t
per s u a sive weight shoul d be given to decision s of
such appell a t e tribun a l. Ideally – subjec t to our
law on evide n c e– what is decr e e d as
[cano nic ally] invalid should be decr e e d civilly
void x x x. (Emp h a si s supplied)
Pertin e n t ly, Rule 132, Section 34 of the Rules of
Evide nc e provide s:
The court shall consid e r no evide nc e which has
not bee n form ally offere d. The purpo s e of which
the evide n c e is offer e d must be specified.
In this rega r d , the belat e d pres e n t a t i o n of the
decision of the NAMT canno t be given value
since it was not offere d duri ng the trial, and the
Court has in no way of asce r t ai ni n g the evide n c e
conside r e d by the sam e tribun a l.
Granti n g that it was offere d and admi t t e d, it
must be point e d out that the basis of the
decla r a t i o n of nullity of mar ri a g e by the NAMT
was not the third par a g r a p h of Canon 1095
which mentio n s caus e s of a psychologic al nat u r e
simila r to Article 36 of the Family Code, but the
secon d para g r a p h of Canon 1095 which refer s to
thos e who suffer from grave lack of discr e t io n of
judg m e n t conce r ni n g esse n t i al mat ri m o ni al
right s and obliga tion s to be mut u ally given and
acce p t e d . For clarity, the perti n e n t portions of
the NAMT decision are as follows:
The FACTS on the Case prove with the certit u d e
requi r e d by law that base d on the deposition of
the petition e r – the respo n d e n t und e r s t a n d a b l y
ignor e d the proce e di n g s comple t ely for which
she was duly cited for Cont e m p t of Court – and
pre mi s e d on the subst a n t i ally concor d a n t
testi m o ni e s of the Witness e s, the wom a n
Respon d e n t demo n s t r a t e d in the exte r n a l forum
thro u g h her action and rea c tio n patt e r n s , before
and afte r the mar ri a g e- in- fact, her grave lack of
due discre tio n in judge m e n t for mar ri a g e inten t s
and purpo s e s basically by rea so n of her
imma t u ri t y of judge m e n t as manifest e d by her
emotion al ambival e n c e x x x.
WHERE FOR E, this COLLEGIAL COURT OF
APPEALS, having invoke d the Divine Nam e and
having in mind the Law, the Jurispr u d e n c e and
the Facts pert ai ni n g to the Case, here by decla r e s
and decr e e s the confir m a t i o n of the nullity
decision rend e r e d by the Metr o polit a n Tribun al
of First Inst a n c e for the Archdioc e s e of Manil on
the Marri a g e Case MALLILIN – JAMISOLAMIN
with Prot. N. 63/200 0 on the groun d provide d by
Canon 1095 par. 2CIC on the part of the wom a n
Respon d e n t – but NOT on the part of the man
Petition e r for lack of evide n c e . (Emph a s e s and
und e r s c o ri n g supplie d) 1 5
In Sant os v. Sant os,6 the Court refer r e d to the
delibe r a ti o n s duri ng the sessions of the Family
Code Revision Com mit t e e , which draft e d the
Code, to provide an insight on the impor t of
Article 36 of the Family Code. It went out to
stat e that a part of the provision is similar to the
third par a g r a p h of Canon 1095 of the Code of
Canon Law, which rea d s:
Canon 1095. The following are incap a bl e of
cont r a c t i n g marri a g e :
1. those who lack sufficie nt use of reaso n;
2. those who suffer from a grave lack of
discr e tio n of judg m e n t conc e r ni n g the esse n ti al
mat ri m o ni al right s and obliga tion s to be
mut u ally given and acce p t e d ;
3. those who, beca u s e of caus e s of a
psychologic al nat u r e , are unabl e to assu m e the
esse n ti al obligation s of mar ri a g e .(E m p h a s i s and
und e r s c o ri n g supplie d)
In Najer a v. Naje r a , 1 7 the Court was also
confro n t e d with a similar issue of whet h e r to
conside r an ann ul m e n t by the NAMT as also
coverin g psychologic al incap a ci ty, the only
groun d recog niz e d in our law. In the said case,
the NAMT decision was also base d on the secon d
par a g r a p h of Canon 1095. The Cour t rule d that it
was not similar to, and only ann ul m e n t s unde r
the third par a g r a p h of, Canon 1095 shoul d be
conside r e d . Elucid a ti n g, the Cour t wrot e:
Petition e r’s arg u m e n t is withou t merit.
In its Decision dat e d Febr u a r y 23, 2004, the
Court of Appeals appa r e n t ly did not have the
opport u ni ty to consid e r the decision of the
Nation al Appellat e Matri m o ni al Tribun al.
Neve r t h e l e s s, it is clear that the Court of
Appeals conside r e d the Mat ri m o ni al Tribun al’s
decision in its Resolution dat e d August 5, 2004
when it resolve d petition e r’s motion for
recon si d e r a t i o n . In the said Resolution, the Court
of Appeal s took cogniza n c e of the very sam e
issue s now raise d befor e this Court and corr e c t ly
held that petition e r’s motion for recon si d e r a t i o n
was devoid of merit. It stat e d:
The Decision of the Nation al Appellat e
Mat ri m o ni al Tribun al dat e d July 2, 2002, which
was forwa r d e d to this Court only on Febr u a r y 11,
2004, rea d s as follows:
[T]he FACTS collat e d from par ty com pl ai n a n t
and reliable witne s s e s which includ e a sist e r- in-
law of Respon d e n t (despit e sum m o n s from the
Court dat e d June1 4, 1999, he did not app e a r
befor e the Cour t, in effect waiving his right to be
hea r d , henc e, trial in abse n t i a followed)
corro bo r a t e and lead this Collegia t e Court to
believe with mor al cert ai n t y requir e d by law and
conclud e that the husb a n d- respo n d e n t upon
cont r a c t i n g marri a g e suffer e d from grave lack of
due discre tio n of judg m e n t , ther e b y rend e r i n g
nug a t o r y his marit al cont r a c t : First, his family
was dysfunc ti on a l in that as a child, he saw the
bre a k- up of the marri a g e of his own par e n t s; his
own two siblings have broke n mar ri a g e s;
Secon d, he the r efo r e grew up with a
domin e e ri n g mot h e r with whom [he] identified
and on whom he depe n d e d for advice; Third, he
was accor di n g to his friend s, alre a dy into drug s
and alcohol befor e mar ri a g e ; this affect e d his
cond u c t of bipola r kind: he could be very quiet
but late r very talkative, peac ef ul but late r
hothe a d e d even violent, he also was awa r e of the
infidelity of his moth e r who now lives with her
par a m o u r , also marri e d and a police m a n ; Finally,
into mar ri a g e , he continu e d with his drugs and
alcohol abus e until one time he cam e hom e very
drun k and beat up his wife and att a c k e d her with
a bolo that woun d e d her; this led to final
sepa r a t i o n.
WHERE FOR E, pre m is e s consi de r e d , this Court
of Secon d Inst a n c e , having invoke d the Divine
Nam e and having consid e r e d the per tin e n t Law
and releva n t Jurispr u d e n c e to the Fact s of the
Case her e by proclai m s, declar e s and decr e e s the
confir m a ti o n of the sent e n c e from the Cour t a
quo in favor of the nullity of mar ri a g e on the
groun d cont e m pl a t e d unde r Canon 1095, 2 of the
1983 Code of Canon Law.
Howev e r, recor d s of the proc e e di n g s befor e the
Trial Court show that, othe r than hers elf,
petition e r- appell a n t offere d the testi m o ni e s of
the following perso n s only, to wit: Aldana
Celedo ni a (petition e r- app ella n t’s moth e r ), Sonny
de la Cruz (me m b e r , PNP, Bugallon,
Pang a si n a n ), and Ma. Cristin a R. Gate s
(psychologi st). Said witne s s e s testified, in
par tic ul a r , to the unfait hful night of July 1, 1994
whe r ei n the respo n d e n t alleg e dly mad e an
att e m p t on the life of the petition e r. But unlike
the hea ri n g and finding befor e the Mat ri m o ni al
Tribun al, petition e r- appella n t’s sist e r- in- law and
friends of the opposin g parti e s wer e neve r
pre s e n t e d befor e said Court. As to the cont e n t s
and vera ci ty of the latt e r’s testi m o ni e s, this
Court is without any clue. True, in the case of
Repu blic v. Court of Appe als, et al. (268 SCRA
198), the Supr e m e Cour t held that the
inte r p r e t a t i o n s given by the Nation al Appellat e
Mat ri m o ni al Tribun al of the Catholic Churc h in
the Philippi n e s, while not cont r olling or decisive,
shoul d be given gre a t resp e c t by our court s.
Howev e r, the High e s t Tribun al expou n d e d as
follows:
Since the pur pos e of includi ng such provision in
our Family Code is to har m o niz e our civil laws
with the religious faith of our peopl e, it sta n d s to
reaso n that to achieve such har m o niz a tio n, gre a t
per s u a sive weight shoul d be given to decision s of
such appell a t e tribun a l. Ideally – subjec t to our
law on evide n c e– what is decr e e d as
[cano nic ally] invalid should be decr e e d civilly
void x x x.
And in relation the r e t o, Rule 132, Sec. 34 of the
Rules of Evidenc e stat e s:
The court shall consid e r no evide nc e which has
not bee n form ally offere d. The purpo s e of which
the evide n c e is offer e d must be specified.
Given the prec e di n g disquisition s, petition e r-
app ella n t should not expec t us to give cred e n c e
to the Decision of the Nation al Appellat e
Mat ri m o ni al Tribun al whe n, appa r e n t l y, it was
made on a differe n t set of evide n c e of which We
have no way of asce r t a i ni n g their trut hful n e s s.
Furt h e r m o r e , it is an elem e n t a r y rule that
judg m e n t s must be base d on the evide nc e
pre s e n t e d befor e the cour t (Manz a n o vs. Perez,
362 SCRA 430 [2001]). And base d on the
evide n c e on recor d, We find no ampl e rea so n to
reve r s e or modify the judg m e n t of the Trial
Court.[3 1]
Sant os v. Sant o s 1 8 cited the delibe r a ti o n s duri ng
the sessions of the Family Code Revision
Com mit t e e , which draft e d the Code, to provide
an insight on the import of Article 36 of the
Family Code. It stat e d that a par t of the
provision is simila r to the third par a g r a p h of
Canon 1095 of the Code of Canon Law, which
rea d s:
Canon 1095. The following are incap a bl e of
cont r a c t i n g marri a g e :
1. those who lack sufficie nt use of reaso n;
2. those who suffer from a grave lack of
discr e tio n of judg m e n t conc e r ni n g the esse n ti al
mat ri m o ni al right s and obliga tion s to be
mut u ally given and acce p t e d ;
3. those who, beca u s e of caus e s of a
psychologic al nat u r e , are unabl e to assu m e the
esse n ti al obligation s of mar ri a g e .
It must be point e d out that in this case, the basis
of the decla r a t io n of nullity of mar ri a g e by the
Nation al Appellat e Matri m o ni al Tribun al is not
the third par a g r a p h of Canon 1095 which
mention s caus e s of a psychologic al nat u r e , but
the secon d par a g r a p h of Canon 1095 which
refer s to those who suffer from a grave lack of
discr e tio n of judg m e n t conc e r ni n g esse n t i al
mat ri m o ni al right s and obliga tion s to be
mut u ally given and acce p t e d . For clarity, the
pertin e n t portion of the decision of the Nation al
Appellat e Mat ri m o ni al Tribun al rea d s:
The FACTS collat e d from party compl ai n a n t and
reliabl e witne s s e s which includ e a siste r- in- law
of Respon d e n t (despit e sum m o n s from the Cour t
dat e d June 14, 1999, he did not app e a r before
the Cour t, in effect waiving his right to be hea r d,
henc e , trial in abse n t i a followe d) corrob o r a t e
and lead this Collegi at e Cour t to believe with
mor al cert ai n t y requi r e d by law and conclud e
that the husb a n d- respo n d e n t upon cont a c ti n g
mar ri a g e suffer e d from grave lack of due
discr e tio n of judg m e n t , the r e by rend e ri n g
nug a t o r y his marit al cont r a c t x x x.
WHERE FOR E, pre m is e s consi de r e d , this Court
of Secon d Inst a n c e , having invoke d the Divine
Nam e and having consid e r e d the per tin e n t Law
and releva n t Jurispr u d e n c e to the Fact s of the
Case her e by proclai m s, declar e s and decr e e s the
confir m a ti o n of the sent e n c e from the Cour t a
quo in favor of the nullity of mar ri a g e on the
groun d cont e m pl a t e d unde r Canon 1095, 2 of the
1983 Code of Canon Law. x x x.
Henc e, even if, as cont e n d e d by petition e r, the
factu al basis of the decision of the Nation al
Appellat e Mat ri m o ni al Tribun al is similar to the
facts est a blish e d by petition e r befor e the trial
court, the decision of the Nation al Appellat e
Mat ri m o ni al Tribun al confir mi n g the decr e e of
nullity of mar ri a g e by the court a quo is not
base d on the psychologic al inca p a ci ty of
respo n d e n t . Petition e r , ther efo r e , err e d in
statin g that the conclusion of Psychologi st
Cristin a Gate s rega r di n g the psychologic al
incap a ci ty of respo n d e n t is suppo r t e d by the
decision of the Nation al Appellat e Mat ri m o ni al
Tribun al.
In fine, the Cour t of Appeals did not err in
affirmin g the Decision of the RTC. (Emph a s e s in
the origin al; Unde r s c o r i n g supplie d)
Henc e, Robe rt’s relian c e on the NAMT decision
is mispl ac e d. To rep e a t , the decision of the
NAMT was base d on the secon d par a g r a p h of
Canon 1095 which refer s to those who suffer
from a grave lack of discr e ti o n of judgm e n t
conce r ni n g esse n ti al mat ri m o ni al right s and
obliga tion s to be mut u ally given and acce p t e d , a
caus e not of psychologi c al natu r e unde r Article
36 of the Family Code. A cause of psychologi c al
nat u r e similar to Article 36 is cover e d by the
third par a g r a p h of Canon 1095 of the Code of
Canon Law (Sant os v. Sant o s 19), which for
rea dy refe r e n c e rea d s:
Canon 1095. The following are incap a bl e of
cont r a c t i n g marri a g e :
xxxx
3. those who, beca u s e of caus e s of a
psychologic al nat u r e , are unabl e to assu m e the
esse n ti al obligation s of mar ri a g e .
To hold that annul m e n t of mar ri a g e s decr e e d by
the NAMT unde r the secon d para g r a p h of Canon
1095 shoul d also be cover e d would be to expa n d
wha t the lawm a k e r s did not inten d to include .
What would preve n t me m b e r s of othe r religious
group s from invoking their own inte r p r e t a t i o n of
psychologic al incap a ci ty? Would this not lead to
multiple, if not inconsist e n t , inter p r e t a t i o n s ?
To consid e r churc h annul m e n t s as addition al
groun d s for ann ul m e n t unde r Article 36 would
be legislati n g from the benc h. As stat e d in
Repu blic v. Court of Appe als and Molina,2 0
inte r p r e t a t i o n s given by the NAMT of the
Catholic Churc h in the Philippin e s are given
gre a t resp e c t by our cour t s, but they are not
cont r olling or decisive.
In Republic v. Galan g, 2 1 it was writt e n that the
Consti t u ti on set out a policy of prot e c ti n g and
stre n g t h e n i n g the family as the basic social
instit ution, and the mar ri a g e was the found a ti o n
of the family. Mar ri a g e , as an inviolabl e
instit ution prot e c t e d by the Stat e, canno t be
dissolve d at the whim of the partie s. In petition s
for decla r a t i o n of nullity of mar ri a g e , the bur d e n
of proof to show the nullity of mar ri a g e lies with
the plaintiff. Unless the eviden c e pres e n t e d
clearly reve al s a situa tio n whe r e the parti e s, or
one of them , could not have validly ent e r e d into
a marri a g e by reaso n of a grave and seriou s
psychologic al illness existing at the time it was
celeb r a t e d , the Court is comp elle d to uphold the
indissol ubility of the marit al tie.
In fine, the Cour t holds that the CA decide d
corr e c tly. Petition e r Rober t failed to addu c e
sufficient and convinci ng evide n c e to prove the
allege d psychologi c al incap a ci ty of Luz.
As asse r t e d by the OSG, the allega ti on s of the
petition e r make a case for legal sepa r a t i o n.
Henc e, this decision is without prejudic e to an
action for legal sepa r a t i o n if a par ty would want
to purs u e such proce e di n g s. In this disposition,
the Cour t canno t decr e e a legal sepa r a t io n
bec a u s e in such proc e e di n g s , the r e are matt e r s
and conse q u e n c e s like custo dy and sep a r a t i o n of
prope r ti e s that nee d to be conside r e d and
settle d.
WHERE FOR E, the petition is DENIED. The
Decision of the Cour t of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 7830 3- MIN, dat e d Nove m b e r 20, 2009, and
its Resolution, dat e d June 1, 2010, are her e by
AFFIRMED, without prejudi c e.
No costs.
G.R. No. 16 4 8 1 7 July 3, 20 0 9
DIGNA A. NAJERA, Peti t i o n e r ,
vs.
EDUAR DO J. NAJERA, Re s p o n d e n t .
DE C IS IO N
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certior a ri of the
Decision dat e d Febr u a r y 23, 2004 of the Cour t of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68053 and its
Resolution August 5, 2004, denying petition e r’s
motion for reconsi d e r a t i o n . The Decision of the
Court of Appeals affirm e d the Decision of the
Region al Trial Cour t of Lingaye n, Pang a si n a n ,
Branc h 68 (RTC), which found petition e r Digna
A. Naje r a and respo n d e n t Edua r d o J. Najer a
entitle d to legal sepa r a t i o n, but not annul m e n t of
mar ri a g e unde r Article 36 of the Family Code.
The facts are as follows:
On Janua r y 27, 1997, petition e r filed with the
RTC a verified Petition for Declar a t i o n of Nullity
of Marri a g e with Alter n a tive Praye r for Legal
Sep a r a t i o n, with Applica tion for Design a ti o n as
Administ r a t o r Pend e n t e Lite of the Conjug al
Part n e r s hi p of Gains.1
Petition e r allege d that she and respo n d e n t are
resid e n t s of Bugallon, Pang a si n a n , but
respo n d e n t is pres e n tly living in the Unite d
Stat e s of Americ a (U.S.A). They wer e mar ri e d on
Janua r y 31, 1988 by Rev. Fath e r Isidro Palina r,
Jr. at the Saint Andre w the Apostle Churc h at
Bugallon, Pang a si n a n . 2 They are childless.
Petition e r claim e d that at the time of the
celeb r a t io n of mar ri a g e , respo n d e n t was
psychologic ally incap a ci t a t e d to comply with the
esse n ti al marit al obligatio n s of the mar ri a g e , and
such incap a ci ty beca m e manifest only after
mar ri a g e as shown by the following facts:
(a) At the time of their mar ri a g e , petition e r was
alre a dy employe d with the Special Service s
Division of the Provincial Gover n m e n t of
Pang a si n a n , while respo n d e n t was jobless. He
did not exer t enoug h effort to find a job and was
dep e n d e n t on petition e r for suppo r t . Only with
the help of petition e r’s elde r brot h e r , who was a
sea m a n , was respo n d e n t able to land a job as a
sea m a n in 1988 thro u g h the Inter c r e w Shippi n g
Agency.
(b) While em ploye d as a sea m a n , respo n d e n t did
not give petition e r sufficien t financi al suppo r t
and she had to rely on her own effort s and the
help of her par e n t s in orde r to live.
(c) As a sea m a n , respo n d e n t was away from
hom e from nine to ten mont h s eac h year. In May
1989, when he cam e hom e from his ship voyag e,
he star t e d to qua r r el with petition e r and falsely
accus e d her of having an affair with anot h e r
man. He took to smoking mariju a n a and tried to
force petition e r into it. When she refuse d, he
insult e d her and utte r e d "unpri nt a b l e words"
again s t her. He would go out of the house and
when he arrive d hom e, he was always drunk.
(d) When respo n d e n t arrive d hom e from his ship
voyag e in April 1994, as had been happ e ni n g
every year, he qua r r e l e d with petition e r . He
continu e d to be jealous, he arrive d hom e drunk
and he smoke d marijua n a . On July 3, 1994, while
he was qua r r eli n g with petition e r , without
provoc a ti on, he inflict ed physical violenc e upon
her and att e m p t e d to kill her with a bolo. She
was able to par ry his att a ck with her left arm,
yet she sust ai n e d physical injuri es on differ e n t
par t s of her body. She was trea t e d by Dr. Padla n,
and the incide n t was repor t e d at the Bugallon
Police Station.
(e) Respon d e n t left the family hom e, taking along
all thei r per so n a l belongi n g s . He lived with his
mot h e r at Bana g a, Bugallon, Pang a si n a n , and he
aba n d o n e d petition e r .
Petition e r learn e d late r that respo n d e n t jump e d
ship while it was ancho r e d in Los Angele s,
Californi a, U.S.A.
Petition e r praye d that upon filing of the petition,
an Orde r be issue d appointi n g her as the sole
admi nist r a t o r of thei r conjug al prop e r t i e s; and
that after trial on the merit s, judgm e n t be
rend e r e d (1) decla ri n g thei r mar ri a g e void ab
initio in accor d a n c e with Article 36 of the Family
Code; (2) in the alter n a t iv e, decr e e i n g legal
sepa r a t i o n of petition e r and respo n d e n t purs u a n t
to Title II of the Family Code; and (3) decla ri n g
the dissolution of the conjug al part n e r s h i p of
petition e r and respo n d e n t and the forfeitu r e in
favor of petition e r of respo n d e n t’ s sha r e in the
said prop e r t i e s purs u a n t to Articles 42 (2) and 63
(2) of the Family Code; and (4) gra n ti n g
petition e r othe r just and equit a bl e reliefs.
On Marc h 7, 1997, the RTC issue d an Orde r
gra n ti n g the motion of petition e r to effect
servic e by publica tio n as provide d unde r Section
17, Rule 14 of the Rules of Cour t.
On April 17, 1997, respo n d e n t filed his Answe r 3
whe r ei n he denie d the mat e ri al alleg a tio n s in the
petition and aver r e d that petition e r was
incur a bly imm a t u r e , of dubiou s inte g ri ty, with
very low morality, and guilty of infidelity. He
claim e d that the subjec t hous e and lot were
acqui r e d thro u g h his sole effort and money. As
count e r c l ai m , respo n d e n t praye d for the awa r d
of ₱ 200,0 0 0. 0 0 as mor al dam a g e s , ₱45,00 0.0 0 as
attor n e y’s fees, and ₱ 1,000. 0 0 as appe a r a n c e fee
for every sche d ul e d heari n g.
On July 18, 1997, the Office of the Solicitor
Gene r al filed its Notice of Appe a r a n c e .
On June 29, 1998, the RTC issue d an Orde r 4
ter mi n a ti n g the pre- trial confer e n c e after the
par ti e s signe d a Form al Manifest a t i o n/ M o tio n,
which stat e d that they had agr e e d to dissolve
their conjug al part n e r s h i p of gains and divide
equ ally their conjug al prope r ti e s.
On August 3, 1998, Assist a n t Provincial
Prose c u t o r Ely R. Reint a r filed a Complian c e
manifes ti n g that afte r condu c ti n g an
investi g a ti o n, he found that no collusion exist e d
betw e e n the parti e s.5 The initial hea ri n g of the
case was held on Nove m b e r 23, 1998.
Petition e r testified in court and pres e n t e d as
witne s s e s the following: her mot h e r , Celedoni a
Aldan a; psychologist Cristina R. Gates; and
Senior Police Officer 1 (SPO1) Sonny Dela Cruz,
a me m b e r of the Philippine Nation al Police
(PNP), Bugallon, Pang a si n a n .
Petition e r testified that she was a com m e r c e
gra d u a t e and was workin g as an accou n ti n g
clerk in a gove r n m e n t age n cy in Manila. She and
respo n d e n t marri e d on Janua ry 31, 1988 as
evide n c e d by their mar ri a g e contr a c t . 6 At the
time of their mar ri a g e , respo n d e n t was jobless,
while petition e r was em ploye d as Clerk at the
Speci al Service s Division of the Provinci al
Govern m e n t of Pang a si n a n with a mont hly sala ry
of ₱ 5,000. 0 0. It was petition e r’s brot h e r who
helpe d respo n d e n t find a job as a sea m a n at the
Inte rc r e w Shippin g Agency in Manila. On July
30, 1988, respo n d e n t was em ploye d as a sea m a n ,
and he gave petition e r a mont hly allot m e n t of
₱ 1,600. 0 0. After ten mont h s at work, he went
hom e in 1989 and then ret u r n e d to work afte r
thre e mont h s. Every time respo n d e n t was hom e,
he quar r e l e d with petition e r and accus e d her of
having an affair with anot h e r man. Petition e r
notice d that respo n d e n t also smoke d marijua n a
and every time he went out of the hous e and
ret u r n e d hom e, he was drunk. Howeve r , the r e
was no recor d in their bar a n g a y that respo n d e n t
was involved in drug s.7
In 1990, petition e r and respo n d e n t wer e able to
purc h a s e a lot out of thei r ear ni n g s . In 1991,
they const r u c t e d a hous e on the lot.8
On July 3, 1994, petition e r and respo n d e n t were
invite d to a party by the boyfrie n d of petition e r’s
siste r. Respo n d e n t , howeve r , did not allow
petition e r to go with him. When respo n d e n t
arrive d hom e at arou n d midnig h t , petition e r
aske d him about the party, the perso n s who
att e n d e d it, and the ladies he danc e d with, but
he did not answ e r her. Inste a d , respo n d e n t went
to the kitch e n . She aske d him again about what
happ e n e d at the party. Respon d e n t qua r r e l e d
with her and said that she was the one having an
affair and sudd e nly slapp e d and boxed her,
causi n g her eyes to be bloodie d. When she
open e d her eyes, she saw respo n d e n t holding a
bolo, and he att e m p t e d to kill her. Howeve r, she
was able to par ry his att a ck with her left arm,
causi n g her to sust ai n injuri es on differe n t part s
of her body. When respo n d e n t saw that she was
bloodi e d, he got nervou s and went out. After 10
minut e s , he turn e d on the light in the kitch e n,
but he could not find her bec a u s e she had gone
out and was hiding from him. When she hea r d
respo n d e n t star t the motor cycl e, she left her
hiding plac e and proce e d e d to Gom ez Str e e t
towar d the highw ay. At the highw ay, she
boar d e d a bus and aske d the cond u c t o r to stop at
a clinic or hospit al. She alight e d in Mang a t a r e m ,
Pang a si n a n and proc e e d e d to the clinic of one
Dr. Padla n, who sutu r e d her wound s. After a few
hour s, she went hom e. 9
When petition e r arrive d hom e, the house was
locked. She called for her pare n t s who wer e
residi ng about 300 met e r s away. She then aske d
her brot h e r to ent e r the house thro u g h the
ceiling in orde r to open the door. She found that
their perso n al belongi n g s were gone, includin g
her Autom a t e d Teller Machin e card and
jewelry.1 0
Ther e af t e r , petition e r repo r t e d the incide n t at
the police station of Bugallon, Pang a si n a n . 1 1
Since then, respo n d e n t neve r retu r n e d home. He
staye d with his mot h e r in Bana g a , Bugallon,
Pang a si n a n . Petition e r lear n e d that he went
abro a d again, but she no longe r receive d any
allotm e n t from him.12
Petition e r testified that her par e n t s wer e happily
mar ri e d, while respo n d e n t’s pare n t s were
sepa r a t e d . Respo n d e n t’s brot h e r s wer e also
sepa r a t e d from their resp e c t iv e wives.13
Petition e r disclose d that she also filed a petition
for the ann ul m e n t of her mar ri a g e with the
Mat ri m o ni al Tribun al of the Dioces e of Alaminos,
Pang a si n a n on the groun d of psychologi c al
incap a ci ty of respo n d e n t . 1 4
Psychologist Cristina R. Gates testified that she
inte rvie w e d petition e r, but not respo n d e n t who
was abroa d . She confir m e d her Psychologic al
Repor t, the conclusion of which rea d s:
PSYCHOLOGICAL CONCLUSIO N S BASED ON
THE INTERVIEWS:
It is clea r from the inte rvie w s that Respon d e n t is
afflicte d with psychologic al han g- ups which are
root e d in the kind of family backg r o u n d he has.
His mot h e r had an extr a m a r i t al affair and
sepa r a t e d from Respon d e n t’s fathe r. This tur n of
event s left an irrep a r a b l e mark upon
Respon d e n t , gaugi n g from his alcoholic and
marijua n a habit. In time, he see m e d stee p in a
kind of a double bind wher e he both dee ply loved
and rese n t e d his moth e r .
His basele s s accus a ti o n agains t his wife and his
violent behavior towa r d s her appe a r s to be an
offshoot of deep- seat e d feelings and rec u r r e n t
thoug h t s towar d s his own mot h e r . Unabl e to
resolve his childhoo d conflicts and ange r, he
turn e d to his wife as the scap e g o a t for all his
trou bl e s.
Based on the Diagnos ti c and Statisti c al Manu al
(DSM IV), Respon d e n t is afflict ed with a
Borde rlin e Perso n a lity Disord e r as mark e d by his
patt e r n of inst a bility in his inter p e r s o n a l
relation s hi p s, his marr e d self- image and self-
dest r u c t ive tend e n c i e s, his uncon t r oll a bl e
impulse s. Edua r d o Najer a’s psychologi c al
impair m e n t as trac e d to his par e n t s’ sepa r a t i o n,
agg r av a t e d by the contin u e d med dlin g of his
mot h e r in his adult life, ante d a t e s his marri a g e
to Petition e r Digna Aldana.
Furt h e r m o r e , the ingestion of prohi bit e d
subst a n c e s (alcohol and mariju a n a ), known to
caus e irrep a r a b l e dam a g e orga ni c ally, and the
manifes t worse ni n g of his violent and abusive
beh avior across time ren d e r his impai r m e n t
grave and irreve r si bl e. In the light of thes e
findings, it is reco m m e n d e d that parti e s’
mar ri a g e be ann ulle d on grou n d s of
psychologic al incap a ci ty on the part of
Respon d e n t Edua r d o Naje r a to fully assu m e his
marit al dutie s and respo n si bilities to Digna
Aldan a- Najer a. 1 5
Psychologist Cristina Gate s testified that the
cha nc e s of cur a bility of respo n d e n t’ s
psychologic al disor d e r wer e nil. Its cura bility
dep e n d e d on whet h e r the est a blis h e d orga ni c
dam a g e was minim al -- refer ri n g to the
malfunc tion of the com posit e s of the brain
broug h t about by habit u al drinking and
marijua n a , which possibly afflict ed respo n d e n t
with bord e rlin e perso n ality disor d e r and
uncon t r oll a bl e impuls e s. 1 6
Furt h e r , SPO1 Sonny Dela Cruz, a me m b e r of the
PNP, Bugallon, Pang a si n a n , testified that on July
3, 1994, he receive d a compl ai n t from petition e r
that respo n d e n t arrive d at thei r house und e r the
influen c e of liquor and maul e d petition e r withou t
provoc a ti on on her par t, and that respo n d e n t
tried to kill her. The compl ai nt was ente r e d in
the police blott e r . 1 7
On Marc h 31, 2000, the RTC rend e r e d a Decision
that decr e e d only the legal sepa r a t i o n of the
petition e r and respo n d e n t , but not the
annul m e n t of their marri a g e . The disposi tive
portion of the Decision rea d s:
WHERE FOR E, in view of the foregoi n g,
judg m e n t is her e by ren d e r e d as follows:
1. Decre ei n g legal sepa r a t i o n of
Petition e r/ Pl ai n tiff Digna Naje r a and
respo n d e n t / d e f e n d a n t Edua r d o Naje r a;
2. Orde ri n g the dissolution of the conjug al
par t n e r s h i p of the petition e r/ pl ai n tiff and
respo n d e n t / d e f e n d a n t , and to divide the sam e
equ ally betw e e n the m s elv e s purs u a n t to thei r
Joint Manifest a t i o n/ M o tio n dat e d April 27,
1998.1 8
Petition e r’s motion for recon si d e r a t i o n was
denie d in a Resolution 1 9 dat e d May 2, 2000.
Petition e r appe al e d the RTC Decision and
Resolution to the Court of Appe als.
In a Decision dat e d Febr u a r y 23, 2004, the Cour t
of Appeal s affirm e d the Decision of the RTC, the
dispositive portion of which rea d s:
WHERE FOR E, pre m is e s consi de r e d , app e al is
her e by DISMIS S ED and judg m e n t of the Trial
Court is AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.2 0
Petition e r’s motion for recon si d e r a t i o n was
denie d by the Court of Appe al s in a Resolution
dat e d August 5, 2004.
Henc e, this petition raising the following issue s:
1. The Cour t of Appeals failed to take into
conside r a t i o n the Decision of the Nation al
Appellat e Mat ri m o ni al Tribun al, contr a r y to the
guidelin e s decr e e d by the Supr e m e Court in the
case of Repu blic v. Cour t of Appe als, 268 SCRA
198.
2. The evide nc e of petition e r prove d the root
caus e of the psychologi c al inca p a ci t y of
respo n d e n t Edua r d o Najer a .
3. The factu al basis of the Decision of the
Nation al Appellat e Matri m o ni al Tribun al is
prac tic ally the sam e set of facts est a blish e d by
petition e r’s evide n c e sub mit t e d befor e the trial
court and the r efo r e the sam e conclusion ough t to
be rend e r e d by the Court.
4. Cred e n c e ought to be given to the conclusion
of Psychologist Cristin a R. Gates as an expe r t in
Psychology.2 1
The main issue is whet h e r or not the totality of
petition e r’s evide n c e was able to prove that
respo n d e n t is psychologic ally incap a ci t a t e d to
comply with the esse n ti al obligation s of mar ri a g e
warr a n t i n g the ann ul m e n t of their mar ri a g e
und e r Article 36 of the Family Code.22
Petition e r cont e n d s that her evide n c e
est a blis h e d the root caus e of the psychologic al
incap a ci ty of respo n d e n t which is his
dysfunc tio n al family backg r o u n d . With such
backg r o u n d , respo n d e n t could not have known
the obligatio n s he was assu m i n g, partic ul a rly the
duty of complying with the obligation s esse n ti al
to mar ri a g e .
The Court is not per su a d e d .
Repu blic v. Court of Appe als2 3 laid down the
guidelin e s in the inte r p r e t a t i o n and applica tion
of Article 36 of the Family Code, thus:
(1) The burd e n of proof to show the nullity of the
mar ri a g e belong s to the plaintiff. Any doubt
shoul d be resolved in favor of the existe n c e and
continu a t i o n of the mar ri a g e and agains t its
dissolution and nullity. This is root e d in the fact
that both our Constit u tio n and our laws che ri sh
the validity of mar ri a g e and unity of the family.
Thus, our Constit u t io n devot e s an entir e Article
on the Family, recog nizin g it "as the found a t io n
of the nation." It decr e e s mar ri a g e as legally
"inviolable," the r e by prot e c ti n g it from
dissolution at the whim of the parti e s. Both the
family and mar ri a g e are to be "prot e c t e d " by the
stat e .
xxxx
(2) The root caus e of the psychologi c al
incap a ci ty must be (a) medic ally or clinically
identifie d, (b) allege d in the compl ai nt , (c)
sufficiently prove n by expe r t s and (d) clea rly
explain e d in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code req ui r e s that the incap a ci ty must be
psychologic al -- not physic al, althou g h its
manifes t a t i o n s and/or sympto m s may be
physical. The evide nc e must convinc e the court
that the parti es, or one of the m, was men t ally or
psychic ally ill to such an exte n t that the perso n
could not have know n the obligatio n s he was
assu m i n g , or knowin g the m , could not have
given valid assu m p t io n ther e of. Althoug h no
exam pl e of such incap a ci ty need be given her e
so as not to limit the applica tio n of the provision
und e r the princi pl e of ejusd e m gen e ri s,
neve r t h e l e s s such root caus e must be identified
as a psychologi c al illness and its incap a cit a t i n g
nat u r e fully explain e d. Expe rt evide n c e may be
given by qualified psychia t ri s t s and clinical
psychologis t s.
(3) The inca p a ci ty must be prove n to be existin g
at "the time of the celeb r a t i o n" of the mar ri a g e .
The evide n c e must show that the illness was
existing whe n the par ti e s exch a n g e d their "I
do’s." The manifes t a t i o n of the illness nee d not
be perc eiva bl e at such time, but the illness itself
must have att a c h e d at such mom e n t , or prior
ther e t o.
(4) Such inca p a ci ty must also be shown to be
medically or clinically per m a n e n t or incur a bl e.
Such incur a bility may be absolut e or even
relative only in rega r d to the othe r spous e, not
nece s s a r ily absolut ely agai ns t everyon e of the
sam e sex. Furt h e r m o r e , such incap a ci ty must be
releva n t to the assu m p t i o n of mar ri a g e
obliga tion s, not nece s s a r ily to those not relat e d
to mar ri a g e , like the exer ci se of a profes sio n or
em ploy m e n t in a job. Henc e, a pedia t ri ci a n may
be effective in diagno si n g illness e s of childr e n
and presc ri bi n g medici n e to cure the m but may
not be psychologic ally capa cit a t e d to procr e a t e ,
bea r and raise his/he r own childr e n as an
esse n ti al obligation of mar ri a g e .
(5) Such illness must be grave enoug h to bring
about the disa bility of the party to assu m e the
esse n ti al obligation s of mar ri a g e . Thus, "mild
cha r a c t e r i ol ogic al peculia ri ti e s, mood chan g e s,
occasion al emotion al outbu r s t s " cannot be
acce p t e d as root caus e s. The illness must be
show n as down ri g h t inca p a ci t y or inability, not a
refusal, negle c t or difficulty, muc h less ill will. In
othe r words, the r e is a nat al or supe r v e ni n g
disa blin g factor in the perso n, an adve r s e
inte g r al elem e n t in the perso n ali ty stru ct u r e that
effectively inca p a ci t a t e s the per so n from really
acce p ti n g and ther e b y complying with the
obliga tion s esse n ti al to mar ri a g e .
(6) The esse n ti al marit al obliga tion s must be
thos e embr a c e d by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as rega r d s the husb a n d and wife as
well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the sam e
Code in reg a r d to pare n t s and their childr e n.
Such non- complie d marit al obligatio n(s) must
also be stat e d in the petition, prove n by evide nc e
and includ e d in the text of the decision.
(7) Inte r p r e t a t i o n s given by the Nation al
Appellat e Mat ri m o ni al Tribun al of the Catholic
Chur c h in the Philippin e s, while not cont rolling
or decisive, should be given gre a t resp e c t by our
court s. It is clear that Article 36 was take n by
the Family Code Revision Commit t e e from Canon
1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which
bec a m e effective in 1983 and which provide s:
The following are inca p a bl e of cont r a c t i n g
mar ri a g e : Those who are una bl e to assu m e the
esse n ti al obligation s of mar ri a g e due to caus e s
of psychologi c al nat u r e .
Since the pur pos e of includi ng such provision in
our Family Code is to har m o niz e our civil laws
with the religious faith of our peopl e, it sta n d s to
reaso n that to achieve such har m o niz a tio n, gre a t
per s u a sive weight shoul d be given to decision s of
such appell a t e tribun a l. Ideally -- subjec t to our
law on evide n c e -- what is decr e e d as canonic ally
invalid should also be decr e e d civilly void.
This is one insta n c e wher e, in view of the evide n t
sourc e and pur pos e of the Family Code
provision, cont e m p o r a n e o u s religious
inte r p r e t a t i o n is to be given pers u a sive effect.
Her e, the Stat e and the Chur c h -- while
rem ai ni n g inde p e n d e n t , sepa r a t e and apa r t from
each other -- shall walk toget h e r in synod al
cade n c e towar d s the sam e goal of prot e c ti n g and
che rishi n g mar ri a g e and the family as the
inviolabl e base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must orde r the pros e c u t i n g
attor n e y or fiscal and the Solicitor Gene r al to
app e a r as couns el for the stat e. No decision shall
be hand e d down unless the Solicitor Gene r a l
issue s a certification, which will be quot e d in the
decision, briefly statin g the r ei n his reaso n s for
his agr e e m e n t or opposition, as the case may be,
to the petition. The Solicitor Gene r al, along with
the prose c u t i n g attor n e y, shall submit to the
court such certificatio n within fiftee n (15) days
from the dat e the case is dee m e d submit t e d for
resolution of the court. The Solicitor Gene r a l
shall disch a r g e the equivale n t function of the
defe ns o r vinculi cont e m p l a t e d und e r Canon
1095.
The guidelin e s incorp o r a t e the thre e basic
requi r e m e n t s earlie r man d a t e d by the Court in
Sant os v. Court of Appeals: "psychologic al
incap a ci ty must be cha r a c t e ri z e d by (a) gravity
(b) juridic al ant e c e d e n c e , and (c) incur a bility."24
The foregoin g guideline s do not requi r e that a
physicia n exa mi n e the perso n to be decl a r e d
psychologic ally incap a ci t a t e d . 2 5 In fact, the root
caus e may be "medically or clinically
identifie d."2 6 What is import a n t is the pres e n c e
of eviden c e that can ade q u a t el y esta blis h the
par ty's psychologic al condition. For inde e d, if the
totality of evide nc e pres e n t e d is enoug h to
sust ai n a finding of psychologic al incap a ci ty,
then actu al medic al exami n a ti o n of the perso n
conce r n e d need not be resor t e d to.27
In this case, the Cour t agr e e s with the Court of
Appeals that the tot ality of the evide n c e
submi t t e d by petition e r failed to satisfac t o rily
prove that respo n d e n t was psychologic ally
incap a ci t a t e d to com ply with the esse n ti al
obliga tion s of marri a g e . The root caus e of
respo n d e n t’s alleg e d psychologic al incap a ci ty
was not sufficien tly prove n by expe r t s or show n
to be medic ally or clinically per m a n e n t or
incur a bl e .
As found by the Court of Appe als, Psychologist
Cristin a Gate s’ conclusion that respo n d e n t was
psychologic ally incap a ci t a t e d was base d on facts
relaye d to her by petition e r and was not base d
on her perso n a l knowl ed g e and evalu a tio n of
respo n d e n t ; thus, her finding is unscie n tific and
unr elia bl e.2 8 Moreov e r , the trial court corr e c t ly
found that petition e r failed to prove with
cert ai n t y that the alleg e d perso n ali ty disor d e r of
respo n d e n t was incur a bl e as may be glea n e d
from Psychologist Cristina Gates’ testi m o ny:
Q You mention e d in your repor t that respo n d e n t
is afflict ed with a bord e rli n e perso n ali ty
disor d e r . [D]id you find any orga ni c cause ?
A No, sir.
Q Do you think that this caus e you mention e d
exist e d at the time of the mar ri a g e of the
respo n d e n t ?
A I believe so, sir. Physically, if you exa mi n e d the
[respo n d e n t’s family] backg r o u n d , ther e was
stron g basis that respo n d e n t develop e d mal-
adoptive patt e r n .
Q Did you intervie w the respo n d e n t’ s family?
A No, sir , but on the disclosu r e of petition e r
(sic).
xxxx
Q Have you [see n] the respo n d e n t ?
A He is not in the count ry, sir.
Q Mad a m Witnes s, this disord e r that you stat e d
in your repor t which the respo n d e n t is alleg e dly
affect e d , is this cura bl e ?
A The chan c e s are nil.
Q But it is cura bl e ?
A It depe n d s actu ally if the est a blish e d orga nic
dam a g e is minim al.
Q What is this orga ni c dam a g e ?
A Composit e s of the brain is malfun cti oni n g.
Q How did you find out the malfunc tioni n g since
you have not see n him (respo n d e n t )?
A His habit u al drinkin g and marijua n a habit
possibly afflict e d the respo n d e n t with bord e rli n e
per so n ali ty disor d e r . This [is] base d on his
inte r p e r s o n a l relation s hi p s, his mar r e d self-
imag e and self- dest r u c t iv e tend e n ci e s, and his
uncon t r oll a bl e impuls e s.
Q Did you intervie w the respo n d e n t in this
rega r d ?
A I take the words of the petition e r in this
rega r d . 2 9
The Court agr e e s with the Court of Appeal s that
the evide n c e pres e n t e d by petition e r in reg a r d to
the physic al violenc e or grossly abusive cond uc t
of respo n d e n t towa r d petition e r and
respo n d e n t’s aba n d o n m e n t of petition e r withou t
justifiabl e caus e for more than one year are
groun d s for legal sepa r a t i o n 3 0 only and not for
annul m e n t of mar ri a g e unde r Article 36 of the
Family Code.
Petition e r arg u e d that the Cour t of Appeal s
failed to consid e r the Decision of the Nation al
Appellat e Mat ri m o ni al Tribun al which her
couns el sough t to be admit t e d by the Court of
Appeals on Febr u a r y 11, 2004, twelve days
befor e the decision was prom ul g a t e d on
Febr u a r y 23, 2004. She cont e n d e d that the Court
of Appeal s failed to follow Guidelin e No. 7 in
Repu blic v. Court of Appe als, thus:
(7) Inte r p r e t a t i o n s given by the Nation al
Appellat e Mat ri m o ni al Tribun al of the Catholic
Chur c h in the Philippin e s, while not cont rolling
or decisive, should be given gre a t resp e c t by our
court s. It is clear that Article 36 was take n by
the Family Code Revision Commit t e e from Canon
1095 of the New Code of Canon law, which
bec a m e effective in 1983 and which provide s:
The following are inca p a bl e of cont r a c t i n g
mar ri a g e : Those who are una bl e to assu m e the
esse n ti al obligation s of mar ri a g e due to caus e s
of psychologi c al nat u r e .
Since the pur pos e of includi ng such provision in
our Family Code is to har m o niz e our civil laws
with the religious faith of our peopl e, it sta n d s to
reaso n that to achieve such har m o niz a tio n, gre a t
per s u a sive weight shoul d be given to decision s of
such appell a t e tribun a l. Ideally – subjec t to our
law on evide n c e – what is decr e e d as cano ni c ally
invalid should also be decr e e d civilly void.
This is one insta n c e wher e, in view of the evide n t
sourc e and pur pos e of the Family Code
provision, cont e m p o r a n e o u s religious
inte r p r e t a t i o n is to be given pers u a sive effect.
Her e, the Stat e and the Chur c h – while
rem ai ni n g inde p e n d e n t , sepa r a t e and apa r t from
each other – shall walk toge t h e r in synod al
cade n c e towar d s the sam e goal of prot e c ti n g and
che rishi n g mar ri a g e and the family as the
inviolabl e base of the nation.
Petition e r’s arg u m e n t is withou t merit.
In its Decision dat e d Febr u a r y 23, 2004, the
Court of Appeals appa r e n t ly did not have the
opport u ni ty to consid e r the decision of the
Nation al Appellat e Matri m o ni al Tribun al.
Neve r t h e l e s s, it is clear that the Court of
Appeals conside r e d the Mat ri m o ni al Tribun al’s
decision in its Resolution dat e d August 5, 2004
when it resolve d petition e r’s motion for
recon si d e r a t i o n . In the said Resolution, the Court
of Appeal s took cogniza n c e of the very sam e
issue s now raise d befor e this Court and corr e c t ly
held that petition e r’s motion for recon si d e r a t i o n
was devoid of merit. It stat e d:
The Decision of the Nation al Appellat e
Mat ri m o ni al Tribun al dat e d July 2, 2002, which
was forwa r d e d to this Court only on Febr u a r y 11,
2004, rea d s as follows:
x x x The FACTS collate d from party compl ain a n t
and reliable witne s s e s which includ e a sist e r- in-
law of Respon d e n t (despit e sum m o n s from the
Court dat e d June 14, 1999, he did not appe a r
befor e the Cour t, in effect waiving his right to be
hea r d , henc e, trial in abse n t i a followed)
corro bo r a t e and lead this Collegia t e Court to
believe with mor al cert ai n t y requir e d by law and
conclud e that the husb a n d- respo n d e n t upon
cont r a c t i n g marri a g e suffer e d from grave lack of
due discre tio n of judg m e n t , ther e b y rend e r i n g
nug a t o r y his marit al cont r a c t : First, his family
was dysfunc ti on a l in that as a child, he saw the
bre a k- up of the marri a g e of his own par e n t s; his
own two siblings have broke n mar ri a g e s;
Secon d, he the r efo r e grew up with a
domin e e ri n g mot h e r with whom [he] identified
and on whom he depe n d e d for advice; Third, he
was accor di n g to his friend s, alre a dy into drug s
and alcohol befor e mar ri a g e ; this affect e d his
cond u c t of bipola r kind: he could be very quiet
but late r very talkative, peac ef ul but late r
hothe a d e d even violent, he also was awa r e of the
infidelity of his moth e r who now lives with her
par a m o u r , also marri e d and a police m a n ; Finally,
into mar ri a g e , he continu e d with his drugs and
alcohol abus e until one time he cam e hom e very
drun k and beat up his wife and att a c k e d her with
a bolo that woun d e d her; this led to final
sepa r a t i o n.
WHERE FOR E, pre m is e s consi de r e d , this Court
of Secon d Inst a n c e , having invoke d the Divine
Nam e and having consid e r e d the per tin e n t Law
and releva n t Jurispr u d e n c e to the Fact s of the
Case her e by proclai m s, declar e s and decr e e s the
confir m a ti o n of the sent e n c e from the Cour t a
quo in favor of the nullity of mar ri a g e on the
groun d cont e m pl a t e d unde r Canon 1095, 2 of the
1983 Code of Canon Law.
Howev e r, recor d s of the proc e e di n g s befor e the
Trial Court show that, othe r than hers elf,
petition e r- appell a n t offere d the testi m o ni e s of
the following perso n s only, to wit: Aldana
Celedo ni a (petition e r- app ella n t’s moth e r ), Sonny
de la Cruz (me m b e r , PNP, Bugallon,
Pang a si n a n ), and Ma. Cristin a R. Gate s
(psychologi st). Said witne s s e s testified, in
par tic ul a r , to the unfait hful night of July 1, 1994
whe r ei n the respo n d e n t alleg e dly mad e an
att e m p t on the life of the petition e r. But unlike
the hea ri n g and finding befor e the Mat ri m o ni al
Tribun al, petition e r- appella n t’s sist e r- in- law and
friends of the opposin g parti e s wer e neve r
pre s e n t e d befor e said Court. As to the cont e n t s
and vera ci ty of the latt e r’s testi m o ni e s, this
Court is without any clue.
True, in the case of Repu blic v. Court of Appeals,
et al. (268 SCRA 198), the Supr e m e Court held
that the inter p r e t a t i o n s given by the Nation al
Appellat e Mat ri m o ni al Tribun al of the Catholic
Chur c h in the Philippin e s, while not cont rolling
or decisive, should be given gre a t resp e c t by our
court s. Howev e r, the Highe st Tribun al
expou n d e d as follows:
Since the pur pos e of includi ng such provision in
our Family Code is to har m o niz e our civil laws
with the religious faith of our peopl e, it sta n d s to
reaso n that to achieve such har m o niz a tio n, gre a t
per s u a sive weight shoul d be given to decision s of
such appell a t e tribun a l. Ideally – subjec t to our
law on evide n c e – what is decr e e d as
[cano nic ally] invalid should be decr e e d civilly
void x x x.
And in relation the r e t o, Rule 132, Sec. 34 of the
Rules of Evidenc e stat e s:
The court shall consid e r no evide nc e which has
not bee n form ally offere d. The purpo s e of which
the evide n c e is offer e d must be specified.
Given the prec e di n g disquisition s, petition e r-
app ella n t should not expec t us to give cred e n c e
to the Decision of the Nation al Appellat e
Mat ri m o ni al Tribun al whe n, appa r e n t l y, it was
made on a differe n t set of evide n c e of which We
have no way of asce r t a i ni n g their trut hful n e s s.
Furt h e r m o r e , it is an elem e n t a r y rule that
judg m e n t s must be base d on the evide nc e
pre s e n t e d befor e the cour t (Manz a n o vs. Perez,
362 SCRA 430 [2001]). And base d on the
evide n c e on recor d, We find no ampl e rea so n to
reve r s e or modify the judg m e n t of the Trial
Court.3 1
Sant os v. Sant o s 3 2 cited the delibe r a ti o n s duri ng
the sessions of the Family Code Revision
Com mit t e e , which draft e d the Code, to provide
an insight on the import of Article 36 of the
Family Code. It stat e d that a par t of the
provision is simila r to the third par a g r a p h of
Canon 1095 of the Code of Canon Law, which
rea d s:
Canon 1095. The following are incap a bl e of
cont r a c t i n g marri a g e :
1. those who lack sufficie nt use of reaso n;
2. those who suffer from a grave lack of
discr e tio n of judg m e n t conc e r ni n g the esse n ti al
mat ri m o ni al right s and obliga tion s to be
mut u ally given and acce p t e d ;
3. those who, beca u s e of caus e s of a
psychologic al nat u r e , are unabl e to assu m e the
esse n ti al obligation s of mar ri a g e .
It must be point e d out that in this case, the basis
of the decla r a t io n of nullity of mar ri a g e by the
Nation al Appellat e Matri m o ni al Tribun al is not
the third par a g r a p h of Canon 1095 which
mention s caus e s of a psychologic al nat u r e , but
the secon d par a g r a p h of Canon 1095 which
refer s to those who suffer from a grave lack of
discr e tio n of judg m e n t conc e r ni n g esse n t i al
mat ri m o ni al right s and obliga tion s to be
mut u ally given and acce p t e d . For clarity, the
pertin e n t portion of the decision of the Nation al
Appellat e Mat ri m o ni al Tribun al rea d s:
The FACTS collat e d from party compl ai n a n t and
reliabl e witne s s e s which includ e a siste r- in- law
of Respon d e n t (despit e sum m o n s from the Cour t
dat e d June 14, 1999, he did not app e a r before
the Cour t, in effect waiving his right to be hea r d,
henc e , trial in abse n t i a followe d) corrob o r a t e
and lead this Collegi at e Cour t to believe with
mor al cert ai n t y requi r e d by law and conclud e
that the husb a n d- respo n d e n t upon cont a c ti n g
mar ri a g e suffer e d from grave lack of due
discr e tio n of judg m e n t , the r e by rend e ri n g
nug a t o r y his marit al cont r a c t x x x.
WHERE FOR E, pre m is e s consi de r e d , this Court
of Secon d Inst a n c e , having invoke d the Divine
Nam e and having consid e r e d the per tin e n t Law
and releva n t Jurispr u d e n c e to the Fact s of the
Case her e by proclai m s, declar e s and decr e e s the
confir m a ti o n of the sent e n c e from the Cour t a
quo in favor of the nullity of mar ri a g e on the
groun d cont e m pl a t e d unde r Canon 1095, 2 of the
1983 Code of Canon Law. x x x
Henc e, even if, as cont e n d e d by petition e r, the
factu al basis of the decision of the Nation al
Appellat e Mat ri m o ni al Tribun al is similar to the
facts est a blish e d by petition e r befor e the trial
court, the decision of the Nation al Appellat e
Mat ri m o ni al Tribun al confir mi n g the decr e e of
nullity of mar ri a g e by the court a quo is not
base d on the psychologic al inca p a ci ty of
respo n d e n t . Petition e r , ther efo r e , err e d in
statin g that the conclusion of Psychologi st
Cristin a Gate s rega r di n g the psychologic al
incap a ci ty of respo n d e n t is suppo r t e d by the
decision of the Nation al Appellat e Mat ri m o ni al
Tribun al.
In fine, the Cour t of Appeals did not err in
affirmin g the Decision of the RTC.
WHERE FOR E, the petition is DENIED. The
Decision of the Cour t of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 6805 3, date d Febr u a r y 23, 2004, and its
Resolution dat e d August 5, 2004, are her e by
AFFIRMED.
No costs.
G.R. No. 11 9 1 9 0 Janu ary 16, 19 9 7
CHI MING TSOI, peti t i o n e r ,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO- TSOI,
res p o n d e n t s .
TORRES, JR., J.:
Man has not invent e d a reliabl e comp a s s by
which to ste e r a mar ri a g e in its journ e y over
trou bl e d wat e r s. Laws are see mi n gly inade q u a t e .
Over time, much relianc e has bee n place d in the
works of the unse e n han d of Him who crea t e d all
things.
Who is to blam e when a mar ri a g e fails?
This case was origin ally com m e n c e d by a
distr a u g h t wife again s t her unc a ri n g husb a n d in
the Region al Trial Court of Quezon City (Bra nc h
89) which decr e e d the ann ul m e n t of the
mar ri a g e on the grou n d of psychologi c al
incap a ci ty. Petition e r appe al e d the decision of
the trial court to respo n d e n t Court of Appe als
(CA-G.R. CV No. 42758) which affirm e d the Trial
Court 's decision Nove m b e r 29, 1994 and
corr e s p o n d i n g ly denie d the motion for
recon si d e r a t i o n in a resol ution dat e d Febr u a r y
14, 1995.
The stat e m e n t of the case and of the facts made
by the trial court and repr o d u c e d by the Cour t of
Appeals 1 its decision are as follows:
From the evide n c e addu c e d , the following acts
were pre po n d e r a n t l y esta blis h e d:
Some ti m e on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff mar ri e d
the defen d a n t at the Manila Cath e d r a l , . . .
Intr a m u r o s Manila, as evide n c e d by their
Mar ri a g e Cont r a c t . (Exh. "A")
After the celeb r a t i o n of their mar ri a g e and
weddin g rec e p t io n at the Sout h Villa, Maka ti,
they went and proce e d e d to the house of
defe n d a n t ' s moth e r .
Ther e, they slept toget h e r on the sam e bed in the
sam e room for the first night of their mar ri e d
life.
It is the version of the plaintiff, that contr a r y to
her expe ct a t i o n s, that as newlyw e d s they wer e
suppos e d to enjoy making love, or having sexual
inte rc o u r s e , with each othe r, the defe n d a n t just
went to bed, slept on one side the r e of, then
turn e d his back and went to sleep . Ther e was no
sexual inter c o u r s e bet w e e n the m duri ng the first
night. The sam e thing happ e n e d on the secon d,
third and fourt h night s.
In an effort to have their honey m o o n in a privat e
place whe r e they can enjoy toge t h e r durin g their
first week as husb a n d and wife, they went to
Baguio City. But, they did so toge t h e r with her
mot h e r , an uncle, his mot h e r and his neph e w .
They wer e all invited by the defen d a n t to join
the m . [T]hey staye d in Baguio City for four (4)
days. But, during this period, ther e was no
sexual inter c o u r s e bet w e e n the m , since the
defe n d a n t avoided her by taking a long walk
durin g siest a time or by just sleepi n g on a
rockin g chair locat e d at the living room. They
slept toge t h e r in the sam e room and on the sam e
bed since May 22, 1988 until Marc h 15, 1989.
But durin g this period, the r e was no att e m p t of
sexual inter c o u r s e bet w e e n the m . [S]he claims,
that she did not: even see her husb a n d ' s privat e
par t s nor did he see hers.
Becau s e of this, they submit t e d the m s elv e s for
medical exami n a t i o n s to Dr. Eufe mio Mac al al a g,
a urologist at the Chine s e Gene r al Hospit al, on
Janua r y 20, 1989.
The result s of their physical examin a t io n s wer e
that she is healt hy, nor m al and still a virgin,
while that of her husb a n d ' s exa mi n a t io n was
kept confide n ti al up to this time. While no
medici ne was presc ri b e d for her, the doctor
pre sc ri b e d medica tio n s for her husb a n d which
was also kept confide n ti al. No tre a t m e n t was
given to her. For her husb a n d , he was aske d by
the docto r to ret u r n but he neve r did.
The plaintiff claims, that the defe n d a n t is
impot e n t , a closet homos ex u a l as he did not
show his penis. She said, that she had obse rv e d
the defen d a n t using an eyeb r o w pencil and
som e ti m e s the clea n si n g crea m of his moth e r.
And that, accor di n g to her, the defen d a n t
mar ri e d her, a Filipino citize n, to acquir e or
maint ai n his resid e n cy stat u s here in the count ry
and to publicly maint ai n the appe a r a n c e of a
nor m a l man.
The plaintiff is not willing to reconcil e with her
husb a n d .
On the othe r hand, it is the claim of the
defe n d a n t that if their mar ri a g e shall be ann ulle d
by rea so n of psychologic al incap a ci ty, the fault
lies with his wife.
But, he said that he does not want his mar ri a g e
with his wife annull e d for sever al rea so n s, viz:
(1) that he loves her very much; (2) that he has
no defec t on his part and he is physic ally and
psychologic ally capa bl e; and, (3) since the
relation s hi p is still very young and if ther e is any
differe n c e s betw e e n the two of the m, it can still
be recon cile d and that, accor di n g to him, if
eithe r one of the m has some incap a bilitie s, the r e
is no cert ai n t y that this will not be cur e d. He
furth e r claims, that if ther e is any defec t, it can
be cur e d by the inte rv e n t i o n of medic al
techn ology or scienc e .
The defe n d a n t admit t e d that since their
mar ri a g e on May 22, 1988, until thei r sepa r a t io n
on Marc h 15, 1989, ther e was no sexual cont a c t
betw e e n them . But, the reaso n for this,
accor di n g to the defen d a n t , was that everyti m e
he want s to have sexual inter c o u r s e with his
wife, she always avoide d him and whe n e v e r he
care ss e s her privat e par t s, she always remov e d
his han d s. The defe n d a n t claim s, that he force d
his wife to have sex with him only once but he
did not contin u e bec a u s e she was shakin g and
she did not like it. So he stopp e d.
Ther e are two (2) reaso n s , accor di n g to the
defe n d a n t , why the plaintiff filed this case
again s t him, and these are: (1) that she is afraid
that she will be force d to ret u r n the piece s of
jewelry of his mot h e r , and, (2) that her husb a n d ,
the defen d a n t , will consu m m a t e their mar ri a g e .
The defe n d a n t insist e d that their mar ri a g e will
rem ai n valid bec a u s e they are still very young
and the r e is still a cha nc e to overco m e their
differe n c e s .
The defe n d a n t submi t t e d hims elf to a physical
examin a t io n. His penis was examin e d by Dr.
Sergio Alteza, Jr., for the purpos e of finding out
whet h e r he is impot e n t . As a result the r e of, Dr.
Alteza sub mi t t e d his Doctor' s Medical Repor t.
(Exh. "2"). It is stat e d ther e , that ther e is no
evide n c e of impot e n c y (Exh. "2- B"), and he is
capa bl e of erec tio n. (Exh. "2- C")
The docto r said, that he aske d the defe n d a n t to
mast u r b a t e to find out whet h e r or not he has an
erec tio n and he found out that from the original
size of two (2) inche s, or five (5) centi m e t e r s , the
penis of the defen d a n t lengt h e n e d by one (1)
inch and one centi m e t e r . Dr. Alteza said, that the
defe n d a n t had only a soft erec tion which is why
his penis is not in its full lengt h. But, still is
capa bl e of furt h e r erec tio n, in that with his soft
erec tio n, the defen d a n t is capa bl e of having
sexual inter c o u r s e with a wom a n.
In open Cour t, the Trial Prose c u t o r manife st e d
that ther e is no collusion bet w e e n the parti e s
and that the evide nc e is not fabric a t e d ." 2
After trial, the cour t rend e r e d judgm e n t , the
dispositive portion of which rea d s:
ACCORDINGLY, judg m e n t is her e by rend e r e d
decla ri n g as VOID the mar ri a g e ent e r e d into by
the plaintiff with the defe n d a n t on May 22, 1988
at the Manila Cath e d r a l , Basilica of the
Imm a c ul a t e Conc e p tio n, Intr a m u r o s , Manila,
befor e the Rt. Rev. Msgr. Mele ncio de Vera.
Withou t costs. Let a copy of this decision be
furnish e d the Local Civil Regist r a r of Quezon
City. Let anot h e r copy be furnish e d the Local
Civil Regist r a r of Manila.
On appe al, the Court of Appe als affirm e d the
trial court ' s decision.
Henc e, the insta n t petition.
Petition e r allege s that the respo n d e n t Court of
Appeals err e d:
I The assaile d decision was not base d on such a
in affirmi ng the conclusio n s of the lower court
that ther e was no sexual inter co u r s e betw e e n the
par ti e s withou t making any finding s of fact.
II
in holding that the refus al of privat e respo n d e n t
to have sexu al com m u ni o n with petition e r is a
psychologic al incap a ci ty inas m u c h as proof
ther e of is totally abse n t .
III
in holding that the alleg e d refusal of both the
petition e r and the privat e respo n d e n t to have sex
with each othe r constit u t e s psychologic al
incap a ci ty of both.
IV
in affirmi ng the annul m e n t of the mar ri a g e
betw e e n the parti e s dec r e e d by the lowe r court
without fully satisfying itself that the r e was no
collusion betw e e n the m.
We find the petition to be ber eft of merit.
Petition e r cont e n d s that being the plaintiff in
Civil Case No. Q-89- 3141, privat e respo n d e n t has
the burd e n of proving the allega tio n s in her
compl ai n t; that since ther e was no indep e n d e n t
evide n c e to prove the alleg e d non- coitus
betw e e n the parti e s, the r e rem ai n s no othe r
basis for the court 's conclusion excep t the
admi ssion of petition e r ; that public policy should
aid acts inte n d e d to validat e mar ri a g e and
shoul d ret a r d acts inten d e d to invalida t e the m ;
that the conclusion draw n by the trial court on
the admissio n s and confession s of the parti es in
their pleadi n g s and in the cours e of the trial is
misplac e d since it could have been a produ c t of
collusion; and that in actions for annul m e n t of
mar ri a g e , the mat e ri al facts alleg e d in the
compl ai n t shall always be prove d.3
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Cour t rea d s:
Section 1. Judgm e n t on the plea di n g s. — Wher e
an answ e r fails to tend e r an issue, or other wi s e
admi ts the mat e ri al allega ti on s of the adve r s e
par ty's pleadi n g, the court may, on motion of
that par ty, direc t judg m e n t on such pleadi n g. But
in actions for ann ul m e n t of mar ri a g e or for legal
sepa r a t i o n the mat e ri al facts allege d in the
compl ai n t shall always be prove d.
The foregoin g provision pert ai n s to a judgm e n t
on the pleadi n g s . What said provision seeks to
preve n t is annul m e n t of mar ri a g e withou t trial.
judg m e n t on the plea di n g s . When privat e
respo n d e n t testified und e r oath befor e the trial
court and was cross- exa mi n e d by oath befor e the
trial court and was cross- exa mi n e d by the
adve r s e par ty, she ther e b y pres e n t e d evide n c e in
form of a testim o ny. After such evide n c e was
pre s e n t e d , it be cam e incum b e n t upon petition e r
to pres e n t his side. He admit t e d that since their
mar ri a g e on May 22, 1988, until thei r sepa r a t io n
on Marc h 15, 1989, ther e was no sexual
inte rc o u r s e bet w e e n the m.
To preve n t collusion betw e e n the parti e s is the
reaso n why, as stat e d by the petition e r, the Civil
Code provide s that no judgm e n t ann ulling a
mar ri a g e shall be prom ul g a t e d upon a
stipul a tion of facts or by confes sio n of judgm e n t
(Arts. 88 and 101[p a r . 2]) and the Rules of Court
prohibit such ann ul m e n t withou t trial (Sec. 1,
Rule 19).
The case has rea c h e d this Court beca u s e
petition e r does not want their mar ri a g e to be
annulle d. This only show s that the r e is no
collusion betw e e n the parti e s. When petition e r
admi tt e d that he and his wife (privat e
respo n d e n t ) have never had sexual cont a c t with
each other , he must have bee n only telling the
trut h. We are repro d u c i n g the releva n t portion of
the challen g e d resolutio n denyin g petition e r ' s
Motion for Reconsi d e r a t i o n, pen n e d with
magist e ri al lucidity by Associat e Justice Mine rv a
Gonza g a- Reyes, viz:
The judg m e n t of the trial cour t which was
affirm e d by this Court is not base d on a
stipul a tion of facts. The issue of whet h e r or not
the app ell a n t is psychologic ally incap a ci t a t e d to
disch a r g e a basic marit al obligation was resolve d
upon a review of both the docu m e n t a r y and
testi m o ni al evide n c e on recor d. Appellan t
admi tt e d that he did not have sexual relations
with his wife afte r almost ten mont h s of
coha bi t a t io n, and it appe a r s that he is not
sufferi ng from any physical disability. Such
abnor m a l reluct a n c e or unwillingn e s s to
consu m m a t e his mar ri a g e is stron gly indicative
of a seriou s perso n ali ty disor d e r which to the
mind of this Court clea rly demo n s t r a t e s an 'utt e r
inse nsi tivity or inability to give mea ni n g and
significa n c e to the mar ri a g e ' within the mea ni n g
of Article 36 of the Family Code (See Sant os vs.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 1120 1 9 , Janua ry 4,
1995).4
Petition e r furth e r cont e n d s that respo n d e n t
court err e d in holding that the alleg e d refusal of
both the petition e r and the privat e respo n d e n t to
have sex with each othe r consti t u t e s
psychologic al incap a ci ty of both. He points out
as erro r the failure of the trial court to make "a
cat e g o ri c al finding about the allege d
psychologic al incap a ci ty and an in- dept h analysis
of the rea so n s for such refus al which may not be
nece s s a r ily due to physc hologic al disor d e r s "
bec a u s e the r e might have bee n othe r reaso n s , —
i.e., physical disor d e r s , such as aches, pains or
othe r discomfo r t s, — why privat e respo n d e n t
would not want to have sexual inte r c o u r s e from
May 22, 1988 to Marc h 15, 1989, in a shor t spa n
of 10 mont h s.
First, it must be stat e d that neith e r the trial
court nor the respo n d e n t cour t mad e a finding
on who betw e e n petition e r and privat e
respo n d e n t refuse s to have sexual cont a c t with
the othe r. The fact rem ai n s, howeve r , that the r e
has neve r been coitus betw e e n the m. At any
rat e, since the action to decla r e the mar ri a g e
void may be filed by eithe r par ty, i.e., even the
psychologic ally incap a ci t a t e d , the que stio n of
who refus e s to have sex with the othe r beco m e s
imma t e ri al.
Petition e r claims that the r e is no indep e n d e n t
evide n c e on recor d to show that any of the
par ti e s is sufferin g from phychologic al
incap a ci ty. Petition e r also claim s that he want e d
to have sex with privat e respo n d e n t ; that the
reaso n for privat e respo n d e n t ' s refusal may not
be psychologic al but physical disor d e r as stat e d
above.
We do not agre e . Assumi n g it to be so, petition e r
could have discus s e d with privat e respo n d e n t or
aske d her what is ailing her, and why she balks
and avoids him everyti m e he want e d to have
sexual inter c o u r s e with her. He never did. At
least, the r e is nothi ng in the recor d to show that
he had tried to find out or discove r what the
proble m with his wife could be. What he
pre s e n t e d in evide nc e is his docto r's Medical
Repor t that ther e is no evide nc e of his impot e n c y
and he is capa bl e of erec tion.5 Since it is
petition e r ' s claim that the rea so n is not
psychologic al but per h a p s physical disor d e r on
the part of privat e respo n d e n t , it beca m e
incum b e n t upon him to prove such a claim.
If a spous e , altho u g h physically capa bl e but
simply refuse s to perfor m his or her esse n ti al
mar ri a g e obligation s, and the refusal is sens el e s s
and const a n t , Cat holic mar ri a g e tribu n a l s
att rib u t e the caus e s to psychologic al incap a ci ty
than to stub bo r n refus al. Sens el e s s and
prot r a c t e d refus al is equival e n t to psychologi c al
incap a ci ty. Thus, the prolong e d refusal of a
spous e to have sexual inter c o u r s e with his or her
spous e is consid e r e d a sign of psychologic al
incap a ci ty.6
Evide n tly, one of the esse n ti al mari t al obligatio n s
und e r the Family Code is "To proc r e a t e childr e n
base d on the unive rs al principl e that procr e a t i o n
of childr e n throu g h sexu al coope r a ti o n is the
basic end of mar ri a g e ." Const a n t non- fulfillme n t
of this obligatio n will finally dest r oy the inte g rity
or wholen e s s of the marri a g e . In the case at bar,
the sensel e s s and prot r a c t e d refus al of one of the
par ti e s to fulfill the above marit al obligatio n is
equival e n t to psychologic al incap a ci ty.
As aptly stat e d by the respo n d e n t cour t,
An exami n a ti o n of the evide nc e convinc e s Us
that the husb a n d ' s plea that the wife did not
want carn al inter c o u r s e with him does not
inspire belief. Since he was not physically
impot e n t , but he refr ain e d from sexu al
inte rc o u r s e durin g the enti re time (from May 22,
1988 to Marc h 15, 1989) that he occupi e d the
sam e bed with his wife, purely out of symph a t y
for her feelings, he dese rv e s to be doubt e d for
not having asse r t e d his right seven thoug h she
balke d (Tompki n s vs. Tompki ns, 111 Atl. 599,
cited in I Para s, Civil Code, at p. 330). Beside s, if
it wer e true that it is the wife was sufferi n g from
incap a ci ty, the fact that defe n d a n t did not go to
court and seek the decla r a t i o n of nullity weak e n s
his claim. This case was instit ut e d by the wife
whose norm al expe c t a t io n s of her mar ri a g e wer e
frust r a t e d by her husb a n d ' s inad e q u a c y.
Consid e ri n g the inna t e mode s ty of the Filipino
wom a n, it is hard to believe that she would
expose her privat e life to public scru tiny and
fabric a t e testi m o ny agains t her husb a n d if it
were not nece s s a r y to put her life in orde r and
put to rest her mari t al stat u s.
love amor gignit amor e m , resp e c t , sacrifice and
a continui n g com mi t m e n t to comp r o m i s e ,
consciou s of its value as a sublim e social
instit ution.
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed
relation s hi p in which the partie s found
the m s elv e s trap p e d in its mire of unfulfilled vows
and uncon s u m m a t e d marit al obliga tion s, can do
no less but sust ai n the studie d judg m e n t of
respo n d e n t appella t e court.

We are not impr e s s e d by defen d a n t ' s claim that IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISE S , the
wha t the evide n c e prove d is the unwillingn e s s or assaile d decision of the Court of Appeals dat e d
lack of intentio n to perfor m the sexu al act, which Nove m b e r 29, 1994 is her e by AFFIRMED in all
is not phychologi c al inca p a ci t y, and which can be resp e c t s and the petition is her e by DENIED for
achiev e d "thro u g h prope r motivation." After lack of merit.
almost ten mont h s of coha bi t a ti o n, the admission
that the husb a n d is reluc t a n t or unwilling to
perfor m the sexual act with his wife whom he
profess e s to love very dea rly, and who has not
pose d any insur m o u n t a b l e resist a n c e to his
allege d appr o a c h e s , is indica tive of a hopel e ss
situati on, and of a serious perso n ali ty disord e r
that constit u t e s psychologic al incap a ci ty to
disch a r g e the basic marit al coven a n t s within the
cont e m pl a t i o n of the Family Code.7

While the law provide s that the husb a n d and the

wife are oblige d to live toget h e r , obse rv e mut u al
love, resp e c t and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code),
the sanctio n the r efo r is actu ally the
"spont a n e o u s , mut u al affection bet w e e n husb a n d
and wife and not any legal man d a t e or court
orde r" (Cuad e r n o vs. Cuad e r n o 120 Phil. 1298).
Love is usele ss unless it is sha r e d with anot h e r .
Inde e d, no man is an island, the cruele s t act of a
par t n e r in mar ri a g e is to say "I could not have
care d less." This is so bec a u s e an ungive n self is
an unfulfilled self. The egoist has not hin g but [G.R. NO. 15 5 8 0 0 : Marc h 10, 20 0 6 ]
himself. In the nat u r al orde r, it is sexual intim a cy
which brings spous e s whole n e s s and onen e s s . LEONILO ANTO NIO Peti t i o n e r , v. MARIE
Sexual intim a cy is a gift and a particip a ti o n in IVON NE F. REYES, Res p o n d e n t .
the myst e ry of cre a tion. It is a function which DE C IS IO N
enlivens the hope of procr e a ti o n and ensu r e s the
continu a t i o n of family relation s. TINGA, J.:

It app e a r s that ther e is abse n c e of emp a t h y
betw e e n petition e r and privat e respo n d e n t . That
is — a shar e d feeling which betw e e n husb a n d
and wife must be expe ri e n c e d not only by having
spont a n e o u s sexual intim a cy but a dee p sens e of
spirit u al com m u ni o n. Marit al union is a two- way
proce s s. An expr e s sive inter e s t in each othe r ' s
feelings at a time it is nee d e d by the othe r can go
a long way in deep e ni n g the mari t al relation s hi p.
Mar ri a g e is definit ely not for childr e n but for two
conse n ti n g adult s who view the relation s hi p with
Statistic s neve r lie, but lovers often do, quipp e d
a sage. This sad trut h has unse t tl e d many a love
tra n sfo r m e d into mat ri m o n y. Any sort of
dec e p t io n betw e e n spous e s , no mat t e r the
gravity, is always disqui e ti n g. Deceit to the
dept h and bre a d t h unveiled in the following
pag e s, dark and irra tion al as in the mode r n noir
tale, dims any trac e of certit u d e on the guilty
spous e ' s capa bility to fulfill the marit al
obliga tion s even more.
The Petition for Review on Certior a ri assails the
Decision1 and Resolution 2 of the Court of
Appeals dat e d 29 Nove m b e r 2001 and 24
Octobe r 2002. The Court of Appeal s had
reve r s e d the judgm e n t 3 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Maka ti decla ri n g the marri a g e of
Leonilo N. Antonio (petition e r ) and Marie Ivonn e
F. Reyes (respo n d e n t ), null and void. After
careful consid e r a t i o n , we reve r s e and affirm
inste a d the trial court.
Antec e d e n t Fact s
Petition e r and respo n d e n t met in August 1989
when petition e r was 26 years old and respo n d e n t
was 36 year s of age. Barely a year afte r their
first meeti n g, they got marri e d before a minist e r
of the Gospel4 at the Manila City Hall, and
thro u g h a subs e q u e n t chur c h weddi n g 5 at the
Sta. Rosa de Lima Parish, Bagon g Ilog, Pasig,
Met ro Manila on 6 Dece m b e r 1990.6 Out of their
union, a child was born on 19 April 1991, who
sadly died five (5) mont h s later.
On 8 Marc h 1993,7 petition e r filed a petition to
have his mar ri a g e to respo n d e n t decla r e d null
and void. He anc ho r e d his petition for nullity on
Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that
respo n d e n t was psychologi c ally incap a ci t a t e d to
comply with the esse n ti al obligation s of
mar ri a g e . He asse r t e d that respo n d e n t ' s
incap a ci ty exist e d at the time their mar ri a g e was
celeb r a t e d and still subsist s up to the pres e n t . 8
As manife st a t i o n s of respo n d e n t ' s alleg e d
psychologic al incap a ci ty, petition e r claim e d that
respo n d e n t per sist e n t ly lied about hers elf, the
people arou n d her, her occup a t i o n, incom e,
educ a t io n al att ai n m e n t and othe r event s or
things, 9 to wit:
(1) She conce al e d the fact that she previously
gave birt h to an illegiti m a t e son,10 and inste a d
introd u c e d the boy to petition e r as the adopt e d
child of her family. She only confess e d the trut h
about the boy's par e n t a g e whe n petition e r
learn e d about it from othe r sourc e s afte r thei r
mar ri a g e . 1 1
(2) She fabric a t e d a story that her brot h e r- in-
law, Edwin David, att e m p t e d to rap e and kill her
when in fact, no such incide n t occur r e d . 1 2
(3) She misre p r e s e n t e d hers elf as a psychia t ri s t
to her obst e t ri ci a n, Dr. Consu elo Gardi n e r , and
told som e of her friend s that she gra d u a t e d with
a degr e e in psychology, whe n she was neit h e r. 1 3
(4) She claim e d to be a singe r or a free- lance
voice talen t affiliat e d with Blackgold Recor di n g
Comp a ny (Blackgol d); yet, not a single mem b e r
of her family ever witne s s e d her allege d singin g
activities with the group. In the sam e vein, she
post ul a t e d that a lunc h e o n show was held at the
Philippin e Village Hotel in her honor and even
pre s e n t e d an invitation to that effect 1 4 but
petition e r discove r e d per certifica tion by the
Direct o r of Sales of said hotel that no such
occasion had take n plac e.1 5
(5) She invent e d friend s nam e d Babes Santo s
and Via Marq u e z, and unde r those nam e s, sent
lengt hy lette r s to petition e r claimi ng to be from
Blackgold and toutin g her as the "num b e r one
money m a k e r " in the com m e r c i al indus t ry wort h
P2 million.1 6 Petition e r later found out that
respo n d e n t her self was the one who wrot e and
sent the lette r s to him when she admi tt e d the
trut h in one of their qua r r e l s. 1 7 He likewise
realize d that Babes Sant os and Via Mar q u e z
were only figm e n t s of her imagin a t io n when he
discove r e d they were not known in or conne c t e d
with Blackgold.1 8
(6) She repr e s e n t e d hers elf as a perso n of
gre a t e r mea n s, thus, she alter e d her payslip to
make it appe a r that she ear n e d a highe r incom e .
She bough t a sala set from a public mark e t but
told petition e r that she acqui r e d it from a famous
furnit u r e deal e r.1 9 She spen t lavishly on
unn ec e s s a r y item s and ende d up borr owi n g
money from othe r people on false pret ext s. 2 0
(7) She exhibit e d insec u ri ti e s and jealousie s over
him to the exte nt of calling up his officem a t e s to
monitor his whe r e a b o u t s . When he could no
longe r take her unus u al behavior, he sepa r a t e d
from her in August 1991. He tried to att e m p t a
recon cilia tion but since her behavior did not
cha n g e , he finally left her for good in Nove m b e r
1991.2 1
In suppo r t of his petition, petition e r pres e n t e d
Dr. Dant e Her r e r a Abced e (Dr. Abced e), a
psychi a t ri s t, and Dr. Arnulfo V.
Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologi st, who
stat e d , base d on the test s they condu c t e d , that
petition e r was esse n t i ally a nor m al,
intros p e c t ive, shy and cons e rv a t ive type of
per so n. On the othe r han d, they observ e d that
respo n d e n t ' s persi st e n t and const a n t lying
to petition e r was abno r m a l or pat hologic al. It
und e r m i n e d the basic relation s hi p that should be
base d on love, trust and resp e c t . 2 2 They furt h e r
asse r t e d that respo n d e n t ' s extr e m e jealousy was
also pat hologic al. It reac h e d the point of
par a n oi a since ther e was no actu al basis for her
to susp e c t that petition e r was having an affair
with anot h e r wom a n. They conclud e d base d on
the foregoi n g that respo n d e n t was
psychologic ally incap a ci t a t e d to perfor m her
esse n ti al marit al obligatio n s.2 3
In opposin g the petition, respo n d e n t claim e d that
she perfor m e d her marit al obliga tion s by
att e n di n g to all the nee d s of her husb a n d . She
asse r t e d that the r e was no trut h to the allega tion
that she fabric a t e d storie s, told lies and invent e d
per so n ali ti e s.2 4 She pres e n t e d her version, thus:
(1) She conce al e d her child by anot h e r man from
petition e r beca u s e she was afraid of losing her
husb a n d . 2 5
(2) She told petition e r about David's att e m p t to
rap e and kill her beca u s e she sur mi s e d such
inte nt from David's act of touchin g her back and
ogling her from hea d to foot.26
(3) She was actu ally a BS Bankin g and Finan c e
gra d u a t e and had been teac hi n g psychology at
the Pasig Catholic School for two (2) years.2 7
(4) She was a free- lance voice tale nt of Aris de
las Alas, an exec utive produ c e r of Chan n e l 9 and
she had done thre e (3) com m e r c i al s with
McCa n n Erickso n for the adve r tis e m e n t of Coca-
cola, Johnson & Johnso n, and Trade r s Royal
Bank. She told petition e r she was a Blackgol d
reco r di n g artist althou g h she was not und e r
cont r a c t with the comp a n y, yet she repor t e d to
the Blackgol d office after office hour s. She
claim e d that a lunch e o n show was indee d held in
her honor at the Philippin e Village Hot el on 8
Dece m b e r 1979.2 8
(5) She vowe d that the lett e r s sent to petition e r
were not writt e n by her and the write r s ther e of
were not fictitious. Bea Marq u e z Recto of the
Recto political clan was a resid e n t of the Unit ed
Stat e s while Babe s Sant os was employe d with
Saniw a r e s . 2 9
(6) She admi tt e d that she called up an officem a t e
of her husb a n d but aver r e d that she mer ely
aske d the latt e r in a diplom a t i c mat t e r if she was
the one asking for chocola t e s from petition e r ,
and not to monito r her husb a n d ' s
whe r e a b o u t s. 3 0
(7) She belied the allega ti on that she spen t
lavishly as she suppo r t e d almost ten people from
her mont hly budg e t of P7,000.0 0. 3 1
In fine, respo n d e n t arg u e d that apa r t from her
non- disclosu r e of a child prior to their mar ri a g e ,
the othe r lies att rib u t e d to her by petition e r wer e
mostly hea r s a y and unconvinci n g. Her sta nc e
was that the totality of the evide n c e pre s e n t e d is
not sufficien t for a finding of psychologic al
incap a ci ty on her part.3 2
In addition, respo n d e n t pres e n t e d Dr. Antonio
Efren Reyes (Dr. Reyes), a psychi a t ri s t , to refut e
the alleg a tio n s ane n t her psychologic al
condition. Dr. Reyes testified that the seri es of
test s cond u c t e d by his assist a n t , 3 3 toge t h e r with
the scre e ni n g proc e d u r e s and the
Comp r e h e n s i v e Psycho- Pat hologic al Rating Scale
(CPRS) he hims elf condu c t e d , led him to
conclud e that respo n d e n t was not
psychologic ally incap a ci t a t e d to perfor m the
esse n ti al marit al obligatio n s. He post ul a t e d that
regr e s sive behavior, gross neu ro ti cis m ,
psychotic tend e n c i e s, and poor contr ol of
impulse s, which are signs that might point to the
pre s e n c e of disa blin g tre n d s, were not elicite d
from respo n d e n t . 3 4
In rebu t t a l, Dr. Lopez asseve r a t e d that ther e
were flaws in the evalu a tio n condu c t e d by Dr.
Reyes as (i) he was not the one who admi nist e r e d
and inter p r e t e d respo n d e n t ' s psychologi c al
evalu a tio n, and (ii) he mad e use of only one
instr u m e n t called CPRS which was not reliabl e
bec a u s e a good liar can fake the resul t s of such
test.3 5
After trial, the lower court gave cred e n c e to
petition e r ' s evide n c e and held that respo n d e n t ' s
prope n si t y to lying abou t almost anyt hi n g â ˆ’ h e r
occup a t i o n, stat e of healt h, singin g abilities and
her incom e , amon g othe r s â ˆ’ h a d been duly
est a blis h e d . Accordi n g to the trial court,
respo n d e n t ' s fant a s ti c ability to invent and
fabric a t e storie s and per so n a liti e s ena bl e d her to
live in a world of make- believe. This mad e her
psychologic ally incap a ci t a t e d as it rend e r e d her
incap a bl e of giving mea ni n g and significa n c e to
her mar ri a g e . 3 6 The trial court thus decla r e d the
mar ri a g e betw e e n petition e r and respo n d e n t null
and void.
Shortly befor e the trial court ren d e r e d its
decision, the Met ro polit a n Tribun al of the
Archdioc e s e of Manila annulle d the Catholic
mar ri a g e of the parti e s, on the grou n d of lack of
due discre tio n on the par t of the par ti e s. 3 7
During the pend e n c y of the appe al befor e the
Court of Appeals, the Met ro polit a n Tribun al's
ruling was affirm e d with modificatio n by both
the Nation al Appellat e Mat ri m o ni al Tribun al,
which held inst e a d that only respo n d e n t was
impair e d by a lack of due discr e tio n. 3 8
Subs e q u e n t ly, the decision of the Nation al
Appellat e Mat ri m o ni al Tribun al was upheld by
the Rom a n Rota of the Vatica n. 3 9
Petition e r duly aler t e d the Court of Appe als of
thes e rulings by the Catholic tribu n a l s. Still, the
app ellat e cour t reve r s e d the RTC's judg m e n t .
While conc e di n g that respo n d e n t may not have
bee n com pl e t ely hone s t with petition e r , the
Court of Appeals neve rt h e l e s s held that the
totality of the evide nc e pres e n t e d was
insufficie nt to est a blish respo n d e n t ' s
psychologic al incap a ci ty. It decla r e d that the
requi r e m e n t s in the case of Republic v. Cour t of
Appeals 4 0 gover ni n g the applica tio n and
inte r p r e t a t i o n of psychologi c al inca p a cit y had
not bee n satisfied.
Taking excep ti on to the appell at e court ' s
prono u n c e m e n t , petition e r elevat e d the case to
this Court. He cont e n d s her ei n that the evide nc e
conclusively est a blis h respo n d e n t ' s psychologic al
incap a ci ty.
In consid e ri n g the merit of this petition, the
Court is heavily influen c e d by the cred e n c e
accor d e d by the RTC to the fact u al alleg a tio n s of
petition e r. 4 1 It is a set tl e d principl e of civil
proce d u r e that the conclusion s of the trial cour t
rega r di n g the credibility of witne s s e s are
entitle d to gre a t resp e c t from the app ella t e
court s bec a u s e the trial court had an opport u ni t y
to obse rv e the dem e a n o r of witne s s e s while
giving testi m o ny which may indicat e their cando r
or lack ther e of.4 2 The Cour t is likewise guide d
by the fact that the Court of Appeals did not
dispu t e the vera city of the evide nc e pres e n t e d by
petition e r. Inst e a d, the appell a t e court
conclud e d that such eviden c e was not sufficien t
to est a blish the psychologic al incap a ci ty of
respo n d e n t . 4 3
Thus, the Court is impelle d to acce p t the factu al
version of petition e r as the oper a tive facts. Still,
the crucial ques tio n rem ai n s as to whet h e r the
stat e of facts as pres e n t e d by petition e r
sufficiently meet s the stan d a r d s set for the
decla r a t i o n of nullity of a mar ri a g e unde r Article
36 of the Family Code. These stan d a r d s were
definitively laid down in the Court' s 1997 ruling
in Repu blic v. Court of Appe als4 4 (also known as
the Molina case 4 5 ), and inde e d the Court of
Appeals cited the Molina guidelin e s in reve r si n g
the RTC in the case at bar.46 Since Molina was
decide d in 1997, the Supr e m e Cour t has yet to
squa r e ly affirm the decl ar a ti o n of nullity of
mar ri a g e unde r Article 36 of the Family Code.4 7
In fact, even befor e Molina was han d e d down,
ther e was only one case, Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court
of Appeal s,4 8 whe r ei n the Court definitively
conclud e d that a spous e was psychologi c ally
incap a ci t a t e d unde r Article 36.
This stat e of jurispr u d e n t i al affairs may have led
to the misp e r c e p t i o n that the rem e d y afford e d by
Article 36 of the Family Code is hollow, insofar
as the Supr e m e Court is conce r n e d . 4 9 Yet what
Molina and the succ e e di n g case s did ordai n was
a set of guideline s which, while undou b t e dl y
oner o u s on the petition e r seekin g the decla r a t i o n
of nullity, still leave room for a decr e e of nullity
und e r the prope r circu m s t a n c e s . Molina did not
foreclos e the gran t of a decr e e of nullity und e r
Article 36, even as it raise d the bar for its
allowa n c e .
Legal Guide s to Unde r s t a n d i n g Article 36
Article 36 of the Family Code stat e s that "[a]
mar ri a g e cont r a c t e d by any par ty who, at the
time of the celebr a t i o n, was psychologic ally
incap a ci t a t e d to com ply with the esse n ti al
marit al obligatio n s of mar ri a g e , shall likewise be
void even if such incap a ci ty beco m e s manifes t
only afte r its sole m niz a ti o n." 5 0 The conc e p t of
psychologic al incap a ci ty as a groun d for nullity
of mar ri a g e is novel in our body of laws,
althou g h ment al incap a cit y has long bee n
recog niz e d as a groun d for the dissolution of a
mar ri a g e .
The Spanis h Civil Code of 1889 prohibit e d from
cont r a c t i n g marri a g e perso n s "who are not in the
full enjoym e n t of their reaso n at the time of
cont r a c t i n g marri a g e ." 5 1 Mar ri a g e s with such
per so n s were ordain e d as void,52 in the sam e
class as mar ri a g e s with unde r a g e parti e s and
per so n s alre a dy marri e d, amon g othe r s. A
par ty's men t al capa ci ty was not a grou n d for
divorc e unde r the Divorc e Law of 1917,5 3 but a
mar ri a g e wher e "eithe r party was of unso u n d
mind" at the time of its celeb r a t i o n was cited as
an "annull a bl e mar ri a g e " unde r the Mar ri a g e
Law of 1929.5 4 Divorce on the groun d of a
spous e ' s incur a bl e insa ni ty was per mi t t e d unde r
the divorc e law ena c t e d duri ng the Japan e s e
occup a t i o n. 5 5 Upon the enac t m e n t of the Civil
Code in 1950, a mar ri a g e contr a c t e d by a party
of "unsou n d mind" was classified und e r Article
85 of the Civil Code as a voidable mar ri a g e . 5 6
The ment al capa ci ty, or lack the r e of, of the
mar ryi n g spous e was not amon g the groun d s for
decla ri n g a mar ri a g e void ab initio.57 Simila rly,
amon g the mar ri a g e s classified as voidabl e
und e r Article 45 (2) of the Family Code is one
cont r a c t e d by a party of unsou n d mind.5 8
Such caus e for the ann ul m e n t of mar ri a g e is
recog niz e d as a vice of conse n t , just like insani ty
imping e s on cons e n t freely given which is one of
the esse n ti al req ui sit e s of a cont r a c t . 5 9 The
initial com m o n conse n s u s on psychologic al
incap a ci ty und e r Article 36 of the Family Code
was that it did not consti t u t e a speci e of vice of
conse n t . Justice s Sem pio- Diy and Caguio a, both
mem b e r s of the Family Code revision com mi t t e e
that draft e d the Code, have opine d that
psychologic al incap a ci ty is not a vice of cons e n t ,
and conce d e d that the spous e may have given
free and volunt a r y conse n t to a mar ri a g e but was
none t h e l e s s inca p a bl e of fulfilling such right s
and obligation s.6 0 Dr. Tolentino likewise stat e d
in the 1990 edition of his com m e n t a r i e s on the
Family Code that this "psychologic al incap a ci ty
to com ply with the esse n t i al marit al obliga tion s
does not affect the conse n t to the mar ri a g e ." 6 1
Ther e wer e initial criticism s of this origin al
und e r s t a n d i n g of Article 36 as phr a s e d by the
Family Code com mit t e e . Tolenti no opine d that
"psychologi c ally inca p a ci ty to com ply would not
be
juridically differ e n t from physical inca p a cit y of
consu m m a t i n g the mar ri a g e , which make s the
mar ri a g e only voidabl e unde r Article 45 (5) of
the Civil Code x x x [and thus] should have bee n
a caus e for ann ul m e n t of the mar ri a g e only."62
At the sam e time, Tolentino note d "[it] would be
differe n t if it were psychologi c al incap a ci ty to
und e r s t a n d the esse n ti al marit al obliga tion s,
bec a u s e the n this would amou n t to lack of
conse n t to the mar ri a g e ." 6 3 These conce r n s
thoug h were answ e r e d , begin ni n g with Santo s v.
Court of Appeals,6 4 wher ei n the Cour t, throu g h
Justice Vitug, ackno wl e d g e d that "psychologic al
incap a ci ty shoul d refe r to no less than a ment al
(not physic al) incap a ci ty that cause s a party to
be truly incognitive of the basic mari t al
coven a n t s that conco mi t a n tl y must be assu m e d
and disch a r g e d by the par ti e s to the
mar ri a g e ." 6 5
The notion that psychologic al incap a ci ty pert ai n s
to the inability to unde r s t a n d the obligatio n s of
mar ri a g e , as oppos e d to a mer e inability to
comply with the m, was furt h e r affirm e d in the
Molina 6 6 case. Ther ei n, the Court, throu g h the n
Justice (now Chief Justice) Pang a ni b a n obse rv e d
that "[t]he evide n c e [to est a blish psychologic al
incap a ci ty] must convince the cour t that the
par ti e s, or one of the m, was ment ally or
psychic ally ill to such exte n t that the perso n
could not have know n the obligatio n s he was
assu m i n g , or knowin g the m , could not have
given valid assu m p t io n ther e t o."6 7
Jurispr u d e n c e since the n has recog niz e d that
psychologic al incap a ci ty "is a malady so grave
and per m a n e n t as to dep rive one of awa r e n e s s of
the duties and respo n si bilitie s of the mat ri m o ni al
bond one is abou t to assu m e ." 6 8
It might see m that this pres e n t unde r s t a n d i n g of
psychologic al incap a ci ty deviat e s from the liter al
wordin g of Article 36, with its cent r al phas e
rea di n g "psychologi c ally incap a ci t a t e d to comply
with the esse n ti al marit al obliga tion s of
mar ri a g e ." 6 9 At the sam e time, it has bee n
consist e n t ly recog niz e d by this Cour t that the
inte nt of the Family Code com mi t t e e was to
desig n the law as to allow som e resilien cy in its
applica tio n, by avoiding specific exam pl e s that
would limit the applica bility of the provision
und e r the princi pl e of ejusd e m gen e ri s. Rath e r,
the prefe r e n c e of the revision com mit t e e was for
"the judge to inte r p r e t the provision on a case- to-
case basis, guide d by expe ri e n c e , in the finding s
of expe r t s and rese a r c h e r s in psychologic al
disciplin e s, and by decision s of chur c h tribu n al s
which, althou g h not binding on
the civil cour t s, may be given pers u a sive effect
since the provision was take n from Canon
Law."70
We likewise observ e d in Republic v. Dagda g: 7 1
Whet h e r or not psychologic al incap a ci ty exists in
a given case calling for ann ul m e n t of a mar ri a g e ,
dep e n d s cruci ally, mor e tha n in any field of the
law, on the facts of the case. Each case must be
judge d, not on the basis of a priori assu m p t i o n s,
pre dilec tio n s or gene r aliza tion s but accor di n g to
its own facts. In rega r d to psychologic al
incap a ci ty as a groun d for ann ul m e n t of
mar ri a g e , it is trite to say that no case is on "all
fours" with anot h e r case. The trial judge must
take pains in exa mi ni n g the factu al milieu and
the app ell at e court must, as muc h as possible,
avoid substit u ti n g its own judgm e n t for that of
the trial court. 7 2
The Court thus acknowl e d g e s that the definition
of psychologi c al incap a ci ty, as inten d e d by the
revision com mi t t e e , was not cast in intra c t a b l e
specifics. Judicial und e r s t a n d i n g of psychologic al
incap a ci ty may be infor m e d by evolving
sta n d a r d s , taking into accou n t the par tic ul a r s of
each case, cur r e n t tre n d s in psychologi c al and
even canonic al thoug h t , and expe ri e n c e . It is
und e r the auspic e s of the delibe r a t e am big ui ty of
the fram e r s that the Court has develop e d the
Molina rules, which have bee n consist e n tly
applied since 1997. Molina has prove n
indubit a bly useful in providing a unit a ry
fram e w o r k that guides court s in adjudica ti n g
petition s for decla r a t i o n of nullity unde r Article
36. At the sam e time, the Molina guideline s are
not set in stone, the clea r legislative inten t
mand a ti n g a case- to- case perc e p t i o n of eac h
situati on, and Molina itself arising from this
evolution a r y unde r s t a n d i n g of Article 36. Ther e
is no caus e to disavow Molina at pres e n t , and
inde e d the disposition of this case shall rely
prim a rily on that prec e d e n t . Ther e is nee d
thoug h to emp h a siz e othe r pers p e c tiv e s as well
which shoul d gover n the disposition of petition s
for decla r a t i o n of nullity unde r Article 36.
Of par tic ul a r notice has bee n the citation of the
Court, first in Sant os the n in Molina, of the
conside r e d opinion of cano n law expe r t s in the
inte r p r e t a t i o n of psychologi c al inca p a cit y. This is
but unavoid a bl e , consid e ri n g that the Family
Code com mit t e e had bluntly acknowl e d g e d that
the conc e p t of psychologic al incap a ci ty was
derive d from canon law,73 and as one mem b e r
admi tt e d, enac t e d as a solution to the probl e m of
mar ri a g e s alre a dy ann ulle d by the Catholic
Chur c h but still exist e n t unde r civil law.74 It
would be dising e n u o u s to disre g a r d the influe nc e
of Catholic Churc h doct rin e in the form ul a ti on
and subse q u e n t unde r s t a n d i n g of Article 36, and
the Cour t has expr e s sly acknowl e d g e d that
inte r p r e t a t i o n s given by the Nation al Appellat e
Mat ri m o ni al Tribun al of the local Churc h, while
not cont rolling or decisive, should be given gre a t
resp e c t by our court s.7 5 Still, it must be
em ph a siz e d that the Cat holic Chur c h is har dly
the sole sourc e of influenc e in the inter p r e t a t i o n
of Article 36. Even thoug h the conc e p t may have
bee n derive d from cano n law, its incor po r a t i o n
into the Family Code and subs e q u e n t judicial
inte r p r e t a t i o n occur r e d in wholly secul a r
progr e s si o n. Inde e d, while Churc h thou g h t on
psychologic al incap a ci ty is mer ely pers u a siv e on
the trial court s, judicial decision s of this Court
inte r p r e t i n g psychologi c al incap a cit y are binding
on lower court s.7 6
Now is also oppor t u n e time to com m e n t on
anot h e r com m o n legal guide utilized in the
adjudica tio n of petition s for decla r a t i o n of nullity
und e r Article 36. All too frequ e n t ly, this Cour t
and lower court s, in denying petition s of the
kind, have favor a bly cited Section s 1 and 2,
Article XV of the Constit u tio n, which resp e c tiv ely
stat e that "[t]he Stat e recog niz e s the Filipino
family as the found a t io n of the nation.
Accordi n gly, it shall stre n g t h e n its solidari ty and
actively prom ot e its total develop m e n [ t ]," and
that "[m]ar ri a g e , as an inviolabl e social
instit ution, is the found a ti o n of the family and
shall be prot e c t e d by the Stat e." These
provision s highligh t the impor t a n c e of the family
and the consti t u tio n al prot e c ti on accor d e d to the
instit ution of mar ri a g e .
But the Constit u t io n itself does not est a blish the
par a m e t e r s of stat e prot e c t io n to mar ri a g e as a
social instit ution and the found a t io n of the
family. It rem ai n s the provinc e of the legisla t u r e
to define all legal aspe c t s of mar ri a g e and
pre sc ri b e the str a t e g y and the modalities to
prot e c t it, base d on wha t e v e r socio- political
influen c e s it dee m s prope r , and subjec t of cours e
to the qualificatio n that such legislative
ena c t m e n t itself adh e r e s to the Consti t u ti on and
the Bill of Right s. This being the case, it also falls
on the legislat u r e to put into oper a ti o n the
constit u tio n al provisions that prot e c t marri a g e
and the family. This has bee n accom plis h e d at
pre s e n t thro u g h the enac t m e n t of the Family
Code, which defines marri a g e and the family,
spells out the corr e s p o n d i n g legal effect s,
impos e s the limitation s that affect mar ri e d and
family life, as well as presc ri b e s the groun d s for
decla r a t i o n of nullity and those for legal
sepa r a t i o n. While it may app e a r that the judicial
denial of a petition for decla r a t i o n of nullity is
reflective of the consti t u tio n al mand a t e to
prot e c t mar ri a g e , such action in fact mer ely
enforc e s a stat u t o r y definition of mar ri a g e , not a
constit u tio n ally ordain e d decr e e of wha t
mar ri a g e is. Inde e d, if circu m s t a n c e s warr a n t ,
Section s 1 and 2 of Article XV nee d not be the
only constit u ti o n al consid e r a t i o n s to be take n
into accou n t in resolving a petition for
decla r a t i o n of nullity.
Inde e d, Article 36 of the Family Code, in
classifying mar ri a g e s cont r a c t e d by a
psychologic ally incap a ci t a t e d perso n as a nullity,
shoul d be dee m e d as an imple m e n t of this
constit u tio n al prot e c t io n of marri a g e . Given the
avow e d Stat e inte r e s t in promo ti n g marri a g e as
the found a t i o n of the family, which in turn serves
as the found a t io n of the nation, the r e is a
corr e s p o n d i n g inte r e s t for the Stat e to defe n d
again s t mar ri a g e s ill-equipp e d to prom o t e family
life. Void ab initio mar ri a g e s unde r Article 36 do
not furt h e r the initiative s of the Stat e conce r ni n g
mar ri a g e and family, as they prom ot e wedlock
amon g perso n s who, for rea so n s inde p e n d e n t of
their will, are not capa cit a t e d to und e r s t a n d or
comply with the esse n ti al obligation s of
mar ri a g e .
These are the legal pre mis e s that inform us as
we decid e the pres e n t petition.
Molina Guidelin e s As Applied in This Case
As stat e d earlie r, Molina est a blish e d the
guidelin e s pres e n t ly recog niz e d in the judicial
disposition of petitions for nullity unde r Article
36. The Court has consist e n t ly applied Molina
since its prom ul g a t i o n in 1997, and the
guidelin e s the r ei n oper a t e as the gene r a l rules.
They war r a n t citation in full:
1) The bur d e n of proof to show the nullity of the
mar ri a g e belong s to the plaintiff. Any doubt
shoul d be resolved in favor of the existe n c e and
continu a t i o n of the mar ri a g e and agains t its
dissolution and nullity. This is root e d in the fact
that both our Constit u tio n and our laws che ri sh
the validity of mar ri a g e and unity of the family.
Thus, our Constit u t io n devot e s an entir e Article
on the Family, recog nizin g it "as the found a t io n
of the nation." It decr e e s mar ri a g e as legally
"inviolable," the r e by prot e c ti n g it from
dissolution at the whim of the parti e s. Both the
family and mar ri a g e are to be "prot e c t e d " ' by the
stat e .
The Family Code echo e s this consti t u tio n a l edict
on mar ri a g e and the family and emp h a siz e s their
per m a n e n c e , inviolability and solidari ty.
2) The root caus e of the psychologic al incap a ci ty
must be: (a) medic ally or clinically identified, (b)
allege d in the com pl ai nt , (c) sufficien tly prove n
by expe r t s and (d) clea rly explaine d in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requi r e s
that the inca p a ci t y must be psychologi c al not
physical, altho u g h its manifest a t i o n s and/or
sympt o m s may be physical. The evide n c e must
convinc e the court that the parti e s, or one of
the m , was ment ally or psychic ally ill to such an
exte n t that the perso n could not have known the
obliga tion s he was assu mi n g , or knowin g the m ,
could not have given valid assu m p ti o n ther e of.
Althoug h no exa m pl e of such inca p a cit y nee d be
given here so as not to limit the applica tio n of
the provision unde r the principl e of ejusd e m
gen e ri s, neve r t h e l e s s such root caus e must be
identifie d as a psychologic al illness and its
incap a ci t a t i n g nat u r e fully explain e d. Expe r t
evide n c e may be given by qualified psychia t ri s t s
and clinical psychologis t s.
3) The incap a ci ty must be prove n to be existin g
at "the time of the celeb r a t i o n" of the mar ri a g e .
The evide n c e must show that the illness was
existing whe n the par ti e s exch a n g e d their "I
do's." The manifest a t i o n of the illness nee d not
be perc eiva bl e at such time, but the illness itself
must have att a c h e d at such mom e n t , or prior
ther e t o.
4) Such incap a ci ty must also be shown to be
medically or clinically per m a n e n t or incur a bl e.
Such incur a bility may be absolut e or even
relative only in rega r d to the othe r spous e, not
nece s s a r ily absolut ely agai ns t everyon e of the
sam e sex. Furt h e r m o r e , such incap a ci ty must be
releva n t to the assu m p t i o n of mar ri a g e
obliga tion s, not nece s s a r ily to those not relat e d
to mar ri a g e , like the exer ci se of a profes sio n or
em ploy m e n t in a job. Henc e, a pedia t ri ci a n may
be effective in diagno si n g illness e s of childr e n
and presc ri bi n g medici n e to cure the m but not
be psychologic ally capacit a t e d to proc r e a t e , bea r
and raise his/he r own childre n as an esse n ti al
obliga tion of mar ri a g e .
5) Such illness must be grave enoug h to bring
about the disa bility of the party to assu m e the
esse n ti al obligation s of mar ri a g e . Thus, "mild
cha r a c t e r i ol ogic al peculia ri ti e s, mood chan g e s,
occasion al emotion al outbu r s t s " cannot be
acce p t e d as root caus e s. The illness must be
show n as down ri g h t inca p a ci t y or inability, not a
refusal, negle c t or difficulty, muc h less ill will. In
othe r words, the r e is a nat al or supe r v e ni n g
disa blin g factor in the perso n, an adve r s e
inte g r al elem e n t in the perso n ali ty stru ct u r e that
effectively inca p a ci t a t e s the per so n from really
acce p ti n g and ther e b y complying with the
obliga tion s esse n ti al to mar ri a g e .
6) The esse n ti al marit al obliga tion s must be
thos e embr a c e d by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as rega r d s the husb a n d and wife as
well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the sam e
Code in reg a r d to pare n t s and their childr e n.
Such non- complie d marit al obligatio n(s) must
also be stat e d in the petition, prove n by evide nc e
and includ e d in the text of the decision.
7) Inte r p r e t a t i o n s given by the Nation al
Appellat e Mat ri m o ni al Tribun al of the Catholic
Chur c h in the Philippin e s, while not cont rolling
or decisive, should be given gre a t resp e c t by our
court s. It is clear that Article 36 was take n by
the Family Code Revision Commit t e e from Canon
1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which
bec a m e effective in 1983 and which provide s:
"The following are incap a bl e of cont r a c ti n g
mar ri a g e : Those who are una bl e to assu m e the
esse n ti al obligation s of mar ri a g e due to caus e s
of psychologi c al nat u r e ."
Since the pur pos e of includi ng such provision in
our Family Code is to har m o niz e our civil laws
with the religious faith of our peopl e, it sta n d s to
reaso n that to achieve such har m o niz a tio n, gre a t
per s u a sive weight shoul d be given to decision s of
such appell a t e tribun a l. Ideally'su bj e c t to our law
on evide nc e what is decr e e d as canonic ally
invalid should also be decr e e d civilly void.77
Molina had provide d for an addition al
requi r e m e n t that the Solicitor Gener al issue a
certifica tio n statin g his rea so n s for his
agr e e m e n t or opposition to the petition.7 8 This
requi r e m e n t howeve r was dispe n s e d with
following the imple m e n t a t i o n of A.M. No. 02- 11-
10- SC, or the Rule on Declar a ti o n of Absolut e
Nullity of Void Marri a g e s and Annul m e n t of
Voidabl e Mar ri a g e s . 7 9 Still, Article 48 of the
Family Code man d a t e s that the appe a r a n c e of
the prose c u t i n g attor n e y or fiscal assign e d be on
beh alf of the Stat e to take steps to preve n t
collusion betw e e n the parti e s and to take care
that evide nc e is not fabrica t e d or supp r e s s e d .
Obviously, collusion is not an issue in this case,
conside ri n g the consist e n t vigorou s opposition of
respo n d e n t to the petition for decla r a t i o n of
nullity. In any event, the fiscal's partici p a tio n in
the hea ri n g s befor e the trial court is exta n t from
the recor d s of this case.
As earlier note d, the factu al findings of the RTC
are now dee m e d binding on this Court, owing to
the gre a t weigh t accor d e d to the opinion of the
prim a ry trier of facts, and the refus al of the
Court of Appeals to disput e the vera city of thes e
facts. As such, it must be conside r e d that
respo n d e n t had consist e n t ly lied abou t many
mat e ri al aspec t s as to her char a c t e r and
per so n ali ty. The ques tio n rem ai n s whet h e r her
patt e r n of fabric a ti on sufficien tly esta blis h e s her
psychologic al incap a ci ty, consist e n t with Article
36 and gen e r ally, the Molina guideline s.
We find that the pres e n t case sufficiently
satisfies the guidelin e s in Molina.
First. Petition e r had sufficie ntly overco m e his
burd e n in proving the psychologi c al incap a ci ty of
his spous e. Apart from his own testi m o ny, he
pre s e n t e d witnes s e s who corro bo r a t e d his
allega tion s on his wife's beh avior, and
certifica tio n s from Blackgold Recor d s and the
Philippin e Village Hotel Pavillon which dispu t e d
respo n d e n t ' s claims perti n e n t to her allege d
singin g care e r . He also pres e n t e d two (2) expe r t
witne s s e s from the field of psychology who
testified that the abe r r a n t behavior of
respo n d e n t was tant a m o u n t to psychologic al
incap a ci ty. In any event, both court s below
conside r e d petition e r ' s evide n c e as cre di bl e
enoug h. Even the app ell at e court ackno wl e d g e d
that respo n d e n t was not totally hone s t with
petition e r. 8 0
As in all civil mat t e r s, the petition e r in an action
for decla r a t i o n of nullity unde r Article 36 must
be able to esta blis h the caus e of action with a
pre po n d e r a n c e of evide n c e . Howeve r , since the
action canno t be consid e r e d as a non- public
mat t e r bet w e e n privat e parti e s, but is impr e s s e d
with Stat e inter e s t , the Family Code likewise
requi r e s the particip a t io n of the Stat e , thro u g h
the prose c u t i n g attor n e y, fiscal, or Solicitor
Gene r al, to take step s to preve n t collusion
betw e e n the parti e s and to take care that
evide n c e is not fabric a t e d or supp r e s s e d . Thus,
even if the petition e r is able esta blis h the
psychologic al incap a ci ty of respo n d e n t with
pre po n d e r a n t evide n c e , any finding of collusion
amon g the par ti e s would nece s s a r ily nega t e such
proofs.
Secon d. The root caus e of respo n d e n t ' s
psychologic al incap a ci ty has bee n medic ally or
clinically identified, alleg e d in the complai n t,
sufficiently prove n by expe r t s, and clearly
explain e d in the trial cour t' s decision. The
initiatory compl ai nt alleg e d that respo n d e n t ,
from the sta r t, had exhibit e d unus u a l and
abnor m a l behavior "of per e n[ n]i ally telling lies,
fabric a ti n g ridiculou s stori es, and inventi n g
per so n ali ti e s and situa tio n s," of writing lette r s to
petition e r using fictitious nam e s, and of lying
about her act u al occup a ti o n, incom e, educ a tio n a l
att ai n m e n t , and family backg r o u n d , amon g
othe r s. 8 1
These alleg a tio n s, initially char a c t e r i z e d in
gen e r a li ti e s, were furt h e r linked to medic al or
clinical cause s by expe r t witne s s e s from the field
of psychology. Petition e r pre se n t e d two (2) such
witne s s e s in partic ul a r. Dr. Abced e, a
psychi a t ri s t who had hea d e d the depa r t m e n t of
psychi a t ry of at least two (2) major hospit al s, 8 2
testified as follows:
WITNES S:
Given that as a fact, which is only base d on the
affidavit provide d to me, I can say that ther e are
a couple of things that [are] terri bly wron g with
the stan d a r d s. Ther e are a coupl e of thing s that
see m s (sic) to be repe a t e d over and over again in
the affidavit. One of which is the persist e n t ,
const a n t and repe a t e d lying of the "respo n d e n t ";
which, I think, base d on asse s s m e n t of nor m al
beh avior of an individu al, is abnor m a l or
pat hologic al. x x x
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witnes s)
Q - Would you say the n, Mr. witne s s, that
bec a u s e of these actu a t io n s of the respo n d e n t
she is then inca p a bl e of perfor mi n g the basic
obliga tion s of her mar ri a g e ? c r a l a wli b r a r y
A - Well, persist e n t lying violat e s the resp e c t that
one owes towa r d s anot h e r . The lack of conc e r n ,
the lack of love towa r d s the perso n, and it is also
som e t hi n g that end a n g e r s hum a n relations hi p.
You see, relations hi p is base d on com m u n i c a t i o n
betw e e n individu als and what we gene r a lly
com m u ni c a t e are our thou g h t s and feelings. But
then when one talks and expr e s s e [ s] their
feelings, [you] are expec t e d to tell the trut h. And
ther efo r e , if you const a n t ly lie, what do you think
is going to happ e n as far as this relation s hi p is
conce r n e d . Ther efo r e , it unde r m i n e s that basic
relation s hi p that should be base d on love, trust
and resp e c t .
Q - Would you say the n, Mr. witne s s, that due to
the beh avior of the respo n d e n t in const a n t ly
lying and fabric a ti n g storie s, she is the n
incap a bl e of perfor m i n g the basic obligatio n s of
the mar ri a g e ?
xxx
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witnes s)
Q - Mr. witne s s, base d on the testi m o ny of Mr.
Levy Mendoz a, who is the third witne s s for the
petition e r, testified that the respo n d e n t has bee n
calling up the petition e r ' s officem a t e s and ask
him (sic) on the activities of the petition e r and
ask him on the behavior of the petition e r. And
this is specifically stat e d on page six (6) of the
tra n sc ri p t of steno g r a p h i c notes, what can you
say about this, Mr. witne s s? c r a l a w li b r a r y
A - If an individu al is jealous enoug h to the point
that he is par a n oi d, which mea n s that the r e is no
act u al basis on her susp e c t (sic) that her
husb a n d is having an affair with a wom a n, if
carri e d on to the extr e m e , then that is
pat hologic al. That is not abnor m a l. We all feel
jealous, in the sam e way as we also lie every now
and the n; but everyt hi n g that is carri e d out in
extr e m e is abnor m a l or pat hologi c al. If ther e is
no basis in reality to the fact that the husb a n d is
having an affair with anot h e r wom a n and if she
per sist e n tl y believes that the husb a n d is having
an affair with differe n t wom e n, then that is
pat hologic al and we call that par a n oi d jealousy.
Q - Now, if a perso n is in par a n oi d jealousy,
would she be consid e r e d psychologic ally
incap a ci t a t e d to perfor m the basic obliga tion s of
the mar ri a g e ? c r a l a w li b r a r y
A - Yes, Ma'a m . 8 3
The othe r witne s s, Dr. Lopez, was pres e n t e d to
est a blis h not only the psychologic al incap a ci ty of
respo n d e n t , but also the psychologic al capa city
of petition e r . He conclu d e d that respo n d e n t "is
[a] pat hologic al liar, that [she contin u e s] to lie
[and] she loves to fabric a t e abou t hers elf."84
These two witne s s e s base d their conclusio n s of
psychologic al incap a ci ty on the case recor d,
par tic ul a rly the trial tran s c ri p t s of respo n d e n t ' s
testi m o ny, as well as the suppo r t i n g affidavits of
petition e r. While thes e witnes s e s did not
per so n ally exami n e respo n d e n t , the Court had
alre a dy held in Marco s v. Marco s 8 5 that
per so n al exami n a ti o n of the subjec t by the
physicia n is not requir e d for the spous e to be
decla r e d psychologic ally incap a ci t a t e d . 8 6 We
dee m the met ho d ol ogy utilized by petition e r ' s
witne s s e s as sufficie nt basis for their medic al
conclusion s. Admitt e dly, Drs. Abcede and
Lopez's com m o n conclusio n of respo n d e n t ' s
psychologic al incap a ci ty hinge d heavily on their
own acce p t a n c e of petition e r ' s version as the
true set of facts. Howev e r , since the trial court
itself acce p t e d the veracity of petition e r ' s factu al
pre mi s e s, ther e is no caus e to dispu t e the
conclusion of psychologic al inca p a ci t y draw n
ther ef r o m by petition e r ' s expe r t witne s s e s.
Also, with the tot ality of the evide n c e pres e n t e d
as basis, the trial court explicat e d its finding of
psychologic al incap a ci ty in its decision in this
wise:
To the mind of the Court, all of the above are
indicatio n s that respo n d e n t is psychologic ally
incap a ci t a t e d to perfor m the esse n ti al
obliga tion s of marri a g e . It has bee n show n
clearly from her actu a t io n s that respo n d e n t has
that prope n si t y for telling lies about almost
anyt hi n g, be it her occup a t i o n, her stat e of
healt h, her singing abilities, her incom e, etc. She
has this fant a s ti c ability to invent and fabrica t e
storie s and perso n a liti e s. She prac tic ally lived in
a world of make believe makin g her the r efo r e
not in a position to give mea ni n g and
significa n c e to her mar ri a g e to petition e r . In
per sist e n tl y and const a n tly lying to petition e r,
respo n d e n t unde r m i n e d the basic tene t s of
relation s hi p betw e e n spous e s that is base d on
love, trust and resp e c t . As conclu d e d by the
psychi a t ri s t pre s e n t e d by petition e r , such
repe a t e d lying is abno r m a l and pathologic al and
amou n t s to psychologi c al inca p a cit y.8 7
Third. Respo n d e n t ' s psychologic al incap a ci ty was
est a blis h e d to have clea rly exist e d at the time of
and even befor e the celebr a t i o n of marri a g e . She
fabric a t e d friends and made up lette r s from
fictitious char a c t e r s well befor e she mar ri e d
petition e r. Likewis e, she kept petition e r in the
dark about her nat u r a l child's real pare n t a g e as
she only confes s e d when the latt e r had found out
the trut h after their mar ri a g e .
Four t h. The gravity of respo n d e n t ' s
psychologic al incap a ci ty is sufficie nt to prove her
disa bility to assu m e the esse n ti al obliga tion s of
mar ri a g e . It is imm e di a t ely disce r ni bl e that the
par ti e s had shar e d only a little over a year of
coha bi t a t io n before the exasp e r a t e d petition e r
left his wife. What eve r such circu m s t a n c e spea k s
of the degr e e of toler a n c e of petition e r , it
likewise suppo r t s the belief that respo n d e n t ' s
psychologic al incap a ci ty, as born e by the recor d,
was so grave in exte nt that any prolon g e d
marit al life was dubit a bl e.
It should be not ed that the lies att ri b u t e d to
respo n d e n t were not adopt e d as false pret e n s e s
in orde r to induc e petition e r into mar ri a g e . More
distu r bi n gly, they indica t e a failur e on the part of
respo n d e n t to disting ui s h trut h from fiction, or at
least abide by the trut h. Petition e r ' s witne ss e s
and the trial court wer e emp h a ti c on
respo n d e n t ' s invet e r a t e proclivity to telling lies
and the pathologic nat u r e of her mist r u t h s ,
which accor di n g to the m , were revela t o r y of
respo n d e n t ' s inability to unde r s t a n d and perfor m
the esse n ti al obliga tion s of mar ri a g e . Inde e d, a
per so n una bl e to disting ui s h betw e e n fant a sy
and reality would similarly be una bl e to
comp r e h e n d the legal nat u r e of the marit al bond,
muc h less its psychic mea ni n g, and the
corr e s p o n d i n g obliga tion s att a c h e d to mar ri a g e ,
includi n g par e n ti n g. One una ble to adh e r e to
reality cannot be expe c t e d to adh e r e as well to
any legal or emotion al com mit m e n t s .
The Court of Appeals som e h o w conclu d e d that
since respo n d e n t allege dly tried her best to
effect a recon ciliation, she had amply exhibit e d
her ability to perfor m her marit al obligatio n s. We
are not convinc e d . Given the nat u r e of her
psychologic al condition, her willingn e s s to
rem ai n in the mar ri a g e hardly banish e s nay
exte n u a t e s her lack of capa ci ty to fulfill the
esse n ti al marit al obligatio n s. Respon d e n t ' s
ability to even comp r e h e n d what the esse n t i al
marit al obligatio n s are is impair e d at best.
Consid e ri n g that the evide nc e convincin gly
dispu t e s respo n d e n t ' s ability to adh e r e to the
trut h, her avowals as to her com mit m e n t to the
mar ri a g e cannot be accor d e d much cred e n c e .
At this point, it is wort h conside r i n g Article 45(3)
of the Family Code which stat e s that a mar ri a g e
may be ann ulle d if the conse n t of eithe r par ty
was obtain e d by fraud, and Article 46 which
enu m e r a t e s the circu m s t a n c e s consti t u ti n g fraud
und e r the previous article, clarifies that "no
othe r misr e p r e s e n t a t i o n or dec eit as to
cha r a c t e r , healt h, rank, fortu n e or chastity shall
constit u t e such fraud as will give grou n d s for
action for the ann ul m e n t of mar ri a g e ." It would
be impro p e r to dra w linka g e s betw e e n
misre p r e s e n t a t i o n s made by respo n d e n t and the
misre p r e s e n t a t i o n s unde r Articles 45 (3) and 46.
The fraud unde r Article 45(3) vitiat e s the
conse n t of the spous e who is lied to, and does
not allude to vitiat e d conse n t of the lying spouse .
In this case, the misr e p r e s e n t a t i o n s of
respo n d e n t point to her own inade q u a c y to cope
with her marit al obligatio n s, kindr e d to
psychologic al incap a ci ty und e r Article 36.
Fifth. Respo n d e n t is evide n tly unabl e to com ply
with the esse n ti al marit al obliga tion s as
em br a c e d by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family
Code. Article 68, in partic ul a r, enjoins the
spous e s to live toget h e r , observ e mut u al love,
resp e c t and fidelity, and rend e r mut u al help and
suppo r t . As note d by the trial court, it is difficult
to see how an invet e r a t e pat hologic al liar would
be able to com mi t to the basic tene t s of
relation s hi p betw e e n spous e s base d on love,
trust and resp e c t .
Sixth. The Court of Appeal s clearly err e d whe n it
failed to take into consid e r a t i o n the fact that the
mar ri a g e of the parti e s was annulle d by the
Catholic Churc h. The appell a t e court app a r e n t ly
dee m e d this det ail totally incons e q u e n t i a l as no
refer e n c e was made to it anyw h e r e in the
assaile d decision despit e petition e r ' s effort s to
bring the mat t e r to its att e n ti o n.8 8 Such
delibe r a t e ignor a n c e is in contr a v e n t i o n of
Molina, which held that inter p r e t a t i o n s given by
the Nation al Appellat e Mat ri m o ni al Tribun al of
the Cat holic Chur c h in the Philippine s, while not
cont r olling or decisive, should be given grea t
resp e c t by our court s.
As note d earlier, the Met ro p olit a n Tribu n al of
the Archdioc e s e of Manila decr e e d the invalidity
of the mar ri a g e in ques tio n in a Conclusion 8 9
dat e d 30 Marc h 1995, citing the "lack of due
discr e tio n" on the par t of respo n d e n t . 9 0 Such
dec r e e of nullity was affirm e d by both the
Nation al Appellat e Matri m o ni al Tribun al,9 1 and
the Rom a n Rota of the Vatica n. 9 2 In fact,
respo n d e n t ' s psychologic al incap a ci ty was
conside r e d so grave that a rest ric tive claus e 9 3
was appe n d e d to the sent e n c e of nullity
prohibiti ng respo n d e n t from cont r a c ti n g anot h e r
mar ri a g e withou t the Tribun al 's cons e n t .
In its Decision dat e d 4 June 1995, the Nation al
Appellat e Mat ri m o ni al Tribun al prono u n c e d :
The JURISRPRUDE N C E in the Case maint ai n s
that mat ri m o ni al cons e n t is consid e r e d
ontologic ally defective and wher efo r e judicially
ineffec tive whe n elicite d by a Part Cont r a c t a n t in
posse s sio n and employ of a discr e t io n a r y
judg m e n t faculty with a perc e p t ive vigor
mark e dly inad e q u a t e for the prac tic al
und e r s t a n d i n g of the conjug al Covena n t or
seriou s impai r e d from the corre c t appr e ci a t io n of
the integ r al significa n c e and implicatio n s of the
mar ri a g e vows.
The FACTS in the Case sufficie ntly prove with
the certit u d e requi r e d by law that base d on the
deposition s of the Part e s in Causa and pre mi s e d
on the testim o ni e s of the Comm o n and Exper t
Witness e [ s], the Respo n d e n t mad e the marri a g e
option in tenu r e of adve r s e per so n ali ty
const r a c t s that were mark e dly antit h e ti c al to the
subst a n ti ve cont e n t and implicatio n s of the
Mar ri a g e Covena n t , and that seriously
und e r m i n e d the integ r ali ty of her mat ri m o ni al
conse n t in ter m s of its delibe r a t iv e com po n e n t .
In othe r words, afflicte d with a discr e t io n a r y
faculty impair e d in its prac tico- conc r e t e
judg m e n t form a ti on on accou n t of an adve r s e
action and reac tion pat t e r n , the Respo n d e n t was
impair e d from eliciting a judicially binding
mat ri m o ni al cons e n t . Ther e is no sufficien t
evide n c e in the Case howeve r to prove as well
the fact of grave lack of due discr e tio n on the
par t of the Petition e r . 9 4
Evide n tly, the concl usion of psychologic al
incap a ci ty was arrive d at not only by the trial
court, but also by canoni c al bodies. Yet, we must
clarify the prop e r impor t of the Churc h rulings
annulling the mar ri a g e in this case. They hold
sway since they are draw n from a similar
recog ni tio n, as the trial court, of the veracity of
petition e r ' s allega ti on s. Had the trial court
inste a d appr e ci a t e d respo n d e n t ' s version as
corr e c t , and the appell a t e court affirm e d such
conclusion, the rulings of the Catholic Churc h on
this mat t e r would have diminish e d per su a sive
value. After all, it is the fact u al findings of the
judicial trie r of facts, and not that of the
canonic al court s, that are accor d e d significa n t
recog ni tio n by this Court.
Seve nt h. The final point of cont e n ti o n is the
requi r e m e n t in Molina that such psychologic al
incap a ci ty be show n to be medic ally or clinically
per m a n e n t or incur a bl e . It was on this scor e that
the Cour t of Appeal s reve r s e d the judgm e n t of
the trial court, the appella t e court noting that it
did not app e a r cert ai n that respo n d e n t ' s
condition was incur a bl e and that Dr. Abced e did
not testify to such effect.95
Petition e r point s out that one mont h afte r he and
his wife initially sepa r a t e d , he ret u r n e d to her,
desiri ng to make thei r mar ri a g e work. Howeve r,
respo n d e n t ' s abe r r a n t beh avior rem ai n e d
unch a n g e d , as she continu e d to lie, fabric a t e
storie s, and maint ai n e d her excessive jealousy.
From this fact, he draw s the conclusion that
respo n d e n t ' s condition is incur a bl e .
From the totality of the evide nc e , can it be
definitively conclu d e d that respo n d e n t ' s
condition is incur a bl e ? It would see m , at least,
that respo n d e n t ' s psychosi s is quite grave, and a
cur e ther e of a rem a r k a b l e feat. Cert ai nly, it
would have bee n easie r had petition e r ' s expe r t
witne s s e s char a c t e r i z e d respo n d e n t ' s condition
as incur a bl e. Inst e a d, they rem ai n e d silent on
whet h e r the psychologi c al incap a ci ty was
cur a bl e or incur a bl e .
But on careful exami n a ti o n, ther e was good
reaso n for the expe r t s ' tacitu r ni ty on this point.
The petition e r ' s expe r t witne s s e s testified in
1994 and 1995, and the trial court ren d e r e d its
decision on 10 August 1995. These event s
tra n s pi r e d well befor e Molina was prom ul g a t e d
in 1997 and made explicit the req ui r e m e n t that
the psychologic al inca p a ci ty must be show n to be
medically or clinically per m a n e n t or incur a bl e.
Such requi r e m e n t was not expr e s sly stat e d in
Article 36 or any othe r provision of the Family
Code.
On the othe r hand, the Cour t in Sant os, which
was decid e d in Janua ry 1995, bega n its
discus sio n by first citing the delibe r a t i o n s of the
Family Code com mit t e e , 9 6 then the opinion of
canonic al schola r s, 9 7 before arriving at its
form ul a ti on of the doct ri n al definition of
psychologic al incap a ci ty.9 8 Sant os did refer to
Justice Caguioa ' s opinion expr e s s e d during the
delibe r a ti o n s that "psychologic al inca p a ci ty is
incur a bl e ,"9 9 and the view of a form e r presi di n g
judge of the Metr o polit a n Mar ri a g e Tribun al of
the Archdioc e s e of Manila that psychologic al
incap a ci ty must be cha r a c t e ri z e d "by (a) gravity,
(b) juridic al ant e c e d e n c e , and (c)
incur a bility."10 0 Howeve r, in form ul a ti n g the
doct ri n al rule on psychologic al inca p a ci ty, the
Court in Sant os omitt e d any refer e n c e to
incur a bility as a cha r a c t e r i s ti c of psychologic al
incap a ci ty.1 0 1
This disquisition is mat e ri al as Sant os was
decide d mont h s befor e the trial court cam e out
with its own ruling that rem ai n e d silent on
whet h e r respo n d e n t ' s psychologi c al incap a ci ty
was incur a bl e . Cert ai nly, Sant o s did not clearly
mand a t e that the incur a bility of the
psychologic al incap a ci ty be est a blish e d in an
action for decla r a t i o n of nullity. At least, the r e
was no jurispr u d e n t i a l clarity at the time of the
trial of this case and the subse q u e n t
prom ul g a t i o n of the trial court ' s decision that
requi r e d a medic al finding of incur a bility. Such
requi sit e aros e only with Molina in 1997, at a
time when this case was on appella t e review, or
after the rec e p t io n of evide n c e .
dispelle d by the fact that the Catholic Churc h
tribu n al s, which indubi t a bly conside r incur a bility
as an integ r al req ui sit e of psychologic al
incap a ci ty, were sufficie ntly convinc e d that
respo n d e n t was so incap a cit a t e d to contr a c t
mar ri a g e to the degr e e that ann ul m e n t was
warr a n t e d .
All told, we conclu d e that petition e r has
est a blis h e d his caus e of action for decla r a t io n of
nullity und e r Article 36 of the Family Code. The
RTC corr e c t ly ruled, and the Court of Appe als
err e d in reve r si n g the trial court.

We are awa r e that in Pesc a v. Pesca, 1 0 2 the
Court count e r e d an argu m e n t that Molina and
Sant os should not apply ret ro a c t ively
with the obse rv a ti o n that the inte r p r e t a t i o n or
const r u c t io n plac e d by the court s of a law
constit u t e s a part of that law as of the dat e the
stat u t e in enac t e d . 1 0 3 Yet we appr o a c h this
pre s e n t case from utte rly prac ti c al
conside r a t i o n s . The requi r e m e n t that
psychologic al incap a ci ty must be shown to be
medically or clinically per m a n e n t or incur a bl e is
one that nec e s s a r ily cannot be divine d withou t
expe r t opinion. Clea rly in this case, the r e was no
cat e g o ri c al aver m e n t from the expe r t witne s s e s
that respo n d e n t ' s psychologic al incap a ci ty was
cur a bl e or incur a bl e simply beca u s e the r e was
no legal nece s si ty yet to elicit such a decla r a t i o n
and the appr o p ri a t e question was not
accor di n gly propou n d e d to him. If we apply
Pesc a withou t deep reflection, ther e would be
undu e preju dic e to thos e case s tried befor e
Molina or Sant o s, espe ci ally those pres e n t ly on
app ellat e review, whe r e pres u m a b l y the
resp e c tiv e petition e r s and their expe r t witnes s e s
would not have see n the nee d to adduc e a
diagno sis of incur a bility. It may hold in those
case s, as in this case, that the psychologic al
incap a ci ty of a spous e is actu ally incur a bl e , even
if not prono u n c e d as such at the trial court level.
Ther e is little relish in decidi ng this pres e n t
petition, prono u n ci n g as it does the marit al bond
as having bee n inexist e n t in the first place. It is
possible that respo n d e n t , despit e her
psychologic al stat e, rem ai n s in love with
petition e r, as exhibit e d by her persist e n t
challen g e to the petition for nullity. In fact, the
app ellat e cour t place d undu e emp h a si s on
respo n d e n t ' s avowe d com mi t m e n t to rem ai n in
the mar ri a g e . Yet the Cour t decid e s thes e case s
on legal rea so n s and not vapid senti m e n t a li ty.
Mar ri a g e , in legal cont e m pl a t i o n, is mor e than
the legitim a tiz a ti o n of a desir e of people in love
to live toge t h e r .
WHERE FOR E, the petition is GRANTED. The
decision of the RTC dat e d 10 August 1995,
decla ri n g the mar ri a g e betw e e n petition e r and
respo n d e n t NULL and VOID unde r Article 36 of
the Family Code, is REINSTATED. No costs.

We stat e d earlie r that Molina is not set in ston e,

and that the inter p r e t a t i o n of Article 36 relies
heavily on a case- to- case perc e p t i o n. It would be
inse ns a t e to reaso n to mand a t e in this case an
expe r t medic al or clinical diagno si s of
incur a bility, since the par ti e s would have had no
impelling cause to pre se n t evide nc e to that effect
at the time this case was tried by the RTC more
than ten (10) years ago. From the totality of the
evide n c e, we are sufficien tly convinc e d that the
incur a bility of respo n d e n t ' s psychologi c al
incap a ci ty has bee n est a blish e d by the
petition e r. Any linge ri n g doubt s are furth e r

G.R. No. 10 4 8 1 8 Se p t e m b e r 17, 19 9 3
ROBERTO DOMI N GO , peti t i o n e r ,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and DELIA SOLEDAD
AVERA repr e s e n t e d by her Attor n e y - in- Fact
MOISE S R. AVERA, resp o n d e n t s .
Jose P.O. Alili n g IV for peti t i o n e r .
De Guz m a n , Me n e s e s & Asso c i a t e s for
privat e res p o n d e n t .
ROMERO, J.:
The inst a n t petition seeks the reve r s a l of
respo n d e n t cour t' s ruling finding no grave abuse
of discr e tio n in the lower court 's orde r denying
petition e r ' s motion to dismiss the petition for
decla r a t i o n of nullity of mar ri a g e and sepa r a t i o n
of prope r t y.
On May 29, 1991, privat e respo n d e n t Delia
Soleda d A. Domingo filed a petition befor e the
Region al Trial Cour t of Pasig entitle d
"Decla r a t i o n of Nullity of Marri a g e and
Sep a r a t i o n of Prope r t y" agains t petition e r
Robe r t o Domingo. The petition which was
docke t e d as Speci al Proc e e di n g s No. 1989- J
allege d amon g othe r s that: they were mar ri e d on
Nove m b e r 29, 1976 at the YMCA Youth Cent e r
Bldg., as evide n c e d by a Marri a g e Cont r a c t
Regist ry No. 1277K- 76 with Marri a g e Licens e
No. 4999 0 3 6 issue d at Car m o n a , Cavite;
unkno w n to her, he had a previous marri a g e with
one Eme rli na dela Paz on April 25, 1969 which
mar ri a g e is valid and still existin g; she cam e to
know of the prior mar ri a g e only som e ti m e in
1983 whe n Emerlin a dela Paz sue d the m for
biga my; from Janua r y 23 1979 up to the pres e n t ,
she has been working in Saudi Arabi a and she
used to com e to the Philippi n e s only whe n she
would avail of the one- mont h annu al vacation
leave gra n t e d by her foreig n em ploye r since
1983 up to the pres e n t , he has bee n une m ploy e d
and comple t ely depe n d e n t upon her for suppo r t
and subsist e n c e ; out of her per so n al earni n g s ,
she purc h a s e d real and perso n al prop e r t i e s with
a total amou n t of appr oxi m a t e ly P350,0 0 0. 0 0 ,
which are unde r the posse s sio n and
admi nist r a t i o n of Robe r t o; some ti m e in June
1989, while on her one- mont h vacation, she
discove r e d that he was cohabi tin g with anot h e r
wom a n; she furt h e r discove r e d that he had bee n
disposin g of som e of her prop e r t i e s withou t her
knowle d g e or conse n t ; she confro n t e d him abou t
this and ther e a f t e r appoi nt e d her brot h e r Moises
R. Avera as her atto r n e y- in- fact to take care of
her prop e r t i e s; he failed and refus e d to tur n over
the posse s sio n and administ r a t i o n of said
prope r ti e s to her brot h e r / a t t o r n e y- in- fact; and he
is not aut ho riz e d to admini st e r and posse s s the
sam e on accou n t of the nullity of their marri a g e .
The petition praye d that a tem po r a r y rest r ai ni n g
orde r or a writ of prelimi n a r y injunc tion be
issue d enjoining Rober t o from exer ci sin g any act
of administ r a t i o n and owne r s hi p over said
prope r ti e s; their mar ri a g e be decla r e d null and
void and of no force and effect; and Delia
Soleda d be decla r e d the sole and exclusive
owne r of all prop e r t i e s acqui r e d at the time of
their void mar ri a g e and such prope r t i e s be
place d unde r the prop e r man a g e m e n t and
admi nist r a t i o n of the attor n e y- in- fact.
Petition e r filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
groun d that the petition stat e d no caus e of
action. The mar ri a g e being void ab initio, the
petition for the decl ar a ti o n of its nullity is,
ther efo r e , supe rfluo u s and unn e c e s s a r y . It adde d
that privat e respo n d e n t has no prope r t y which is
in his posse s sio n.
On August 20, 1991, Judge Maria Alicia M.
Austri a issue d an Orde r denying the motion to
dismiss for lack of merit. She explaine d:
Movan t arg u e s that a secon d mar ri a g e
cont r a c t e d after a first mar ri a g e by a man with
anot h e r wom a n is illegal and void (citing the
case of Yap v. Cour t of Appeals, 145 SCRA 229)
and no judicial decr e e is nece s s a r y to est a blis h
the invalidity of a void mar ri a g e (citing the cases
of People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033; People v.
Mendoz a , 95 Phil. 845). Inde e d, unde r the Yap
case ther e is no disput e that the secon d
mar ri a g e cont r a c t e d by respo n d e n t with her ei n
petition e r afte r a first mar ri a g e with anot h e r
wom a n is illegal and void. Howeve r, as to
whet h e r or not the secon d mar ri a g e should first
be judicially decla r e d a nullity is not an issue in
said case. In the case of Vda. de Consu e g r a v.
GSIS, the Supr e m e Court rule d in explicit ter m s,
thus:
And with resp e c t to the right of the secon d wife,
this Court obse rv e d that altho u g h the secon d
mar ri a g e can be pres u m e d to be void ab initio as
it was celeb r a t e d while the first mar ri a g e was
still subsisti n g, still the r e is nee d for judicial
decla r a t i o n of its nullity. (37 SCRA 316, 326)
The above ruling which is of later vinta g e
deviat e d from the previou s rulings of the
Supr e m e Court in the aforecit e d case s of Aragon
and Mendoz a .
Finally, the cont e n ti o n of respo n d e n t movan t
that petition e r has no prop e r t y in his posse s si o n
is an issue that may be dete r m i n e d only afte r
trial on the merit s. 1
A motion for reconsi d e r a t i o n was filed str es si n g
the erro n e o u s applica tio n of Vda. de Consu e g r a
v. GSIS2 and the abse n c e of justicia ble
cont r ov e r sy as to the nullity of the mar ri a g e . On
Sept e m b e r 11, 1991, Judge Austri a deni e d the
motion for reconsi d e r a t i o n and gave petition e r
fiftee n (15) days from recei pt within which to file
his answ e r .
Inst e a d of filing the req ui r e d answ e r , petition e r
filed a special civil action of certior a ri and
mand a m u s on the grou n d that the lower court
act e d with grave abus e of discr e t io n amou n ti n g
to lack of jurisdiction in denying the motion to
dismiss.
On Febr u a r y 7, 1992, the Court of Appeals 3
dismiss e d the petition. It explaine d that the case
of Yap v. CA4 cited by petition e r and that of
Consu e g r a v. GSIS relied upon by the lower
court do not have releva n c e in the case at bar,
ther e being no identity of facts beca u s e these
case s dealt with the succe s si o n al right s of the
secon d wife while the insta n t case prays for
sepa r a t i o n of prope r t y corollary with the
decla r a t i o n of nullity of mar ri a g e . It observ e d
that the sepa r a t i o n and subse q u e n t dist rib u tio n
of the prop e r t i e s acqui r e d during the union can
be had only upon prop e r det e r m i n a t i o n of the
stat u s of the mari t al relation s hi p betw e e n said
par ti e s, whet h e r or not the validity of the first
mar ri a g e is denie d by petition e r . Furt h e r m o r e , in
orde r to avoid duplica tio n and multiplicity of
suits, the decla r a t io n of nullity of mar ri a g e may
be invoke d in this proc e e di n g toget h e r with the
par tition and distrib u ti o n of the prop e r t i e s
involved. Citing Articles 48, 50 and 52 of the
Family Code, it held that privat e respo n d e n t ' s
praye r for decla r a t io n of absol ut e nullity of their
mar ri a g e may be raise d toget h e r with othe r
incide n t s of their mar ri a g e such as the
sepa r a t i o n of their prop e r t i e s. Lastly, it note d
that since the Cour t has jurisdiction, the alleg e d
error in refusin g to gra n t the motion to dismiss is
mer ely one of law for which the rem e d y
ordin a rily would have bee n to file an answ e r ,
proce e d with the trial and in case of an adve r s e
decision, reite r a t e the issue on app e al. The
motion for reconsi d e r a t i o n was subs e q u e n t l y
denie d for lack of merit.5
Henc e, this petition.
The two basic issue s confron ti n g the Cour t in the
inst a n t case are the following.
First, whet h e r or not a petition for judicial
decla r a t i o n of a void marri a g e is nece s s a r y. If in
the affirm a tive, whet h e r the sam e should be filed
only for purpo s e s of rem a r r i a g e .
Secon d, whet h e r or not SP No. 1989- J is the
prope r rem e d y of privat e respo n d e n t to recove r
cert ai n real and perso n al prop e r t i e s allege dly
belon gi n g to her exclusively.
Petition e r, invoking the ruling in People v.
Aragon 6 and Peopl e v. Mendoz a , 7 cont e n d s that
SP. No. 1989- J for Declar a ti o n of Nullity of
Mar ri a g e and Sepa r a t i o n of Prop e r t y filed by
privat e respo n d e n t must be dismiss e d for being
unn ec e s s a r y and supe rfluo u s. Furt h e r m o r e ,
und e r his own inte r p r e t a t i o n of Article 40 of the
Family Code, he sub mit s that a petition for
decla r a t i o n of absolut e nullity of marri a g e is
requi r e d only for purpo s e s of rem a r r i a g e . Since
the petition in SP No. 1989- J cont ai n s no
allega tion of privat e respo n d e n t ' s inte ntio n to
rem a r r y, said petition should ther efo r e , be
dismiss e d .
On the othe r hand, privat e respo n d e n t insist s on
the nec es si ty of a judicial decla r a t io n of the
nullity of their marri a g e , not for purpo s e s of
rem a r r i a g e , but in orde r to provide a basis for
the sepa r a t i o n and dist rib u t io n of the prope r t i e s
acqui r e d during covert u r e .
Ther e is no question that the mar ri a g e of
petition e r and privat e respo n d e n t celeb r a t e d
while the form e r ' s previous mar ri a g e with one
Eme rli n a de la Paz was still subsisti n g, is
biga m o u s. As such, it is from the beginni n g. 8
Petition e r himself does not disput e the absol ut e
nullity of their marri a g e . 9
The case s of People v. Aragon and Peopl e v.
Mendoz a relied upon by petition e r are case s
whe r e the Cour t had earlie r ruled that no judicial
dec r e e is nece s s a r y to est a blis h the invalidity of
a void, biga m o u s mar ri a g e . It is not e wo r t h y to
obse rv e that Justice Alex Reyes, howeve r,
disse n t e d on thes e occasion s stati ng that:
Thoug h the logician may say that whe r e the
form e r mar ri a g e was void the r e would be
nothin g to dissolve, still it is not for the spous e s
to judge whe t h e r that mar ri a g e was void or not.
That judg m e n t is rese r v e d to the cour t s. . . . 10
This disse n ti n g opinion was adopt e d as the
majority position in subs e q u e n t case s involving
the sam e issue. Thus, in Gomez v. Lipan a, 11 the
Court aba n d o n e d its earlie r ruling in the Aragon
and Mendoz a case s. In rever si n g the lower
court ' s orde r forfeiting the husb a n d ' s shar e of
the disput e d prop e r t y acqui r e d during the
secon d mar ri a g e , the Court stat e d that "if the
nullity, or annul m e n t of the mar ri a g e is the basis
for the applica tion of Article 1417, ther e is nee d
for a judicial decla r a t i o n ther e of, which of cours e
cont e m pl a t e s an action for that purpos e ."
Citing Gomez v. Lipan a, the Court subse q u e n t ly
held in Vda. de Consu e g r a v. Gover n m e n t
Servic e Insur a n c e Syst e m , that "althou g h the
secon d mar ri a g e can be pres u m e d to be void ab
initio as it was celeb r a t e d while the first
mar ri a g e was still subsisti n g, still ther e is nee d
for judicial decl a r a t io n of such nullity."
In Tolenti no v. Par a s, 1 2 howeve r , the Court
turn e d arou n d and applie d the Aragon and
Mendoz a ruling once again. In gran ti n g the
praye r of the first wife asking for a decla r a ti o n
as the lawful surviving spous e and the corr e c ti o n
of the deat h certificat e of her dec e a s e d husb a n d ,
it explain e d that "(t)he secon d mar ri a g e that he
cont r a c t e d with privat e respo n d e n t during the
lifetim e of his first spous e is null and void from
the begin ni n g and of no force and effect. No
judicial dec r e e is nece s s a r y to est a blis h the
invalidity of a void marri a g e ."
Howev e r, in the more rece n t case of Wiegel v.
Sem pio- Diy 13 the Cour t reve r t e d to the
Consu e g r a case and held that the r e was "no
nee d of introd u ci n g evide n c e about the existin g
prior marri a g e of her first husb a n d at the time
they mar ri e d each othe r, for then such a
mar ri a g e thoug h void still nee d s accor di n g to
this Court a judicial decla r a t i o n of such fact and
for all legal inten t s and purpo s e s she would still
be reg a r d e d as a mar ri e d wom a n at the time she
cont r a c t e d her mar ri a g e with respo n d e n t Karl
Heinz Wiegel."
Cam e the Family Code which settle d once and
for all the conflictin g jurispr u d e n c e on the
mat t e r . A decla r a t i o n of the absolut e nullity of a
mar ri a g e is now explicitly req ui r e d eithe r as a
caus e of action or a grou n d for defe ns e . 14
Wher e the absolut e nullity of a previou s
mar ri a g e is soug h t to be invoke d for pur pos e s of
cont r a c t i n g a secon d mar ri a g e , the sole basis
acce p t a bl e in law for said project e d mar ri a g e be
free from legal infirmity is a final judg m e n t
decla ri n g the previous mar ri a g e void. 15
The Family Law Revision Com mit t e e and the
Civil Code Revision Commit t e e 16 which draft e d
wha t is now the Family Code of the Philippine s
took the position that par ti e s to a mar ri a g e
shoul d not be allowe d to assu m e that their
mar ri a g e is void even if such be the fact but
must first secu r e a judicial declar a ti o n of the
nullity of their marri a g e befor e they can be
allowe d to marry again. This is born e out by the
following minut e s of the 152n d Joint Meetin g of
the Civil Code and Family Law Commit t e e s
whe r e the pres e n t Article 40, then Art. 39, was
discus s e d .
B. Article 39. —
The absol ut e nullity of a mar ri a g e may be
invoke d only on the basis of a final judgm e n t
decla ri n g the mar ri a g e void, excep t as provide d
in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa rem a r k e d that the above
provision shoul d includ e not only void but also
voida bl e mar ri a g e s . He the n sugg e s t e d that the
above provision be modified as follows:
The validity of a mar ri a g e may be invoke d only . .
.
Justice Reyes (J.B.L. Reyes), howev e r, propos e d
that they say:
The validity or invalidity of a mar ri a g e may be
invoke d
only . . .
On the othe r hand, Justice Puno sugg e s t e d that
they say:
The invalidity of a mar ri a g e may be invoke d
only . . .
Justice Caguioa explaine d that his idea is that
one cannot det e r m i n e for hims elf whet h e r or not
his mar ri a g e is valid and that a court action is
nee d e d . Justice Puno accor di n gly propos e d that
the provision be modified to read:
The invalidity of a mar ri a g e may be invoke d only
on the basis of a final judg m e n t ann ulling the
mar ri a g e or decla ri n g the mar ri a g e void, excep t
as provide d in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa rem a r k e d that in annul m e n t ,
ther e is no que stio n. Justice Puno, howeve r,
point e d out that, even if it is a judg m e n t of
annul m e n t , they still have to prod u c e the
judg m e n t .
Justice Caguioa sugg e s t e d that they say:
The invalidity of a mar ri a g e may be invoke d only
on the basis of a final judg m e n t decla ri n g the
mar ri a g e invalid, excep t as provide d in Article
41.
Justice Puno raise d the ques tio n: When a
mar ri a g e is decla r e d invalid, does it includ e the
annul m e n t of a marri a g e and the declar a ti o n that
the mar ri a g e is void? Justice Caguio a replied in
the affirm a tive. Dean Gupit adde d that in som e
judg m e n t s , even if the mar ri a g e is annulle d, it is
decla r e d void. Justice Puno sugg e s t e d that this
mat t e r be made clear in the provision.
Prof. Bavier a rem a r k e d that the original idea in
the provision is to requi r e first a judicial
decla r a t i o n of a void marri a g e and not annulla bl e
mar ri a g e s , with which the othe r mem b e r s
concu r r e d . Judge Diy add e d that annulla bl e
mar ri a g e s are pres u m e d valid until a direc t
action is filed to annul it, which the othe r
mem b e r s affirm e d . Justice Puno rem a r k e d that if
this is so, then the phr a s e "absolut e nullity" can
sta n d since it might result in confusion if they
cha n g e the phr a s e to "invalidity" if what they are
refer ri n g to in the provision is the decla r a t i o n
that the mar ri a g e is void.
Prof. Bautist a com m e n t e d that they will be doing
away with collat e r a l defen s e as well as collate r al
att a c k. Justice Caguio a explaine d that the idea in
the provision is that ther e should be a final
judg m e n t decla ri n g the mar ri a g e void and a
par ty should not decla r e for hims elf whet h e r or
not the mar ri a g e is void, while the othe r
mem b e r s affirm e d . Justice Caguioa adde d that
they are, the r efo r e , trying to avoid a collat e r a l
att a c k on that point. Prof. Bautist a stat e d that
ther e are actions which are broug h t on the
assu m p ti o n that the marri a g e is valid. He then
aske d: Are they deprivin g one of the right to
raise the defen s e that he has no liability beca u s e
the basis of the liability is void? Prof. Bautist a
add e d that they canno t say that ther e will be no
judg m e n t on the validity or invalidity of the
mar ri a g e bec a u s e it will be take n up in the sam e
proce e di n g. It will not be a unilat e r a l decla r a t i o n
that, it is a void mar ri a g e . Justice Caguioa saw
the point of Prof. Bautist a and sugg e s t e d that
they limit the provision to rem a r r i a g e . He then
propos e d that Article 39 be rewo r d e d as follows:
The absol ut e nullity of a mar ri a g e for pur po s e s
of rem a r ri a g e may be invoke d only on the basis
of final judgm e n t . . .
Justice Puno sugg e s t e d that the above be
modified as follows:
The absol ut e nullity of a previous mar ri a g e may
be invoke d for pur po s e s of est a blis hin g the
validity of a subse q u e n t mar ri a g e only on the
basis of a final judg m e n t decla ri n g such previou s
mar ri a g e void, except as provide d in Article 41.
Justice Puno later modified the above as follows:
For the purpo s e of est a blis hin g the validity of a
subs e q u e n t mar ri a g e , the absol ut e nullity of a
previous mar ri a g e may only be invoked on the
basis of a final judg m e n t decla ri n g such nullity,
excep t as provide d in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa com m e n t e d that the above
provision is too broa d and will not solve the
objection of Prof. Bautist a . He propos e d that
they say:
For the purpo s e of ent e ri n g into a subs e q u e n t
mar ri a g e , the absol ut e nullity of a previous
mar ri a g e may only be invoke d on the basis of a
final judg m e n t decl a ri n g such nullity, excep t as
provide d in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa explaine d that the idea in the
above provision is that if one ent e r s into a
subs e q u e n t mar ri a g e withou t obt ainin g a final
judg m e n t decla ri n g the nullity of a previou s
mar ri a g e , said subs e q u e n t mar ri a g e is void ab
initio.
After furth e r delibe r a t io n, Justice Puno
sugg e s t e d that they go back to the original
wordin g of the provision as follows:
The absol ut e nullity of a previous mar ri a g e may
be invoke d for pur po s e s of rem a r r i a g e only on
the basis of a final judg m e n t decla ri n g such
previous mar ri a g e void, exce pt as provide d in
Article 41. 17
In fact, the requir e m e n t for a decla r a t io n of
absol ut e nullity of a mar ri a g e is also for the
prot e c ti on of the spous e who, believing that his
or her mar ri a g e is illegal and void, mar ri e s
again. With the judicial decla r a t i o n of the nullity
of his or her first mar ri a g e , the perso n who
mar ri e s again canno t be cha r g e d with biga my.
18
Just over a year ago, the Court made the
prono u n c e m e n t that ther e is a nece s sity for a
decla r a t i o n of absolut e nullity of a prior
subsisti n g mar ri a g e befor e cont r a c t i n g anot h e r
in the rece n t case of Terr e v. Terre. 19 The
Court, in turni n g down the defen s e of
respo n d e n t Terre who was cha r g e d with grossly
immor al cond u c t consisti n g of cont r a c t i n g a
secon d mar ri a g e and living with anot h e r wom a n
othe r tha n compl ain a n t while his prior mar ri a g e
with the latte r rem ai n e d subsisti n g, said that "for
purpo s e s of det e r m i ni n g whet h e r a perso n is
legally free to cont r a c t a secon d mar ri a g e , a
judicial decla r a t i o n that the first mar ri a g e was
null and void ab initio is esse n t i al."
As reg a r d s the nece s si ty for a judicial
decla r a t i o n of absolut e nullity of marri a g e ,
petition e r sub mit s that the sam e can be
maint ai n e d only if it is for the purpo s e of
rem a r r i a g e . Failur e to allege this purpo s e ,
accor di n g to petition e r ' s theo ry, will warr a n t
dismiss al of the sam e .
Article 40 of the Family Code provide s:
Art. 40. The absolut e nullity of a previou s
mar ri a g e may be invoke d for purpo s e s of
rem a r r i a g e on the basis solely of a final
judg m e n t decla ri n g such previou s mar ri a g e void.
(n)
Cruci al to the prop e r inter p r e t a t i o n of Article 40
is the position in the provision of the word
"solely." As it is plac e d, the sam e shows that it is
mea n t to qualify "final judg m e n t decla ri n g such
previous mar ri a g e void." Realizing the nee d for
careful crafts m a n s h i p in conveying the preci se
inte nt of the Com mit t e e me m b e r s , the provision
in ques tio n, as it finally eme r g e d , did not stat e
"The absolut e nullity of a previous mar ri a g e may
be invoke d solely for purpo s e s of
rem a r r i a g e . . .," in which case "solely" would
clearly qualify the phra s e "for purpos e s of
rem a r r i a g e ." Had the phr a s e olo gy bee n such, the
inte r p r e t a t i o n of petition e r would have been
corr e c t and, that is, that the absolut e nullity of a
previous mar ri a g e may be invoke d solely for
purpo s e s of rem a r ri a g e , thus ren d e ri n g
irrel eva n t the claus e "on the basis solely of a
final judg m e n t decl a ri n g such previous marri a g e
void."
That Article 40 as finally form ul a t e d include d the
significa n t claus e denot e s that such final
judg m e n t decla ri n g the previous mar ri a g e void
nee d not be obtai n e d only for purpo s e s of
rem a r r i a g e . Undou b t e d ly, one can conc eive of
othe r inst a n c e s wher e a party might well invoke
the absolut e nullity of a previou s mar ri a g e for
purpo s e s othe r tha n rem a r r i a g e , such as in case
of an action for liquida ti on, partition, dist rib u tio n
and sepa r a t io n of prop e r t y betw e e n the
erst w hil e spouse s , as well as an action for the
custody and suppo r t of their com m o n childr e n
and the delivery of the latte r s ' pres u m p t iv e
legiti m e s. In such case s, eviden c e need s must be
add uc e d , testi m o ni al or docu m e n t a r y , to prove
the exist e n c e of groun d s rend e ri n g such a
previous mar ri a g e an absolut e nullity. These
nee d not be limited solely to an earlie r final
judg m e n t of a court decla ri n g such previous
mar ri a g e void. Henc e, in the insta n c e wher e a
par ty who has previously contr a c t e d a mar ri a g e
which rem ai n s subsisti n g desir e s to ente r into
anot h e r marri a g e which is legally unass aila bl e,
he is req ui r e d by law to prove that the previous
one was an absolut e nullity. But this he may do
on the basis solely of a final judgm e n t decla ri n g
such previous mar ri a g e void.
This leads us to the ques tio n: Why the
distinctio n? In othe r words, for purpos e s of
rem a r r i a g e , why should the only legally
acce p t a bl e basis for decla ri n g a previous
mar ri a g e an absolut e nullity be a final judg m e n t
decla ri n g such previou s mar ri a g e void? Wher e a s,
for purpo s e s othe r tha n rem a r r i a g e , othe r
evide n c e is acce p t a b l e ?
Mar ri a g e , a sacro s a n c t instit u tio n, decla r e d by
the Constit u tio n as an "inviolabl e social
instit ution, is the found a ti o n of the family;" as
such, it "shall be prot e c t e d by the Stat e." 2 0 In
more explicit ter m s, the Family Code
cha r a c t e r i z e s it as "a speci al contr a c t of
per m a n e n t union betw e e n a man and a wom a n
ent e r e d into in accor d a n c e with law for the
est a blis h m e n t of conjug al, and family life." 21 So
cruci al are mar ri a g e and the family to the
stability and peac e of the nation that their
"nat u r e , cons e q u e n c e s , and incide n t s are
gover n e d by law and not subjec t to
stipul a tion . . ." 22 As a mat t e r of policy,
ther efo r e , the nullification of a mar ri a g e for the
purpo s e of cont r a c t i n g anot h e r cannot be
acco m pli sh e d mer ely on the basis of the
perc e p ti o n of both parti e s or of one that their
union is so defective with resp e c t to the esse n ti al
requi sit e s of a cont r a c t of marri a g e as to rend e r
it void ipso jure and with no legal effect — and
nothin g mor e. Were this so, this inviolabl e social
instit ution would be redu c e d to a mocke r y and
would rest on very shaky found a ti o n s inde e d.
And the groun d s for nullifying mar ri a g e would
be as divers e and far- ran gi n g as hum a n
inge n ui ty and fancy could conceive. For such a
social significa n t instit u tio n, an official stat e
prono u n c e m e n t thro u g h the cour t s, and nothin g
less, will satisfy the exacti n g nor m s of society.
Not only would such an open and public
decla r a t i o n by the cour t s definitively confir m the
nullity of the cont r a c t of mar ri a g e , but the sam e
would be easily verifiabl e throu g h recor d s
acce s si bl e to everyo n e .
That the law seeks to ensu r e that a prior
mar ri a g e is no impe di m e n t to a secon d soug h t to
be cont r a c t e d by one of the par ti e s may be
glea n e d from new infor m a t i o n requi r e d in the
Family Code to be include d in the applica tion for
a marri a g e licens e , viz, "If previou sly mar ri e d ,
how, when and wher e the previous mar ri a g e was
dissolve d and annull e d." 23
Rever tin g to the case befor e us, petition e r ' s
inte r p r e t a t i o n of Art. 40 of the Family Code is,
undo u b t e d ly, quite rest ri ctive. Thus, his position
that privat e respo n d e n t ' s failur e to stat e in the
petition that the sam e is filed to ena bl e her to
rem a r r y will resul t in the dismiss al of SP No.
1989- J is unt e n a b l e . His miscon st r u c t i o n of Art.
40 resulti n g from the mispla c e d emph a si s on the
ter m "solely" was in fact anticip a t e d by the
mem b e r s of the Com mi t t e e .
Dean Gupit com m e n t e d the word "only" may be
miscons t r u e d to refer to "for purpo s e s of
rem a r r i a g e ." Judge Diy stat e d that "only" refer s
to "final judg m e n t ." Justice Puno sugg e s t e d that
they say "on the basis only of a final judg m e n t ."
Prof. Bavier a sugg e s t e d that they use the legal
ter m "solely" inste a d of "only," which the
Com mit t e e appr ove d . 24 (Emp h a si s supplie d)
Purs ui n g his previous arg u m e n t that the
decla r a t i o n for absol ut e nullity of mar ri a g e is
unn ec e s s a r y, petition e r sugg e s t s that privat e
respo n d e n t should have filed an ordina r y civil
action for the recove r y of the prop e r t i e s allege d
to have bee n acqui r e d during their union. In
such an event u a lity, the lower court would not
be acting as a mer e special court but would be
clothe d with jurisdic tion to rule on the issue s of
posse s sio n and owne r s hi p. In addition, he
point e d out that ther e is actu ally nothin g to
sepa r a t e or par tition as the petition admit s that
all the prope r t i e s wer e acqui r e d with privat e
respo n d e n t ' s money.
The Court of Appeals disre g a r d e d this arg u m e n t
and conclud e d that "the praye r for decla r a t i o n of
absol ut e nullity of mar ri a g e may be raise d
toge t h e r with the othe r incide n t of their
mar ri a g e such as the sep a r a t i o n of thei r
prope r ti e s."
When a mar ri a g e is decla r e d void ab initio, the
law stat e s that the final judgm e n t ther ei n shall
provide for "the liquidati on, par tition and
distri b u ti o n of the prop e r t i e s of the spouse s , the
custody and suppo r t of the com m o n childr e n,
and the delivery of their pres u m p t iv e legitim e s,
unless such matt e r s had been adjudic a t e d in
previous judicial proce e di n g s ." 25 Othe r specific
effect s flowing the r efr o m , in prope r case s, are
the following:
Art. 43. xxx xxx xxx
(2) The absolut e com m u ni t y of prope r t y or the
conjug al par t n e r s h i p, as the case may be, shall
be dissolve d and liquida t e d , but if eithe r spous e
cont r a c t e d said mar ri a g e in bad faith, his or her
sha r e of the net profits of the com m u ni ty
prope r t y or conjug al part n e r s h i p prope r t y shall
be forfeite d in favor of the com m o n childre n or,
if ther e are none, the childr e n of the guilty
spous e by a previous mar ri a g e or, in default of
childr e n, the innoce n t spous e;
(3) Donation s by reaso n of mar ri a g e shall rem ai n
valid, exce pt that if the done e contr a c t e d the
mar ri a g e in bad faith, such dona tio n s mad e to
said done e are revoke d by ope r a tio n of law;
(4) The innoc e n t spous e may revoke the
desig n a t i o n of the othe r spous e who act e d in bad
faith as a ben eficia ry in any insur a n c e policy,
even if such design a t io n be stipul at e d as
irrevoc a bl e; and
(5) The spouse who cont r a c t e d the subs e q u e n t
mar ri a g e in bad faith shall be disqu alified to
inhe rit from the innoce n t spouse by test a t e and
intest a t e succ e s sio n. (n)
Art. 44. If both spous e s of the subs e q u e n t
mar ri a g e act e d in bad faith, said mar ri a g e shall
be void ab initio and all dona tion s by rea so n of
mar ri a g e and test a m e n t a r y disposition made by
one in favor of the other are revoke d by
oper a ti o n of law. (n) 26
Based on the foregoi n g provisions, privat e
respo n d e n t ' s ultim a t e praye r for sepa r a t i o n of
prope r t y will simply be one of the nece s s a r y
conse q u e n c e s of the judicial decla r a t i o n of
absol ut e nullity of their mar ri a g e . Thus,
petition e r ' s sugg e s ti o n that in orde r for their
prope r ti e s to be sepa r a t e d , an ordina r y civil
action has to be instit ut e d for that purpo s e is
basel e s s. The Family Code has clea rly provide d
the effect s of the decla r a t i o n of nullity of
mar ri a g e , one of which is the sepa r a t i o n of
prope r t y accor di n g to the regi m e of prop e r t y
relation s gover ni n g the m. It stan d s to reaso n
that the lowe r court before whom the issue of
nullity of a first mar ri a g e is brou g h t is likewise
clothe d with jurisdic tion to decide the incide n t al
ques tio n s reg a r di n g the couple' s prop e r t i e s.
Accordi n gly, the respo n d e n t cour t com mit t e d no
reve r si bl e error in finding that the lower court
com mit t e d no grave abus e of discr e t io n in
denying petition e r ' s motion to dismiss SP No.
1989- J.
WHERE FOR E, the insta n t petition is her e by
DENIED. The decision of respo n d e n t Court dat e d
Febr u a r y 7, 1992 and the Resolution dat e d
Marc h 20, 1992 are AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 14 3 3 7 6 . Nov e m b e r 26, 20 0 2 ]
LENI O. CHOA, Peti t i o n e r , vs. ALFONS O C.
CHOA, res p o n d e n t .
DE C IS IO N
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Thoug h inte rloc u t o r y in char a c t e r , an orde r
denying a dem u r r e r to evide n c e may be the
subjec t of a certior a ri proc e e di n g, provide d the
petition e r can show that it was issue d with grave
abus e of discr e tio n; and that app e al in due
cours e is not plain, ade q u a t e or spee dy und e r
the circu m s t a n c e s . Inde e d, when the plaintiffs
evide n c e is utte rly and pat e n tly insufficien t to
prove the complai n t, it would be capriciou s for a
trial judge to deny the dem u r r e r and to requir e
the defen d a n t to pres e n t evide nc e to cont rov e r t
a nonexisti n g case. Verily, the deni al constit u t e s
an unwelco m e imposition on the court s docke t
and an assa ul t on the defen d a n t s resou r c e s and
pea c e of mind. In shor t, such denial nee dl e s sly
delays and, thus, effectively denie s justice.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certior a ri
und e r Rule 45 of the Rules of Cour t, assailing the
Marc h 16, 2000 Decision1 and the May 22, 2000
Resolution 2 of the Court of Appe als (CA) in CA-
GR SP No. 53100. The dec r e t a l portion of the
Decision rea d s as follows:
WHERE FOR E, the insta n t Petition is her e by
DISMISS ED for lack of meri t.
[3cr äl ä wvi rt u a li b r ä r y
The assaile d Resolution denie d petition e r s
Motion for Reconsi d e r a t i o n.[ 4
The Fact s
Petition e r and respo n d e n t wer e mar ri e d on
Marc h 15, 1981. Out of this union, two childr e n
were born, Cheryl Lynne and Albryan. On
Octobe r 27, 1993, respo n d e n t filed befor e the
Region al Trial Cour t (RTC) of Negr o s Occide n t al ,
Branc h 51, a Com pl ai n t[5 for the annul m e n t of
his mar ri a g e to petition e r . The Compl ai nt was
docke t e d as Civil Case No. 93- 8098. Afterw a r d s
he filed an Amend e d Complai nt [ 6 dat e d
Nove m b e r 8, 1993 for the declar a ti o n of nullity
of his mar ri a g e to petition e r base d on her
allege d psychologi c al incap a ci ty.
The case went to trial with respo n d e n t
pre s e n t i n g his eviden c e in chief. After his last
witne s s testified, he submi t t e d his Form al Offer
of Exhibits[7 dat e d Febr u a r y 20, 1998. Inst e a d of
offering any objection to it, petition e r filed a
Motion to Dismiss (Dem u r r e r to Evide nc e )[ 8
dat e d May 11, 1998. The lower court the n
allowe d a num b e r of pleadi n g s to be filed
ther e af t e r .
Finally, the RTC issue d its Dece m b e r 2, 1998
Orde r 9 denying petition e r s Dem u r r e r to
Evide nc e . It held that [respo n d e n t ] est a blish e d a
qua n t u m of evide n c e that the [petition e r ] must
cont r ov e r t . 1 0 After her Motion for
Reconsi d e r a t i o n 1 1 was deni e d in the Marc h 22,
1999 Orde r , 1 2 petition e r elevat e d the case to the
CA by way of a Petition for Certior a r i,[1 3
docke t e d as CA-GR No. 5310 0.
Ruling of the Court of Appe al s
The CA held that the denial of the dem u r r e r was
mer ely interloc u t o ry; henc e, certior a r i unde r
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was not availabl e.
The prope r rem e d y was for the defen s e to
pre s e n t eviden c e ; and if an unfavor a bl e decision
was hand e d down later, to take an app e al
ther ef r o m . 1 4 In any event, no grave abus e of
discr e tio n was com mi t t e d by respo n d e n t judge in
issuing the assaile d Orde r s.
[15cr äl ä wvi r t u a li b r ä r y
The CA also ruled that the propri e t y of gra n ti n g
or denying a dem u r r e r to evide nc e rest s on the
sound exercis e of the [trial] court s discr e ti o n.[1 6
Furt h e r , the [p]etition e r failed to show that the
issue s in the court below [had] been resolve d
arbit r a rily or withou t basis.
[17cr äl ä wvi r t u a li b r ä r y
Henc e, this Petition.1 8
The Issue s
In her Memo r a n d u m , 1 9 petition e r sub mit s the
following issue s for our consid e r a t i o n:
1) Upon the denial of petition e r s dem u r r e r to
evide n c e unde r Rule 33 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Proc e d u r e , is she unde r obligatio n, as a mat t e r of
inflexible rule, as what the Cour t of Appeal s
requi r e d of her, to pre s e n t her evide nc e, and
when an unfavor a bl e [verdict] is hand e d down,
app e al ther ef r o m in the man n e r aut ho riz e d by
law, despit e the palpa bly and pat e n tly weak and
grossly insufficien t or so inad e q u a t e eviden c e of
the privat e respo n d e n t as plaintiff in the
annul m e n t of mar ri a g e case, grou n d e d on
psychologic al incap a ci ty und e r Art. 36 of The
Family Code? Or unde r such circu m s t a n c e s , can
the extr a o r di n a r y rem e d y of certior a ri be
directly and imm e di a t ely resor t e d to by the
petition e r; and
2) In upholdi n g the lower court s denial of
petition e r s dem u r r e r to evide nc e, did the Court
of Appeal s wanto nly violat e, ignor e or disr e g a r d
in a whimsic al man n e r the doct ri n al
prono u n c e m e n t s of this Court in Molina (G.R.
No. 1087 6 3, Febr u a r y 13, 1997, 268 SCRA 198)
and Sant os (G.R. No. 1120 1 9 , Janua ry 14, 1995,
58 SCRA 17)?[20c r äl ä w vi r t u a li b r ä r y
Simply stat e d, the issue s are: (1) is certior a ri
availabl e to corre c t an orde r denying a dem u r r e r
to eviden c e ? and (2) in its denial, did the RTC
com mit grave abus e of discr e tio n by violating or
ignorin g the applica bl e law and jurisp r u d e n c e ?
The Court s Ruling
The Petition is merito ri ou s.
First Issue:
Resor t to Certior a ri
Petition e r arg u e s that the RTC denie d her
Demu r r e r to Eviden c e despi t e the pat e n t
weakn e s s and gross insufficien cy of respo n d e n t s
evide n c e. Thus, she was entitle d to the
imme di a t e recou r s e of the extr a o r di n a r y rem e d y
of certior a r i. Echoin g the CA, respo n d e n t
count e r s that appe al in due cours e , not
certior a ri , is the prop e r rem e dy.
We clarify. In gene r a l, interloc u t o r y orde r s are
neith e r appe al a bl e nor subjec t to certior a ri
proce e di n g s.
Howev e r, this rule is not absolut e . In Tadeo v.
People,[21 this Court decla r e d that appe al -- not
certior a ri -- in due time was indee d the prop e r
rem e d y, provide d ther e was no grave abus e of
discr e tio n or excess of jurisdiction or oppr e s sive
exercis e of judicial aut ho ri t y.
In fact, Rules 41 and 65 of the Rules of Court
expr e s sly recog niz e this excep tio n and allow
certior a ri whe n the lower cour t acts with grave
abus e of discr e tio n in the issua n c e of an
inte rloc u t o r y orde r . Rule 41 provide s:
No appe al may be take n from:
xxx
(c) An inte rloc u t o r y orde r;
xxx
In all the above insta n c e s whe r e the judgm e n t or
final orde r is not appe al a bl e, the aggri ev e d party
may file an appr o p ri a t e special civil action unde r
Rule 65. 22cr äl ä wvi r t u a lib r ä r y
In turn, Section 1 of Rule 65 rea d s as follows:
SEC. 1. Petition for certior a ri -- When any
tribu n al, boa r d or officer exercisi n g judicial or
quasi- judicial function s has act e d without or in
excess of its or his jurisdic tion, or with grave
abus e of discr e tio n amou n ti n g to lack or exces s
of jurisdiction, and ther e is no appe a l, nor any
plain, spe e dy, and adeq u a t e rem e d y in the
ordin a ry cours e of law, a perso n aggri ev e d
ther e b y may file a verified petition in the prope r
court, allegi ng the facts with cert ai n ty and
praying that judg m e n t be rend e r e d annulling or
modifying the proc e e di n g s of such tribu n al,
boar d or officer, and gra n ti n g such incide n t a l
reliefs as law and justice may requi r e.
[23cr äl ä wvi r t u a li b r ä r y
Thus, a denial of a dem u r r e r that is taint e d with
grave abuse of discr e ti on amou n t i n g to lack or
excess of jurisdiction may be assaile d throu g h a
petition for certior a ri. 2 4 In Cruz v. People, this
excep tion was stre s s e d by the Cour t in this wise:
Admitt e dly, the gene r al rule that the
extr a o r di n a r y writ of certior a ri is not availabl e to
challen g e interloc u t o ry orde r s of the trial court
may be subjec t to excep tio n s. When the assaile d
inte rloc u t o r y orde r s are pat e n tly erron e o u s or
issue d with grave abus e of discre tio n, the
rem e d y of certior a ri lies.25
Secon d Issue:
Denial of Dem u r r e r to Eviden c e
Having est a blish e d that a writ of certior a ri may
be issue d in excepti on al circu m s t a n c e s , this
Court is now taske d to det e r m i n e whet h e r the
pre s e n t case falls und e r the excep tion; that is,
whet h e r the RTC inde e d com mit t e d a pat e n t
error or grave abus e of discr e ti o n in denyin g
petition e r s Dem u r r e r to Eviden c e .
A dem u r r e r to evide n c e is define d as an
objection or exce ptio n by one of the parti e s in an
action at law, to the effect that the evide n c e
which his adve r s a r y produ c e d is insufficien t in
point of law (whet h e r true or not) to make out
his case or sust ai n the issue.2 6 The dem u r r e r
challen g e s the sufficiency of the plaintiffs
evide n c e to sust ai n a verdict.[2 7 In passi n g upon
the sufficiency of the evide n c e raise d in a
dem u r r e r , the court is mer ely requi r e d to
asce r t a i n whet h e r the r e is comp e t e n t or
sufficient proof to sust ai n the indict m e n t or to
suppo r t a verdict of guilt.[28c r äl ä w vi r t u a li b r ä r y
We have thoro u g hl y review e d the recor d s of the
pre s e n t case, and we are convinc e d that the
evide n c e agai ns t respo n d e n t (her ei n petition e r )
is grossly insufficie nt to suppo r t any finding of
psychologic al incap a ci ty that would warr a n t a
decla r a t i o n of nullity of the par ti e s mar ri a g e .
First. Respo n d e n t claims that the filing by
petition e r of a serie s of char g e s again st him are
proof of the latte r s psychologic al incap a ci ty to
comply with the esse n ti al obligation s of
mar ri a g e . These char g e s includ e d Compl ai nt s for
perju ry,2 9 false testi m o ny,[30 concu bi n a g e [ 3 1
and depo r t a t i o n.[ 3 2 Accordi n g to him, the filing
and the prose c u t i o n of thes e case s clearly
show e d that his wife (herei n petition e r ) want e d
not only to put him behi nd bars, but also to
banis h him from the count ry. He cont e n d s that
this is very abno r m a l for a wife who, inste a d of
prot e c ti n g the na m e and integ ri ty of her husb a n d
as the fathe r of her childr e n , had acte d to the
cont r a r y.[ 3 3 c r ä l ä w vi r t u a li b r ä r y
We do not agre e . The docu m e n t s pres e n t e d by
respo n d e n t durin g the trial do not in any way
show the allege d psychologic al inca p a ci ty of his
wife. It is the height of absu r di ty and inequity to
cond e m n her as psychologic ally incap a ci t a t e d to
fulfill her marit al obliga tion s, simply beca u s e she
filed case s again st him. The evide n c e pre s e n t e d ,
even if take n as true, mer ely est a blis h e s the
pros e c u ti o n of the case s again s t him. To rule
that the filings are sufficien t to est a blish her
psychologic al incap a ci ty is not only totally
erron e o u s , but also grave abus e of discr e tio n
bord e ri n g on absu r di t y.
Secon d. Neit h e r is the testi m o ny of respo n d e n t ,
take n by itself or in conjun c tio n with his
docu m e n t a r y offering s, sufficie nt to prove
petition e r s allege d psychologic al inca p a ci t y. He
testified in thes e words:
Q Will you pleas e tell us or explain to the Court
wha t do you mea n by psychologic ally
incap a ci t a t e d to com ply with the esse n ti al
obliga tion s of marri a g e . What do you mea n by
that?
A Becau s e befor e our mar ri a g e she was alre a dy
on the family way, so at that time she even want
it abort e d by taking pills. She was even
imma t u r e , carefr e e , and she lacke d the inten ti on
of proc r e a ti ve sexuality.34
xxx
ATTY. CHUA:
And you conside r her that she was carefr e e , she
is psychologi c ally inca p a ci t a t e d ? Will you pleas e
elabor a t e on this what you mea n by carefr e e
app roxi m a t i n g psychologi c ally incap a ci t a t e d ?
ATTY. MIRANO:
I think we bett e r ask the witne s s what he mea n s
by car efr e e .
ATTY. CHUA:
Okay.
COURT:
Witness may answ e r .
WITNES S:
She does not help in the hous e h ol d chor e s, she
does not take care of the child, she want s me to
hire an att e n d a n t in orde r to take care of the
child. Even when the childr e n were sick she does
not both e r to let the childr e n see a doctor. 3 5
xxx
STENOGRAPH ER (rea d s back the ques tio n of
Atty. Chua):
ATTY. CHUA:
Now. From the time of court s hi p up to the time
of your mar ri a g e to the defe n d a n t , did you notice
any char a c t e ri s ti c or traits which you consid e r as
psychologic al incap a ci ty?
WITNES S:
Some ti m e s when I cannot visit at her house she
gets mad at me, and she wont talk to me when I
call her up by telep ho n e . So, all she want e d for
me to visit her everyti m e and even at the time
when I am busy with som e othe r things. So, I
think that is all.[36c r ä l ä w vi r t u a li b r ä r y
Even if take n as true, the testi m o ny of
respo n d e n t basic ally com pl ai ns about thr e e
aspe c t s of petition e r s per so n a lity; nam ely, her
allege d (1) lack of att e n t io n to their childr e n, (2)
imma t u ri t y and (3) lack of an inte ntio n of
procr e a t iv e sexuality. None of these thre e , singly
or collectively, constit u t e s psychologi c al
incap a ci ty. Far from it.
In Sant os v. CA,[37 this Court clea rly explai ne d
that psychologic al incap a ci ty must be
cha r a c t e r i z e d by (a) gravity, (b) juridic al
ant e c e d e n c e and (c) incur a bility.[38 Said the
Court:
It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoi n g
disquisitions, includin g, and most import a n tl y,
the delibe r a t i o n s of the Family Code Revision
Com mit t e e itself, that the use of the phra s e
psychologic al incap a ci ty und e r Article 36 of the
Code has not bee n mea n t to comp r e h e n d all such
possible case s of psychos e s as, likewise
mention e d by some ecclesi a s ti c al aut ho ri ti e s,
extr e m e ly low intellige n c e , imm a t u ri ty, and like
circu m s t a n c e s (cited in Fr. Artemio Balum a ' s
Void and Voidabl e Mar ri a g e s in the Family Code
and their Par all els in Canon Law, quotin g from
the Diagno s ti c Statistic al Manu al of Ment al
Disor d e r by the Americ a n Psychia t ri c
Associa tion; Edwa r d Hudso n' s Hand b oo k II for
Mar ri a g e Nullity Cases). Article 36 of the Family
Code canno t be take n and const r u e d
inde p e n d e n t l y of but must sta n d in conjun c tio n
with, existing prec e p t s in our law on mar ri a g e .
Thus corr el a t e d , psychologi c al incap a ci ty shoul d
refer to no less than a ment al (not physic al)
incap a ci ty that caus e s a party to be truly
incog ni tive of the basic marit al coven a n t s that
conco m it a n t ly must be assu m e d and disch a r g e d
by the parti e s to the mar ri a g e which, as so
expr e s s e d by Article 68 of the Family Code,
includ e their mut u al obliga tion s to live toge t h e r ,
obse rv e love, resp e c t and fidelity and rend e r
help and suppo r t . There is har dly any doubt that
the inten d m e n t of the law has bee n to confine
the mea ni n g of psychologic al inca p a ci ty to the
most seriou s cases of perso n ali ty disord e r s
clearly demo n s t r a t iv e of an utt e r inse nsi tivity or
inability to give mea ni n g and significa n c e to the
mar ri a g e . This psychologic condition must exist
at the time the marri a g e is celeb r a t e d .
[39cr äl ä wvi r t u a li b r ä r y
Furt h e r m o r e , in Repu blic v. Molina,[4 0 we ruled
that the psychologic al inca p a ci t y must be more
than just a difficulty, a refusal or a negl ec t in the
perfor m a n c e of some mari t al obligatio n s. We
stre s s e d that a mer e showing of irreco n cil a bl e
differe n c e s and conflicting perso n aliti e s in no
wise constit u t e s psychologi c al incap a cit y.
In the case at bar, the evide n c e adduc e d by
respo n d e n t mer ely show s that he and his wife
could not get along with each othe r. Ther e was
absol ut ely no showi ng of the gravity or juridic al
ant e c e d e n c e or incur a bility of the proble m s
bese t ti n g their marit al union.
Sorely lacking in respo n d e n t s evide nc e is proof
that the psychologic al inca p a ci t y was grave
enoug h to bring about the disa bility of a party to
assu m e the esse n t i al obligatio n s of marri a g e . In
Molina, we affirm e d that mild cha r a c t e r ol o gi c al
pec ulia riti es, mood chan g e s and occa sion al
emotion al outbu r s t s canno t be acce p t e d as root
caus e s of psychologic al incap a ci ty. The illness
must be shown as downri g h t incap a ci ty or
inability, not a refus al, negle c t or difficulty, much
less ill will. In othe r words, ther e should be a
nat al or supe rv e ni n g disabling factor in the
per so n, an adve r s e integ r al elem e n t in the
per so n ali ty struc t u r e that effectively
incap a ci t a t e s the perso n from really acce p ti n g
and the r e b y complying with the obligatio n s
esse n ti al to mar ri a g e . 4 1 c r ä l ä w vi r t u a li b r ä r y
Respon d e n t s pious pero r a t io n that petition e r
lacke d the inten tion of procr e a t iv e sexuality is
easily belied by the fact that two childr e n were
born durin g their union. Moreove r , ther e is
absol ut ely no showi ng that the allege d defec t
was alrea d y existing at the time of the
celeb r a t io n of the mar ri a g e .
Third. Most telling is the insufficie ncy, if not
incom p e t e n c y, of the suppos e d expe r t testi m o ny
pre s e n t e d by respo n d e n t . His witne s s, Dr.
Antonio M. Gauzon, utte rly failed to identify and
prove the root caus e of the allege d psychologic al
incap a ci ty. Specifically, his testi mo ny did not
show that the incap a ci ty, if true, was medic ally
or clinically per m a n e n t or incur a bl e . Neit h e r did
he testify that it was grave enoug h to bring
about the disa bility of the party to assu m e the
esse n ti al obligation s of mar ri a g e . The pertin e n t
portion s of his testi m o ny are quot e d thus:
ATTY. CHUA:
And then finally and ultim a t e ly you reac h e d the
conclusion that both partie s, mea ni n g the
husb a n d and the wife in the pres e n t case have a
per so n ali ty which is nor m a l. That is your
conclusion?
WITNES S:
They are nor m al, but they cannot mix toge t h e r .
Q. So as a gen e r a l proposition, both of the m are
of nor m al perso n a lity, only that they are not
comp a ti bl e with each othe r?
A. Yes.
Q. And by norm al perso n a lity, you mea n that
neith e r of the m suffer from any perso n a lity
disor d e r , bord e ri n g on abno r m a li ty?
A. Yes.
Q. But Doctor, is not a fact or a fact of life, that
no couple could be or are perfe ctly mat c h?
A. Precisely, if ther e is a probl e m , marit al
proble m , ther e should be som e b o d y who knows
how to handl e mar ri a g e , that should try to
inte rve n e .
Q. You mea n expe r t advise or servic es should be
nee d e d by the couple?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, if the coupl e are mat u r e enou g h and
each of the m prac tis e s what we call maxim u m
toler a n c e and give and take, will that serve the
purpo s e ?
A. That would serve d the purpo s e of gettin g well.
Q. Yes?
A. Yes.
Q. Mea ni n g to say that the incom p a t i bility could
be har m o ni z e d ?
A. Yes, beca u s e they are suppo s e dly norm al, but
both of the m are perso n ally disor d e r e d . It canno t
be har m o ni z e d. So this case, if only they have
tried profession al help to take care of thei r
marit al proble m , it could have been solved.
Q. Or the situa tio n could have bee n rem e di e d ?
A. Yes. But I would like to say that it must be
som e b o d y who is an expe r t . Not just any from
Tom, Dick and Har ry could han dle this. That
mea n s from the very begin ni n g they have
per so n ali ti e s which they wer e incom p a t i bl e. So if
anybody would handl e that, they will not mix,
they will be always qua r r eli n g with each othe r.
They should not have got mar ri e d. 4 2
xxx
Q. Yes. So in this pre s e n t case, your expe r t
opinion was sough t by the plaintiff, and you
found out that both are nor m a l?
A. With differe n t perso n a liti e s. So that they wer e
incom p a t i bl e.
Q. Nor m al, simply incom p a t i bl e.
A. Yes, with perso n a liti e s differ e n t from each
othe r, which I mention e d the r e in my last page.
That they are like oil and wat e r , immiscibl e. Like
oil and wate r, they will not mix.
Q. You also mention e d that the plaintiff. Mea ni n g
to say the husb a n d told you about the frequ e n t
qua r r el s had with the wife. Did he ever tell you
that was a serious or major qua r r el ?
A. Actually the r e was no major qua r r el . It was all
petty qua r r el s.[4 3
xxx
Q. So the probl e m of this couple is funda m e n t a lly
a conflicting perso n aliti e s?
A. Yes.[44
xxx
Q. Now, you mentio n e d that you mayb e able to
make the m reconcil e?
A. Yes.
Q. You mea n that given the time and
opport u ni ty, things could be worke d out?
A. Yes.
Q. You mea n recon ciliation at this stag e with
expe r t service s, and the advise of those who
posse s s the nece s s a r y [expe r t is e] could be
worke d out?
A. Yes, as I said it can be done by ther a py.
Family the r a py.[ 4 5
xxx
Q. Doctor, you dra w your concl usion that ther e is
psychologic al inc[a]pa city existing in this case?
A. Yes.
Q. Becau s e of the
A. The incom p a t i bility.
Q. Incom p a ti bility.
A. Yes.[46c r ä l ä w vi r t u a lib r ä r y
His testi m o ny est a blish e d mer ely that the
spous e s had an incom p a t i bility, a defect that
could possibly be tre a t e d or alleviat e d thro u g h
psychot h e r a p y . We nee d not expou n d furt h e r on
the pate n t insufficie ncy of the expe r t testi m o ny
to est a blish the psychologic al incap a ci ty of
petition e r.
Furt h e r m o r e , the asse s s m e n t of petition e r by Dr.
Gauzon was base d mer ely on desc ri ptio n s
com m u ni c a t e d to him by respo n d e n t . The docto r
neve r cond u c t e d any psychologic al exa mi n a t i o n
of her. Neit h e r did he ever claim to have done so.
In fact, his Profession al Opinion 4 7 bega n with
the stat e m e n t [I]f what Alfonso Choa said about
his wife Leni is true, x x x.[48 The expe r t witne s s
testified thus:
ATTY. CHUA
Q Doctor, in this profession al opinion of yours,
you gat h e r e d most of your mat e ri al data from the
plaintiff who is the husb a n d ?
WITNES S
A Yes. By the way, I requ e s t e d the husb a n d
Alfonso, if it was possible for me to inte rvie w
Leni, and he said, he doesn t know.
ATTY. CHUA
Q He doesn t know. Now, Doctor if we were to
requ e s t you to cond u c t the sam e perso n al
inte rvie w and writt e n psychologic al examin a ti o n
on the part of the wife, [w]ould you be willing to
do that?
WITNES S
A Sure for a fee. I mayb e able to make the m
recon cile.4 9 c r ä l ä w vi r t u a li b r ä r y
Obviously, Dr. Gauzon had no perso n al
knowle d g e of the facts he testified to, as these
had mer ely been relaye d to him by respo n d e n t .
The form e r was workin g on pure supposition s
and secon d h a n d inform a ti o n fed to him by one
side. Conse q u e n t l y, his testi m o ny can be
dismiss e d as unscie n t ific and unr eli a bl e.
Dr. Gauzon tried to save his cre di bility by
asse r t i n g that he was able to asse s s petition e r s
cha r a c t e r , not only throu g h the desc ri p tio n s
given by respo n d e n t , but also throu g h the
form e r s at least fiftee n hour s[ 5 0 of study of the
volumino u s tra n s c ri p t of recor d s of this case.
Even if it took the good doctor a whole day or a
whole week to exami n e the recor d s of this case,
we still find his asse s s m e n t of petition e r s
psychologic al stat e sorely insufficient and
met h o d olo gic ally flawe d.
As to respo n d e n t s arg u m e n t -- that bec a u s e Dr.
Gauzon s testi m o ny had neve r bee n object e d to,
the objection raise d ther e af t e r was dee m e d
waived -- the Supr e m e Court has alre a dy ruled
on the mat t e r . It held that althou g h the question
of admissibility of evide n c e could not be raise d
for the first time on app e al, hea r s a y or unrelia bl e
evide n c e shoul d be disr e g a r d e d whet h e r
object e d to or not, bec a u s e it has no prob a t ive
value.5 1 c r ä l ä w vi r t u a li b r ä r y
We are, of cours e, mindful of the ruling that a
medical exami n a t i o n is not a conditio sine qua
non to a finding of psychologic al inca p a ci ty, so
long as the totality of evide n c e pres e n t e d is
enoug h to esta blis h the inca p a ci ty ade q u a t e l y.5 2
Her e, howeve r, the totality of evide nc e
pre s e n t e d by respo n d e n t was compl et ely
insufficie nt to sust ai n a finding of psychologic al
incap a ci ty -- mor e so without any medical,
psychi a t ric or psychologic al exami n a t i o n.
The trial court should have carefully studi e d and
asse s s e d the evide n c e pres e n t e d by respo n d e n t
and take n into accou n t the prevailing
jurisp r u d e n c e on the mat t e r . It could then have
easily conclu d e d , as we conclud e now, that it
was usel ess to proce e d furt h e r with the tediou s
proce s s of hea ri n g cont r av e ni n g proof. His
evide n c e was obviously, grossly and clea rly
insufficie nt to suppo r t a decla r a t i o n of nullity of
mar ri a g e base d on psychologi c al inca p a cit y.
Withal, it was grave abus e of discr e t io n for the
RTC to deny the Demu r r e r and to violat e or
ignor e this Court s rulings in point. Inde e d,
continui n g the proc e s s of litigation would have
bee n a total wast e of time and money for the
par ti e s and an unw elco m e imposition on the trial
court s docke t .
We have alre a d y ruled that grave abus e of
discr e tio n may arise whe n a lower court or
tribu n al violat e s or cont r av e n e s the Consti t u tio n,
the law or existing jurispr u d e n c e . 5 3 Any
decision, orde r or resolutio n of a lower court
tant a m o u n t to overr ulin g a judicial
prono u n c e m e n t of the high e s t Cour t is
unmi st a k a b ly a very grave abuse of discr e ti o n.
[54cr äl ä wvi r t u a li b r ä r y
Ther e is no reaso n to believe that an appe al
would prove to be a plain, spe e dy or adeq u a t e
rem e d y in the case at bar. An app e al would not
prom p tly relieve petition e r from the injuriou s
effect s of the pat e n tly mist ak e n Orde r s
maint ai ni n g the basel e s s action of respo n d e n t . It
would only comp el her to go needl e s sly throu g h
a prot r a c t e d trial, which would furt h e r clog the
court docke t s with anot h e r futile case.
[55cr äl ä wvi r t u a li b r ä r y
WHERE FOR E, the Petition is here by GRANTED
and the assaile d CA Decision REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Respon d e n t s Dem u r r e r to Eviden c e
is GRANTED, and the case for decla r a t i o n of
nullity of mar ri a g e base d on the alleg e d
psychologic al incap a ci ty of petition e r is
DISMISS ED. No prono u n c e m e n t as to costs.
G.R. No. 13 8 5 0 9 . July 31, 20 0 0
IMELDA MARB ELLA- BO BI S , Peti t i o n e r , v.
ISAGANI D. BO BI S , resp o n d e n t .
D E C I S I O N
YNARE S- SANTIAGO, J.:
On Octob e r 21, 1985, respo n d e n t contr a c t e d a
first mar ri a g e with one Mari a Dulce B. Javier.
Withou t said marri a g e having bee n ann ulle d,
nullified or ter mi n a t e d , the sam e respo n d e n t
cont r a c t e d a secon d mar ri a g e with petition e r
Imelda Marb ell a- Bobis on Janua ry 25, 1996 and
allege dly a third mar ri a g e with a cert ai n Julia
Sally Her n a n d e z . Base d on petition e r s com pl ai nt-
affidavit, an infor m a t io n for biga my was filed
again s t respo n d e n t on Feb r u a r y 25, 1998, which
was docke t e d as Criminal Case No. Q98- 7561 1 of
the Region al Trial Court, Branc h 226, Quezon
City. Som e ti m e ther e af t e r , respo n d e n t initiat e d a
civil action for the judicial decla r a t io n of
absol ut e nullity of his first mar ri a g e on the
groun d that it was celeb r a t e d withou t a mar ri a g e
licens e . Respo n d e n t then filed a motion to
susp e n d the proce e di n g s in the crimin al case for
biga my invoking the pendi n g civil case for nullity
of the first mar ri a g e as a preju dici al ques tio n to
the crimin al case. The trial judge gra n t e d the
motion to susp e n d the crimin al case in an Orde r
dat e d Dece m b e r 29, 1998.1 Petition e r filed a
motion for reconsi d e r a t i o n , but the sam e was
denie d.
Henc e, this petition for review on certior a ri .
Petition e r arg u e s that respo n d e n t should have
first obtai n e d a judicial declar a ti o n of nullity of
his first marri a g e befor e ente ri n g into the secon d
mar ri a g e , inas m u c h as the allege d preju dici al
ques tio n justifying susp e n si o n of the biga m y case
is no longe r a legal truism purs u a n t to Article 40
of the Family Code.2 c r ä l ä w vi r t u a li b r ä r y
The issue to be resolve d in this petition is
whet h e r the subse q u e n t filing of a civil action for
decla r a t i o n of nullity of a previous mar ri a g e
constit u t e s a prejudi ci al ques tio n to a criminal
case for biga m y.
A preju dici al ques tio n is one which arise s in a
case the resol ution of which is a logical
ant e c e d e n t of the issue involved ther ei n. 3 It is a
ques tio n base d on a fact distinc t and sepa r a t e
from the crime but so intim a t e ly conne c t e d with
it that it det e r m i n e s the guilt or innoc e n c e of the
accus e d . 4 It must app e a r not only that the civil
case involves facts upon which the crimin al
action is base d, but also that the resolution of
the issue s raise d in the civil action would
nece s s a r ily be det e r m i n a t i ve of the crimin al
case.5 Conse q u e n t l y, the defen s e must involve
an issue similar or intim a t ely relat e d to the sam e
issue raise d in the crimin al action and its
resolution det e r m i n a t iv e of whet h e r or not the
latt e r action may proc e e d . 6 Its two esse n ti al
elem e n t s are:7c r ä l ä w vi r t u a li b r ä r y
(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or
intim a t e ly relat e d to the issue raise d in the
criminal action; and
(b) the resol ution of such issue det e r m i n e s
whet h e r or not the crimin al action may proc e e d .
A preju dici al ques tio n does not conclusively
resolve the guilt or innoce n c e of the accus e d but
simply test s the sufficiency of the allega ti on s in
the infor m a t i o n in orde r to sust ai n the furth e r
pros e c u ti o n of the crimi nal case. A party who
raise s a prejudici al ques tio n is dee m e d to have
hypot h e t i c ally admit t e d that all the esse n ti al
elem e n t s of a crim e have bee n ade q u a t e l y
allege d in the infor m a t i o n, consid e ri n g that the
pros e c u ti o n has not yet pres e n t e d a singl e
evide n c e on the indict m e n t or may not yet have
rest e d its case. A challen g e of the alleg a tio n s in
the infor m a t i o n on the grou n d of preju dici al
ques tio n is in effect a question on the merit s of
the crimin al cha r g e throu g h a non- criminal suit.
Article 40 of the Family Code, which was
effective at the time of celeb r a ti o n of the secon d
mar ri a g e , requir e s a prior judicial decla r a t i o n of
nullity of a previou s mar ri a g e befor e a par ty may
rem a r r y. The clea r implica tion of this is that it is
not for the parti e s, particul a rly the accus e d , to
det e r m i n e the validity or invalidity of the
mar ri a g e . 8 Whet h e r or not the first mar ri a g e
was void for lack of a licens e is a mat t e r of
defe ns e beca u s e ther e is still no judicial
decla r a t i o n of its nullity at the time the secon d
mar ri a g e was cont r a c t e d . It shoul d be
rem e m b e r e d that biga my can succe s sf ully be
pros e c u t e d provide d all its elem e n t s concu r two
of which are a previous mar ri a g e and a
subs e q u e n t mar ri a g e which would have bee n
valid had it not bee n for the exist e n c e at the
mat e ri al time of the first
mar ri a g e . 9 c r ä l ä w vi r t u a lib r ä r y
In the case at bar, respo n d e n t s clear inten t is to
obtai n a judicial decl ar a ti o n of nullity of his first
mar ri a g e and ther e af t e r to invoke that very sam e
judg m e n t to preve n t his prose c u t io n for biga m y.
He cannot have his cake and eat it too.
Other wi s e, all that an adve nt u r o u s biga mi st has
to do is to disre g a r d Article 40 of the Family
Code, contr a c t a subse q u e n t mar ri a g e and
esca p e a biga m y char g e by simply claimin g that
the first marri a g e is void and that the
subs e q u e n t mar ri a g e is equ ally void for lack of a
prior judicial declar a ti o n of nullity of the first. A
par ty may even ent e r into a mar ri a g e awa r e of
the abse n c e of a requisit e - usually the mar ri a g e
licens e - and the r e af t e r cont r a c t a subs e q u e n t
mar ri a g e withou t obtainin g a decla r a t i o n of
nullity of the first on the assu m p ti o n that the
first mar ri a g e is void. Such scen a ri o would
rend e r nug a t o r y the provisions on biga m y. As
succinctly held in Landic ho v.
Relova: 10 c r ä l ä w vi r t u ali b r ä r y
(P)arti e s to a mar ri a g e shoul d not be per mi t t e d
to judge for the m s el ve s its nullity, only
comp e t e n t court s having such aut ho ri ty. Prior to
such decla r a t i o n of nullity, the validity of the
first mar ri a g e is beyond questio n. A party who
cont r a c t s a secon d mar ri a g e then assu m e s the
risk of being pros e c u t e d for biga m y.
Respon d e n t allege s that the first mar ri a g e in the
case befor e us was void for lack of a mar ri a g e
licens e . Petition e r , on the othe r hand, argu e s
that her mar ri a g e to respo n d e n t was exem p t
from the requi r e m e n t of a mar ri a g e licens e .
More specifically, petition e r claims that prior to
their marri a g e , they had alre a dy att ain e d the age
of majority and had bee n living toget h e r as
husb a n d and wife for at least five years.1 1 The
issue in this case is limite d to the existe n c e of a
preju dici al ques tio n, and we are not called upon
to resolve the validity of the first mar ri a g e . Be
that as it may, suffice it to stat e that the Civil
Code, und e r which the first mar ri a g e was
celeb r a t e d , provide s that "every inten d m e n t of
law or fact leans towa r d the validity of marri a g e ,
the indissolubility of the mar ri a g e bond s." 12
Henc e, par ti e s shoul d not be per mi t t e d to judge
for the m s elv e s the nullity of their mar ri a g e , for
the sam e must be submi t t e d to the det e r m i n a t i o n
of comp e t e n t cour t s. Only when the nullity of the
mar ri a g e is so decla r e d can it be held as void,
and so long as the r e is no such decla r a t i o n the
pre s u m p t i o n is that the mar ri a g e exists.1 3 No
mat t e r how obvious, manifes t or pate n t the
abse n c e of an elem e n t is, the inte rv e n t i o n of the
court s must always be resor t e d to. That is why
Article 40 of the Family Code requi r e s a "final
judg m e n t ," which only the court s can ren d e r .
Thus, as rule d in Landicho v. Relova,14 he who
cont r a c t s a secon d mar ri a g e befor e the judicial
decla r a t i o n of nullity of the first marri a g e
assu m e s the risk of being pros e c u t e d for biga my,
and in such a case the crimin al case may not be
susp e n d e d on the grou n d of the pend e n c y of a
civil case for decla r a t i o n of nullity. In a rece n t
case for concu bi n a g e , we held that the pend e n c y
of a civil case for decla r a t i o n of nullity of
mar ri a g e is not a prejudi ci al ques tio n. 1 5 This
ruling applies her e by analogy since both crim es
pre s u p p o s e the subsist e n c e of a mar ri a g e .
Ignor a n c e of the exist e n c e of Article 40 of the
Family Code canno t even be succ e s sf ully invoke d
as an excuse . 1 6 The cont r a c ti n g of a marri a g e
knowing that the req ui r e m e n t s of the law have
not bee n complie d with or that the mar ri a g e is in
disr e g a r d of a legal impe di m e n t is an act
pen alize d by the Revise d Penal Code.1 7 The
legality of a mar ri a g e is a matt e r of law and
every perso n is pres u m e d to know the law. As
respo n d e n t did not obt ain the judicial decla r a t i o n
of nullity whe n he ent e r e d into the secon d
mar ri a g e , why should he be allowe d to belat e dly
obtai n that judicial decla r a t i o n in orde r to delay
his crimin al pros e c u ti o n and subs e q u e n t ly defe a t
it by his own disobe di e n c e of the law? If he
want s to raise the nullity of the previous
mar ri a g e , he can do it as a matt e r of defe ns e
when he pres e n t s his evide n c e during the trial
prope r in the crimin al case.
WHERE FOR E, the petition is GRANTED. The
orde r dat e d Dece m b e r 29, 1998 of the Region al
Trial Court, Branc h 226 of Quezon City is
REVERSEDa n d SETASIDE and the trial court is
orde r e d to IMMEDIATELYproc e e d with Crimin al
Case No. Q98- 7561 1.

The burd e n of proof to show the dissolution of

the first marri a g e befor e the secon d mar ri a g e
was cont r a c t e d rest s upon the defen s e , 1 8 but
that is a mat t e r that can be raise d in the trial of
the biga m y case. In the mea n ti m e , it should be
stre s s e d that not every defe ns e raise d in the civil
action may be use d as a prejudici al ques tio n to
obtai n the susp e n s i o n of the crimin al action. The
lower court , ther efo r e , err e d in susp e n d i n g the
criminal case for biga my. More ove r, when
respo n d e n t was indict e d for biga my, the fact that
he ent e r e d into two mar ri a g e cere m o ni e s
app e a r e d indubit a bl e. It was only afte r he was
sued by petition e r for biga m y that he thoug h t of
seeki ng a judicial decla r a t i o n of nullity of his
first mar ri a g e . The obvious inte nt , the r efo r e, is
that respo n d e n t mer ely reso r t e d to the civil
action as a pote n ti al prejudici al question for the
purpo s e of frust r a t i n g or delaying his crimin al
pros e c u ti o n. As has bee n discus s e d above, this
cannot be done.

In the light of Article 40 of the Family Code,

respo n d e n t , withou t first having obt ain e d the
judicial decla r a t i o n of nullity of the first
mar ri a g e , can not be said to have validly ent e r e d
into the secon d mar ri a g e . Per curr e n t
jurisp r u d e n c e , a mar ri a g e thoug h void still nee ds
a judicial decl ar a ti o n of such fact befor e any
par ty can marry again; othe r wi s e the secon d
mar ri a g e will also be void.19 The reaso n is that,
without a judicial decla r a t i o n of its nullity, the
first mar ri a g e is pres u m e d to be subsisti n g. In
the case at bar, respo n d e n t was for all legal
inte nt s and purpo s e s rega r d e d as a mar ri e d man
at the time he contr a c t e d his secon d mar ri a g e
with petition e r . 2 0 Against this legal backd r o p,
any decision in the civil action for nullity would
not eras e the fact that respo n d e n t ent e r e d into a
EFFECTS OF NULLITY
secon d mar ri a g e duri ng the subsist e n c e of a first
mar ri a g e . Thus, a decision in the civil case is not ART 50- 54
esse n ti al to the det e r m i n a t i o n of the crimin al
cha r g e . It is, the r efo r e , not a preju dicial
ques tio n. As stat e d above, respo n d e n t canno t be TENE B R O VS. CA
per mi t t e d to use his own malfe as a n c e to defea t
the crimin al action agai nst G.R. No. 15 0 7 5 8 Febr u a ry 18, 20 0 4
him.21 c r ä l ä w vi r t u ali b r ä r y
VERONICO TENE B RO , peti t i o n e r
vs.
THE HONORA BLE COURT OF APPEALS,
res p o n d e n t .
DE C IS IO N
YNARES- SANTIAGO, J.:
We are called on to decide the novel issue
conce r ni n g the effect of the judicial decla r a t io n
of the nullity of a secon d or subs e q u e n t
mar ri a g e , on the groun d of psychologi c al
incap a ci ty, on an individu al’s crimin al liability for
biga my. We hold that the subse q u e n t judicial
decla r a t i o n of nullity of mar ri a g e on the groun d
of psychologi c al incap a ci ty does not retr o a c t to
the date of the celeb r a ti o n of the mar ri a g e
insofar as the Philippi n e s’ pen al laws are
conce r n e d . As such, an individu al who cont r a c t s
a secon d or subse q u e n t mar ri a g e during the
subsist e n c e of a valid mar ri a g e is criminally
liable for biga my, notwit h s t a n d i n g the
subs e q u e n t decl ar a ti o n that the secon d mar ri a g e
is void ab initio on the groun d of psychologic al
incap a ci ty.
Petition e r in this case, Veronico Tene b r o,
cont r a c t e d mar ri a g e with privat e complai n a n t
Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The two were
wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City
Trial Court of Lapu- lapu City. Tene b r o and
Ancajas lived toget h e r continu o u sly and withou t
inte r r u p t i o n until the latte r par t of 1991, whe n
Tene b r o infor m e d Ancajas that he had bee n
previously mar ri e d to a cert ai n Hilda Villareye s
on Nove m b e r 10, 1986. Tene b r o show e d Ancajas
a photoc o py of a mar ri a g e contr a c t betw e e n him
and Villarey e s. Invoking this previous marri a g e ,
petition e r the r e a f t e r left the conjug al dwelling
which he shar e d with Ancajas, statin g that he
was going to cohabi t with Villarey e s.1
On Janua r y 25, 1993, petition e r cont r a c t e d yet
anot h e r marri a g e , this one with a cert ai n Nilda
Villegas, befor e Judge Germ a n Lee, Jr. of the
Region al Trial Cour t of Cebu City, Branc h 15.2
When Ancajas lear n e d of this third mar ri a g e , she
verified from Villareye s whet h e r the latt e r was
inde e d mar ri e d to petition e r . In a hand w ri t t e n
lette r, 3 Villareye s confir m e d that petition e r ,
Veronico Tene b r o, was inde e d her husb a n d .
Ancajas ther e af t e r filed a com pl ai nt for biga my
again s t petition e r . 4 The Infor m a t io n, 5 which was
docke t e d as Criminal Case No. 01309 5- L, rea d s:
That on the 10th day of April 1990, in the City of
Lapu- lapu, Philippin e s, and within the
jurisdic tion of this Honor a bl e Court, the
afor e n a m e d accus e d, having bee n previou sly
unit e d in lawful marri a g e with Hilda Villareye s,
and withou t the said marri a g e having been
legally dissolved, did the n and ther e willfully,
unlawf ully and feloniously contr a c t a secon d
mar ri a g e with LETICIA ANCAJAS, which secon d
or subse q u e n t mar ri a g e of the accus e d has all
the esse n ti al req ui sit e s for validity wer e it not for
the subsisti n g first marri a g e .
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arrai g n e d , petition e r ente r e d a plea of "not
guilty".6
During the trial, petition e r admit t e d having
coha bi t e d with Villareye s from 1984- 1988, with
whom he sire d two childr e n . Howeve r , he denie d
that he and Villareye s wer e validly marri e d to
each other , claimi ng that no mar ri a g e cere m o ny
took place to sole m niz e their union.7 He allege d
that he signe d a marri a g e cont r a c t mer ely to
ena bl e her to get the allot m e n t from his office in
conne c t io n with his work as a sea m a n . 8 He
furth e r testified that he requ e s t e d his brot h e r to
verify from the Civil Regist e r in Manila whet h e r
ther e was any mar ri a g e at all betw e e n him and
Villareye s, but ther e was no recor d of said
mar ri a g e . 9
On Nove m b e r 10, 1997, the Region al Trial Cour t
of Lapu- lapu City, Branc h 54, rend e r e d a
decision finding the accus e d guilty beyond
reaso n a b l e doubt of the crim e of biga m y unde r
Article 349 of the Revise d Penal Code, and
sent e n ci n g him to four (4) years and two (2)
mont h s of prision corr e c cio n a l, as minim u m , to
eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor,
as maxim u m . 1 0 On app e al, the Court of Appeals
affirm e d the decision of the trial court.
Petition e r’s motion for recon si d e r a t i o n was
denie d for lack of merit.
Henc e, the insta n t petition for review on the
following assig n m e n t of error s:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY ERRED, AND THIS ERROR IS
CORRECTIBLE IN THIS APPEAL – WHEN IT
AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE
HONORABLE COURT A QUO CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF BIGAMY,
DESPITE THE NON- EXISTENC E OF THE FIRST
MARRIAGE AND INSUF FICIE N CY OF
EVIDENCE.
II. THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF BIGAMY
DESPITE CLEAR PROOF THAT THE MARRIAGE
BETWEE N THE ACCUSED AND PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT HAD BEEN DECLARED NULL
AND VOID AB INITIO AND WITHOUT LEGAL
FORCE AND EFFECT.11
After a careful review of the evide n c e on recor d,
we find no coge n t reaso n to distu r b the assaile d
judg m e n t .
Unde r Article 349 of the Revise d Penal Code, the
elem e n t s of the crim e of Bigamy are:
(1) that the offend e r has bee n legally mar ri e d;
(2) that the first mar ri a g e has not bee n legally
dissolve d or, in case his or her spous e is abse n t ,
the abse n t spous e could not yet be pres u m e d
dea d accor di n g to the Civil Code;
(3) that he cont r a c t s a secon d or subse q u e n t
mar ri a g e ; and
(4) that the secon d or subs e q u e n t mar ri a g e has
all the esse n t i al requi sit e s for validity.12
Petition e r’s assig n m e n t of error s pre s e n t s a two-
tier e d defen s e , in which he (1) deni es the
exist e n c e of his first mar ri a g e to Villarey e s, and
(2) argu e s that the decla r a ti o n of the nullity of
the secon d marri a g e on the groun d of
psychologic al incap a ci ty, which is an alleg e d
indicat o r that his mar ri a g e to Ancajas lacks the
esse n ti al requisi t e s for validity, retr o a c t s to the
dat e on which the secon d marri a g e was
celeb r a t e d . 1 3 Henc e, petition e r arg u e s that all
four of the elem e n t s of the crime of biga m y are
abse n t , and prays for his acquit t al.1 4
Petition e r’s defen s e must fail on both count s.
First, the pros e c u ti o n pres e n t e d sufficie nt
evide n c e, both docu m e n t a r y and oral, to prove
the exist e n c e of the first marri a g e bet w e e n
petition e r and Villareye s. Docum e n t a r y evide n c e
pre s e n t e d was in the form of: (1) a copy of a
mar ri a g e cont r a c t bet w e e n Tene b r o and
Villareye s, dat e d Nove m b e r 10, 1986, which, as
see n on the docu m e n t , was solem niz e d at the
Manila City Hall befor e Rev. Julieto Torre s, a
Minist e r of the Gospel, and certified to by the
Office of the Civil Regist r a r of Manila; 15 and (2)
a han d w ri t t e n lette r from Villareye s to Ancajas
dat e d July 12, 1994, informin g Ancajas that
Villareye s and Tene b r o wer e legally mar ri e d. 1 6
To assail the veracity of the mar ri a g e cont r a c t ,
petition e r prese n t e d (1) a certifica tion issue d by
the Nation al Stati stics Office date d Octob e r 7,
1995;1 7 and (2) a certifica tion issue d by the City
Civil Regist ry of Manila, date d Febr u a r y 3,
1997.1 8 Both thes e docu m e n t s atte s t that the
resp e c tiv e issuing offices have no recor d of a
mar ri a g e celeb r a t e d betw e e n Veronico B.
Tene b r o and Hilda B. Villareye s on Nove m b e r
10, 1986.
To our mind, the docu m e n t s pres e n t e d by the
defe ns e canno t ade q u a t e ly assail the mar ri a g e
cont r a c t , which in itself would alre a dy have bee n
sufficient to est a blis h the exist e n c e of a mar ri a g e
betw e e n Tene b r o and Villareye s.
All thre e of thes e docu m e n t s fall in the cate go ry
of public docu m e n t s , and the Rules of Court
provision s releva n t to public docu m e n t s are
applica bl e to all. Perti n e n t to the mar ri a g e
cont r a c t , Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court rea d s as follows:
Sec. 7. Eviden c e admissi ble when original
docu m e n t is a public recor d. – When the original
of a docu m e n t is in the custody of a public officer
or is reco r d e d in a public office, its cont e n t s may
be prove d by a certifie d copy issue d by the
public officer in custo dy ther e of (Emp h a si s ours).
This being the case, the certifie d copy of the
mar ri a g e cont r a c t , issue d by a public officer in
custody the r e of, was admissi bl e as the best
evide n c e of its cont e n t s . The mar ri a g e cont r a c t
plainly indicat e s that a mar ri a g e was celeb r a t e d
betw e e n petition e r and Villareye s on Nove m b e r
10, 1986, and it shoul d be accor d e d the full faith
and cred e n c e given to public docu m e n t s .
Moreov e r, an exami n a ti o n of the wordi n g s of the
certifica tio n issue d by the Nation al Statistic s
Office on Octob e r 7, 1995 and that issue d by the
City Civil Regist ry of Manila on Febr u a r y 3, 1997
would plainly show that neith e r docu m e n t att e s t s
as a positive fact that ther e was no mar ri a g e
celeb r a t e d betw e e n Veronico B. Tene b r o and
Hilda B. Villareye s on Nove m b e r 10, 1986.
Rath e r , the docu m e n t s mer ely att e s t that the
resp e c tiv e issuing offices have no recor d of such
a marri a g e . Docu m e n t a r y evide n c e as to the
abse n c e of a recor d is quite differe n t from
docu m e n t a r y evide n c e as to the abse n c e of a
mar ri a g e cere m o n y, or docu m e n t a r y evide n c e as
to the invalidity of the mar ri a g e betw e e n
Tene b r o and Villareye s.
The mar ri a g e cont r a c t pres e n t e d by the
pros e c u ti o n serve s as positive evide nc e as to the
exist e n c e of the mar ri a g e bet w e e n Tene b r o and
Villareye s, which should be given gre a t e r
cred e n c e than docu m e n t s testifying mer ely as to
abse n c e of any recor d of the mar ri a g e , espe ci ally
conside ri n g that ther e is absolut ely no
requi r e m e n t in the law that a mar ri a g e cont r a c t
nee d s to be sub mit t e d to the civil regist r a r as a
condition prec e d e n t for the validity of a
mar ri a g e . The mer e fact that no recor d of a
mar ri a g e exists does not invalida t e the marri a g e ,
provide d all requi sit e s for its validity are
pre s e n t . 1 9 Ther e is no evide nc e pres e n t e d by the
defe ns e that would indicat e that the mar ri a g e
betw e e n Tene b r o and Villareye s lacke d any
requi sit e for validity, apar t from the self- serving
testi m o ny of the accus e d himself. Balanc e d
again s t this testi m o ny are Villareye s’ lett e r,
Ancajas’ testi mo ny that petition e r infor m e d her
of the existe n c e of the valid first mar ri a g e , and
petition e r’s own cond u c t , which would all tend to
indicat e that the first mar ri a g e had all the
requi sit e s for validity.
Finally, altho u g h the accus e d claims that he took
steps to verify the non- exist e n c e of the first
mar ri a g e to Villareye s by req u e s t i n g his brot h e r
to valida t e such purpo r t e d non- exist e n c e , it is
significa n t to note that the certifica tio n s issue d
by the Nation al Statistics Office and the City
Civil Regist ry of Manila are dat e d Octobe r 7,
1995 and Febr u a r y 3, 1997, resp e c t iv ely. Both
docu m e n t s , the r efo r e , are dat e d after the
accus e d’s mar ri a g e to his secon d wife, privat e
respo n d e n t in this case.
As such, this Court rules that ther e was
sufficient evide nc e pres e n t e d by the pros e c u ti o n
to prove the first and secon d requisi t e s for the
crime of biga m y.
The secon d tier of petition e r’s defen s e hinge s on
the effect s of the subs e q u e n t judicial
decla r a t i o n 2 0 of the nullity of the secon d
mar ri a g e on the grou n d of psychologi c al
incap a ci ty.
Petition e r arg u e s that this subse q u e n t judicial
decla r a t i o n ret ro a c t s to the date of the
celeb r a t io n of the mar ri a g e to Ancajas. As such,
he argu e s that, since his mar ri a g e to Ancajas
was subse q u e n t ly decla r e d void ab initio, the
crime of biga m y was not com mi t t e d. 2 1
This arg u m e n t is not impr e s s e d with meri t.
Petition e r make s much of the judicial decla r a t i o n
of the nullity of the secon d mar ri a g e on the
groun d of psychologic al inca p a ci ty, invoking
Article 36 of the Family Code. What petition e r
fails to realize is that a decla r a t io n of the nullity
of the secon d mar ri a g e on the grou n d of
psychologic al incap a ci ty is of absol ut ely no
mom e n t insofa r as the Stat e’s penal laws are
conce r n e d .
As a secon d or subse q u e n t marri a g e cont r a c t e d
durin g the subsist e n c e of petition e r’s valid
mar ri a g e to Villareye s, petition e r’s mar ri a g e to
Ancajas would be null and void ab initio
compl et ely reg a r dl e s s of petition e r’s
psychologic al capa ci ty or incap a ci ty.2 2 Since a
mar ri a g e cont r a c t e d durin g the subsist e n c e of a
valid mar ri a g e is auto m a ti c ally void, the nullity
of this secon d mar ri a g e is not per se an
arg u m e n t for the avoida n c e of crimin al liability
for biga m y. Perti n e n t ly, Article 349 of the
Revise d Penal Code criminaliz es "any perso n
who shall cont r a c t a secon d or subse q u e n t
mar ri a g e before the form e r mar ri a g e has bee n
legally dissolved, or befor e the abse n t spous e
has bee n decla r e d pres u m p t iv ely dea d by mea n s
of a judgm e n t rend e r e d in the prope r
proce e di n g s". A plain rea di n g of the law,
ther efo r e , would indica t e that the provision
pen alize s the mer e act of cont r a c t i n g a secon d or
a subs e q u e n t marri a g e durin g the subsist e n c e of
a valid mar ri a g e .
Thus, as soon as the secon d mar ri a g e to Ancajas
was celeb r a t e d on April 10, 1990, durin g the
subsist e n c e of the valid first mar ri a g e , the crim e
of biga my had alre a dy bee n consu m m a t e d . To
our mind, the r e is no coge n t rea so n for
disting ui s hi n g bet w e e n a subse q u e n t mar ri a g e
that is null and void pur ely bec a u s e it is a secon d
or subse q u e n t mar ri a g e , and a subs e q u e n t
mar ri a g e that is null and void on the grou n d of
psychologic al incap a ci ty, at least insofar as
criminal liability for biga my is conce r n e d . The
Stat e’s pen al laws prot e c ti n g the instit ution of
mar ri a g e are in recog ni tio n of the sacros a n c t
cha r a c t e r of this speci al cont r a c t betw e e n
spous e s, and punish an individu al’s delibe r a t e
disr e g a r d of the per m a n e n t char a c t e r of the
speci al bond betw e e n spous e s, which petition e r
has undo u b t e d ly done.
Moreov e r, the decla r a t io n of the nullity of the
secon d mar ri a g e on the grou n d of psychologic al
incap a ci ty is not an indica t o r that petition e r’s
mar ri a g e to Ancajas lacks the esse n ti al
requi sit e s for validity. The requi sit e s for the
validity of a mar ri a g e are classified by the Family
Code into esse n t i al (legal capa city of the
cont r a c t i n g par ti e s and their conse n t freely
given in the pres e n c e of the solem nizing
officer)2 3 and form al (aut ho ri ty of the
solem nizing officer, marri a g e licens e , and
mar ri a g e cere m o n y whe r ei n the partie s
per so n ally decla r e their agr e e m e n t to mar ry
befor e the sole m nizi ng officer in the pre s e n c e of
at least two witne s s e s ).2 4 Unde r Article 5 of the
Family Code, any male or female of the age of
eight e e n years or upwa r d s not unde r any of the
impe di m e n t s mention e d in Articles 3725 and
3826 may cont r a c t mar ri a g e . 2 7
In this case, all the esse n t i al and form al
requi sit e s for the validity of mar ri a g e were
satisfied by petition e r and Ancajas. Both wer e
over eight e e n years of age, and they volunt a rily
cont r a c t e d the secon d marri a g e with the
requi r e d licens e befor e Judge Alfredo B. Per ez,
Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu- lapu City, in
the pres e n c e of at least two witne s s e s .
Althoug h the judicial decla r a t i o n of the nullity of
a marri a g e on the groun d of psychologic al
incap a ci ty ret ro a c t s to the dat e of the
celeb r a t io n of the mar ri a g e insofa r as the
vinculu m bet w e e n the spous e s is conce r n e d , it is
significa n t to note that said mar ri a g e is not
without legal effect s. Among thes e effect s is that
childr e n conceive d or born befor e the judgm e n t
of absolut e nullity of the mar ri a g e shall be
conside r e d legitim a t e . 2 8 Ther e is ther efo r e a
recog ni tio n writt e n into the law itself that such a
mar ri a g e , altho u g h void ab initio, may still
produ c e legal conse q u e n c e s . Among these legal
conse q u e n c e s is incur ri n g crimin al liability for
biga my. To hold othe r wi s e would rend e r the
Stat e’s pen al laws on biga my compl e t ely
nug a t o r y, and allow individu al s to delibe r a t e l y
ensu r e that each mari t al cont r a c t be flawe d in
som e man n e r , and to thus esca p e the
conse q u e n c e s of contr a c t i n g multipl e mar ri a g e s ,
while beguiling thron g s of haple s s wom e n with
the promis e of futurity and com mit m e n t .
mediu m period. Applying the Indet e r m i n a t e
Sent e n c e Law, petition e r shall be entitle d to a
minim u m ter m, to be take n from the pen alty next
lower in degr e e , i.e., prision corr e c ci on al which
has a dur a ti on of six (6) mont h s and one (1) day
to six (6) years. Henc e , the Court of Appeals
corr e c tly affirm e d the decision of the trial cour t
which sent e n c e d petition e r to suffer an
indet e r m i n a t e pen al ty of four (4) years and two
(2) mont h s of prision corr e c ci o n al, as minim u m ,
to eight (8) year s and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as maxim u m .
WHERE FOR E, in view of all the foregoi n g, the
inst a n t petition for review is DENIED. The
assaile d decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 2163 6, convicti ng petition e r
Veronico Tene b r o of the crim e of Bigamy and
sent e n ci n g him to suffer the indet e r m i n a t e
pen al ty of four (4) year s and two (2) mont h s of
prision corre c cio n a l, as minim u m , to eight (8)
year s and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
maxi m u m , is AFFIRMED in toto.

As such, we rule that the third and fourt h

requi sit e s for the crim e of biga my are pres e n t in
this case, and affirm the judgm e n t of the Court
of Appeal s.

As a final point, we note that base d on the

evide n c e on recor d, petition e r cont r a c t e d
mar ri a g e a third time, while his mar ri a g e s to
Villareye s and Ancajas were both still subsisti n g.
Althoug h this is irrel ev a n t in the dete r m i n a t i o n
of the accus e d’s guilt for purpo s e s of this
par tic ul a r case, the act of the accus e d displays a
delibe r a t e disre g a r d for the sancti ty of mar ri a g e ,
and the Stat e does not look kindly on such
activities. Marri a g e is a speci al cont r a c t , the key
cha r a c t e r i s ti c of which is its per m a n e n c e . When
an individu al manife st s a delibe r a t e pat t e r n of
flouting the found a ti o n of the Stat e’s basic social
instit ution, the Stat e’s crimi nal laws on biga m y
step in.

Unde r Article 349 of the Revise d Penal Code, as

am e n d e d , the penalty for the crim e of biga m y is
prision mayor, which has a dur a tio n of six (6)
year s and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. Ther e
being neit he r aggr a v a t i n g nor mitigati n g
circu m s t a n c e , the sam e shall be impose d in its

VOIDABLE MARRIAGE
GROU N D S FOR ANN UL M E N T
ART. 45- 48 FC
ART 34 4 RPC
AQUINO VS. DELIZO
G.R. No. L-15 8 5 3 July 27, 19 6 0
FERNA N D O AQUINO , peti t i o n e r ,
vs.
CONCHITA DELIZO, resp o n d e n t .
GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.:
This is a petition for certior a ri to review a
decision of the Court of Appe al s affirmin g that of
the Cour t of First Inst a n c e of Rizal which
dismiss e d petition e r ' s compl ai nt for annul m e n t
of his mar ri a g e with respo n d e n t Conchit a Delizo.
The dismiss e d compl ai n t, which was filed on
Sept e m b e r 6, 1955, was base d on the grou n d of
fraud, it being alleg e d, amon g othe r things, that
defe n d a n t Conchit a Delizo, her ei n respo n d e n t , at
the date of her mar ri a g e to plaintiff, her ei n
petition e r Fer n a n d o Aquino, on Dece m b e r 27,
1954, conce al e d from the latt e r that fact that she
was preg n a n t by anot h e r man, and som e ti m e in
April, 1955, or about four mont h s after their
mar ri a g e , gave birt h to a child. In her answ e r ,
defe n d a n t claim e d that the child was conceive d
out of lawful wedlock bet w e e n her and the
plaintiff.
At the trial, the attor n e y' s for both par ti e s
app e a r e d and the cour t a quo orde r e d Assista n t
Provinci al Fiscal Jose Goco to repr e s e n t the
Stat e in the proce e di n g s to preve n t collusion.
Only the plaintiff howev e r , testified and the only
docu m e n t a r y evide n c e pre s e n t e d was the
mar ri a g e cont r a c t bet w e e n the par ti e s.
Defend a n t neith e r appe a r e d nor pres e n t e d any
evide n c e despi t e the rese r v a ti o n mad e by her
couns el that he would pres e n t evide nc e on a
later date.
On June 16, 1956, the trial cour t — noting that
no birth certifica t e was pres e n t e d to show that
the child was born within 180 days afte r the
mar ri a g e betw e e n the par ti e s, and holding that
conce al m e n t of preg n a n c y as alleg e d by the
plaintiff does not constit u t e such fraud sa would
annul a mar ri a g e — dismiss e d the compl ai nt .
Throu g h a verified "petition to reope n for
rec e p tio n of addition al evide n c e ", plaintiff tried
to pres e n t the certificat e s of birt h and delivery of
the child born of the defen d a n t on April 26,
1955, which docu m e n t s , accor di n g to him, he
had failed to secur e earlier and produ c e befor e
the trial court thru excus a bl e neglige n c e . The
petition, howeve r, was deni e d.
On appe al to the Court of Appeals, that cour t
held that ther e has bee n excusa bl e negl ec t in
plaintiff's inability to pres e n t the proof of the
child's birt h, thro u g h her birt h certifica t e, and
for that reaso n the cour t a quo err e d in denyin g
the motion for rec e p t io n of addition al evide n c e .
On the theo ry, howeve r, that it was not
impossi bl e for plaintiff and defe n d a n t to have
had sexual inter c o u r s e during their eng a g e m e n t
so that the child could be their own, and finding
unb elieva bl e plaintiff's claim that he did not
notice or even susp e c t that defe n d a n t was
pre g n a n t whe n he mar ri e d her, the appella t e
court, neve r t h e l e s s, affirm e d the dismiss al of the
compl ai n t.
On Marc h 17, 1959, plaintiff filed a motion
praying that the decision be recon si d e r e d , or, if
such recon si d e r a t i o n be denie d, that the case be
rem a n d e d to the lower court for new trial. In
suppo r t of the motion, plaintiff att a c h e d as
annex e s the r e of the following docu m e n t s :
1. Affidavit of Cesa r Aquino (Annex A)
(defen d a n t ' s brot h e r- in- law and plaintiff's
brot h e r , with whom defe n d a n t was living at the
time plaintiff met, cour t e d and mar ri e d her, and
with whom defen d a n t has begot t e n two more
childr e n, aside from her first born, in com m o n-
law relation s hi p) admit tin g that he is the fathe r
of defen d a n t ' s first born, Cathe r i n e Bess Aquino,
and that he and defe n d a n t hid her pre g n a n c y
from plaintiff at the time of plaintiff's mar ri a g e
to defen d a n t ;
2. Affidavit of defen d a n t , Conc hi t a Delizo (Annex
"B") admi tti n g her preg n a n c y by Cesa r Aquino,
her brot h e r- in- law and plaintiff's own brot h e r , at
the time of her mar ri a g e to plaintiff and her
having hidde n this fact from plaintiff befor e and
up to the time of thei r mar ri a g e ;
3. Affidavit of Albert Powell (Annex "C") statin g
that he knew Cesa r Aquino and defe n d a n t lived
toge t h e r as husb a n d and wife before Dece m b e r
27, 1954, the dat e of plaintiff's mar ri a g e to
defe n d a n t ;
4. Birth Certifica t e of defen d a n t ' s first born,
Cath e ri n e Bess Aquino showin g her dat e of birt h
to be April 26, 1955;
5. Birth Certifica t e (Annex "D") of Carolle Ann
Aquino, the secon d child of defen d a n t with Cesa r
Aquino, her brot h e r- in- law;
6. Birth Certifica t e (Annex "E") of Chris Chari b el
Aquino, the third child of Cesa r Aquino and
defe n d a n t ; and
7. Pictu r e s of defe n d a n t showi ng her nat u r al
plum p n e s s as early as 1952 to as late as
Nove m b e r , 1954, the Nove m b e r , 1954 photo
itself does not show defe n d a n t ' s preg n a n c y
which must have bee n almost four mont h s old at
the time the pict ur e was take n.
Acting upon the motion, the Cour t of Appe als
orde r e d the defen d a n t Conc hit a Delizo and
Assist a n t Provinci al Fiscal of Rizal, who was
repr e s e n t i n g the Gover n m e n t , to answ e r the
motion for reconsi d e r a t i o n , and defe r r e d action
on the praye r for new trial until after the case is
dispos e d of. As both the defe n d a n t and the fiscal
failed to file an answ e r, and stati ng that it "does
not believe the veraci ty of the cont e n t s of the
motion and its ann exe s", the Court of Appeals, on
August 6, 1959, denie d the motion. From that
orde r , the plaintiff broug h t the case to this Court
thru the pres e n t petition for certior a ri.
After going over the recor d of the case, we find
that the dismiss al of plaintiff's com pl ai nt cannot
be sust ai n e d.
Unde r the new Civil Code, conce al m e n t by the
wife of the fact that at the time of the mar ri a g e ,
she was preg n a n t by a man othe r tha n her
husb a n d constit u t e s fraud and is grou n d for
annul m e n t of mar ri a g e . (Art. 85, par. (4) in
relation to Art. 86, par. (3). In the case of Bucca t
vs. Bucca t (72 Phil., 19) cited in the decision
sough t to be review e d , which was also an action
for the ann ul m e n t of marri a g e on the groun d of
fraud, plaintiff's claim that he did not even
susp e c t the preg n a n c y of the defe n d a n t was held
to be unbeliev a bl e, it having bee n prove n that
the latt e r was alre a dy in an adva nc e d stag e of
pre g n a n c y (7th mont h) at the time of their
mar ri a g e . That prono u n c e m e n t , howeve r, cannot
apply to the case at bar. Her e the defen d a n t wife
was allege d to be only more than four mont h s
pre g n a n t at the time of her mar ri a g e to plaintiff.
At that stag e, we are not prep a r e d to say that
her preg n a n c y was rea dily appa r e n t , especi ally
since she was "natu r a lly plum p" or fat as allege d
by plaintiff. Accordi n g to medic al aut ho ri ti e s,
even on the 5th mont h of preg n a n c y, the
enla r g e m e n t of a wom a n ' s abdo m e n is still below
the um bilicus, that is to say, the enlar g e m e n t is
limited to the lower part of the abdo m e n so that
it is har dly notice a bl e and may, if notic e d, be
att rib u t e d only to fat form a tion on the lower part
of the abdo m e n . It is only on the 6th mont h of
pre g n a n c y that the enlar g e m e n t of the wom a n ' s
abdo m e n reac h e s a height above the umbilicus,
makin g the roun d n e s s of the abdo m e n more
gen e r a l and app a r e n t . (See Lull, Clinical
Obst e t ri c s, p. 122) If, as claim e d by plaintiff,
defe n d a n t is "nat u r a lly plum p", he could har dly
be expec t e d to know, mer ely by looking, whet h e r
or not she was preg n a n t at the time of their
mar ri a g e more so bec a u s e she must have
att e m p t e d to conc e al the true stat e of affairs.
Even physicia n s and surg e o n s, with the aid of
the wom a n hers elf who shows and gives her
subjec tive and objective sym pt o m s , can only
claim positive diagno si s of pre g n a n c y in 33% at
five mont h s. and 50% at six mont h s. (XI
Cyclope di a of Medicin e, Surg e r y, etc. Preg n a n c y,
p. 10).
The app ellat e cour t also said that it was not
impossi bl e for plaintiff and defe n d a n t to have
had sexual inter c o u r s e befor e they got mar ri e d
and the r efo r e the child could be thei r own. This
stat e m e n t , howev e r, is pur ely conject u r a l and
finds no suppo r t or justifica tion in the recor d.
Upon the othe r han d, the evide n c e sough t to be
introd u c e d at the new trial, take n toge t h e r with
wha t has alre a dy bee n addu c e d would, in our
opinion, be sufficien t to sust ai n the fraud allege d
by plaintiff. The Court of Appeals should,
ther efo r e , not have deni e d the motion praying
for new trial simply beca u s e defe n d a n t failed to
file her answ e r ther e t o. Such failur e of the
defe n d a n t cannot be take n as evide nc e of
collusion, especi ally since a provinci al fiscal has
bee n orde r e d of repr e s e n t the Gover n m e n t
precis ely to preve n t such collusion. As to the
veracity of the cont e n t s of the motion and its
annex e s, the sam e can best be dete r m i n e d only
after hea ri n g evide n c e . In the circu m s t a n c e , we
think that justice would be bett e r serve d if a new
trial wer e orde r e d .
Wher efo r e , the decision com pl ai n e d of is set
aside and the case rem a n d e d to the court a quo
for new trial. Withou t costs.
Par a s, C.J., Bengzon, Mont e m a y o r, Labr a d o r ,
Conc e p cio n, and Reyes, J.B.L., JJ., conc u r.
Barr e r a , J., conc u r s in the result.
BUCCAT VS. MANGO N O DE BUCCAT
G.R. No. 47 1 0 1 April 25, 19 4 1
GODOFRE DO BUCCAT, de m a n d a n t e -
ap e l a n t e ,
vs.
LUIDA MANGO N O N DE BUCCAT,
de m a n d a d a - ap el a d a .
D. Feli c i a n o Levi st e , D. Tom a s P.
Pan g a n i b a n y Doñ a Sot e r a N. Me g i a en
repr e s e n t a c i o n del ape l a n t e .
Doñ a Luid a Man g o n o n de Bu c c a t en su
propi a repr e s e n t a c i o n .
HORRILLENO, J.:
Este asun t o se ha elevad o a est a Supe ri o ri d a d
por el Juzga do de Prim e r a Inst a n ci a de Baguio,
ya que solo suscit a una cuestion pur a m e n t e de
der e c h o.
El 20 de marzo de 1939 el dem a n d a n t e inico la
pre s e n t o caus a, en la que no comp a r e c i o la
dem a n d a d a , no obst a n t e habe r sido debida m e n t e
em pl az a d a . Por lo que, per mi ti do el dem a n d a n t e
a pres e n t a r sus prue b a s , el Juzga d o inferior fallo
el asun t o a favor de la dem a n d a d a . De ahi est a
apela cion.
El dem a n d a n t e pide la anula cio n de su
mat ri m o ni o habido con la dem a n d a d a Luida
Mango n o n de Bucc a t el 26 de noviem b r e de
1938, en la Ciuda d de Baguio, fund a n d o s e en
que, al conse n t i r en dicho mat ri m o ni o, lo hizo
porq u e la dem a n d a d a le habia aseg u r a d o que
ella era virge n.
De la decision del Juzga d o inferior se
desp r e n d e n los siguie n t e s hechos:
El dem a n d a n t e conocio a la dem a n d a d a el mes
de marzo de 1938. Despu e s de varias
ent r evi st a s , ambo s que d a r o n com p ro m e t i d o s el
19 de septie m b r e del mism o año. El 26 de
novie m b r e de igual año, el dem a n d a n t e cont r aj o
mat ri m o ni o con la dem a n d a d a en la cate d rl a
catolica de la Ciuda d de Baguio. Desou e s de
convivir mari t al m e n t e por espa cio de oche n t a y
nueve dias, la dem a n d a d a dio a luz un niño de
nueve mese s, el 23 de febre r o de 1939. De
result a s de est e acont e ci mi e n t o , el dem a n d a n t e
aba n d o n o a la dem a n d a d a y no volvio a hace r
vida mari t al con ella.
No vemos razon algun a par a revoc a r la sent e n ci a
apela d a. En efecto, es inverosi mil la aleg a ci on
del dem a n d a n t e y apel a n t e que el ni siguie r a
habi a sospe c h a d o el est a d o gravido de la
dem a n d a d a , est a n d o est a, como que d a proba d o,
en condicion pre ñ a d a muy avanz a d a . Por lo que
no ha luga r a estim a r el fraud e de que habla el
apela n t e . Lo alega d o por est e en el sentido de
que no ses raro halla r a perso n a s de abdo m e n
desa r r olla d o, nos pare c e pue ril par a mer e c e r
nues t r a consid e r a ci o n, tant o mas cuan t o que el
dem a n d a n t e era estu di a n t e de prim e r año de
der e c h o.
El mat ri m o ni o es una instit ucion sacr a ti si m a : es
el cimien t o en que desc a n s a la socie d a d . Para
anula rlo, son men e s t e r pru e b a s clar a s y
fehaci e n t e s . En est e asunt o no exist e n tales
pru e b a s .
Hallan d o la sent e n c i a apel a d a ajust a d a a
der e c h o, debe ser confir m a d a , como por la
pre s e n t e la confir m a m o s , en todas sus part e s,
con las cost a s al apel a n t e . Asi se orde n a .
Avanc e ñ a , Pres., Impe ri al, Diaz y Laur el, MM.,
est a n confor m e s .
WEGEL VS. SEMPIO DIY
G.R. No. L-53 7 0 3 Aug u s t 19, 19 8 6
LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL, peti ti o n e r ,
vs.
THE HONORA BLE ALICIA V. SEM PIO- DIY
(as pre s i d i n g jud g e of the Juve n i l e and
Do m e s t i c Rel at i o n s Court of Calo o c a n City)
and KARL HEINZ WIEGEL, resp o n d e n t s .
Dapuc a n t a , Dulay & Associat e s for petition e r .
Siguion Reyna, Mont e cillo and Ongsia ko Law
Office for privat e respo n d e n t .
PARAS, J.:
In an action (Family Case No. 483) filed befor e
the erst w hil e Juvenile and Dom esti c Relations
Court of Calooc a n City, her ei n respo n d e n t Karl
Heinz Wiegel (plaintiff ther ei n) aske d for the
decla r a t i o n of Nullity of his mar ri a g e (cele b r a t e d
on July, 1978 at the Holy Cat holic Apostolic
Christia n Chur c h Branc h in Maka ti, Met ro
Manila) with her ein petition e r Lilia Oliva Wiegel
(Lilia, for short, and defen d a n t ther ei n) on the
groun d of Lilia's previous existin g mar ri a g e to
one Edua r d o A. Maxion, the cere m o ny having
bee n perfor m e d on June 25, 1972 at our Lady of
Lourd e s Chur c h in Quezon City. Lilia, while
admi ttin g the exist e n c e of said prior subsisti n g
mar ri a g e claim e d that said mar ri a g e was null
and void, she and the first husb a n d Edua r d o A.
Maxion having bee n allege dly force d to ent e r
said marit al union. In the pre- trial that ensu e d,
the issue agr e e d upon by both partie s was the
stat u s of the first mar ri a g e (assu m i n g the
pre s e n c e of force exert e d agains t both par ti e s):
was said prior mar ri a g e void or was it mer ely
voida bl e? Cont e s ti n g the validity of the pre- trial
orde r , Lilia aske d the respo n d e n t court for an
opport u ni ty to pres e n t evide n c e-
(1) that the first mar ri a g e was vitiat e d by force
exercis e d upon both her and the first husb a n d ;
and
(2) that the first husb a n d was at the time of the
mar ri a g e in 1972 alre a dy mar ri e d to som eo n e
else.
Respon d e n t judge ruled again st the pres e n t a t i o n
of eviden c e beca u s e the exist e n c e of force
exert e d on both partie s of the first mar ri a g e had
alre a dy bee n agre e d upon. Henc e , the pres e n t
petition for certior a ri assailing the following
Orde r s of the r e s p o n d e n t Judge-
(1) the Orde r dat e d Marc h 17, 1980 in which the
par ti e s wer e com p ell e d to submi t the case for
resolution base d on "agr e e d facts;" and
(2) the Orde r dat e d April 14, 1980, denyin g
petition e r ' s motion to allow her to pres e n t
evide n c e in her favor.
We find the petition devoid of merit.
Ther e is no nee d for petition e r to prove that her
first mar ri a g e was vitiat e d by force com mi t t e d
again s t both partie s beca u s e assu m i n g this to be
so, the mar ri a g e will not be void but mer ely
viodabl e (Art. 85, Civil Code), and ther efo r e valid
until annulle d. Since no ann ul m e n t has yet bee n
made , it is clear that whe n she mar ri e d
respo n d e n t she was still validly mar ri e d to her
first husb a n d , conse q u e n t l y, her mar ri a g e to
respo n d e n t is VOID (Art. 80, Civil Code).
Ther e is likewise no nee d of introd u ci n g
evide n c e about the existing prior marri a g e of her
first husb a n d at the time they mar ri e d each
othe r, for then such a mar ri a g e thou g h void still
nee d s accor di n g to this Court a judicial
decla r a t i o n 1 of such fact and for all legal inten t s
and purpo s e s she would still be reg a r d e d as a
mar ri e d wom a n at the time she cont r a c t e d her
mar ri a g e with respo n d e n t Karl Heinz Wiegel);
accor di n gly, the marri a g e of petition e r and
respo n d e n t would be reg a r d e d VOID und e r the
law.
WHERE FOR E, this petition is her e by
DISMISS ED, for lack of meri t, and the Orde r s
compl ai n e d of are her e by AFFIRMED. Costs
again s t petition e r .
Feri a (Chai r m a n ) , Fern a n Alam p a y and
Guti e rr e z , Jr., JJ., co n c u r .
ALCAZAR VS. ALCAZAR
G.R. No. 17 4 4 5 1 Oct o b e r 13, 20 0 9
VERONICA CABACU NGA N ALCAZAR,
Peti t i o n e r ,
vs.
REY C. ALCAZAR, Res p o n d e n t .
DE C IS IO N
CHICO- NAZARIO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certior a ri seeks to
reve r s e the Decision1 dat e d 24 May 2006 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 84471,
affirmin g the Decision dat e d 9 June 2004 of the
Region al Trial Cour t (RTC) of Malolos City,
Branc h 85, in Civil Case No. 664- M- 2002, which
dismiss e d petition e r Veronica Caba c u n g a n
Alcaza r’s Compl ai nt for the ann ul m e n t of her
mar ri a g e to respo n d e n t Rey C. Alcazar.
The Compl ai nt, 2 docke t e d as Civil Case No. 664-
M- 2002, was filed by petition e r before the RTC
on 22 August 2002. Petition e r alleg e d in her
Compl ai nt that she was mar ri e d to respo n d e n t
on 11 Octob e r 2000 by Rev. August o G. Pabus t a n
(Pabu s t a n ) , at the latte r’s reside n c e . After their
weddin g, petition e r and respo n d e n t lived for five
days in San Jose, Occide n t a l Mindor o, the
hom e t o w n of respo n d e n t’ s par e n t s. Ther e af t e r ,
the newlywe d s went back to Manila, but
respo n d e n t did not live with petition e r at the
latt e r’s abod e at 2601- C Jose Abad Santo s
Avenu e, Tondo, Manila. On 23 Octob e r 2000,
respo n d e n t left for Riyadh, Kingdo m of Saudi
Arabi a, wher e he worke d as an upholst e r e r in a
furnit u r e shop. While workin g in Riyadh,
respo n d e n t did not com m u ni c a t e with petition e r
by phon e or by lett e r . Petition e r tried to call
respo n d e n t for five time s but respo n d e n t neve r
answ e r e d . About a year and a half after
respo n d e n t left for Riyadh, a co- teac h e r inform e d
petition e r that respo n d e n t was about to com e
hom e to the Philippin e s. Petition e r was surp ri s e d
why she was not advise d by respo n d e n t of his
arrival.
Petition e r furth e r aver r e d in her Compl ain t that
when respo n d e n t arrive d in the Philippine s, the
latt e r did not go hom e to petition e r at 2601- C
Jose Abad Sant o s Avenu e, Tondo, Manila.
Inst e a d, respo n d e n t proc e e d e d to his par e n t s’
house in San Jose, Occide n t al Mindor o. Upon
learni n g that respo n d e n t was in San Jose,
Occide n t al Mindor o, petition e r went to see her
brot h e r- in- law in Velasq u e z St., Tondo, Manila,
who claim e d that he was not awa r e of
respo n d e n t’s whe r e a b o u t s . Petition e r travel e d to
San Jose, Occide n t a l Mindo ro, whe r e she was
inform e d that respo n d e n t had bee n living with
his par e n t s since his arrival in Marc h 2002.
Petition e r asse r t e d that from the tim e
respo n d e n t arrive d in the Philippin e s, he neve r
cont a c t e d her. Thus, petition e r conclu d e d that
respo n d e n t was physically incap a bl e of
consu m m a t i n g his mar ri a g e with her, providing
sufficient caus e for ann ul m e n t of their mar ri a g e
purs u a n t to para g r a p h 5, Article 45 of the Family
Code of the Philippin e s (Family Code). Ther e was
also no more possibility of reconciliation
betw e e n petition e r and respo n d e n t .
Per the She riff’s Retur n 3 dat e d 3 Octob e r 2002,
a sum m o n s, toget h e r with a copy of petition e r’s
Compl ai nt, was serve d upon respo n d e n t on 30
Sept e m b e r 2002.4
On 18 Nove m b e r 2002, petition e r , throu g h
couns el, filed a Motion 5 to direct the public
pros e c u t o r to cond u c t an investig a ti o n of the
case purs u a n t to Article 48 of the Family Code.
As respo n d e n t did not file an Answe r, the RTC
issue d on 27 Nove m b e r 2002 an Orde r 6
directi n g the public prose c u t o r to cond u c t an
investi g a ti o n to ensu r e that no collusion exist e d
betw e e n the parti e s; to submi t a repor t the r e o n;
and to appe a r in all stag e s of the proce e di n g s to
see to it that evide n c e was not fabric a t e d or
supp r e s s e d .
On 4 Marc h 2003, Public Prose c u t r ix Veronic a
A.V. de Guzm a n (De Guzm a n) sub mi t t e d her
Repor t manifesti n g that she had cond u c t e d an
investi g a ti o n of the case of petition e r and
respo n d e n t in Janua ry 2003, but respo n d e n t
neve r partici p a t e d ther ei n. Public Prose c u t r i x De
Guzm a n also not e d that no collusion took plac e
betw e e n the parti e s, and mea s u r e s wer e take n to
preve n t supp r e s si o n of evide n c e betw e e n the m .
She then reco m m e n d e d that a full- blown trial be
cond u c t e d to det e r m i n e whet h e r petition e r’s
Compl ai nt was meri torio u s or not.
Pre- trial was held and ter mi n a t e d on 20 May
2003.
On 21 May 2003, the RTC rec eive d the Notice of
Appea r a n c e of the Solicitor Gene r al.
Trial on the merit s ensu e d the r e af t e r .
During trial, petition e r pres e n t e d her s elf, her
mot h e r Lolita Cabac u n g a n (Caba c u n g a n ) , and
clinical psychologis t Nedy L. Tayag (Tayag) as
witne s s e s .
Petition e r first took the witne s s stan d and
elabor a t e d on the alleg a tio n s in her Compl ai nt.
Caba c u n g a n corro bo r a t e d petition e r’s testim o ny.
Petition e r’s third witne s s, Tayag, pres e n t e d the
following psychologic al evalu a tio n of petition e r
and respo n d e n t :
After metic ulo u s scruti ny and car eful analysis of
the collect e d dat a, petition e r is found to be free
from any unde rlyin g perso n ali ty abe r r a t io n
neith e r (sic) of any seriou s psycho p a t h ol o gi c al
traits, which may possibly impe d e her norm al
functioni n g (sic) of mar ri a g e . On the othe r han d,
the unde r si g n e d arrive d to (sic) a firm opinion
that the sudd e n bre a k d o w n of marit al life
betw e e n petition e r and respo n d e n t was clea rly
due to the diagno s e d perso n ality disord e r that
the respo n d e n t is harb o ri n g , makin g him
psychologic ally incap a ci t a t e d to prope rly assu m e
and comply [with] esse n t i al roles (sic) of
obliga tion s as a mar ri e d man.
The patt e r n of beh avior s displaye d by the
respo n d e n t satisfies the diagn os t ic crite ri a of a
disor d e r clinically classified as Narcissi stic
Perso n a lity Disor d e r , a condition dee m e d to be
grave, sever e , long lasting in propo r t io n and
incur a bl e by any tre a t m e n t .
People sufferin g from Nar ci ssis tic Perso n a lity
Disor d e r are known to have a perva sive pat t e r n
of gra n dio sity (in fant a sy or beh avior), nee d for
admi r a t io n, and lack of emp a t hy, begin ni n g by
early adult ho o d and pres e n t in a variety of
cont ext s, as indicat e d by five (or more) of the
following:
1. has a gra n dio s e of self- impor t a n c e (e.g.
exagg e r a t e s achi eve m e n t s and talen t s, expec t to
be recog niz e d as supe rior without com m e n s u r a t e
achiev e m e n t s )
2. is preoc c u pi e d with fant a si e s of unlimite d
succe s s, powe r, brillianc e , bea u t y or ideal love
3. believes that he or she is "speci al" and uniqu e
and can only be und e r s t o o d by, or should
associa t e with, othe r special or high stat u s
people (instit u ti on s)
4. requi r e s exces sive admi r a ti o n
5. has sens e of entitle m e n t , i.e., unr e a s o n a b l e
expe c t a t i o n s of espe ci ally favor a bl e trea t m e n t or
auto m a t i c compli a nc e with his or her
expe c t a t i o n s
6. is inter p e r s o n a lly exploita tive, i.e., takes
adva n t a g e of othe r s to achi eve his or her own
ends
7. lacks emp a t hy: is unwilling to recog niz e or
identify with the feelings and need s of othe r s
8. is often envious of othe r s or believe s that
othe r s are envious of him or her
9. shows arrog a n t , haug h t y behavior or
attit u d e s.
The root caus e of respo n d e n t’s perso n a lity
disor d e r can be attri b u t e d to his early childhoo d
year s with predis po si n g psycho soci al factor s that
influen c e[ d] his develop m e n t . It was recou n t e d
that respo n d e n t is the first child of his moth e r’s
secon d family. Obviously, unh e al t hy familial
const ell a tio n compos e d his imm e di a t e
environ m e n t in his growin g up years.
Respon d e n t had unde r g o n e a seve r e longing for
att e n t io n from his fathe r who had bee n unfait hful
to the m and had died early in life, that he was
left alone to fend for the family nee d s. More so
that they wer e coping again st pover t y, his
care giv e r s failed to valida t e his nee d s, wishe s or
respo n s e s and overlooke d the love and atte n t io n
he year n e d which led to develop a pat hologic al
nee d for self- object to help him maint ai n a
cohesive sens e of self- such so grea t that
everyt hi n g other people offer is "consu m e d ."
Henc e, he is una bl e to develop relation s hi p with
othe r (sic) beyon d this nee d. Ther e is no capa ci ty
for empa t hy sha ri n g, or loving othe r s.
The psychologic al incap a ci ty of the respo n d e n t is
cha r a c t e r i z e d by juridical ant e c e d e n c e as it
alre a dy existe d long befor e he ent e r e d into
mar ri a g e . Since it alre a dy star t e d early in life, it
is deeply engr ai n e d within his syst e m and
becom e s a[n] integ r a l part of his perso n ali ty
stru ct u r e , the r e b y rend e ri n g such to be
per m a n e n t and incur a bl e . 7
Tayag conclu d e d in the end that:
As such, their mar ri a g e is alre a dy beyon d rep ai r,
conside ri n g the fact that it has long bee n (sic)
ceas e d to exist and have their differe n t life
priorities. Reconciliation bet w e e n the m is
rega r d e d to be (sic). The esse n ti al obliga tion s of
love, trust , resp e c t , fidelity, auth e n t i c
coha bi t a t io n as husb a n d and wife, mut u al help
and suppo r t, and com mi t m e n t , did not and will
no lon[g]e r exist bet w e e n the m . With due
conside r a t i o n of the above- mentio n e d findings,
the unde r si g n e d reco m m e n d s , the decla r a t i o n of
nullity of mar ri a g e betw e e n petition e r and
respo n d e n t . 8
On 18 Febr u a r y 2004, petition e r filed her Form al
Offer of Evide nc e . Public Prose c u t r ix Myrna S.
Lagros a (Lagro s a ), who repl ac e d Public
Prose c u t r ix De Guzm a n, inter p o s e d no objection
to the admissio n of petition e r’s evide nc e and
manifes t e d that she would no longe r pres e n t
evide n c e for the Stat e.
On 9 June 2004, the RTC rend e r e d its Decision
denying petition e r’s Compl ai nt for ann ul m e n t of
her mar ri a g e to respo n d e n t , holding in
subst a n c e that:
In the case at bar, the Court finds that the acts of
the respo n d e n t in not com m u n i c a t i n g with
petition e r and not living with the latt e r the
mom e n t he ret u r n e d hom e from Saudi Arabi a
despi t e their mar ri a g e do (sic) not lead to a
conclusion of psychologic al inca p a ci t y on his
par t. Ther e is absol ut ely no showing that his
"defect s" wer e alre a d y pres e n t at the incep tio n
of their mar ri a g e or that these are incur a bl e .
That being the case, the Cour t resolves to deny
the inst a n t petition.
WHERE FOR E, pre m is e s consi de r e d , the Petition
for Annul m e n t of Mar ri a g e is here by DENIED.9
Petition e r filed a Motion for Reconsi d e r a t i o n 1 0
but it was denie d by the RTC in an Orde r 1 1
dat e d 19 August 2004.
Aggrieve d, petition e r filed an appe al with the
Court of Appeals, docke t e d as CA-G.R. CV No.
84471. In a Decision 1 2 date d 24 May 2006, the
Court of Appeals affirm e d the RTC Decision
dat e d 9 June 2004. The Court of Appe als ruled
that the RTC did not err in finding that petition e r
failed to prove respo n d e n t’s psychologic al
incap a ci ty. Other than petition e r’s bar e
allega tion s, no othe r eviden c e was pres e n t e d to
prove respo n d e n t ’s perso n ality disor d e r that
made him compl e t ely una bl e to disch a r g e the
esse n ti al obligation s of the marit al stat e. Citing
Repu blic v. Court of Appe als,1 3 the appellat e
court ruled that the evide nc e should be able to
est a blis h that at least one of the spous e s was
ment ally or physically ill to such an exten t that
said perso n could not have known the marit al
obliga tion s to be assu m e d ; or knowin g the
marit al obligatio n s, could not have validly
assu m e d the sam e. At most, respo n d e n t’ s
aba n d o n m e n t of petition e r could be a groun d for
legal sepa r a t i o n unde r Article 5 of the Family
Code.
Petition e r’s Motion for Reconsi d e r a t i o n was
denie d by the Court of Appe al s in a Resolution 1 4
dat e d 28 August 2008.
Henc e, this Petition raising the sole issue of:
WHETHER OR NOT, AS DEFINED BY THE LAW
AND JURISPRUDE N C E, RESPONDE NT IS
PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO
PERFOR M THE ESSE NTIAL MARITAL
OBLIGATONS.1 5
At the outse t , it must be note d that the
Compl ai nt origin ally filed by petition e r before
the RTC was for annul m e n t of mar ri a g e base d on
Article 45, para g r a p h 5 of the Family Code,
which rea d s:
ART. 45. A mar ri a g e may be annull e d for any of
the following caus e s, existing at the time of the
mar ri a g e :
xxxx
(5) That eithe r party was physic ally inca p a bl e of
consu m m a t i n g the mar ri a g e with the othe r, and
such incap a ci ty contin u e s and appe a r s to be
incur a bl e ; x x x.
Article 45(5) of the Family Code refe r s to lack of
powe r to copul a t e . 1 6 Inca p a ci ty to consu m m a t e
denot e s the per m a n e n t inability on the par t of
the spous e s to perfor m the com pl e t e act of
sexual inter c o u r s e . 1 7 Non- consu m m a t i o n of a
mar ri a g e may be on the part of the husb a n d or of
the wife and may be caus e d by a physical or
stru ct u r a l defec t in the ana t o m y of one of the
par ti e s or it may be due to chronic illness and
inhibition s or fear s arising in whole or in part
from psychop hy sic al conditions. It may be
caus e d by psychog e ni c caus e s, wher e such
ment al block or distu r b a n c e has the resul t of
makin g the spous e physic ally incap a bl e of
perfor m i n g the mar ri a g e act.1 8
No evide nc e was pres e n t e d in the case at bar to
est a blis h that respo n d e n t was in any way
physically incap a bl e to consu m m a t e his mar ri a g e
with petition e r . Petition e r even admit t e d durin g
her cross- examin a t io n that she and respo n d e n t
had sexual inter c o u r s e after their weddi n g and
befor e respo n d e n t left for abroa d . Ther e
obviously being no physic al incap a ci ty on
respo n d e n t’s part, the n, ther e is no groun d for
annulling petition e r’s mar ri a g e to respo n d e n t .
Petition e r’s Compl ai nt was, ther efo r e , rightfully
dismiss e d .
One curious thing, thoug h, caug h t this Court’s
att e n t io n. As can be glea n e d from the evide n c e
pre s e n t e d by petition e r and the observ a ti o n s of
the RTC and the Court of Appeals, it app e a r s
that petition e r was actu ally seekin g the
decla r a t i o n of nullity of her mar ri a g e to
respo n d e n t base d on the latt e r’s psychologic al
incap a ci ty to com ply with his marit al obligatio n s
of mar ri a g e unde r Article 36 of the Family Code.
Petition e r att rib u t e s the filing of the erron e o u s
Compl ai nt before the RTC to her form e r
couns el’s mist a k e or gross ignor a n c e . 1 9 But
even said reaso n canno t save petition e r’s
Compl ai nt from dismiss al. It is settl e d in this
jurisdic tion that the client is boun d by the acts,
even mist a k e s, of the couns el in the real m of
proce d u r a l techni q u e . 2 0 Althoug h this rule is not
a har d and fast one and admit s of excep tio n s,
such as wher e the mist ak e of couns el is so gross,
palpa bl e and inexcus a bl e as to result in the
violation of his client’s subst a n t iv e right s, 2 1
petition e r failed to convince us that such
excep tion al circu m s t a n c e s exist her ein.
Assumi n g for the sake of arg u m e n t that we can
tre a t the Compl ai nt as one for decl a r a t io n of
nullity base d on Article 36 of the Family Code,
we will still dismiss the Compl ai nt for lack of
merit, consist e n t with the evide n c e pre s e n t e d by
petition e r during the trial.
Article 36 of the Family Code provide s:
ART. 36. A mar ri a g e contr a c t e d by any par ty
who, at the tim e of the celeb r a ti o n, was
psychologic ally incap a ci t a t e d to comply with the
esse n ti al marit al obligatio n s of mar ri a g e , shall
likewise be void even if such inca p a ci t y beco m e s
manifes t only afte r its sole m niz a tio n.
In Sant os v. Court of Appe als,2 2 the Court
decla r e d that "psychologic al inca p a ci t y" unde r
Article 36 of the Family Code is not mea n t to
comp r e h e n d all possible case s of psychos e s. It
shoul d refe r, rat h e r , to no less tha n a ment al (not
physical) inca p a ci t y that caus e s a party to be
truly incognitive of the basic marit al coven a n t s
that conco m it a n t ly must be assu m e d and
disch a r g e d by the parti e s to the mar ri a g e .
Psychologic al incap a ci ty must be char a c t e ri z e d
by (a) gravity, (b) juridical ant e c e d e n c e , and (c)
incur a bility.2 3
The Court laid down the guideline s in resolving
petition s for decla r a t i o n of nullity of mar ri a g e ,
base d on Article 36 of the Family Code, in
Repu blic v. Court of Appe als,2 4 to wit:
(1) The burd e n of proof to show the nullity of the
mar ri a g e belong s to the plaintiff. Any doubt
shoul d be resolved in favor of the existe n c e and
continu a t i o n of the mar ri a g e and agains t its
dissolution and nullity. This is root e d in the fact
that both our Constit u tio n and our laws che ri sh
the validity of mar ri a g e and unity of the family.
Thus, our Constit u t io n devot e s an entir e Article
on the Family, recog nizin g it "as the found a t io n
of the nation." It decr e e s mar ri a g e as legally
"inviolable," the r e by prot e c ti n g it from
dissolution at the whim of the parti e s. Both the
family and mar ri a g e are to be "prot e c t e d " by the
stat e .
The Family Code echo e s this consti t u tio n a l edict
on mar ri a g e and the family and emp h a siz e s their
per m a n e n c e , inviolability and solidari ty.
(2) The root caus e of the psychologi c al
incap a ci ty must be a) medic ally or clinically
identifie d, b) alleg e d in the com pl ai nt , c)
sufficiently prove n by expe r t s and d) clearly
explain e d in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code req ui r e s that the incap a ci ty must be
psychologic al – not physical, altho u g h its
manifes t a t i o n s and/or sympto m s may be
physical. The evide nc e must convinc e the court
that the parti es, or one of the m, was men t ally or
psychic ally ill to such an exte n t that the perso n
could not have know n the obligatio n s he was
assu m i n g , or knowin g the m , could not have
given valid assu m p t io n ther e of. Althoug h no
exam pl e of such incap a ci ty need be given her e
so as not to limit the applica tio n of the provision
und e r the princi pl e of ejusd e m gen e ri s,
neve r t h e l e s s such root caus e must be identified
as a psychologi c al illness and its incap a cit a t i n g
nat u r e fully explain e d. Expe rt evide n c e may be
given by qualified psychia t ri s t s and clinical
psychologis t s.
(3) The inca p a ci ty must be prove n to be existin g
at the "time of the celeb r a t i o n" of the mar ri a g e .
The evide n c e must show that the illness was
existing whe n the par ti e s exch a n g e d their "I
do’s." The manifes t a t i o n of the illness nee d not
be perc eiva bl e at such time, but the illness itself
must have att a c h e d at such mom e n t , or prior
ther e t o.
(4) Such inca p a ci ty must also be shown to be
medically or clinically per m a n e n t or incur a bl e.
Such incur a bility may be absolut e or even
relative only in rega r d to the othe r spous e, not
nece s s a r ily absolut ely agai ns t everyon e of the
sam e sex. Furt h e r m o r e , such incap a ci ty must be
releva n t to the assu m p t i o n of mar ri a g e
obliga tion s, not nece s s a r ily to those not relat e d
to mar ri a g e , like the exer ci se of a profes sio n or
em ploy m e n t in a job. Henc e, a pedia t ri ci a n may
be effective in diagno si n g illness e s of childr e n
and presc ri bi n g medici n e to cure the m but may
not be psychologic ally capa cit a t e d to procr e a t e ,
bea r and raise his/he r own childr e n as an
esse n ti al obligation of mar ri a g e .
(5) Such illness must be grave enoug h to bring
about the disa bility of the party to assu m e the
esse n ti al obligation s of mar ri a g e . Thus, "mild
cha r a c t e r i ol ogic al peculia ri ti e s, mood chan g e s,
occasion al emotion al outbu r s t s " cannot be
acce p t e d as root caus e s. The illness must be
show n as down ri g h t inca p a ci t y or inability, not a
refusal, negle c t or difficulty, muc h less ill will. In
othe r words, the r e is a nat al or supe r v e ni n g
disa blin g factor in the perso n, an adve r s e
inte g r al elem e n t in the perso n ali ty stru ct u r e that
effectively inca p a ci t a t e s the per so n from really
acce p ti n g and ther e b y complying with the
obliga tion s esse n ti al to mar ri a g e .
(6) The esse n ti al marit al obliga tion s must be
thos e embr a c e d by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as rega r d s the husb a n d and wife as
well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the sam e
Code in reg a r d to pare n t s and their childr e n.
Such non- complie d marit al obligatio n(s) must
also be stat e d in the petition, prove n by evide nc e
and includ e d in the text of the decision.
(7) Inte r p r e t a t i o n s given by the Nation al
Appellat e Mat ri m o ni al Tribun al of the Catholic
Chur c h in the Philippin e s, while not cont rolling
or decisive, should be given gre a t resp e c t by our
court s. x x x.
Being accor di n gly guide d by the afore q u o t e d
prono u n c e m e n t s in Republic v. Court of Appeals,
we scruti nize d the totality of eviden c e pres e n t e d
by petition e r and found that the sam e was not
enoug h to sust ai n a finding that respo n d e n t was
psychologic ally incap a ci t a t e d .
Petition e r’s evide nc e , par tic ul a rly her and her
mot h e r’s testi m o ni e s, mer ely est a blish e d that
respo n d e n t left petition e r soon afte r thei r
weddin g to work in Saudi Arabia; that whe n
respo n d e n t ret u r n e d to the Philippin e s a year
and a half later, he direc tly went to live with his
par e n t s in San Jose, Occide n t al Mindor o, and not
with petition e r in Tondo, Manila; and that
respo n d e n t also did not cont a c t petition e r at all
since leaving for abro a d. These testi m o ni e s
thoug h do not give us much insight into
respo n d e n t’s psychologic al stat e.
Tayag’s psychologic al repo r t leaves much to be
desir e d and hardly helps petition e r’s caus e. It
must be not e d that Tayag was not able to
per so n ally exami n e respo n d e n t . Respo n d e n t did
not app e a r for exa mi n a t i o n despit e Tayag’s
invitation.2 5 Tayag, in evalu a ti n g respo n d e n t’s
psychologic al stat e, had to rely on inform a t i o n
provide d by petition e r. Henc e , we expec t Tayag
to have bee n mor e prud e n t and thoro u g h in her
evalu a tio n of respo n d e n t’ s psychologic al
condition, since her sour c e of infor m a t i o n,
nam ely, petition e r , was hardly impa r ti al.
Tayag conclu d e d in her repor t that respo n d e n t
was sufferi n g from Narci ssis ti c Perso n ali ty
Disor d e r , trac e a b l e to the latt e r’s expe ri e n c e s
durin g his childhood. Yet, the repo r t is totally
ber eft of the basis for the said conclusio n. Tayag
did not partic ul a rly desc ri b e the "pat t e r n of
beh avior" that showe d that respo n d e n t indee d
had a Nar cissi sti c Person a lity Disor d e r . Tayag
likewise failed to explai n how such a perso n a lity
disor d e r made respo n d e n t psychologi c ally
incap a ci t a t e d to perfor m his obligatio n s as a
husb a n d . We emp h a siz e that the burd e n falls
upon petition e r, not just to prove that
respo n d e n t suffer s from a psychologic al
disor d e r , but also that such psychologic al
disor d e r rend e r s him "truly incognitive of the
basic marit al coven a n t s that conco mi t a n t ly must
be assu m e d and disch a r g e d by the parti e s to the
mar ri a g e ." 2 6 Psychologi c al incap a ci ty must be
more than just a "difficulty," a "refus al," or a
"neglec t " in the perfor m a n c e of som e marit al
obliga tion s.
In this insta n c e , we have been allowe d, throu g h
the evide n c e addu c e d , to peek into petition e r’s
marit al life and, as a result, we perc eive a simple
case of a mar ri e d couple being apar t too long,
becomi n g stra n g e r s to each othe r, with the
husb a n d falling out of love and dist a n ci n g or
det a c hi n g hims elf as much as possibl e from his
wife.
To be tire d and give up on one’s situa tio n and on
one’s spouse are not nec es s a rily signs of
psychologic al illness; neith e r can falling out of
love be so labele d. When thes e happ e n , the
rem e d y for som e is to cut the marit al knot to
allow the par ti e s to go their sepa r a t e ways. This
simple rem e d y, howeve r, is not availabl e to us
und e r our laws. Ours is a limite d rem e dy that
add r e s s e s only a very specific situa tio n – a
relation s hi p wher e no mar ri a g e could have
validly bee n concl ud e d beca u s e the par ti e s; or
whe r e one of the m , by reaso n of a grave and
incur a bl e psychologic al illness existing whe n the
mar ri a g e was celeb r a t e d , did not appr e ci a t e the
obliga tion s of marit al life and, thus, could not
have validly ent e r e d into a mar ri a g e . 2 7
An unsa ti sfa c t o r y mar ri a g e is not a null and void
mar ri a g e . As we stat e d in Marcos v. Marco s 2 8]:
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stre s s, is not to
be confus e d with a divorc e law that cuts the
marit al bond at the time the caus e s ther efo r
manifes t the m s e lve s. It refer s to a seriou s
psychologic al illness afflicting a party even
befor e the celeb r a t i o n of the mar ri a g e . It is a
mala dy so grave and so per m a n e n t as to deprive
one of awa r e n e s s of the duties and
respo n si bilitie s of the mat ri m o ni al bond one is
about to assu m e . x x x.
Result a n t ly, we have held in the past that mer e
"irrec o n cil a bl e differe n c e s" and "conflictin g
per so n ali ti e s" in no wise constit u t e psychologi c al
incap a ci ty.2 9
As a last- ditch effort to have her mar ri a g e to
respo n d e n t decla r e d null, petition e r plea d s
aba n d o n m e n t by and sexual infidelity of
respo n d e n t . In a Manifest a t i o n and Motion 3 0
dat e d 21 August 2007 filed befor e us, petition e r
claims that she was infor m e d by one Jacinto
Fordo n e z , who is residin g in the sam e bar a n g a y
as respo n d e n t in Occide n t al Mindor o, that
respo n d e n t is living- in with anot h e r wom a n
nam e d "Sally."
Sexual infidelity, per se, howev e r , does not
constit u t e psychologic al inca p a ci ty within the
cont e m pl a t i o n of the Family Code. Again,
petition e r must be able to est a blish that
respo n d e n t’s unfait hf ul n e s s is a manifest a t i o n of
a disord e r e d perso n a lity, which makes him
compl et ely una bl e to disch a r g e the esse n t i al
obliga tion s of the marit al stat e. 3 1
It rem ai n s settle d that the Stat e has a high stake
in the pres e rv a t i o n of mar ri a g e root e d in its
recog ni tio n of the sanctity of marri e d life and its
mission to prot e c t and stre n g t h e n the family as a
basic autono m o u s social instit ution. Henc e, any
doubt should be resolve d in favor of the
exist e n c e and contin u a t i o n of the mar ri a g e and
again s t its dissolution and nullity.32 Pres u m p t i o n
is always in favor of the validity of mar ri a g e .
Sem p e r pra e s u m i t u r pro mat ri m o ni o. 3 3 In the
case at bar, petition e r failed to per su a d e us that
respo n d e n t’s failur e to com m u ni c a t e with
petition e r since leaving for Saudi Arabia to work,
and to live with petition e r afte r ret u r ni n g to the
count ry, are grave psychologic al mala di e s that
are keepi n g him from knowing and/or complying
with the esse n ti al obligatio n s of mar ri a g e .
We are not down pl ayin g petition e r’s frust r a t i o n
and misery in finding hers elf shackl e d, so to
spea k, to a marri a g e that is no longe r workin g.
Regr e t t a bl y, the r e are situa tion s like this one,
whe r e neith e r law nor society can provide the
specific answ e r s to every individu al proble m . 3 4
WHERE FOR E, the Petition is DENIED. The 24
May 2006 Decision and 28 August 2008
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 8447 1, which affirm e d the 9 June 2004
Decision of the Region al Trial Court of Malolos
City, Branc h 85, dismissi n g petition e r Veronica
Caba c u n g a n Alcazar’s Compl ain t in Civil Case
No. 664- M- 2002, are AFFIRMED. No costs.
MARRIAGE WHE N ONE SPO U S E IS ABSE N T
ART 41- 44
ART 34 9 RPC
VALDEZ VS. REPU BLIC
G.R. No. 18 0 8 6 3 Se p t e m b e r 8, 20 0 9
ANGELITA VALDEZ, Peti t i o n e r ,
vs.
REPU BLIC OF THE PHILIPPI N E S ,
Res p o n d e n t .
DE C IS IO N
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Cour t is a Petition for Review on
Certior a ri unde r Rule 45 of the Rules of Cour t
assailing the Decision of the Regional Trial Cour t
(RTC) of Camiling, Tarlac date d Nove m b e r 12,
2007 dismissin g petition e r Angelita Valdez’s
petition for the decl ar a ti o n of pres u m p t i v e deat h
of her husb a n d , Sofio Polboro s a (Sofio).
The facts of the case are as follows:
Petition e r mar ri e d Sofio on Janua r y 11, 1971 in
Pate r o s, Rizal. On Dece m b e r 13, 1971, petition e r
gave birt h to the spous e s’ only child, Nancy.
Accordi n g to petition e r , she and Sofio arg u e d
const a n t ly beca u s e the latte r was une m ploy e d
and did not bring hom e any money. In Marc h
1972, Sofio left thei r conjug al dwelling.
Petition e r and their child waite d for him to
ret u r n but, finally, in May 1972, petition e r
decide d to go back to her par e n t s’ hom e in
Banc ay 1st, Camiling, Tarlac. Thre e year s passe d
without any word from Sofio. In Octob e r 1975,
Sofio showe d up at Bancay 1st. He and petition e r
talke d for sever al hour s and they agr e e d to
sepa r a t e . They execu t e d a docu m e n t to that
effect.1 That was the last time petition e r saw
him. After that, petition e r didn’t hea r any news
of Sofio, his wher e a b o u t s or even if he was alive
or not.2
Believing that Sofio was alre a d y dead, petition e r
mar ri e d Virgilio Reyes on June 20, 1985.3
Subs e q u e n t ly, howeve r, Virgilio’s applica tion for
nat u r aliza tion filed with the Unit ed Stat e s
Depa r t m e n t of Hom el a n d Secu ri ty was deni ed
bec a u s e petition e r’s mar ri a g e to Sofio was
subsisti n g. 4 Henc e , on Marc h 29, 2007,
petition e r filed a Petition befor e the RTC of
Camiling, Tarlac seeki ng the decl ar a ti o n of
pre s u m p t iv e deat h of Sofio.
The RTC rend e r e d its Decision 5 on Nove m b e r
12, 2007, dismissi n g the Petition for lack of
merit. The RTC held that Angelit a "was not able
to prove the well- grou n d e d belief that her
husb a n d Sofio Polboro s a was alre a dy dea d." It
said that unde r Article 41 of the Family Code,
the pres e n t spous e is burd e n e d to prove that her
spous e has bee n abse n t and that she has a well-
found e d belief that the abse n t spous e is alrea d y
dea d before the pres e n t spous e may cont r a c t a
subs e q u e n t mar ri a g e . This belief, the RTC said,
must be the result of prop e r and hone s t- to-
goodn e s s inquirie s and effort s to asce r t a i n the
whe r e a b o u t s of the abse n t spous e.
The RTC found that, by petition e r’s own
admi ssion, she did not try to find her husb a n d
anym o r e in light of their mut u al agr e e m e n t to
live sepa r a t e ly. Likewise, petition e r’s dau g h t e r
testified that her moth e r preve n t e d her from
looking for her fathe r. The RTC also said ther e is
a stron g possibility that Sofio is still alive,
conside ri n g that he would have been only 61
year s old by then, and people who have rea c h e d
their 60s have not beco m e incre a si n gly low in
healt h and spirits, and, even assu m i n g as true
petition e r’s testi m o ny that Sofio was a chain
smoke r and a drun k a r d , ther e is no eviden c e that
he continu e s to drink and smoke until now.
Petition e r filed a motion for recon si d e r a t i o n. 6
She argu e d that it is the Civil Code that applies
in this case and not the Family Code since
petition e r’s mar ri a g e to Sofio was celeb r a t e d on
Janua r y 11, 1971, long befor e the Family Code
took effect. Petition e r furt h e r argu e d that she
had acqui r e d a vest e d right und e r the provision s
of the Civil Code and the strict e r provisions of
the Family Code should not be applie d agai ns t
her beca u s e Title XIV of the Civil Code, whe r e
Articles 384 and 390 on decla r a t i o n of abse n c e
and pres u m p t i o n of deat h, resp e c t ively, can be
found, was not expre s sly rep e al e d by the Family
Code. To apply the strict e r provisions of the
Family Code will impair the right s petition e r had
acqui r e d unde r the Civil Code.
The RTC deni e d the Motion for Reconsi d e r a t i o n
in a Resolution date d Dece m b e r 10, 2007.7
Petition e r now com e s befor e this Court seekin g
the reve r s al of the RTC Decision and Motion for
Reconsi d e r a t i o n .
In its Manifes t a t i o n and Motion,8 the Office of
the Solicitor Gene r al (OSG) recom m e n d e d that
the Cour t set aside the assail ed RTC Decision
and gran t the Petition to decla r e Sofio
pre s u m p t iv ely dea d. The OSG arg u e s that the
requi r e m e n t of "well- found e d belief" und e r
Article 41 of the Family Code is not applica bl e to
the inst a n t case. It said that petition e r could not
be expec t e d to comply with this requir e m e n t
bec a u s e it was not yet in exist e n c e duri ng her
mar ri a g e to Virgilio Reyes in 1985. The OSG
furth e r argu e s that befor e the effectivity of the
Family Code, petition e r alre a dy acqui r e d a
vest e d right as to the validity of her mar ri a g e to
Virgilio Reyes base d on the pre s u m e d dea t h of
Sofio unde r the Civil Code. This vest e d right and
the pres u m p t i o n of Sofio’s deat h, the OSG posits,
could not be affect e d by the obliga tion s crea t e d
und e r the Family Code.9
Next, the OSG cont e n d s that Article 390 of the
Civil Code was not repe a l e d by Article 41 of the
Family Code.10 Title XIV of the Civil Code, the
OSG said, was not one of those expr e s sly
repe a l e d by the Family Code. Moreove r , Article
256 of the Family Code provide s that its
provision s shall not be retr o a c tiv ely applie d if
they will prejudi c e or impair veste d or acqui r e d
right s.1 1
The RTC Decision, insofar as it dismiss e d the
Petition, is affirm e d . Howeve r, we must stat e
that we are denying the Petition on groun d s
differe n t from those cited in the RTC Decision.
Initially, we discus s a proc e d u r a l issue. Unde r
the Rules of Court, a party may directly appe al to
this Court from a decision of the trial court only
on pure question s of law. A ques tio n of law lies,
on one hand, when the doub t or differe n c e arise s
as to what the law is on a cert ai n set of facts; on
the othe r hand, a ques tio n of fact exist s whe n the
doubt or differ e n c e arise s as to the trut h or
false hoo d of the allege d facts. Here, the facts are
not disput e d; the contr ove r s y mer ely relat e s to
the corr e c t applica tion of the law or
jurisp r u d e n c e to the undisp u t e d facts.12
The RTC err e d in applying the provisions of the
Family Code and holding that petition e r nee d e d
to prove a "well- found e d belief" that Sofio was
alre a dy dea d. The RTC applied Article 41 of the
Family Code, to wit:
Art. 41. A mar ri a g e cont r a c t e d by any perso n
durin g subsist e n c e of a previous mar ri a g e shall
be null and void, unless befor e the celebr a t i o n of
the subs e q u e n t mar ri a g e , the prior spous e had
bee n abse n t for four conse c u t ive years and the
spous e pres e n t has a well- found e d belief that the
abse n t spous e was alre a dy dea d. In case of
disa p p e a r a n c e whe r e ther e is dang e r unde r the
circu m s t a n c e s set fort h in the provisions of
Article 391 of the Civil Code, an abse n c e of only
two years shall be sufficien t.
For the purpo s e of cont r a c t i n g a subse q u e n t
mar ri a g e unde r the prec e di n g para g r a p h , the
spous e pres e n t must instit u t e a sum m a r y
proce e di n g as provide d in this Code for the
decla r a t i o n of pres u m p t i v e dea t h of the
abse n t e e , withou t preju dic e to the effect of
rea p p e a r a n c e of the abse n t spous e .
It is readily appa r e n t , howeve r, that the
mar ri a g e s of petition e r to Sofio and Virgilio on
Janua r y 11, 1971 and June 20, 1985,
resp e c tiv ely, were both celebr a t e d unde r the
auspic e s of the Civil Code.
The pertin e n t provision of the Civil Code is
Article 83:
Art. 83. Any mar ri a g e subse q u e n t ly cont r a c t e d
by any perso n durin g the lifetim e of the first
spous e of such perso n with any perso n othe r
than such first spouse shall be illegal and void
from its perfor m a n c e , unless:
(1) The first mar ri a g e was ann ulle d or dissolve d;
or
(2) The first spous e had bee n abse n t for seven
conse c u t ive year s at the time of the secon d
mar ri a g e withou t the spous e pres e n t having
news of the abse n t e e being alive, of if the
abse n t e e , thoug h he has bee n abse n t for less
than seven years, is gen e r a lly conside r e d as
dea d and believe d to be so by the spous e pre s e n t
at the time of cont r a c t i n g such subs e q u e n t
mar ri a g e , or if the abse n t e e is pre s u m e d dea d
accor di n g to Articles 390 and 391. The mar ri a g e
so cont r a c t e d shall be valid in any of the thr e e
case s until decla r e d null and void by a comp e t e n t
court.
Article 390 of the Civil Code stat e s:
Art. 390. After an abse n c e of seve n years, it
being unknow n whet h e r or not the abse n t e e still
lives, he shall be pres u m e d dea d for all purpo s e s,
excep t for those of succ e s si o n.
The abse n t e e shall not be pres u m e d dead for the
purpo s e of openi n g his succ e s si on till afte r an
abse n c e of ten years. If he disap p e a r e d afte r the
age of seve nt y- five year s, an abse n c e of five
year s shall be sufficie nt in orde r that his
succe s sio n may be open e d.
The Court, on seve r al occasion s, had inter p r e t e d
the above- quot e d provision in this wise:
For the purpo s e s of the civil marri a g e law, it is
not nec e ss a r y to have the form e r spous e
judicially decla r e d an abse n t e e . The decla r a t i o n
of abse n c e made in accor d a n c e with the
provision s of the Civil Code has for its sole
purpo s e to ena bl e the taking of the nece s s a r y
prec a u t i o n s for the administ r a t i o n of the est a t e
of the abse n t e e . For the celeb r a ti o n of civil
mar ri a g e , howev e r , the law only requi r e s that
the form e r spous e has bee n abse n t for seven
conse c u t ive year s at the time of the secon d
mar ri a g e , that the spous e pres e n t does not know
his or her form e r spous e to be living, that such
form e r spouse is gen e r a lly repu t e d to be dead
and the spouse pre se n t so believe s at the tim e of
the celebr a t i o n of the mar ri a g e . 1 3
Furt h e r , the Cour t explain e d that pres u m p t i o n of
dea t h cannot be the subjec t of cour t proc e e di n g s
inde p e n d e n t of the settle m e n t of the abse n t e e’s
est a t e .
In re Szat r a w 1 4 is instr u c tiv e. In that case,
petition e r cont r a c t e d mar ri a g e with a Polish
nation al in 1937. They lived toge t h e r as husb a n d
and wife for thre e years. Som e ti m e in 1940, the
husb a n d , on the pret ext of visiting some friend s,
left the conjug al abod e with thei r child and neve r
ret u r n e d . After inquirin g from friends, petition e r
found that her husb a n d went to Sha n g h ai , China.
Howev e r, friends who cam e from Shan g h a i told
her that the husb a n d was not seen ther e . In
1948, petition e r filed a petition for the
decla r a t i o n of pres u m p t i v e dea t h of her husb a n d
arg ui n g that since the latt e r had bee n abse n t for
more than seven years and she had not hea r d
any news from him and about her child, she
believes that he is dea d. In deciding the case, the
Court said:
The petition is not for the settl e m e n t of the
est a t e of Nicolai Szat r a w , bec a u s e it does not
app e a r that he posse s s e d prope r t y brou g h t to
the mar ri a g e and bec a u s e he had acqui r e d no
prope r t y durin g his mar ri e d life with the
petition e r. The rule invoke d by the latt e r is
mer ely one of evide n c e which per mi t s the cour t
to pres u m e that a per so n is dead after the fact
that such perso n had bee n unh e a r d from in
seven years had bee n est a blish e d . This
pre s u m p t i o n may arise and be invoke d and made
in a case, eithe r in an action or in a speci al
proce e di n g, which is tried or hea r d by, and
submi t t e d for decision to, a comp e t e n t court .
Inde p e n d e n t l y of such an action or speci al
proce e di n g, the pres u m p t i o n of deat h canno t be
invoke d, nor can it be mad e the subjec t of an
action or speci al proc e e di n g . In this case, ther e
is no right to be enforc e d nor is the r e a rem e d y
praye d for by the petition e r again s t her abse n t
husb a n d . Neith e r is the r e a praye r for the final
det e r m i n a t i o n of his right or stat u s or for the
asce r t a i n m e n t of a partic ul a r fact (Hag a n s v.
Wislizen u s, 42 Phil. 880), for the petition does
not pray for a decla r a t io n that the petition e r ' s
husb a n d is dea d, but mer ely asks for a
decla r a t i o n that he be pre s u m e d dea d beca u s e
he had bee n unhe a r d from in seve n year s. If
ther e is any pret e n s e at securi n g a decla r a t i o n
that the petition e r ' s husb a n d is dea d, such a
pret e n si o n canno t be gra n t e d bec a u s e it is
una u t h o r iz e d. The petition is for a decla r a t i o n
that the petition e r ' s husb a n d is pres u m p t iv ely
dea d. But this decla r a t i o n, even if judicially
made , would not improve the petition e r ' s
situati on, bec a u s e such a pres u m p t i o n is alre a dy
est a blis h e d by law. A judicial prono u n c e m e n t to
that effect, even if final and execut o r y, would
still be a prim a facie pre s u m p t i o n only. It is still
dispu t a bl e. It is for that rea so n that it cannot be
the subjec t of a judicial prono u n c e m e n t or
decla r a t i o n, if it is the only question or mat t e r
involved in a case, or upon which a comp e t e n t
court has to pass. The latte r must decid e finally
the contr ove r s y bet w e e n the parti es, or
det e r m i n e finally the right or stat u s of a party or
est a blis h finally a partic ul a r fact, out of which
cert ai n right s and obliga tion s arise or may arise;
and once such cont r ov e r sy is decid e d by a final
judg m e n t , or such right or stat u s det e r m i n e d , or
such partic ul a r fact est a blish e d , by a final
dec r e e, the n the judgm e n t on the subjec t of the
cont r ov e r sy, or the decr e e upon the right or
stat u s of a par ty or upon the exist e n c e of a
par tic ul a r fact, beco m e s res judica t a, subjec t to
no collat e r a l att a ck, excep t in a few rar e
inst a n c e s espe ci ally provide d by law. It is,
ther efo r e , clear that a judicial decla r a t i o n that a
per so n is presu m p t iv ely dea d, bec a u s e he had
bee n unhe a r d from in seven years, being a
pre s u m p t i o n juris tant u m only, subject to
cont r a r y proof, canno t reac h the stag e of finality
or beco m e final. Proof of actu al deat h of the
per so n pres u m e d dea d bec a u s e he had bee n
unh e a r d from in seven years, would have to be
made in anot h e r proc e e di n g to have such
par tic ul a r fact finally det e r m i n e d . If a judicial
dec r e e decl ari n g a perso n pres u m p t i v ely dea d,
bec a u s e he had not been hea r d from in seven
year s, cannot beco m e final and exec ut o r y even
after the lapse of the regle m e n t a r y period within
which an appe al may be take n, for such
pre s u m p t i o n is still dispu t a bl e and rem ai n s
subjec t to cont r a r y proof, the n a petition for such
a declar a ti o n is usel ess, unne c e s s a r y ,
supe rfl uo u s and of no benefit to the petition e r. 1 5
In Lukba n v. Repu blic,16 petition e r Lourd e s G.
Lukba n cont r a c t e d mar ri a g e with Fra nci s co
Chuidia n on Dece m b e r 10, 1933. A few days
later, on Dece m b e r 27, Fran ci s co left Lourd e s
after a violent qua r r e l. She did not hea r from him
after that day. Her dilige nt sea r c h, inqui rie s
from his pare n t s and friends, and sea rc h in his
last known addr e s s , prove d futile. Believing her
husb a n d was alre a d y dea d since he had been
abse n t for more than twe nt y year s, petition e r
filed a petition in 1956 for a decla r a t io n that she
is a widow of her husb a n d who is pres u m e d to be
dea d and has no legal impedi m e n t to cont r a c t a
subs e q u e n t mar ri a g e . On the othe r hand, the
ant e c e d e n t s in Gue v. Repu blic1 7 are simila r to
Szat r a w . On Janua ry 5, 1946, Angelina Gue’s
husb a n d left Manila whe r e they were residing
and went to Sha n g h a i, China. From that day on,
he had not bee n hea r d of, had not writt e n to her,
nor in anyway com m u ni c a t e d with her as to his
whe r e a b o u t s. Despit e her effort s and dilige nc e ,
she failed to locat e him. After 11 years, she
aske d the court for a declar a ti o n of the
pre s u m p t i o n of deat h of Willian Gue, purs u a n t to
the provisions of Article 390 of the Civil Code of
the Philippi n e s.
In both case s, the Court reite r a t e d its ruling in
Szat r a w . It held that a petition for judicial
decla r a t i o n that petition e r ' s husb a n d is
pre s u m e d to be dea d canno t be ent e r t a i n e d
bec a u s e it is not aut ho riz e d by law.18
From the foregoi n g, it can be glea n e d that,
und e r the Civil Code, the pre su m p t i o n of deat h is
est a blis h e d by law19 and no court decla r a t i o n is
nee d e d for the pre s u m p t i o n to arise. Since dea t h
is pres u m e d to have take n place by the seve n t h
year of abse n c e , 2 0 Sofio is to be pres u m e d dea d
sta rti n g Octob e r 1982.
Conse q u e n t l y, at the time of petition e r’s
mar ri a g e to Virgilio, ther e exist e d no
impe di m e n t to petition e r’s capa city to mar ry,
and the mar ri a g e is valid unde r par a g r a p h 2 of
Article 83 of the Civil Code.
Furt h e r , consid e ri n g that it is the Civil Code that
applies, proof of "well- found e d belief" is not
requi r e d . Petition e r could not have bee n
expe c t e d to comply with this requi r e m e n t since
the Family Code was not yet in effect at the time
of her mar ri a g e to Virgilio. The ena c t m e n t of the
Family Code in 1988 does not chan g e this
conclusion. The Family Code itself stat e s:
Art. 256. This Code shall have ret ro a c t ive effect
insofar as it does not prejudi c e or impair veste d
or acquir e d right s in accor d a n c e with the Civil
Code or othe r laws.
To ret ro a c t ively apply the provisions of the
Family Code req ui ri n g petition e r to exhibit "well-
found e d belief" will, ultim a t e ly, result in the
invalida tio n of her secon d mar ri a g e , which was
valid at the time it was celeb r a t e d . Such a
situati on would be unt e n a b l e and would go
again s t the objective s that the Family Code
wishe s to achieve.
In sum, we hold that the Petition must be
dismiss e d since no dec r e e on the pres u m p t i o n of
Sofio’s dea t h can be gra n t e d und e r the Civil
Code, the sam e pre su m p t i o n having arise n by
oper a ti o n of law. Howeve r, we decl a r e that
petition e r was capa ci t a t e d to mar ry Virgilio at
the time thei r mar ri a g e was celeb r a t e d in 1985
and, ther efo r e , the said mar ri a g e is legal and
valid.
WHERE FOR E, the foregoi n g pre m is e s
conside r e d , the Petition is DENIED.
EFFECTS OF PEN DI N G ACTION/ D EC REE
Rul e on de c l a r a t i o n of abs o l u t e nulli ty of
void marri a g e s and ann u l m e n t of void a b l e
marri a g e s
Art 49- 54 FC
YU VS. YU
G.R. No. 16 4 9 1 5 Marc h 10, 20 0 6
ERIC JONATHA N YU, Peti t i o n e r ,
vs.
CAROLINE T. YU, Res p o n d e n t .
DE C IS IO N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
On Janua r y 11, 2002, Eric Jonat h a n Yu
(petition e r ) filed a petition for hab e a s corp u s
befor e the Cour t of Appe als allegin g that his
est r a n g e d wife Caroline Tanc h ay- Yu
(respo n d e n t ) unlawfully withh el d from him the
custody of their minor child Bianc a. The petition,
which includ e d a praye r for the awa r d to him of
the sole custody of Bianc a, was docke t e d as CA-
G.R. SP No. 6846 0.
Subs e q u e n t ly or on Marc h 3, 2002, respo n d e n t
filed a petition again st petition e r befor e the
Pasig Regional Trial Cour t (RTC) for decla r a t i o n
of nullity of mar ri a g e and dissolution of the
absol ut e com m u ni ty of prop e r t y. The petition
includ e d a praye r for the awa r d to her of the sole
custody of Bianc a and for the fixing of sche d ul e
of petition e r’s visiting right s "subjec t only to the
final and execut o r y judg m e n t of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 68460."
In the mea n ti m e , the app ella t e court, by
Resolution of Marc h 21, 2002, awa r d e d
petition e r full custody of Bianca durin g the
pend e n c y of the habe a s corpu s case, with full
visitation right s of respo n d e n t .
Petition e r and respo n d e n t late r filed on April 5,
2002 befor e the app ell at e court a Joint Motion to
Approve Interi m Visitation Agree m e n t which
was, by Resolution of April 24, 2002, appr ov e d .
On April 18, 2002, respo n d e n t filed befor e the
app ellat e cour t a Motion for the Modificatio n of
her visiting right s unde r the Inte ri m Visitation
Agree m e n t . To the Motion, petition e r filed an
Opposition with Motion to Cite Respo n d e n t for
Cont e m p t of Court in light of her filing of the
petition for decla r a t i o n of nullity of marri a g e
befor e the Pasig RTC which, so he cont e n d e d ,
constit u t e d foru m shoppi n g.
By Resolution of July 5, 2002, the appell a t e court
orde r e d respo n d e n t and her couns el to make the
nece s s a r y ame n d m e n t in her petition for
decla r a t i o n of nullity of mar ri a g e befor e the
Pasig City RTC in so far as the custody aspe c t is
conce r n e d , unde r pain of cont e m p t .
In compli a n c e with the appella t e cour t’s
Resolution of July 5, 2002, respo n d e n t filed a
Motion to Admit Amend e d Petition befor e the
Pasig RTC. She, howeve r, later filed in Dece m b e r
2002 a Motion to Dismiss her petition, withou t
preju dic e , on the groun d that since she sta rt e d
residi ng and condu c t i n g busin e s s at her new
add r e s s at Pasay City, const r a i n t s on resou r c e s
and her very busy sche d ul e rend e r e d her una ble
to devot e the nece s s a r y time and att e n ti o n to the
petition. The Pasig RTC gran t e d respo n d e n t’s
motion and accor di n gly dismiss e d the petition
without prejudic e, by Orde r of Marc h 28, 2003.
On June 12, 2003, petition e r filed his own
petition for decla r a t i o n of nullity of marri a g e and
dissolution of the absolut e com m u ni ty of
prope r t y before the Pasig RTC, docket e d as
JDRC Case No. 6190, with praye r for the awa r d
to him of the sole custody of Bianc a, subjec t to
the final resolutio n by the appella t e court of his
petition for hab e a s corp u s.
The app ellat e cour t event u ally dismiss e d the
habe a s corpu s petition, by Resolution of July 3,
2003, for having beco m e moot and aca d e m i c,
"the rest r a i n t on the liber ty of the perso n allege d
to be in rest r ai n t [having bee n] lifted."
In the mea n ti m e , respo n d e n t filed on July 24,
2003 befor e the Pasay RTC a petition for habe a s
corpu s, which she deno mi n a t e d as "Amend e d
Petition," praying for, amon g othe r thing s, the
awa r d of the sole custo dy to her of Bianc a or, in
the alte r n a t ive, pendi n g the hea ri n g of the
petition, the issua n c e of an orde r "replic a tin g
and reit e r a t i n g the enforc e a b ility of the Interi m
Visiting Agre e m e n t " which was approv e d by the
app ellat e cour t. The petition was docket e d as SP
Proc. No. 03- 0048.
Not to be outdon e , petition e r filed on July 25,
2003 befor e the Pasig RTC in his petition for
decla r a t i o n of nullity of mar ri a g e an urge n t
motion prayin g for the custody of Bianc a for the
dur a tio n of the case.
Acting on respo n d e n t’s petition, Branc h 113 of
the Pasay RTC issue d a Writ of Habe a s Corp u s, a
Hold Depa r t u r e Orde r and Sum m o n s addr e s s e d
to petition e r , drawi n g petition e r to file a motion
to dismiss the petition on the groun d of lack of
jurisdic tion, failur e to stat e a caus e of action,
foru m shop pi n g and litis pend e n t i a, he citing the
pendi n g petition for declar a ti o n of nullity of
mar ri a g e which he filed befor e the Pasig RTC.
The Pasay RTC, in the me a n ti m e , issue d an
Orde r of August 12, 2003 decla ri n g that pendi n g
the disposi tion of respo n d e n t’ s petition, Bianc a
shoul d stay with petition e r from Sund ay
after n o o n to Sat u r d a y morni n g and "with the
comp a ny of her moth e r from Satu r d a y 1:00 in
the after n o o n up to Sund ay 1:00 in the
after n o o n ." To this Orde r, petition e r filed a
Motion for Reconsi d e r a t i o n, arg ui n g that the
Pasay RTC did not have jurisdiction to issue the
sam e. He likewise filed a Manifest a t i o n of August
14, 2003 statin g that he was const r ai n e d to
submi t to the said cour t’s orde r but with the
rese rv a ti o n that he was not submi t ti n g the issue
of custody and himself to its jurisdiction.
Respon d e n t soon filed her Answe r with Count e r-
Petition on the nullity case befor e the Pasig RTC
whe r ei n she also praye d for the awa r d of the sole
custody to her of Bianc a, subjec t to the final
disposition of the habe a s corp u s petition which
she filed befor e the Pasay RTC.
By Omnibu s Orde r of Octob e r 30, 2003, the
Pasig RTC asse r t e d its jurisdiction over the
custody aspe c t of the petition filed by petition e r
and direc t e d the parti es to comply with the
provision s of the Interi m Visitation Agree m e n t ,
unless they agr e e d to a new bilat e r al agr e e m e n t
bea ri n g the appr ov al of the court; and gran t e d
custody of Bianc a to petition e r for the dura tion
of the case.
The Pasay RTC in the mea n ti m e denie d, by Orde r
of Nove m b e r 27, 2003, petition e r’s motion to
dismiss. The court , citing Som bo n g v. Court of
Appeals,1 held that in custody cases involving
minor s, the question of illegal and involunt a r y
rest r ai n t of liberty is not the unde rlyin g ration al e
for the availa bility of a writ of hab e a s corp u s as a
rem e d y; rat h e r , a writ of habe a s corpu s is
pros e c u t e d for the purpos e of det e r m i ni n g the
right of custody over the child.2 And it furth e r
held that the filing befor e it of the hab e a s corp u s
case by respo n d e n t , who is a resid e n t of Pasay, is
well within the ambit of the provision s of A.M.
No. 03- 04- 04- SC.3
On the issue of forum shoppi n g, the Pasay RTC
held that it is petition e r , not respo n d e n t , who
com mit t e d foru m shop pin g, he having filed (on
June 12, 2003) the petition for decla r a t i o n of
nullity of mar ri a g e befor e the Pasig RTC while
his petition for habe a s corpu s befor e the Court of
Appeals was still pendi n g. 4
The Pasay RTC held that assu m i n g argu e n d o that
petition e r’s filing befor e the Pasig RTC of the
decla r a t i o n of nullity of mar ri a g e case did not
constit u t e foru m shoppi n g, it (the Pasay RTC)
acqui r e d jurisdiction over the custody issue
ahe a d of the Pasig RTC, petition e r not having
am e n d e d his petition before the Pasig RTC as
soon as the Court of Appeals dismiss e d his
petition for hab e a s corp u s 5 (on July 3, 2003).
Finally, the Pasay RTC held that the r e was no
litis pend e n t i a beca u s e two elem e n t s the r e of are
lacking, nam ely, 1) identity of the right s asse r t e d
and reliefs praye d for, the relief being found e d
on the sam e facts, and 2) identity with resp e c t to
the two prec e di n g partic ul a r s in the two case s
such that any judgm e n t that may be ren d e r e d in
the pendin g case, rega r dl e s s of which party is
succe s sf ul, would amou n t to res judicat a in the
othe r case.6
Petition e r the r e u p o n assaile d the Pasay RTC’s
denial of his Motion to Dismiss via Petition for
Certior a ri, Prohibition and Mand a m u s befor e the
app ellat e cour t whe r ei n he raise d the following
issue s:
A. RESPONDE NT JUDGE COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION BY DENYING
PETITIONER’S MOTION TO DISMIS S DESPITE
THE EVIDENT LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER
THE SUBJECT MATTER OF CUSTODY, LITIS
PENDE NTIA, AND DELIBERATE AND WILLFUL
FORUM- SHOP PING ON THE PART OF
RESPOND E NT CAROLINE T. YU.7
B. RESPOND E N T JUDGE ACTED
WHIMSICALLY, CAPRICIOUSLY AND
ARBITRARILY IN ISSUING THE AUGUST 12,
2003 ORDER GRANTING RESPOND E NT
CAROLINE T. YU OVERNIGHT VISITATION
RIGHTS OVER THE MINOR CHILD BIANCA
AND DENYING PETITIONER’S URGENT
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE
SAID ORDER.8 (Unde r s c o r i n g supplie d)
By Decision of August 10, 2004,9 the app ell at e
court deni e d petition e r’s petition, it holding that
the assu m p t i o n of jurisdiction by the Pasay RTC
over the habe a s corpu s case does not constit u t e
grave abuse of discr e ti on; the filing by
respo n d e n t before the Pasay RTC of a petition
for habe a s corp u s could not be conside r e d foru m
shoppi n g in the strict e s t sens e of the word as
befor e she filed it after petition e r’s petition for
habe a s corpu s filed befor e the appell at e court
was dismiss e d; and it was petition e r who
com mit t e d foru m shop pin g whe n he filed the
decla r a t i o n of nullity of mar ri a g e case while his
habe a s corpu s petition was still pendi n g befor e
the app ell at e court.
In fine, the appella t e cour t held that since
respo n d e n t filed the petition for decla r a t io n of
nullity of mar ri a g e befor e the Pasig RTC during
the pend e n c y of the hab e a s corpu s case he filed
befor e the app ell at e court, whe r e a s respo n d e n t
filed the hab e a s corp u s petition before the Pasay
RTC on July 24, 2003 afte r the dismiss al on July
3, 2003 by the appell a t e court of petition e r’s
habe a s corpu s case, jurisdiction over the issue
custody of Bianc a did not att a c h to the Pasig
RTC.
As for the question e d orde r of the Pasay RTC
which modified the Interi m Visiting Agree m e n t ,
the app ell at e court, noting that the prop e r
rem e d y for the custo dy of Bianc a was filed with
the Pasay RTC, held that said cour t had the
aut ho ri ty to issue the sam e.
Henc e, the pre s e n t petition filed by petition e r
faulting the appell a t e court for
I. . . . DECLARING THAT PETITIONER ERIC YU
COMMITTED FORUM- SHOP PING IN FILLING
THE PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF
NULLITY OF MARRIAGE WITH PRAYER FOR
CUSTODY BEFORE THE PASIG FAMILY COURT
AND THAT THE LATTER COURT WAS BARRED
FROM ACQUIRING JURISDICTION OVER THE
CUSTODY ASPECT OF THE NULLITY CASE IN
RECKLES S DISREGARD OF THE PRINCIPLE
THAT THE FILING OF A PETITION FOR
NULLITY OF MARRIAGE BEFORE THE FAMILY
COURTS VESTS THE LATTER WITH
EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION TO DETERMIN E
THE NECES SARY ISSUE OF CUSTODY.
II. . . . APPL[YING] THE LAW OF THE CASE
DOCTRINE BY RULING THAT THE PASIG
FAMILY COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER
THE CUSTODY ASPECT OF THE NULLITY CASE
ON THE BASIS OF THE JULY 5, 2002
RESOLUTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IN
CA GR SP NO. 68460 WHEN THE SAID
RESOLUTION CLEARLY APPLIES ONLY TO THE
NULLITY CASE FILED BY PRIVATE
RESPOND E NT ON MARCH 7, 2002 DOCKETED
AS JDRC CASE NO. 5745 AND NOT TO HEREIN
PETITIONER’S JUNE 12, 2003 PETITION FOR
NULLITY DOCKETED AS JDRC CASE NO. 6190.
III. . . . DECLARING THAT THE PASIG FAMILY
COURT MUST YIELD TO THE JURISDICTION
OF THE PASAY COURT INSOFAR AS THE
ISSUE OF CUSTODY IS CONCER N ED IN GRAVE
VIOLATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL
STABILITY AND NON- INTERFER E N C E .
IV. . . . RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPO ND E NT
CAROLINE DID NOT COMMIT FORUM-
SHOPING IN FILING THE HABEAS CORPUS
CASE WITH PRAYER FOR CUSTODY BEFORE
THE RESPO ND E NT PASAY COURT DESPITE
THE FACT THAT AN EARLIER FILED PETITION
FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE WITH PRAYER FOR CUSTODY IS
STILL PENDING BEFORE THE PASIG FAMILY
COURT WHEN THE FORMER CASE WAS
INSTITUTED.
V. . . . RULING THAT RESPONDE NT CAROLINE
YU DID NOT SUBMIT TO THE JURISDICTION
OF THE PASIG FAMILY COURT BASED ON AN
ERRONEO U S FACTUAL FINDING THAT SHE
FILED ON AUGUST 25, 2003 AN OMNIBUS
OPPOSITION IN PETITIONER’S ACTION FOR
NULLITY BEFORE THE PASIG COURT.10
(Und e r s c o ri n g supplie d)
The petition is impr e s s e d with merit.
The main issue raise d in the pres e n t petition is
whet h e r the ques tio n of custo dy over Bianc a
shoul d be litigat e d befor e the Pasay RTC or
befor e the Pasig RTC.
Judg m e n t on the issue of custody in the nullity of
mar ri a g e case befor e the Pasig RTC, reg a r dl e s s
of which party would prevail, would constit u t e
res judica t a on the hab e a s corp u s case befor e
the Pasay RTC since the form e r has jurisdiction
over the parti e s and the subjec t matt e r .
Ther e is identity in the caus e s of action in Pasig
and Pasay beca u s e ther e is identi ty in the facts
and evide nc e esse n t i al to the resol ution of the
identic al issue raise d in both actions 1 1 –
whet h e r it would serve the best inte r e s t of
Bianc a to be in the custody of petition e r rat h e r
than respo n d e n t or vice vers a.
Since the grou n d invoked in the petition for
decla r a t i o n of nullity of mar ri a g e befor e the
Pasig RTC is respo n d e n t’s allege d psychologic al
incap a ci ty to perfor m her esse n t i al marit al
obliga tion s 1 2 as provide d in Article 36 of the
Family Code, the evide n c e to suppo r t this caus e
of action nece s s a r ily involves evide nc e of
respo n d e n t’s fitness to take custody of Bianc a.
Thus, the elem e n t s of litis pend e n t i a, to wit: a)
identity of parti e s, or at least such as
repr e s e n t i n g the sam e inter e s t in both action s;
b) identi ty of right s asse r t e d and reliefs praye d
for, the relief being found e d on the sam e facts;
and c) the identity in the two case s should be
such that the judgm e n t that may be rend e r e d in
the pendin g case would, rega r dl e s s of which
par ty is succe s sful, amou n t to res judica t a in the
othe r,1 3 are pres e n t .
Respon d e n t arg u e s in her Com m e n t to the
petition at bar that the Pasig RTC neve r acqui r e d
jurisdic tion over the custody issue raise d the r ei n.
"[T]he subse q u e n t dismissal of the habe a s corp u s
petition by the Court of Appe al s on 3 July 2003
could not have the effect of confer ri n g
jurisdic tion over the issue on the Pasig cour t. For
the Pasig cour t to acquir e jurisdiction over the
custody issue after the dismiss al of the habe a s
corpu s petition befor e the Court of Appeals, the
rule is that petition e r must furnish the occasion
for the acquisition of jurisdic tion by reple a di n g
his caus e of action for custo dy and invoking said
caus e anew."14 (Emp h a si s and unde r s c o ri n g
supplied)
And respo n d e n t cites Calua g v. Pecson,1 5
whe r ei n this Court held:
Jurisdic tion of the subjec t mat t e r of a parti cul a r
case is som e t hi n g more than the gene r al powe r
confer r e d by law upon a cour t to take cogniza n c e
of case s of the gen e r al class to which the
par tic ul a r case belon g s. It is not enoug h that a
court has powe r in abst r a c t to try and decide the
class litiga tion s [sic] to which a case belon gs; it
is nece s s a r y that said powe r be prop e rly
invoke d, or called into activity, by the filing of a
petition, or com pl ai nt or othe r app ro p ri a t e
plea din g. (Unde r s c o ri n g suppli ed by Caroline.)1 6
Specific provisions of law gove r n the case at bar,
howeve r. Thus Articles 49 and 50 of the Family
Code provide:
Art. 49. During the pend e n c y of the action [for
annul m e n t or decla r a t i o n of nullity of mar ri a g e ]
and in the abse n c e of adeq u a t e provisions in a
writt e n agr e e m e n t bet w e e n the spous e s, the
Court shall provide for the suppo r t of the
spous e s and the custody and suppo r t of thei r
com m o n childr e n. x x x It shall also provide for
app ro p r i a t e visita tion right s of the othe r par e n t .
(Emp h a si s and unde r s c o ri n g supplie d) 1 7
Art. 50. x x x x
The final judg m e n t in such case s [for the
annul m e n t or decla r a t i o n of nullity of mar ri a g e ]
shall provide for the liquida ti on, partition and
distri b u ti o n of the prop e r t i e s of the spouse s , the
custody and suppo r t of the com m o n childr e n,
and the delivery of their pres u m p t iv e legitim e s,
unless such othe r matt e r s had bee n adjudic a t e d
in previous judicial proc e e di n g s." (Emph a si s and
und e r s c o ri n g add e d)
By petition e r’s filing of the case for decla r a t i o n
of nullity of mar ri a g e befor e the Pasig RTC he
auto m a t i c a lly sub mit t e d the issue of the custo dy
of Bianc a as an incide n t the r e of. After the
app ellat e cour t subs e q u e n t l y dismiss e d the
habe a s corpu s case, the r e was no nee d for
petition e r to repl e a d his praye r for custo dy for,
as above- quot e d provisions of the Family Code
provide, the custody issue in a decl a r a t io n of
nullity case is dee m e d plea d e d. That that is so
gains light from Section 21 of the "Rule on
Decla r a t i o n Of Absolut e Nullity Of Void
Mar ri a g e s and Annulm e n t of Voidabl e
Mar ri a g e s" 1 8 which provide s:
Sec. 21. Liquida tio n, partition and distri b u tio n,
custody, suppo r t of com m o n childr e n and
delivery of their pres u m p t iv e legitim e s.–Upo n
ent ry of the judg m e n t gra n ti n g the petition, or,
in case of appe al, upon recei pt of the ent ry of
judg m e n t of the appella t e cour t gra n ti n g the
petition, the Family Cour t, on motion of eithe r
par ty, shall proc e e d with the liquida tion,
par tition and distrib u ti o n of the prop e r t i e s of the
spous e s, includi n g custo dy, suppo r t of com m o n
childr e n and delivery of their pres u m p t iv e
legiti m e s pur su a n t to Articles 50 and 51 of the
Family Code unless such matt e r s had bee n
adjudica t e d in previous judicial proce e di n g s.
(Emp h a si s and unde r s c o ri n g supplie d)
Since this imm e di a t el y- quot e d provision direct s
the court taking jurisdiction over a petition for
decla r a t i o n of nullity of mar ri a g e to resolve the
custody of com m o n childr e n, by mer e motion of
eithe r party, it could only mea n that the filing of
a new action is not nece s s a r y for the court to
conside r the issue of custody of a minor.1 9
The only explicit excep tio n to the earlie r- quot e d
secon d para g r a p h of Art. 50 of the Family Code
is whe n "such matt e r s had been adjudic a t e d in
previous judicial proce e di n g s ," which is not the
case here.
The elem e n t s of litis pend e n t i a having bee n
est a blis h e d , the more appro p r i a t e action
crite rion guide s this Court in deciding which of
the two pendin g actions to abat e . 2 0
The petition filed by petition e r for the
decla r a t i o n of nullity of mar ri a g e befor e the
Pasig RTC is the more app ro p ri a t e action to
det e r m i n e the issue of who betw e e n the par ti e s
shoul d have custo dy over Bianc a in view of the
expr e s s provision of the secon d par a g r a p h of
Article 50 of the Family Code. This must be so in
line with the policy of avoiding multiplicity of
suits.2 1
The app ellat e cour t thus erron e o u s ly applie d the
law of the case doct ri n e when it ruled that in its
July 5, 2002 Resolution that the pend e n c y of the
habe a s corpu s petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 6846 0
preve n t e d the Pasig RTC from acqui rin g
jurisdic tion over the custody aspe c t of
petition e r’s petition for decla r a t i o n of nullity.
The factu al circu m s t a n c e s of the case refele c t e d
above do not justify the applica tion of the law of
the case doct ri n e which has bee n define d as
follows:
Law of the case has bee n define d as the opinion
deliver e d on a form e r appe al. It is a ter m applied
to an est a blish e d rule that when an appellat e
court pass e s on a question and rem a n d s the case
to the lower court for furt h e r proce e di n g s , the
ques tio n ther e settle d beco m e s the law of the
case upon subs e q u e n t app e al. It mea n s that
wha t e v e r is once irrevoc a bly est a blish e d as the
cont r olling legal rule or decision bet w e e n the
sam e par ti e s in the sam e case conti nu e s to be
the law of the case, whet h e r corr e c t on gene r al
principle s or not, so long as the facts on which
such decision was pre di c a t e d conti nu e to be the
facts of the case befor e the cour t." (Emp h a si s
and unde r s c o ri n g supplied, italics in the
original)22
WHERE FOR E, the petition is GRANTED. The
August 10, 2004 decision of the Cour t of Appeal s
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE,an d anot h e r is
ent e r e d DISMIS SI NG Pasay City Region al Trial
Court Sp. Proc. No. 03- 0048- CFM and orde ri n g
Branc h 69 of Pasig City Region al Trial Cour t to
continu e , with dispa t c h , the proce e di n g s in JDRC
No. 6190.
TUASO N VS. CA
G.R. No. 11 6 6 0 7 April 10, 19 9 6
EMILIO R. TUASO N , peti t i o n e r ,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA VICTORIA
L. TUASO N , resp o n d e n t s .
PUNO, J.:
This petition for review on certior a ri seeks to
annul and set aside the decision dat e d July 29,
1994 of the Cour t of Appe als in CA-G.R. CV No.
37925 denying petition e r ' s app e al from an orde r
of the Region al Trial Court, Branc h 149, Maka ti
in Civil Case No. 3769.
This case aros e from the following facts:
In 1989, privat e respo n d e n t Mari a Victoria Lopez
Tuaso n filed with the Region al Trial Court,
Branc h 149, Maka ti a petition for annul m e n t or
decla r a t i o n of nullity of her mar ri a g e to
petition e r Emilio R. Tuaso n. In her compl ai nt ,
privat e respo n d e n t allege d that she and
petition e r wer e mar ri e d on June 3, 1972 and
from this union, begot two childr e n; that at the
time of the marri a g e , petition e r was alre a dy
psychologic ally incap a ci t a t e d to comply with his
esse n ti al marit al obligatio n s which beca m e
manifes t after w a r d and result e d in violent fight s
betw e e n husb a n d and wife; that in one of their
fights, petition e r inflict ed physic al injuries on
privat e respo n d e n t which impelle d her to file a
criminal case for physical injuri es agains t him;
that petition e r use d prohi bit e d drugs, was
app r e h e n d e d by the autho ri ti e s and sent e n c e d to
a one- year susp e n d e d pen alty and has not bee n
reha bilit a t e d; that petition e r was a woma niz e r ,
and in 1984, he left the conjug al hom e and
coha bi t e d with thre e wom e n in succe s sio n, one
of whom he pres e n t e d to the public as his wife;
that after he left the conjug al dwelling,
petition e r gave minim al suppo r t to the family
and even refus e d to pay for the tuition fees of
their childr e n comp elling privat e respo n d e n t to
acce p t dona tio n s and dole- outs from her family
and friend s; that petition e r likewise beca m e a
spen d t h rift and abus e d his admi nist r a t i o n of the
conjug al par t n e r s h i p by aliena ti n g som e of thei r
asse t s and incur ri n g larg e obliga tion s with
banks, credit car d comp a ni e s and othe r financi al
instit ution s, without privat e respo n d e n t ' s
conse n t ; that att e m p t s at recon ciliatio n wer e
made but they all failed bec a u s e of petition e r ' s
refusal to refor m . In addition to her praye r for
annul m e n t of mar ri a g e , privat e respo n d e n t
praye d for powe r s of administ r a t i o n to save the
conjug al prop e r t i e s from furth e r dissipa ti on. 1
Petition e r answ e r e d denying the imput a t io n s
again s t him. As affirm a t ive defen s e , he claime d
that he and privat e respo n d e n t wer e a norm al
mar ri e d coupl e duri ng the first ten years of their
mar ri a g e and actu ally begot two childr e n during
this period; that it was only in 1982 that they
beg a n to have serious perso n a l differ e n c e s whe n
his wife did not accor d the resp e c t and dignity
due him as a husb a n d but tre a t e d him like a
per so n a non gra t a; that due to the "extre m e
anim ositie s " betw e e n the m , he tem po r a r ily left
the conjug al hom e for a "cooling- off period" in
1984; that it is privat e respo n d e n t who had been
taking prohi bit e d drug s and had a seriou s affair
with anot h e r man; that petition e r ' s work as
owne r and oper a t o r of a radio and television
station expose d him to malicious gossip linking
him to various wom e n in medi a and the
ent e r t a i n m e n t world; and that since 1984, he
expe ri e n c e d financi al reve r s e s in his busin e s s
and was comp elle d, with the knowle d g e of his
wife, to dispos e of som e of the conjug al sha r e s in
exclusive golf and count ry clubs. Petition e r
petition e d the court to allow him to ret u r n to the
conjug al hom e and contin u e his admi nist r a t io n of
the conjug al part n e r s h i p .
After the issue s wer e joined, trial com m e n c e d on
Marc h 30, 1990. Privat e respo n d e n t pres e n t e d
four witne s s e s, nam ely, hers elf; Dr. Sam u el
Wiley, a Canon Law exper t and mar ri a g e
couns elo r of both privat e respo n d e n t and
petition e r; Ms. Adelita Priet o, a close friend of
the spous e s , and Atty. Jose F. Racel a IV, privat e
respo n d e n t ' s couns el. Privat e respo n d e n t
likewise submi t t e d docu m e n t a r y evide n c e
consisti n g of newsp a p e r articles of her husb a n d ' s
relation s hi p with othe r wom e n, his app r e h e n s i o n
by the aut ho ri ti e s for illegal posse s sio n of drug s;
and copies of a prior a churc h annul m e n t
dec r e e. 2 The par ti e s' mar ri a g e was cleric ally
annulle d by the Tribu n al Met ro polit a n u m
Mat ri m o ni al which was affirm e d by the Nation al
Appellat e Mat ri m o ni al Tribun al in 1986.3
During pre se n t a t i o n of privat e respo n d e n t ' s
evide n c e, petition e r , on April 18, 1990, filed his
Opposition to privat e respo n d e n t ' s petition for
appoint m e n t as administ r a t r ix of the conjug al
par t n e r s h i p of gains.
After privat e respo n d e n t rest e d her case, the
trial court sche d ul e d the rece p tio n of petition e r ' s
evide n c e on May 11, 1990.
On May 8, 1990, two days befor e the sche d ul e d
hea ri n g , a couns el for petition e r moved for a
post po n e m e n t on the grou n d that the princi pal
couns el was out of the count ry and due to retu r n
on the first week of June.4 The cour t gra n t e d the
motion and rese t the hea ri n g to June 8, 1990.5
On June 8, 1990, petition e r failed to appe a r . On
oral motion of privat e respo n d e n t , the cour t
decla r e d petition e r to have waived his right to
pre s e n t eviden c e and dee m e d the case sub mit t e d
for decision on the basis of the evide n c e
pre s e n t e d .
On June 29, 1990, the trial cour t rend e r e d
judg m e n t decla ri n g the nullity of privat e
respo n d e n t ' s mar ri a g e to petition e r and
awa r di n g cust ody of the childr e n to privat e
respo n d e n t . The court ruled:
WHERE FOR E, in view of the foregoi n g, the
mar ri a g e cont r a c t e d by Ma. Victoria L. Tuason
and Emilio R. Tuason on June 3, 1972 is decla r e d
null and void ab initio on the grou n d of
psychologic al incap a ci ty on the part of the
defe n d a n t unde r Sec. 36 of the Family Code. Let
her ei n judg m e n t of ann ul m e n t be recor d e d in the
regist ry of Mand al uyo n g , Metro Manila whe r e
the mar ri a g e was contr a c t e d and in the regist ry
of Maka ti, Met r o Manila wher e the marri a g e is
annulle d.
The custody of the two (2) legitim a t e childr e n of
the plaintiff and the defe n d a n t is her e by
awa r d e d to the plaintiff.
The foregoin g judg m e n t is withou t preju dic e to
the applica tion of the othe r effect s of ann ul m e n t
as provide d for unde r Arts . 50 and 51 of the
Family Code of the Philippine s. 6
Couns el for petition e r received a copy of this
decision on August 24, 1990. No app e al was
take n from the decision.
On Sept e m b e r 24, 1990, privat e respo n d e n t filed
a "Motion for Dissolution of Conjug al Part n e r s hi p
of Gains and Adjudica tio n to Plaintiff of the
Conjug al Prope r t i e s." 7 Petition e r oppos e d the
motion on Octobe r 17, 1990.8
Also on the sam e day, Octob e r 17, 1990,
petition e r, throu g h new couns el, filed with the
trial court a petition for relief from judg m e n t of
the June 29, 1990 decision.
The trial court denie d the petition on August 8,
1991.9
Petition e r appe al e d before the Court of Appe als
the orde r of the trial court denyin g his petition
for relief from judg m e n t . On July 29, 1994, the
Court of Appeals dismiss e d the app e al and
affirm e d the orde r of the trial court. 10
Henc e this petition.
The thre s h ol d issue is whet h e r a petition for
relief from judgm e n t is warr a n t e d und e r the
circu m s t a n c e s of the case.
We rule in the neg a tive.
A petition for relief from judg m e n t is gover n e d
by Rule 38, Section 2 of the Revise d Rules of
Court which provide s:
Sec. 2. Petition to Court of First Insta n c e for
relief from judgm e n t or othe r proc e e di n g
ther e of. — When a judg m e n t or orde r is ente r e d ,
or any othe r proce e di n g is take n, agains t a par ty
in a Cour t of First Inst a n c e throu g h fraud,
accid e n t , mist ak e, or excus a bl e neglige n c e , he
may file a petition in such court and in the sam e
caus e praying that the judg m e n t , orde r or
proce e di n g be set aside.
Unde r the rules, a final and execu t o ry judgm e n t
or orde r of the Regional Trial Court may be set
aside on the grou n d of fraud, accid e n t , mista k e
or excus a bl e neglige n c e . In addition, the
petition e r must asse r t facts showi ng that he has
a good, subst a n t i al and merit orio u s defen s e or
caus e of action. 11 If the petition is gra n t e d , the
court shall proc e e d to hea r and det e r m i n e the
case as if a timely motion for new trial had bee n
gra n t e d the r ei n. 12
In the case at bar, the decision annulling
petition e r ' s mar ri a g e to privat e respo n d e n t had
alre a dy beco m e final and execu t o ry when
petition e r failed to appe a l during the
regl e m e n t a r y period. Petition e r howev e r claims
that the decision of the trial court was null and
void for violation of his right to due proce s s. He
cont e n d s he was deni e d due proce ss when, after
failing to appe a r on two sche d ul e d hea ri n g s, the
trial court dee m e d him to have waived his right
to pres e n t evide n c e and rend e r e d judg m e n t on
the basis of the evide n c e for privat e respo n d e n t .
Petition e r justifies his abse n c e at the hea ri n g s on
the grou n d that he was the n "confine d for
medical and/or reha bilit a tio n rea so n." 13 In his
affidavit of merit befor e the trial court, he
att a c h e d a certifica tio n by Lt. Col. Plaridel F.
Vidal, Direct o r of the Narco tics Com m a n d , Drug
Reha bilit a tio n Cent e r which stat e s that on Marc h
27, 1990 petition e r was admit t e d for trea t m e n t
of drug dep e n d e n c y at the Drug Reha bilit a tion
Cent e r at Cam p Bagon g Diwa, Bicut a n, Taguig,
Met ro Manila of the Philippin e Const a b ul a r y-
Inte g r a t e d Nation al Police. 14 The recor d s ,
howeve r, show that the form e r couns el of
petition e r did not inform the trial court of this
confine m e n t . And when the cour t rend e r e d its
decision, the sam e couns el was out of the
count ry for which rea so n the decision bec a m e
final and execut o r y as no appe al was take n
ther ef r o m . 15
The failure of petition e r ' s couns el to notify him
on time of the adve r s e judg m e n t to ena ble him to
app e al ther ef r o m is neglige n c e which is not
excus a bl e. Notice sent to couns el of recor d is
bindi ng upon the client and the neglec t or failure
of couns el to infor m him of an adver s e judg m e n t
resulti n g in the loss of his right to appe al is not a
groun d for setti ng aside a judgm e n t valid and
regul a r on its face. 16
Simila rly inexcus a bl e was the failure of his
form e r couns el to inform the trial cour t of
petition e r ' s confine m e n t and medical trea t m e n t
as the rea so n for his non- app e a r a n c e at the
sche d ul e d hea rin g s. Petition e r has not given any
reaso n why his form e r couns el, inten ti on ally or
unint e n ti o n a lly, did not infor m the court of this
fact. This led the trial court to orde r the case
dee m e d submi t t e d for decision on the basis of
the evide n c e pres e n t e d by the privat e
respo n d e n t alone. To compo u n d the neglige n c e
of petition e r ' s couns el, the orde r of the trial
court was neve r assaile d via a motion for
recon si d e r a t i o n .
Clearly, petition e r canno t now claim that he was
deprive d of due proc e s s. He may have lost his
right to pres e n t evide nc e but he was not denie d
his day in cour t. As the recor d show, petition e r ,
thro u g h couns el, actively partici p a t e d in the
proce e di n g s below. He filed his answ e r to the
petition, cross- exa mi n e d privat e respo n d e n t ' s
witne s s e s and even submi t t e d his opposition to
privat e respo n d e n t ' s motion for dissolution of the
conjug al par t n e r s h i p of gains. 17
A petition for relief from judg m e n t is an
equit a bl e rem e dy; it is allowe d only in excep tio n
case s whe r e the r e is no othe r availa bl e or
ade q u a t e rem e d y. When a par ty has anot h e r
rem e d y availa bl e or ade q u a t e rem e d y. When a
par ty has anot h e r rem e dy availabl e to him,
which may be eithe r a motion for new trial or
app e al from an adve r s e decision of the trial or
app e al from an adve r s e decision of the trial
court, and he was not preve n t e d by fraud,
accid e n t , mist ak e or excus a bl e neglige n c e from
filing such motion or taking such app e al, he
cannot avail himself of this petition. 18 Inde e d,
relief will not be gra n t e d to a party who seeks
avoida n c e from the effect s of the judg m e n t when
the loss of the rem e dy at law was due to his own
neglig e n c e ; othe r wi s e the petition for relief can
be use d to revive the right to appe al which had
bee n lost thru inexcus a bl e neglige n c e . 19
Petition e r also insist s that he has a valid and
merito ri ou s defe ns e . He cites the Family Code
which provides that in actions for ann ul m e n t of
mar ri a g e or legal sepa r a ti o n, the pros ec u t i n g
officer shoul d inte rv e n e for the stat e beca u s e the
law "looks with disfavor upon the haph a z a r d
decla r a t i o n of ann ul m e n t of mar ri a g e s by
defa ult." He cont e n d s that whe n he failed to
app e a r at the sche d ul e d hea ri n g s, the trial court
shoul d have orde r e d the pros e c u ti n g officer to
inte rve n e for the stat e and inqui r e as to the
reaso n for his non- app e a r a n c e . 20
Articles 48 and 60 of the Family Code rea d as
follows:
Art. 48. In all case s of ann ul m e n t or decla r a t i o n
of absolut e nullity of mar ri a g e , the Cour t shall
orde r the prose c u t io n attor n e y or fiscal assign e d
to it to appe a r on beh alf of the Stat e to take
steps to preve n t collusion bet w e e n the parti e s
and to take care that evide n c e is not fabrica t e d
or supp r e s s e d .
In the case s refer r e d to in the prec e di n g
par a g r a p h , no judg m e n t shall be base d upon a
stipul a tion of facts or confes sio n of judg m e n t .
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 60. No dec r e e of legal sepa r a t i o n shall be
base d upon a stipul a tion of facts or a confes sio n
of judg m e n t .
In any case, the Court shall orde r the
pros e c u ti n g attor n e y or fiscal assig n e d to it to
take step s to preve n t collusion bet w e e n the
par ti e s and to take car e that the evide n c e is not
fabric a t e d or supp r e s s e d . 21
A gran t of ann ul m e n t of mar ri a g e or legal
sepa r a t i o n by default is fraug h t with the dang e r
of collusion. 22 Henc e, in all case s for
annul m e n t , decla r a t i o n of nullity of mar ri a g e and
legal sepa r a t i o n, the pros e c u ti n g attor n e y or
fiscal is orde r e d to app e a r on beh alf of the stat e
for the pur pos e of preve n ti n g any collusion
betw e e n the parti e s and to take care that their
evide n c e is not fabric a t e d or supp r e s s e d . If the
defe n d a n t spous e fails to answ e r the complai n t,
the court canno t decla r e him or her in default
but inste a d , should orde r the pros e c u ti n g
attor n e y to det e r m i n e if collusion exists bet w e e n
the parti es.2 3 The prose c u t i n g attor n e y or fiscal
may oppose the applica tio n for legal sepa r a t i o n
or annul m e n t thro u g h the pre se n t a t i o n of his
own evide n c e , if in his opinion, the proof
add uc e d is dubiou s and fabric a t e d . 2 4 Our
Consti t u ti on is com mi t t e d to the policy of
stre n g t h e n i n g the family as a basic social
instit ution. 25 Our family law is base d on the
policy that mar ri a g e is not a mer e cont r a c t , but a
social instit ution in which the stat e is vitally
inte r e s t e d . The stat e can find no stron g e r anc ho r
than on good, solid and happy families. The
bre a k up of families weak e n s our social and
mor al fabric and, henc e, thei r pres e r v a ti o n is not
the conc e r n alone of the family me m b e r s .
The facts in the case at bar do not call for the
strict applica tion of Articles 48 and 60 of the
Family Code. For one, petition e r was not
decla r e d in defa ult by the trial court for failure
to answ e r . Petition e r filed his answ e r to the
compl ai n t and cont e s t e d the caus e of action
allege d by privat e respo n d e n t . He actively
par tici p a t e d in the proce e di n g s below by filing
sever al plea di n g s and cross- exa mi ni n g the
witne s s e s of privat e respo n d e n t . It is cryst al
clear that every stag e of the litigation was
cha r a c t e r i z e d by a no- holds bar r e d cont e s t and
not by collusion.
The role of the prose c u t i n g attor n e y or fiscal in
annul m e n t of mar ri a g e and legal sepa r a ti o n
proce e di n g s is to det e r m i n e whet h e r collusion
exists bet w e e n the parti e s and to take care that
the evide n c e is not supp r e s s e d or fabric a t e d .
Petition e r ' s vehe m e n t opposition to the
annul m e n t proc e e di n g s nega t e s the conclusion
that collusion existe d bet w e e n the par ti e s. There
is no alleg a tio n by the petition e r that evide n c e
was supp r e s s e d or fabric a t e d by any of the
par ti e s. Unde r thes e circu m s t a n c e s , we are
convinc e d that the non- inte rve n t io n of a
pros e c u ti n g attor n e y to assu r e lack of collusion
betw e e n the cont e n di n g par ti e s is not fatal to the
validity of the proce e di n g s in the trial cour t.
Petition e r also refut e s the testi m o ni e s of privat e
respo n d e n t ' s witne s s e s , partic ul a rly Dr. Sam u el
Wiley and Ms. Adelita Prieto, as biase d,
incre di bl e and hea r s a y. Petition e r alleg e s that if
he were able to pres e n t his evide n c e , he could
have testified that he was not psychologic ally
incap a ci t a t e d at the time of the mar ri a g e as
indicat e d by the fact that durin g their first ten
year s, he and privat e respo n d e n t lived toget h e r
with their childr e n as one nor m a l and happy
family, that he conti nu e d suppo r ti n g his family
even afte r he left the conjug al dwelling and that
his work as owne r and oper a t o r of a radio and
television corpo r a t i o n plac es him in the public
eye and make s him a good subjec t for malicious
gossip linking him with various wom e n. These
facts, accor di n g to petition e r , should disprov e
the grou n d for annul m e n t of his marri a g e to
petition e r.
Suffice it to stat e that the finding of the trial
court as to the exist e n c e or non- exist e n c e of
petition e r ' s psychologi c al inca p a ci t y at the tim e
of the mar ri a g e is final and bindin g on us. 26
Petition e r has not sufficien tly show n that the
trial court ' s factu al finding s and evalua tio n of the
testi m o ni e s of privat e respo n d e n t ' s witne ss e s
vis- a- vis petition e r ' s defen s e s are clearly and
manifes tly erron e o u s . 27
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is denie d and
the decision dat e d July 29, 1994 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 37925 is affirm e d .
Regal a d o, Rom e ro and Mendoz a, JJ., concu r.
LEGAL SEPARATIO N (GROU N D S )
G.R. No. 79 2 8 4 Nov e m b e r 27, 19 8 7
FROILAN C. GANDIO N CO , peti t i o n e r ,
vs.
HO N. SENE N C. PEÑARA N DA, as Pre s i d i n g
Judg e of the Re gi o n a l Trial Court of
Misa m i s Orie n t a l , Bran c h 18, Cagay a n de
Oro City, and TERE SITA S. GANDIO N CO ,
res p o n d e n t s .
PADILLA, J.:
A speci al civil action for certior a ri , with
applica tio n for injunctio n, to annul (1) the Orde r
of the respo n d e n t Judge, dat e d 10 Dece m b e r
1986, orde ri n g petition e r to pay suppo r t
pend e n t e lite to privat e respo n d e n t (his wife)
and their child, and (2) the Orde r of the sam e
respo n d e n t Judge, date d 5 August 1987, denying
petition e r ' s motion to suspe n d heari n g s in the
action for legal sepa r a t i o n filed agains t him by
privat e respo n d e n t as well as his motion to
inhibit respo n d e n t Judge from furt h e r hea ri n g
and trying the case.
On 29 May 1986, privat e respo n d e n t , the legal
wife of the petition e r , filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Misa mi s Orient al, 10t h Judicial
District, Branc h 18, in Cagay a n de Oro City,
pre si d e d over by respo n d e n t Judge, a compl ai n t
again s t petition e r for legal sepa r a ti o n, on the
groun d of concu bi n a g e , with a petition for
suppo r t and paym e n t of dam a g e s . This case was
docke t e d as Civil Case No. 10636. On 13 Octobe r
1986, privat e respo n d e n t also filed with the
Municip al Trial Cour t, Gene r al Sant os City, a
compl ai n t again s t petition e r for conc u bi n a g e ,
which was docke t e d on 23 Octobe r 1986 as
Criminal Case No. 1543 7 1 1 1 . On 14 Nove m b e r
1986, applica tio n for the provision al rem e dy of
suppo r t pend e n t e lite, pendi n g a decision in the
action for legal sepa r a t i o n, was filed by privat e
respo n d e n t in the civil case for legal sepa r a t i o n.
The respo n d e n t judge, as alre a d y stat e d, on 10
Dece m b e r 1986, orde r e d The paym e n t of suppo r t
pend e n t e lite.
In this recou r s e , petition e r cont e n d s that the
civil action for legal sepa r a t i o n and the incide n t s
conse q u e n t the r e t o, such as, applica tio n for
suppo r t pend e n t e lite, shoul d be susp e n d e d in
view of the criminal case for conc u bi n a g e filed
again s t him the privat e respo n d e n t . In suppo r t of
his cont e n t io n, petition e r cites Art. III. Sec. 3 of
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Proce d u r e , which
stat e s:
SEC. 3. Othe r Civil action arising from offens e s.
— Whenev e r the offend e d par ty shall have
instit ut e d the civil action to enforc e the civil
liability arising from the offense. as
cont e m pl a t e d in the first Section 1 her e of, the
following rules shall be observ e d :
(a) After a crimin al action has bee n com m e n c e d
the pendin g civil action arising from the sam e
offense shall be susp e n d e d , in what ev e r stag e it
may be found, until final judgm e n t in the
criminal proc e e di n g has bee n ren d e r e d . . . .
The civil action for legal sepa r a t i o n, grou n d e d as
it is on conc u bi n a g e , it is petition e r ' s position
that such civil action arise s from, or is
inext ric a bly tied to the crimin al action for
concu bi n a g e , so that all proc e e di n g s relat e d to
legal sepa r a t i o n will have to be susp e n d e d to
await conviction or acqui t t al for concu bi n a g e in
the crimin al case. Authority for this position is
this Court 's decision in the case of Jerus al e m vs.
Hon. Rober t o Zurb a n o. 1
Petition e r ' s cont e n t i o n is not corr e c t .
In Jerus al e m , the Court 's stat e m e n t to the effect
that susp e n si o n of an action for legal sepa r a t i o n
would be prope r if an allega tion of concu bi n a g e
is made ther ei n, relied solely on Sec. 1 of Rule
107 of the then provision s of the Rules of Court
on crimin al proc e d u r e , to wit:
Sec. 1. Rules gover ni n g civil actions arising from
offense s.- Except as othe r wi s e provide d by law,
the following rules shall he obse rv e d:
(a) When a crimin al action is instit ut e d , the civil
action for recove ry of civil liability arising from
the offens e char g e d is impliedly instit u t e d with
the crimin al action, unless the offend e d party
expr e s sly waives the civil action or rese rv e s his
right to institu t e it sepa r a t e l y;
(b) Criminal and civil actions arising from the
sam e offense may be instit u t e d sepa r a t e l y, but
after the crimin al action has bee n com m e n c e d
the civil action can not be instit ut e d until final
judg m e n t has been rend e r e d in the crimin al
action;
(c) After a crimin al action has been com m e n c e d ,
no civil action arising from the sam e offense can
be pros e c u t e d and the sam e shall be susp e n d e d
in what e v e r stag e it may be found until final
judg m e n t in the crimin al proce e di n g has bee n
rend e r e d ... (Emph a si s suppli ed)
The provision s last quot e d did not clearly stat e ,
as the 1985 Rules do, that the civil action to be
susp e n d e d , with or upon the filing of a criminal
action, is one which is "to enforc e the civil
liability arising from the offense". In othe r words,
in view of the ame n d m e n t unde r the 1985 Rules
on Crimin al Proce d u r e , a civil action for legal
sepa r a t i o n, base d on concu bi n a g e , may proc e e d
ahe a d of, or simult a n e o u s ly with, a criminal
action for concu bi n a g e , bec a u s e said civil action
is not one "to enforc e the civil liability arising
from the offens e" even if both the civil and
criminal actions arise from or are relat e d to the
sam e offense. Such civil action is one inten d e d to
obtai n the right to live sepa r a t e ly, with the legal
conse q u e n c e s ther e of, such as, the dissolution of
the conjug al part n e r s h i p of gains, custo dy of
offspri n g s, suppo r t , and disqu alifica tio n from
inhe riti n g from the innoc e n t spous e , amon g
othe r s. As corr e c tly point e d out by the
respo n d e n t Judge in his Orde r dat e d 5 August
1987:
The unr e p o r t e d case of JERUSALEM vs. Hon.
Robe r t o Zurb a n o, Judge of CFI of Antiqu e, et al.,
L-11935, April 24, 1959 (105 Phil. 1277) is not
cont r olling. It applied par a g r a p h C of Sec. 1, of
then Rule 107 of the Rules of Cour t, which rea d s:
After a criminal action has bee n com m e n c e d , no
civil action arising from the sam e offense can be
pros e c u t e d and the sam e shall be susp e n d e d , in
wha t e v e r sta g e it may be found, until final
judg m e n t in the crimin al proce e di n g has bee n
rend e r e d . (Emp h a si s supplie d)
The gover ni n g rule is now Sec. 3, Rule 111, 1985
Rules on Crimin al Proce d u r e which refe rs to
"civil actions to enforc e the civil liability arising
from the offens e" as cont e m p l a t e d in the first
par a g r a p h of Section 1 of Rule 111- which is a
civil action "for recove ry of civil liability arising
from the offens e char g e d ." Sec. 1, Rule 111,
(1985) is specific that it refer s to civil action for
the recove r y of civil liability arising from the
offense char g e d . Wher e a s, the old Sec. 1 (c),
Rule 107 simply refer r e d to "Civil action arising
from the offens e."
As earlier note d this action for legal sepa r a t i o n is
not to recove r civil liability, in the main, but is
aime d at the conjug al right s of the spous e s and
their relations to each other , within the
cont e m pl a t i o n of Articles 7 to 108, of the Civil
Code."2
Petition e r also arg u e s that his conviction for
concu bi n a g e will have to be first secur e d befor e
the action for legal sepa r a ti o n can prosp e r or
succe e d, as the basis of the action for legal
sepa r a t i o n is his alleg e d offens e of conc u bi n a g e .
Petition e r ' s assu m p t i o n is erron e o u s.
A decr e e of legal sepa r a t i o n, on the groun d of
concu bi n a g e , may be issue d upon proof by
pre po n d e r a n c e of evide n c e in the action for legal
sepa r a t i o n. 3 No crimin al proce e di n g or
conviction is nece s s a r y. To this end, the doct ri n e
in Fra n ci sc o vs. Tayao 4 has been modified, as
that case was decid e d und e r Act. No. 2710, when
absol ut e divorc e was then allowe d and had for
its grou n d s the sam e grou n d s for legal
sepa r a t i o n und e r the New Civil Code, with the
requi r e m e n t , unde r such form e r law, that the
guilt of defen d a n t spous e s had to be est a blish e d
by final judg m e n t in a crimin al action. That
requi r e m e n t has not bee n repr o d u c e d or adopt e d
by the fram e r s of the pres e n t Civil Code, and the
omission has bee n unifor mly acce p t e d as a
modificatio n of the string e n t rule in Fra n ci sc o v.
Tayao.5
Petition e r ' s att e m p t to resist paym e n t of suppo r t
pend e n t e lite to his wife must also fail, as we find
no proof of grave abus e of discr e tio n on the part
of the respo n d e n t Judge in orde ri n g the sam e.
Suppo r t pend e n t e lite, as a rem e d y, can be
availed of in an action for legal sepa r a ti o n, and
gra n t e d at the discr e tio n of the judg e. 6 If
petition e r finds the amou n t of suppo r t pend e n t e
lite orde r e d as too oner o u s, he can always file a
motion to modify or reduc e the sam e. 7
Petition e r lastly seeks to have the respo n d e n t
Judge disqu alified from hea rin g the case, as the
gra n t of suppo r t pend e n t e lite and the denial of
the motion to susp e n d hea ri n g s in the case, are
take n by the petition e r as a disre g a r d of
applica bl e laws and existing doct ri n e s , ther e b y
showin g the respo n d e n t Judge' s allege d manifes t
par ti ality to privat e respo n d e n t .
Petition e r ' s cont e n t i o n is withou t meri t.
Diverg e n c e of opinions betw e e n a judge hea ri n g
a case and a par ty's couns el, as to applic a bl e
laws and jurisp r u d e n c e , is not a sufficie nt
groun d to disqu alify the judge from hea ri n g the
case, on the grou n d of bias and manifest
par ti ality. This is mor e so, in this case, whe r e we
find the judge' s disposition of petition e r ' s
motion s to be sound and well- take n.
WHERE FOR E, the insta n t petition is her e by
DISMISS ED. Costs agai ns t petition e r .
G.R. No. L-30 9 7 7 Janu ary 31, 19 7 2
CARME N LAPUZ SY, repr e s e n t e d by her
su b s t i t u t e MACARIO LAPUZ, peti ti o n e r -
app e l l a n t , vs. EUFE MIO S. EUFE MIO alia s
EUFEMIO SY UY, resp o n d e n t - app e l l e e .
Jose W. Diok n o for peti t i o n e r - app e l l a n t .
D. G. Eufe m i o for resp o n d e n t - app e l l e e .
REYES J.B.L., J.:
Petition, filed after the effectivity of Repu blic Act
5440, for review by certior a ri of an orde r, dat e d
29 July 1969, of the Juvenile and Domes tic
Relation s Court of Manila, in its Civil Case No.
20387, dismissi n g said case for legal sep a r a t i o n
on the groun d that the deat h of the ther ei n
plaintiff, Car m e n O. Lapuz Sy, which occur r e d
durin g the pend e n c y of the case, abat e d the
caus e of action as well as the action itself. The
dismiss al orde r was issue d over the objection of
Mac a rio Lapuz, the heir of the dece a s e d plaintiff
(and petition e r her ei n) who sough t to substit u t e
the dec e a s e d and to have the case prose c u t e d to
final
judg m e n t . c h a n r o b l e svi r t u a l a wli b r a r y c h a n r o b l e s
virtu al law libra ry
On 18 August 1953, Car m e n O. Lapuz Sy filed a
petition for legal sepa r a t i o n agai ns t Eufemio S.
Eufemio, allegi ng, in the main, that they wer e
mar ri e d civilly on 21 Sept e m b e r 1934 and
canonic ally on 30 Sept e m b e r 1934; that they had
lived toget h e r as husb a n d and wife continu o u sly
until 1943 when her husb a n d aba n d o n e d her;
that they had no child; that they acqui r e d
prope r ti e s duri ng their mar ri a g e ; and that she
discove r e d her husb a n d coha bitin g with a
Chine s e wom a n na m e d Go Hiok at 1319 Sisa
Stre e t , Manila, on or about Marc h 1949. She
praye d for the issua n c e of a decr e e of legal
sepa r a t i o n, which, amon g othe r s, would orde r
that the defe n d a n t Eufemio S. Eufe mio shoul d be
deprive d of his sha r e of the conjug al par t n e r s h i p
profits.c h a n r o b l e s vi r t u a l a wli b r a r y c h a n r o b l e s
virtu al law libra ry
In his secon d ame n d e d answ e r to the petition,
her ei n respo n d e n t Eufe mio S. Eufe mio allege d
affirm a t ive and speci al defen s e s, and, along with
sever al othe r claims involving money and othe r
prope r ti e s, count e r- claim e d for the decla r a t i o n
of nullity ab initio of his mar ri a g e with Car m e n
O. Lapuz Sy, on the groun d of his prior and
subsisti n g mar ri a g e , celeb r a t e d accor di n g to
Chine s e law and custo m s, with one Go Hiok,
alias Ngo
Hiok.ch a n r o b l e svi rt u a l a wli b r a r y c h a n r o b l e s
virtu al law libra ry
Issue s having bee n joined, trial proc e e d e d and
the parti es addu c e d thei r resp e c t ive evide n c e .
But befor e the trial could be comple t e d (the
respo n d e n t was alre a dy sche d ul e d to pre se n t
surr e b u t t a l evide n c e on 9 and 18 June 1969),
petition e r Car m e n O. Lapuz Sy died in a
vehicula r accide n t on 31 May 1969. Couns el for
petition e r duly notified the cour t of her
dea t h.c h a n r o bl e s vi r t u a l a w li b r a r y c h a n r o b l e s
virtu al law libra ry
On 9 June 1969, respo n d e n t Eufe mio moved to
dismiss the "petition for legal sepa r a t i o n" 1on
two (2) groun d s , nam ely: that the petition for
legal sepa r a t i o n was filed beyon d the one- year
period provide d for in Article 102 of the Civil
Code; and that the deat h of Car m e n aba t e d the
action for legal
sepa r a t i o n. c h a n r o bl e svi r t u a l a wli b r a r y c h a n r o b l e s
virtu al law libra ry
On 26 June 1969, couns el for dece a s e d petition e r
move d to substit u t e the dece a s e d Carm e n by her
fathe r , Maca rio Lapuz. Counsel for Eufe mio
oppos e d the
motion.c h a n r o b l e s vi r t u a l a wlib r a r y c h a n r o b l e s
virtu al law libra ry
On 29 July 1969, the court issue d the orde r
und e r review, dismissi n g the case. 2In the body
of the orde r, the court stat e d that the motion to
dismiss and the motion for substit u ti o n had to be
resolve d on the question of whet h e r or not the
plaintiff's caus e of action has survive d, which the
court resolve d in the nega tive. Petition e r ' s
move d to recon si d e r but the motion was deni e d
on 15 Sept e m b e r
1969.c h a n r o bl e s vi r t u a l a wli b r a r y c h a n r o b l e s
virtu al law libra ry
After first secu ri n g an exten sio n of time to file a
petition for review of the orde r of dismiss al
issue d by the juvenile and dom e s ti c relations
court, the petition e r filed the pres e n t petition on
14 Octobe r 1969. The sam e was given due
cours e and answ e r ther e t o was filed by
respo n d e n t , who praye d for the affirm a n c e of the
said orde r . 3cha n r o bl e s virtual law libra ry
Althoug h the defen d a n t below, the her ein
respo n d e n t Eufe mio S. Eufe mio, filed
count e r c l ai m s, he did not purs u e the m after the
court below dismiss e d the case. He acquie s c e d
in the dismiss al of said count e r c l ai m s by praying
for the affirm a n c e of the orde r that dismiss e d not
only the petition for legal sepa r a t i o n but also his
count e r c l ai m to declar e the Eufe mio- Lapuz
mar ri a g e to be null and void ab
initio.ch a n r o b l e svi r t u a l a wli b r a r y c h a n r o b l e s
virtu al law libra ry
But petition e r Car m e n O. Lapuz Sy (throu g h her
self- assu m e d substi t u t e - for the lower court did
not act on the motion for substit u ti o n) stat e d the
princip al issue to be as follows:
When an action for legal sepa r a t i o n is conve r t e d
by the count e r c l ai m into one for a decla r a ti o n of
nullity of a marri a g e , does the deat h of a party
aba t e the proce e di n g s ?
The issue as fram e d by petition e r inject s into it a
suppos e d conve r si on of a legal sepa r a t i o n suit to
one for decla r a t io n of nullity of a mar ri a g e ,
which is without basis, for even petition e r
asse r t e d that "the respo n d e n t has acqui e s c e d to
the dismiss al of his count e r c l ai m " (Petition e r ' s
Brief, pag e 22). Not only this. The petition for
legal sepa r a t i o n and the count e r c l ai m to decl ar e
the nullity of the self sam e mar ri a g e can stan d
inde p e n d e n t and sepa r a t e adjudic a ti o n. They are
not insep a r a b l e nor was the action for legal
sepa r a t i o n conve r t e d into one for a decla r a ti o n
of nullity by the count e r cl ai m , for legal
sepa r a t i o n pre- suppos e s a valid mar ri a g e , while
the petition for nullity has a voida bl e mar ri a g e as
a pre-
condition.c h a n r o bl e s vi r t u a l a wlib r a r y c h a n r o b l e s
virtu al law libra ry
The first real issue in this case is: Does the deat h
of the plaintiff befor e final decr e e , in an action
for legal sepa r a t i o n, aba t e the action? If it does,
will abat e m e n t also apply if the action involves
prope r t y right s?
.cha n r o bl e svi r t u a l a wli b r a r y c h a n r o b l e s virtu al
law libra ry
An action for legal sepa r a ti o n which involves
nothin g mor e tha n the bed- and- boar d sepa r a ti o n
of the spous e s (the r e being no absol ut e divorc e
in this jurisdiction) is pur ely perso n al . The Civil
Code of the Philippin e s recog niz e s this in its
Article 100, by allowing only the innoce n t spous e
(and no one else) to claim legal sepa r a t io n; and
in its Article 108, by providing that the spouse s
can, by their reconciliation, stop or aba t e the
proce e di n g s and even rescin d a decr e e of legal
sepa r a t i o n alre a dy rend e r e d . Being perso n a l in
cha r a c t e r , it follows that the dea t h of one par ty
to the action caus e s the deat h of the action itself
- actio perso n alis moritu r cum perso n a.
... When one of the spous e s is dea d, ther e is no
nee d for divorce, bec a u s e the mar ri a g e is
dissolve d. The heirs cannot even contin u e the
suit, if the dea t h of the spous e take s place duri ng
the cours e of the suit (Article 244, Section 3).
The action is absolut ely dea d (Cass., July 27,
1871, D. 71. 1. 81; Cass. req., May 8, 1933, D. H.
1933, 332.") 4
.cha n r o bl e svi r t u a l a wli b r a r y c h a n r o b l e s virtu al
law libra ry
Mar ri a g e is a perso n a l relation or stat u s, crea t e d
und e r the sanc tion of law, and an action for
divorc e is a proce e di n g brou g h t for the pur po s e
of effecti ng a dissolution of that relation. The
action is one of a perso n al nat u r e . In the abse n c e
of a stat u t e to the cont r a r y, the deat h of one of
the parti es to such action aba t e s the action, for
the rea so n that deat h has settle d the question of
sepa r a t i o n beyond all cont rov e r s y and deprive d
the court of jurisdiction, both over the perso n s of
the parti es to the action and of the subjec t-
mat t e r of the action itself. For this reaso n the
court s are almost una ni m o u s in holding that the
dea t h of eithe r party to a divorc e proc e e di n g ,
befor e final decr e e , abat e s the action. 1 Corp u s
Juris, 208; Wren v. Moss, 2 Gilman, 72; Danfort h
v. Danfor t h, 111 Ill. 236; Matt e r of Gran d all, 196
N.Y. 127, 89 N.E. 578; 134 Am St. Rep. 830; 17
Ann. Cas. 874; Wilcon v. Wilson, 73 Mich, 620,
41 N.W. 817; Strickla n d v. Strickl a n d, 80 Ark.
452, 97 S. W. 659; McCurley v. McCurl ey, 60
Md. 185, 45 Am. Rep. 717; Begbi e v. Begbie, 128
Cal. 155, 60 Pac. 667, 49 L.R.A. 141.
5cha n r o bl e s virtual law libra ry
The sam e rule is true of caus e s of action and
suits for sepa r a t i o n and maint e n a n c e (Johnso n
vs. Bates, Ark. 101 SW 412; 1 Corp us Juris
208).c h a n r o bl e svi r t u a l a wlib r a r y c h a n r o b l e s
virtu al law libra ry
A review of the resul tin g cha n g e s in prop e r t y
relation s betw e e n spous e s shows that they are
solely the effect of the decr e e of legal sepa r a t io n;
henc e , they can not survive the deat h of the
plaintiff if it occur s prior to the dec r e e . On the
point, Article 106 of the Civil Code provide s: .
Art. 106. The decr e e of legal sepa r a t io n shall
have the following effect s: chan r o bl e s virtu al law
libra ry
(1) The spouse s shall be entitle d to live
sepa r a t e ly from each othe r, but the mar ri a g e
bonds shall not be seve r e d;
.cha n r o bl e svi r t u a l a wli b r a r y c h a n r o b l e s virtu al
law libra ry
(2) The conjug al par t n e r s h i p of gains or the
absol ut e conjug al com m u ni ty of prope r t y shall be
dissolve d and liquida t e d , but the offendi n g
spous e shall have no right to any shar e of the
profits ear n e d by the part n e r s h i p or com m u ni t y,
without prejudic e to the provisions of article 176;
cha n r o bl e s virtual law libra ry
(3) The custo dy of the minor childr e n shall be
awa r d e d to the innoc e n t spouse , unless
othe r wi s e direc t e d by the court in the inter e s t of
said minor s, for whom said court may appoin t a
gua r di a n; chan r o bl e s virtu al law libra ry
(4) The offendin g spous e shall be disqu alified
from inhe ritin g from the innoce n t spous e by
intest a t e succ e s sio n. More ove r, provisions in
favor of the offendin g spous e mad e in the will of
the innoce n t one shall be revoke d by oper a tio n of
law.
From this article it is appa r e n t that the right to
the dissolution of the conjug al part n e r s h i p of
gains (or of the absolut e com m u ni ty of prope r t y),
the loss of right by the offendi n g spous e to any
sha r e of the profits ear n e d by the par t n e r s hi p or
com m u ni t y, or his disqu alificatio n to inhe rit by
intest a cy from the innoc e n t spous e as well as the
revoc a ti on of test a m e n t a r y provisions in favor of
the offendi n g spous e mad e by the innoc e n t one,
are all right s and disabilitie s that, by the very
ter m s of the Civil Code article, are vest e d
exclusively in the per so n s of the spous e s; and by
their nat u r e and inten t, such claims and
disa bilitie s are difficult to conceive as assign a bl e
or tra ns m i s si bl e. Henc e , a claim to said right s is
not a claim that "is not ther e b y exting uis h e d "
after a party dies, unde r Section 17, Rule 3, of
the Rules of Court, to warr a n t contin u a t i o n of
the action throu g h a substit u t e of the dece a s e d
par ty.
Sec. 17. Deat h of party. After a par ty dies and
the claim is not ther e by exting ui s h e d , the court
shall orde r, upon prop e r notice, the legal
repr e s e n t a t i v e of the dec e a s e d to appe a r and to
be substit u t e d for the dece a s e d , within a period
of thirty (30) days, or within such tim e as may be
gra n t e d ...
The sam e result flows from a conside r a t i o n of
the enu m e r a t i o n of the actions that survive for or
again s t admini st r a t o r s in Section 1, Rule 87, of
the Revised Rules of Court:
SECTION 1. Actions which may and which may
not be brou g h t again s t execu t o r or
admi nist r a t o r . No action upon a claim for the
recove ry of money or debt or inter e s t the r e o n
shall be com m e n c e d agai ns t the execu t o r or
admi nist r a t o r ; but actions to recove r real or
per so n al prop e r t y, or an inte r e s t ther ei n, from
the esta t e, or to enforc e a lien ther e o n , and
actions to recove r dam a g e s for an injury to
per so n or prop e r t y, real or perso n al , may be
com m e n c e d agains t him.
Neit h e r actions for legal sep a r a t i o n or for
annul m e n t of mar ri a g e can be dee m e d fairly
includ e d in the
enu m e r a t i o n..c h a n r o bl e svi r t u al a wli b r a r y c h a n r o b
les virtual law library
A furt h e r reaso n why an action for legal
sepa r a t i o n is abat e d by the deat h of the plaintiff,
even if prope r t y right s are involved, is that these
right s are mer e effects of decr e e of sepa r a t i o n,
their sour c e being the decr e e itself; without the
dec r e e such right s do not com e into existe n c e , so
that befor e the finality of a dec r e e , thes e claims
are mer ely right s in expec t a t i o n. If deat h
supe r v e n e s durin g the pend e n c y of the action, no
dec r e e can be forthco m i n g , deat h prod u ci n g a
more radic al and definitive sepa r a t i o n; and the
expe c t e d conse q u e n t i a l right s and claim s would
nece s s a r ily rem ai n
unbo r n .c h a n r o b l e svi r t u a l a wli b r a r y c h a n r o b l e s
virtu al law libra ry
As to the petition of respo n d e n t- appelle e
Eufemio for a declar a ti o n of nullity ab initio of
his mar ri a g e to Carm e n Lapuz, it is appa r e n t
that such action beca m e moot and aca d e m i c
upon the dea t h of the latt e r, and ther e could be
no furth e r inte r e s t in continui n g the sam e afte r
her demis e, that auto m a t i c ally dissolve d the
ques tio n e d union. Any prop e r t y right s acqui r e d
by eithe r party as a result of Article 144 of the
Civil Code of the Philippin e s 6 could be resolve d
and det e r m i n e d in a prope r action for partition
by eithe r the appelle e or by the heirs of the
app ella n t . c h a n r o b l e svi rt u a l a w li b r a r y c h a n r o b l e s
virtu al law libra ry
In fact, even if the biga m o u s mar ri a g e had not
bee n void ab initio but only voida bl e unde r
Article 83, para g r a p h 2, of the Civil Code,
bec a u s e the secon d mar ri a g e had bee n
cont r a c t e d with the first wife having bee n an
abse n t e e for seven conse c u t iv e years, or when
she had bee n gen e r a lly believe d dea d, still the
action for annul m e n t beca m e exting ui s h e d as
soon as one of the thr e e per so n s involved had
died, as provide d in Article 87, par a g r a p h 2, of
the Code, requi rin g that the action for
annul m e n t should be broug h t durin g the lifetim e
of any one of the parti e s involved. And
furth e r m o r e , the liquida tion of any conjug al
par t n e r s h i p that might have result e d from such
voida bl e mar ri a g e must be carri e d out "in the
test a t e or intest a t e proc e e di n g s of the dec e a s e d
spous e", as expr e s sly provide d in Section 2 of the
Revise d Rule 73, and not in the ann ul m e n t
proce e di n g. c h a n r o b l e s vi r t u a l a wlib r a r y c h a n r o b l e
s virtu al law libra ry
ACCORDINGLY, the appe al e d judgm e n t of the
Manila Court of Juvenile and Dome sti c Relation s
is here by affirm e d . No special prono u n c e m e n t as
to costs.
Conc e p cio n, C.J., Makalint al, Zaldiva r, Cast r o,
Fer n a n d o , Teeh a n k e e , Barr e d o, Villamor and
Maka si a r, JJ., concu r .
LEGAL SEPARATION (DEFE N S E S )
G.R. No. L-13 5 5 3 Febr u a r y 23, 19 6 0
JOSE DE OCAMPO, peti t i o n e r ,
vs.
SERAFI NA FLORE NCIA NO , res p o n d e n t .
Joselito J. Colom a for petition e r .
BENGZON, J.:
Action for legal sepa r a ti o n by Jose de Oca m p o
again s t his wife Ser afin a, on the grou n d of
adult e r y. The court of first inst a n c e of Nueva
Ecija dismiss e d it. The Court of Appe als affirm e d,
holding ther e was confes sio n of judg m e n t , plus
condon a t io n or cons e n t to the adult e ry and
pre sc ri p tio n.
We gra n t e d certior a ri to conside r the applica tion
of articles 100 and 101 of the New Civil Code,
which for conve ni e n c e are quot e d here wi t h:
ART. 100.—The legal sepa r a t i o n may be claim e d
only by the innoc e n t spous e , provide d the r e has
bee n no condon a ti o n of or conse n t to the
adult e r y or concu bi n a g e . Wher e both spous e s
are offend e r s, a legal sepa r a t i o n cannot be
claim e d by eithe r of the m . Collusion betw e e n the
par ti e s to obtain legal sepa r a t i o n shall caus e the
dismiss al of the petition.
ART. 101.—No decr e e of legal sepa r a t i o n shall
be prom ul g a t e d upon a stipul a tion of facts or by
confession of judgm e n t .
In case of non- appe a r a n c e of the defe n d a n t , the
court shall orde r the prose c u t i n g attor n e y to
inquir e whet h e r or not a collusion betw e e n the
par ti e s exist s. If ther e is no collusion, the
pros e c u ti n g attor n e y shall inte rv e n e for the
Stat e in orde r to take care that the evide n c e for
the plaintiff is not fabrica t e d .
The reco r d shows that on July 5, 1955, the
compl ai n t for legal sep a r a t i o n was filed. As
am e n d e d , it desc ri b e d their mar ri a g e perfor m e d
in 1938, and the com mi ssion of adult e ry by
Serafin a, in Marc h 1951 with Jose Arcalas, and
in June 1955 with Nelson Orza m e .
Becau s e the defen d a n t made no answ e r , the
court default e d her, and pur su a n t to Art. 101
above, direct e d the provinci al fiscal to
investi g a t e whet h e r or not collusion exist e d
betw e e n the parti e s. The fiscal exami n e d the
defe n d a n t unde r oat h, and then repo r t e d to the
Court that the r e was no collusion. The plaintiff
pre s e n t e d his evide n c e consistin g of the
testi m o ny of Vicent e Medin a, Erne s t o de
Oca m p o, Cesa r Enriq u e z, Mat e o Damo, Jose de
Oca m p o and Capt. Serafin Guba t.
Accordi n g to the Court of Appeal s, the evide nc e
thus pres e n t e d show s that "plaintiff and
defe n d a n t wer e mar ri e d in April 5, 1938 by a
religious cer e m o n y in Guimb a , Nueva Ecija, and
had lived the r e af t e r as husb a n d and wife. They
begot sever al childr e n who are now living with
plaintiff. In Marc h, 1951, plaintiff discove r e d on
sever al occasion s that his wife was bet r ayi n g his
trust by maint ai ni n g illicit relation s with one Jose
Arcala s. Having found the defen d a n t car ryin g
marit al relation s with anot h e r man plaintiff sent
her to Manila in June 1951 to study bea u ty
cultu r e , whe r e she staye d for one year. Again,
plaintiff discove r e d that while in the said city
defe n d a n t was going out with sever al othe r men,
aside from Jose Arcala s. Towar d s the end of
June, 1952, when defe n d a n t had finishe d
studyin g her cours e, she left plaintiff and since
then they had lived sepa r a t el y.
"On June 18, 1955, plaintiff sur p ris e d his wife in
the act of having illicit relation s with anot h e r
man by the nam e of Nelson Orza m e . Plaintiff
signified his inte ntio n of filing a petition for legal
sepa r a t i o n, to which defe n d a n t manife st e d her
confor mi ty provide d she is not cha r g e d with
adult e r y in a crimin al action. Accordi n gly,
plaintiff filed on July 5, 1955, a petition for legal
sepa r a t i o n."
The Court of Appeals held that the husb a n d ' s
right to legal sepa r a ti o n on accou n t of the
defe n d a n t ' s adult e ry with Jose Arcalas had
pre sc ri b e d , bec a u s e his action was not filed
within one year from Marc h 1951 whe n plaintiff
discove r e d her infidelity. (Art. 102, New Civil
Code) We must agre e with the Court of Appeals
on this point.1
As to the adult e ry with Nelson Orza m e, the
app ellat e cour t found that in the night of June
18, 1955, the husb a n d upon discove ri n g the
illicit conne c t io n, expr e s s e d his wish to file a
petition for legal sepa r a t i o n and defe n d a n t
rea dily agre e d to such filing. And when she was
ques tio n e d by the Fiscal upon orde r s of the
court, she reit e r a t e d her confor mi t y to the legal
sepa r a t i o n even as she admit t e d having had
sexual relation s with Nelson Orza m e .
Inte r p r e t i n g thes e facts virtually to mea n a
confession of judgm e n t the Appellat e Court
decla r e d that unde r Art. 101, legal sepa r a ti o n
could not be decr e e d .
As we unde r s t a n d the article, it does not exclud e,
as evide n c e , any admissio n or confession made
by the defe n d a n t outsid e of the court. It mer ely
prohibit s a dec r e e of sepa r a ti o n upon a
confession of judgm e n t . Confessio n of judgm e n t
usually happ e n s when the defe n d a n t appe a r s in
court and confess e s the right of plaintiff to
judg m e n t or files a plea di n g expr e s sly agr e ei n g
to the plaintiff's dem a n d . 2 This is not occur.
Yet, even supposi n g that the above stat e m e n t of
defe n d a n t constit u t e d prac tic ally a confession of
judg m e n t , inasm u c h as the r e is evide n c e of the
adult e r y indep e n d e n t l y of such stat e m e n t , the
dec r e e may and should be gra n t e d , since it
would not be base d on her confes sio n, but upon
evide n c e pres e n t e d by the plaintiff. What the law
prohibit s is a judg m e n t base d exclusively or
mainly on defen d a n t ' s confession. If a confession
defe a t s the action ipso facto, any defen d a n t who
oppos e s the sepa r a t i o n will imme di a t e ly confess
judg m e n t , purpo s ely to preve n t it.
The mer e circu m s t a n c e that defen d a n t s told the
Fiscal that she "like also" to be legally sepa r a t e d
from her husb a n d , is no obst a cl e to the
succe s sf ul pros e c u ti o n of the action. When she
refuse d to answ e r the compl ai n t, she indicat e d
her willingn e s s to be sep a r a t e d . Yet, the law
does not orde r the dismissal. Allowing the
proce e di n g to conti nu e , it takes prec a u ti o n s
again s t collusion, which implies mor e tha n
conse n t or lack of opposition to the agr e e m e n t .
Nee dl e s s to say, whe n the court is inform e d that
defe n d a n t equ ally desir e s the sep a r a t i o n and
admi tt e d the com mi ssion of the offens e, it shoul d
be doubly caref ul lest a collusion exists. (The
Court of Appeals did not find collusion.)
Collusion in divorc e or legal sepa r a t io n mea n s
the agr e e m e n t .
. . . betw e e n husb a n d and wife for one of the m to
com mit, or to appe a r to com mit, or to be
repr e s e n t e d in court as having com mi t t e d, a
mat ri m o ni al offens e, or to supp r e s s evide n c e of a
valid defe ns e, for the purpo s e of ena bli ng the
othe r to obt ain a divorc e. This agr e e m e n t , if not
expr e s s, may be implied from the acts of the
par ti e s. It is a grou n d for denying the divorc e.
(Griffiths vs. Griffiths, 69 N. J. Eq. 689 60 Atl.
1099; Sandoz vs. Sandoz, 107 Ore. 282, 214 Pas.
590.).
In this case, the r e would be collusion if the
par ti e s had arr a n g e d to make it app e a r that a
mat ri m o ni al offens e had been com mi t t e d
althou g h it was not, or if the partie s had
connive d to bring abou t a legal sepa r a t i o n even
in the abse n c e of groun d s ther efor .
Her e, the offense of adult e ry had really taking
place, accor di n g to the evide n c e . The defe n d a n t
could not have falsely told the adult e r o u s acts to
the Fiscal, beca u s e her story might send her to
jail the mom e n t her husb a n d requ e s t s the Fiscal
to pros ec u t e . She could not have practic e d
dec e p t io n at such a perso n a l risk.
In this conn e c tio n, it has bee n held that collusion
may not be infer r e d from the mer e fact that the
guilty party confess e s to the offense and thus
ena bl e s the othe r party to proc u r e evide n c e
nece s s a r y to prove it. (William s vs. William s, [N.
Y.] 40 N. E. (2d) 1017; Rosen w e i g vs. Rosen w e i g,
246 N. Y. Suppl. 231; Conye r s, vs. Conyer s, 224
S. W. [2d] 688.).
And proof that the defe n d a n t desir e s the divorc e
and make s no defen s e , is not by itself collusion.
(Pohlm a n vs. Pohlm a n, [N. J.] 46 Atl. Rep. 658.).
We do not think plaintiff's failure actively to
sear c h for defe n d a n t and take her hom e (after
the latt e r had left him in 1952) consti t u t e d
condon a t io n or cons e n t to her adult e r o u s
relation s with Orza m e . It will be rem e m b e r e d
that she "left" him afte r having sinne d with
Arcala s and afte r he had discove r e d her dat e s
with othe r men. Conse q u e n t l y, it was not his
duty to sear c h for her to bring her hom e. Her s
was the obligatio n to ret u r n .
Two decisions 3 are cited whe r ei n from
app a r e n t ly simila r circu m s t a n c e s , this Court
inferr e d the husb a n d ' s conse n t to or condon a t io n
of his wife's miscon d u c t . Howev e r , upon careful
examin a t io n, a vital differ e n c e will be found: in
both insta n c e s , the husb a n d had aba n d o n e d his
wife; her e it was the wife who "left" her husb a n d .
Wher efo r e , finding no obst a cl e s to the agg ri eve d
husb a n d ' s petition we her e by reve r s e the
app e al e d decision and decr e e a legal sepa r a t io n
betw e e n thes e spous e, all the conse q u e n t
effect s. Costs of all insta n c e s again st Serafin a
Flore n ci a n o.
G.R. No. L-10 6 9 9 Oct o b e r 18, 19 5 7
WILLIAM H. BROW N , plai n t i f f - app e l l a n t ,
vs.
JUANITA YAMBAO, def e n d a n t - app e l l e e .
Jime n e z B. Bu e n d i a for app e l l a n t .
Assist a n t City Fiscal Rafel A. Jose for appelle e.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
On July 14, 1955, William H. Brown filed suit in
the Cour t of First Inst a n c e of Manila to obtain
legal sepa r a t i o n from his lawful wife Juanit a
Yambao. He allege d unde r oat h that while
inte r n e d by the Japa n e s e invade r s, from 1942 to
1945, at the Univer sity of Sto. Toma s inter n m e n t
cam p, his wife eng a g e d in adult e r o u s relation s
with one Carlos Field of whom she begot a baby
girl that Brown lear n e d of his wifes miscon d u c t
only in 1945, upon his relea s e from inter n m e n t ;
that ther e af t e r the spous e lived sepa r a t e ly and
later execut e d a docu m e n t (Annex A ) liquida ti n g
their conjug al part n e r s h i p and assigni n g cert ai n
prope r ti e s to the erri ng wife as her shar e. The
compl ai n t praye d for confir m a t io n of the
liquida tion agr e e m e n t ; for custody of the
childr e n issue d of the mar ri a g e ; that the
defe n d a n t be decla r e d disqu alified to succ e e d
the plaintiff; and for their rem e d y as might be
just and equit a bl e.
Upon petition of the plaintiff, the court
subs e q u e n t ly decla r e d the wife in default, for
failure to answ e r in due time, despit e servic e of
sum m o n s; and direc t e d the City Fiscal or his
repr e s e n t a t i v e s to—
investi g a t e , in accor d a n c e with Article 101 of the
Civil Code, whet h e r or not a collusion exists
betw e e n the parti e s and to repor t to this Court
the resul t of his investig a ti o n within fiftee n (15)
days from rec eip t of copy of this orde r. The City
Fiscal or his repr e s e n t a t iv e is also direc t e d to
inte rve n e in the case in behalf of the Stat e. (Rec.
App. p. 9).
As orde r e d , Assist a n t City Fiscal Rafael Jose
app e a r e d at the trial, and cross- exami n e d
plaintiff Brown. His question s (stre n u o u sl y
object e d to by Brown' s couns el) elicite d the fact
that after liber a t io n, Brown had lived marit ally
with anot h e r wom a n and had begot t e n childr e n
by her. Ther e af t e r , the court rend e r e d judg m e n t
denying the legal sepa r a t i o n aske d, on the
groun d that, while the wife's adult e r y was
est a blis h e d , Brown had incur r e d in a miscon d u c t
of similar natu r e that bar r e d his right of action
und e r Article 100 of the new Civil Code,
providing:
ART. 100. The legal sepa r a t io n may be claim e d
only by the innoc e n t spous e , provide d the r e has
bee n no condon a ti o n or of conse n t to the
adult e r y or concu bi n a g e . Wher e both spous e s
are offend e r s, a legal sepa r a t i o n cannot be
claim e d by eithe r of the m . Collusion betw e e n the
par ti e s to obtain legal sepa r a t i o n shall caus e the
dismiss al of the petition.
that ther e had bee n conse n t and conniva n c e , and
bec a u s e Brown's action had presc ri b e d unde r
Article 102 of the sam e Code:
ART. 102 An action for legal sepa r a t i o n cannot
be filed except within one year from and after
the date on which the plaintiff beca m e cogniza n t
of the caus e and within five year s from and after
dat e when such caus e occur r e d .
since the evide nc e showe d that the lear n e d of his
wife's infidelity in 1945 but only filed action in
1945.
Brown appe a r e d to this Court, assigni n g the
following error s:
The court err e d in per mi t ti n g the Assist a n t
Fiscal Rafel Jose of Manila to act as couns el for
the defen d a n t , who defa ul t e d .
The court err e d in decla ri n g that the r e was
condon a t io n of or conse n t to the adult e r y.
The court err e d in dismissi n g the plaintiff's
compl ai n t.
Appella nt Brown argu e s that in cross- exami nin g
him with reg a r d to his marit al relation with Lilia
Deito, who was not his wife, the Assista n t Fiscal
act e d as consel for the defaultin g wife, "whe n
the powe r of the prose c u t i n g officer is limite d to
finding out whet h e r or not the r e is collusion, and
if ther e is no collusion, which is the fact in the
case at bar, to interve n e for the stat e which is
not the fact in the insta n t case, the trut h of the
mat t e r being that he interv e n e d for Juanit a
Yambao, the defen d a n t- appell e e, who is privat e
citize n and who is far from being the stat e.".
The arg u m e n t is unt e n a bl e . Collusion in
mat ri m o ni al case s being "the act of mar ri e d
per so n s in procu ri n g a divorc e by mut u al
conse n t , whet h e r by preco n c e r t e d com mis sio n
by one of a mat ri m o ni al offense, or by failure, in
purs u a n c e of agre e m e n t to defe n d divorc e
proce e di n g s" (Cyclope di a Law Diction a r y;
Nelson, Divorc e and Sepa r a t i o n, Section 500), it
was legitim a t e for the Fiscal to bring to light any
circu m s t a n c e s that could give rise to the
infere n c e that the wife's defaul t was calcul a t e d ,
or agr e e d upon, to enabl e appell a n t to obtain the
dec r e e of legal sepa r a t i o n that he sough t withou t
rega r d to the legal meri ts of his case. One such
circu m s t a n c e is obviously the fact of Brown's
coha bi t a t io n with a wom a n othe r tha n his wife,
since it bars him from claimin g legal sepa r a ti o n
by expr e s s provision of Article 100 of the new
Civil Code. Wher efo r e , such evide nc e of such
miscon d u c t , wer e prop e r subjec t of inqui ry as
they may justifiably be consid e r e d circu m s t a n t i al
evide n c e of collusion bet w e e n the spous e s.
The policy of Article 101 of the new Civil Code,
calling for the inte rve n t i o n of the stat e attor n e y s
in case of uncon t e s t e d proc e e di n g s for legal
sepa r a t i o n (and of ann ul m e n t of mar ri a g e s ,
und e r Article 88), is to emp h a siz e that marri a g e
is more than a mer e contr a c t ; that it is a social
instit ution in which the stat e is vitally inter e s t e d ,
so that its contin u a t i o n or inte r r u p t i o n cannot be
made depe n d upon the parti e s the m s elv e s (Civil
Code, Article 52; Adong vs, Cheon g Gee, 43 Phil,
43; Ramire z vs. Gmur 42 Phil. 855; Goitia vs.
Cam po s, 35 Phil. 252). It is conson a n t with this
policy that the injury by the Fiscal should be
allowe d to focus upon any releva n t mat t e r that
may indica t e whet h e r the proce e di n g s for
sepa r a t i o n or annul m e n t are fully justified or not.
The court below also found, and corr e c tly held
that the app ell a n t ' s action was alre a d y bar r e d,
bec a u s e Brown did not petition for legal
sepa r a t i o n proce e di n g s until ten years after he
learn e d of his wife's adult e ry, which was upon
his rele a s e from inte r n m e n t in 1945. Unde r
Article 102 of the new Civil Code, action for legal
sepa r a t i o n can not be filed excep t within one (1)
year from and afte r the plaintiff beca m e
cogniz a n t of the caus e and within five years from
and afte r the dat e whe n such caus e occur r e d .
Appella nt ' s brief does not even cont e s t the
corr e c t n e s s of such findings and conclusio n.
It is true that the wife has not inter p o s e d
pre sc ri p tio n as a defe ns e . Neve r t h e l e s s , the
court s can take cogniza n c e ther e of, bec a u s e
actions seeking a decr e e of legal sepa r a t io n, or
annul m e n t of mar ri a g e , involve public inter e s t
and it is the policy of our law that no such decr e e
be issue d if any legal obst a cl e s the r e t o appe a r
upon the recor d.
Henc e, ther e being at least two well est a blish e d
stat u t o r y groun d s for denying the rem e dy soug h t
(com mi s sio n of similar offense by petition e r and
pre sc ri p tio n of the action), it beco m e s
unn ec e s a r y to delve furt h e r into the case and
asce r t a i n if Brown's inaction for ten year s also
evide n c e s condo n a t i o n or conniva n c e on his part.
Even if it did not, his situati on would not be
improve d. It is thus nee dl e s s to discuss the
secon d assign m e n t of error.
The third assig n m e n t of error being a mer e
conse q u e n c e of the othe r s must nece s s a r ily fail
with the m .
The decision appe al e d from is affirm e d , with
cost s agains t app ell a n t.
LEGAL SEPARATION (WHEN TO FILE/TRY
ACTIONS)
G.R. No. L-29138 May 29, 1970c h a n r o bl e s
virtu al law libra ry
ELENA CONTRERAS, Plaintiff- Appellan t, v.
CESAR J. MACARAIG, Defend a n t- Appellee.
Jose T. Nery for plaintiff-
app elle e.c h a n r o b l e svi r t u a l a w li b r a r y c h a n r o b l e s
virtu al law libra ry
The City fiscal for defen d a n t-
app ella n t . c h a n r o b l e svi rt u a l a w li b r a r y c h a n r o b l e s
virtu al law libra ry
Cesa r J. Mac a r ai g in his own behalf.
DIZON, J.:
Appeal take n by Elena Cont r e r a s from a decision
of the Juvenile and Dome stic Relation s Court of
Manila in Civil Case No. 0013 8 dismissi n g her
compl ai n t upon the groun d that the sam e was
filed more than one year from and after the date
on which she had becom e cogniza n t of the caus e
for legal
sepa r a t i o n. c h a n r o bl e svi r t u a l a wli b r a r y c h a n r o b l e s
virtu al law libra ry
The following, facts found by the trial cour t are
not in disput e:
Plaintiff and defe n d a n t wer e mar ri e d on Marc h
16, 1952 in the Catholic Churc h of Quiapo,
Manila. Out of their Mar ri a g e , thr e e childr e n
were born: Euse bio C. Mac a r a i g, on Janua ry 11,
1953; Victoria C. Maca r a i g, on Marc h 26, 1956;
and Alexand e r C. Maca r ai g, on August 4, 1958.
All the childre n are in the care of plaintiff
wife.ch a n r o b l e svi r t u a l a wli b r a r y c h a n r o b l e s
virtu al law libra ry
Some ti m e in 1958, the couple acqui r e d right s, as
lesse e and purc h a s e r unde r a condition al sale
agr e e m e n t , to own a hous e and lot, known as Lot
4, Block 8 of the Philamlife Hom e s in Quezon
City which they tran sf e r r e d in favor of their
thre e childr e n on Octobe r 29, 1958 (Exh. F).
Inst all m e n t paym e n t s are being made by
plaintiff's fathe r. The spous e s own no othe r
conjug al
prope r t y.c h a n r o b l e svi r t u a l a wlib r a r y c h a n r o b l e s
virtu al law libra ry
Imm e di a t el y befor e the election of 1961,
defe n d a n t was em ploye d as man a g e r of the
printi ng esta blis h m e n t owne d by plaintiff's fathe r
known as the MICO Offset. In that capa city,
defe n d a n t met and cam e to know Lily Ann Alcala,
who place orde r s with MICO Offset for
propa g a n d a mat e ri al s for Mr. Ser gio Osm e ñ a ,
who was then a Vice- Presid e n t i al candi d a t e .
After the elections of 1961, defe n d a n t resig n e d
from MICO Offset to be a speci al age n t at
Malac a ñ a n g . He bega n to be away so often and
to com e hom e very late. Upon plaintiff's inquiry,
defe n d a n t explain e d that he was out on a seri es
of confide n t i al
missions.c h a n r o bl e s vi r t u a l a wli b r a r y c h a n r o b l e s
virtu al law libra ry
In Sept e m b e r , 1962, Avelino Lubos, driver of the
family car, told plaintiff that defe n d a n t was living
in Singalon g with Lily Ann Alcala. When
defe n d a n t , the following Octob e r , ret u r n e d to the
conjug al hom e, plaintiff refr ain e d from verifying
Lubos' repor t from defen d a n t in her desir e not to
ange r nor drive defen d a n t away. Althou g h
plaintiff, in April 1963, also received rum o r s that
defe n d a n t was seen with a wom a n who was on
the family way on Dasm a ri ñ a s St., she was so
happy that defen d a n t again ret u r n to the family
hom e in May, 1963 that she once mor e desist e d
from discussi n g the mat t e r with him beca u s e she
did not wish to preci pi t a t e a qua r r el and drive
him away. All this while, defen d a n t , if and
when ev e r he ret u r n e d to the family fold, would
only stay for two or thre e days but would be
gone for a period of about a
mont h.c h a n r o bl e svi r t u a l a w li b r a r y c h a n r o b l e s
virtu al law libra ry
After plaintiff rec eive d repor t s that Lily Ann
Alcala had given birth to a baby, she sent Mrs.
Felicisi m a Antioqui a, her fathe r ' s employe e, to
verify the repo r t s. The latt e r was driven by
Lubos to the house in Singalon g and betw e e n
5:00 and 6:00 o'clock that after n o o n, she saw
defe n d a n t was carryin g a baby in his ar m s. Mrs.
Antioqui a then went to the parish priest of
Singalon g wher e she inquir e d about the child of
Cesa r Maca r ai g and Lily Ann Alcala and she was
given a copy of the baptis m a l certificat e of Maria
Vivien Mag elin e Mac a r a i g (Exh. G) which she
gave to plaintiff som e ti m e in Octob e r ,
1963.c h a n r o bl e s vi r t u a l a wli b r a r y c h a n r o b l e s
virtu al law libra ry
Plaintiff the n ent r e a t e d her fathe r- in- law, Lucilo
Mac a r a i g, to inter c e d e with defen d a n t and to
convinc e him to ret u r n to his family. Mr.
Mac a r a i g, after talking to his son and seeking
him with the latte r ' s child told plaintiff that he
could not do
anyt hi n g.c h a n r o b l e s vi r t u a l a wli b r a r y c h a n r o b l e s
virtu al law libra ry
In Nove m b e r , 1963, plaintiff requ e s t e d the
coope r a t i o n of defen d a n t ' s olde r sist er , Mrs.
Enriqu e t a Majul, and the latte r oblige d and
arr a n g e d a mee tin g at her hom e in Buen di a
betw e e n plaintiff and Lily Ann Alcala. Lily Ann
said she was willing to give up defen d a n t as she
had no desir e to be accus e d crimin ally but it was
defe n d a n t who refuse d to bre a k relation s hi p with
her.c h a n r o bl e svi r t u a l a wli b r a r y c h a n r o b l e s virtual
law libra ry
In the early part of Dece m b e r , 1963, plaintiff,
acco m p a ni e d by her two childr e n , Victoria and
Alexand e r , and by Mrs. Leticia Lagro nio went to
talk to defen d a n t at his place of work on Espa ñ a
Exte nsio n in front of Quezon Instit ut e . They
repai r e d to Victoria Peak, a nea r by rest a u r a n t ,
whe r e plaintiff plead e d with defen d a n t to give up
Lily Ann Alcala and to ret u r n to the conjug al
hom e, assu ri n g him that she was willing to
forgive him. Defen d a n t inform e d plaintiff that he
could no longe r leave Lily Ann and refuse d to
ret u r n to his legitim a t e
family.ch a n r o bl e svi rt u a l a w li b r a r y c h a n r o b l e s
virtu al law libra ry
On Dece m b e r 14, 1963, plaintiff institu t e d the
pre s e n t action for legal sepa r a t i o n. When
defe n d a n t did not inter p o s e any answ e r afte r he
was serve d sum m o n s, the case was refer r e d to
the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila purs u a n t
to the provisions of Article 101 of the Civil Code.
After a repor t was receive d from Asst. Fiscal
Primitivo M. Peña r a n d a that he believe d that
ther e was no collusion pres e n t , plaintiff was
allowe d to pres e n t her evide n c e . Defen d a n t has
neve r appe a r e d in this case.
The reaso n s relied upon by the trial cour t in
dismissin g the compl ai nt are set forth in the
app e al e d decision as follows:
Unde r the facts est a blish e d by plaintiff's
evide n c e, althou g h the infidelity of the husb a n d
is appa r e n t , yet the case will have to be
dismiss e d . Article 102 provide s that, an action
for legal sepa r a t i o n canno t be instit u t e d excep t
within one year after plaintiff "beca m e cogniza n t
of the caus e." In the abse n c e of a clea r- cut
decision of the Supr e m e Court as to the exact
impor t of the ter m "cogniza n t ," the prac tic al
applica tio n of said Article can be att e n d e d with
difficulty. For one thing; that rules might be
differe n t in case of adult e ry, which is an act, and
for concu bi n a g e , which may be a situa tio n or a
relation s hi p.c h a n r o b l e svi r t u a l a w li b r a r y c h a n r o b l
es virtual law libra ry
In resp e c t of concu bi n a g e , the word 'cogniza n t '
may not connot e the dat e when proof ther e of
sufficient to est a blis h the caus e befor e a court of
law is posse s s e d . Othe r wi s e , the one year period
would be mea ni n gl e s s for prac ti c al purpo s e s
bec a u s e all a wife would have to do would be to
claim that the nece s s a r y proof was secu r e d only
within one year befor e the filing of the
compl ai n t. On the othe r hand, it shoul d be hard
to conc e d e that what the law envisa g e s (and, in a
way, encou r a g e s ) is the filing of a compl ai n t
within one year after the innoc e n t spous e s has
rec eive d infor m a t i o n of the othe r ' s infidelity,
howso ev e r basel e s s the repo r t might
be.c h a n r o bl e s vi r t u al a wli b r a r y c h a n r o b l e s virtu al
law libra ry
The Court believes that the corr e c t rule lies
betw e e n the two extr e m e s. At the time a wife
acqui r e d inform a t i o n, which can be reaso n a b ly
relied upon as true, that her husb a n d is living in
concu bi n a g e with anot h e r wom a n, the one- year
period shoul d be dee m e d to have star t e d even if
the wife shall not the n be in posse s sio n of proof
sufficient to est a blis h the concu bi n a g e befor e a
court of law. The one- year period may be viewed,
inte r alia, as an allot e d time within which proof
shoul d be secu r e d . It is in the light of this rule
that the Cour t will det e r m i n e whet h e r or not
plaintiff's action for legal sepa r a t i o n has
pre sc ri b e d . c h a n r o b l e svi r t u a l a wli b r a r y c h a n r o b l e s
virtu al law libra ry
After her husb a n d resign e d from MICO Offset to
be a special age n t in Malac a ñ a n , subse q u e n t to
the elections of 1961, he would seldo m com e
hom e. He allaye d plaintiff's suspicion s with the
explan a t i o n that he had been away on
'confide n t i al missions.' Howev e r, in Sept e m b e r ,
1962, Avelino Lubos, plaintiff's drive r, repo r t e d
to plaintiff that defen d a n t was living in Singalon g
with Lily Ann Alcala. As a mat t e r of fact, it was
also Lubos who broug h t Mrs. F. Antioqui a (whe n
plaintiff had aske d to verify the repo r t s) to the
house in Sing alo n g whe r e she saw defen d a n t ,
Lily Ann and the
baby.ch a n r o bl e svi r t u al a wli b r a r y c h a n r o b l e s
virtu al law libra ry
The requi r e m e n t of the law that a com pl ai nt for
legal sepa r a t i o n be filed within one year afte r the
dat e plaintiff beco m e cogniza n t of the caus e is
not of presc ri p t ive nat u r e , but is of the esse n c e
of the caus e of action. It is conson a n t with the
philosop hy that mar ri a g e is an inviolabl e social
instit ution so that the law provide s strict
requi r e m e n t s befor e it will allow a disru p t io n of
its stat u s.c h a n r o bl e s vi r t u a l a wli b r a r y c h a n r o b l e s
virtu al law libra ry
In the inst a n t action, the Court has to find that
plaintiff beca m e cogniz a n t of defen d a n t ' s
infidelity in Sept e m b e r , 1962. Plaintiff mad e
succe s siv e att e m p t s to induc e the husb a n d to
am e n d his erri ng ways but failed. Her desire to
bring defe n d a n t back to the connu bi al fold and
to pres e r v e family solida ri ty det e r r e d her from
taking timely legal action.
The only ques tio n to be resolve d is whet h e r the
period of one year provide d for in Article 102 of
the Civil Code shoul d be count e d , as far as the
inst a n t case is conce r n e d from Sept e m b e r 1962
or from Dece m b e r 1963. Com pu ti n g the period
of one year from the form e r dat e, it is clear that
plaintiff's compl ain t filed on Dece m b e r 14, 1963
cam e a little too late, while the reve r s e would be
true if said period is dee m e d to have com m e n c e d
only in the mont h of Dece m b e r
1963.c h a n r o bl e s vi r t u a l a wli b r a r y c h a n r o b l e s
virtu al law libra ry
The period of "five year s from after the dat e
when such caus e occur r e d " is not her e
involved.c h a n r o b l e s vi r t u a l a wli b r a r y c h a n r o b l e s
virtu al law libra ry
Upon the undisp u t e d facts it see m s clear that, in
the mont h of Sept e m b e r 1962, what ev e r
knowle d g e appell a n t had acqui r e d rega r di n g the
infidelity of her husb a n d , that is, of the fact that
he was then living in Singalo n g with Lily Ann
Alcala, was only thro u g h the inform a t i o n given to
her by Avelino Lubos, driver of the family car.
Much as such hea r s a y inform a t i o n had paine d
and angui s h e d her, she app a r e n t l y thou g h t it
best - and no reaso n a b l e perso n may justifiably
blam e her for it - not to go deep e r into the
mat t e r hers elf beca u s e in all proba bility even up
to that time, notwit hs t a n d i n g her husb a n d ' s
obvious neglec t of his entire family, appella n t
still cheris h e d the hope - howeve r forlor n - of his
coming back hom e to the m. Inde e d, whe n her
husb a n d retu r n e d to the conjug al hom e the
following Octob e r , she purpo s ely refrai n e d from
bringi n g up the mat t e r of his marit al infidelity
"in her desir e not to ange r nor drive defen d a n t
away" - quotin g the very words of the trial court.
True, app ell a n t likewise hea r d in April 1963
rum o r s that her husb a n d was see n with a wom a n
on the family way on Dasm a ri ñ a s Str e e t , but
failed again to eithe r bring up the mat t e r with
her husb a n d or make att e m p t s to verify the trut h
of said rumo r s, but this was due, as the lower
court itself believe d, bec a u s e "she was so happy
that defen d a n t again retu r n e d to the family hom e
in May 1963 that she once more desist e d from
discus si n g the matt e r with him bec a u s e she did
not wish to precipi t a t e a qua r r el and drive him
away." As a mat t e r of fact, notwit h s t a n d i n g all
thes e painful infor m a ti o n s which would not have
bee n legally sufficien t to make a case for legal
sepa r a t i o n - app ell a n t still mad e brave if
desp e r a t e att e m p t s to per su a d e her husb a n d to
com e back hom e. In the words of the lower
court, she "entr e a t e d her fathe r- in- law, Lucilo
Mac a r a i g, to inter c e d e with defen d a n t and to
convinc e him to ret u r n to his family" and also
"requ e s t e d the coope r a t i o n of defe n d a n t ' s olde r
siste r, Mrs. Enriq u e t a Majul" for the sam e
purpo s e , but all that was of no avail. Her
husb a n d rem ai n e d
obdu r a t e . c h a n r o b l e svi r t u al a wlib r a r y c h a n r o b l e s
virtu al law libra ry
After a careful review of the recor d, We are
per s u a d e d that, in the eyes of the law, the only
time when appella n t really beca m e cogniz a n t of
the infidelity of her husb a n d was in the early
par t of Dece m b e r 1963 whe n, quotin g from the
app e al e d decision, the following happ e n e d -
In the early part of Dece m b e r , 1963, plaintiff,
acco m p a ni e d by her two childr e n , Victoria and
Alexand e r , and by Mrs. Leticia Lagro nio went to
talk to defen d a n t at his place of work on Espa ñ a
Exte nsio n in front of Quezon Instit ut e . They
repai r e d to Victoria Peak, a nea r by rest a u r a n t ,
whe r e plaintiff plead e d with defen d a n t to give up
Lily Ann Alcala and to ret u r n to the conjug al
hom e, assu ri n g him that she was willing to
forgive him. Defen d a n t inform e d plaintiff that he
could no longe r leave Lily Ann and refuse d to
ret u r n to his legitim a t e
family.ch a n r o bl e svi rt u a l a w li b r a r y c h a n r o b l e s
virtu al law libra ry
From all the foregoi n g We conclud e that it was
only on the occasion mention e d in the prec e di n g
par a g r a p h when her husb a n d admit t e d to her
that he was living with and would no longe r
leave Lily Ann to ret u r n to his legiti m a t e family
that app ella n t must be dee m e d to be und e r
obliga tion to decide whe t h e r to sue or not to sue
for legal sepa r a t i o n, and it was only the n that the
legal period of one year must be dee m e d to have
com m e n c e d .
WHERE FOR E, the decision appe al e d from is set
aside and anot h e r is her e by rend e r e d holding
that app ella n t is entitle d to legal sepa r a t i o n as
praye d for in her compl ain t; and the case is
her e by rem a n d e d to the lower court for
app ro p r i a t e proc e e di n g s in accor d a n c e with law.
Reyes, J.B.L., Makalint al, Zaldivar, Fern a n d o ,
Teeh a n k e e , Barr e d o and Villamor, JJ.,
concu r .c h a n r o b l e svi rt u a l a w li b r a r y c h a n r o b l e s
virtu al law libra ry
G.R. No. L-53 8 8 0 Mar c h 17, 19 9 4
ENRICO L. PACETE, CLARITA DE LA
CONCEPCIO N , EMELDA C. PACETE,
EVELINA C. PACETE an d EDUARDO C.
PACETE, peti t i o n e r s ,
vs.
HO N. GLICERIO V. CARRIAGA, JR. and
CONCEPCIO N (CONC HITA) ALANIS
PACETE, resp o n d e n t s .
Juan G. Sib u g and Rod ol f o B. Quia c h o n for
peti ti o n e r s .
Julio F. Andr e s , Jr. for privat e res p o n d e n t .
VITUG, J.:
The issue in this petition for certior a r i is whet h e r
or not the Court of First Insta n c e (now Region al
Trial Court) of Cotab a t o, Branc h I, in Cota b a t o
City, gravely abus e d its discr e t io n in denyin g
petition e r s ' motion for exte n sio n of time to file
their answ e r in Civil Case No. 2518, in decla ri n g
petition e r s in default and in rend e ri n g its
decision of 17 Marc h 1980 which, amon g othe r
things, dec r e e d the legal sepa r a t i o n of petition e r
Enrico L. Pace t e and privat e respo n d e n t
Conc e p cio n Alanis and held to be null and void
ab initio the marri a g e of Enrico L. Pacet e to
Clarit a de la Conce p cio n.
On 29 Octob e r 1979, Conce p cio n Alanis filed
with the cour t below a complai n t for the
decla r a t i o n of nullity of the mar ri a g e betw e e n
her erst w hile husb a n d Enrico L. Pace t e and one
Clarit a de la Conce p cio n, as well as for legal
sepa r a t i o n (bet w e e n Alanis and Pacet e),
accou n ti n g and sep a r a t i o n of prop e r t y. In her
compl ai n t, she averr e d that she was mar ri e d to
Pace t e on 30 April 1938 befor e the Justice of the
Peac e of Cotab a t o, Cotab a t o; that they had a
child nam e d Consu elo who was born on 11
Marc h 1943; that Pace t e subse q u e n t ly
cont r a c t e d (in 1948) a secon d mar ri a g e with
Clarit a de la Conce p cio n in Kidap a w a n , Nort h
Cotab a t o; that she lear n e d of such mar ri a g e only
on 01 August 1979; that durin g her mar ri a g e to
Pace t e , the latt e r acquir e d vast prope r t y
consisti n g of large trac t s of land, fishpo n d s and
sever al motor vehicles; that he fraud ul e n t ly
place d the sever al pieces of prop e r t y eithe r in
his nam e and Clarit a or in the nam e s of his
childr e n with Clarita and othe r "dum m i e s;" that
Pace t e ignor e d overt u r e s for an amica bl e
settle m e n t ; and that recon ciliation betw e e n her
and Pace t e was impossi bl e since he evide n tly
prefe r r e d to conti nu e living with Clarit a.
The defe n d a n t s wer e eac h serve d with sum m o n s
on 15 Nove m b e r 1979. They filed a motion for an
exte n sio n of twen ty (20) days from 30 Nove m b e r
1979 within which to file an answ e r . The court
gra n t e d the motion. On 18 Dece m b e r 1979,
app e a r i n g throu g h a new couns el, the
defe n d a n t s filed a secon d motion for an
exte n sio n of anot h e r thirty (30) days from 20
Dece m b e r 1979. On 07 Janua r y 1980, the lower
court gra n t e d the motion but only for twe nty (20)
days to be count e d from 20 Dece m b e r 1979 or
until 09 Janua ry 1980. The Orde r of the court
was mailed to defe n d a n t s ' couns el on 11 Janu a ry
1980. Likely still unaw a r e of the cour t orde r, the
defe n d a n t s , on 05 Febr u a r y 1980, again filed
anot h e r motion (date d 18 Janua ry 1980) for an
exte n sio n of "fiftee n (15) days count e d from the
expir ati on of the 30- day period previou sly
sough t " within which to file an answ e r . The
following day, or on 06 Febr u a r y 1980, the cour t
denie d this last motion on the grou n d that it was
"filed afte r the original period given . . . as first
exte n sio n had expire d."1
The plaintiff ther e u p o n filed a motion to decla r e
the defen d a n t s in defa ul t, which the court
forthwit h gra n t e d . The plaintiff was then
direct e d to pres e n t her evide n c e . 2 The cour t
rec eive d plaintiff's evide nc e during the hea ri n g s
held on 15, 20, 21 and 22 Feb r u a r y 1980.
On 17 Marc h 1980, the cour t 3 prom ul g a t e d the
her ei n ques tio n e d decision, disposin g of the
case, thus —
WHERE FOR E, orde r is her e by issue d orde ri n g:
1. The issua n c e of a Decr e e of Legal Sepa r a t io n
of the mar ri a g e bet w e e n , the plaintiff,
Conc e p cio n (Conchit a) Alanis Pace t e and the
her ei n defe n d a n t s , Enrico L. Pace t e , in
accor d a n c e with the Philippin e laws and with
conse q u e n c e s , as provide d for by our laws;
2. That the following prop e r t i e s are her e by
decla r e d as the conjug al prope r ti e s of the
par t n e r s h i p of the plaintiff, Conce p cio n
(Conchit a) Alanis Pace t e and the defe n d a n t ,
Enrico L. Pace t e, half and half, to wit:
1. The parc el of land cover e d by TCT No. V-815
which is a parc el of land situa t e d in the bar rio of
Langco n g , Municipality of Mat a n o g (previou sly
of Par a n g ), provinc e of Magui n d a n a o (previously
of Cota b a t o provinc e) with an area of 45,265
squa r e met e r s regist e r e d in the nam e of Enrico
Pace t e , Filipino, of legal age, mar ri e d to
Conc hit a Alanis as show n in Exhibits "B" and "B-
1" for the plaintiff.
2. A parc el of land cover e d by Transfe r
Certificat e of Title No. T-2044 2, with an are a of
538 squa r e met e r s and cover e d by Tax
Decla r a t i o n No. 2650 (74) in the nam e of Enrico
Pace t e , situat e d in the Poblacion of Kidap a w a n ,
Nort h Cotab a t o, toge t h e r with all its
improve m e n t s , which parc el of land, as shown by
Exhibit s "K-1" was acqui r e d by way of absolut e
dee d of sale execu t e d by Amrosio Mondo g on
Janua r y 14, 1965.
3. A parc el of land cover e d by Transfe r
Certificat e of Title No. T-2042 4 and cover e d by
Tax Declar a ti o n No. 803 (74), with an are a of
5.167 0 hect a r e s , mor e or less, as show n by
Exhibit "R", the sam e was regist e r e d in the nam e
of Enrico Pacet e and the sam e was acqui r e d by
Enrico Pacet e last Febr u a r y 17, 1967 from
Ambag Ampoy, as shown by Exhibit "R-1",
situat e d at Musa n, Kidapa w a n , Nort h Cotab a t o.
4. A parc el of land situat e d at Lanao, Kidapa w a n ,
Nort h Cotab a t o, with an are a of 5.056 7 hect a r e s ,
cover e d by Tax Declar a ti o n No. 4332 (74), as
show n by Exhibit "S", and regist e r e d in the nam e
of Enrico Pacet e.
5. A parc el of land cover e d by Transfe r
Certificat e of Title No. T-9750, situa t e d at Lika,
Mlang, Nort h Cotab a t o, with an are a of 4.984 1
hect a r e s and the sam e is cover e d by Tax
Decla r a t i o n No. 803 (74) and regist e r e d in the
nam e of Enrico Pace t e and which land was
acqui r e d by Enrico Pacet e from Salvado r Pace t e
on Sept e m b e r 24, 1962, as show n by Exhibit "Q-
1".
6. A parc el of land cover e d by Transfe r
Certificat e of Title No. T-9944, with an are a of
9.956 6 and also cover e d by Tax Declar a ti o n No.
8608 (74) and regist e r e d in the nam e of the
defe n d a n t Enrico L. Pace t e which Enrico L.
Pace t e acqui r e d from Sanc ho Balingco s last
Octobe r 22, 1962, as shown by Exhibit "L-1" and
which parc el of land is situa t e d at (Kialab), Kiab,
Mat al a m , Nort h Cotab a t o.
7. A parc el of land cover e d by Transfe r
Certificat e of Title No. T-9227, situa t e d at Kiab,
Mat al a m , Nort h Cotab a t o, with an are a of
12.04 3 3 9 hect a r e s , more or less, and also
cover e d by Tax Declar a ti o n No. 8607 (74) both in
the nam e of the defen d a n t Enrico L. Pace t e
which he acqui r e d last Octobe r 15, 1962 from
Minda Bern a r di n o, as shown by Exhibit "M- 1".
8. A parc el of land cover e d by Transfe r
Certificat e of Title No. T-9228, situa t e d at Kiab,
Mat al a m , Nort h Cotab a t o, with an are a of
10.89 0 8 hect a r e s , regist e r e d in the nam e of
Enrico Pacet e and also cover e d by Tax
Decla r a t i o n No. 5781 (74) in the nam e of Enrico
Pace t e and which parc el of land he acqui r e d last
Sept e m b e r 25, 1962 from Conc hi t a dela Torr e,
as shown by Exhibit "P- 1".
9. A parc el of land cover e d by Transfe r
Certificat e of Title No. T-1030 1, situa t e d at
Linao, Mat al a m , Nort h Cotab a t o, with an are a of
7.254 7 hect a r e s , regist e r e d in the nam e of
Enrico Pacet e and also cover e d by Tax
Decla r a t i o n No. 8716 (74) also in the nam e of
Enrico Pacet e which Enrico Pace t e acqui r e d
from Agusti n Bijo last July 16, 1963, as show n by
Exhibit "N- 1".
10. A parc el of land cover e d by Transf e r
Certificat e of Title No. 1272 8 in the nam e of the
defe n d a n t , Enrico L. Pace t e , with an are a of
10.90 0 6 hect a r e s , situa t e d at Linao, Matal a m ,
Nort h Cotab a t o and is also cover e d by Tax
Decla r a t i o n No. 5745 (74) in the nam e of Enrico
Pace t e , as shown on Exhibit "O" and which
Enrico Pacet e acqui r e d last Dece m b e r 31, 1963
from Eliseo Pugni, as shown on Exhibit "0- 1".
3. Orde ri n g the Canc ella tio n of Original
Certificat e of Title No. P-3424 3 coverin g Lot No.
1066, issue d in the nam e of Evelina Pace t e,
situat e d at Kiab, Mat al a m , Nort h Cotab a t o, and
orde ri n g the regist r a t i o n of the sam e in the joint
nam e of Conc e p cio n (Conchit a) Alanis Pace t e
and Enrico L. Pacet e as their conjug al prop e r t y,
with addr e s s on the part of Conc e p cio n
(Conchit a) Alanis Pace t e at Para n g ,
Magui n d a n a o and on the par t of Enrico L. Pacet e
at Kidapa w a n , Nort h Cota b a t o.
4. Orde ri n g likewise the canc ella tio n of Origin al
Certificat e of Title No. V-2010 1, coverin g Lot No.
77, in the nam e of Edua r d o C. Pace t e , situa t e d at
New Lawa a n, Mlang, Nort h Cotab a t o, and the
issua n c e of a new Transfe r Certificat e of Title in
the joint na m e of (half and half) Conc e p cio n
(Conchit a) Alanis Pace t e and Enrico L. Pacet e.
5. Orde ri n g likewise the canc ella tio n of Origin al
Certificat e of Title No. P-2989 0, coverin g Lot
1068, situat e d at Kiab, Matal a m , Nort h
Cotab a t o, with an area of 12.103 1 hect a r e s , in
the nam e of Emel d a C. Pace t e and the issua n c e
of a new Transfe r Certificat e of Title in the joint
nam e (half and half) of Conc e p cio n (Conchit a)
Alanis Pacet e and Enrico L. Pace t e; and
decla ri n g that the fishpon d situa t e d at Barrio
Tuma n a n , Bislig, Surig a o Del Sur, with an are a
of 48 hect a r e s and cover e d by Fishpo n d Lease
Agree m e n t of Emeld a C. Pace t e, dat e d July 29,
1977 be canc ell e d and in lieu ther e of, the joint
nam e of Conc e p cio n (Conchit a) Alanis Pace t e
and her husb a n d , Enrico L. Pace t e , be regist e r e d
as their joint prop e r t y, includin g the 50 hect a r e s
fishpo n d situat e d in the sam e place, Barrio
Tima n a n , Bislig, Suriga o del Sur.
6. Orde ri n g the following motor vehicle s to be
the joint prope r ti e s of the conjug al part n e r s h i p
of Conce p cio n (Conchi t a) Alanis Pace t e and
Enrico L. Pace t e, viz:
a. Motor vehicle with Plat e No. T-RG-783; Make,
Dodge; Motor No. T137- 20561; Chassi s No.
83920 3 9 3 , and Type, Mca r ri e r ;
b. Motor vehicle with Plat e No. T-RG-784; Make,
Dodge; Motor No. T214- 22954 7; Chassis No.
10D- 1302- C; and Type, Mcar ri e r ;
c. Motor vehicle with Plat e No. J-PR- 818; Make,
Ford; Motor No. GRW- 1161 8 8; Chassi s No.
HOCC- GPW- 1161- 88- C; Type, Jeep;
d. Motor vehicle with Plat e No. TH- 5J-583; Make,
Ford: Motor No. F70MU 5- 11111; Chassis No.
HOCC- GPW- 1161 1 8 8- G; Type, Stak e;
e. Motor vehicle with Plat e No. TH- 5J-584; Make,
Hino; Motor No. ED300- 4575 8; Chassi s No.
KB222- 2204 4; Type, Stak e; and
f. Motor vehicle with Plate No. TH- 5J-585; Make,
Ford: Motor No. LTC- 780- Dv; Chassis No. 10F-
13582- K; Type, Stak e.
7. Orde ri n g the defe n d a n t Enrico L. Pace t e to
pay the plaintiff the sum of P46,95 0. 0 0 which is
the shar e of the plaintiff in the unacc o u n t e d
incom e of the rice mill and corn sheller for thre e
year s from 1971 to 1973.
8. Orde ri n g the defe n d a n t , Enrico L. Pace t e, to
reim b u r s e the plaintiff the mone t a r y equip m e n t
of 30% of whet h e r the plaintiff has recove r e d as
attor n e y ' s fees;
9. Decla rin g the subs e q u e n t mar ri a g e bet w e e n
defe n d a n t Enrico L. Pace t e and Clarit a de la
Conc e p cio n to be void ab initio; and
10. Orde ri n g the defen d a n t s to pay the costs of
this suit.4
Henc e, the insta n t speci al civil action of
certior a ri .
Unde r ordin a r y circu m s t a n c e s , the petition
would have out rig h tly been dismiss e d, for, as
also point e d out by privat e respo n d e n t s , the
prope r rem e d y of petition e r s shoul d have inste a d
bee n eithe r to appe al from the judgm e n t by
defa ult or to file a petition for relief from
judg m e n t . 5 This rule, howev e r, is not inflexible;
a petition for certior a ri is allowe d when the
defa ult orde r is impro p e r ly decla r e d , or even
when it is prop e rly decla r e d , whe r e grave abus e
of discr e tio n att e n d e d such decla r a ti o n. 6 In
thes e excep tion al inst a n c e s, the special civil
action of certior a ri to decla r e the nullity of a
judg m e n t by defaul t is availa bl e. 7 In the case at
benc h, the defa ult orde r unqu e s t i o n a bly is not
legally sanction e d . The Civil Code provide s:
Art. 101. No decr e e of legal sepa r a t i o n shall be
prom ul g a t e d upon a stipul a tion of facts or by
confession of judgm e n t .
In case of non- appe a r a n c e of the defe n d a n t , the
court shall orde r the prose c u t i n g attor n e y to
inquir e whet h e r or not a collusion betw e e n the
par ti e s exist s. If ther e is no collusion, the
pros e c u ti n g attor n e y shall inte rv e n e for the
Stat e in orde r to take care that the evide n c e for
the plaintiff is not fabrica t e d .
The provision has bee n take n from Article 30 of
the California Civil Code,8 and it is, in subst a n c e ,
repr o d u c e d in Article 60 of the Family Code.9
Article 101 reflect s the public policy on
mar ri a g e s , and it should easily explain the
mand a t o r y teno r of the law. In Brown v. Yambao,
10 the Cour t has obse rv e d:
The policy of Article 101 of the new Civil Code,
calling for the inte rve n t i o n of the stat e attor n e y s
in case of uncon t e s t e d proc e e di n g s for legal
sepa r a t i o n (and of ann ul m e n t of mar ri a g e s ,
und e r Article 88), is to emp h a siz e that marri a g e
is more than a mer e contr a c t ; that it is a social
instit ution in which the stat e is vitally inter e s t e d ,
so that its contin u a t i o n or inte r r u p t i o n can not
be mad e to depe n d upon the parti e s the m s elv e s
(Civil Code, Article 52; Adong vs. Cheon g Gee,
43 Phil. 43; Rami r ez v. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855; Goitia
v. Cam po s, 35 Phil. 252). It is conson a n t with
this policy that the inquiry by the Fiscal should
be allowe d to focus upon any releva n t mat t e r
that may indica t e whet h e r the proce e di n g s for
sepa r a t i o n or annul m e n t are fully justified or not.
Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of
the Family Code, furt h e r mand a t e s that an action
for legal sepa r a t i o n must "in no case be tried
befor e six mont h s shall have elaps e d since the
filing of the petition," obviously in orde r to
provide the parti e s a "cooling- off" period. In this
inte ri m, the court should take step s towa r d
gettin g the partie s to reconcile.
The significa n c e of the above subst a n ti ve
provision s of the law is furt h e r unde r s c o r e d by
the inclusion of the following provision in Rule
18 of the Rules of Cour t:
Sec. 6. No defa ul ts in actions for ann ul m e n t s of
mar ri a g e or for legal sepa r a t i o n. — If the
defe n d a n t in an action for ann ul m e n t of mar ri a g e
or for legal sepa r a t i o n fails to answ e r , the court
shall orde r the prose c u t i n g attor n e y to
investi g a t e whet h e r or not a collusion betw e e n
the parti es exists, and if ther e is no collusion, to
inte rve n e for the Stat e in orde r to see to it that
the evide n c e submi t t e d is not fabric a t e d .
The speci al presc ri p t io n s on actions that can put
the integ ri ty of marri a g e to possible jeopa r dy are
impelle d by no less tha n the Stat e' s inte r e s t in
the mar ri a g e relation and its avow e d inte ntio n
not to leave the matt e r within the exclusive
dom ai n and the vagari e s of the parti e s to alone
dict a t e .
It is clea r that the petition e r did, in fact,
specifically pray for legal sepa r a t i o n. 11 That
othe r rem e di e s, whe t h e r princip al or incide n t al,
have likewise been soug h t in the sam e action
cannot dispe n s e , nor excus e complia n c e , with
any of the stat u t o ry requir e m e n t s afor e q u o t e d .
WHERE FOR E, the petition for certior a r i is
her e by GRANTED and the proc e e di n g s below,
includi n g the Decision of 17 Marc h 1980
app e al e d from, are NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE.
No costs.
LEGAL SEPARATIO N (EFFECT S OF FILING
A PETITIO N )
G.R. No. L-33 3 5 2 De c e m b e r 20, 19 7 4
TEODORO E. LERMA, peti t i o n e r ,
vs.
THE HONORA BLE COURT OF APPEALS and
CONCEPCIO N DIAZ, resp o n d e n t s .
Salong a , Ordoñ e z, Yap, Parl a d e & Associat e s for
petition e r.
Villare al, Matic & Associat e s for privat e
respo n d e n t .
MAKALINTAL, C.J.:p
Before Us for resol utio n are: (1) the petition for
review by certior a ri filed by Teodor o E. Lerm a on
Marc h 21, 1971 to set aside the resol ution of the
respo n d e n t Court of Appe al s in CA-G.R. No.
44906- R dismissi n g his petition for certior a r i and
prohibition with preli mi n a r y injunction filed
ther ei n; and (2) the petition e r ' s motion for
recon si d e r a t i o n of our resolutio n date d Febr u a r y
8, 1974 denying his urg e n t motion for the
issua n c e of a writ of prelimin a r y injunctio n
and/or rest r a i ni n g orde r to enjoin the
enforc e m e n t of cert ai n orde r s of the Juvenile and
Dom esti c Relations Cour t of Quezon City
(her ei n af t e r refer r e d to as the lowe r court)
orde ri n g the petition e r to pay suppo r t pend e n t e
lite to Conce p cion Diaz, the privat e respo n d e n t
her ei n.
Petition e r Lerm a and respo n d e n t Diaz are
husb a n d and wife. They marri e d on May 19,
1951. On August 22, 1969 the petition e r filed a
compl ai n t for adult e ry again st the respo n d e n t
and a cert ai n Teodor o Ramir ez (Crim. Case No.
0519 of the Cour t of First Inst a n c e of Rizal). On
Nove m b e r 18, 1969 the respo n d e n t filed with the
lower court , presid e d by Judge Leonor Ines
Luciano, a compl ain t 1 agai ns t the petition e r for
legal sepa r a t i o n and/or sepa r a t i o n of prope r t i e s,
custody of their childr e n 2 and suppo r t, with an
urg e n t petition for suppo r t pend e n t e lite for her
and their young e s t son, Grego ry, who was the n
and until now is in her custody. The respo n d e n t ' s
compl ai n t for legal sep a r a t i o n is base d on two
groun d s : conc u bi n a g e and atte m p t again st her
life.
The petition e r filed his opposition to the
respo n d e n t ' s applica tion for suppo r t pend e n t e
lite, settin g up as defen s e the adult e r y char g e he
had filed agains t the respo n d e n t .
Judge Luciano gra n t e d the respo n d e n t ' s
applica tio n for suppo r t pend e n t e lite in an orde r
dat e d Dece m b e r 24, 1969, which she ame n d e d in
an orde r dat e d Febr u a r y 15, 1970 to the
following effect: (1) the respo n d e n t was decla r e d
entitle d to suppo r t pend e n t e lite from the dat e of
the filing of the com pl ai nt; and (2) the amou n t of
such mont hly suppo r t was redu c e d from
P2,250.0 0 to P1,82 0. 0 0.
On Marc h 12, 1970 the petition e r filed with
respo n d e n t Court of Appe al s a petition for
certior a ri and prohibition with preli mi n a r y
injunc tion to annul the afore m e n t i o n e d orde r s on
the grou n d that they were issue d with grave
abus e of discr e tio n. The next day the respo n d e n t
court gave due cours e to the petition and issue d
a writ of prelimin a ry injunctio n to stop Judge
Luciano from enforcin g said orde r s.
The respo n d e n t cour t, in its decision of Octobe r
8, 1970, set aside the assaile d orde r s and
gra n t e d the petition e r an oppor t u ni ty to pre se n t
evide n c e befor e the lower court in suppo r t of his
defe ns e agai nst the applica tion for suppo r t
pend e n t e lite.
The respo n d e n t move d to recon si d e r the decision
on the groun d that the petition e r had not aske d
that he be allowe d to pres e n t evide n c e in the
lower court . The respo n d e n t court, in its
resolution of Janua ry 20, 1971, set aside the
decision of Octob e r 8 and rend e r e d anot h e r ,
dismissin g the petition. This is now the subjec t of
the inst a n t proc e e di n g for review.
On Janua r y 23, 1974 the petition e r filed an
urg e n t motion for a writ of prelimin a ry
injunc tion and/or rest r ai ni n g orde r, allegi ng (1)
that durin g the pend e n c y of this appe al and until
Dece m b e r 5, 1973 the respo n d e n t had neve r
sough t the enforc e m e n t of the assaile d orde r s of
the lowe r court gra n ti n g suppo r t pend e n t e lite;
(2) that on Dece m b e r 5, 1973 the respo n d e n t
filed with the lower court an urg e n t motion
praying that the petition e r be orde r e d to pay the
awa r d e d suppo r t pend e n t e lite, both cur r e n t and
in arr e a r s , on the grou n d that in the abse n c e of
an injunction from this Court the assaile d orde r s
shoul d be execu t e d ; (3) that the petition e r filed
his opposition to the motion, pointin g out that for
the previou s thr e e year s the respo n d e n t did not
ask for the enforc e m e n t of the orde r s and her
belat e d move cam e only "after petition e r had
filed new adult e r y char g e s agai ns t her and her
secon d para m o u r " and after the petition e r had
sough t custo dy of thei r son Gregory; (4) that in
conne c t io n with the first adult e r y char g e , the
respo n d e n t and her co- accus e d, Teddy Ramir e z,
had been convict e d by the Cour t of First
Inst a n c e of Rizal in its decision rend e r e d on
Sept e m b e r 26, 1972 and said judg m e n t of
conviction was pendi n g app e al in the Court of
Appeals; (5) that Judge Lucia no issue d an orde r
dat e d Janua ry 19, 1974, orde ri n g the petition e r
to pay the respo n d e n t the awar d e d suppo r t
pend e n t e lite within 15 days; and (6) that unless
the lowe r court was enjoine d from enforcin g its
assaile d orde r s, the pres e n t petition would be
rend e r e d moot and aca d e m i c, to the prejudi c e of
the petition e r .
On Janua r y 28, 1974 this Court, acting on the
petition e r ' s motion, resolved "to issue a
tem p o r a r y rest r a i ni n g orde r effective
imme di a t e ly and until furt h e r orde r s from this
Court." The orde r was add r e s s e d to Judge
Luciano, her age n t s and repr e s e n t a t iv e s.
Requi r e d to com m e n t on the petition e r ' s urge n t
motion for prelimin a r y injunc tion, the
respo n d e n t filed an opposition, with a praye r for
the imm e di a t e lifting of the tem p o r a r y
rest r ai ni n g orde r issue d ex- par t e . The opposition
reite r a t e d the grou n d s of her motion dat e d
Dece m b e r 5, 1973 filed in the lower cour t, to wit:
(1) that an orde r gra n ti n g suppo r t pend e n t e lite,
althou g h inte rloc u t o r y, is imm e di a t e ly execu t o r y
even if appe al e d, unless enjoine d; (2) that the
dismiss al of the petition by the respo n d e n t Court
of Appeal s rend e r e d funct u s oficio the writ of
prelimi n a r y injunc tion it had previou sly issue d;
and (3) that und e r Article 292 of the New Civil
Code, which provide s that "durin g the
proce e di n g s for legal sepa r a t i o n, or for
annul m e n t of mar ri a g e , the spous e s and childr e n
shall be suppo r t e d from the conjug al part n e r s hi p
prope r t y ...," such suppo r t is mand a t o r y even if
ther e be a showin g that the wife is guilty of
adult e r y.
In a minut e resolution dat e d Febr u a r y 8, 1974
We denie d the petition e r ' s urge n t motion for a
writ of prelimin a r y injunc tion. On Febr u a r y 28,
1974 the petition e r filed this insta n t motion for
recon si d e r a t i o n . On Marc h 6, 1974 We issue d
anot h e r resolution settin g aside the resol ution of
Febr u a r y 8, 1974 and reinst a t e d the tem po r a r y
rest r ai ni n g orde r previously issue d until furt h e r
orde r s. On the sam e day the respo n d e n t filed her
opposition to the motion for recon si d e r a t i o n and
later asked that it be set for oral argu m e n t . The
petition e r ' s pendi n g motion was set for hea ri n g
on April 22, 1974 and the n rese t for May 20,
1974. On the latte r dat e couns el for both par ti e s
app e a r e d . In lieu, howeve r, of oral argu m e n t the
Court allowe d the m to file me m o r a n d a .
The petition assails the resolution of the
respo n d e n t Court of Appe al s on two main
groun d s :
I. IT IS ERROR FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS
TO HOLD THAT THE LOWER COURT, IN
GRANTING SUPPORT PENDE NTE LITE TO
RESPOND E NT CONCEP CION DIAZ, DID NOT
COMMIT A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE
292 OF THE CIVIL CODE MAKE IT
MANDATORY DURING THE PENDE N CY OF
LEGAL SEPARATION PROCEEDING S TO
GRANT SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE TO HEREIN
RESPOND E NT.
The foregoin g alleg e d error s refe r to the two
aspe c t s, proc e d u r a l and subst a n t iv e, of the
dispu t e d orde r s gra n ti n g suppo r t pend e n t e lite.
As corr e c t ly stat e d by the respo n d e n t court in its
decision (which was later recon si d e r e d in its
resolution unde r review), the proc e d u r a l law on
suppo r t pend e n t e lite is Rule 61 of the Revise d
Rules of Court, specifically Section 5 ther e of,
which partly provide s:
The court shall det e r m i n e provision ally the
pertin e n t facts, and shall ren d e r such orde r as
equity and justice may requi r e, having due
rega r d to the nece s si ti e s of the applica n t , the
mea n s of the adve r s e party, the proba bl e
outco m e of the case, and such othe r
circu m s t a n c e s as may aid in the prop e r
elucid a t ion of the ques tio n s involved. ...
The petition e r maint ai n s that the above- quot e d
provision was disre g a r d e d by the lower court
when it issue d the disput e d orde r s withou t
provision ally det e r m i ni n g the perti n e n t facts of
the case, partic ul a rly insofa r as they might have
a bea rin g on its prob a bl e outco m e , mer ely
relying on the bar e allega ti on s of the com pl ai nt .
The petition e r also claim s he was deprive d of the
opport u ni ty to pres e n t evide n c e in suppo r t of his
defe ns e of adult e ry again st the respo n d e n t ' s
applica tio n for suppo r t pend e n t e lite.
The ques tio n of whet h e r or not the petition e r
shoul d be allowe d to pres e n t eviden c e in the
lower court in suppo r t of that his wife had
com mit t e d adult e r y has beco m e acad e m i c. The
petition e r, in his motion filed Febr u a r y 28, 1974
for recon si d e r a t i o n of the denial by this Court of
his petition for preli min a r y injunc tion,
manifes t e d that on Sept e m b e r 26, 1972 the court
of First Inst a n c e of Rizal decide d the adult e ry
case of the respo n d e n t and found her and her co-
accus e d , Teodo ro Ramir ez, guilty of the cha r g e ,
sent e n ci n g the m to a ter m of impriso n m e n t . This
has not bee n deni e d by the respo n d e n t . Neith e r
is it deni ed that on March 30, 1970, as a resul t of
the adult e r o u s relations with Teodor o Ramire z
for which she was later on convict e d, the said
respo n d e n t gave birt h pre m a t u r e l y to a baby
boy, who howeve r died the sam e day. When the
respo n d e n t ent e r e d the hospit al for delive ry, she
regist e r e d unde r the assu m e d na m e of "Gloria
Sant os," and whe n the child died had it falsely
identifie d in the dea t h certifica t e as the child of
one Rosario R. Salit a, a close friend of her s. For
the falsification thus com mit t e d Rosario E. Salit a
was crimin ally char g e d and convict e d, altho u g h
the respo n d e n t her s elf was acqui t t e d on
reaso n a b l e doubt. The petition e r ' s motion of
Febr u a r y 28 also stat e s, withou t deni al on the
par t of the respo n d e n t , that afte r Teodoro
Ramir ez anot h e r man, this time a Manila
police m a n by the nam e of Jose Gocha n g c o,
bec a m e her par a m o u r , as a conse q u e n c e of
which crimin al cha r g e s of adult e ry have bee n
filed again st the m befor e the Fiscal of Manila.
Photog r a p h s of the two, showin g the m in
intim a t e pose, wer e sub mit t e d to this Cour t.
Their veracity has not been dispu t e d .
The legal issue pose d by the foregoi n g facts is
whet h e r adult e ry is a good defen s e agains t the
respo n d e n t ' s claim for suppo r t pend e n t e lite. In
Quint a n a v. Lerm a , 24 Phil. 285, which was an
action by the wife agains t the husb a n d for
suppo r t , base d upon a writt e n cont r a c t , this
Court held that adult e ry is a good defens e . This
ruling was reite r a t e d in the subs e q u e n t case s of
Sanc h e z v. Zulue t a, 68 Phil. 110, and Mango m a
v. Mac a d a e g , et al., 90 Phil. 508. See also
Olayvar v. Olayvar, 98 Phil. 52.
The respo n d e n t Court of Appe al s, in uphol din g
the question e d orde r s of the lower court, relied
on Article 292 of the Civil Code, which rea d s:
ART. 292. During the proc e e di n g s for legal
sepa r a t i o n, or for ann ul m e n t of marri a g e , the
spous e s and childr e n shall be suppo r t e d from the
conjug al par t n e r s h i p prope r t y. After the final
judg m e n t of legal sep a r a t i o n, or of ann ul m e n t of
mar ri a g e , the obligatio n of mut u al suppo r t
betw e e n the spous e s ceas e s. Howev e r, in case of
legal sepa r a t i o n, the court may orde r that the
guilty spous e shall give suppo r t to the innoce n t
one, the judgm e n t specifying the ter m s of such
orde r .
It is sugg e s t e d that while adult e r y may be a
defe ns e in an action for perso n a l suppo r t , that is,
suppo r t of the wife by the husb a n d from his own
funds, it is not a defen s e whe n the suppo r t is to
be take n from the conjug al par t n e r s h i p prop e r t y.
We do not see that the distinctio n is mat e ri al in
this case. In the first plac e Article 292 is not in
itself the sourc e of the legal right to receive
suppo r t . It mer ely stat e s that the suppo r t , not
only of the spous e s but also of the childr e n, shall
be take n from the conjug al prope r t y durin g the
pend e n c y of the legal sepa r a t i o n proc e e di n g. It
does not precl u d e the loss of such right in
cert ai n case s. In the secon d place, the said
articl e cont e m p l a t e s the pend e n c y of a court
action and, infere n ti ally at least, a prim a facie
showin g that the action will prosp e r . For if the
action is show n to be groun dl e s s the mer e filing
ther e of will not nece s s a rily set Article 292 in
oper a ti o n. This is also the sens e of Section 5 of
Rule 61, supr a , which requi r e s, amon g othe r
things, when suppo r t pend e n t e lite is applied for,
that the court det e r m i n e provision ally "the
proba bl e outco m e of the case."
Article 100 of the Civil Code provide s that "the
legal sepa r a t i o n may be claim e d only by the
innoce n t spous e, provide d ther e has bee n no
condon a t io n of or conse n t to the adult e r y or
concu bi n a g e ... (and) whe r e both spous e s are
offend e r s, a legal sepa r a t i o n cannot be claim e d
by eithe r of the m ..."
In a provision al sens e at least, within the
mea ni n g of Rule 61 (Section 5), the prob a bl e
failure of the respo n d e n t ' s suit for legal
sepa r a t i o n can be forese e n since she is not an
innoce n t spous e, having bee n convict e d of
adult e r y by the Court of First Inst a n c e . It is true
that the judg m e n t of conviction is on appe al in
the Cour t of Appeal s, but the sam e undou b t e dl y
satisfies the stan d a r d of provision al showing set
by the afore s ai d Rule. If legal sepa r a t i o n canno t
be claim e d by the guilty spous e in the first plac e,
the fact that an action for that purpo s e is filed
anyw ay shoul d not be per mi t t e d to be used as a
mea n s to obtain suppo r t pend e n t e lite, which,
without such action, would be denie d on the
stre n g t h of the decision s of this Cour t
recog nizi ng adult e ry as a good defe ns e.
Other wi s e, as point e d out by the petition e r , all
that an errin g spous e has to do to circu m v e n t
such defens e would be to file a suit for legal
sepa r a t i o n no mat t e r how groun dl e s s .
The right to sepa r a t e suppo r t or maint e n a n c e ,
even from the conjug al par t n e r s hi p prope r t y,
pre s u p p o s e s the exist e n c e of a justifiable caus e
for the spous e claimin g such right to live
sepa r a t e ly. This is implicit in Article 104 of the
Civil Code, which stat e s that afte r the filing of
the petition for legal sepa r a t io n the spous e s shall
be entitl ed to live sepa r a t e ly from each other . A
petition in bad faith, such as that filed by one
who is himself or hers elf guilty of an act which
constit u t e s a grou n d for legal sepa r a t i o n at the
inst a n c e of the othe r spous e, cannot be
conside r e d as within the inten d m e n t of the law
gra n ti n g sepa r a t e suppo r t. In fact unde r Article
303 of the sam e Code the obligatio n to give
suppo r t shall ceas e "when the recipie n t, be he a
forced heir or not, has com mi t t e d some act
which gives rise to disinh e ri t a n c e ;" and unde r
Article 921 one of the caus e s for disinh e ri tin g a
spous e is "whe n the spous e has given cause for
legal sepa r a t i o n." The loss of the subst a n t iv e
right to suppo r t in such a situa tion is
incom p a t i bl e with any claim for suppo r t
pend e n t e lite.
What has been said above, of cour s e, is not
mea n t to be a prejud g m e n t of eithe r the legal
sepa r a t i o n proce e di n g pendi n g in the lower
court or the crimin al case for adult e ry pendi n g in
the Cour t of Appeal s. It is to be unde r s t o o d only
in the light of Rule 61, Section 5, of the Rules of
Court, which specifically gove r n s the subjec t of
suppo r t pend e n t e lite.
WHERE FOR E, the resolutio n of respo n d e n t
Court of Appeals of Janua ry 20, 1971 and the
orde r s of respo n d e n t Juvenile and Dome stic
Relation s Court herei n com pl ai n e d of, dat e d
Dece m b e r 24, 1969 and Febr u a r y 15, 1970, all
are set aside and thei r enforc e m e n t enjoine d,
without prejudic e to such judg m e n t as may be
rend e r e d in the pendi n g action for legal
sepa r a t i o n betw e e n the parti e s. No
prono u n c e m e n t as to costs.
Cast ro, Teeha n k e e , Maka si a r and Muñoz Palm a,
JJ., conc u r.
Esgu e r r a , J., took no part.
G.R. No. 10 6 1 6 9 Febr u a ry 14, 19 9 4
SAM S O N T. SABALO NE S , peti t i o n e r ,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and REME DIO S
GAVIOLA- SABALO NE S , res p o n d e n t s .
Leve n S. Pun o for peti t i o n e r .
Be n i g n o M. Pun o for privat e res p o n d e n t .
CRUZ, J.:
The subjec t of this petition is the prelimi n a r y
injunc tion issue d by the respo n d e n t court
pendi n g resolutio n of a case on appe al. We deal
only with this mat t e r and not the merit s of the
case.
As a me m b e r of our diplom a ti c service assign e d
to differ e n t count ri e s during his succ e s sive tour s
of dutie s, petition e r Sam so n T. Sabalo n e s left to
his wife, her ei n respo n d e n t Rem e dio s Gaviola-
Sabalon e s , the admi ni st r a t i o n of som e of their
conjug al, prope r t i e s for fifteen year s.
Sabalon e s retir e d as amb a s s a d o r in 1985 and
cam e back to the Philippin e s but not to his wife
and their childr e n . Four years late r, he filed an
action for judicial aut ho riz a tio n to sell a building
and lot locat e d at
# 1 7 Eise n ho w e r St., Gree n hills, San Juan, Met ro
Manila, belongi n g to the conjug al part n e r s hi p.
He claim e d that he was sixty- eight year s old,
very sick and living alone withou t any incom e,
and that his shar e of the proce e d s of the sale to
defr ay the prohi bitive cost of his hospit aliza tion
and medic al tre a t m e n t .
In her answ e r , the privat e respo n d e n t oppos e d
the autho ri za tio n and filed a count e r c l ai m for
legal sepa r a t i o n. She allege d that the house in
Gree n hills was being occupi e d by her and their
six childr e n and that they were depe n di n g for
their suppo r t on the rent al s from anot h e r
conjug al prop e r t y, a building and lot in Forb e s
Park which was on lease to Nobu mi c hi Izumi.
She also inform e d the cour t that despi t e her
husb a n d ' s retire m e n t , he had not ret u r n e d to his
legiti m a t e family and was inst e a d maint ai ni n g a
sepa r a t e resid e n c e in Don Antonio Heigh t s,
Fairview, Quezon City, with Thelm a Cum a r e n g
and their thre e childre n .
In her praye r, she aske d the court to gra n t the
dec r e e of legal sepa r a t i o n and orde r the
liquida tion of their conjug al prope r t i e s, with
forfeitu r e of her husb a n d ' s shar e ther ei n beca u s e
of his adult e ry. She also praye d that it enjoin the
petition e r and his age n t s from a) dist ur bi n g the
occup a n t s of the Forb e s Park prope r t y and b)
disposin g of or encu m b e r i n g any of the conjug al
prope r ti e s.
After trial, Judge Maria no M. Umali, found that
the petition e r had inde e d cont r a c t e d a biga m o u s
mar ri a g e on Octob e r 5, 1981, with Thelm a
Cum a r e n g , to whom he had ret u r n e d upon his
retir e m e n t in 1985 at a sepa r a t e resid e n c e . The
court thus dec r e e d the legal sepa r a t i o n of the
spous e s and the forfeit u r e of the petition e r ' s
sha r e in the conjug al prope r t i e s, decla ri n g as
well that he was not entitle d to suppo r t from his
respo n d e n t wife.1
This decision was app e al e d to the respo n d e n t
court. Pend e n t e lite, the respo n d e n t wife filed a
motion for the issua n c e of a writ of prelimin a r y
injunc tion to enjoin the petition e r from
inte rf e ri n g with the admi nist r a t i o n of their
prope r ti e s in Gree n hills and Forb e s Park. She
allege d inter alia that he had har a s s e d the ten a n t
of the Forb e s Park prope r t y by informin g him
that his lease would not be ren e w e d . She also
compl ai n e d that the petition e r had dispos e d of
one of their valua bl e conjug al prop e r t i e s in the
Unite d Stat e s in favor of his par a m o u r , to the
preju dic e of his legiti m a t e wife and childr e n .
The petition e r oppos e d this motion and filed his
own motion to preve n t his wife from ent e ri n g
into a new cont r a c t of lease over the Forb e s Park
prope r t y with its pres e n t tena n t , or with futur e
ten a n t s, withou t his conse n t .
After hea ri n g, the Cour t of Appe als, in an orde r
dat e d April 7, 1992, gra n t e d the preli mi n a r y
injunc tion praye d for by his wife.2
The petition e r now assails this orde r, argui n g
that since the law provide s for a joint
admi nist r a t i o n of the conjug al prope r t i e s by the
husb a n d and wife, no injunctive relief can be
issue d again s t one or the othe r beca u s e no right
will be violate d. In suppo r t of this cont e n ti o n, he
cites Art. 124 of the Family Code, rea di n g as
follows:
Art. 124. The administ r a t i o n and enjoym e n t of
the conjug al part n e r s h i p prop e r t y shall belong to
both spous e s jointly. In case of disag r e e m e n t , the
husb a n d ' s decision shall prevail, subjec t to
recou r s e to the court by the wife for prop e r
rem e d y, which must be availed of within five
year s from the date of the contr a c t imple m e n t i n g
such decision.
In the event that one spous e is incap a ci t a t e d or
othe r wi s e una bl e to partici p a t e in the
admi nist r a t i o n of the conjug al prope r t i e s, the
othe r spous e may assu m e sole powe r s of the
admi nist r a t i o n. These powe r s do not includ e
disposition or encu m b r a n c e withou t aut ho rity of
the court or the writt e n cons e n t of the othe r
spous e. In the abse n c e of such aut ho ri ty or
conse n t , the disposi tion or encu m b r a n c e shall be
void. Howeve r, the tra n s a c t i o n shall be
const r u e d and the third per so n, and may be
perfec t e d as a binding cont r a c t upon the
acce p t a n c e by the othe r spous e or the
aut ho riz a ti o n by the court before the offer is
withd r a w n by eithe r or both offeror s.
He furt h e r not es that the respo n d e n t cour t failed
to appoin t an admi nist r a t o r of the conjug al
asse t s as man d a t e d by Art. 61 of the Code, thus:
Art. 61 After the filing of the petition for legal
sepa r a t i o n, the spous e s shall be entitle d to live
sepa r a t e ly from each othe r.
The court, in the abse n c e of a writt e n agr e e m e n t
betw e e n the spous e s, shall design a t e eithe r of
the m or a third perso n to administ e r the absolut e
com m u ni t y or conjug al part n e r s h i p prop e r t y. The
admi nist r a t o r appoi nt e d by the cour t shall have
the sam e powe r s and duties as those of a
gua r di a n unde r the Rules of Court.
The Court has carefully conside r e d the issues
and the arg u m e n t s of the parti e s and finds that
the petition has no merit.
We agr e e with the respo n d e n t court that pendin g
the appoin t m e n t of an admini st r a t o r over the
whole mass of conjug al asse t s, the respo n d e n t
court was justified in allowing the wife to
continu e with her admi ni st r a ti o n. It was also
corr e c t , taking into accou n t the evide n c e
add uc e d at the heari n g, in enjoining the
petition e r from interfe ri n g with his wife's
admi nist r a t i o n pendi n g resolution of the app e al.
The law does indee d gran t to the spous e s joint
admi nist r a t i o n over the conjug al prop e r t i e s as
clearly provide d in the above- cited Article 124 of
the Family Code. Howeve r, Article 61, also above
quot e d, stat e s that afte r a petition for legal
sepa r a t i o n has bee n filed, the trial court shall, in
the abse n c e of a writt e n agr e e m e n t betw e e n the
coupl e, appoint eithe r one of the spous e s or a
third perso n to act as the admi ni st r a t o r .
While it is true that no form al desig n a t i o n of the
admi nist r a t o r has been mad e, such design a t i o n
was implicit in the decision of the trial court
denying the petition e r any shar e in the conjug al
prope r ti e s (and thus also disqu alifying him as
admi nist r a t o r ther e of). That design a t i o n was in
effect appr ov e d by the Court of Appeals when it
issue d in favor of the respo n d e n t wife the
prelimi n a r y injunc tion now unde r challen g e .
The prim a ry purpos e of the provision al rem e d y
of injunc tion is to pres e r v e the stat u s quo of the
things subjec t of the action or the relation s
betw e e n the parti e s and thus prot e c t the right s
of the plaintiff resp e c ti n g thes e mat t e r s durin g
the pend e n c y of the suit. Othe r wi s e, the
defe n d a n t may, befor e final judg m e n t , do or
continu e doing the act which the plaintiff asks
the court to rest r ai n and thus make ineffect u al
the final judg m e n t that may be rend e r e d
after w a r d s in favor of the plaintiff.3
As observ e d by Fran ci s co, "Injunc tion is
prim a rily a preve n tive rem e dy. Its provinc e is to
afford relief agains t futur e acts which are
again s t equity and good consci e n c e and to keep
and pres e r v e the thing in the stat u s quo, rat h e r
than to rem e dy what is past or to punish for
wrongful acts alre a dy com mi t t e d . It may issue to
preve n t futur e wron g s althou g h no right has yet
bee n violat e d."4
The Court note s that the wife has been
admi nist e r i n g the subjec t prope r ti e s for almost
ninet e e n years now, appa r e n t l y withou t
compl ai n t on the part of the petition e r . He has
not alleg e d, much less show n, that her
admi nist r a t i o n has caus e d prejudi c e to the
conjug al par t n e r s h i p. What he mer ely sugg e s t s is
that the lease of the Forb e s Park prop e r t y could
be ren e w e d on bett e r ter m s, or he should at least
be given his shar e of the rent al s.
In her motion for the issua n c e of a preli mi n a r y
injunc tion, the respo n d e n t wife allege d that the
petition e r ' s har a s s m e n t of their tena n t at Forb e s
Park
would jeopa r diz e the lease and deprive her and
her childr e n of the incom e ther ef ro m on which
they dep e n d for thei r subsist e n c e . She also
testified the num e r o u s . . . includin g various
dollar accou n t s , two house s in Quezon City and
Cebu City, and a Merc e d e s Benz. The privat e
respo n d e n t also com pl ai n e d that on June 10,
1991, the petition e r exec ut e d a quitcl ai m over
their conjug al prop e r t y in Apple Valley, San
Bern a r d i n o, Californi a, U.S.A., in favor of Thelm a
Cum a r e n g , to improve his par a m o u r ' s luxuriou s
lifestyle to the prejudi c e of his legitim a t e family.
These alleg a tio n s, none of which was refut e d by
the husb a n d , show that the injunc tion is
nece s s a r y to prot e c t the inter e s t s of the privat e
respo n d e n t and her childr e n and preve n t the
dissipa tion of the conjug al asset s.
The twin requi r e m e n t s of a valid injunc tion are
the exist e n c e of a right and its actu al or
thre a t e n e d violation.5 Rega r dl e s s of the outco m e
of the appe al, it cannot be denie d that as the
petition e r ' s legitim a t e wife (and the com pl ai n a n t
and injure d spous e in the action for legal
sepa r a t i o n), the privat e respo n d e n t has a right to
a shar e (if not the whole) of the conjug al est a t e .
Ther e is also, in our view, enoug h evide n c e to
raise the appr e h e n si o n that entr u s ti n g said
est a t e to the petition e r may resul t in its
improvid e n t disposition to the det ri m e n t of his
wife and childr e n. We agr e e that inas m u c h as
the trial court had earlie r decla r e d the forfeitu r e
of the petition e r ' s sha r e in the conjug al
prope r ti e s, it would be prud e n t not to allow him
in the mea n ti m e to partici p a t e in its
man a g e m e n t .
Let it be stre s s e d that the injunc tion has not
per m a n e n t l y installe d the respo n d e n t wife as the
admi nist r a t o r of the whole mass of conjug al
asse t s. It has mer ely allowe d her to conti nu e
admi nist e r i n g the prope r t i e s in the mea n t i m e
without interfe r e n c e from the petition e r , pendi n g
the expre s s design a ti o n of the admi nist r a t o r in
accor d a n c e with Article 61 of the Family Code.
WHERE FOR E, the petition is DENIED for lack of
merit. It is
4. 5 EFFECT OF DECREE
ARTICLE 63- 64, FC
DIS S OL UTIO N AND LIQUIDATIO N OF ACP
AND CPG
G.R. No. L-30 9 7 7 Janu ary 31, 19 7 2
CARME N LAPUZ SY, repr e s e n t e d by her
su b s t i t u t e MACARIO LAPUZ, peti ti o n e r -
app e l l a n t ,
vs.
EUFEMIO S. EUFEMIO alia s EUFE MIO SY
UY, resp o n d e n t - app e l l e e .
Jose W. Diok n o for peti t i o n e r - app e l l a n t .
D. G. Eufe m i o for resp o n d e n t - app e l l e e .
REYES J.B.L., J.:p
Petition, filed after the effectivity of Repu blic Act
5440, for review by certior a ri of an orde r, dat e d
29 July 1969, of the Juvenile and Domes tic
Relation s Court of Manila, in its Civil Case No.
20387, dismissi n g said case for legal sep a r a t i o n
on the groun d that the deat h of the ther ei n
plaintiff, Car m e n O. Lapuz Sy, which occur r e d
durin g the pend e n c y of the case, abat e d the
caus e of action as well as the action itself. The
dismiss al orde r was issue d over the objection of
Mac a rio Lapuz, the heir of the dece a s e d plaintiff
(and petition e r her ei n) who sough t to substit u t e
the dec e a s e d and to have the case prose c u t e d to
final judg m e n t .
On 18 August 1953, Car m e n O. Lapuz Sy filed a
petition for legal sepa r a t i o n agai ns t Eufemio S.
Eufemio, allegi ng, in the main, that they wer e
mar ri e d civilly on 21 Sept e m b e r 1934 and
canonic ally on 30 Sept e m b e r 1934; that they had
lived toget h e r as husb a n d and wife continu o u sly
until 1943 when her husb a n d aba n d o n e d her;
that they had no child; that they acqui r e d
prope r ti e s duri ng their mar ri a g e ; and that she
discove r e d her husb a n d coha bitin g with a
Chine s e wom a n na m e d Go Hiok at 1319 Sisa
Stre e t , Manila, on or about Marc h 1949. She
praye d for the issua n c e of a decr e e of legal
sepa r a t i o n, which, amon g othe r s, would orde r
that the defe n d a n t Eufemio S. Eufe mio shoul d be
deprive d of his sha r e of the conjug al par t n e r s h i p
profits.
In his secon d ame n d e d answ e r to the petition,
her ei n respo n d e n t Eufe mio S. Eufe mio allege d
affirm a t ive and speci al defen s e s, and, along with
sever al othe r claims involving money and othe r
prope r ti e s, count e r- claim e d for the decla r a t i o n
of nullity ab initio of his mar ri a g e with Car m e n
O. Lapuz Sy, on the groun d of his prior and
subsisti n g mar ri a g e , celeb r a t e d accor di n g to
Chine s e law and custo m s, with one Go Hiok,
alias Ngo Hiok.
Issue s having bee n joined, trial proc e e d e d and
the parti es addu c e d thei r resp e c t ive evide n c e .
But befor e the trial could be comple t e d (the
respo n d e n t was alre a dy sche d ul e d to pre se n t
surr e b u t t a l evide n c e on 9 and 18 June 1969),
petition e r Car m e n O. Lapuz Sy died in a
vehicula r accide n t on 31 May 1969. Couns el for
petition e r duly notified the cour t of her deat h.
On 9 June 1969, respo n d e n t Eufe mio moved to
dismiss the "petition for legal sepa r a t i o n" 1 on
two (2) groun d s , nam ely: that the petition for
legal sepa r a t i o n was filed beyon d the one- year
period provide d for in Article 102 of the Civil
Code; and that the deat h of Car m e n aba t e d the
action for legal sepa r a t i o n.
On 26 June 1969, couns el for dece a s e d petition e r
move d to substit u t e the dece a s e d Carm e n by her
fathe r , Maca rio Lapuz. Counsel for Eufe mio
oppos e d the motion.
On 29 July 1969, the court issue d the orde r
und e r review, dismissi n g the case.2 In the body
of the orde r, the court stat e d that the motion to
dismiss and the motion for substit u ti o n had to be
resolve d on the question of whet h e r or not the
plaintiff's caus e of action has survive d, which the
court resolve d in the nega tive. Petition e r ' s
move d to recon si d e r but the motion was deni e d
on 15 Sept e m b e r 1969.
After first secu ri n g an exten sio n of time to file a
petition for review of the orde r of dismiss al
issue d by the juvenile and dom e s ti c relations
court, the petition e r filed the pres e n t petition on
14 Octobe r 1969. The sam e was given due
cours e and answ e r ther e t o was filed by
respo n d e n t , who praye d for the affirm a n c e of the
said orde r .3
Althoug h the defen d a n t below, the her ein
respo n d e n t Eufe mio S. Eufe mio, filed
count e r c l ai m s, he did not purs u e the m after the
court below dismiss e d the case. He acquie s c e d
in the dismiss al of said count e r c l ai m s by praying
for the affirm a n c e of the orde r that dismiss e d not
only the petition for legal sepa r a t i o n but also his
count e r c l ai m to declar e the Eufe mio- Lapuz
mar ri a g e to be null and void ab initio.
But petition e r Car m e n O. Lapuz Sy (throu g h her
self- assu m e d substi t u t e — for the lower court did
not act on the motion for substit u ti o n) stat e d the
princip al issue to be as follows:
When an action for legal sepa r a t i o n is conve r t e d
by the count e r c l ai m into one for a decla r a ti o n of
nullity of a marri a g e , does the deat h of a party
aba t e the proce e di n g s ?
The issue as fram e d by petition e r inject s into it a
suppos e d conve r si on of a legal sepa r a t i o n suit to
one for decla r a t io n of nullity of a mar ri a g e ,
which is without basis, for even petition e r
asse r t e d that "the respo n d e n t has acqui e s c e d to
the dismiss al of his count e r c l ai m " (Petition e r ' s
Brief, pag e 22). Not only this. The petition for
legal sepa r a t i o n and the count e r c l ai m to decl ar e
the nullity of the self sam e mar ri a g e can stan d
inde p e n d e n t and sepa r a t e adjudic a ti o n. They are
not insep a r a b l e nor was the action for legal
sepa r a t i o n conve r t e d into one for a decla r a ti o n
of nullity by the count e r cl ai m , for legal
sepa r a t i o n pre- suppos e s a valid mar ri a g e , while
the petition for nullity has a voida bl e mar ri a g e as
a pre- condition.
The first real issue in this case is: Does the deat h
of the plaintiff befor e final decr e e , in an action
for legal sepa r a t i o n, aba t e the action? If it does,
will abat e m e n t also apply if the action involves
prope r t y right s? .
An action for legal sepa r a ti o n which involves
nothin g mor e tha n the bed- and- boar d sepa r a ti o n
of the spous e s (the r e being no absol ut e divorc e
in this jurisdiction) is pur ely perso n al . The Civil
Code of the Philippin e s recog niz e s this in its
Article 100, by allowing only the innoce n t spous e
(and no one else) to claim legal sepa r a t io n; and
in its Article 108, by providing that the spouse s
can, by their reconciliation, stop or aba t e the
proce e di n g s and even rescin d a decr e e of legal
sepa r a t i o n alre a dy rend e r e d . Being perso n a l in
cha r a c t e r , it follows that the dea t h of one par ty
to the action caus e s the deat h of the action itself
— actio perso n alis morit u r cum perso n a .
... When one of the spous e s is dea d, ther e is no
nee d for divorce, bec a u s e the mar ri a g e is
dissolve d. The heirs cannot even contin u e the
suit, if the dea t h of the spous e take s place duri ng
the cours e of the suit (Article 244, Section 3).
The action is absolut ely dea d (Cass., July 27,
1871, D. 71. 1. 81; Cass. req., May 8, 1933, D. H.
1933, 332.")4 .
Mar ri a g e is a perso n a l relation or stat u s, crea t e d
und e r the sanc tion of law, and an action for
divorc e is a proce e di n g brou g h t for the pur po s e
of effecti ng a dissolution of that relation. The
action is one of a perso n al nat u r e . In the abse n c e
of a stat u t e to the cont r a r y, the deat h of one of
the parti es to such action aba t e s the action, for
the rea so n that deat h has settle d the question of
sepa r a t i o n beyond all cont rov e r s y and deprive d
the court of jurisdiction, both over the perso n s of
the parti es to the action and of the subjec t-
mat t e r of the action itself. For this reaso n the
court s are almost una ni m o u s in holding that the
dea t h of eithe r party to a divorc e proc e e di n g ,
befor e final decr e e , abat e s the action. 1 Corp u s
Juris, 208; Wren v. Moss, 2 Gilman, 72; Danfort h
v. Danfor t h, 111 Ill. 236; Matt e r of Gran d all, 196
N.Y. 127, 89 N.E. 578; 134 Am St. Rep. 830; 17
Ann. Cas. 874; Wilcon v. Wilson, 73 Mich, 620,
41 N.W. 817; Strickla n d v. Strickl a n d, 80 Ark.
452, 97 S. W. 659; McCurley v. McCurl ey, 60
Md. 185, 45 Am. Rep. 717; Begbi e v. Begbie, 128
Cal. 155, 60 Pac. 667, 49 L.R.A. 141. 5
The sam e rule is true of caus e s of action and
suits for sepa r a t i o n and maint e n a n c e (Johnso n
vs. Bates, Ark. 101 SW 412; 1 Corp us Juris 208).
A review of the resul tin g cha n g e s in prop e r t y
relation s betw e e n spous e s shows that they are
solely the effect of the decr e e of legal sepa r a t io n;
henc e , they can not survive the deat h of the
plaintiff if it occur s prior to the dec r e e . On the
point, Article 106 of the Civil Code provide s: .
Art. 106. The decr e e of legal sepa r a t io n shall
have the following effect s:
(1) The spouse s shall be entitle d to live
sepa r a t e ly from each othe r, but the mar ri a g e
bonds shall not be seve r e d; .
(2) The conjug al par t n e r s h i p of gains or the
absol ut e conjug al com m u ni ty of prope r t y shall be
dissolve d and liquida t e d , but the offendi n g
spous e shall have no right to any shar e of the
profits ear n e d by the part n e r s h i p or com m u ni t y,
without prejudic e to the provisions of article 176;
(3) The custo dy of the minor childr e n shall be
awa r d e d to the innoc e n t spouse , unless
othe r wi s e direc t e d by the court in the inter e s t of
said minor s, for whom said court may appoin t a
gua r di a n;
(4) The offendin g spous e shall be disqu alified
from inhe ritin g from the innoce n t spous e by
intest a t e succ e s sio n. More ove r, provisions in
favor of the offendin g spous e mad e in the will of
the innoce n t one shall be revoke d by oper a tio n of
law.
From this article it is appa r e n t that the right to
the dissolution of the conjug al part n e r s h i p of
gains (or of the absolut e com m u ni ty of prope r t y),
the loss of right by the offendi n g spous e to any
sha r e of the profits ear n e d by the par t n e r s hi p or
com m u ni t y, or his disqu alificatio n to inhe rit by
intest a cy from the innoc e n t spous e as well as the
revoc a ti on of test a m e n t a r y provisions in favor of
the offendi n g spous e mad e by the innoc e n t one,
are all right s and disabilitie s that, by the very
ter m s of the Civil Code article, are vest e d
exclusively in the per so n s of the spous e s; and by
their nat u r e and inten t, such claims and
disa bilitie s are difficult to conceive as assign a bl e
or tra ns m i s si bl e. Henc e , a claim to said right s is
not a claim that "is not ther e b y exting uis h e d "
after a party dies, unde r Section 17, Rule 3, of
the Rules of Court, to warr a n t contin u a t i o n of
the action throu g h a substit u t e of the dece a s e d
par ty.
Sec. 17. Deat h of party. After a par ty dies and
the claim is not ther e by exting ui s h e d , the court
shall orde r, upon prop e r notice, the legal
repr e s e n t a t i v e of the dec e a s e d to appe a r and to
be substit u t e d for the dece a s e d , within a period
of thirty (30) days, or within such tim e as may be
gra n t e d ...
The sam e result flows from a conside r a t i o n of
the enu m e r a t i o n of the actions that survive for or
again s t admini st r a t o r s in Section 1, Rule 87, of
the Revised Rules of Court:
SECTION 1. Actions which may and which may
not be brou g h t again s t execu t o r or
admi nist r a t o r . No action upon a claim for the
recove ry of money or debt or inter e s t the r e o n
shall be com m e n c e d agai ns t the execu t o r or
admi nist r a t o r ; but actions to recove r real or
per so n al prop e r t y, or an inte r e s t ther ei n, from
the esta t e, or to enforc e a lien ther e o n , and
actions to recove r dam a g e s for an injury to
per so n or prop e r t y, real or perso n al , may be
com m e n c e d agains t him.
Neit h e r actions for legal sep a r a t i o n or for
annul m e n t of mar ri a g e can be dee m e d fairly
includ e d in the enu m e r a t i o n ..
A furt h e r reaso n why an action for legal
sepa r a t i o n is abat e d by the deat h of the plaintiff,
even if prope r t y right s are involved, is that these
right s are mer e effects of decr e e of sepa r a t i o n,
their sour c e being the decr e e itself; without the
dec r e e such right s do not com e into existe n c e , so
that befor e the finality of a dec r e e , thes e claims
are mer ely right s in expec t a t i o n. If deat h
supe r v e n e s durin g the pend e n c y of the action, no
dec r e e can be forthco m i n g , deat h prod u ci n g a
more radic al and definitive sepa r a t i o n; and the
expe c t e d conse q u e n t i a l right s and claim s would
nece s s a r ily rem ai n unbor n.
As to the petition of respo n d e n t- appelle e
Eufemio for a declar a ti o n of nullity ab initio of
his mar ri a g e to Carm e n Lapuz, it is appa r e n t
that such action beca m e moot and aca d e m i c
upon the dea t h of the latt e r, and ther e could be
no furth e r inte r e s t in continui n g the sam e afte r
her demis e, that auto m a t i c ally dissolve d the
ques tio n e d union. Any prop e r t y right s acqui r e d
by eithe r party as a result of Article 144 of the
Civil Code of the Philippin e s 6 could be resolve d
and det e r m i n e d in a prope r action for partition
by eithe r the appelle e or by the heirs of the
app ella n t .
In fact, even if the biga m o u s mar ri a g e had not
bee n void ab initio but only voida bl e unde r
Article 83, para g r a p h 2, of the Civil Code,
bec a u s e the secon d mar ri a g e had bee n
cont r a c t e d with the first wife having bee n an
abse n t e e for seven conse c u t iv e years, or when
she had bee n gen e r a lly believe d dea d, still the
action for annul m e n t beca m e exting ui s h e d as
soon as one of the thr e e per so n s involved had
died, as provide d in Article 87, par a g r a p h 2, of
the Code, requi rin g that the action for
annul m e n t should be broug h t durin g the lifetim e
of any one of the parti e s involved. And
furth e r m o r e , the liquida tion of any conjug al
par t n e r s h i p that might have result e d from such
voida bl e mar ri a g e must be carri e d out "in the
test a t e or intest a t e proc e e di n g s of the dec e a s e d
spous e", as expr e s sly provide d in Section 2 of the
Revise d Rule 73, and not in the ann ul m e n t
proce e di n g.
ACCORDINGLY, the appe al e d judgm e n t of the
Manila Court of Juvenile and Dome sti c Relation s
is here by affirm e d . No special prono u n c e m e n t as
to costs
CUSTO DY
DETERMI N I N G THE BEST INTERE S T OF
THE CHILD
G.R. No. 11 3 0 5 4 Marc h 16, 19 9 5
LEOUEL SANTO S , SR., peti t i o n e r - app e l l a n t ,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, and SPOU S E S
LEOPOLDO and OFELIA BEDIA,
res p o n d e n t s - app e l l e e s .
ROMERO, J.:
In this petition for review, we are aske d to
overt u r n the decision of the Court of Appeals 1
gra n ti n g custo dy of six- year old Leouel Sant os,
Jr. to his mat e r n a l gra n d p a r e n t s and not to his
fathe r , Sant os, Sr. What is sough t is a decision
which shoul d definitively settle the mat t e r of the
care, custody and cont r ol of the boy.
Hap pily, unlike King Solomon, we nee d not
mer ely rely on a "wise and unde r s t a n d i n g hea r t ,"
for ther e is man's law to guide us and that is, the
Family Code.
The ant e c e d e n t facts giving rise to the case at
benc h are as follows:
Petition e r Leouel Santo s, Sr., an army
lieute n a n t , and Julia Bedia a nurs e by professio n,
were marri e d in Iloilo City in 1986. Their union
beg e t only one child, Leouel Sant os, Jr. who was
born July 18, 1987.
From the time the boy was rele a s e d from the
hospit al until som e ti m e the r e a f t e r , he had bee n
in the car e and custody of his mat e r n a l
gra n d p a r e n t s , privat e respo n d e n t s her ein,
Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia.
Petition e r and wife Julia agr e e d to place Leouel
Jr. in the tem po r a r y custody of the latt e r ' s
par e n t s , the respo n d e n t spous e s Bedia. The
latt e r alleg e d that they paid for all the hospit al
bills, as well as the subse q u e n t suppo r t of the
boy beca u s e petition e r could not afford to do so.
The boy's mot h e r , Julia Bedia- Sant o s, left for the
Unite d Stat e s in May 1988 to work. Petition e r
allege d that he is not awa r e of her whe r e a b o u t s
and his effort s to locat e her in the Unite d Stat e s
prove d futile. Privat e respo n d e n t s claim that
althou g h abro a d, thei r daug h t e r Julia had been
sendi n g financi al suppo r t to the m for her son.
On Sept e m b e r 2, 1990, petition e r along with his
two brot h e r s , visited the Bedia house h ol d, whe r e
thre e- year old Leouel Jr. was staying. Privat e
respo n d e n t s cont e n d that thro u g h deceit and
false pret e n sio n s, petition e r abduc t e d the boy
and cland e s t i n e ly spirit e d him away to his
hom e t o w n in Bacon g, Neg ro s Orient al.
The spous e s Bedia then filed a "Petition for Care,
Custody and Cont rol of Minor Ward Leouel
Sant os Jr.," befor e the Regional Trial Court of
Iloilo City, with Sant o s, Sr. as respo n d e n t . 2
After an ex- part e hea ri n g on Octob e r 8, 1990,
the trial court issue d an orde r on the sam e day
awa r di n g cust ody of the child Leouel Sant os, Jr.
to his gra n d p a r e n t s , Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia.3
Petition e r appe al e d this Orde r to the Cour t of
Appeals.4 In its decision dat e d April 30, 1992,
respo n d e n t appella t e court affirm e d the trial
court ' s
orde r . 5 His motion for recon si d e r a t i o n having
bee n denie d, 6 petition e r now brings the insta n t
petition for review for a rever s al of the appella t e
court ' s decision.
The Court of Appeals err e d, accor di n g to
petition e r, in awa r di n g custo dy of the boy to his
gra n d p a r e n t s and not to hims elf. He cont e n d s
that since privat e respo n d e n t s have failed to
show that petition e r is an unfit and unsuit a bl e
fathe r , substi t u t e par e n t al aut ho ri ty gra n t e d to
the boy's gra n d p a r e n t s unde r Art. 214 of the
Family Code is inapp r o p r i a t e .
Petition e r adds that the reaso n s relied upon by
the privat e respo n d e n t s in having custody over
the boy, are flimsy and insufficie nt to dep rive
him of his natu r a l and legal right to have
custody.
On the othe r hand, privat e respo n d e n t s aver that
they can provide an air- condition e d room for the
boy and that petition e r would not be in a position
to take care of his son since he has to be
assign e d to differe n t plac e s. They also allege
that the petition e r did not give a single cent avo
for the boy's suppo r t and maint e n a n c e . When the
boy was about to be relea s e d from the hospit al,
they wer e the ones who paid the fees beca u s e
their daug h t e r and petition e r had no money.
Beside s, Julia Bedia Sant os, thei r daug h t e r , had
ent r u s t e d the boy to the m befor e she left for the
Unite d Stat e s. Furt h e r m o r e , petition e r ' s use of
tricke ry and dec eit in abd uc ti n g the child in
1990, after being hospit a bly tre a t e d by privat e
respo n d e n t s , does not spea k well of his fitne ss
and suita bility as a par e n t .
The Bedias argu e that althou g h the law
recog niz e s the right of a par e n t to his child's
custody, ultim a t ely the prim a r y consid e r a t i o n is
wha t is best for the happi n e s s and welfar e of the
latt e r . As mat e r n a l gra n d p a r e n t s who have
am ply dem o n s t r a t e d their love and affection for
the boy since his infancy, they claim to be in the
best position to promo t e the child's welfar e.
The issue to be resolve d her e boils down to who
shoul d prop e rly be awar d e d cust ody of the minor
Leouel Sant o s, Jr.
The right of custody accor d e d to par e n t s sprin gs
from the exercis e of par e n t a l autho ri ty. Par e n t a l
aut ho ri ty or pat ri a pote st a s in Rom a n Law is the
juridical institu tion wher e b y par e n t s rightfully
assu m e cont rol and prot e c tio n of their
une m a n c i p a t e d childr e n to the exte nt requi r e d
by the latt e r ' s need s. 7 It is a mass of right s and
obliga tion s which the law gra n t s to par e n t s for
the purpo s e of the childr e n ' s physical
pre s e r v a t io n and develop m e n t , as well as the
cultivation of their intellec t and the educ a ti o n of
their hea r t and sens e s. 8 As reg a r d s par e n t a l
aut ho ri ty, "the r e is no powe r, but a task; no
compl ex of right s, but a sum of duties; no
sover ei g n t y but a sacr e d trust for the welfar e of
the minor."9
Pare n t a l aut ho ri ty and respo n si bility are
inalien a bl e and may not be tra n sfe r r e d or
reno u n c e d excep t in cases aut ho riz e d by law. 10
The right att a c h e d to par e n t a l aut ho rit y, being
pur ely perso n a l, the law allows a waiver of
par e n t a l autho ri t y only in cases of adoption,
gua r di a n s hi p and surr e n d e r to a childr e n ' s hom e
or an orph a n institu tio n. 11 When a par e n t
ent r u s t s the custody of a minor to anot h e r , such
as a friend or godfa t h e r , even in a docu m e n t ,
wha t is given is mer ely tem p o r a r y custo dy and it
does not constit u t e a ren u n ci a tio n of par e n t al
aut ho ri ty. 12 Even if a definit e ren u n ci a t io n is
manifes t, the law still disallow s the sam e. 13
The fathe r and mot h e r , being the nat u r al
gua r di a n s of une m a n c i p a t e d childr e n, are duty-
bound and entitle d to keep the m in their custody
and
comp a ny. 14 The child's welfar e is always the
par a m o u n t consid e r a t i o n in all question s
conce r ni n g his car e and custody. 15
The law vests on the fathe r and mot h e r joint
par e n t a l autho ri t y over the perso n s of their
com m o n childr e n. 16 In case of abse n c e or deat h
of eithe r par e n t , the par e n t pres e n t shall
continu e exer ci sin g par e n t a l aut ho ri ty. 17 Only
in case of the par e n t s ' deat h, abse n c e or
unsuit a bility may substi t u t e par e n t a l aut ho ri ty
be exercis e d by the surviving gra n d p a r e n t . 18
The situati on obtai ni n g in the case at benc h is
one whe r e the moth e r of the minor Sant os, Jr., is
workin g in the Unite d Stat e s while the fathe r,
petition e r Sant os, Sr., is pres e n t . Not only are
they physically apa r t but are also emotion ally
sepa r a t e d . Ther e has bee n no decr e e of legal
sepa r a t i o n and petition e r ' s att e m p t to obt ain an
annul m e n t of the mar ri a g e on the groun d of
psychologic al incap a ci ty of his wife has failed. 19
Petition e r assails the decisions of both the trial
court and the app ell at e court to awar d custody of
his minor son to his par e n t s- in- law, the Bedia
spous e s on the grou n d that unde r Art. 214 of the
Family Code, substit u t e par e n t a l aut ho ri ty of the
gra n d p a r e n t s is prop e r only when both par e n t s
are dea d, abse n t or unsuit a bl e . Petition e r ' s
unfitn e s s, accor di n g to him, has not been
succe s sf ully shown by privat e respo n d e n t s .
The Court of Appeals held that altho u g h ther e is
no evide nc e to show that petition e r (Sant os Sr.)
is "depr a v e d, a habit u al dru nk a r d or poor, he
may neve r t h e l e s s be conside r e d , as he is in fact
so consid e r e d , to be unsui t a bl e to be allowe d to
have custo dy of minor Leouel Sant os Jr." 20
The respo n d e n t appella t e court, in affirmin g the
trial court ' s orde r of Octob e r 8, 1990, adopt e d as
its own the latt e r ' s obse rv a tio n s, to wit:
From the evide n c e addu c e d , this Court is of the
opinion that it is to be (sic) best inter e s t of the
minor Leouel Santo s, Jr. that he be place d unde r
the care, custo dy, and contr ol of his mat e r n a l
gra n d p a r e n t s the petition e r s her ei n. The
petition e r s have amply dem o n s t r a t e d their love
and devotion to their gra n d s o n while the nat u r al
fathe r , respo n d e n t her ei n, has shown little
inte r e s t in his welfar e as reflec t e d by his condu c t
in the past. Moreov e r the fact that petition e r s
are well- off financially, shoul d be carefully
conside r e d in awa r di n g to the m the cust ody of
the minor her ei n, lest the bre a ki n g of such ties
with his mat e r n a l gran d p a r e n t s might deprive
the boy of an event u al college educ a t io n and
othe r mat e ri al adva n t a g e s (Consa ul vs. Consa ul,
63 N.Y.S. 688). Respo n d e n t had neve r given any
previous financi al suppo r t to his son, while, upon
the othe r hand, the latte r receive s so much
bounty from his mat e r n a l gran d p a r e n t s and his
mot h e r as well, who is now gainfully em ploye d in
the Unite d Stat e s. Moreove r , the fact that
respo n d e n t , as a military perso n n e l who has to
shut tl e from one assign m e n t to anot h e r , and, in
thes e trou bl e d time s, may have pres sin g and
comp elling military dutie s which may preve n t
him from att e n di n g to his son at times whe n the
latt e r nee d s him most, militat e s stron gly agains t
said respo n d e n t . Addition ally, the child is sickly
and ast h m a t i c and nee d s the loving and tend e r
care of those who can provide for it. 21
We find the afore m e n t i o n e d conside r a t i o n s
insufficie nt to defea t petition e r ' s par e n t a l
aut ho ri ty and the conco mi t a n t right to have
custody over the minor Leouel Santo s, Jr.,
par tic ul a rly since he has not bee n shown to be
an unsui t a bl e and unfit par e n t . Privat e
respo n d e n t s ' demo n s t r a t e d love and affection for
the boy, notwit h s t a n d i n g , the legiti m a t e fathe r is
still prefe r r e d over the gra n d p a r e n t s . 22 The
latt e r ' s wealt h is not a decidin g factor,
par tic ul a rly bec a u s e ther e is no proof that at the
pre s e n t time, petition e r is in no position to
suppo r t the boy. The fact that he was unabl e to
provide financi al suppo r t for his minor son from
birt h up to over thr e e years when he took the
boy from his in- laws without per m is sio n, shoul d
not be sufficien t reaso n to strip him of his
per m a n e n t right to the child's custo dy. While
petition e r ' s previou s inat t e n t i o n is inexcu s a bl e
and merit s only the seve r e s t criticism , it cannot
be const r u e d as aba n d o n m e n t . His appe al of the
unfavor a bl e decision agains t him and his effort s
to keep his only child in his custody may be
rega r d e d as seriou s effort s to rectify his past
misd e e d s . To awa r d him custo dy would help
enh a n c e the bond betw e e n par e n t and son. It
would also give the fathe r a chanc e to prove his
love for his son and for the son to expe ri e n c e the
war m t h and suppo r t which a fathe r can give.
His being a soldier is likewise no bar to allowing
him custody over the boy. So many men in
unifor m who are assign e d to differe n t par t s of
the count ry in the service of the nation, are still
the natu r a l guar di a n s of their childr e n. It is not
just to deprive our soldier s of aut ho ri ty, car e and
custody over their childr e n mer ely bec a u s e of
the nor m al conse q u e n c e s of thei r duties and
assign m e n t s , such as tem p o r a r y sepa r a t i o n from
their families.
Petition e r ' s em ploym e n t of tricke ry in spiriting
away his boy from his in- laws, thou g h
unjustifia bl e, is likewise not a grou n d to wrest
custody from him.
Privat e respo n d e n t s ' att ac h m e n t to the young
boy whom they have rea r e d for the past thre e
year s is und e r s t a n d a b l e . Still and all, the law
conside r s the nat u r al love of a par e n t to
outw ei g h that of the gran d p a r e n t s , such that
only when the par e n t pres e n t is show n to be
unfit or unsuit a bl e may the gran d p a r e n t s
exercis e substit u t e par e n t a l autho ri ty, a fact
which has not bee n prove n her e.
The stron g bond s of love and affection poss es s e d
by privat e respo n d e n t s as gra n d p a r e n t s should
not be seen as incom p a t i bl e with petition e r ' right
to custody over the child as a fathe r. Moreov e r,
who is to say whet h e r the petition e r ' s financi al
sta n di n g may improv e in the futur e ?
WHERE FOR E, the petition is GRANTED. The
decision of the respo n d e n t Court of Appe als
dat e d April 30, 1992 as well as its Resolution
dat e d Nove m b e r 13, 1992 are her e by
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Custody over the
minor Leouel Santo s Jr. is awa r d e d to his
legiti m a t e fathe r , her ei n petition e r Leouel
Sant os, Sr.
ii. ROLE OF CHILD’S PREFERECE
G.R. No. 11 5 6 4 0 Marc h 15, 19 9 5
REYNALDO ESPIRIT U and GUILLERMA
LAYUG, peti t i o n e r s ,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and TERESITA
MASAU DI N G , resp o n d e n t s .
MELO, J.:
This case conce r n s a see mi n gly void mar ri a g e
and a relation s hi p which went sour. The innoc e n t
victims are two childre n horn out of the sam e
union. Upon this Cour t now falls the not too
welcom e task of deciding the issue of who,
betw e e n the fathe r and moth e r, is more suit abl e
and bett e r qualified in helpin g the childr e n to
grow into respo n si bl e, well- adjust e d, and happy
young adult hoo d.
Petition e r Reynaldo Espirit u and respo n d e n t
Tere sit a Masa u di n g first met som e ti m e in 1976
in Iligan City whe r e Reynal do was employe d by
the Nation al Steel Corpor a t io n and Tere sit a was
em ploye d as a nurs e in a local hospit al. In 1977,
Tere sit a left for Los Angeles, Califor ni a to work
as a nur se . She was able to acqui r e immigr a n t
stat u s som eti m e late r. In 1984, Reynaldo was
sent by his employe r, the Nation al Steel
Corpo r a t i o n, to Pittsb u r g h , Pennsylva ni a as its
liaison officer and Reynaldo and Tere sit a then
beg a n to maint ai n a com m o n law relation s hi p of
husb a n d and wife. On August 16, 1986, their
dau g h t e r , Rosalind There s e , was born. On
Octobe r 7, 1987, while they were on a brief
vacation in the Philippin e s, Reynaldo and
Tere sit a got mar ri e d , and upon their ret u r n to
the Unite d Stat e s, their secon d child, a son, this
time, and given the nam e Reginald Vince, was
born on Janua ry 12, 1988.
The relation s hi p of the couple det e rio r a t e d until
they decide d to sep a r a t e som e ti m e in 1990.
Tere sit a blam e d Reynaldo for the bre a k- up,
statin g he was always naggi n g her about money
mat t e r s. Reynal do, on the othe r han d, cont e n d e d
that Tere sit a was a spe n d t h rif t, buying expen sive
jewelry and antiq u e furnitu r e inst e a d of
att e n di n g to house h ol d expe n s e s .
Inst e a d of giving their mar ri a g e a secon d chan c e
as alleg e dly plea d e d by Reynaldo, Teresit a left
Reynaldo and the childr e n and went back to
Californi a. She claim s, howeve r, that she spe nt a
lot of money on long dista n c e telep ho n e calls to
keep in const a n t touch with her childre n .
Reynaldo broug h t his childr e n hom e to the
Philippin e s, but bec a u s e his assign m e n t in
Pittsb u r g h was not yet compl e t e d , he was sent
back by his com p a n y to Pittsb u r g h . He had to
leave his childr e n with his siste r , co- petition e r
Guiller m a Layug and her family.
Tere sit a claims that she did not imm e di a t ely
follow her childr e n beca u s e Reynaldo filed a
criminal case for biga my agains t her and she was
afraid of being arr e s t e d . The judg m e n t of
conviction in the biga my case was actu ally
rend e r e d only on Sept e m b e r 29, 1994. (Per
Judge Har ri e t O. Dem e t r io u, Branc h 70, RTC,
Pasig, pp. 210- 222, Rollo). Teresit a, mea n w hil e,
decide d to retu r n to the Philippine s and on
Dece m b e r 8, 1992 and filed the petition for a
writ of hab e a s corpu s agains t her ein two
petition e r s to gain custody over the childr e n ,
thus sta r ti n g the whole proc e e di n g s now
reac hi n g this Court.
On June 30, 1993, the trial cour t dismiss e d the
petition for hab e a s corp u s. It susp e n d e d
Tere sit a ' s par e n t a l aut ho ri ty over Rosalind and
Regin al d and decla r e d Reynal do to have sole
par e n t a l autho ri t y over the m but with right s of
visitation to be agr e e d upon by the parti e s and to
be approve d by the Court.
On Febr u a r y 16, 1994, the Court of Appe als per
Justice Isna ni, with Justice s de Pano and Ibay-
Some r a concu r ri n g, reve r s e d the trial court 's
decision. It gave custody to Teresit a and
visitation right s on week e n d s to Reynaldo.
Petition e r s now com e to this Court on a petition
for review, in the main cont e n di n g that the Court
of Appeal s disr e g a r d e d the fact u al findings of the
trial court; that the Court of Appe als furt h e r
eng a g e d in spec ul a tio n s and conjec t u r e s ,
resulti n g in its erro n e o u s concl usion that custody
of the childr e n should be given to respo n d e n t
Tere sit a .
We believe that respo n d e n t court resolve d the
ques tio n of custo dy over the childr e n throu g h an
auto m a t i c and blind applic a tio n of the age
proviso of Article 363 of the Civil Code which
rea d s:
Art. 363. In all que stion s on the care, custody,
educ a t io n and prop e r t y of the childr e n, the
latt e r ' s welfar e shall be par a m o u n t . No mot h e r
shall be sepa r a t e d from her child unde r seven
year s of age, unless the court finds com p elling
reaso n s for such mea s u r e .
and of Article 213 of the Family Code which in
turn provide s:
Art. 213. In case of sepa r a t i o n of the par e n t s
par e n t a l autho ri t y shall be exer cise d by the
par e n t desig n a t e d by the Court. The Court shall
take into accou n t all releva n t conside r a t i o n s,
espe ci ally the choice of the child over seven
year s of age unless the par e n t chose n is unfit.
The decision unde r review is base d on the repo r t
of the Code Com mis sio n which draft e d Article
213 that a child below seve n year s still nee d s the
loving, tend e r care that only a mot h e r can give
and which, pre su m a b ly, a fathe r cannot give in
equ al mea s u r e . The com m e n t a r i e s of a me m b e r
of the Code Com mis sio n, form e r Court of
Appeals Justic e Alicia Sem pio- Diy, in a textbook
on the Family Code, were also take n into
accou n t . Justice Diy believes that a child below
seven years should still be awa r d e d to her
mot h e r even if the latte r is a prostit u t e or is
unfaithful to her husb a n d . This is on the theo ry
that mor al der eliction has no effect on a baby
una bl e to unde r s t a n d such action. (Han d b o o k on
the Family Code of the Philippin e s, 1988 Ed., p.
297.)
The Court of Appeals was unduly swaye d by an
abst r a c t pres u m p t i o n of law rat h e r tha n an
app r e ci a t io n of releva n t facts and the law which
shoul d apply to those facts. The task of choosi ng
the par e n t to whom custo dy shall be awa r d e d is
not a minist e ri al function to be det e r m i n e d by a
simple det e r m i n a t i o n of the age of a minor child.
Whet h e r a child is und e r or over seven years of
age, the par a m o u n t crite rio n must always be the
child's inter e s t s. Discre tio n is given to the court
to decid e who can best assu r e the welfar e of the
child, and awar d the custody on the basis of that
conside r a t i o n. In Unson III vs. Nava r r o (101
SCRA 183 [1980]), we laid down the rule that "in
all cont r ov e r si e s rega r di n g the custo dy of
minor s, the sole and fore m o s t conside r a t i o n is
the physic al, educ a ti o n, social and mor al welfar e
of the child conc e r n e d , taking into accou n t the
resp e c tiv e resou r c e s and social and mor al
situati on s of the cont e n di n g par e n t s", and in
Medi na vs. Maka b a li (27 SCRA 502 [1969]),
whe r e custody of the minor was given to a non-
relative as again st the moth e r , the n the count ry' s
leading civilist, Justice J.B.L. Reyes, explaine d its
basis in this man n e r :
. . . While our law recog nize s the right of a
par e n t to the custody of her child, Court s must
not lose sight of the basic principl e that "in all
ques tio n s on the car e, cust ody, educ a ti o n and
prope r t y of childr e n, the latte r ' s welfar e shall be
par a m o u n t " (Civil Code of the Philippin e s. Art.
363), and that for comp elling reaso n s , even a
child und e r seven may be orde r e d sepa r a t e d
from the mot h e r (do). This is as it shoul d be, for
in the conti nu al evolution of legal instit ution s,
the patri a pote st a s has bee n tra nsfor m e d from
the jus vitae ac necis (right of life and deat h) of
the Rom a n law, und e r which the offspri n g was
virtu ally a chatt el of his par e n t s into a radic ally
differe n t institu tio n, due to the influen c e of
Christia n faith and doct ri n e s. The obliga tion al
aspe c t is now supr e m e . As point e d out by Puig
Pena, now "the r e is no powe r, but a task; no
compl ex of right s (of par e n t s) but a sum of
dutie s; no sover ei g n t y, but a sacr e d trust for the
welfar e of the minor."
As a result, the right of par e n t s to the com p a n y
and custody of their childr e n is but ancillary to
the prop e r discha r g e of par e n t a l dutie s to
provide the childr e n with ade q u a t e suppo r t ,
educ a t io n, moral, intellec t u al and civic trainin g
and develop m e n t (Civil Code, Art. 356).
(pp. 504- 505.)
In asce r t ai ni n g the welfar e and best inter e s t s of
the child, court s are man d a t e d by the Family
Code to take into accou n t all releva n t
conside r a t i o n s . If a child is unde r seven years of
age, the law pres u m e s that the moth e r is the
best custo di a n. The pres u m p t i o n is stron g but it
is not conclusive. It can be overco m e by
"com p elling reaso n s". If a child is over seve n, his
choice is par a m o u n t but, again, the court is not
bound by that choice. In its discr e ti o n, the cour t
may find the chose n par e n t unfit and awa r d
custody to the othe r par e n t , or even to a third
par ty as it dee m s fit unde r the circu m s t a n c e s .
In the pre s e n t case, both Rosalind and Reginald
are now over seven years of age. Rosalind
celeb r a t e d her seven t h birt h d ay on August 16,
1993 while Regin al d reac h e d the sam e age on
Janua r y 12, 1995. Both are studyin g in repu t a bl e
schools and appe a r to be fairly intellige n t
childr e n, quite capa bl e of thou g h tf ully
det e r m i ni n g the par e n t with whom they would
want to live. Once the choice has bee n made, the
burd e n ret u r n s to the court to investig a t e if the
par e n t thus chose n is unfit to assu m e par e n t al
aut ho ri ty and custodi al respo n si bility.
Her ei n lies the erro r of the Cour t of Appeals.
Inst e a d of scruti nizing the recor d s to discove r
the choice of the childr e n and rath e r tha n
verifying whet h e r that pare n t is fit or unfit,
respo n d e n t cour t simply followe d stat u t o r y
pre s u m p t i o n s and gene r al proposi tion s
applica bl e to ordin a ry or com m o n situa tion s. The
seven- year age limit was mec h a ni c a lly tre a t e d as
an arbit r a r y cut off period and not a guide base d
on a stron g pres u m p t i o n.
A scru tiny of the plea di n g s in this case indicat e s
that Tere sit a , or at least, her couns el are more
inte nt on emp h a sizin g the "tort u r e and agony" of
a mot h e r sep a r a t e d from her childr e n and the
humiliation she suffer e d as a result of her
cha r a c t e r being mad e a key issue in cour t rath e r
than the feelings and futur e , the best inte r e s t s
and welfar e of her childr e n . While the bonds
betw e e n a mot h e r and her small child are speci al
in nat u r e , eithe r par e n t , whet h e r fathe r or
mot h e r , is bound to suffer agony and pain if
deprive d of custo dy. One canno t say that his or
her sufferi n g is gre a t e r than that of the othe r
par e n t . It is not so muc h the sufferin g, pride, and
othe r feelings of eithe r pare n t but the welfar e of
the child which is the par a m o u n t conside r a t i o n.
We are incline d to sust ai n the finding s and
conclusion s of the region al trial cour t bec a u s e it
gave gre a t e r atte n ti o n to the choice of Rosalind
and consid e r e d in det ail all the releva n t factor s
bea ri n g on the issue of custody.
When she was a little over 5 years old, Rosalind
was refer r e d to a child psychologist , Rita Flore s
Mac a b ul os, to det e r m i n e the effect s of uprooti n g
her from the Assum p tio n College wher e she was
studyin g. Four differ e n t test s were administ e r e d .
The result s of the test s are quite reve alin g. The
respo n s e s of Rosalind abou t her moth e r wer e
very nega tive causi n g the psychologis t to delve
dee p e r into the child's anxiety. Among the things
reve al e d by Rosalind was an incide n t whe r e she
saw her moth e r huggi n g and kissing a "bad" man
who lived in thei r hous e and worke d for her
fathe r . Rosalind refuse d to talk to her mot h e r
even on the telep ho n e . She tend e d to be
emotion ally em blaz e d bec a u s e of const a n t fear s
that she may have to leave school and her aunt' s
family to go back to the Unit ed Stat e s to live
with her mot h e r . The 5- 1/2 page repor t deals at
lengt h with feelings of insec u r i ty and anxiety
arising from stron g conflict with the mot h e r . The
child tried to comp e n s a t e by having fanta sy
activities. All of the 8 reco m m e n d a t i o n s of the
child psychologist show that Rosalind choos e s
petition e r s over the privat e respo n d e n t and that
her welfar e will be best serve d by staying with
the m (pp. 199- 205, Rollo).
At about the sam e time, a social welfar e case
study was condu c t e d for the purpo s e of securi n g
the travel clear a n c e requi r e d befor e minors may
go abro a d. Social Welfar e Officer Emm a D.
Estr a d a Lopez, stat e d that the child Rosalind
refuse d to go back to the Unite d Stat e s and be
reuni t e d with her moth e r . She felt unlove d and
unca r e d for. Rosalind was more att a c h e d to her
Yaya who did everyt hi n g for her and Reginal d.
The child was found sufferin g from emotion al
shock caus e d by her mot h e r ' s infidelity. The
applica tio n for travel clea r a n c e was
reco m m e n d e d for denial (pp. 206- 209, Rollo).
Respon d e n t Teresi t a , for her part, argu e s that
the 7- year age refe r e n c e in the law applies to the
dat e when the petition for a writ of hab e a s
corpu s is filed, not to the dat e when a decision is
rend e r e d . This argu m e n t is flawe d.
Consid e r a t i o n s involving the choice mad e by a
child must be asce r t a i n e d at the tim e that eithe r
par e n t is given custody over the child. The
mat t e r of custo dy is not per m a n e n t and
unalt e r a b l e . If the par e n t who was given custody
suffers a futur e char a c t e r chan g e and beco m e s
unfit, the mat t e r of custo dy can always be re-
examin e d and adjust e d (Unson III v. Nava r r o,
supr a , at p. 189). To be sure, the welfar e, the
best inter e s t s, the benefit, and the good of the
child must be det e r m i n e d as of the time that
eithe r par e n t is chose n to be the custo di a n. At
the pres e n t time, both childre n are over 7 year s
of age and are thus perfec tly capa bl e of makin g a
fairly intellige n t choice.
Accordi n g to respo n d e n t Teresi t a , she and her
childr e n had tea rful reu nio n in the trial court ,
with the childr e n crying, grab bi n g, and
em br a c i n g her to preve n t the fathe r from taking
the m away from her. We are more incline d to
believe the fathe r ' s cont e n ti o n that the childr e n
ignor e d Teresit a in court bec a u s e such an
emotion al displ ay as desc ri b e d by Tere sit a in her
plea din g s could not have bee n misse d by the
trial court . Unlike the Justice s of the Court of
Appeals Four t h Division, Judge Lucas P.
Bersa m i n per so n a lly obse rv e d the childre n and
their moth e r in the court r oo m . What the Judge
found is diam e t r i c ally oppose d to the cont e n ti o n s
of respo n d e n t Teresit a. The Judge had this to say
on the mat t e r .
And, lastly, the Court cannot look at petition e r
[Tere si t a] in similar light, or with more
und e r s t a n d i n g , espe ci ally as her condu c t and
dem e a n o r in the cour t r o o m (during most of the
proce e di n g s) or else w h e r e (but in the pres e n c e
of the unde r si g n e d presi di n g judge)
demo n s t r a t e d her ebule n t tem p e r that tend e d to
corro bo r a t e the alleg e d violenc e of her physical
punish m e n t of the childr e n (even if only for
ordin a ry disciplin a ry purpo s e s) and emotion al
inst a bility, typified by her failur e (or refusal?) to
show defer e n c e and resp e c t to the Court and the
othe r partie s (pp. 12- 13, RTC Decision)
Respon d e n t Teresi t a also question s the
comp e t e n c e and impa r t i ality of the expe r t
witne s s e s . Respon d e n t court, in turn, stat e s that
the trial court shoul d have consid e r e d the fact
that Reynaldo and his siste r, her ei n petition e r
Guiller m a Layug, hired the two expe r t witne s s e s.
Actually, this was take n into accou n t by the trial
court which stat e d that the alleg a tio n s of bias
and unfair n e s s mad e by Teresit a agai ns t the
psychologis t and social worke r were not
subst a n ti a t e d .
The trial court stat e d that the profes sio n a l
inte g ri ty and comp e t e n c e of the expe r t witne s s e s
and the objectivity of the intervi ew s were
unsh a k e n and unim p e a c h e d . We might add that
their testi m o ny rem ai n uncont r ov e r t e d . We also
note that the examin a ti o n s made by the expe r t s
were condu c t e d in late 1991, well over a year
befor e the filing by Tere sit a of the habe a s corpu s
petition in Dece m b e r , 1992. Thus, the
examin a t io n s wer e at that time not inten d e d to
suppo r t petition e r s ' position in litigation,
bec a u s e the r e was the n not even an impe n di n g
possibility of one. That they were subs e q u e n t l y
utilized in the case a quo whe n it did mat e ri alize
does not chan g e the teno r in which they wer e
first obtai n e d.
Furt h e r m o r e , such exami n a ti o n s, whe n
pre s e n t e d to the court must be const r u e d to have
bee n pre se n t e d not to sway the cour t in favor of
any of the par ti e s, but to assist the cour t in the
det e r m i n a t i o n of the issue befor e it. The per so n s
who effect e d such exa mi n a t i o n s wer e pres e n t e d
in the capa city of expe r t witne s s e s testifying on
mat t e r s within their resp e c t iv e knowl e d g e and
expe r ti s e. On this mat t e r , this Cour t had
occasion to rule in the case of Sali vs. Abukak a r,
et al. (17 SCRA 988 [1966]).
The fact that, in a partic ul a r litigation, an NBI
expe r t examin e s cert ai n conte s t e d docu m e n t s , at
the req u e s t , not of a public officer or age n cy of
the Gover n m e n t , but of a privat e litigan t , does
not nec e ss a r ily nullify the exa mi n a t i o n thus
made . Its purpo s e , pres u m a b l y, to assist the
court having jurisdiction over said litigation, in
the perfor m a n c e of its duty to settl e corr e c t ly the
issue s relative to said docu m e n t s . Even a non-
expe r t privat e individu al may exa mi n e the sam e,
if ther e are facts within his knowle d g e which
may help, the court in the dete r m i n a ti o n of said
issue. Such examin a t io n, which may prope r ly be
und e r t a k e n by a non- expe r t privat e individu al,
does not, cert ai nly beco m e null and void when
the exami n e r is an expe r t and/or an officer of the
NBI.
(pp. 991- 992.)
In rega r d to testi m o ny of expe r t witnes s e s it was
held in Salom o n, et al. vs. Inter m e d i a t e Appellat e
Court, et al. (185 SCRA 352 [1990]):
. . . Althou g h cour t s are not ordin a rily bound by
expe r t testi m o ni e s, they may place what ev e r
weigh t they choos e upon such testi mo ni e s in
accor d a n c e with the facts of the case. The
relative weight and sufficiency of expe r t
testi m o ny is peculia rly within the provinc e of the
trial court to decid e, consid e r i n g the ability and
cha r a c t e r of the witne s s, his action s upon the
witne s s sta n d, the weight and proc e s s of the
reaso ni n g by which he has suppo r t e d his opinion,
his possibl e bias in favor of the side for whom he
testifies, the fact that he is a paid witne s s, the
relative oppor t u n i ti e s for study and obse rv a ti o n
of the mat t e r s about which he testifies, and any
othe r mat t e r s which rese r v e to illumin a t e his
stat e m e n t s . The opinion of the expe r t may not be
arbit r a rily reject e d ; it is to be conside r e d by the
court in view of all the facts and circu m s t a n c e s
in the case and whe n com m o n knowl e d g e utt e rly
fails, the expe r t opinion may be given cont rolling
effect (20 Am. Jur., 1056- 1058). The proble m of
the cre di bility of the expe r t witnes s and the
evalu a tio n of his testi m o ny is left to the
discr e tio n of the trial cour t whose ruling
ther e u p o n is not review a bl e in the abse n c e of an
abus e of that discre tio n.
(p. 359)
It was in the exer cise of this discr e t io n, couple d
with the oppor t u n i t y to asse s s the witne s s e s '
cha r a c t e r and to obse rv e their resp e c t iv e
dem e a n o r that the trial court opte d to rely on
their testi m o ny, and we believe that the trial
court was corr e c t in its action.
Unde r direc t exami n a t i o n an Febr u a r y 4, 1993,
Social Worke r Lopez stat e d that Rosalind and
her aunt wer e abou t to boa r d a plan e when they
were off-loade d beca u s e ther e was no req ui r e d
clear a n c e . They were refer r e d to her office, at
which time Regin al d was also brou g h t along and
inte rvie w e d . One of the reg ul a r duties of Social
Worke r Lopez in her job app e a r s to be the
inte rvie w of minors who leave for abro a d with
their par e n t s or othe r perso n s. The intervie w
was for purpo s e s of foreign travel by a 5- year old
child and had not hin g to do with any pendi n g
litiga tion. On cross- exami n a ti o n, Social Worke r
Lopez stat e d that her asse ss m e n t of the minor' s
hat r e d for her moth e r was base d on the
disclosu r e s of the minor. It is inconc eiv a bl e ,
muc h less pres u m a b l e that Ms. Lopez would
comp r o m i s e her position, ethics, and the public
trust repos e d on a perso n of her position in the
cours e of doing her job by falsely testifying just
to suppo r t the position of any litigan t .
The psychologis t, Ms. Maca b ul os, is a B.S.
magn a cum laud e grad u a t e in Psychology and an
M.A. degr e e holde r also in Psychology with her
thesis grad e d "Excelle n t". She was a candi d a t e
for a docto r al deg r e e at the time of the
inte rvie w. Petition e r Reynal do may have
shoul de r e d the cost of the intervi e w but Ms.
Mac a b ul os servic e s were secur e d beca u s e
Assum p t io n College want e d an exa mi n a ti o n of
the child for school pur pos e s and not beca u s e of
any litigation. She may have bee n paid to
examin e the child and to rend e r a finding base d
on her exami n a ti o n, but she was not paid to
fabric a t e such finding s in favor of the party who
ret ai n e d her servic e s. In this inst a n c e it was not
even petition e r Reynaldo but the school
aut ho ri tie s who initiat e d the sam e. It canno t be
pre s u m e d that a profession al of her pote n ti al and
stat u r e would comp r o m i s e her profession al
sta n di n g .
Tere sit a questio n s the finding s of the trial cour t
that:
1. Her mor ality is ques tio n a bl e as show n by her
mar ryi n g Reynaldo at the time she had a
subsisti n g mar ri a g e with anot h e r man.
2. She is guilty of grave indiscr e ti o n in carryin g
on a love affair with one of the Reynaldo's fellow
NSC employe e s.
3. She is incap a bl e of providin g the childr e n with
nece s sitie s and conveni e n c e s com m e n s u r a t e to
their social sta n di n g bec a u s e she does not even
own any hom e in the Philippi ne s.
4. She is emotion ally unst a bl e with ebullie nt
tem p e r .
It is cont e n d e d that the above findings do not
constit u t e the comp elling rea so n s und e r the law
which would justify depriving her of custody over
the childr e n; wors e, she claim s, thes e finding s
are non- exist e n t and have not bee n prove d by
clear and convinci ng evide n c e .
Public and privat e respo n d e n t s give undu e
weigh t to the mat t e r of a child unde r 7 years of
age not to be sepa r a t e d from the mot h e r , withou t
conside ri n g what the law itself deno mi n a t e s as
comp elling rea so n s or releva n t conside r a t i o n s to
othe r wi s e dec r e e . In the Unson III case, earlie r
mention e d , this Cour t stat e d that it found no
difficulty in not awa r di n g custo dy to the mot h e r,
it being in the best inter e s t of the child "to be
freed from the obviously unwhol e so m e , not
to say immor al influe nc e , that the situa tion
whe r e [the moth e r ] had place d hers elf . . . might
crea t e in the moral and social outlook of [the
child] who was in her form a t ive and most
impr e s si o n a bl e stag e . . ."
Then too, it must be note d that both Rosalind
and Reginal d are now over 7 year s of age. They
und e r s t a n d the differ e n c e bet w e e n right and
wrong, ethical beh avior and devia nt immor ali ty.
Their best inter e s t s would be bett e r serve d in an
environ m e n t cha r a c t e r i z e d by emotion al stability
and a cert ai n degr e e of mat e ri al sufficie ncy.
Ther e is nothi ng in the recor d s to show that
Reynaldo is an "unfit" perso n und e r Article 213
of the Family Code. In fact, he has bee n trying
his best to give the childre n the kind of att e n t io n
and car e which the mot h e r is not in a position to
exte n d.
The arg u m e n t that the cha r g e s again st the
mot h e r are false is not suppo r t e d by the recor d s .
The findings of the trial cour t are base d on
evide n c e.
Tere sit a does not deny that she was legally
mar ri e d to Rober t o Lust a d o on Dece m b e r 17,
1984 in California (p. 13, Respo n d e n t ' s
Memo r a n d u m ; p. 238, Rollo; pp. 11, RTC
Decision). Less than a year late r, she had alre a dy
driven across the contin e n t a l Unite d Stat e s to
com m e n c e living with anot h e r man, petition e r
Reynaldo, in Pittsb u r g h . The two wer e mar ri e d
on Octob e r 7, 1987. Of cours e , to dilute this
disa dva n t a g e on her par t, this matt e r of her
having cont r a c t e d a biga m o u s mar ri a g e later
with Reynaldo, Teresit a tried to pictu r e Reynal do
as a rapist, allegin g furth e r that she told
Reynaldo about her mar ri a g e to Lust a do on the
occasion whe n she was rape d by Reynal do.
Expec t e dly, Judge Har ri e t Dem e t ri o u of the
Pasig RTC lent no weigh t to such tale. And even
if this story wer e given cre d e n c e , it adds to and
not subt r a c t s from the conviction of this Court
about Teresi t a ' s values. Rape is an insidious
crime agains t privacy. Confiding to one's
pote n ti al rapist abou t a prior mar ri a g e is not a
very convinci ng indica tion that the pote n ti al
victim is avers e to the act. The implica tion
crea t e d is that the act would be acce p t a b l e if not
for the prior mar ri a g e .
More likely is Reynal do' s story that he lear n e d of
the prior mar ri a g e only much later. In fact, the
rap e incide n t itself is unlikely agains t a wom a n
who had drive n thr e e days and thre e night s from
Californi a, who went str aig h t to the house of
Reynaldo in Pittsb u r g h and upon arriving went
to bed and, who imm e di a t e ly ther e a ft e r sta rt e d
to live with him in a relation s hi p which is mari t al
in nat u r e if not in fact.
Judge Bersa mi n of the court a quo believe d the
testi m o ny of the various witne s s e s that while
mar ri e d to Reynaldo, Tere si t a ente r e d into an
illicit relation s hi p with Perd e n c i o Gonzale s right
ther e in the hous e of petition e r Reynaldo and
respo n d e n t Teresi t a. Perd e n ci o had bee n
assign e d by the Nation al Ste el Corpor a t io n to
assist in the projec t in Pittsb u r g h and was
staying with Reynal do, his co- em ploye e, in the
latt e r ' s house. The recor d shows that the
dau g h t e r Rosalind suffer e d emotion al
distu r b a n c e caus e d by the tra u m a t i c effect of
seei ng her moth e r huggin g and kissing a boar d e r
in their house. The recor d also show s that it was
Tere sit a who left the conjug al hom e and the
childr e n, boun d for Califor ni a. When Perd e n ci o
Gonzale s was rea ssi g n e d to the Philippi n e s,
Tere sit a followe d him and was seen in his
comp a ny in a Cebu hot el, staying in one room
and taking bre a kfa s t toge t h e r . More significa n t
is that lett e r s and writt e n mess a g e s from
Tere sit a to Perd e n c io wer e sub mi t t e d in
evide n c e (p.12, RTC Decision).
The arg u m e n t that moral laxity or the habit of
flirting from one man to anot h e r does not fall
und e r "com p elling reaso n s" is neith e r
merito ri ou s nor applica bl e in this case. Not only
are the childr e n over seven year s old and their
clear choice is the fathe r, but the illicit or
immor al activities of the mot h e r had alre a dy
caus e d emotion al dist u r b a n c e s , perso n ali ty
conflict s, and exposu r e to conflicting mor al
value s, at least in Rosalind. This is not to
mention her conviction for the crime of biga m y,
which from the recor d s appe a r s to have beco m e
final (pp. 210- 222, Rollo).
Respon d e n t court 's finding that the fathe r could
not very well perfor m the role of a sole par e n t
and substit u t e mot h e r beca u s e his job is in the
Unite d Stat e s while the childre n will be left
behin d with thei r aunt in the Philippin e s is
misplac e d. The assign m e n t of Reynal do in
Pittsb u r g h is or was a tem p o r a r y one. He was
sent ther e to overs e e the purc h a s e of a steel mill
compo n e n t and various equip m e n t nee d e d by the
Nation al Ste el Corpo r a t i o n in the Philippi n e s.
Once the purc h a s e s are compl e t e d , ther e is
nothin g to keep him the r e anymo r e . In fact, in a
lette r dat e d Janua r y 30, 1995, Reynal do infor m s
this Court of the comple tio n of his assign m e n t
abro a d and of his per m a n e n t ret u r n to the
Philippin e s (ff.
p. 263, Rollo).
The law is more than satisfied by the judg m e n t of
the trial court. The childr e n are now both over
seven years old. Their choice of the pare n t with
whom they prefe r to stay is clear from the
reco r d. From all indicatio n s, Reynal do is a fit
per so n, thus mee ti n g the two requi r e m e n t s
found in the first par a g r a p h of Article 213 of the
Family Code. The pres u m p t i o n unde r the secon d
par a g r a p h of said article no longe r applies as the
childr e n are over seve n years. Assumi n g that the
pre s u m p t i o n shoul d have pers u a si ve value for
childr e n only one or two years beyon d the age of
seven years mention e d in the stat u t e , ther e are
comp elling rea so n s and releva n t consid e r a t i o n s
not to gra n t custo dy to the moth e r . The childr e n
und e r s t a n d the unfor t u n a t e shor t c o m i n g s of
their moth e r and have been affect e d in their
emotion al growt h by her behavior.
WHERE FOR E, the petition is here by GRANTED.
The decision of the Court of Appe al s is reve r s e d
and set aside, and the decision of Branc h 96 of
the Region al Trial Court of the Nation al Capit al
Judicial Region station e d in Quezon City and
pre si d e d over by the Honor a bl e Lucas P.
Bersa m i n in its Civil Case No. Q-92- 14206
awa r di n g cust ody of the minor s Rosalind and
Regin al d Espirit u to their fathe r, Reynaldo
Espirit u, is reinst a t e d . No speci al
prono u n c e m e n t is mad e as to cost s.
c. OTHER EFFECT S
G.R. No. L-18 0 0 8 Oct o b e r 30, 19 6 2
ELISEA LAPERAL, peti t i o n e r ,
vs.
REPU BLIC OF THE PHILIPPI N E S , opp o s i t o r .
Marti n B. Laure a and Ass o c i a t e s for
peti ti o n e r .
Offic e of th e Soli c i t o r Gen e r a l for opp o s i t o r .
BARRERA, J.:
On May 10, 1960, Elisea Lape r al filed in the
Court of First Inst a n c e of Baguio (Sp Proc. No.
433) a petition which rea d s:
1. That petition e r has bee n a bona fide reside n t
of the City of Baguio for the last thre e year s
prior to the dat e of the filing of this petition;
2. That petition e r ' s maid e n nam e is ELISEA
LAPERAL; that on Marc h 24, 1939, she mar ri e d
Mr. Enriqu e R. Sant a m a r i a ; that in a par ti al
decision ent e r e d on this Honor a bl e Court on
Janua r y 18, 1958, in Civil Case No. 356 of this
Court, entitle d 'Enriq u e R. Sant a m a r i a vs. Elisea
L. Sant a m a r i a ' Mr. Enriqu e Sant a m a r i a was
given a decr e e of legal sep a r a t i o n from her; that
the said parti al decision is now final;
3. That during her mar ri a g e to Enriqu e R.
Sant a m a r i a , she natu r a lly used, inste a d of her
maide n nam e , that of Elise a L. Sant a m a r i a ; that
aside from her legal sepa r a t i o n from Enriqu e R.
Sant a m a r i a , she has also ceas e d to live with him
for many years now;
4. That in view of the fact that she has bee n
legally sepa r a t e d from Mr. Enriqu e R.
Sant a m a r i a and has likewise ceas e d to live with
him for many year s, it is desir a bl e that she be
allowe d to cha n g e her nam e and/or be per mi t t e d
to resu m e using her maid e n nam e, to wit:
ELISEA LAPERAL.
WHERE FOR E, petition e r resp e c t f ully praye d
that after the nece s s a r y proc e e di n g s are had,
she be allowe d to resu m e using her maide n
nam e of Elisea Lape r al.
The petition was oppos e d by the City Attorn ey of
Baguio on the grou n d that the sam e violat e s the
provision s of Article 370 (should be 372) of the
Civil Code, and that it is not sanctio n e d by the
Rules of Court.
In its decision of Octobe r 31, 1960, the court
denie d the petition for the reaso n that Article
372 of the Civil Code requi r e s the wife, even
after she is dec r e e d legally sepa r a t e d from her
husb a n d , to conti nu e using the nam e and
surn a m e she employe d befor e the legal
sepa r a t i o n. Upon petition e r ' s motion, howev e r ,
the court , tre a ti n g the petition as one for chan g e
of nam e, recon si d e r e d its decision and gra n t e d
the petition on the groun d that to allow
petition e r, who is a busin e s s w o m a n decr e e d
legally sepa r a t e d from her husb a n d , to contin u e
using her mar ri e d nam e would give rise to
confusion in her financ e s and the event u al
liquida tion of the conjug al asset s. Henc e, this
app e al by the Stat e .
The cont e n ti o n of the Republic finds suppo r t in
the provisions of Article 372 of the New Civil
Code which rea d s:
ART. 372. When legal sepa r a t i o n has bee n
gra n t e d , the wife shall conti nu e using her nam e
and sur n a m e employe d befor e the legal
sepa r a t i o n. (Emp h a si s supplie d)
Not e that the lang u a g e of the stat u t e is
mand a t o r y that the wife, even after the legal
sepa r a t i o n has bee n decr e e d , shall contin u e
using her nam e and surn a m e employe d befor e
the legal sepa r a ti o n. This is so beca u s e her
mar ri e d stat u s is unaffec t e d by the sepa r a t i o n,
ther e being no seve r a n c e of the vinculu m . It
see m s to be the policy of the law that the wife
shoul d contin u e to use the nam e indica tive of her
unch a n g e d stat u s for the benefit of all
conce r n e d .
hold othe r wi s e would be to provide an easy
circu m v e n ti o n of the mand a t o r y provisions of
Article 372.
It is true that in the secon d decision which
recon si d e r e d the first it is stat e d that as the
petition e r owns exten sive busine s s inte r e s t s , the
continu e d used of her husb a n d surn a m e may
caus e undu e confusion in her financ e s and the
event u a l liquida tio n of the conjug al asse t s. This
finding is howeve r without basis. In the first
place, thes e were not the caus e s upon which the
petition was base d; henc e, obviously no evide nc e
to this effect had been addu c e d . Secon dly, with
the issua n c e of the dec r e e of legal sepa r a t i o n in
1958, the conjug al part n e r s h i p betw e e n
petition e r and her husb a n d had auto m a ti c ally
bee n dissolve d and liquida t e d . (Art. 106[2], Civil
Cod). Conse q u e n t l y, ther e could be no more
occasion for an event u al liquida tio n of the
conjug al asse t s.
WHERE FOR E, the orde r of the lower cour t of
Dece m b e r 1, 1960, gra n ti n g the petition, is
her e by set aside and the petition dismiss e d .
Withou t costs.

The app elle e cont e n d s , howeve r , that the

petition is subst a n t i ally for cha n g e of her nam e
from Elisea L. Sant a m a r i a , the one she has bee n
using, since her marri a g e , to Elisea Laper a l, her
maide n nam e , giving as reaso n or caus e the r efo r
her being legally sepa r a t e d from the husb a n d
Enriqu e R. Sant a m a r i a , and the fact that they
have cease d to live toge t h e r for many years.

Ther e see m s to be no disput e that in the

instit ution of thes e proce e di n g s , the proce d u r e
pre sc ri b e d in Rule 103 of the Rules of Court for
cha n g e of nam e has bee n obse rv e d . But from the
petition quot e d in full at the begin ni n g of thes e
opinion, the only reaso n relied upon for the
cha n g e of nam e is the fact that petition e r is
legally sepa r a t e d from her husb a n d and has, in
fact, ceas e d to live with him for many years. It is
doubtf ul, to say the least, whet h e r Rule 103
which refe r s to cha n g e of nam e in gen e r al , may
prevail over the specific provision s of Article 372
of the New Civil Code with rega r d s to mar ri e d
wom e n legally sepa r a t e d from their husb a n d s .
Even, howeve r, applying Rule 103 to this case,
the fact of legal sepa r a t i o n alone — which is the
only basis for the petition at bar — is, in our
opinion, not a sufficien t groun d to justify a
cha n g e of the nam e of her ei n petition e r , for to