VENUE OF ACTIONS the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein . . .
the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein . . ." in accordance with Section 19 (2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. With
G.R. No. 74854 April 2, 1991
JESUS DACOYCOY, petitioner,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. ANTONIO V. BENEDICTO, Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch LXXI, Antipolo,
Rizal, and RUFINO DE GUZMAN, respondents.
Ramon V. Sison for petitioner.
Public Attorney's Office for private respondent.
FERNAN, C.J.:
May the trial court motu proprio dismiss a complaint on the ground of improper venue? This is the issue confronting the Court in the case
at bar.
On March 22, 1983, petitioner Jesus Dacoycoy, a resident of Balanti, Cainta, Rizal, filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch LXXI,
Antipolo, Rizal, a complaint against private respondent Rufino de Guzman praying for the annulment of two (2) deeds of sale involving a
parcel of riceland situated in Barrio Estanza, Lingayen, Pangasinan, the surrender of the produce thereof and damages for private
respondent's refusal to have said deeds of sale set aside upon petitioner's demand.
On May 25, 1983, before summons could be served on private respondent as defendant therein, the RTC Executive Judge issued an order
requiring counsel for petitioner to confer with respondent trial judge on the matter of venue. After said conference, the trial court
dismissed the complaint on the ground of improper venue. It found, based on the allegations of the complaint, that petitioner's action is a
real action as it sought not only the annulment of the aforestated deeds of sale but also the recovery of ownership of the subject parcel of
riceland located in Estanza, Lingayen, Pangasinan, which is outside the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court.
Petitioner appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, which in its decision of April 11, 1986, 1 affirmed the order
of dismissal of his complaint.
In this petition for review, petitioner faults the appellate court in affirming what he calls an equally erroneous finding of the trial court that
the venue was improperly laid when the defendant, now private respondent, has not even answered the complaint nor waived the venue. 2
Petitioner claims that the right to question the venue of an action belongs solely to the defendant and that the court or its magistrate does
not possess the authority to confront the plaintiff and tell him that the venue was improperly laid, as venue is waivable. In other words,
petitioner asserts, without the defendant objecting that the venue was improperly laid, the trial court is powerless to dismiss the
case motu proprio.
Private respondent, on the other hand, maintains that the dismissal of petitioner's complaint is proper because the same can "readily be
assessed as (a) real action." He asserts that "every court of justice before whom a civil case is lodged is not even obliged to wait for the
defendant to raise that venue was improperly laid. The court can take judicial notice and motu proprio dismiss a suit clearly denominated
as real action and improperly filed before it. . . . the location of the subject parcel of land is controlling pursuant to Sec. 2, par. (a), Rule 4 of
the New Rules of Court . . .3
We grant the petition.
The motu proprio dismissal of petitioner's complaint by respondent trial court on the ground of improper venue is plain error, obviously
attributable to its inability to distinguish between jurisdiction and venue.
Questions or issues relating to venue of actions are basically governed by Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court. It is said that the laying of
venue is procedural rather than substantive. It relates to the jurisdiction of the court over the person rather than the subject matter.
Provisions relating to venue establish a relation between the plaintiff and the defendant and not between the court and the subject
matter. Venue relates to trial not to jurisdiction, touches more of the convenience of the parties rather than the substance of the case. 4
Jurisdiction treats of the power of the court to decide a case on the merits; while venue deals on the locality, the place where the suit may
be had.5
In Luna vs. Carandang,6 involving an action instituted before the then Court of First Instance of Batangas for rescission of a lease contract
over a parcel of agricultural land located in Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, which complaint said trial court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
over the leased land, we emphasized:
(1) A Court of First Instance has jurisdiction over suits involving title to, or possession of, real estate wherever situated in the
Philippines, subject to the rules on venue of actions (Manila Railroad Company vs. Attorney General, etc., et al., 20 Phil. 523;
Central Azucarera de Tarlac vs. De Leon, et al., 56 Phil. 169; Navarro vs. Aguila, et al., 66 Phil. 604; Lim Cay, et al. vs. Del Rosario,
etc., et al., 55 Phil. 692);
(2) Rule 4, Section 2, of the Rules of Court requiring that an action involving real property shall be brought in the Court of First
Instance of the province where the land lies is a rule on venue of actions, which may be waived expressly or by implication.
In the instant case, even granting for a moment that the action of petitioner is a real action, respondent trial court would still have
jurisdiction over the case, it being a regional trial court vested with the exclusive original jurisdiction over "all civil actions which involve
respect to the parties, there is no dispute that it acquired jurisdiction over the plaintiff Jesus Dacoycoy, now petitioner, the moment he
filed his complaint for annulment and damages. Respondent trial court could have acquired jurisdiction over the defendant, now private
respondent, either by his voluntary appearance in court and his submission to its authority, or by the coercive power of legal process
exercised over his person.7
Although petitioner contends that on April 28, 1963, he requested the City Sheriff of Olongapo City or his deputy to serve the summons on
defendant Rufino de Guzman at his residence at 117 Irving St., Tapinac, Olongapo City, 8 it does not appear that said service had been
properly effected or that private respondent had appeared voluntarily in court 9 or filed his answer to the complaint. 10 At this stage,
respondent trial court should have required petitioner to exhaust the various alternative modes of service of summons under Rule 14 of
the Rules of Court, i.e., personal service under Section 7, substituted service under Section 8, or service by publication under Section 16
when the address of the defendant is unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry.
Dismissing the complaint on the ground of improper venue is certainly not the appropriate course of action at this stage of the proceeding,
particularly as venue, in inferior courts as well as in the courts of first instance (now RTC), may be waived expressly or impliedly. Where
defendant fails to challenge timely the venue in a motion to dismiss as provided by Section 4 of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, and allows the
trial to be held and a decision to be rendered, he cannot on appeal or in a special action be permitted to challenge belatedly the wrong
venue, which is deemed waived.11
Thus, unless and until the defendant objects to the venue in a motion to dismiss, the venue cannot be truly said to have been improperly
laid, as for all practical intents and purposes, the venue, though technically wrong, may be acceptable to the parties for whose
convenience the rules on venue had been devised. The trial court cannot pre-empt the defendant's prerogative to object to the improper
laying of the venue by motu proprio dismissing the case.
Indeed, it was grossly erroneous for the trial court to have taken a procedural short-cut by dismissing motu propriothe complaint on the
ground of improper venue without first allowing the procedure outlined in the Rules of Court to take its proper course. Although we are
for the speedy and expeditious resolution of cases, justice and fairness take primary importance. The ends of justice require that
respondent trial court faithfully adhere to the rules of procedure to afford not only the defendant, but the plaintiff as well, the right to be
heard on his cause.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, dated April 11, 1986, is
hereby nullified and set aside. The complaint filed by petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Branch LXXI is revived and
reinstated. Respondent court is enjoined to proceed therein in accordance with law.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 106847. March 5, 1993.
PATRICIO P. DIAZ, petitioner, vs. JUDGE SANTOS B. ADIONG, RTC, Br. 8, Marawi City, SULTAN MACORRO L. MACUMBAL, SULTAN LINOG M.
INDOL, MACABANGKIT LANTO and MOHAMADALI ABEDIN, respondents.
Rex J.M.A. Fernandez for petitioner.
Mangurun B. Batuampar for respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; VENUE OF LIBEL CASE WHERE OFFENDED PARTY IS AN PUBLIC OFFICIAL. — From the provision of Article 360,
third paragraph of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. 4363, it is clear that an offended party who is at the same time a public
official can only institute an action arising from libel in two (2) venues: the place where he holds office, and the place where the alleged
libelous articles were printed and first published.
2. ID.; ID.; IMPROPER VENUE; MUST BE RAISED IN A NOTION TO DISMISS PRIOR TO A RESPONSIVE PLEADING. — Unless and until the
defendant objects to the venue in a motion to dismiss prior to a responsive pleading, the venue cannot truly be said to have been
improperly laid since, for all practical intents and purposes, the venue though technically wrong may yet be considered acceptable to the
parties for whose convenience the rules on venue had been devised.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; WAIVED IN CASE AT BAR BY FILING ANSWER. — Petitioner Diaz then, as defendant in the court below, should have timely
challenged the venue laid in Marawi City in a motion to dismiss, pursuant to Sec. 4, Rule 4, of the Rules of Court. Unfortunately, petitioner
had already submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court when he filed his Answer to the Complaint with Counterclaim. His
motion to dismiss was therefore belatedly filed and could no longer deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to hear and decide the instant
civil action for damages. Well-settled is the rule that improper venue may be waived and such waiver may occur by laches. Sec. 1 of Rule
16 provides that objections to improper venue must be made in a motion to dismiss before any responsive pleading is filed. Responsive
pleadings are those which seek affirmative relief and set up defenses. Consequently, having already submitted his person to the
jurisdiction of the trial court, petitioner may no longer object to the venue which, although mandatory in the instant case, is nevertheless
waivable. As such, improper venue must be seasonably raised, otherwise, it may be deemed waived.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; RELATES TO TRIAL AND NOT TO JURISDICTION. — Indeed, the laying of venue is procedural rather than substantive, relating
as it does to jurisdiction of the court over the person rather than the subject matter. Venue relates to trial and not to jurisdiction.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J p:
VENUE in the instant civil action for damages arising from libel was improperly laid; nonetheless, the trial court refused to dismiss the
complaint. Hence, this Petition for Certiorari, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, assailing that order of denial 1
as well as the order denying reconsideration. 2
The facts: On 16 July 1991, the Mindanao Kris, a newspaper of general circulation in Cotabato City, published in its front page the news
article captioned "6-Point Complaint Filed vs. Macumbal," and in its Publisher's Notes the editorial, "Toll of Corruption," which exposed
alleged anomalies by key officials in the Regional Office of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. 3
On 22 July 1991, the public officers alluded to, namely, private respondents Sultan Macorro L. Macumbal, Sultan Linog M. Indol, Atty.
Macabangkit M. Lanto and Atty. Mohamadali Abedin, instituted separate criminal and civil complaints arising from the libel before the City
Prosecutor's Office and the Regional Trial Court in Marawi City. The publisher-editor of the Mindanao Kris, petitioner Patricio P. Diaz, and
Mamala B. Pagandaman, who executed a sworn statement attesting to the alleged corruption, were named respondents in both
complaints. 4
On 2 September 1991, the City Prosecutor's Office dismissed the criminal case thus 5 —
"WHEREFORE . . . this investigation in the light of Agbayani vs. Sayo case finds that it has no jurisdiction to handle this case and that the
same be filed or instituted in Cotabato City where complainant is officially holding office at the time respondents caused the publication of
the complained news item in the Mindanao Kris in Cotabato City, for which reason it is recommended that this charge be dropped for lack
of jurisdiction."
In the interim, the civil complaint for damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 385-91 and raffled to Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court in
Marawi City, was set for Pre-Trial Conference. The defendants therein had already filed their respective Answers with Counterclaim.
On 18 November 1991, petitioner Diaz moved for the dismissal of the action for damages on the ground that the trial court did not have
jurisdiction over the subject matter. He vehemently argued that the complaint should have been filed in Cotabato City and not in Marawi
City. 6
Pending action on the motion, the presiding judge of Branch 10 inhibited himself from the case which was thereafter reraffled to the sala
of respondent judge.
On 15 June 1991, respondent judge denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss for lack of merit. Diaz thereafter moved for reconsideration of
the order of denial. The motion was also denied in the Order of 27 August 1991, prompting petitioner to seek relief therefrom.
Petitioner Diaz contends that the civil action for damages could not be rightfully filed in Marawi City as none of the private respondents,
who are all public officers, held office in Marawi City; neither were the alleged libelous news items published in that city. Consequently, it
is petitioner's view that the Regional Trial Court in Marawi City has no jurisdiction to entertain the civil action for damages.
The petitioner is correct. Not one of the respondents then held office in Marawi City: respondent Macumbal was the Regional Director for
Region XII of the DENR and held office in Cotabato City; respondent Indol was the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer of
Lanao del Norte and held office in that province; respondent Lanto was a consultant of the Secretary of the DENR and, as averred in the
complaint, was temporarily residing in Quezon City; and, respondent Abedin was the Chief of the Legal Division of the DENR Regional
Office in Cotabato City. 7 Indeed, private respondents do not deny that their main place of work was not in Marawi City, although they had
sub-offices therein.
Apparently, the claim of private respondents that they maintained sub-offices in Marawi City is a mere afterthought, considering that it
was made following the dismissal of their criminal complaint by the City Prosecutor of Marawi City. Significantly, in their complaint in civil
Case No. 385-91 respondents simply alleged that they were residents of Marawi City, except for respondent Lanto who was then
temporarily residing in Quezon City, and that they were public officers, nothing more. This averment is not enough to vest jurisdiction
upon the Regional Trial Court of Marawi City and may be properly assailed in a motion to dismiss.
The Comment of private respondents that Lanto was at the time of the commission of the offense actually holding office in Marawi City as
consultant of LASURECO can neither be given credence because this is inconsistent with their allegation in their complaint that respondent
Lanto, as consultant of the Secretary of the DENR, was temporarily residing in Quezon City.
Moreover, it is admitted that the libelous articles were published and printed in Cotabato City. Thus, respondents were limited in their
choice of venue for their action for damages only to Cotabato City where Macumbal, Lanto and Abedin had their office and Lanao del
Norte where Indol worked. Marawi City is not among those where venue can be laid.
The third paragraph of Art. 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 4363, specifically requires that —
"The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as provided for in this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or
separately with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first
published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense: Provided, however, that
where one of the offended parties is a public officer . . . (who) does not hold office in the City of Manila, the action shall be filed in the
Court of First Instance (Regional Trial Court) of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense or
where the libelous article is printed and first published and in case one of the the offended parties is a private individual, the action shall
be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense or
where the libelous matter is printed and first published . . . . " (emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing provision, it is clear that an offended party who is at the same time a public official can only institute an action arising
from libel in two (2) venues: the place where he holds office, and the place where the alleged libelous articles were printed and first
published.
Private respondents thus appear to have misread the provisions of Art. 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, when they filed their
criminal and civil complaints in Marawi City. They deemed as sufficient to vest jurisdiction upon the Regional Trial Court of Marawi City the
allegation that "plaintiffs are all of legal age, all married, Government officials by occupation and residents of Marawi City." 8 But they are
wrong.
Consequently, it is indubitable that venue was improperly laid. However, unless and until the defendant objects to the venue in a motion
to dismiss prior to a responsive pleading, the venue cannot truly be said to have been improperly laid since, for all practical intents and
purposes, the venue though technically wrong may yet be considered acceptable to the parties for whose convenience the rules on venue
had been devised. 9
Petitioner Diaz then, as defendant in the court below, should have timely challenged the venue laid in Marawi City in a motion to dismiss,
pursuant to Sec. 4, Rule 4, of the Rules of Court. Unfortunately, petitioner had already submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial
court when he filed his Answer to the Complaint with Counterclaim. 10
His motion to dismiss was therefore belatedly filed and could no longer deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to hear and decide the instant
civil action for damages. Well-settled is the rule that improper venue may be waived and such waiver may occur by laches. 11
Petitioner was obviously aware of this rule when he anchored his motion to dismiss on lack of cause of action over the subject matter,
relying on this Court's ruling in Time, Inc. v. Reyes. 12 Therein, We declared that the Court of First Instance of Rizal was without jurisdiction
to take cognizance of Civil Case No. 10403 because the complainants held office in Manila, not in Rizal, while the alleged libelous articles
were published abroad.
It may be noted that in Time, Inc. v. Reyes, the defendant therein moved to dismiss the case without first submitting to the jurisdiction of
the lower court, which is not the case before Us. More, venue in an action arising from libel is only mandatory if it is not waived by
defendant. Thus —
"The rule is that where a statute creates a right and provides a remedy for its enforcement, the remedy is exclusive; and where it confers
jurisdiction upon a particular court, that jurisdiction is likewise exclusive, unless otherwise provided. Hence, the venue provisions of
Republic Act No. 4363 should be deemed mandatory for the party bringing the action, unless the question of venue should be waived by
the defendant . . . . " 13
Withal, objections to venue in civil actions arising from libel may be waived; it does not, after all, involve a question of jurisdiction. Indeed,
the laying of venue is procedural rather than substantive, relating as it does to jurisdiction of the court over the person rather than the
subject matter. 14 Venue relates to trial and not to jurisdiction.
Finally, Sec. 1 of Rule 16 provides that objections to improper venue must be made in a motion to dismiss before any responsive pleading
is filed. Responsive pleadings are those which seek affirmative relief and set up defenses. Consequently, having already submitted his
person to the jurisdiction of the trial court, petitioner may no longer object to the venue which, although mandatory in the instant case, is
nevertheless waivable. As such, improper venue must be seasonably raised, otherwise, it may be deemed waived.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED and the Temporary Restraining Order heretofore issued is LIFTED.
This case is remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.