94802_Diez_01_30.

qxp 1/30/2006 10:44 AM Page 111

Chapter Six
Deforestation in the Selva
Lacandona of Chiapas:
The Last of the Mahoganies?

“Here the river is the last destination.

Here, men are taken by the current [ . . . ].
Here, men turn into jungle.
In order not to die like rotten trees,
They take revenge on a world that takes them where it wants to,
A world that they cannot tame,
And that’s why they destroy it.
The logger knows how to cut, break and disembowel admirably.”
Mario Monteforte Toledo, Anaité, 1948
(translated by the author as quoted by de Vos 1994: 7).

The forgoing study has thus far looked at the formulation of environmen-
tal policy in Mexico during the Zedillo administration, by looking at the
setting of the environmental agenda and the drafting of environmental
policy. A study of policymaking in Mexico would be limited, however, if
it did not pay attention to the implementation of the policies that are for-
mulated given the historical gap there has been in Latin America between
the adoption of policies and their implementation. Historically, the adher-
ence to the rule of law has not generally been equal in the region; there
has been a difference between legal formalism and individual compliance
with the law. A dualism of legality has been institutionalized, where there
are those who make the law, interpret it and are above it, and those who
have no option but to comply. It could be argued that the gap between the

111
94802_Diez_01_30.qxp 1/30/2006 10:44 AM Page 112

112 Political Change and Environmental Policymaking in Mexico

adoption of certain policies and their implementation is not specific to the

Latin American experience, since the same also occurs in developed coun-
tries.1 In the case of Latin America, however, the dualism between legal
formalism and actual implementation is argued to be related to culture, a
tradition that can be traced back through colonial times and ultimately to
sixteenth century Spain. More precisely, it refers to the principle of la ley
se acata pero no se cumple (which, if translated literally, means the law
must be obeyed but not complied with). Although contradictory at first
glance, this principle was based on the idea of the poder moderador
(moderating power). That is, in sixteenth century Spain, and subsequently
in Latin America, the King was the ultimate interpreter of the law and it
was up to him to decide what was legal or not (castizo or just) (Anglade
1986). Individuals could therefore appeal to the King whenever they
thought a law was unjust.
A phrase which encapsulates this concept is obedezco pero no cumplo
(I obey but I do not comply with). Because of an individual’s right to appeal
to the King, the law was not expected to be complied with. Even though at
the time of independence most Latin American countries adopted liberal
constitutions, this dualism in the adherence of the rule of law appears to
have remained. A case in point is the 1917 Mexican constitution: although
the constitution is considered a very progressive document—comparable to
the most developed democratic societies of Europe in areas such as social
and labor laws—many of its laws have not been fully enforced, such as
agrarian reform (Anglade 1995). In spite of this possible cultural trait,
however, it has been pointed out that the privileged in Latin America tend
to exempt themselves from the law more inordinately than the poor. As
Guillermo O’Donnell suggests, there is a widespread feeling that to be sub-
ject to the law is a sign of social weakness (1999: 312).
The lack of policy implementation in Mexico has frequently resulted
from the interference of powerful social actors, such as big business and the
landed élite, whose interests may be affected by the full implementation of
the law and who may decide to influence the implementation process or at
times sabotage it. There exist several examples of weak policy implementa-
tion in Mexico, among which the most prominent are the failure to imple-
ment fully the profit-sharing scheme, that was instituted in 1961; and the
land reform provisions that were entrenched in the 1917 Constitution. It is
precisely because of this traditional dualism between legal formalism and
weak compliance with the law that I include an analysis of the implementa-
tion phase of the policymaking process by looking at the implementation of
forestry policy in the Selva Lacandona (the Lacandone rainforest) of the
south-eastern state of Chiapas.
94802_Diez_01_30.qxp 1/30/2006 10:44 AM Page 113

Deforestation in the Selva Lacandona of Chiapas 113

The study of the implementation of forestry policy in the Selva Lacan-

dona is justified on several counts. Firstly, as we have seen, the Forestry
Law and its regulation were reformed in 1997 and 1998, soon after the
completion of the reform of the Environmental Protection Law (LGEEPA).
The reform of the Forestry Law, which represented a cornerstone of the
Minister of the Environment’s environmental policy objectives, introduced
certain mechanisms, such as a forestry regulatory framework, to decrease
deforestation rates and foster the sustainable use of forests. It is justified to
look at whether such mechanisms have been implemented. Secondly, unlike
other environmental policy areas, such as water management, which is the
responsibility of local governments, the implementation of forestry policy
falls under the jurisdiction of the federal government. Because this study is
limited to an analysis of policymaking at the national level, forestry policy
allows one to concentrate on the role the federal government plays without
having to look at the sub-national levels of government. Thirdly, the Selva
Lacandona is a justified choice since it is the largest tropical rainforest left
in Mexico (the second one being that of Los Chimalapas in the state of
Oaxaca).2
Prior to embarking upon the elaboration of such an analysis, it is
important to look at the context within which the forestry policy is to be
implemented. That is to say, it is necessary to look at the problem that the
policy intends to address, which in this case refers to deforestation.3 This
chapter presents thus a brief glimpse at the process of deforestation in the
Selva Lacandona, while the next chapter looks specifically at the implemen-
tation of forestry policy. The causes of deforestation are multiple and a
detailed analysis of them would certainly fall beyond the scope of this
study. This chapter will look at the main causes only and present evidence
that points to continued deforestation in the area. It will attempt to show
that, despite the complexities of its causes, deforestation has been to a large
extent the result of immigration pressures and timber extraction by private
corporations. Immigration has been primarily the direct result of the socio-
economic exclusion of vast sectors of society—especially landless peasants
and indigenous communities—who have not had access to arable land and
have been forced to migrate to the forest. Socio-economic exclusion has
been a constant characteristic of the history of Chiapas since colonialism,
but it has been exacerbated by the economic policies adopted over the last
two decades as living conditions have deteriorated in rural areas in general,
and rather precipitously in Chiapas. This is the context within which the
forestry policy has to be implemented.
This short chapter is divided in two sections. The first section looks at
the socio-economic conditions of Chiapas, something that is indispensable
94802_Diez_01_30.qxp 1/30/2006 10:44 AM Page 114

114 Political Change and Environmental Policymaking in Mexico

to any understanding of the problems of deforestation in the region. In this

section it will be seen that socio-economic conditions of Chiapas are very
precarious and that they have deteriorated as a result of the economic
reform that the country has been undergoing over the last two decades. The
second section will look specifically at the problem of deforestation in the
Selva Lacandona (providing fairly recent satellite images which show the
levels of deforestation in the area) and it will briefly review the causes.

SETTING THE STAGE: CHIAPAS IN HISTORICAL AND

SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONTEXT
The seemingly remote Selva Lacandona in south-eastern Mexico became
the focus of international media coverage and debate when the peasant
rebellion of the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN) vio-
lently took six towns in Chiapas in the early morning hours of January 1,
1994. The rebellion was intended to bring national and international atten-
tion to the demands of the group, through the Declaration of the Selva
Lacandona, for work, land, housing, food, health, education, independ-
ence, liberty, democracy, justice and peace, under the theme ¡Ya Basta!
(EZLN 1994). The uprising was quickly suppressed by an intense military
response from the Mexican Armed Forces, through heavy land and air
attacks, that began swiftly two days after the outbreak. The military
response was sustained until a ceasefire was declared on January 13.
Human rights violations were committed by both sides during the fighting
and more than 300 people died. As a result of intense popular mobilization,
the public debate throughout the country that ensued, and mounting pres-
sure by various national political forces that it be resolved peacefully, the
government began negotiations on February 21. The consultations trans-
lated into a peace proposal that was ultimately rejected by the EZLN, but
the ceasefire continued until new negotiations began again in 1996.4
Explanations as to the causes of the uprising varied. For example,
some attributed great importance to poverty (Katzenberger 1994) while
others, more simplistically, argued that it was mostly the result of environ-
mental scarcity (Howard and Homer-Dixon 1996). Zapatismo is a com-
plex social movement, whose causes are multiple and, more importantly,
have mutated since its gestation. As Neil Harvey shows, it was first formed
in the early 1980s as a self-defense group to protect peasants and indige-
nous peoples from para-military groups (1998). Various factors con-
tributed to the crystallization of the conflict, such as the deleterious effects
of the economic crisis and reforms of the 1980s on rural workers; the ensu-
ing reduction in social spending; the crash of the price of coffee in the late
94802_Diez_01_30.qxp 1/30/2006 10:44 AM Page 115

Deforestation in the Selva Lacandona of Chiapas 115

1980s and subsequent reduction in the support to coffee producers; contin-

ued violent repression of independent peasant mobilization; the failure to
bring about any significant land redistribution; and the failure of the two
levels of government to tend to increasing basic demands.5 Nevertheless,
one of the things that became apparent through intense media coverage in
the days and months after the uprising is the appalling socio-economic con-
ditions in which large sectors of Chiapas society live.

Table 6.1. Social and Economic Indicators of Chiapas, 2000*

National Chiapas

Population 97, 483, 412 3, 920, 892

Population growth (annual) 1.6 % 2.1 %a

Per capita income (US dollars) 5, 600 1, 466

Gini Coefficient 0.5896b 0.635c

Fertility rate 2.9 3.5
Infant mortality rated 10.66 11.75

Literacy rate 90.5 (Women 88.6) 77 (Women 71)

Access to health care (% of population)e 70 17.6

Percentage of population without 20.6 43

running waterf
Percentage of population without 12.5 35
electricityf
Percentage of population who work 15 47
in agricultureg
Percentage of population who speak 7.2 24.6
an Amerindian languageh

* All the data have been obtained from the 2000 national census, unless otherwise noted.
Source: 2000 National Census (INEGI 2000b).

a
Chiapas had an overall migratory balance of–5.7%. b This datum has been obtained from
Lustig (1998). c This figure has been taken from Hernández (2000) and is based on 1996
income data from INEGI. d Refers to the percentage of dead children of less than one year of
age per 1000. e Refers to the percentage of people that have some form of access to institution-
alized health care, whether it be through a federal-government funded health system (IMSS
ISSTE, PEMEX or the Armed Forces), a state-government funded one or private, as per cate-
gorized by the 2000 National Census. f These figures are for 1995 (INEGI 2000b). g As per
categorized as “Trabajadores Agropecuarios” in the 2000 census. h Over 5 years of age.
94802_Diez_01_30.qxp 1/30/2006 10:44 AM Page 116

116 Political Change and Environmental Policymaking in Mexico

In effect, if there is anything that characterizes the state of Chiapas is

socio-economic exclusion and inequality. Despite the fact that Chiapas pos-
sesses abundant natural end energy resources (it provides Mexico with
20% of its oil, 23% of its natural gas and 15% of its electricity) it is the
poorest state in Mexico and the one which exhibits the most skewed
income distribution in the country; its Gini Coefficient in 1996 was 0.635
(Table A5–1 in Appendix 5) and its per capita income is significantly lower
than the national average (Table 6.1).6 According to the 2000 census, 40 of
its 111 municipalities exhibit ‘very high levels’ of indigence. It also has the
highest mortality rate in the country and its annual population growth sur-
passed the national average from 1970 until 2000. Moreover, less than
18% of the population has access to public health care (Table 6.1); not sur-
prisingly, the main causes of death are malnutrition, anemia, and intestinal
infections, and it has the highest reported number of cholera cases and
deaths caused by tuberculosis (INEGI 2000b). It also has one of the highest
illiteracy rates in the country (24% of its population does not have educa-
tion of any kind), 35% of its population does not have electricity and 43%
does not have running water (Table 6.1). Further, more than half of the
population lives on less than the minimum wage (which in Mexico is very
low), 47% work in agriculture, and it is the Mexican state with the highest
non-Hispanophone population (24.6% of its population speaks an
Amerindian language).7 However, inequality is nothing new in Chiapas; the
history of Chiapas is one of social and economic exclusion of large sectors
of its population. Such exclusion has been mostly the result of high concen-
tration of land ownership that has been a constant characteristic of the
state since colonial times. Indeed, it is impossible to understand contempo-
rary society and politics in Chiapas without looking at land distribution.
Let us review briefly the main aspects of the history of Chiapas that are rel-
evant to the present subject.8
Socio-economic exclusion has been a constant characteristic of Chia-
pas. Upon the their arrival to Chiapas in 1524, the Spanish established a sys-
tem of indebted servitude, known as encomiendas. Under this system,
Amerindians were forced to work in large landholdings taken over by the
Spanish conquerors and the Catholic Church. The Spanish Crown, under
pressure from some important religious figures to treat the Amerindian com-
munities more humanely, introduced legislation in 1542 limiting the holding
of encomienda rights and granting some rights to Amerindian communities.
However, in practice, exploitation endured and land concentration increased
(Benjamin 1995; Zebadúa 1999). When Chiapas joined the new and inde-
pendent Mexican federation in 1824, an emerging group of criollos (Ameri-
can-born Spaniards) replaced the former colonial administrators and enacted
94802_Diez_01_30.qxp 1/30/2006 10:44 AM Page 117

Deforestation in the Selva Lacandona of Chiapas 117

agrarian laws that allowed them to appropriate the best arable land
(Zebadúa 1999).
This new landowning élite came to dominate political and social life
in Chiapas during the nineteenth century. It was, however, not a homoge-
neous group. Indeed, similar to what occurred in other parts of Mexico and
in most of Latin America, there were rivalries between liberal and conser-
vative factions within this élite. These rivalries characterized the history of
Chiapas during the nineteenth century.9 By the beginning of the twentieth
century, though, the liberal faction had won control of the state’s political
landscape. The number of large landholdings increased dramatically during
this ‘liberal’ regime forcing an increasing number of Amerindian and agri-
cultural workers to work as renters and day laborers. The relationship
between these agricultural workers and the regional élite was characterized
by clientelism, whereby laborers afforded loyalty to the landlords in return
for land (Zebadúa 1999). By the beginning of the twentieth century, land
ownership was consolidated in the hands of a few in the form of latifundios
(large landholdings) whose owners had managed to deprive most native
communities of their land (Benjamin 1995; Zebadúa 1999).
Although Mexico underwent an important political revolution at the
beginning of the twentieth century, it took a very different course in Chia-
pas from the rest of the country and failed to bring about any significant
social change. The Mexican Revolution did not develop as a social move-
ment from below in Chiapas. Due to the very strong clientelistic ties that
characterized the relationship between the oligarchy and workers, the latter
mostly fought with the former, and the political élite of Chiapas saw the
revolution as a threat to their interests from the revolutionaries who gained
control of the federal government (O’Brien 1998; Zebadúa 1999, Benjamin
1995). As a result, the divisions that had existed among the regional élite
prior to the revolution quickly vanished and, once unified, this élite
mounted a counterrevolution, known as the revolución mapache, prevent-
ing the implementation of any significant land redistribution. Indeed, it has
been said that the Mexican Revolution effectively bypassed Chiapas
(Zebadúa 1999). Although land reform legislation was introduced in the
post-revolutionary period (mostly through the granting of ejidos),10 its
implementation was not fully carried out and, by 1930, land concentration
in Chiapas remained high (O’Brien 1998). President Lázaro Cárdenas
(1934–1940) renewed agrarian reform efforts during his administration,11
and land was given to peasants, but land tenure remained highly concen-
trated. By 1940 more than half of the arable land remained in the hands of
only 2.2% of the population and peasants, representing 76.79% of the
population, possessed a mere 4.39% of the land (O’Brien 1998: 110;
94802_Diez_01_30.qxp 1/30/2006 10:44 AM Page 118

118 Political Change and Environmental Policymaking in Mexico

Zebadúa 1999: 163). Although some limited land reform did occur during
the 1950s and 1960s, the best arable land remained in the hands of a few;
by 1970, 60% of cultivated land was in the hands of 3% of the population
(Zebadúa 1999: 163).
The élite that controlled social and political life in rural Chiapas at
the beginning of the century continued to dominate economic and social
relations in the rural areas of the state through cacicazgos for decades to
come.12 Although some peasant mobilization did occur during the 1930s,
all newly-formed peasant organizations were integrated into the corporatist
structures established by President Cárdenas through the centralized
National Confederation of Peasants (CNC) (Chapter One).13 Landowners,
who slowly became subordinated to the federal government, remained in
control of social and economic activity in their regional domains through
patronage and coercion (Harvey 1998).14 Such historically highly skewed
land distribution and the domination of the landowning élite of Chiapas
have resulted in highly concentrated income distribution.
During the three decades after the presidency of Cárdenas there was a
decrease in land redistribution and in loans to ejidatarios. Agricultural poli-
cies favored private property and the production and cultivation of coffee,
cotton and sugar that favored the landowning class (Zebadúa 1999). Such
policies, which later became to be known as the ‘Green Revolution,’
involved significant investments in large-scale agriculture and the promo-
tion of production directed toward export crops. Communal landowners
were, as a result of not being able to compete in the export market, forced
to cultivate crops for subsistence. By the early 1980’s, Chiapas was experi-
encing an agricultural crisis as a result of the failure to bring about any sig-
nificant land reform, a reduction in the high population growth rates that
the state had been experiencing, and a halt to the reduction in the produc-
tion of corn—the mainstay of rural households. Evidently, this crisis fell
most heavily on rural workers. Even before the onset of Mexico’s debt cri-
sis in 1982, the socio-economic conditions of large sectors of society in Chi-
apas were precarious.
Living conditions declined precipitously in Chiapas during the 1980s.
The severe economic crisis that hit Mexico in the early 1980s, the subse-
quent structural adjustment it underwent, and the staggering reduction in
spending on agriculture during the de la Madrid and Salinas administra-
tions, had a severely negative impact on Chiapas. This was especially the
case in rural areas since almost half of its population depends on agricul-
ture. Studies on the social impact of the Mexican economic crisis of the
1980s show that it was felt most heavily in rural areas.15 There was a dra-
matic reduction in public investment in rural development; between 1980
94802_Diez_01_30.qxp 1/30/2006 10:44 AM Page 119

Deforestation in the Selva Lacandona of Chiapas 119

and 1989, there was a 85% real reduction in agricultural spending (Kelly
1999: 95). From 1980 until 1987, the budget for the Ministry of Agricul-
ture and Livestock (SAG) dropped 70% in real terms (Grammont 2003:
351). Moreover, subsidies for agricultural and livestock dropped from
10.9% of GDP in 1982 to 3.2% in 1988 (Grammont 2003: 351). Further,
Mexico’s agricultural terms of trade dropped from an index of 100 in 1980
to 83.8 in 1989 (Escalante Semerena and Talavera Flores 1998, as cited in
Grammont 2003: 351).16 By 1988, over 11,000 irrigation projects had
fallen idle or partially idle due to a lack of fund for maintenance and
repairs (Kelly 1999: 95). Also, the availability of credit, through Mexico’s
rural development bank (Banrural), for the production of the most impor-
tant crops dropped from 1.7 billion pesos in 1987 to 285 million by 1992.
This situation was made worse by the collapse of the price of basic crops,
such as maize and coffee (falling 24% and 84%, respectively, from 1987 to
1992) (Grammont 2003: 351).
The effects were felt heavily by agricultural workers whose real aver-
age earnings fell by 18% over 1984–1989 (Kelly 1999: 109). Although
Mexico’s economy recovered in the early 1990s (its GDP grew at an aver-
age of 3.0% per annum from 1989 to 1994), poverty increased sharply
among rural workers during this period. From 1984 to 1994 real average
agricultural wages dropped by 32.4 % (Kelly 1999: 109).17 Given that
almost half of the population of Chiapas works in agriculture, the effects of
this agricultural crisis on them were disastrous: in an already poor state,
real GDP per capita dropped by 4.5% in 1980–1985; 9.91% in 1985–1988
and, despite the recovery of the early 1990s, by 1.48% in 1988–1993
(Tamayo-Flores 2001: 388–190, Table 2). Moreover, as Nora Lustig shows,
data on poverty and inequality during the 1990s demonstrate that a
process of differentiation has begun to occur between the southern and cen-
tral regions and the northern part of the country: poverty increased more
sharply in the south and south-eastern regions—and it is five times higher
in the southeast (composed of Chiapas, Guerrero and Oaxaca) than in the
northeast and close to forty times higher than in Mexico City (1998:
204–205). It is within this context of a historic unequal distribution of land
and deteriorating socio-economic conditions in the state of Chiapas that
the problem of deforestation in the Selva Lacandona must be analyzed.

DEFORESTATION IN THE SELVA LACANDONA

The Selva Lacandona is located in the eastern part of the state of Chiapas
in the Grijalva-Usumacinta basin—which is the largest in Mexico and
receives a significant part of Mexico’s total rainfall—and north of the
94802_Diez_01_30.qxp 1/30/2006 10:44 AM Page 120

120 Political Change and Environmental Policymaking in Mexico

Mexico-Guatemala border (Map A6–1 in Appendix 6). It covers an area of

approximately 1.9 million hectares. Three important rivers run through the
area: the Usumacinta, the Lacantún and the Lacanjá. Most of the vegeta-
tion of this region consists of lowland and montane rainforests, although
there are pine-oak forests in the higher areas of the region, especially on the
western part of the area. The Selva Lacandona possesses extraordinary bio-
diversity of flora and fauna. It is home to 25% of Mexico’s total species: it
contains 163 species of non-marine mammals (or 37.1% of the country’s
total); 508 species of birds (47.9% of the country’s total); 800 species of
butterflies (40% of the country’s total); and more than 3,400 vascular
plants (PROFEPA 1999). This biodiversity has come under intense pres-
sure—and a number of species have become in danger of extinction—as a
result of a process of deforestation that has intensified over the last thirty
years.18 Map A6.2 in Appendix 6 shows a satellite picture of the area,
where one can notice the deforestation that occurred from 1972 to 1998. In
effect, although estimates vary, a recent study concludes that up to approx-
imately 40% of the forest had been destroyed by the early 1990s (O’Brien
1998).19 Karen O’Brien estimates that 56% of this deforestation occurred
from the periods between 1974—1979 and 1989—1992, years for which
she was able to obtain satellite images (1998: 35—60).20 More recent satel-
lite images suggest that deforestation has continued apace in the 1990s.
Maps A6–3, A6–4 and A6–5 in Appendix 6 show the areas that were
deforested in the years 1972, 1993 and 1998, respectively, where it can be
seen that new pockets of deforested areas appeared between 1993 and
1998 (The colored areas refer to vegetation).21
The causes of deforestation in the Selva Lacandona are multiple
(Dichtl 1987; Masera 1996; de Vos 1994; Vásquez Sánchez and Ramos
1992; Arizpe et al 1996; O’Brien 1998; Ditchl 1987). Karen O’Brien sug-
gests that timber extraction, agricultural expansion and cattle production
are interrelated phenomena that affect deforestation and that any compre-
hensive analysis has to look at their interrelationship (1998).22 Because it is
important to be aware of the causes of the problem that a policy is attempt-
ing to address (forestry policy, in our case), a brief review of these causes is
in order. We shall look at what studies of deforestation in the area suggest
are four of the most salient ones: timber extraction, migration, illegal log-
ging, and, indirectly, the Zapatista conflict.
The oldest cause of deforestation in the Selva Lacandona has surely
been the extraction of precious woods, a process that began in the late
nineteenth century. The Industrial Revolution and the consequent expan-
sion of capitalism during the nineteenth century in Europe and the United
States increased the demand for precious woods, such as mahogany and
94802_Diez_01_30.qxp 1/30/2006 10:44 AM Page 121

Deforestation in the Selva Lacandona of Chiapas 121

tropical cedar. Because the Selva Lacandona is rich in these woods, Belgian,
English and US companies began to extract these raw materials from the
region for international markets. This previously isolated part of Mexico
became the main centre of attraction in southern Mexico for foreign
investors. Timber companies, representing the interests of international
capital, acquired vast swathes of land and began to extract mostly
mahogany and cedar and sell them at the main international ports, such as
Liverpool, Hamburg and Le Havre. Between 1875 and 1908, 27% of the
total area of Chiapas had been acquired by foreign private companies
(González Pacheco 1983: 53—56).23 Benefiting from an influx of interna-
tional capital from timber companies, exports of precious woods from Chi-
apas increased significantly during this period; between 1877–1878 and
1910–1911, the total value of exports increased by almost 846% (Ayala
and Blanco 1985, as cited in Arizpe et al 1996: 23).24
The ascendant position of the United States in the global economy at
the beginning of the twentieth century allowed it to place its capital in
Latin America and to gain control over its natural resources. After 1914,
most of the timber companies of the Selva Lacandona were American, dis-
placing the European ones (Arizpe et al 1996: 23). By the mid 1940s,
though, logging companies in the Selva Lacandona had ceased to operate
due to the increased costs of logging in areas of more difficult access that
would have required investment in infrastructure. In 1949, the Mexican
government passed the first Forestry Law which prohibited the export of
unprocessed timber at which point massive timber extraction in the Selva
Lacandona came to a halt. However, after 1964, deforestation recom-
menced, marking the beginning of a new period of state-managed defor-
estation, which was also characterized by significant waves of migration
into the forest: the second cause of deforestation in the area. 25
In 1964, the Pensacola-based Weiss Fricker Mahogany Company con-
tracted logging rights and set up the Mexican affiliate Aserraderos Bonam-
pack, S.A. to carry out logging in the area. The company built a network of
roads to mahogany-rich areas, which allowed for the establishment of the first
small ejidos.26 After its permit expired in 1973 (it was tenable for only ten
years), it was sold to the government-owned Nacional Financiera, S.A. .
(NAFINSA) (González Pacheco 1983). A year later, through presidential
decree, the government established another subsidiary of NAFINSA in the
area, the Compañía Forestal de la Lacandona, S.A. (COFOLASA). The estab-
lishment of these corporations was part of the broader forestry policy of pres-
ident Luis Echeverría Álvarez (1970—1976) to control the management of
forests through the creation of forestry parastatals (O’Brien 1998; González
Pacheco 1983), and signalled the beginning of the era of real devastation of
94802_Diez_01_30.qxp 1/30/2006 10:44 AM Page 122

122 Political Change and Environmental Policymaking in Mexico

the rainforest (Bray 1997: 4). The government also decreed, in 1972, the
creation of the Montes Azules Biosphere Reserve to restrict commercial
exploitation in the area making COFOLASA the only firm entitled to
exploit wood. This 1972 decree granted 614,321 hectares of land to sixty-
six Lacandone heads of family, justifying such action on the alleged historic
right to the land the Lacandone community had.27 Consequently, CFO-
LASA had to negotiate timber extraction with the now legal representatives
and owners of the forest. However, after almost two decades of underper-
formance and operating at a loss, COFOLASA declared insolvency in 1980
and was subsequently taken over by the state of Chiapas which ran it until
1989 (Arizpe et al 1996). The creation of the Montes Azules Biosphere
Reserve in 1972 marked the start of a period of land disputes in the area
that has not been solved to this day. In part the problem has been that the
new reserve was established on land that had already been settled by other
Amerindian groups.
Although some migration to the Selva Lacandona occurred during
the first part of the twentieth century, massive colonization began to take
place in the early 1950s. It increased significantly between 1964 and 1970
due to the scarcity of land and population pressures (Gutiérrez Sánchez
2000). The first group to have migrated to the rainforest were Tzeltal
Amerindians from the Ocosingo municipality, who founded the village of
Lacandón. Subsequently, Tzeltales from Bachajón formed the ejido of
Santo Domingo in 1961, and numerous groups from the municipalities of
Bachajón, Yajalón, Ocosingo, Pantheló, Tila, Tumbalá and Salto de Agua,
also left their homes in search for land in the rainforest (Arizpe et al 1996:
25—26; Gutiérrez Sánchez 2000). Constant migration to the rainforest
thus began, not only from within Chiapas, but from other parts of the
country.
Migration was also encouraged by the federal government through a
policy of colonization that attempted to deal with agrarian pressures, with-
out having to take land away from landowners. From approximately 1960 to
1974, the forest received thousands of Amerindian migrants to the area in an
attempt by the government to bring migrants together in large settlements in
which minimal services could be provided (Arizpe et al 1996: 27–28). By the
time the government established the Biosphere Reserve in 1972, approxi-
mately 62,000 Tzeltal and Ch’ol colonizers in 23 ejidos had migrated,
becoming illegal squatters.28 As a result of a continued effort by the federal
government to relieve agrarian and demographic pressures elsewhere in the
country, migration continued during the 1970s and 1980s as part of the gov-
ernment’s colonization strategy. According to census figures, population
increased by 165% between 1970 and 1990 in the Selva Lacandona; by
94802_Diez_01_30.qxp 1/30/2006 10:44 AM Page 123

Deforestation in the Selva Lacandona of Chiapas 123

1990 there were 263,043 inhabitants in the area (Gutiérrez Sánchez 2000:
96).29 Such a significant increase of population in the area had, not surpris-
ingly, a very severe effect on deforestation as the new settlers cleared forests
through practices of slash-and-burn agriculture. It is mostly because of the
significant wave of migration that, according to some studies, 90% of the
deforestation that has taken place in the Selva Lacandona has occurred
during the last thirty years (Fuentes Aguilar et al 1992, as cited in O’Brien
1998).
In addition to timber extraction and migration, illegal logging has
also been an important cause of deforestation, but it appears to be a recent
phenomenon given that legislation banning logging was not introduced
until the late 1980s. The federal and state governments declared a complete
logging ban in 1989. On May of that year, both levels of government estab-
lished the Coordinación Forestal del Estado, with the purpose of managing
timber exploitation permits and elaborate programs for forest exploitation
and conservation (O’Brien 1998: 80). However, such actions do not appear
to have been successful in reducing deforestation for two main reasons.
Firstly, the timber ban was not fully enacted or implemented since it
required a series of time-consuming studies to justify it, studies that the
state government did not carry out fully (O’Brien 1998). Secondly, the ban
was introduced without having provided an alternative source of income to
some 260,000 residents of the area. Because logging proved to be the most
economically viable means to survive for many peasants in the area, espe-
cially in the Marqués de Comillas region, numerous peasants continued to
cut down trees despite its illegality, and sell it to private companies. Buyers
of timber, such as the Palenque-based timber sawmill corporation CARPI-
CENTRO, reimbursed the peasants for any logging fines they received by
paying a slightly higher price for the timber (Harvey 1997, as cited in
O’Brien 1998). The illegal logging of precious woods continued during the
early 1990s, causing further deforestation.
The Zapatista Rebellion has also contributed, albeit indirectly, to
deforestation in the Selva Lacandona in two important ways. Immediately
after the uprising in 1994, a significant wave of refugees seeking to escape
the conflict left the Highlands (Las Cañadas) and migrated eastward into
the rainforest and toward the Montes Azules Biosphere Reserve. Despite
the ceasefire reached by the EZLN and the federal government soon after
the conflict, migration continued in its aftermath and has resulted in illegal
land occupations (invasiones) by landless migrants. Similar to previous
peasant migration waves, land takeovers of the forest have been character-
ized by slash-and-burn agricultural practices, causing the depletion of for-
est cover. It is estimated that this conflict-induced migration caused the
94802_Diez_01_30.qxp 1/30/2006 10:44 AM Page 124

124 Political Change and Environmental Policymaking in Mexico

deforestation of 100,000 hectares during the first year alone after the upris-
ing.30 Some of these migrants penetrated deep into the forest and took over
land within the Biosphere Reserve belonging to the Lacandone Community.
Migration to the Reserve did not abate years after the initiation of conflict
and, by 1999, there were 22 large illegal settlements inside of it. The effects
that these settlements have had on the forest have been of such magnitude
that deforestation on the eastern part of the reserve can be appreciated in
the 1998 satellite image in Map A6–5 (Appendix 6).
Secondly, the conflict has also had an effect on deforestation due to
the heavy military presence that followed the uprising in 1994. By early
1998, more than 36,000 soldiers had been deployed and 43 military camps
had been established in the Selva Lacandona alone (Coutiño 1998).31 This
military presence has applied increased pressure on the rainforest as clear-
ing has been conducted to establish the camps, conduct surveillance and
patrol operations and build roads. Activities conducted by the army in the
rainforest have included the felling of trees to secure access to some remote
areas, such as the Miramar lagoon (in the central part of the reserve); estab-
lishing paths and clearings; and cutting down trees without authorization
from local communities (Conpaz et al 1996 as cited in O’Brien 1998). A
good example of such military activity is the 140-kilometre extension of the
Southern Border Highway, along the Guatemalan border that began in
1996 and was inaugurated in May of 2000 by President Zedillo. The road
surrounds the Marqués de Comillas area and runs along the Guatemalan
border (Map A6–6 in Appendix 6).32 The impact of the road on the forest
is evident when traveling around the Selva Lacandona as it cuts right
through deeply forested areas. Moreover, various permanent military
camps can be seen on the Comitán—Boca Lacantún stretch and, during my
time in the field, there were military checkpoints every 20–25 km. It, of
course, also encourages further deforestation as it facilitates access to areas
that were previously remote, not only by the army, but also by peasants and
migrants.33

CONCLUSION
The satellite images presented here show that deforestation of the Selva
Lacandona has been critical, especially in the areas outside the Montes
Azules Biosphere Reserve. Although the causes of such deforestation are
multiple and at times interrelated, this chapter referred to the most impor-
tant ones, namely migration, timber extraction and illegal logging, as well
94802_Diez_01_30.qxp 1/30/2006 10:44 AM Page 125

Deforestation in the Selva Lacandona of Chiapas 125

as the indirect impact of the Zapatista conflict. Most of the deforestation in

the area has taken place during the last thirty years, a period of Chiapas
history that has been characterized by significant waves of migration of
landless agricultural workers and Amerindian people in search of land. As
this chapter has attempted to show, the high concentration of land has been
a constant characteristic of the state of Chiapas since colonial times and,
even though some land reform has taken place since the Mexican Revolu-
tion, especially during the administration of President Lázaro Cárdenas,
land concentration has remained high and the best arable lands have
remained in the hands of a few. High land concentration along with the for-
mation of strong caciques, has resulted in the socio-economic exclusion of
large sectors of Chiapas society and in consequent demographic and land
pressures. Land pressures have translated into a significant movement of
people into the rainforest, something that was encouraged by the federal
government—especially in the 1970s and early 1980s. Mexico’s economic
crisis of the 1980’s and the ensuing economic structural adjustment policies
it undertook have had an inordinate impact on rural workers, adding to
demographic and land pressures. These deteriorating socio-economic con-
ditions in turn contributed to the violent conflict that erupted in 1994,
which in turn played a part in increasing deforestation through additional
migration and military activity in the region.
The high levels of deforestation in the Selva Lacandona prompted the
two levels of government to enact legislation banning logging in the area.
But such measures were not successful as illegal logging continued during
the 1980s and 1990s. It is within this context of a highly unequal distribu-
tion of land, appalling socio-economic conditions, high levels of migration
and illegal logging, violent conflict and heavy military presence that defor-
estation in the Selva Lacandona must be looked at since it is the result of
these historical and socio-economic circumstances.
It is also within this context that any attempt to reduce the high levels
of deforestation in the area has to be made. As we saw in Chapter Three,
one of the main policy objectives of the Minister of the Environment was to
reduce deforestation and to encourage a more sustainable use of forest
resources. The Minister therefore launched a reform of the Forestry Law in
1996 in an attempt to redress the problem of deforestation through the
introduction of mechanisms that would decrease deforestation rates and
encourage sustainable commercial forestry plantations. The next chapter
will look at the implementation of policy toward the achievement of these
objectives.
94802_Diez_01_30.qxp 1/30/2006 10:44 AM Page 126

This page intentionally left blank