G.R. No.
L-74324 November 17, 1988
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
FERNANDO PUGAY y BALCITA, &
BENJAMIN SAMSON y
MAGDALENA, accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Citizens Legal Assistance Office for accused-
appellants.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
For the death of Bayani Miranda, a retardate,
FERNANDO PUGAY y BALCITA and
BENJAMIN SAMSON y MAGDALENA were
charged with the crime of MURDER in Criminal
Case No. L-175-82 of the Court of First Instance
(now Regional Trial Court) of Cavite, under an
information which reads as follows:
That on or about May 19, 1982
at the town plaza of the
Municipality of Rosario,
Province of Cavite, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually
helping and assisting one
another, with treachery and
evident premeditation, taking
advantage of their superior
strength, and with the decided
purpose to kill, poured gasoline,
a combustible liquid to the body
of Bayani Miranda and with the
use of fire did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, burn the whole body
of said Bayani Miranda which
caused his subsequent death, to
the damage and prejudice of the
heirs of the aforenamed Bayani
Miranda.
That the crime was committed
with the qualifying circumstance
of treachery and the aggravating
circumstances of evident
premeditation and superior
strength, and the means
employed was to weaken the
defense; that the wrong done in
the commission of the crime
was deliberately augmented by
causing another wrong, that is
the burning of the body of
Bayani Miranda.
CONTRARY TO LAW (p.
1, Records).
Upon being arraigned, both accused pleaded not
guilty to the offense charged. After trial, the trial
court rendered a decision finding both accused
guilty on the crime of murder but crediting in
favor of the accused Pugay the mitigating
circumstance of lack of intention to commit so
grave a wrong, the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the accused
Fernando Pugay y Balcita and
Benjamin Samson y Magdalena
are pronounced guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principals
by direct participation of the
crime of murder for the death of
Bayani Miranda, and
appreciating the aforestated
mitigating circumstance in favor
of Pugay, he is sentenced to a
prison term ranging from twelve
(12) years of prision mayor, as
minimum, to twenty (20) years
of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, and Samson to suffer
the penalty of reclusion
perpetua together with the
accessories of the law for both
of them. The accused are
solidarily held liable to indemnify
the heirs of the victim in the
amount of P13,940.00 plus
moral damages of P10,000.00
and exemplary damages of
P5,000.00.
Let the preventive imprisonment
of Pugay be deducted from the
principal penalty.
Cost against both accused.
 SO ORDERED (p.
248, Records).
Not satisfied with the decision, both accused
interposed the present appeal and assigned the
following errors committed by the court a quo:
1. THE COURT A QUO ERRED
IN UTILIZING THE
STATEMENTS OF ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS IN ITS
APPRECIATION OF FACTS
DESPITE ITS ADMISSION
THAT THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS WERE NOT
ASSISTED BY A COUNSEL
DURING THE CUSTODIAL
INVESTIGATION.
2. THE COURT A QUO ERRED
IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
SUPPRESSION BY THE
PROSECUTION OF SOME
EVIDENCE IS FATAL TO ITS
CASE.
3. THE COURT A QUO ERRED
IN LENDING CREDENCE TO
THE INCREDIBLE TESTIMONY
OF EDUARDO GABION WHO
WAS ONE OF THE MANY
SUSPECTS ARRESTED BY
THE POLICE (Accused-
appellants' Brief, p. 48, Rollo).
The antecedent facts are as follows:
The deceased Miranda, a 25-year old retardate,
and the accused Pugay were friends. Miranda
used to run errands for Pugay and at times they
slept together. On the evening of May 19, 1982,
a town fiesta fair was held in the public plaza of
Rosario, Cavite. There were different kinds of
ride and one was a ferris wheel.
Sometime after midnight of the same date,
Eduardo Gabion was sitting in the ferris wheel
and reading a comic book with his friend Henry.
Later, the accused Pugay and Samson with
several companions arrived. These persons
appeared to be drunk as they were all happy
and noisy. As the group saw the deceased
walking nearby, they started making fun of him.
They made the deceased dance by tickling him
with a piece of wood.
Not content with what they were doing with the
deceased, the accused Pugay suddenly took a
can of gasoline from under the engine of the
ferns wheel and poured its contents on the body
of the former. Gabion told Pugay not to do so
while the latter was already in the process of
pouring the gasoline. Then, the accused
Samson set Miranda on fire making a human
torch out of him.
The ferris wheel operator later arrived and
doused with water the burning body of the
deceased. Some people around also poured
sand on the burning body and others wrapped
the same with rags to extinguish the flame.
The body of the deceased was still aflame when
police officer Rolando Silangcruz and other
police officers of the Rosario Police Force
arrived at the scene of the incident. Upon
inquiring as to who were responsible for the
dastardly act, the persons around spontaneously
pointed to Pugay and Samson as the authors
thereof.
The deceased was later rushed to the Grace
Hospital for treatment. In the meantime, the
police officers brought Gabion, the two accused
and five other persons to the Rosario municipal
building for interrogation. Police officer Reynaldo
Canlas took the written statements of Gabion
and the two accused, after which Gabion was
released. The two accused remained in custody.
After a careful review of the records, We find the
grounds relied upon by the accused-appellants
for the reversal of the decision of the court a
quo to be without merit.
It bears emphasis that barely a few hours after
the incident, accused-appellants gave their
written statements to the police. The accused
Pugay admitted in his statement, Exhibit F, that
he poured a can of gasoline on the deceased
believing that the contents thereof was water
and then the accused Samson set the deceased
on fire. The accused Samson, on the other
hand, alleged in his statement that he saw
Pugay pour gasoline on Miranda but did not see
the person who set him on fire. Worthy of note is
the fact that both statements did not impute any
participation of eyewitness Gabion in the
commission of the offense.
While testifying on their defense, the accused-
appellants repudiated their written statements
alleging that they were extracted by force. They
claimed that the police maltreated them into
admitting authorship of the crime. They also
engaged in a concerted effort to lay the blame
on Gabion for the commission of the offense.
Thus, while it is true that the written statements
of the accused-appellants were mentioned and
discussed in the decision of the court a quo, the
contents thereof were not utilized as the sole
basis for the findings of facts in the decision
rendered. The said court categorically stated
that "even without Exhibits 'F' and 'G', there is
still Gabion's straightforward, positive and
convincing testimony which remains unaffected
by the uncorroborated, self-serving and
unrealiable testimonies of Pugay and Samson"
(p. 247, Records).
Accused-appellants next assert that the
prosecution suppressed the testimonies of other
eyewitnesses to the incident. They claim that
despite the fact that there were other persons
investigated by the police, only Gabion was
presented as an eyewitness during the trial of
the case. They argue that the deliberate non-
presentation of these persons raises the
presumption that their testimonies would be
adverse to the prosecution.
There is no dispute that there were other
persons who witnessed the commission of the
crime. In fact there appears on record (pp. 16-
17, Records) the written statements of one
Abelardo Reyes and one Monico Alimorong
alleging the same facts and imputing the
respective acts of pouring of gasoline and
setting the deceased on fire to the accused-
appellants as testified to by Gabion in open
court. They were listed as prosecution witnesses
in the information filed. Considering that their
testimonies would be merely corroborative, their
non-presentation does not give rise to the
presumption that evidence wilfully suppressed
would be adverse if produced. This presumption
does not apply to the suppression of merely
corroborative evidence (U.S. vs. Dinola, 37 Phil.
797).<äre||anº•1àw> Besides, the matter as to
whom to utilize as witness is for the prosecution
to decide.
Accused-appellants also attack the credibility of
the eyewitness Gabion alleging that not only was
the latter requested by the mother of the
deceased to testify for the prosecution in
exchange for his absolution from liability but also
because his testimony that he was reading a
comic book during an unusual event is contrary
to human behavior and experience.
Gabion testified that it was his uncle and not the
mother of the deceased who asked him to testify
and state the truth about the incident. The
mother of the deceased likewise testified that
she never talked to Gabion and that she saw the
latter for the first time when the instant case was
tried. Besides, the accused Pugay admitted that
Gabion was his friend and both Pugay and the
other accused Samson testified that they had no
previous misunderstanding with Gabion. Clearly,
Gabion had no reason to testify falsely against
them.
In support of their claim that the testimony of
Gabion to the effect that he saw Pugay pour
gasoline on the deceased and then Samson set
him on fire is incredible, the accused-appellants
quote Gabion's testimony on cross-examination
that, after telling Pugay not to pour gasoline on
the deceased, he (Gabion) resumed reading
comics; and that it was only when the victim's
body was on fire that he noticed a commotion.
However, explaining this testimony on re-direct
examination, Gabion stated:
Q. Mr. Gabion,
you told the
Court on cross-
examination
that you were
reading comics
when you saw
Pugay poured
gasoline unto
Bayani Miranda
and lighted by
Samson. How
could you
possibly see
that incident
while you were
reading
comics?
A. I put down A. I do not know
the comics that would be
which I am that incident.
reading and I
saw what they Q. Why did you
were doing. as(k) Pugay in
the first place
Q. According to not to pour
you also before gasoline before
Bayani was he did that
poured with actually?
gasoline and
lighted and A. Because I
burned later you pity Bayani, sir.
had a talk with
Pugay, is that
Q. When you
correct?
saw Pugay
tickling Bayani
A. When he with a stick on
was pouring his ass you tried
gasoline on according to
Bayani Miranda you to ask him
I was trying to not to and then
prevent him later you said
from doing so. you asked not
to pour
Q. We want to gasoline. Did
clarify. Pugay tell you
According to he was going to
you a while ago pour gasoline
you had a talk on Bayani?
with Pugay and
as a matter of A. I was not
fact, you told told, sir.
him not to pour
gasoline. That
Q. Did you
is what I want to
come to
know from you,
know..... how
if that is true? did you come to
know he was
A. Yes, sir. going to pour
gasoline that is
Q. Aside from why you
Bayani being prevent him?
tickled with a
stick on his ass, A. Because he
do you mean to was holding on
say you come a container of
to know that gasoline. I
Pugay will pour thought it was
gasoline unto water but it was
him? gasoline.
 Q. It is clear However, there is nothing in the records showing
that while that there was previous conspiracy or unity of
Pugay was criminal purpose and intention between the two
tickling Bayani accused-appellants immediately before the
with a stick on commission of the crime. There was no
his ass, he later animosity between the deceased and the
got hold of a accused Pugay or Samson. Their meeting at the
can of gasoline, scene of the incident was accidental. It is also
is that correct? clear that the accused Pugay and his group
merely wanted to make fun of the deceased.
A. Yes, sir. Hence, the respective criminal responsibility of
Pugay and Samson arising from different acts
Q. And when he directed against the deceased is individual and
pick up the can not collective, and each of them is liable only for
the act committed by him (U.S. vs. Magcomot,
of gasoline, was
et. al. 13, Phil. 386; U.S. vs. Abiog, et. al. 37
that the time
Phil. 1371).
you told him not
to pour gasoline
when he merely The next question to be determined is the
pick up the can criminal responsibility of the accused Pugay.
of gasoline. Having taken the can from under the engine of
the ferris wheel and holding it before pouring its
contents on the body of the deceased, this
A. I saw him
pouring the accused knew that the can contained gasoline.
The stinging smell of this flammable liquid could
gasoline on the
not have escaped his notice even before pouring
body of Joe.
the same. Clearly, he failed to exercise all the
diligence necessary to avoid every undesirable
Q. So, it is clear consequence arising from any act that may be
when you told committed by his companions who at the time
Pugay not to were making fun of the deceased. We agree
pour gasoline with the Solicitor General that the accused is
he was already only guilty of homicide through reckless
in the process imprudence defined in Article 365 of the Revised
of pouring Penal Code, as amended. In U.S. vs. Maleza, et.
gasoline on the al. 14 Phil. 468, 470, this Court ruled as follows:
body of Bayani?
A man must use common sense
A. Yes, sir (Tsn, and exercise due reflection in all
July 30, 1983, his acts; it is his duty to be
pp. 32-33). cautious, careful, and prudent, if
not from instinct, then through
It is thus clear that prior to the incident in fear of incurring punishment. He
question, Gabion was reading a comic book; that is responsible for such results
Gabion stopped reading when the group of as anyone might foresee and for
Pugay started to make fun of the deceased; that acts which no one would have
Gabion saw Pugay get the can of gasoline from performed except through
under the engine of the ferris wheel; that it was culpable abandon. Otherwise
while Pugay was in the process of pouring the his own person, rights and
gasoline on the body of the deceased when property, all those of his fellow-
Gabion warned him not to do so; and that beings, would ever be exposed
Gabion later saw Samson set the deceased on to all manner of danger and
fire. injury.
The proper penalty that the accused Pugay must
suffer is an indeterminate one ranging from four
(4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to
four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as maximum. With respect to the
accused Samson, the Solicitor General in his
brief contends that "his conviction of murder, is
proper considering that his act in setting the
deceased on fire knowing that gasoline had just
been poured on him is characterized by
treachery as the victim was left completely
helpless to defend and protect himself against
such an outrage" (p. 57, Rollo). We do not
agree.
There is entire absence of proof in the record
that the accused Samson had some reason to
kill the deceased before the incident. On the
contrary, there is adequate evidence showing
that his act was merely a part of their fun-making
that evening. For the circumstance of treachery
to exist, the attack must be deliberate and the
culprit employed means, methods, or forms in
the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to
himself arising from any defense which the
offended party might make.
There can be no doubt that the accused Samson
knew very well that the liquid poured on the body
of the deceased was gasoline and a flammable
substance for he would not have committed the
act of setting the latter on fire if it were
otherwise. Giving him the benefit of doubt, it call
be conceded that as part of their fun-making he
merely intended to set the deceased's clothes
on fire. His act, however, does not relieve him of
criminal responsibility. Burning the clothes of the
victim would cause at the very least some kind
of physical injuries on his person, a felony
defined in the Revised Penal Code. If his act
resulted into a graver offense, as what took
place in the instant case, he must be held
responsible therefor. Article 4 of the aforesaid
code provides, inter alia, that criminal liability
shall be incurred by any person committing a
felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended.
As no sufficient evidence appears in the record
establishing any qualifying circumstances, the
accused Samson is only guilty of the crime of
homicide defined and penalized in Article 249 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended. We are
disposed to credit in his favor the ordinary
mitigating circumstance of no intention to commit
so grave a wrong as that committed as there is
evidence of a fact from which such conclusion
can be drawn. The eyewitness Gabion testified
that the accused Pugay and Samson were
stunned when they noticed the deceased
burning (Tsn, June 1, 1983, pp. 16-
17).<äre||anº•1àw>
The proper penalty that the accused Samson
must suffer is an indeterminate one ranging from
eight (8) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to
fourteen (14) years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum.
The lower court held the accused solidarily liable
for P13,940.00, the amount spent by Miranda's
parents for his hospitalization, wake and
interment. The indemnity for death is
P30,000.00. Hence, the indemnity to the heirs of
the deceased Miranda is increased to
P43,940.00.
Both accused shall be jointly and severally liable
for the aforesaid amount plus the P10,000.00 as
moral damages and P5,000.00 as exemplary
damages as found by the court a quo.
Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed with the
modifications above-indicated. Costs against the
accused-appellants.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 172716 November 17, 2010
JASON IVLER y AGUILAR, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN
PEDRO, Judge of the Metropolitan Trial
Court, Branch 71, Pasig City, and
EVANGELINE PONCE, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
The petition seeks the review1 of the Orders2 of
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City affirming
sub-silencio a lower court’s ruling finding
inapplicable the Double Jeopardy Clause to bar
a second prosecution for Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property.
This, despite the accused’s previous conviction
for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight
Physical Injuries arising from the same incident
grounding the second prosecution.
The Facts
Following a vehicular collision in August 2004,
petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 71 (MeTC), with two separate offenses:
(1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight
Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No. 82367) for
injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L.
Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage
to Property (Criminal Case No. 82366) for the
death of respondent Ponce’s husband Nestor C.
Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce’s
vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his temporary
release in both cases.
On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty
to the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367 and
was meted out the penalty of public censure.
Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to
quash the Information in Criminal Case No.
82366 for placing him in jeopardy of second
punishment for the same offense of reckless
imprudence.
The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of
offenses in the two cases.3
After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration,
petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157 (RTC), in a
petition for certiorari (S.C.A. No. 2803).
Meanwhile, petitioner sought from the MeTC the
suspension of proceedings in Criminal Case No.
82366, including the arraignment on 17 May
2005, invoking S.C.A. No. 2803 as a prejudicial
question. Without acting on petitioner’s motion,
the MeTC proceeded with the arraignment and,
because of petitioner’s absence, cancelled his
bail and ordered his arrest.4 Seven days later,
the MeTC issued a resolution denying
petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings and
postponing his arraignment until after his
arrest.5 Petitioner sought reconsideration but as
of the filing of this petition, the motion remained
unresolved.
Relying on the arrest order against petitioner,
respondent Ponce sought in the RTC the
dismissal of S.C.A. No. 2803 for petitioner’s loss
of standing to maintain the suit. Petitioner
contested the motion.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In an Order dated 2 February 2006, the RTC
dismissed S.C.A. No. 2803, narrowly grounding
its ruling on petitioner’s forfeiture of standing to
maintain S.C.A. No. 2803 arising from the
MeTC’s order to arrest petitioner for his non-
appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case
No. 82366. Thus, without reaching the merits of
S.C.A. No. 2803, the RTC effectively affirmed
the MeTC. Petitioner sought reconsideration but
this proved unavailing.6
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner denies absconding. He explains that
his petition in S.C.A. No. 2803 constrained him
to forego participation in the proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner
distinguishes his case from the line of
jurisprudence sanctioning dismissal of appeals
for absconding appellants because his appeal
before the RTC was a special civil action
seeking a pre-trial relief, not a post-trial appeal
of a judgment of conviction.7
Petitioner laments the RTC’s failure to reach the
merits of his petition in S.C.A. 2803. Invoking
jurisprudence, petitioner argues that his
constitutional right not to be placed twice in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense
bars his prosecution in Criminal Case No.
82366, having been previously convicted in
Criminal Case No. 82367 for the same offense
of reckless imprudence charged in Criminal
Case No. 82366. Petitioner submits that the
multiple consequences of such crime are
material only to determine his penalty.
Respondent Ponce finds no reason for the Court
to disturb the RTC’s decision forfeiting
petitioner’s standing to maintain his petition in
S.C.A. 2803. On the merits, respondent Ponce
calls the Court’s attention to jurisprudence
holding that light offenses (e.g. slight physical
injuries) cannot be complexed under Article 48
of the Revised Penal Code with grave or less
grave felonies (e.g. homicide). Hence, the
prosecution was obliged to separate the charge
in Criminal Case No. 82366 for the slight
physical injuries from Criminal Case No. 82367
for the homicide and damage to property.
In the Resolution of 6 June 2007, we granted the
Office of the Solicitor General’s motion not to file
a comment to the petition as the public
respondent judge is merely a nominal party and
private respondent is represented by counsel.
The Issues
Two questions are presented for resolution: (1)
whether petitioner forfeited his standing to seek
relief in S.C.A. 2803 when the MeTC ordered his
arrest following his non-appearance at the
arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366; and (2)
if in the negative, whether petitioner’s
constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy
Clause bars further proceedings in Criminal
Case No. 82366.
The Ruling of the Court
We hold that (1) petitioner’s non-appearance at
the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 did
not divest him of personality to maintain the
petition in S.C.A. 2803; and (2) the protection
afforded by the Constitution shielding petitioner
from prosecutions placing him in jeopardy of
second punishment for the same offense bars
further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.
Petitioner’s Non-appearance at the Arraignment
in
Criminal Case No. 82366 did not Divest him of
Standing
to Maintain the Petition in S.C.A. 2803
Dismissals of appeals grounded on the
appellant’s escape from custody or violation of
the terms of his bail bond are governed by the
second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 124,8 in
relation to Section 1, Rule 125, of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure authorizing this
Court or the Court of Appeals to "also, upon
motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss
the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison
or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign
country during the pendency of the appeal." The
"appeal" contemplated in Section 8 of Rule 124
is a suit to review judgments of convictions.
The RTC’s dismissal of petitioner’s special civil
action for certiorari to review a pre-arraignment
ancillary question on the applicability of the Due
Process Clause to bar proceedings in Criminal
Case No. 82366 finds no basis under procedural
rules and jurisprudence. The RTC’s reliance
on People v. Esparas9 undercuts the cogency of
its ruling because Esparas stands for a
proposition contrary to the RTC’s ruling. There,
the Court granted review to an appeal by an
accused who was sentenced to death for
importing prohibited drugs even though she
jumped bail pending trial and was thus tried and
convicted in absentia. The Court in Esparas
treated the mandatory review of death
sentences under Republic Act No. 7659 as an
exception to Section 8 of Rule 124.10
The mischief in the RTC’s treatment of
petitioner’s non-appearance at his arraignment
in Criminal Case No. 82366 as proof of his loss
of standing becomes more evident when one
considers the Rules of Court’s treatment of a
defendant who absents himself from post-
arraignment hearings. Under Section 21, Rule
11411 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the defendant’s absence merely
renders his bondsman potentially liable on its
bond (subject to cancellation should the
bondsman fail to produce the accused within 30
days); the defendant retains his standing and,
should he fail to surrender, will be tried in
absentia and could be convicted or acquitted.
Indeed, the 30-day period granted to the
bondsman to produce the accused underscores
the fact that mere non-appearance does not ipso
facto convert the accused’s status to that of a
fugitive without standing.
Further, the RTC’s observation that petitioner
provided "no explanation why he failed to attend
the scheduled proceeding"12 at the MeTC is
belied by the records. Days before the
arraignment, petitioner sought the suspension of
the MeTC’s proceedings in Criminal Case No.
82366 in light of his petition with the RTC in
S.C.A. No. 2803. Following the MeTC’s refusal
to defer arraignment (the order for which was
released days after the MeTC ordered
petitioner’s arrest), petitioner sought
reconsideration. His motion remained
unresolved as of the filing of this petition.
Petitioner’s Conviction in Criminal Case No.
82367
 Bars his Prosecution in Criminal Case No.
82366
The accused’s negative constitutional right not to
be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense"13protects him from, among
others, post-conviction prosecution for the same
offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a
court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid
information.14 It is not disputed that petitioner’s
conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 was
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction
upon a valid charge. Thus, the case turns on the
question whether Criminal Case No. 82366 and
Criminal Case No. 82367 involve the "same
offense." Petitioner adopts the affirmative view,
submitting that the two cases concern the same
offense of reckless imprudence. The MeTC ruled
otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely
separate offense from Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property
"as the [latter] requires proof of an additional fact
which the other does not."15
We find for petitioner.
Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime,
its Consequences on Persons and
Property are Material Only to Determine
the Penalty
The two charges against petitioner, arising from
the same facts, were prosecuted under the
same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, namely, Article 365 defining and
penalizing quasi-offenses. The text of the
provision reads:
Imprudence and negligence. — Any person who,
by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act
which, had it been intentional, would constitute a
grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its medium period; if it would
have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty
of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium
periods shall be imposed; if it would have
constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto
menor in its maximum period shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or
negligence, shall commit an act which would
otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer
the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and
maximum periods; if it would have constituted a
less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor
in its minimum period shall be imposed.
When the execution of the act covered by this
article shall have only resulted in damage to the
property of another, the offender shall be
punished by a fine ranging from an amount
equal to the value of said damages to three
times such value, but which shall in no case be
less than twenty-five pesos.
A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and
censure shall be imposed upon any person who,
by simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause
some wrong which, if done maliciously, would
have constituted a light felony.
In the imposition of these penalties, the court
shall exercise their sound discretion, without
regard to the rules prescribed in Article sixty-
four.
The provisions contained in this article shall not
be applicable:
1. When the penalty provided for the
offense is equal to or lower than those
provided in the first two paragraphs of
this article, in which case the court shall
impose the penalty next lower in degree
than that which should be imposed in
the period which they may deem proper
to apply.
2. When, by imprudence or negligence
and with violation of the Automobile
Law, to death of a person shall be
caused, in which case the defendant
shall be punished by prision correccional
in its medium and maximum periods.
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but
without malice, doing or failing to do an act from
which material damage results by reason of
inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the
person performing or failing to perform such act,
taking into consideration his employment or
occupation, degree of intelligence, physical
condition and other circumstances regarding
persons, time and place.
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of
precaution displayed in those cases in which the
damage impending to be caused is not
immediate nor the danger clearly manifest.
The penalty next higher in degree to those
provided for in this article shall be imposed upon
the offender who fails to lend on the spot to the
injured parties such help as may be in this hand
to give.
Structurally, these nine paragraphs are
collapsible into four sub-groupings relating to (1)
the penalties attached to the quasi-offenses of
"imprudence" and "negligence" (paragraphs 1-
2); (2) a modified penalty scheme for either or
both quasi-offenses (paragraphs 3-4, 6 and 9);
(3) a generic rule for trial courts in imposing
penalties (paragraph 5); and (4) the definition of
"reckless imprudence" and "simple imprudence"
(paragraphs 7-8). Conceptually, quasi-offenses
penalize "the mental attitude or condition behind
the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of
care or foresight, the imprudencia
punible,"16 unlike willful offenses which punish
the intentional criminal act. These structural and
conceptual features of quasi-offenses set them
apart from the mass of intentional crimes under
the first 13 Titles of Book II of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended.
Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether
reckless or simple, are distinct species of crime,
separately defined and penalized under the
framework of our penal laws, is nothing new. As
early as the middle of the last century, we
already sought to bring clarity to this field by
rejecting in Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of
Pampanga the proposition that "reckless
imprudence is not a crime in itself but simply a
way of committing it x x x"17 on three points of
analysis: (1) the object of punishment in quasi-
crimes (as opposed to intentional crimes); (2)
the legislative intent to treat quasi-crimes as
distinct offenses (as opposed to subsuming
them under the mitigating circumstance of
minimal intent) and; (3) the different penalty
structures for quasi-crimes and intentional
crimes:
The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the
Revised Penal Code) that "reckless imprudence"
is not a crime in itself but simply a way of
committing it and merely determines a lower
degree of criminal liability is too broad to
deserve unqualified assent. There are crimes
that by their structure cannot be committed
through imprudence: murder, treason, robbery,
malicious mischief, etc. In truth, criminal
negligence in our Revised Penal Code is treated
as a mere quasi offense, and dealt with
separately from willful offenses. It is not a mere
question of classification or terminology. In
intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in
negligence or imprudence, what is principally
penalized is the mental attitude or condition
behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack
of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible. x x
xx
Were criminal negligence but a modality in the
commission of felonies, operating only to reduce
the penalty therefor, then it would be absorbed
in the mitigating circumstances of Art. 13,
specially the lack of intent to commit so grave a
wrong as the one actually committed.
Furthermore, the theory would require that the
corresponding penalty should be fixed in
proportion to the penalty prescribed for each
crime when committed willfully. For each penalty
for the willful offense, there would then be a
corresponding penalty for the negligent variety.
But instead, our Revised Penal Code (Art. 365)
fixes the penalty for reckless imprudence at
arresto mayor maximum, to prision correccional
[medium], if the willful act would constitute a
grave felony, notwithstanding that the penalty for
the latter could range all the way from prision
mayor to death, according to the case. It can be
seen that the actual penalty for criminal
negligence bears no relation to the individual
willful crime, but is set in relation to a whole
class, or series, of crimes.18 (Emphasis supplied)
This explains why the technically correct way to
allege quasi-crimes is to state that their
commission results in damage, either to person
or property.19
Accordingly, we found the Justice of the Peace
in Quizon without jurisdiction to hear a case for
"Damage to Property through Reckless
Imprudence," its jurisdiction being limited to
trying charges for Malicious Mischief, an
intentional crime conceptually incompatible with
the element of imprudence obtaining in quasi-
crimes.
Quizon, rooted in Spanish law20 (the normative
ancestry of our present day penal code) and
since repeatedly reiterated,21 stands on solid
conceptual foundation. The contrary doctrinal
pronouncement in People v. Faller22 that
"[r]eckless impudence is not a crime in itself x x
x [but] simply a way of committing it x x x,"23 has
long been abandoned when the Court en banc
promulgated Quizon in 1955 nearly two
decades after the Court decided Faller in 1939.
Quizon rejected Faller’s conceptualization of
quasi-crimes by holding that quasi-crimes under
Article 365 are distinct species of crimes and not
merely methods of committing crimes. Faller
found expression in post-Quizon
jurisprudence24 only by dint of lingering doctrinal
confusion arising from an indiscriminate fusion of
criminal law rules defining Article 365 crimes and
the complexing of intentional crimes under
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code which, as
will be shown shortly, rests on erroneous
conception of quasi-crimes. Indeed, the
Quizonian conception of quasi-crimes
undergirded a related branch of jurisprudence
applying the Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-
offenses, barring second prosecutions for a
quasi-offense alleging one resulting act after a
prior conviction or acquittal of a quasi-offense
alleging another resulting act but arising from the
same reckless act or omission upon which the
second prosecution was based.
Prior Conviction or Acquittal of
Reckless Imprudence Bars
Subsequent Prosecution for the Same
Quasi-Offense
The doctrine that reckless imprudence under
Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and
not merely a means to commit other crimes such
that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense
bars subsequent prosecution for the same
quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting
acts, undergirded this Court’s unbroken chain of
jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to
Article 365 starting with People v.
Diaz,25 decided in 1954. There, a full Court,
speaking through Mr. Justice Montemayor,
ordered the dismissal of a case for "damage to
property thru reckless imprudence" because a
prior case against the same accused for
"reckless driving," arising from the same act
upon which the first prosecution was based, had
been dismissed earlier. Since then, whenever
the same legal question was brought before the
Court, that is, whether prior conviction or
acquittal of reckless imprudence bars
subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-
offense, regardless of the consequences alleged
for both charges, the Court unfailingly and
consistently answered in the affirmative in
People v. Belga26 (promulgated in 1957 by the
Court en banc, per Reyes, J.), Yap v.
Lutero27 (promulgated in 1959, unreported, per
Concepcion, J.), People v.
Narvas28 (promulgated in 1960 by the Court en
banc, per Bengzon J.), People v.
Silva29 (promulgated in 1962 by the Court en
banc, per Paredes, J.), People v.
Macabuhay30 (promulgated in 1966 by the Court
en banc, per Makalintal, J.), People v.
Buan31 (promulgated in 1968 by the Court en
banc, per Reyes, J.B.L., acting C. J.), Buerano
v. Court of Appeals32 (promulgated in 1982 by
the Court en banc, per Relova, J.), and People
v. City Court of Manila33 (promulgated in 1983 by
the First Division, per Relova, J.). These cases
uniformly barred the second prosecutions as
constitutionally impermissible under the Double
Jeopardy Clause.
The reason for this consistent stance of
extending the constitutional protection under the
Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses was
best articulated by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in
Buan, where, in barring a subsequent
prosecution for "serious physical injuries and
damage to property thru reckless imprudence"
because of the accused’s prior acquittal of
"slight physical injuries thru reckless
imprudence," with both charges grounded on the
same act, the Court explained:34
Reason and precedent both coincide in that
once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of
reckless imprudence, the accused may not be
prosecuted again for that same act. For the
essence of the quasi offense of criminal
negligence under article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent
or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would
be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes
thus the negligent or careless act, not the result
thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only
taken into account to determine the penalty, it
does not qualify the substance of the offense.
And, as the careless act is single, whether the
injurious result should affect one person or
several persons, the offense (criminal
negligence) remains one and the same, and can
not be split into different crimes and
prosecutions.35 x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Evidently, the Diaz line of jurisprudence on
double jeopardy merely extended to its logical
conclusion the reasoning of Quizon.
There is in our jurisprudence only one ruling
going against this unbroken line of authority.
Preceding Diaz by more than a decade, El
Pueblo de Filipinas v. Estipona,36 decided by the
pre-war colonial Court in November 1940,
allowed the subsequent prosecution of an
accused for reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property despite his previous
conviction for multiple physical injuries arising
from the same reckless operation of a motor
vehicle upon which the second prosecution was
based. Estipona’s inconsistency with the post-
war Diaz chain of jurisprudence suffices to
impliedly overrule it. At any rate, all doubts on
this matter were laid to rest in 1982 in
Buerano.37 There, we reviewed the Court of
Appeals’ conviction of an accused for "damage
to property for reckless imprudence" despite his
prior conviction for "slight and less serious
physical injuries thru reckless imprudence,"
arising from the same act upon which the
second charge was based. The Court of Appeals
had relied on Estipona. We reversed on the
strength of Buan:38
Th[e] view of the Court of Appeals was inspired
by the ruling of this Court in the pre-war case of
People vs. Estipona decided on November 14,
1940. However, in the case of People vs. Buan,
22 SCRA 1383 (March 29, 1968), this Court,
speaking thru Justice J. B. L. Reyes, held that –
Reason and precedent both coincide in that
once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of
reckless imprudence, the accused may not be
prosecuted again for that same act. For the
essence of the quasi offense of criminal
negligence under Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent
or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would
be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes
thus the negligent or careless act, not the result
thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only
taken into account to determine the penalty, it
does not qualify the substance of the offense.
And, as the careless act is single, whether the
injurious result should affect one person or
several persons, the offense (criminal
negligence) remains one and the same, and can
not be split into different crimes and
prosecutions.
xxxx
. . . the exoneration of this appellant, Jose Buan,
by the Justice of the Peace (now Municipal)
Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan, of the charge of
slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for
serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the
province, where both charges are derived from
the consequences of one and the same
vehicular accident, because the second
accusation places the appellant in second
jeopardy for the same offense.39 (Emphasis
supplied)
Thus, for all intents and purposes, Buerano had
effectively overruled Estipona.
It is noteworthy that the Solicitor General in
Buerano, in a reversal of his earlier stance in
Silva, joined causes with the accused, a fact
which did not escape the Court’s attention:
Then Solicitor General, now Justice Felix V.
Makasiar, in his MANIFESTATION dated
December 12, 1969 (page 82 of the Rollo)
admits that the Court of Appeals erred in not
sustaining petitioner’s plea of double jeopardy
and submits that "its affirmatory decision dated
January 28, 1969, in Criminal Case No. 05123-
CR finding petitioner guilty of damage to
property through reckless imprudence should be
set aside, without costs." He stressed that "if
double jeopardy exists where the reckless act
resulted into homicide and physical injuries. then
the same consequence must perforce follow
where the same reckless act caused merely
damage to property-not death-and physical
injuries. Verily, the value of a human life lost as
a result of a vehicular collision cannot be
equated with any amount of damages caused to
a motors vehicle arising from the same
mishap."40 (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, we find merit in petitioner’s submission
that the lower courts erred in refusing to extend
in his favor the mantle of protection afforded by
the Double Jeopardy Clause. A more fitting
jurisprudence could not be tailored to petitioner’s
case than People v. Silva, 41 a Diaz progeny.
There, the accused, who was also involved in a
vehicular collision, was charged in two separate
Informations with "Slight Physical Injuries thru
Reckless Imprudence" and "Homicide with
Serious Physical Injuries thru Reckless
Imprudence." Following his acquittal of the
former, the accused sought the quashal of the
latter, invoking the Double Jeopardy Clause. The
trial court initially denied relief, but, on
reconsideration, found merit in the accused’s
claim and dismissed the second case. In
affirming the trial court, we quoted with approval
its analysis of the issue following Diaz and its
progeny People v. Belga:42
On June 26, 1959, the lower court reconsidered
its Order of May 2, 1959 and dismissed the
case, holding: —
[T]he Court believes that the case falls squarely
within the doctrine of double jeopardy
enunciated in People v. Belga, x x x In the case
cited, Ciriaco Belga and Jose Belga were
charged in the Justice of the Peace Court of
Malilipot, Albay, with the crime of physical
injuries through reckless imprudence arising
from a collision between the two automobiles
driven by them (Crim. Case No. 88). Without the
aforesaid complaint having been dismissed or
otherwise disposed of, two other criminal
complaints were filed in the same justice of the
peace court, in connection with the same
collision one for damage to property through
reckless imprudence (Crim. Case No. 95) signed
by the owner of one of the vehicles involved in
the collision, and another for multiple physical
injuries through reckless imprudence (Crim.
Case No. 96) signed by the passengers injured
in the accident. Both of these two complaints
were filed against Jose Belga only. After trial,
both defendants were acquitted of the charge
against them in Crim. Case No. 88. Following his
acquittal, Jose Belga moved to quash the
complaint for multiple physical injuries through
reckless imprudence filed against him by the
injured passengers, contending that the case
was just a duplication of the one filed by the
Chief of Police wherein he had just been
acquitted. The motion to quash was denied and
after trial Jose Belga was convicted, whereupon
he appealed to the Court of First Instance of
Albay. In the meantime, the case for damage to
property through reckless imprudence filed by
one of the owners of the vehicles involved in the
collision had been remanded to the Court of First
Instance of Albay after Jose Belga had waived
the second stage of the preliminary
investigation. After such remand, the Provincial
Fiscal filed in the Court of First Instance two
informations against Jose Belga, one for
physical injuries through reckless imprudence,
and another for damage to property through
reckless imprudence. Both cases were
dismissed by the Court of First Instance, upon
motion of the defendant Jose Belga who alleged
double jeopardy in a motion to quash. On appeal
by the Prov. Fiscal, the order of dismissal was
affirmed by the Supreme Court in the following
language: .
The question for determination is whether the
acquittal of Jose Belga in the case filed by the
chief of police constitutes a bar to his
subsequent prosecution for multiple physical
injuries and damage to property through
reckless imprudence.
In the case of Peo[ple] v. F. Diaz, G. R. No. L-
6518, prom. March 30, 1954, the accused was
charged in the municipal court of Pasay City with
reckless driving under sec. 52 of the Revised
Motor Vehicle Law, for having driven an
automobile in a ῾fast and reckless manner ...
thereby causing an accident.’ After the accused
had pleaded not guilty the case was dismissed
in that court ῾for failure of the Government to
prosecute’. But some time thereafter the city
attorney filed an information in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, charging the same accused
with damage to property thru reckless
imprudence. The amount of the damage was
alleged to be ₱249.50. Pleading double
jeopardy, the accused filed a motion, and on
appeal by the Government we affirmed the
ruling. Among other things we there said through
Mr. Justice Montemayor —
The next question to determine is the relation
between the first offense of violation of the Motor
Vehicle Law prosecuted before the Pasay City
Municipal Court and the offense of damage to
property thru reckless imprudence charged in
the Rizal Court of First Instance. One of the tests
of double jeopardy is whether or not the second
offense charged necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in
the former complaint or information (Rule 113,
Sec. 9). Another test is whether the evidence
which proves one would prove the other that is
to say whether the facts alleged in the first
charge if proven, would have been sufficient to
support the second charge and vice versa; or
whether one crime is an ingredient of the other.
xxx
xxxx
The foregoing language of the Supreme Court
also disposes of the contention of the
prosecuting attorney that the charge for slight
physical injuries through reckless imprudence
could not have been joined with the charge for
homicide with serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence in this case, in view of the
provisions of Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended. The prosecution’s contention might
be true. But neither was the prosecution obliged
to first prosecute the accused for slight physical
injuries through reckless imprudence before
pressing the more serious charge of homicide
with serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence. Having first prosecuted the
defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of
the Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which
acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting
attorney is not now in a position to press in this
case the more serious charge of homicide with
serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence which arose out of the same alleged
reckless imprudence of which the defendant
have been previously cleared by the inferior
court.43
Significantly, the Solicitor General had urged us
in Silva to reexamine Belga (and hence, Diaz)
"for the purpose of delimiting or clarifying its
application."44 We declined the invitation, thus:
The State in its appeal claims that the lower
court erred in dismissing the case, on the ground
of double jeopardy, upon the basis of the
acquittal of the accused in the JP court for Slight
Physical Injuries, thru Reckless Imprudence. In
the same breath said State, thru the Solicitor
General, admits that the facts of the case at bar,
fall squarely on the ruling of the Belga case x x
x, upon which the order of dismissal of the lower
court was anchored. The Solicitor General,
however, urges a re-examination of said ruling,
upon certain considerations for the purpose of
delimiting or clarifying its application. We find,
nevertheless, that further elucidation or
disquisition on the ruling in the Belga case, the
facts of which are analogous or similar to those
in the present case, will yield no practical
advantage to the government. On one hand,
there is nothing which would warrant a
delimitation or clarification of the applicability of
the Belga case. It was clear. On the other, this
Court has reiterated the views expressed in the
Belga case, in the identical case of Yap v. Hon.
Lutero, etc., L-12669, April 30,
1959.45 (Emphasis supplied)
Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized
Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
The confusion bedeviling the question posed in
this petition, to which the MeTC succumbed,
stems from persistent but awkward attempts to
harmonize conceptually incompatible
substantive and procedural rules in criminal law,
namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing
quasi-offenses and Article 48 on complexing of
crimes, both under the Revised Penal Code.
Article 48 is a procedural device allowing single
prosecution of multiple felonies falling under
either of two categories: (1) when a single act
constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies (thus excluding from its operation light
felonies46); and (2) when an offense is a
necessary means for committing the other. The
legislature crafted this procedural tool to benefit
the accused who, in lieu of serving multiple
penalties, will only serve the maximum of the
penalty for the most serious crime.
In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule
penalizing not an act defined as a felony but "the
mental attitude x x x behind the act, the
dangerous recklessness, lack of care or
foresight x x x,"47 a single mental attitude
regardless of the resulting consequences. Thus,
Article 365 was crafted as one quasi-crime
resulting in one or more consequences.
Ordinarily, these two provisions will operate
smoothly. Article 48 works to combine in a single
prosecution multiple intentional crimes falling
under Titles 1-13, Book II of the Revised Penal
Code, when proper; Article 365 governs the
prosecution of imprudent acts and their
consequences. However, the complexities of
human interaction can produce a hybrid quasi-
offense not falling under either models – that of
a single criminal negligence resulting in multiple
non-crime damages to persons and property
with varying penalties corresponding to light,
less grave or grave offenses. The ensuing
prosecutorial dilemma is obvious: how should
such a quasi-crime be prosecuted? Should
Article 48’s framework apply to "complex" the
single quasi-offense with its multiple (non-
criminal) consequences (excluding those
amounting to light offenses which will be tried
separately)? Or should the prosecution proceed
under a single charge, collectively alleging all
the consequences of the single quasi-crime, to
be penalized separately following the scheme of
penalties under Article 365?
Jurisprudence adopts both approaches. Thus,
one line of rulings (none of which involved the
issue of double jeopardy) applied Article 48 by
"complexing" one quasi-crime with its multiple
consequences48 unless one consequence
amounts to a light felony, in which case charges
were split by grouping, on the one hand,
resulting acts amounting to grave or less grave
felonies and filing the charge with the second
level courts and, on the other hand, resulting
acts amounting to light felonies and filing the
charge with the first level courts.49 Expectedly,
this is the approach the MeTC impliedly
sanctioned (and respondent Ponce invokes),
even though under Republic Act No. 7691,50 the
MeTC has now exclusive original jurisdiction to
impose the most serious penalty under Article
365 which is prision correccional in its medium
period.
Under this approach, the issue of double
jeopardy will not arise if the "complexing" of acts
penalized under Article 365 involves only
resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave
felonies because there will be a single
prosecution of all the resulting acts. The issue of
double jeopardy arises if one of the resulting
acts is penalized as a light offense and the other
acts are penalized as grave or less grave
offenses, in which case Article 48 is not deemed
to apply and the act penalized as a light offense
is tried separately from the resulting acts
penalized as grave or less grave offenses.
The second jurisprudential path nixes Article 48
and sanctions a single prosecution of all the
effects of the quasi-crime collectively alleged in
one charge, regardless of their number or
severity,51 penalizing each consequence
separately. Thus, in Angeles v. Jose,52 we
interpreted paragraph three of Article 365, in
relation to a charge alleging "reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property and
less serious physical injuries," as follows:
[T]he third paragraph of said article, x x x reads
as follows:
When the execution of the act covered by this
article shall have only resulted in damage to the
property of another, the offender shall be
punished by a fine ranging from an amount
equal to the value of said damage to three times
such value, but which shall in no case be less
than 25 pesos.
The above-quoted provision simply means that if
there is only damage to property the amount
fixed therein shall be imposed, but if there are
also physical injuries there should be
an additional penalty for the latter. The
information cannot be split into two; one for the
physical injuries, and another for the damage to
property, x x x.53 (Emphasis supplied)
By "additional penalty," the Court meant,
logically, the penalty scheme under Article 365.
Evidently, these approaches, while parallel, are
irreconcilable. Coherence in this field demands
choosing one framework over the other. Either
(1) we allow the "complexing" of a single quasi-
crime by breaking its resulting acts into separate
offenses (except for light felonies), thus re-
conceptualize a quasi-crime, abandon its
present framing under Article 365, discard its
conception under the Quizon and Diaz lines of
cases, and treat the multiple consequences of a
quasi-crime as separate intentional felonies
defined under Titles 1-13, Book II under the
penal code; or (2) we forbid the application of
Article 48 in the prosecution and sentencing of
quasi-crimes, require single prosecution of all
the resulting acts regardless of their number and
severity, separately penalize each as provided in
Article 365, and thus maintain the distinct
concept of quasi-crimes as crafted under Article
365, articulated in Quizon and applied to double
jeopardy adjudication in the Diaz line of
cases.1avvphi1
A becoming regard of this Court’s place in our
scheme of government denying it the power to
make laws constrains us to keep inviolate the
conceptual distinction between quasi-crimes and
intentional felonies under our penal code. Article
48 is incongruent to the notion of quasi-crimes
under Article 365. It is conceptually impossible
for a quasi-offense to stand for (1) a
single act constituting two or more grave or less
grave felonies; or (2) an offense which is a
necessary means for committing another. This is
why, way back in 1968 in Buan, we rejected the
Solicitor General’s argument that double
jeopardy does not bar a second prosecution for
slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence allegedly because the charge for
that offense could not be joined with the other
charge for serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence following Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code:
The Solicitor General stresses in his brief that
the charge for slight physical injuries through
reckless imprudence could not be joined with the
accusation for serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence, because Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code allows only the complexing
of grave or less grave felonies. This same
argument was considered and rejected by this
Court in the case of People vs. [Silva] x x x:
[T]he prosecution’s contention might be true. But
neither was the prosecution obliged to first
prosecute the accused for slight physical injuries
through reckless imprudence before pressing
the more serious charge of homicide with
serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence. Having first prosecuted the
defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of
the Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which
acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting
attorney is not now in a position to press in this
case the more serious charge of homicide with
serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence which arose out of the same alleged
reckless imprudence of which the defendant has
been previously cleared by the inferior court.
[W]e must perforce rule that the exoneration of
this appellant x x x by the Justice of the Peace x
x x of the charge of slight physical injuries
through reckless imprudence, prevents his being
prosecuted for serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence in the Court of First
Instance of the province, where both charges
are derived from the consequences of one and
the same vehicular accident, because the
second accusation places the appellant in
second jeopardy for the same
offense.54 (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, this is a constitutionally compelled
choice. By prohibiting the splitting of charges
under Article 365, irrespective of the number and
severity of the resulting acts, rampant occasions
of constitutionally impermissible second
prosecutions are avoided, not to mention that
scarce state resources are conserved and
diverted to proper use.
Hence, we hold that prosecutions under Article
365 should proceed from a single charge
regardless of the number or severity of the
consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge
will do no more than apply the penalties under
Article 365 for each consequence alleged and
proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of
charges under Article 365, and only one
information shall be filed in the same first level
court.55
Our ruling today secures for the accused facing
an Article 365 charge a stronger and simpler
protection of their constitutional right under the
Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby
denied the beneficent effect of the favorable
sentencing formula under Article 48, but any
disadvantage thus caused is more than
compensated by the certainty of non-prosecution
for quasi-crime effects qualifying as "light
offenses" (or, as here, for the more serious
consequence prosecuted belatedly). If it is so
minded, Congress can re-craft Article 365 by
extending to quasi-crimes the sentencing
formula of Article 48 so that only the most
severe penalty shall be imposed under a single
prosecution of all resulting acts, whether
penalized as grave, less grave or light offenses.
This will still keep intact the distinct concept of
quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the lenient schedule
of penalties under Article 365, befitting crimes
occupying a lower rung of culpability, should
cushion the effect of this ruling.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition.
We REVERSE the Orders dated 2 February
2006 and 2 May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig City, Branch 157. We DISMISS the
Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 against
petitioner Jason Ivler y Aguilar pending with the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71
on the ground of double jeopardy.
Let a copy of this ruling be served on the
President of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-1477 January 18, 1950
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
JULIO GUILLEN, defendant-appellant.
Mariano A. Albert for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista
Angelo and Solicitor Francisco A. Carreon for
appellee.
PER CURIAM, J.:
This case is before us for review of, and by
virtue of appeal from, the judgment rendered by
the Court of First Instance of Manila in case No.
2746, whereby Julio Guillen y Corpus, or Julio C.
Guillen, is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of murder and multiple frustrated
murder, as charged in the information, and is
sentenced to the penalty of death, to indemnify
the of the deceased Simeon Valera (or Barrela)
in the sum of P2,000 and to pay the costs.
Upon arraignment the accused entered a plea of
not guilty to the charges contained in the
information.
Then the case was tried in one of the branches
of the Court of First Instance of Manila presided
over by the honorable Buenaventura Ocampo
who, after the submission of the evidence of the
prosecution and the defense, rendered judgment
as above stated.
In this connection it should be stated that, at the
beginning of the trial and before arraignment,
counsel de oficio for the accused moved that the
mental condition of Guillen be examined. The
court, notwithstanding that it had found out from
the answers of the accused to questions
propounded to him in order to test the
soundness of his mind, that he was not suffering
from any mental derangement, ordered that Julio
Guillen be confined for Hospital, there to be
examined by medical experts who should report
their findings accordingly. This was done, and,
according to the report of the board of medical
experts, presided over by Dr. Fernandez of the
National Psychopathic Hospital, Julio Guillen
was not insane. Said report (Exhibit L), under
the heading "Formulation and Diagnosis," at
pages 13 and 14, reads:
FORMULATION AND DIAGNOSIS
Julio C. Guillen was placed under
constant observation since admission.
There was not a single moment during
his whole 24 hours daily, that he was not
under observation.
The motive behind the commission of
the crime is stated above. The veracity
of this motivation was determined in the
Narcosynthesis. That the narco-
synthesis was successful was checked
up the day after the test. The narco-
synthesis proved not only reveal any
conflict or complex that may explain a
delusional or hallucinatory motive
behind the act.
Our observation and examination failed
to elicit any sign or symptom of insanity
in Mr. Julio C. Guillen. He was found to
be intelligent, always able to differentiate
right from wrong, fully aware of the
nature of the crime he committed and is
equally decided to suffer for it in any
manner or form.
His version of the circumstances of the
crime, his conduct and conversation
relative thereto, the motives, temptations
and provocations that preceded the act,
were all those of an individual with a
sound mind.
On the other hand he is an man of
strong will and conviction and once
arriving at a decision he executes,
irrespective of consequences and as in
this case, the commission of the act at
Plaza Miranda.
What is of some interest in the
personality of Julio C. Guillen is his
commission of some overt acts. This is
seen not only in the present instance,
but sometime when an employee in la
Clementina Cigar Factory he engaged in
a boxing bout Mr. Manzano, a Span-
wanted to abuse the women cigar
makers, and felt it his duty to defend
them. One time he ran after a policeman
with a knife in hand after being provoked
to a fight several times. He even
challenged Congressman Nueno to a
fight sometime before when Mr. Nueno
was running for a seat in the Municipal
 Board of the City of Manila, after hearing
him deliver one of his apparently
outspoken speeches.
All these mean a defect in his
personality characterized by a weakness
of censorship especially in relation to
rationalization about the consequences
of his acts.
In view of the above findings it is our
considered opinion that Julio C. Guillen
is not insane but is an individual with a
personality defect which in Psychiatry is
termed, Constitutional Psychopathic
Inferiority.
Final Diagnosis
Not insane: Constitutional Psychopathic
Inferiority, without psychosis.
In view of the above-quoted findings of the
medical board, and notwithstanding the contrary
opinion of one Dr. Alvarez, who was asked by
the defense to give his opinion on the matter, the
court ruled that Guillen, not being insane, could
be tired, as he was tired, for the offenses he
committed on the date in question.
THE FACTS
Upon careful perusal of the evidence and the
briefs submitted by counsel for the accused, the
Solicitor General and their respective
memoranda, we find that there is no
disagreement between the prosecution and the
defense, as to the essential facts which caused
the filing of the present criminal case against this
accused. Those facts may be stated as follows:
On the dates mentioned in this decision, Julio
Guillen y Corpus, although not affirmed with any
particular political group, has voted for the
defeated candidate in the presidential elections
held in 1946. Manuel A. Roxas, the successful
candidate, assumed the office of President of
the Commonwealth and subsequently President
of the President of the Philippine Republic.
According to Guillen, he became disappointed in
President Roxas for his alleged failure to redeem
the pledges and fulfill the promises made by him
during the presidential election campaign; and
his disappointment was aggravated when,
according to him, President Roxas, instead of
looking after the interest of his country,
sponsored and campaigned for the approval of
the so-called "parity" measure. Hence he
determined to assassinate the President.
After he had pondered for some time over the
ways and means of assassinating President
Roxas, the opportunity presented itself on the
night of March 10, 1947, when at a popular
meeting held by the Liberal Party at Plaza de
Miranda, Quiapo, Manila attended by a big
crowd, President Roxas, accompanied by his
wife and daughter and surrounded by a number
of ladies and gentlemen prominent in
government and politics, stood on a platform
erected for that purpose and delivered his
speech expounding and trying to convince his
thousand of listeners of the advantages to be
gained by the Philippines, should the
constitutional amendment granting American
citizens the same rights granted to Filipino
nationals be adopted.
Guillen had first intended to use a revolver for
the accomplishment of his purpose, but having
lost said firearm, which was duly licensed, he
thought of two hand grenades which were given
him by an American soldier in the early days of
the liberation of Manila in exchange for two
bottles of whisky. He had likewise been weighing
the chances of killing President Roxas, either by
going to Malacañan, or following his intended
victim in the latter's trips to provinces, for
instance, to Tayabas (now Quezon) where the
President was scheduled to speak, but having
encountered many difficulties, he decided to
carry out his plan at the pro-parity meeting held
at Plaza de Miranda on the night of March 10,
1947.
On the morning of that he went to the house of
Amando Hernandez whom he requested to
prepare for him a document (Exhibit B), in
accordance with their pervious understanding in
the preceding afternoon, when they met at the
premises of the Manila Jockey Club on the
occasion of an "anti-parity" meeting held there.
On account of its materially in this case, we
deem it proper to quote hereunder the contents
of said document. An English translation (Exhibit
B-2) from its original Tagalog reads:
FOR THE SAKE OF A FREE PHILIPPINES
I am the only one responsible for what
happened. I conceived it, I planned it,
and I carried it out all by myself alone. It
took me many days and nights
pondering over this act, talking to my
own conscience, to my God, until I
reached my conclusion. It was my duty.
I did not expected to live long; I only had
on life to spare. And had I expected to
lives to spare, I would not have
hesitated either ton sacrifice it for the
sake of a principle which was the
welfare of the people.
Thousands have died in Bataan; many
more have mourned the loss of their
husbands, of their sons, and there are
millions now suffering. Their deeds bore
no fruits; their hopes were frustrated.
I was told by my conscience and by my
God that there was a man to be blamed
for all this: he had deceived the people,
he had astounded them with no other
purpose than to entice them; he even
went to the extent of risking the heritage
of our future generations. For these
reasons he should not continue any
longer. His life would mean nothing as
compared with the welfare of eighteen
million souls. And why should I not give
up my life too if only the good of those
eighteen million souls.
These are the reasons which impelled
me to do what I did and I am willing to
bear up the consequences of my act. I t
matters not if others will curse me. Time
and history will show, I am sure, that I
have only displayed a high degree of
patriotism in my performance of my said
act.
Hurrah for a free Philippines.
Cheers for the happiness of every
Filipino home.
May God pity on me.
Amen.
JULIO C. GUILLEN
A copy (Exhibit B-1) of the original in Tagalog
(Exhibit B), made at the request of Guillen by his
nephew, was handed to him only at about 6
o'clock in the afternoon of March 10, 1947, for
which reason said Exhibit B-1 appears unsigned,
because he was in a hurry for that meeting at
Plaza de Miranda.
When he reached Plaza de Miranda, Guillen
was carrying two hand grenades concealed in a
paper bag which also contained peanuts. He
buried one of the hand grenades (Exhibit D), in a
plant pot located close to the platform, and when
he decided to carry out his evil purpose he stood
on the chair on which he had been sitting and,
from a distance of about seven meters, he
hurled the grenade at the President when the
latter had just closed his speech, was being
congratulated by Ambassador Romulo and was
about to leave the platform.
General Castañeda, who was on the platform,
saw the smoking, hissing, grenade and without
losing his presence of mind, kicked it away from
the platform, along the stairway, and towards an
open space where the general thought the
grenade was likely to do the least harm; and,
covering the President with his body, shouted to
the crowd that everybody should lie down. The
grenade fell to the ground and exploded in the
middle of a group of persons who were standing
close to the platform. Confusion ensued, and the
crowd dispersed in a panic. It was found that the
fragments of the grenade had seriously injured
Simeon Varela (or Barrela ) — who died on the
following day as the result of mortal wounds
caused by the fragments of the grenade
(Exhibits F and F-1) — Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio,
Pedro Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang.
Guillen was arrested by members of the Police
Department about two hours after the
occurrence. It appears that one Angel Garcia,
who was one spectators at that meeting, saw
how a person who was standing next to him
hurled an object at the platform and, after the
explosion, ran away towards a barber shop
located near the platform at Plaza de Miranda.
Suspecting that person was the thrower of the
object that exploded, Garcia went after him and
had almost succeeded in holding him, but
Guillen offered stiff resistance, got loose from
Garcia and managed to escape. Garcia pursued
him, but some detectives, mistaking the former
for the real criminal and the author of the
explosion, placed him under arrest. In the
meantime, while the City Mayor and some
agents of the Manila Police Department were
investigating the affair, one Manuel Robles
volunteered the information that the person with
whom Angel Garcia was wrestling was Julio
Guillen; that he (Manuel Robles) was acquainted
with Julio Guillen for the previous ten years and
had seen each other in the plaza a few moments
previous to the explosion.
The police operatives interrogated Garcia and
Robles, and Julio Guillen was, within two hours
after the occurrence, found in his home at 1724
Juan Luna Street, Manila, brought to the police
headquarters and identified by Angel Garcia, as
the same person who hurled towards the
platform the object which exploded and whom
Garcia tried to hold when he was running away.
During the investigation conducted by the police
he readily admitted his responsibility, although at
the same time he tried to justify his action in
throwing the bomb at President Roxas. He also
indicated to his captors the place where he had
hidden his so called last will quoted above and
marked Exhibit B, which was then unsigned by
him and subsequently signed at the police
headquarters.
Re-enacting the crime (Exhibit C), he pointed out
to the police where he had buried (Exhibit C-1)
the other hand grenade (Exhibit D), and, in the
presence of witnesses he signed a statement
which contained his answers to question
propounded to him by Major A. Quintos of the
Manila Police, who investigated him soon after
his arrest (Exhibit E). From a perusal of his
voluntary statement, we are satisfied that it
tallies exactly with the declarations and made by
him on the witness stand during the trial of this
case.
THE ISSUES
In the brief submitted by counsel de oficio for
this appellant, several errors are assigned
allegedly committed by the trial court,
namely: first, "in finding the appellant guilty of
murder for the death of Simeon Varela"; second,
"in declaring the appellant guilty of the complex
crime of murder and multiple frustrated
murder"; third, "in applying sub-section 1 of
article 49 of the Revised Penal Code in
determining the penalty to be imposed upon the
accused"; andfourth, "in considering the
concurrence of the aggravating circumstances of
nocturnity and of contempt of public authorities
in the commission of crime."
The evidence for the prosecution, supported by
the brazen statements made by the accused,
shows beyond any shadow of doubt that, when
Guillen attended that meeting, carrying with him
two hand grenades, to put into execution his
preconceived plan to assassinate President
Roxas, he knew fully well that, by throwing one
of those two hand grenades in his possession at
President Roxas, and causing it to explode, he
could not prevent the persons who were around
his main and intended victim from being killed or
at least injured, due to the highly explosive
nature of the bomb employed by him to carry out
his evil purpose.
Guillen, testifying in his own behalf, in answer to
questions propounded by the trial judge (page
96 of transcript) supports our conclusion. He
stated that he performed the act voluntarily; that
his purpose was to kill the President, but that it
did not make any difference to him if there were
some people around the President when he
hurled that bomb, because the killing of those
who surrounded the President was tantamount
to killing the President, in view of the fact that
those persons, being loyal to the President being
loyal to the President, were identified with the
latter. In other word, although it was not his main
intention to kill the persons surrounding the
President, he felt no conjunction in killing them
also in order to attain his main purpose of killing
the President.
The facts do not support the contention of
counsel for appellant that the latter is guilty only
of homicide through reckless imprudence in
regard to the death of Simeon Varela and of less
serious physical injuries in regard to Alfredo Eva,
Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio
Maglalang, and that he should be sentenced to
the corresponding penalties for the different
felonies committed, the sum total of which shall
not exceed three times the penalty to be
imposed for the most serious crime in
accordance with article 70 in relation to article 74
of the Revised Penal Code.
In throwing hand grenade at the President with
the intention of killing him, the appellant acted
with malice. He is therefore liable for all the
consequences of his wrongful act; for in
accordance with article 4 of the Revised Penal
Code, criminal liability is incurred by any person
committing felony (delito) although the wrongful
act done be different from that which he
intended. In criminal negligence, the injury
caused to another should be unintentional, it
being simply the incident of another act
performed without malice. (People vs. Sara, 55
Phil., 939.) In the words of Viada, "in order that
an act may be qualified as imprudence it is
necessary that either malice nor intention to
cause injury should intervene; where such
intention exists, the act should qualified by the
felony it has produced even though it may not
have been the intention of the actor to cause an
evil of such gravity as that produced.' (Viada's
Comments on the Penal Code, vol. 7, 5th ed.,
p.7.) And, as held by this Court, a deliberate
intent to do an unlawful act is essentially
inconsistent with the idea of reckless
imprudence. (People vs. Nanquil, 43 Phil., 232.)
Where such unlawful act is wilfully done, a
mistake in the identity of the intended victim
cannot be considered as reckless imprudence.
(People vs. Gona, 54 Phil., 605)
Squarely on the point by counsel is the following
decision of the Supreme Court of Spain:
Cuestion 62. Se presenta A, a las ocho
de la noche, en el estanco de B a
comprar tabaco, y habiendose negado
este a darselo al fiado, se retira a quel
sin mediar entre ambos disputa alguna;
pero; trnscurrido un cuarto de hora,
hallandose el estanquero despachando
a C, se oye la detonacion de un arma de
fuego disparada por A desde la calle,
quedando muertos en el acto C y el
estanquero; supuesta la no intencion en
A de matar a C y si solo al estanquero,
cabe calificar la muerte de este de
homicidio y la de c de imprudencia
temeraria? — La Sala de lo Criminal de
la Auudiencia de Granada lo estimo asi,
y condeno al procesado a catorse anos
de reclusion por el homivcidio y a un
año de prision correctional por la
imprudencia. Aparte de que la muerte
del estanquero debio calificarse de
assesinato y no de homicidio, por
haberse ejecutado con aleviosa. es
evidente que la muerte de C,
suponiendo que no se propusiera
ejecutaria el procesado, no pudo
calificarse de imprudencia teme raria,
sino que tambien debio declararsele
responsable de la misma, a tenor de lo
puesto en este apartado ultimo del
articulo; y que siendo ambas muertes
producidas por un solo hecho, o sea por
un solo disparo, debio imponerse al reo
la pena del delito de asesinato en el
grado maximo, a tenor de lo dispuesto
en el art. 90 del Codigo, o sea la pena
de muerte. Se ve, pues, claramente que
en el antedicha sentencia, aparte de
otros articulos del Codigo, se infringio
por la Sala la disposicion de este
apartado ultimo del articulo muy
principalmente, y asi lo declaro el
Tribunal Supremo en S. de 18 junio de
1872. (Gaceta de 1,0 de agosto.) (I
Viada, 5th Ed., p. 42.)
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides
as follows:
Art. 48. Penalty for Complex Crimes. —
When a single act constitutes two or
more grave or less grave felonies, or
when an offense is a necessary means
for committing the other, the penalty for
the most serious crime shall be
imposed, the same to be applied in its
maximum period.
We think it is the above-quoted article and not
paragraph 1 of article 49 that is applicable. The
case before us is clearly governed by the first
clause of article 48 because by a single act, that
a throwing highly explosive hand grenade at
President Roxas, the accused committed two
grave felonies, namely: (1) murder, of which
Simeon Varela was the victim; and (2) multiple
attempted murder, of which President Roxas,
Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and
Emilio Maglalang were the injured parties.
The killing of Simeon Varela was attended by
the qualifying circumstance of treachery. In the
case of People vs. Mabug-at, supra, this court
held that the qualifying circumstance of
treachery may be properly considered, even
when the victim of the attack was not the one
whom the defendant intended to kill, if it appears
from the evidence that neither of the two
persons could in any manner put up defense
against the attack, or become aware of it. In the
same case it was held that the qualifying
circumstance of premeditation may not be
properly taken into the account when the person
whom the defendant proposed to kill was
different from the one who became his victim.
There can be no question that the accused
attempted to kill President Roxas by throwing a
hand grenade at him with the intention to kill
him, thereby commencing the commission of a
felony by over acts, but he did not succeed in
assassinating him "by reason of some cause or
accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance." For the same reason we qualify the
injuries caused on the four other persons
already named as merely attempted and not
frustrated murder.
In this connection, it should be stated that ,
although there is abundant proof that , in
violation of the provisions of article 148 of the
Revised Penal Code, the accused Guillen has
committed among others the offense of assault
upon a person in authority, for in fact his efforts
were directed towards the execution of his main
purpose of eliminating President Roxas for his
failure to redeem his electoral campaign
promises, by throwing at him in his official
capacity as the Chief Executive of the nation the
hand grenade in question, yet, in view of the
appropriate allegation charging Guillen with the
commission of said offense, we shall refrain
making a finding to that effect.
The complex crimes of murder and multiple
attempted murder committed by the accused
with the single act of throwing a hand grenade at
the President, was attended by the various
aggravating circumstances alleged in the
information, without any mitigating circumstance.
But we do not deem it necessary to consider
said aggravating circumstances because in any
event article 48 of the Revised Penal Code
above-quoted requires that the penalty for the
most serious of said crimes be applied in its
maximum period. The penalty for murder
is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
death. (Art. 248.)
It is our painful duty to apply the law and mete
out to the accused the extreme penalty provided
by it upon the facts and circumstances
hereinabove narrated.
The sentence of the trial court being correct, we
have no alternative but to affirm it, and we
hereby do so by a unanimous vote. The death
sentence shall be executed in accordance with
article 81 of the Revised Penal Code, under
authority of the Director of Prisons, on such
working day as the trial court may fix within 30
days from the date the record shall have been
remanded. It is so ordered.
G.R. No. 123485 August 31, 1998
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-
Appellee, vs. ROLUSAPE
SABALONES alias"Roling," ARTEMIO
TIMOTEO BERONGA, TEODULO
ALEGARBES and EUFEMIO CABANERO,
accused, ROLUSAPE
SABALONES alias "Roling" and ARTEMIO
TIMOTEO BERONGA, Accused-Appellants.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Factual findings of trial courts which are affirmed
by the Court of Appeals are, as a general rule,
binding and conclusive upon the Supreme Court.
Alibi, on the other hand, cannot prevail over
positive identification by credible witnesses.
Furthermore, alleged violations of constitutional
rights during custodial investigation are relevant
only when the conviction of the accused by the
trial court is based on the evidence obtained
during such investigation.
The Case
These are the principles relied upon by the Court
in resolving this appeal from the Court of
Appeals (CA) 1 Decision 2 dated September 28,
1995, convicting Rolusape Sabalones and
Timoteo Beronga of murder and frustrated
murder. The convictions arose from a shooting
incident on June 1, 1985 in Talisay, Cebu, which
resulted in the killing of two persons and the
wounding of three others, who were all riding in
two vehicles which were allegedly ambushed by
appellants.
After conducting a preliminary investigation,
Second Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Juanito
M. Gabiana Sr. filed before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 7, 3 five
amended Informations charging four "John
Does," who were later identified as Rolusape
Sabalones, Artemio Timoteo Beronga, Teodulo
Alegarbes and Eufemio Cabanero, with two
counts of murder and three counts of frustrated
murder. The Informations are quoted hereunder.
1) Crim Case No. CBU-9257 for murder:
That on the 1st day of June, 1985, at 11:45
o'clock in the evening, more or less, at
Mansueto Village, Bulacao, Municipality of
Talisay, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another,
armed with high-powered firearms, with intent to
kill and treachery, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
shoot GLENN TIEMPO, who was riding [i]n a
jeep and who gave no provocation, thereby
inflicting upon the latter several gunshot wounds,
thereby causing his instantaneous death.
CONTRARY TO Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code.
2) Criminal Case No. 9258 for murder:
That on the 1st day of June, 1985 at 11:45
o'clock in the evening, more or less at Mansueto
Village, Barangay Bulacao, Municipality of
Talisay, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another,
armed with high-powered firearms, with intent to
kill and treachery, did [then] and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
shoot ALFREDO NARDO, who was riding on a
jeep and who gave no provocation, thereby
inflicting upon the latter several gunshot wounds,
thereby causing his instantaneous death.
CONTRARY TO Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code.
3) Crim Case No. CBU-9259 for frustrated
murder:
That on the 1st day of June, 1985 at 11:45
o'clock in the evening, more or less, at
Mansueto Village, Barangay Bulacao,
Municipality of Talisay, Province of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
one another, armed with high-powered firearms,
with intent to kill and treachery, did and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault
and shoot REY BOLO who was riding in a car
and who gave no provocation, thereby inflicting
upon the latter the following injuries to wit:
laceration, mouth due to gunshot wound,
gunshot wound (L) shoulder penetrating (L)
chest; gunshot wound (R) hand (palm); open
fracture (L) clavicle (L) scapula; contusion (L)
lung;
thereby performing all the acts of execution
which would produce the crime of [m]urder as a
consequence but which, nevertheless, did not
produce it by reason of causes independent of
the will of the perpetrator, i.e. the timely medical
attendance.
IN VIOLATION of Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code.
4) Criminal Case No. 9260 for frustrated murder:
That on the 1st day of June, 1985 at 11:45
o'clock in the evening, more or less, at
Mansueto Village, Barangay Bulacao,
Municipality of Talisay, Province of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
one another, armed with high-powered firearms,
with intent to kill and treachery, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and shoot ROGELIO PRESORES, who
was riding in a car and who gave no
provocation, thereby inflicting upon the latter the
following injuries, to wit:
gunshot wound, thru and thru right chest
thereby performing all the acts of execution
which would produce the crime of [m]urder as a
consequence but which, nevertheless, did not
produce it by reason of causes independent of
the will of the perpetrator, i.e. the timely medical
attendance.
IN VIOLATION of Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code.
5) Criminal Case No. 9261 for frustrated murder:
That on the 1st day of June, 1985 at 11:45
o'clock in the evening, more or less, at
Mansueto Village, Barangay Bulacao,
Municipality of Talisay, Province of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
one another, armed with high-powered firearms,
with intent to kill and treachery, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and shoot NELSON TIEMPO, who was
riding in a car and who gave no provocation,
thereby inflicting upon the latter the following
injuries, to wit:
Gunshot wound neck penetrating wound
perforating trachea (cricoid) thereby performing
all the acts of execution which would produce
the crime of [m]urder as a consequence but
which nevertheless, did not produce it by reason
of causes independent of the will of the
perpetrator, i.e. the timely medical attendance.
IN VIOLATION of Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code.
Of the four indictees in the five Informations,
Teodulo Alegarbes and Artemio Timoteo
Beronga were the first to be arraigned. Upon the
arrest of the two, the Informations were
amended by the public prosecutor, with the
conformity of the defense counsel, by
substituting the names of the two accused for
the "John Does" appearing in the original
Informations. When arraigned, said accused,
assisted by their respective lawyers, pleaded not
guilty to the five Informations.
Alegarbes died in the course of trial; thus, the
cases against him were dismissed. Accused
Cabanero remained at large. Sabalones, on the
other hand, was eventually arrested.
Subsequently, he jumped bail but was
recaptured in 1988 and thereafter pleaded not
guilty during his arraignment.
The cases against Sabalones and Beronga were
jointly tried. Thereafter, the lower court found
them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crimes charged. The RTC disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises above-set forth, the
Court finds accused ROLUSAPE SABALONES
and (ARTEMIO) TIMOTEO BERONGA, [g]uilty
beyond reasonable doubt, as principals:
In Crim. Case No. CBU-9257, for MURDER,
defined and penalized in Art. 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, hereby sentences each said
accused to suffer the penalty of [f]ourteen (14)
years, [e]ight (8) months and [o]ne (1) day, as
minimum, to [s]eventeen (17) years, [f]our (4)
months and [o]ne (1) day, of [r]eclusion
[t]emporal, as maximum, to indemnify the heirs
of deceased, Glenn Tiempo, the sum of
P50,000.00;
In Crim. Case No. CBU-9258, for MURDER,
defined and penalized in Art. 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, hereby sentences each said
accused to suffer the penalty of [f]ourteen (14)
years, [e]ight (8) months and [o]ne (1) day, as
minimum, to [s]eventeen (17) years, [f]our (4)
months and [o]ne (1) day, of [r]eclusion
[t]emporal, as maximum, to indemnify the heirs
of deceased, Alfredo Nardo, the sum of
P50,000.00;
In Crim. Case No. CBU-9259, for FRUSTRATED
MURDER, defined and penalized in Art. 248 in
relation to Art. 50 of the Revised Penal Code,
hereby sentences each said accused to suffer
the penalty of [e]ight (8) years of prision mayor,
as minimum, to [f]ourteen (14) years and [e]ight
(8) months of [re]clusion [t]emporal, as
maximum, to indemnify the victim, Rey Bolo, the
sum of P20,000.00;
In Crim. Case No. CBU-9260, for FRUSTRATED
MURDER, defined and penalized in Art. 248 in
relation to Art. 50 of the Revised Penal Code,
hereby sentences each said accused to suffer
the penalty of [e]ight (8) years of prision mayor,
as minimum, to [f]ourteen (14) years and [e]ight
months of [r]eclusion [t]emporal, as maximum, to
indemnify the victim, Rogelio Presores, the sum
of P20,000.00;
In Crim. Case No. CBU-9261, for FRUSTRATED
MURDER, defined and penalized in Art. 248 in
relation to Art. 50 of the Revised Penal Code,
hereby sentences each said accused to suffer
the penalty of [e]ight (8) years of prision mayor,
as minimum, to [f]ourteen (14) years and [e]ight
(8) months of [r]eclusion [t]emporal, as
maximum, to indemnify the victim, Nelson
Tiempo, the sum of P20,000.00; and
To pay the costs in all instances. The period of
their preventive imprisonment shall be credited
to each accused in full.
SO ORDERED. 4
Appellants filed a notice of appeal to the Court of
Appeals. Thereafter, the CA affirmed their
conviction but sentenced them to reclusion
perpetua for the murders they were found guilty
of. Accordingly, the appellate court, without
entering judgment, certified the case to the
Supreme Court in accordance with Section 13,
Rule 124 of the Rules of Court. The dispositive
portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the trial court
convicting accused-appellants Rolusa[p]e
Sabalones and Artemio Timoteo Beronga for
murder in Crim. Cases Nos. CBU-9257 and
CBU-9258, and [f]rustrated [m]urder in Crim.
Cases Nos. CBU-9259, CBU-9260, and CBU-
9261 is hereby AFFIRMED; however, the
penalties in the [f]rustrated [m]urder and
[m]urder cases are hereby MODIFIED, such that
both accused-appellants are each sentenced to
imprisonment of TEN (10) YEARS of [p]rision
[m]ayor medium as minimum to SEVENTEEN
(17) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS
of [r]eclusion [t]emporalmedium as maximum in
each of the three [f]rustrated [m]urder cases
(Crim. Cases Nos. CBU-9259, CBU-9260 and
CBU-9261); and are each sentenced
to [r]eclusion [p]erpetua in each of the two
[m]urder cases (Crim. Cases Nos. CBU-9257
and CBU-9258). The indemnity to the victim in
each [f]rustrated [m]urder case shall remain. In
conformity with Rule 124, Section 13 of the
Rules of Court, however, this Court refrains from
entering judgment, and hereby certifies the case
and orders that the entire record hereof be
elevated to the Supreme Court for review. 5
After the Court of Appeals certified the case to
this Court, we required appellants to file
supplemental briefs. Appellants failed to comply
within the prescribed period and were deemed to
have waived their right to do so. 6 Thus, in
resolving this case, this Court will address
primarily the arguments raised by the appellants
in their Brief before the Court of Appeals, which
assailed the RTC Decision.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The solicitor general 7 quoted the following
factual findings of the trial court:
Edwin Santos, a resident of Mambaling, Cebu
City stated that on June 1, 1985 at 6:00 o'clock
in the evening, he was at the residence of Inday
Presores, sister of Rogelio Presores, located at
Rizal Ave., Cebu City to attend a wedding. He
stayed until 9:00 o'clock in the evening and
proceeded to the house of Maj. Tiempo at
Basak, Mambaling, Cebu City where a small
gathering was also taking place. (pp. 3-6, tsn,
April 7, 1987)
Arriving thereat, he saw Nelson and Glenn
Tiempo as well as Rogelio Presores, Rogelio
Oliveros, Junior Villoria, Rey Bolo and Alfredo
Nardo. (p. 7, ibid.)
At about 11:00 o'clock in the evening, Stephen
Lim, who was also at the party, called their
group and requested them to push his car.
When the engine started, the former asked them
to drive his car home. (pp. 7-11, ibid.)
Together with Nelson Tiempo, who was at the
wheel, Rogelio Presores, Rogelio Oliveros and
Junior Villoria, they drove to the residence of
Stephen Lim at Mansueto Compound, Bulacao,
Talisay, Cebu. (p. 12, ibid.)
Glenn Tiempo, Rey Bolo and Alfredo Nardo also
went with them riding in an owner-type jeep,
driven by the latter, in order to bring back the
group [as] soon as the car of Mr. Lim was
parked in his home. (p. 21, ibid.)
The two vehicles traveled in convoy with the
jeep 3 to 4 meters ahead of the car. When they
arrived at the gate of the house of Stephen Lim,
they were met with a sudden burst of gunfire. He
looked at the direction where the gunfire came,
and saw [the] persons [who] fired at the jeep. He
identified accused, Teodulo Alegarbes,
Rolusape Sabalones and Timoteo Beronga as
the persons who fired at the vehicle. Except for
Teodulo Alegarbes, who was naked from [the]
waist up, the gunmen wore clothes. (pp. 21-23;
13-16; 33, ibid.)
After firing at the jeep, the assailants shot the
ear they were riding[,] hitting Nelson Tiempo on
the throat and Rogelio Presores on the breast.
Despite the injury he sustained, Nelson Tiempo
was able to maneuver the car back to their
residence. (pp. 17-19, ibid.)
He immediately informed Maj. Tiempo about the
incident and the lat[t]er brought the victims to the
Cebu Doctor's Hospital. (p. 20, ibid.)
Rogelio Presores corroborated in substance the
testimony of Edwin Santos, being one of those
who were in the car driven by Nelson Tiempo to
the residence of Stephen Lim. (pp. 4-6, tsn, Aug.
14, 1987)
He further testified that when the jeep driven by
Alfredo Nardo with Rey Bolo and Glenn Tiempo
as passengers arrived at the front gate of Lim's
residence and while their car was 3 meters from
the rear end of the jeep, there was a volley of
gunfire. He glanced at the direction of the gunfire
and saw the jeep being fired at by four persons,
who were standing behind a concrete wall, 42
inches in height, and armed with long firearms.
Thenceforth, he saw Alfredo Nardo, Glenn
Tiempo and Rey Bolo f[a]ll to the ground. (pp. 6-
7, ibid.)
He recognized accused, Rolusape Sabalones,
as one of those who fired at the jeep. He also
identified in Court accused, Teodulo Alegarbes,
Timoteo Beronga and another person, whom he
recognized only through his facial appearance.
(pp. 7-8, ibid.)
When the shots were directed [at] their car[,]
they were able to bend their heads low. When
the firing stopped, he directed Nelson Tiempo to
back out from the place. As the latter was
maneuvering the car, the shooting continued
and he was hit in the breast while Nelson
Tiempo, in the neck, and the windshield of the
vehicle was shattered. (p. 10, ibid.)
Arriving at the house of Maj. Tiempo, they were
brought to Cebu Doctor's Hospital. He and
Nelson Tiempo were operated on. He had
incurred hospital expenses in the sum of
P5,412.69, (Exh. "I", "K"). (pp. 11-12, ibid.)
Ladislao Diola, Jr., [m]edico-[l]egal [o]fficer of the
PC Crime Laboratory, Regional Unit 7 stationed
at Camp Sotero Cabahug, Cebu City
remembered having performed a post-mortem
examination on the dead body of Glenn Tiempo
on June 2, 1985 at the Cosmopolitan Funeral
Homes, Cebu City. (p. 7, tsn, Nov. 11, 1987)
He issued the necessary Death Certificate, (Exh.
"D") and Necropsy Report, (Exh. "F") and
indicated therein that the victim's cause of death
was "[c]ardio respiratory arrest due to [s]hock
and [h]emorrhage [s]econdary to [g]unshot
wounds to the trunk." (p. 8, ibid.)
The victim sustained gunshot wounds in the right
chest and left lumbar area. (pp. 10-11, ibid.)
He explained that in gunshot wound no. 1, the
wound entrance[,] which [was] characterized by
invaginated edges and contusion collar[,] was
located in the right chest and the bullet went up
to the left clavicle hitting a bone which
incompletely fractured it causing the navigation
of the bullet to the left and to the anterior side of
the body. He recovered a slug, (Exh. "G") below
the muscles of the left clavicle. (p. 21, ibid.)
Based on the trajectory of the bullet, the
assailant could have been [o]n the right side of
the victim or in front of the victim but [o]n a lower
level than the latter.
In both gunshot wounds, he did not find any
powder burns which would indicate that the
muzzle of the gun was beyond a distance of 12
inches from the target. (p. 15, ibid.)
At the time he conducted the autopsy, he noted
that rigor mortis in its early stage had already set
in which denote[s] that death had occurred 5 to 6
hours earlier. (pp. 34-5, ibid.)
Maj. Juan Tiempo, father of the victims, Glenn
and Nelson Tiempo, testified that when he
learned about the incident in question, he
immediately summoned military soldiers and
together they proceeded to the scene. (pp. 4-6,
tsn, Nov. 12, 1988)
Arriving thereat, he saw the lifeless body of his
son, Glenn. He immediately carried him in his
arms and rushed him to the hospital but the
victim was pronounced Dead on Arrival. (pp. 6-
7, ibid.)
They buried his son, who was then barely 14
years old, at Cebu Memorial Park and had
incurred funeral expenses (Exhs. "K", "L", "O").
(pp. 7-8, ibid.)
His other son, Nelson, then 21 years old and a
graduate of [m]edical [t]echology, was admitted
at the Cebu Doctor's Hospital for gunshot wound
in the neck. The latter survived but could hardly
talk as a result of the injuries he sustained. He
had incurred medical and hospitalization
expenses in the sum of P21,594.22, (Exh. "H"),
(pp. 8-10, ibid.)
He had also incurred expenses in connection
with the hospitalization of the injured victims,
Rogelio Presores and Rey Bolo in the amount[s]
of P5,412.69, (exh. "I") and P9,431.10, (Exh.
"J"), respectively. (p. 11, ibid.)
He further stated that he [was] familiar the
accused, Roling Sabalones, because the latter
had a criminal record in their office in connection
with the kidnapping of a certain Zabate and
Macaraya. (p. 16, ibid.)
xxx xxx xxx
Dr. Jesus P. Cerna, [m]edico-[l]egal [o]fficer of
the PC/INP, Cebu Metrodiscom, had conducted
an autopsy on the dead body of Alfredo Nardo,
who sustained two (2) gunshot wounds in the
lower lip and left intraclavicular region, upon the
request of the [c]hief of the Homicide Section of
Cebu Metrodiscom. He issued the victim's
Necropsy Report, (Exh. "F:") and Death
Certificate, (Exh. "G"). (pp. 5-8, tsn, Dec. 4,
1987; pp. 4-6, tsn, Nov. 29, 1988)
He stated that the wound of entrance in gunshot
wound no. 1 was located in the lower lip, more
or less[,] on the left side making an exit in the left
mandibular region. (pp. 9-11, tsn, Dec. 4, 1987;
pp. 6-8, tsn, Nov. 29, 1988)
In gunshot wound no. 2, the wound of entrance
was in the left intraclavicular region exiting at the
back as reflected in the sketch, (Exh. "F-2"). This
wound was fatal and [could] almost cause an
instantaneous death considering that the bullet
penetrated the thoracic cavity, lacerating the
lungs and perforating the heart before making an
exit. (pp. 11-13, tsn, Dec. 4, 1987; pp. 13-15,
tsn, Nov. 29, 1988)
He found no tattooing around the wound of
entrance in both gunshot wounds. (pp. 8-9, tsn,
Nov. 29, 1988)
He prepared and issued th[e] Necropsy Report,
(Exh. "F") and Death Certificate, (Exh. "G") of
Alfredo Nardo who was identified to him by the
latter's daughter, Anita Nardo. (pp. 26-27, ibid.)
Rey Bolo, one of the victims, testified that when
the jeep he was riding [in] together with Glenn
Tiempo and Alfredo Nardo, reached the gate of
the residence of Stephen Lim, they were
suddenly fired upon. (pp. 5-8, tsn, March 6,
1989)
He was hit in the right palm and left cheek. He
jumped out of the vehicle and ran towards the
car which was behind them but he was again
shot at [,] [and hit] in the left scapular region. He
was still able to reach the road despite the
injuries he sustained and tried to ask help from
the people who were in the vicinity but nobody
dared to help him, [they] simply disappeared
from the scene, instead: (pp. 8-9, ibid.)
He took a passenger jeepney to the city and had
himself treated at the Cebu Doctor's Hospital,
and incurred medical expenses in the sum of
P9,000.00. (p. 9, ibid.)
He was issued a Medical Certificate, (Exh. "N")
by his attending physician.
Dr. Miguel Mancao, a [p]hysician-[s]urgeon,
recalled having attended [to] the victims, Nelson
Tiempo, Rey Bolo and Rogelio Presores at the
Cebu Doctor's Hospital on June 2, 1985. (pp. 7-
8, 11, 14, tsn, May 30, 1989)
Nelson Tiempo sustained gunshot wound[s] in
the neck and in the right chest but the bullet did
not penetrate the chest cavity but only the left
axilla. He was not able to recover any slugs
because the same disintegrated while the other
was thru and thru. The wound could have
proved fatal but the victim miraculously survived.
As a consequence of the injury he sustained,
Nelson Tiempo permanently lost his voice
because his trachea was shattered. His only
chance of recovery is by coaching and speech
therapy. He issued his Medical Certificate. (Exh.
"O"). (pp. 8-11, ibid.)
With regard to the patient, Rey Bolo, the latter
suffered multiple gunshot wounds in the left
shoulder penetrating the chest and fracturing the
2nd, 3rd, and 4th ribs in the process, in the right
hand fracturing the proximal right thumb and in
the mouth lacerating its soft tissues, per Medical
Certificate, (Exh. "N") which he issued. (pp. 11-
16, ibid.)
Based on the trajectory of the bullet, the gunman
could have been in front of the victim, when
gunshot would no. 1 was inflicted. (p. 30, ibid.)
With respect to the patient, Rogelio Presores,
the latter suffered [a] gunshot wound in the chest
with the wound of entrance in the right anterior
chest exiting at the back which was slightly lower
than the wound of entrance. He issued the
victim's Medical Certificate, (Exh. "M"). (pp. 34-
35, ibid.)
Based on the location of the wound, the gunman
could have been in front of the victim but [o]n a
slightly higher elevation than the latter. (pp. 35-
36, ibid.) 8
Version of the Defense
Appellants interposed denial and alibi. Their
version of the facts is summarized by the trial
court 9 thus:
. . . Timoteo Beronga, a cristo or bet caller in the
cockpit, testified that in the afternoon of June 1,
1985, he was in the Talisay Sports Complex
located at Tabunok, Talisay, Cebu to attend a
cock-derby.
At about 7:00 o'clock in the evening, he was
fetched by his wife and they left taking a taxicab
going to their residence in Lapulapu City. After
passing by the market place, they took a tricycle
and arrived home at 8:00 o'clock in the evening.
After taking his supper with his family, he went
home to sleep at 10:30 in the evening. The
following morning, after preparing breakfast, he
went back to sleep until 11:00 in the morning.
On February 24, 1987, while he was playing
mahjong at the corner of R.R. Landon and D.
Jakosalem Sts., Cebu City, complainant, Maj.
Juan Tiempo with some companions, arrived
and after knowing that he [was] "Timmy," [which
was] his nickname, the former immediately held
him by the neck.
He ran away but the latter chased him and
kicked the door of the house where he hid. He
was able to escape through the back door and
took refuge in Mandaue at the residence of Nito
Seno, a driver of Gen. Emilio Narcissi. (Tsn-
Abangan, pp. 4-17, October 19, 1989)
On February 27, 1987, upon the advi[c]e of his
friend, they approached Gen. Narcissi and
informed him of the incident. The latter brought
him to the Provincial Command Headquarters in
Lahug, Cebu City to confront Maj. Juan Tiempo.
After several days, he was brought by Maj.
Tiempo to the PC Headquarter[s] in Jones Ave.,
Cebu City where he was provided with a lawyer
to defend him but he was instructed that he
should assent to whatever his lawyer would ask
of him.
He was introduced to Atty. Marcelo Guinto, his
lawyer, who made him sign an Affidavit, (Exh.
"U") the contents of which, co[u]ched in the
dialect, were read to him.
He also testified that before he was detained at
the CPDRC, complainant brought him inside the
shop of a certain Den Ong, where he was again
mauled after he denied having any knowledge of
the whereabouts of Roling Sabalones and the
carbine.
At the instance of Col. Medija, he was physically
examined at the Southern Islands Hospital,
Cebu City and was issued a [M]edical
Certificate. (Tsn-Formentera, pp. 3-36, Jan. 18,
1990).
Justiniano Cuizon, [a]ccount [o]fficer of the
Visayan Electric Company (VECO) South
Extension Office, who is in charge of the billing,
disconnection and reconnection of electric
current, testified that based on the entries in
their logbook, (Exh. "3") made by their checker,
Remigio Villaver, the electrical supply at the
Mansueto Compound, Bulacao, Talisay, Cebu,
particularly the Mansueto Homeowners covered
by Account No. 465-293000-0, (Exh. "4-B") was
disconnected on January 10, 1985, (Exh. "3-A")
for non-payment of electric bills from March
1984 to January 1985 and was reconnected only
on June 17, 1985 (Exh. "4", "4-A"). (Tsn-
Abangan, pp. 22-27, Jan. 31, 1990).
Remigio Villaver, a checker of VECO, whose
area of responsibility cover[ed] the towns of
Talisay and San Fernando, Cebu had kept the
record of disconnection of electrical supply of
Mansueto Subdivision in Bulacao, Talisay, Cebu
and the same showed that on January 10, 1985,
(Exh. "3-A"), a service order was issued by their
office to the Mansueto Homeowners for the
permanent disconnection of their electric lights
due to non-payment of their electric bills from
March 1984 until January 1985. The actual
disconnection took place on December 29,
1984.
Witness Fredo Canete made efforts to
corroborate their testimony. (Tsn-Formentera,
pp. 3-5, Apr. 20, 1990).
Vicente Cabanero, a resident of Mansueto
Compound in Talisay, Cebu since 1957 until the
present, remembered that on June 1, 1985,
between 10:00 o'clock and 11:00 o'clock in the
evening, he heard a burst of gunfire about 15 to
20 armslength [sic] from his residence.
He did not bother to verify because he was
scared since the whole place was in total
darkness. (Tsn-Abangan, pp. 18-23, Feb. 22,
1990).
Marilyn Boc, another witness for the accused,
stated that on the date and time of the incident in
question, while she was at the wake of Junior
Sabalones, younger brother of Roling
Sabalones, who died on May 26, 1985, a
sudden burst of gunfire occurred more or less 60
meters away.
Frightened, she went inside a room to hide and
saw accused, Roling Sabalones, sound asleep.
She came to know accused, Timoteo Beronga,
only during one of the hearings of this case and
during the entire period that the body of the late
Junior Sabalones [lay] in state at his residence,
she never saw said accused.
She was requested to testify in this case by
Thelma Beronga, wife of Timoteo Beronga.
(Tsn-Abangan, pp. 9-13, February 28, 1990).
Dr. Daniel Medina, while then the [r]esident
[p]hysician of Southern Islands Hospital, Cebu
City had treated the patient, Timoteo Beronga on
March 18, 1987.
Upon examination, he found out that the patient
sustained linear abrasion, linear laceration and
hematoma in the different parts of the body.
Except for the linear laceration which he
believed to have been inflicted two or three days
prior to [the] date of examination, all the other
injuries were already healed indicating that the
same were inflicted 10 to 12 days earlier.
He issued the corresponding Medical Certificate
(Exh. "2") to the patient. (Tsn-Abangan, pp. 9-
13, May 21, 1990).
Atty. Jesus Pono, counsel for accused Beronga,
mounted the witness stand and averred that he
[was] a resident of Mansueto Compound,
Bulacao, Talisay, Cebu. As shown in the
pictures, (Exhs. "3", "4" & "5" with submarkings)
his house is enclosed by a concrete fence about
5 feet 6 inches tall. It is situated 6 meters from
the residence of accused, Roling Sabalones,
which was then being rented by Stephen Lim.
Outside the fence [are] shrubs and at the left
side is a lamp post provided with 200 watts
fluorescent bulb.
On June 1, 1985 at about 7:00 o'clock in the
evening, he saw Roling Sabalones, whom he
personally [knew] because they used to be
neighbors in Talisay, Cebu, at the wake of his
brother, Federico Sabalones, Jr. or Junior
Sabalones, as mentioned repeatedly hereabout.
They even had a talk and he noticed accused to
be physically indisposed being gravely affected
by the loss of his only brother, who met a violent
death in the hands of an unknown hitman on
May 26,1985.
He went home after he saw accused [lie] down
on a bamboo bench to rest.
At about 12:00 o'clock midnight, he was
awakened by a rapid burst of gunfire which
emanated near his house. He did not attempt to
go down or look outside. He [was] in no position
to tell whether or not the street light was lighted.
When he verified the following morning, he
noticed bloodstains on the ground as well as
inside the jeep which was parked 2 to 3 meters
from his fence and 50 to 70 meters from the
house where Junior Sabalones [lay] in state. He
observed that the jeep was riddled with bullets
and its windshield shattered. (Tsn-Abangan, pp.
3-16, June 6, 1990).
He admitted that he used to be a counsel of
accused, Roling Sabalones, in several cases,
among which involved the death of a certain
Garces and Macaraya, which cases were
however, dismissed by the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal of Cebu. (Tsn-Tumarao, pp. 2-
3, June 13, 1990).
Doroteo Ejares, a relative of accused, testified
that when he attended the wake of Junior
Sabalones on June 1, 1985 at 8:00 o'clock in the
evening, he saw accused lying on a bamboo
bench in the yard of the house of the deceased.
At past 10:00 o'clock in the evening, accused
excused himself as he was not feeling well and
entered a room to rest while he remained by the
door and slept.
At almost 12:00 o'clock midnight, he was
awakened by a burst of gunfire which took place
more or less 20 meters away and saw the
people scamper[ing] for safety. He hid inside the
room where accused was sleeping and peeped
thru the door. Not long after, Marilyn Boc
entered and in a low voice talked about the
incident.
They decided to wake up the accused to inform
him of what was happening, but the latter merely
opened his eyes and realizing that accused was
too weak, they allowed him to go back to sleep.
When he went home at past 5:00 o'clock in the
morning of June 2, 1985, he saw a jeep outside
of the compound. He did not bother to
investigate or inquire about the incident as he
was in a hurry to go home and prepare for the
burial of Junior Sabalones.
He was requested to testify in this case by his
aunt and mother of accused Rolusape
Sabalones. (Tsn-Tumarao, pp. 10-15, June 13,
1990).
Russo Sabalones, uncle of accused, Sabalones,
averred that the latter was once, one of his
undercover agents while he was then the [c]hief
of the Intelligence Service of the PC from 1966
until 1968.
As part of their intelligence tradition, an
undercover agent is not allowed to carry his real
name. In the case of his nephew and accused,
Rolusape Sabalones, the latter chose the name
"Paciano Laput" which name was recorded in
their code of names.
When he retired in 1968, the accused ceased to
be an agent and . . . likewise ceased to have the
authority to use the name Paciano Laput. (Tsn-
Abangan, p. 12, July 23, 1990).
Alfonso Allere, a distant relative of the accused,
remembered having received a call from Roling
Sabalones, one morning after the burial of the
latter's brother, asking for his advise because of
the threats [to] his life which he received thru
telephone from the group of Nabing Velez and
the group of the military.
After he had advised accused to lie low, he had
not heard of him, since then.
Godofredo Mainegro of the Public Assistance
and Complaint Action Office of the Regional
Unified Command 7, received a complaint from
one Inocencia Sabalones on March 13, 1986.
He recorded the complaint in their Complaint
Sheet, (Exh. "6") and let complainant affix her
signature.
After the document was subscribed and sworn to
before him, (Exh. "6-C"), he indorsed it to their
[c]ommanding [o]fficer, Apolinario Castano.
(Tsn-Formentera, pp. 3-10, July 24, 1990).
Ret. Col. Apolinario Castano, recalled that while
he was then with the Regional Unified Command
7, his niece, Racquel Sabalones together with
her husband Roling Sabalones, came to him for
advi[c]e because the latter was afraid of his life
brought about by the rampant killings of which
his brother and the son of Maj. Tiempo were
victims.
Considering that accused's problem matter, they
approached Gen. Ecarma, the then
[c]ommander of the PC/INP, Recom 7, and the
latter referred them to his [c]hief of [s]taff, Col.
Roger Denia, who informed them that there was
no case filed against the accused. Nevertheless,
the latter was advised to be careful and consult
a lawyer.
Inocencia Sabalones, mother of accused, Roling
Sabalones, narrated that on March 12, 1986 at
past 10:00 o'clock in the evening, she was
roused from sleep by a shout of a man
demanding for Roling Sabalones.
Upon hearing the name of her son, she
immediately stood up and peeped through the
door of her store and saw men in fatigue
uniforms carrying long firearms. Thenceforth,
these men boarded a vehicle and left.
On the following morning, she was again
awakened by the persistent shouts and pushing
of the gate. When she verified, the man who
introduced himself to her as Maj. Tiempo,
ordered her to open the gate. Once opened, the
men of Maj. Tiempo entered the house and
proceeded to search for Roling Sabalones,
whom Maj. Tiempo suspected to have killed his
son and shot another to near death. When she
demanded for a search warrant, she was only
shown a piece of paper but was not given the
chance to read its contents.
Racquel Sabalones, wife of accused, Rolusape
Sabalones, maintained that on June 1, 1985 at
1.00 o'clock in the afternoon, she was at the
wake of her brother-in-law, Junior Sabalones, at
his residence in Bulacao, Talisay, Cebu.
At 11:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day,
together with her 3 daughters as well as Marlyn
Sabarita, Rose Lapasaran and Gloria Mondejar,
left the place in order to sleep in an unoccupied
apartment situated 30 meters away from the
house where her deceased, brother-in-law,
Junior, was lying in state, as shown in the
Sketch, (Exh. "7" and submarkings) prepared by
her. They brought with them a flashlight because
the whole place was in total darkness.
As they were about to enter the gate leading to
her apartment she noticed a sedan car coming
towards them. She waited for the car to come
nearer as she thought that the same belong[ed]
to her friend, but the vehicle instead stopped at
the corner of the road, (Exh. "7-F") and then
proceeded to the end portion of Mansueto
Compound, (Exh. "7-G"). As it moved slowly
towards the highway, she rushed inside the
apartment.
Few minutes later, she heard a burst of gunfire
outside their gate. She immediately gathered her
children and instructed Marlyn Sabarita to use
the phone situated at the third door apartment
and call the police.
After the lull of gunfire, she went to the terrace
and saw people in civilian and in fatigue
uniforms with firearms, gathered around the
place. One of these men even asked her about
the whereabouts of her husband, whom she left
sleeping in the house of the deceased.
At 8:30 in the morning of June 2, 1985, during
the burial of Junior Sabalones, they were
informed by Pedro Cabanero that Roling
Sabalones was a suspect for the death of
Nabing Velez and the son of Maj. Tiempo.
She believed that the reason why her husband
was implicated in the killing of Nabing Velez was
because of the slapping incident involving her
father-in-law, Federico Sabalones, Sr. and
Nabing Velez which took place prior to the death
of Junior Sabalones.
After the funeral, she began to receive
mysterious calls at their residence in Sikatuna
St., Cebu City where they began staying since
1978. She also noticed cars with tinted windows
strangely parked in front of their residence.
Frightened and cowed, they decided to seek the
advice of Col. Apolinario Castano, who after
relating to him their fears, advised her husband
to lie low and to consult a lawyer.
To allay their apprehension, accused, Roling
Sabalones, left Cebu City for Iligan, Manila and
other cities to avoid those who were after him.
When she learned about the threat made by
Maj. Tiempo on her husband, she forewarned
the latter not to return to Cebu.
Marlyn Sabarita, an illegitimate daughter of
Rolusape Sabalones, stated that in the night in
question, she was at the wake of Junior
Sabalones and saw her Papa Roling, the herein
accused, lying on the lawn of the house of the
deceased.
She was already in the apartment with her
Mama Racquel when she heard a burst of
gunfire. Upon instructions of the latter, she went
out to call the police thru the phone located [in]
the third apartment occupied by a certain Jet.
(Tsn-Tumarao, pp. 3-15, Oct. 15, 1990).
Edward Gutang, [a]sst. lay-out [e]ditor and
[a]sst. [s]ports [e]ditor of Sun-Star Daily, while
then a military and police reporter had covered
the shooting incident which took place on June
1, 1985 at the Mansueto Compound, Bulacao,
Talisay, Cebu.
At past 1:00 o'clock dawn, together with their
newspaper photographer, Almario Bitang, they
went to the crime scene boarding the vehicle of
the Cosmopolitan Funeral Homes. Arriving
thereat, they decided not to proceed inside the
compound because of fear. The place was then
incomplete darkness.
Upon being informed that the victims were
brought to Cebu City Medical Center, they
rushed to the place and met Maj. Tiempo
hugging the dead body of his 14-year old son.
His photographer took a picture of that pathetic
scene. (Exh. "8-B").
Samson Sabalones, a retired [a]mbassador and
uncle of Rolusape Sabalones, posted a bail
bond for his nephew with Eastern Insurance
Company, when a warrant for his arrest was
issued by the Municipal Court, on March 12,
1986 because he was bothered by the fact that
the latter was being unreasonably hunted by
several groups. He even advised the accused to
appear in [c]ourt to clarify the nature of the case
filed against him.
Virgincita Pajigal, a resident of Butuan City, met
accused, Rolusape Sabalones, who introduced
himself to her as "Paciano Laput" nicknamed,
Ondo, in a massage clinic where she was
working.
For less than a year, they lived together as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage
because according to her the accused was
married but separated from his wife, whose
name was never mentioned to her. For such a
short span of time being together, her love for
the accused developed to the extent that
whatever happen[ed] to him, she [would] always
be there to defend him.
With the help of Maj. delos Santos, who advised
her to always stay close [to] the accused, she
was able to board the same vessel. She saw the
latter clad in green T-shirt, (Exh. "14") and pants,
handcuffed and guarded.
Reaching Cebu City, they took a taxicab and as
the vehicle went around the city, she was
instructed by Maj. Tiempo to place the towel,
(Exh. "15") which she found inside her bag, on
the head of the accused. They stopped at the
Reclamation Area and Maj. Tiempo pulled them
out of the vehicle but she held on tightly to
Ondo, ripping his shirt. This pulling incident
happened for several times but complainant
failed to let them out of the vehicle.
The accused was finally brought to the
Provincial Jail while she stayed in the residence
of the accused. She returned to Butuan after a
week. (Tsn-Formentera, pp. 5-33, Jan. 22,
1991).
Accused, Rolusape Sabalones, alias "Roling", in
his defense, with ancillary incidental narrations,
testified, that on June 1, 1985 at 6:00 o'clock in
the evening, he was at the wake of his only
brother, Junior Sabalones, who was killed on
May 26, 1985.
He had no idea as to who was responsible for
the killing of his brother inasmuch as the latter
had plenty of enemies. He also did not exert
effort to look into the case and to place it under
police authority since he had lost faith in the
capabilities of the police. The matter was
however reported by his uncle, Ambassador
Sabalones, to the authorities.
He stayed at the wake until 10:00 o'clock in the
evening because he was not feeling well. He
retired in a small room adjacent to the sala of the
house of the deceased. Not long after, he felt
somebody waking him up but he merely opened
his eyes and went back to sleep as he was really
exhausted.
At 6:30 the following morning, he was roused by
his wife so he could prepare for the burial. He
came to know about the burst of gunfire which
took place the previous night upon the
information of his wife. He did not take the news
seriously as he was busy preparing for the burial
of his deceased brother, Jun.
The funeral started at past 8:00 o'clock in the
morning and he noticed the presence of Maj.
Eddie Ricardo and his men, who were sent by
Col. Castano purposely to provide the burial with
military security, upon the request of his wife.
He had a conversation with Maj. Ricardo who
inquired about the shooting incident which
resulted in the death of the son of Maj. Tiempo
and others in his company. Also in the course of
their conversation, he came to know that Nabing
Velez was killed earlier on that same night in
Labangon, Cebu [C]ity.
On the same occasion, Pedro Cabanero also
notified him that he was a suspect in the killing
of Nabing Velez, a radio commentator of
ferocious character, who was engaged in a
protection racket with several under his control.
He remembered that a month prior to the death
of Nabing Velez, his father, Federico Sabalones,
Sr. and the deceased while matching their
fighting cocks at the Talisay Sports Complex,
had an altercation and the latter slapped his
paralytic father and challenged him to ask one of
his sons to avenge what he had done to him. He
came to know about the incident only after a
week.
He did not deny the fact that he was hurt by the
actuation of the deceased for humiliating his
father but it did not occur to him to file a case or
take any action against the deceased because
he was too busy with his business and with his
work as a bet caller in the cockpit.
He advised his father to stay in Bohol to avoid
further trouble because he knew that the latter
would frequent the cockpit[,] being a cockfight
aficionado.
Likewise, during the burial, he was informed by a
PC soldier, Roger Capuyan, that he was also a
suspect in the killing of the son of Maj. Tiempo
and even advised him to leave the place.
On the following days after the burial, his wife
started to notice cars suspiciously parked in front
of their house and [she] also received
mysterious calls.
Together with his wife, they decided to see Col.
Apolinario Castaño to seek his advise. The latter
verified from the Cebu Metrodiscom and learned
that there was no case filed against him.
In the evening of June 6, 1985, he left for Iligan
and after a month, he transferred to Ozamis and
ten to Pagadian. He likewise went to Manila
especially when he learned that his uncle,
Samson Sabalones, had arrived from abroad.
The latter posted a bond for his temporary liberty
immediately after being informed that a case
was filed against him, before the Municipal Court
of Talisay.
Despite . . . the bond put up his uncle, he did not
return to Cebu City because it came to his
knowledge that Maj. Tiempo inquired from the
bonding company as to his address.
He also stayed in Marikina in the house of his
friend and during his stay in the said place, he
registered as a voter and was issue a Voter's
Affidavit, (Exh. "19"; Exh. "R" for the
prosecution) which bore the name "Paciano
Mendoza Laput" which [was] his baptismal
name. He explained that the name[s] Mendoza
and Laput [were] the middle name and surname,
respectively of his mother. The name "Rolusape"
was given to him by his father and the same
[was] not his registered name because during
the old days, priests would not allow parents to
name their children with names not found in the
Almanac; thus, Paciano [was] his chosen name
and the same appeared in his Baptismal
Certificate, (Exh. "20") issued by the Parish of
the Blessed Trinity of Talibon, Bohol. In his Birth
Certificate, it [was] the name "Rolusape" which
appeared based upon the data supplied by his
father.
He had used the name Paciano during the time
when he [was] still a secret agent under his
uncle, Gen. Russo Sabalones, when the latter
was still the [c]hief of the C-2 in 1966 until 1967
and as such, he was issued a firearm. He
likewise used said name at the time he was
employed at the Governor's Office in Agusan
and when he registered in the Civil Service
Commission to conceal his identity to protect
himself from those who were after him.
From Marikina he proceeded to Davao and then
to Butuan City where he was made to campaign
for the candidacy of Gov. Eddie Rama. When
the latter won in the election, he was given a job
at the Provincial Capitol and later became an
agent of the PC in Butuan using the name,
"Paciano Laput."
During his stay in Butuan, he met Virgie Pajigal,
a manicurist who became his live-in partner.
On October 23, 1988 while he was at the
Octagon Cockpit in Butuan with Sgt. Tambok, he
was arrested by Capt. Ochate and was brought
to the PC Headquarter[s] in Libertad, Butuan
City and was detained. Among the papers
confiscated from him was his Identification Card
No. 028-88, (Exh. "21") issued by the PC
Command bearing the name Paciano Laput.
On October 26, 1988 he was taken from the City
Jail by Capt. Ochate and some soldiers, one of
whom was Maj. Tiempo whom he met for the
first time.
On their way to Nasipit to board a vessel bound
for Cebu City, Maj. Tiempo made him lie flat on
his belly and stepped on his back and
handcuffed him. He cried in pain because of his
sprained shoulder. A certain soldier also took his
watch and ring.
Arriving in Cebu at 7:00 o'clock in the morning,
he and Virgie Pajigal, who followed him in the
boat, were made to board a taxicab. Maj.
Tiempo alighted in certain place and talked to a
certain guy. Thereafter, they were brought to the
Reclamation Area and were forced to go down
from the vehicle but Virgie Pajigal held him
tightly. They were again pulled out of the taxi but
they resisted.
From the Capitol Building, they proceeded to
CPDRC and on their way thereto, Maj. Tiempo
sat beside him inside the taxi and boxed him on
the right cheek below the ear and pulled his
cuffed hands apart.
At the Provincial Jail, he was physically
examined by its resident physician, Dr. Dionisio
Sadaya, and was also fingerprinted and
photographed, (Exh. "21"). He was issued a
Medical Certificate, (Exh. "22").
He further stated that he [was] acquainted with
his co-accused Timoteo Beronga, known to him
as "Timmy" being also a bet caller in the cockpit.
(Tsn-Formentera, pp. 5-23, Feb. 26, 1991; Tsn-
Abangan, pp. 3-33, Feb. 27, 1991; Tsn-
Abangan, pp. 4-18, Apr. 10, 1991).
As surrebuttal witness, accused Rolusape
Sabalones denied that he bribed a certain
soldier because at the time he was arrested, his
wallet as well as his wristwatch and ring worth
P2,000.00 each were confiscated and his hands
tied behind his back.
He also denied the allegation of Maj. Tiempo
that he offered the latter the amount of
P1,000,000.00 to drop the case against him, the
truth being that while they were on board a
vessel bound for Cebu City, Maj. Tiempo
compelled him to tell [who] the real killers of his
son [were] because he knew that he (Rolusape
Sabalones) was not responsible. The former
also inquired from him as to the whereabouts of
the carbine.
He also rebutted complainant's testimony that
upon their arrival here in Cebu City and while on
board a taxicab, he directed the former [to] first
go around the city to locate a certain Romeo
Cabañero, whom he did not know personally. 10
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Giving full credence to the evidence of the
prosecution, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court's Decision convicting appellants of two
counts of murder and three counts of frustrated
murder. Like the trial court, it appreciated the
qualifying circumstance of treachery and
rejected appellants' defense of alibi.
The Court of Appeals, however, ruled that the
penalties imposed by the trial court were
erroneous. Hence, for each count of murder, it
sentenced appellants to reclusion perpetua. For
each count of frustrated murder, it imposed the
following penalty: ten years (10) ofprision
mayor (medium), as minimum, to seventeen
years (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion
temporal (medium), as maximum. Sustaining the
trial court, the Court of Appeals awarded
indemnity of P20,000 to each of the victims of
frustrated murder. However, it was silent on the
indemnity of P50,000 awarded by the trial court
to the heirs of each of the two deceased.
Having imposed reclusion perpetua on the
appellants, the Court of Appeals, as earlier
noted, refrained from entering judgment and
certified the case to the Supreme Court for
review, in conformity with Section 13, Rule 124
of the Rules of Court.
11
Hence, this appeal before this Court.
The Issues
In his Brief, 12 Appellant Sabalones raised the
following errors allegedly committed by the trial
court:
I sufficiency of the prosecution evidence, (2)
The court a quo erred in finding that accused
Sabalones and his friends left the house where
his brother Sabalones Junior was lying in state
and "went to their grisly destination amidst the
dark and positioned themselves in defense of his
turf against the invasion of a revengeful gang of
the supporters of Nabing Velez.
II
The court a quo erred in finding that accused
Sabalones and his two co-accused were
identified as among the four gunmen who fired
at the victims.
III
The court a quo erred in overlooking or
disregarding physical evidence that would have
contradicted the testimony of prosecution
witnesses Edwin Santos and Rogelio Presores
that the gunmen were shooting at them from a
standing position.
IV
The court a quo erred in holding that the instant
case is "one of aberratio ictus", which is not a
defense, and that the "defense of alibi"
interposed by the accused may not be
considered.
V
The court a quo erred in not finding that the
evidence of the prosecution has not overcome
the constitutional presumption of innocence in
favor of the accused.
VI
The court a quo erred in not acquitting the
accused on ground of reasonable doubt.
In a Manifestation dated December 20, 1995,
Appellant Beronga, through counsel, adopted as
his own the Brief of Sabalones. 13
The foregoing assignment of errors shall be
reformulated by the Court into these three issues
or topics: (1) credibility of the witnesses and
defense of denial and alibi, and (3)
characterization of the crimes committed and the
penalty therefor.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is devoid of merit.
First Issue:
Credibility of Witnesses and
Sufficiency of Evidence
Well-entrenched is the tenet that this Court will
not interfere with the trial court's assessment of
the credibility of the witnesses, absent any
indication or showing that the trial court has
overlooked some material facts or gravely
abused its discretion, 14 especially where, as in
this case, such assessment is affirmed by the
Court of Appeals. "As this Court has reiterated
often enough, the matter of assigning values to
declarations at the witness stand is best and
most competently performed or carried out by a
trial judge who, unlike appellate magistrates, can
weigh such testimony in light of the accused's
behavior, demeanor, conduct and attitude at the
trial." 15 Giving credence to the testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses, the trial court
concluded:
Stripped of unnecessary verbiage, this Court,
given the evidence, finds that there is more
realism in the conclusion based on a keener and
realistic appraisal of events, circumstances and
evidentiary facts on record, that the gun slaying
and violent deaths of Glenn Tiempo and Alfredo
Nardo, and the near fatal injuries of Nelson
Tiempo, Rey Bolo and Rogelio Presores,
resulted from the felonious and wanton acts of
the herein accused for mistaking said victims for
the persons [who were] objects of their wrath. 16
We stress that "factual findings of the lower
courts, the trial court and the Court of Appeals
are, as a general rule, binding and conclusive
upon the Supreme Court." 17 We find nothing in
the instant case to justify a reversal or
modification of the findings of the trial court and
the Court of Appeals that appellants committed
two counts of murder and three counts of
frustrated murder.
Edwin Santos, a survivor of the assault,
positively pointed to and identified the appellants
as the authors of the crime. His categorical and
straightforward testimony is quoted hereunder: 18
COURT:
Q You stated there was a gun fired. What
happened next?
WITNESS:
A There was a rapid fire in succession.
Q When you heard this rapid firing, what did you
do?
A I tried to look from where the firing came from.
Q After that, what did you find?
A I saw persons firing towards us.
Q Where were these persons situated when they
were firing towards you?
A Near the foot of the electric post and close to
the cemented wall.
Q This electric post, was that lighted at that
moment?
A Yes, sir, it was lighted.
Q How far were these persons firing, to the
place where you were?
A From here to there (The witness indicating the
distance by pointing to a place inside the
courtroom, indicating a distance of about 6 to 7
meters, making the witness stand as the point of
reference).
Q Were you able to know how many persons
fired towards you?
A I only saw 3 to 4 persons.
Q How long did these persons fire the guns at
you?
A Until we went home. The persons were still
firing, until we went home.
Q You stated that you saw these persons who
were firing at you. Do you know these persons?
A I can identify [them] when I [see] them.
Q Try to look around this courtroom, if these
persons you saw who were firing at you are
present in the courtroom[.]
A Yes, sir.
Q Can you point to these persons?
A Yes, sir.
Q Point at them.
COURT INTERPRETER:
The Court directed the witness to go down from
the witness stand and [point] at them, Beronga
and Alegarbes.
FISCAL GABIANA:
I would like to make it of record that on the
bench of prisoner, only the two accused were
seated.
COURT:
Make it of record that only two prisoners were
present.
Q Now, Mr. Santos, aside from these two
accused you identified as among those who fired
[at] you on that evening, were there other
persons that you saw on that particular occasion
who fired at you?
A Yes, sir, there were[;] if I can see them, I can
identify them.
Corroborating the foregoing, Rogelio Presores,
another survivor, also pointed to Timoteo
Beronga, Teodulo Alegarbes and Roling
Sabalones as the perpetrators of the crime. His
testimony proceeded in this manner: 19
Q When you arrived at the residence of Stephen
Lim, can you remember of any unusual incident
that took place?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was that?
A When the jeep arrived, the car was following.
Q What happened next?
A When the jeep was near the gate, the car was
following.
Q The car was following the jeep, at what
distance?
A 3 to 4 meters.
Q While the car was following the jeep at that
distance of 3 to 4 meters, what happened?
A All of a sudden, we heard the burst of gunfire.
Q From what direction was the gunfire?
A Through the direction of the jeep.
Q After hearing the gunfire, what happened?
A We looked at the jeep.
Q What did you see?
A We saw Alfredo Nardo and Glenn Tiempo and
Rey Bolo f[a]ll to the ground. There were only 3.
Q Who was driving the jeep at that time?
A Alfredo Nardo.
Q What happened after that?
A So, I looked, whence the burst of gunfire came
from.
Q What did you see from that gunfire?
A I saw 4 persons standing at the back of the
fence.
Q What were those 4 persons doing when they
were standing at the back of the fence?
A They were bringing long firearms.
Q Did you recognize these persons?
A I can clearly recognize one and the 3
persons[.] I can identify them, if I can see them
again.
Q If you are shown these persons, can you
recognize them? Can you name these persons?
A No, sir. Only their facial appearance.
Q What about the 3 persons?
A That's why the 3 persons, I do not know them.
I can recognize only their facial appearance.
Q What about one person?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is the name of the person?
A Roling Sabalones.
Q If Roling Sabalones is inside the courtroom,
can you recognize Roling Sabalones?
A Yes, sir, he is around.
Q Can you point to Roling Sabalones?
A Yes, he is there (The witness pointing to the
person who answered the name of Roling
Sabalones).
Q I would like [you] again to please look around
and see, if those persons whom you know
through their faces, if they are here around?
A The two of them (The witness pointing to the 2
persons, who, when asked, answered that his
name [was] Teofilo Beronga and the other [was]
Alegarbes).
Indeed, we have carefully waded through the
voluminous records of this case and the
testimonies of all the fifty-nine witnesses, and we
find that the prosecution has presented the
required quantum of proof to establish that
appellants are indeed guilty as charged.
Appellants' arguments, as we shall now discuss,
fail to rebut this conclusion.
Positive Identification
Appellants allege that the two witnesses could
not have properly identified the appellants
because, after the first burst of shooting, they
both crouched down, such that they could not
have seen the faces of their assailants. This
contention does not persuade. Both
eyewitnesses testified that the firing was not
continuous; thus, during a lull in the firing, they
raised their heads and managed a peek at the
perpetrators. Edwin Santos testified as follows:
Atty. Albino, counsel for accused Beronga:
Q You mean to say that when you bent you
heard the successive shots, [and] you again
raised your head. Is that correct?
A There, were times that the shots were not in
succession and continuous and that was the
time I raised my head again. 20
Like Santos, Rogelio Presores also stooped
down when the firing started, but he raised his
head during a break in the gunfire:
Atty. Albino:
Q So, what did you do when you first heard that
one shot?
A So, after the first shot, we looked towards the
direction we were facing and when we heard the
second shot, that was the time we stooped
down. 21
He further testified:
Atty. Acido: [Counsel for Appellant Sabalones]
Q And you said you stooped down inside the car
when you heard the first firing to the jeep. Is that
what you want the Court to understand[?]
Presores:
A Yes, sir.
Q So, you never saw who fired the successive
shots to the car as you said you stooped down
inside the car?
A The bursts of gunfire stopped for a while and
that was the time I reared of [sic] my head.
Q And that was the first time you saw them?
A Yes, sir. 22
The records clearly show that two vehicles
proceeded to the house of Stephen Lim on that
fateful day. The first was the jeep where Alfredo
Nardo, Glenn Tiempo and Rey Bolo were riding.
About three to four meters behind was the
second car carrying Nelson Tiempo, Guillermo
Viloria, Rogelio Oliveros and the two prosecution
witnesses - Edwin Santos and Rogelio
Presores. 23 As stated earlier, said witnesses
attested to the fact that after the first volley of
shots directed at the jeep, they both looked at
the direction where the shots were coming from,
and they saw their friends in the jeep falling to
the ground, as well as the faces of the
perpetrators. 24 It was only then that a rapid
succession of gunshots were directed at them,
upon which they started crouching to avoid
being hit.
Hence, they were able to see and identify the
appellants, having had a good look at them after
the initial burst of shots. We stress that the
normal reaction of a person is to direct his sights
towards the source of a startling shout or
occurrence. As held in People v. Dolar, 25"the
most natural reaction for victims of criminal
violence is to strive to see the looks and faces of
their assailants and to observe the manner in
which the crime is committed.
In bolstering their claim that it was impossible for
the witnesses to have identified them, appellants
further aver that the crime scene was dark, there
being no light in the lampposts at the time. To
prove that the service wire to the street lamps at
the Mansueto Compound was disconnected as
early as December 1984 and reconnected only
on June 27, 1985, they presented the
testimonies of Vicente Cabanero, 26 Remigio
Villaver, 27 Fredo Canete 28 and Edward
Gutang. 29 The trial court, however, did not lend
weight to said testimonies, preferring to believe
the statement of other prosecution witnesses
that the place was lighted during that time.
The Court of Appeals sustained said findings by
citing the testimonies of defense witnesses.
Fredo Canete of the Visayan Electric Company
(VECO), for instance, admitted that it was so
easy to connect and disconnect the lights. He
testified thus:
Atty. Kintanar:
Q Now, as a cutter, what instruments do you
usually use in cutting the electrical connection of
a certain place?
Canete:
A Pliers and screw driver.
Q Does it need . . . very sophisticated
instruments to disconnect the lights?
A No, these are the only instruments we use.
Q Ordinary pliers and ordinary screw driver?
A Yes, sir.
Q And does [one] need to be an expert in
electronic [sic] in order to conduct the
disconnection?
A No, sir.
Q In other words, Mr. Canete, any ordinary
electrician can cut it?
A That is if they are connected with the Visayan
Electric Company.
Q What I mean is that, can the cutting be done
by any ordinary electrician?
A Yes, sir. 30
Said witness even admitted that he could not
recall if he did in fact cut the electrical
connection of the Mansueto Compound. 31 The
Court of Appeals further noted that "none of the
above witnesses were at the crime scene at or
about the exact time that the ambush occurred.
Thus, none was in a position to state with
absolute certainty that there was allegedly no
light to illuminate the gunmen when they rained
bullets on the victims. 32
Even assuming arguendo that the lampposts
were not functioning at the time, the headlights
of the jeep and the car were more than sufficient
to illuminate the crime scene. 33 The Court has
previously held that the light from the stars or the
moon, an oven, or a wick lamp or gasera can
give ample illumination to enable a person to
identify or recognize another. 34 In the same
vein, the headlights of a car or a jeep are
sufficient to enable eyewitnesses to identify
appellants at the distance of 4 to 10 meters.
Extrajudicial Statement
of Beronga
Appellants insist that Beronga's extrajudicial
statement was obtained through violence and
intimidation. Citing the res inter alios acta rule,
they also argue that the said statement is
inadmissible against Sabalones. Specifically,
they challenge the trial court's reliance on the
following portions of Beronga's statement:
Q After Roling knew that Na[b]ing Velez was
killed, have you observed [if] Roling and his
companions prepared themselves for any
eventuality?
A It did not take long after we knew that Na[b]ing
was killed, somebody called up by telephone
looking for Roling, and this was answered by
Roling but we did not know what they were
conversing about and then Roling went back to
the house of Junior after answering the phone.
And after more than two hours, we heard the
sound of engines of vehicles arriving, and then
Meo, the man who was told by Roling to guard,
shouted saying: "They are already here[;]" after
that, Roling came out carrying a carbine
accompanied by Tsupe, and not long after we
heard gunshots and because of that we ran
towards the house where the wake was. But
before the gun-shots, I heard Pedring Sabalones
father of Roling saying: "You clarify, [t]hat you
watch out for mistake[n] in identity," and after
that shout, gunshots followed. [sic] Then after
the gun-shots Roling went back inside still
carrying the carbine and shouted: "GATHER
THE EMPTY SHELLS AND MEO[,] YOU BRING
A FLASHLIGHT," and then I was called by Meo
to help him gather the empty shells of the
carbine and also our third companion to gather
the empty shells.
These arguments have no merit. In the first
place, it is well to stress that appellants were
convicted based primarily on the positive
identification of the two survivors, Edwin Santos
and Rogelio Presores, and not only on the
extrajudicial statement, which merely
corroborates the eyewitness testimonies. Thus,
said arguments have no relevance to this case.
As the Court held in People vs. Tidula: 35 "Any
allegation of violation of rights during custodial
investigation is relevant and material only to
cases in which an extrajudicial admission or
confession extracted from the accused becomes
the basis of their conviction."
In any case, we sustain the trial court's holding,
as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that the
extrajudicial statement of Beronga was executed
in compliance with the constitutional
requirements. 36 "Extrajudicial confessions,
especially those which are adverse to the
declarant's interests are presumed voluntary,
and in the absence of conclusive evidence
showing that the declarant's consent in
executing the same has been vitiated, such
confession shall be upheld." 37
The exhaustive testimony of Sgt. Miasco, who
undertook the investigation, shows that the
appellant was apprised of his constitutional
rights to remain silent and to have competent
and independent counsel of his own
choice. 38 Said witness also stated that Beronga
was assisted by Atty. Marcelo Guinto during the
custodial investigation. 39 In fact, Atty. Guinto
also took the witness stand and confirmed that
Appellant Beronga was informed of his rights,
and that the investigation was proper, legal and
not objectionable. Indeed, other than appellants'
bare allegations, there was no showing that
Beronga's statement was obtained by force or
duress. 40
Equally unavailing is appellants' reliance on
the res inter alios acta rule under Section 30,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to
the conspiracy and during its existence, may be
given in evidence against the co-conspirator
after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other
than such act or declaration.
Appellants assert that the admission referred to
in the above provision is considered to be
against a co-conspirator only when it is
given during the existence of the conspiracy.
They argue that Beronga's statement was
made after the termination of the conspiracy;
thus, it should not be admitted and used against
Sabalones.
The well-settled rule is that the extrajudicial
confession of an accused is binding only upon
himself and is nor admissible as evidence
against his co-accused, it being mere hearsay
evidence as far as the other accused are
concerned. 41 But this rule admits of exception. It
does not apply when the confession, as in this
case, is used as circumstantial evidence to show
the probability of participation of the co-accused
in the killing of the victims 42 or when the
confession of the co-accused is corroborated by
other evidence. 43
Beronga's extrajudicial statement is, in fact,
corroborated by the testimony of Prosecution
Witness Jennifer Binghoy. Pertinent portions of
said testimony are reproduced hereunder:
Q While you were at the wake of Jun Sabalones
and the group were sitting with Roling
Sabalones, what were they doing?
A They were gathered in one table and they
were conversing with each other.
xxx xxx xxx
Q On that same date, time and place, at about
10:00 [i]n the evening, can you remember if
there was unusual incident that took place?
A I heard over the radio at the Sabalones Family
that a certain Nabing Velez was shot.
Q That [a] certain Nabing Velez was shot? What
else . . . transpired?
A I observed that their reactions were so queer, -
as if they were running.
xxx xxx xxx
Q In that evening of June 1, 1985, when you
went there at the house of Jun Sabalones, have
you seen an armalite?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where aid you see this armalite?
A At the table where they were conversing.
Q How many armalites or guns [did you see] that
evening in that place?
A Two (2).
xxx xxx xxx
Q This armalite that you saw, - how far was this
in relation to the groups of Sabalones?
A There (The witness indicating a distance of
about 4 to 5 meters).
ATTY. KINTANAR:
Q When you looked . . . through the window and
saw there were two vehicles and there were
bursts of gunfire, what happened after that?
A I did not proceed to look . . . through the
window because I stooped down.
Q When you stooped down, what happened?
A After the burst of gunfire, I again opened the
window.
Q And when again you opened the window,
what happened?
A I saw two persons going towards the jeep.
Q What transpired next after [you saw] those 2
persons?
A When they arrived there, they nodded their
head[s].
Q After that, what happened?
A So, they went back to the direction where they
came from, going to the house of Sabalones.
Q While they were going to the direction of the
house of Sabalones, what transpired?
A I saw 5 to 6 persons coming from the highway
and looking to the jeep, and before they reached
the jeep, somebody shouted that "it's ours".
Q Who shouted?
A The voice was very familiar to me.
Q Whose voice?
A The voice of Roling Sabalones.
Q What else have you noticed during the
commotion [when] wives were advising their
husbands to go home?
A They were really in chaos. 44
A careful reading of her testimony buttresses the
finding of the trial court that Rolusape Sabalones
and his friends were gathered at one table,
conversing in whispers with each other, that
there were two rifles on top of the table, and that
they became panicky after hearing of the death
of Nabing Velez on the radio. Hence, the
observation of the trial court that "they went to
their grisly destination amidst the dark and
positioned themselves in defense of his turf
against the invasion of a revengeful gang of
45
supporters of the recently slain Nabing Velez."
Alleged Inconsistencies
Appellants also allege that the prosecution
account had inconsistencies relating to the
number of shots heard, the interval between
gunshots and the victims' positions when they
were killed. These, however, are minor and
inconsequential flaws which strengthen, rather
than impair, the credibility of said eyewitnesses.
Such harmless errors are indicative of truth, not
falsehood, and do not cast serious doubt on the
veracity and reliability of complainant's
testimony. 46
Appellants further claim that the relative
positions of the gunmen, as testified to by the
eyewitnesses, were incompatible with the
wounds sustained by the victims. They cite the
testimony of Dr. Ladislao Diola, who conducted
the autopsy on Glenn Tiempo. He declared that
the victim must necessarily be on a higher level
than the assailant, in the light of the path of the
bullet from the entrance wound to where the slug
was extracted. This finding, according to
appellant, negates the prosecution's account
that the appellants were standing side by side
behind a wall when they fired at the victims. If
standing, appellants must have been on a level
higher than that of the occupants of the vehicles;
if beside each other, they could not have inflicted
wounds which were supposed to have come
from opposite angles.
We are not persuaded. The defense presumes
that the victims were sitting still when they were
fired upon, and that they froze in the same
position during and after the shooting. This has
no testimonial foundation. On the contrary, it
was shown that the victims ducked and hid
themselves, albeit in vain, when the firing began.
After the first volley, they crouched and tried to
take cover from the hail of bullets. It would have
been unnatural for them to remain upright and
still in their seat. Hence, it is not difficult to
imagine that the trajectories of the bullet wounds
varied as the victims shifted their positions. We
agree with the following explanation of the Court
of Appeals:
The locations of the entry wounds can readily be
explained, . . . Glenn Tiempo, after looking in the
direction of the explosion, turned his body
around; and since the ambushers were between
the jeep and the car, he received a bullet in his
right chest (wound no. 1) which traveled to the
left. As to wound No. 2, it can be explained by
the spot where Major Tiempo found his fallen
son.
Atty. Kintanar:
Q: Upon being informed by these occupants who
were ambushed and [you] were able to return
the car, what did you do?
Major Tiempo:
A: I immediately got soldiers and we immediately
proceeded to the area or to the place where my
fallen son was located and when we reached . . .
the place, I saw my fallen son [in] a kneeling
position where both knees [were] touching the
ground and the toes also and the forehead was
touching towards the ground. (TSN, Feb. 12,
1988, p. 6)
In such position the second bullet necessarily
traveled upwards in relation to the body, and
thus the entry wound should be lower than the
exit wound. There is no showing that both
wounds were inflicted at the same time. 47
In any event, the witnesses saw that the
appellants were the gunmen who were standing
side by side firing at them. They could have
been in a different position and in another hiding
place when they first fired, but this is not
important. They were present at the crime
scene, and they were shooting their rifles at the
victims.
Aberratio Ictus
Appellants likewise accuse the trial court of
engaging in "conjecture" in ruling that there
was aberratio ictus in this case. This allegation
does not advance the cause of the appellants. It
must be stressed that the trial court relied on the
concept of aberratio ictus to explain why the
appellants staged the ambush, not to prove that
appellants did in fact commit the crimes. Even
assuming that the trial court did err in explaining
the motive of the appellants, this does not
detract from its findings, as affirmed by the Court
of Appeals and sustained by this Court in the
discussion above, that the guilt of the appellants
was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
In any event, the trial court was not engaging in
conjecture in so ruling. The conclusion of the
trial court and the Court of Appeals that the
appellants killed the wrong persons was based
on the extrajudicial statement of Appellant
Beronga and the testimony of Jennifer Binghoy.
These pieces of evidence sufficiently show that
appellants believed that they were suspected of
having killed the recently slain Nabing Velez,
and that they expected his group to retaliate
against them. Hence, upon the arrival of the
victims' vehicles which they mistook to be
carrying the avenging men of Nabing Velez,
appellants opened fire. Nonetheless, the fact
that they were mistaken does not diminish their
culpability. The Court has held that "mistake in
the identity of the victim carries the same gravity
as when the accused zeroes in on his intended
victim." 48
Be that as it may, the observation of the solicitor
general on this point is well-taken. The case is
better characterized as error personae or
mistake in the identity of the victims, rather
than aberratio ictus which means mistake in the
blow, characterized by aiming at one but hitting
the other due to imprecision in the blow.
Second Issue:
Denial and Alibi
Appellants decry the lower courts' disregard of
their defense of alibi. We disagree. As constantly
enunciated by this Court, the established
doctrine requires the accused to prove not only
that he was at some other place at the time of
the commission of the crime, but that it was
physically impossible for him at the time to have
been present at the locus criminis or its
immediate vicinity. 49 This the appellants
miserably failed to do.
Appellant Beronga testified that, at the time of
the incident, he was in his residence in Lapulapu
City, which was not shown to be so remote and
inaccessible that it precluded his presence in
Mansueto Subdivision. The alibi of Sabalones is
even more unworthy of belief; he sought to
establish that he was a mere 20-25 meters away
from the scene of the crime. He was allegedly in
the house of his brother who was lying in state,
which was so near the ambush site that some of
the defense witnesses even testified that they
were terrified by the gunfire. Clearly, appellants
failed to establish the requisites of alibi.
Furthermore, the defense of alibi cannot
overcome the positive identification of the
appellants. 50 As aptly held by this Court
in People v. Nescio: 51
Alibi is not credible when the accused-appellant
is only a short distance from the scene of the
crime. The defense of alibi is further offset by the
positive identification made by the prosecution
witnesses. Alibi, to reiterate a well-settled
doctrine, is accepted only upon the clearest
proof that the accused-appellant was not or
could not have been at the crime scene when it
was committed.
Flight
Appellants further object to the finding that
Sabalones, after the incident, "made himself
scarce from the place of commission. He left for
Manila, thence Mindanao on the supposition that
he want[ed] to escape from the wrath of Maj.
Tiempo and his men for the death of Glenn
Tiempo and the near fatal shooting of the other
son or from the supporters of Nabing Velez. . . .
On his supposedly borrowed freedom, he
jumped bail and hid himself deeper into
Mindanao, under a cloak of an assumed name.
Why, did his conscience bother him for
comfort?" 52
Appellants rationalized that Sabalones was
forced to jump bail in order to escape two
groups, who were allegedly out to get him, one
of Nabing Velez and the other of Major Tiempo.
Their ratiocination is futile. It is well-established
that "the flight of an accused is competent
evidence to indicate his guilt, and flight, when
unexplained, is a circumstance from which an
inference of guilt may be drawn." 53 It must be
stressed, nonetheless, that appellants were not
convicted based on legal inference alone but on
the overwhelming evidence presented against
them.
Third Issue:
Crime and Punishment
We agree with the appellate court that accused-
appellants are guilty of murder for the deaths of
Glenn Tiempo end Alfredo Nardo. The allegation
of treachery as charged in the Information was
duly proven by the prosecution. "Treachery is
committed when two conditions concur, namely,
that the means, methods, and forms of
execution employed gave the person attacked
no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate;
and that such means, methods and forms of
execution were deliberately and consciously
adopted by the accused without danger to his
person." 54 These requisites were evidently
present when the accused, swiftly and
unexpectedly, fired at the victims who were
inside their vehicles and were in no position and
without any means to defend themselves.
The appellate court also correctly convicted
them of frustrated murder for the injuries
sustained by Nelson Tiempo, Rey Bolo and
Rogelio Presores. As evidenced by the medical
certificates and the testimony of Dr. Miguel
Mancao who attended to the victims, Nelson
Tiempo sustained a neck wound which
completely shattered his trachea and rendered
him voiceless, as well as a wound on the right
chest which penetrated his axilla but not his
chest cavity. 55 Rey Bolo sustained three injuries
which affected his clavicle, ribs and
lungs. 56Rogelio Presores, on the other hand,
sustained an injury to his lungs from a bullet
wound which entered his right chest and exited
through his back. 57
The wounds sustained by these survivors would
have caused their death had it not been for the
timely medical intervention. Hence, we sustain
the ruling of the Court of Appeals that appellants
are guilty of three counts of frustrated murder.
We also uphold the Court of Appeals'
modification of the penalty for murder, but not its
computation of the sentence for frustrated
murder.
For each of the two counts of murder, the trial
court imposed the penalty of fourteen (14) years,
eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal (medium), as minimum, to seventeen
(17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal (maximum), as maximum.
This is incorrect. Under Article 248 of the
Ravised Penal Code, the imposable penalty
is reclusion temporal, in its maximum period, to
death. There being no aggravating or mitigating
circumstance, aside from the qualifying
circumstance of treachery, the appellate court
correctly imposed reclusion perpetua for murder.
The Court of Appeals, however, erred in
computing the penalty for each of the three
counts of frustrated murder. It sentenced
appellants to imprisonment of ten years
of prision mayor(medium) as minimum to
seventeen years and four months of reclusion
temporal (medium) as maximum. It modified the
trial court's computation of eight (8) years of
prision mayor (minimum), as minimum, to
fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months
of reclusion temporal(minimum) as maximum.
Under Article 50 of the Revised Penal Code, the
penalty for a frustrated felony is the "next lower
in degree than that prescribed by law for the
consummated felony . . . ." The imposable
penalty for frustrated murder, therefore, is
prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion
temporal in its medium period. 58 Because there
are no aggravating or mitigating circumstance as
the Court of Appeals itself held, 59 the penalty
prescribed by law should be imposed in its
medium period. With the application of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty for
frustrated murder should be 8 years of prision
mayor (minimum), as minimum, to 14 years and
8 months of reclusion temporal (minimum) as
maximum.
Although the Court of Appeals was silent on this
point, the trial court correctly ordered the
payment of P50,000 as indemnity to the heirs of
each of the two murdered victims. In light of
current jurisprudence, this amount is awarded
without need of proof other than the fact of the
victim's death. 60 The trial court and the CA,
however, erred in awarding indemnity of
P20,000 each to Nelson Tiempo, Rogelio
Presores and Rey Bolo. There is no basis,
statutory or jurisprudential, for the award of a
fixed amount to victims of frustrated murder.
Hence, they are entitled only to the amounts of
actual expenses duly proven during the trial.
Thus, Nelson Tiempo, who was treated for a
gunshot wound on the neck which shattered his
trachea, should be awarded indemnity of
P21,594.22 for his medical expenses. This is
evidenced by a statement of account from Cebu
Doctor's Hospital. 61
Rogelio Presores, who was likewise treated for
gunshot wound in the same hospital, presented
a statement of account amounting to P5,412.69
for his hospitalization. 62 Hence, he is likewise
entitled to indemnity in the said amount.
Rey Bolo, on the other hand, incurred an
expense of P9,431.10 for the treatment of his
gunshot wounds, as evidenced by a statement
of account from the same hospital. 63 This
amount should be awarded to him as indemnity.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED and the
assailed Decision is AFFIRMED. However, the
penalties are hereby MODIFIED as follows:
1) In Crim. Case No. CBU-9257, for MURDER,
the accused-appellants are each hereby
sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of the
deceased, Glenn Tiempo, in the sum of
P50,000;
2) In Crim. Case No. CBU-9258, for MURDER,
the accused-appellants are each hereby
sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of the
deceased, Alfredo Nardo, in the sum of P50,000;
3) In Crim. Case No. CBU-9259, for
FRUSTRATED MURDER, the accused-
appellants are each hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of 8 years of prision
mayor (minimum), as minimum, to 14 years and
8 months of reclusion temporal (minimum) as
maximum; and to jointly and severally pay the
victim, Rey Bolo, in the sum of P9,431.10 as
actual damages;
4) In Crim Case No. CBU-9260, for
FRUSTRATED MURDER, the accused-
appellants are hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of 8 years of prision mayor (minimum),
as minimum, to 14 years and 8 months
of reclusion temporal (minimum) as maximum;
and to jointly and severally indemnify the victim,
Rogelio Presores, in the sum of P5,412.69 for
actual damages;
5) In Crim. Case No. CBU-9261 for
FRUSTRATED MURDER, the accused-
appellants are hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of 8 years of prision mayor (minimum),
as minimum, to 14 years and 8 months
of reclusion temporal (minimum) as maximum;
and to jointly and severally indemnify the victim,
Nelson Tiempo, in the sum of P21,594.22 as
actual damages.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the
Secretary of Interior and Local Government and
the Secretary of Justice so that Accused
Eufemio Cabanero may be brought to justice.
Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-38773 December 19, 1933
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. GINES
ALBURQUERQUE Y SANCHEZ, Defendant-
Appellant.
Gibbs and McDonough and Roman Ozaeta, for
appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for
appellee.
AVANCEÑA, C.J.: chanrobles virtual law library
The judgment appealed from finds the
appellants Gines Alburquerque guilty of the
crime of homicide committed on the person of
Manuel Osma and sentences him to eight years
and one day of prision mayor, and to indemnify
the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000,
with costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
The appellant herein, who is a widower of fifty-
five years of age and father of nine living
children, has been suffering from partial
paralysis for some time, walks dragging one leg
and has lost control of the movement of his right
arm. He has been unable to work since he
suffered the stroke of paralysis. One of his
daughters was named Maria and another, are
married, while still another one is a nun. With the
exemption of the other married daughter and the
nun, of all of them, including the appellant, live
with Maria upon whom they depend for
support.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
Among the daughters living with Maria, one
named Pilar became acquainted and had
intimate relations later with the deceased
Manuel Osma about the end of the year 1928. It
was then that the appellant became acquainted
with the deceased who frequently visited Pilar in
his house. The relations between Pilar and the
deceased culminated in Pilar's giving birth to a
child. The appellant did not know that his
daughter's relations with the deceased had gone
to such extremes, that he had to be deceived
with the information that she had gone to her
godfather's house in Singalong, when in fact she
had been taken to the Chinese Hospital for
delivery. The appellant learned the truth only
when Pilar returned home with her
child.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
Naturally the appellant was deeply affected by
this incident, since which time he has appeared
sad and worried not only because of the
dishonor it brought upon his family but also
because the child meant an added burden to
Maria upon whom they all depended for support.
For some time the appellant wrote letters, that at
times were hostile and threatening and at other
times entreating the deceased to legitimize his
union with Pilar by marrying her, or at least, to
support her and his child. Although the
deceased agreed to give the child a monthly
allowance by way of support, he never complied
with his
promise.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
The appellant was in such a mood when he
presented himself one day at the office where
the deceased worked and asked leave of the
manager thereof to speak to Osma. They both
went downstairs. What happened later, nobody
witnessed. But the undisputed fact is that on that
occasion the appellant inflicted a wound at the
base of the neck of the deceased, causing his
death.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
After excluding the improbable portions thereof,
the court infers from the testimony of the
appellant that he proposed to said deceased to
marry his daughter and that, upon hearing that
the latter refused to do so, he whipped out his
penknife. Upon seeing the appellant's attitude,
the deceased tried to seize him by the neck
whereupon the said appellant stabbed him on
the face with the said penknife. Due to his lack
of control of the movement of his arm, the
weapon landed on the base of the neck of the
deceased.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
The trial court found that the appellant did not
intend to cause so grave an injury as the death
of the deceased. We find that his conclusion is
supported by the evidence. In his testimony the
appellant emphatically affirmed that he only
wanted to inflict a wound that would leave a
permanent scar on the face of the deceased, or
one that would compel him to remain in the
hospital for a week or two but never intended to
kill him, because then it would frustrate his plan
of compelling him to marry or, at least, support
his daughter. The appellant had stated this
intention in some of his letters to the deceased
by way of a threat to induce him to accept his
proposal for the benefit of his daughter. That the
act of the appellant in stabbing the deceased
resulted in the fatal wound at the base of his
neck, was due solely to the fact hereinbefore
mentioned that appellant did not have control of
his right arm on account of paralysis and the
blow, although intended for the face, landed at
the base of the
neck.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
Therefore, the mitigating circumstance of lack of
intention to cause so grave an injury as the
death of the deceased as well as those of his
having voluntarily surrendered himself to the
authorities, and acted under the influence of
passion and obfuscation, should be taken into
consideration in favor of the
appellant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
Under the facts above stated, we cannot
entertain the appellant's contention that he acted
in legitimate self-defense inasmuch as he
provoked and commenced the aggression by
whipping out and brandishing his
penknife.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
The defense likewise claims that, at all events,
article 49 of the Revised Penal Code, which
refers to cases where the crime committed is
different from that intended by the accused,
should be applied herein. This article is a
reproduction of article 64 of the old Code and
has been interpreted as applicable only in cases
where the crime befalls a different person
(decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain of
October 20, 1897, and June 28,1899), which is
not the case
herein.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
The facts as herein proven constitute the crime
of homicide defined and penalized in article 249
of the Revised Penal Code with reclusion
temporal. In view of the concurrence therein of
three mitigating circumstances without any
aggravating circumstance, the penalty next
lower in degree, that is prision mayor, should be
imposed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
Wherefore, pursuant to the provisions of Act No.
4103, the appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer
the indeterminate penalty of from one (1) year
of prision correccional to eight (8) years and (1)
day ofprision mayor, affirming the judgment
appealed from in all other respects, with the
costs. So
ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
G.R. No. L-10126 October 22, 1957
SALUD VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BATACLAN and
the minors NORMA, LUZVIMINDA, ELENITA,
OSCAR and ALFREDO BATACLAN,
represented by their Natural guardian, SALUD
VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BATACLAN, plaintiffs-
appellants,
vs.
MARIANO MEDINA, defendant-appellant.
Lope E. Adriano, Emmanuel Andamo and Jose
R. Francisco for plaintiffs-appellants.
Fortunato Jose for defendant and appellant.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
Shortly after midnight, on September 13, 1952
bus no. 30 of the Medina Transportation,
operated by its owner defendant Mariano
Medina under a certificate of public
convenience, left the town of Amadeo, Cavite,
on its way to Pasay City, driven by its regular
chauffeur, Conrado Saylon. There were about
eighteen passengers, including the driver and
conductor. Among the passengers were Juan
Bataclan, seated beside and to the right of the
driver, Felipe Lara, sated to the right of Bataclan,
another passenger apparently from the Visayan
Islands whom the witnesses just called Visaya,
apparently not knowing his name, seated in the
left side of the driver, and a woman named
Natalia Villanueva, seated just behind the four
last mentioned. At about 2:00 o'clock that same
morning, while the bus was running within the
jurisdiction of Imus, Cavite, one of the front tires
burst and the vehicle began to zig-zag until it fell
into a canal or ditch on the right side of the road
and turned turtle. Some of the passengers
managed to leave the bus the best way they
could, others had to be helped or pulled out,
while the three passengers seated beside the
driver, named Bataclan, Lara and the Visayan
and the woman behind them named Natalia
Villanueva, could not get out of the overturned
bus. Some of the passengers, after they had
clambered up to the road, heard groans and
moans from inside the bus, particularly, shouts
for help from Bataclan and Lara, who said they
could not get out of the bus. There is nothing in
the evidence to show whether or not the
passengers already free from the wreck,
including the driver and the conductor, made any
attempt to pull out or extricate and rescue the
four passengers trapped inside the vehicle, but
calls or shouts for help were made to the houses
in the neighborhood. After half an hour, came
about ten men, one of them carrying a lighted
torch made of bamboo with a wick on one end,
evidently fueled with petroleum. These men
presumably approach the overturned bus, and
almost immediately, a fierce fire started, burning
and all but consuming the bus, including the four
passengers trapped inside it. It would appear
that as the bus overturned, gasoline began to
leak and escape from the gasoline tank on the
side of the chassis, spreading over and
permeating the body of the bus and the ground
under and around it, and that the lighted torch
brought by one of the men who answered the
call for help set it on fire.
That same day, the charred bodies of the four
deemed passengers inside the bus were
removed and duly identified that of Juan
Bataclan. By reason of his death, his widow,
Salud Villanueva, in her name and in behalf of
her five minor children, brought the present suit
to recover from Mariano Medina compensatory,
moral, and exemplary damages and attorney's
fees in the total amount of P87,150. After trial,
the Court of First Instance of Cavite awarded
P1,000 to the plaintiffs plus P600 as attorney's
fee, plus P100, the value of the merchandise
being carried by Bataclan to Pasay City for sale
and which was lost in the fire. The plaintiffs and
the defendants appealed the decision to the
Court of Appeals, but the latter endorsed the
appeal to us because of the value involved in the
claim in the complaint.
Our new Civil Code amply provides for the
responsibility of common carrier to its
passengers and their goods. For purposes of
reference, we are reproducing the pertinent
codal provisions:
ART. 1733. Common carriers, from the
nature of their business and for reasons
of public policy, are bound to observe
extraordinary diligence in the vigilance
over the goods and for the safety of the
passengers transported by them,
according to all the circumstances of
each case.
Such extraordinary diligence in the
vigilance over the goods is further
expressed in articles 1734, 1735, and
1745, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the extra
ordinary diligence for the safety of the
passengers is further set forth in articles
1755 and 1756.
ART. 1755. A common carrier is bound
to carry the passengers safely as far as
human care and foresight can provide,
using the utmost diligence of very
cautious persons, with a due regard for
all the circumstances.
ART. 1756. In case of death of or
injuries to passengers, common carriers
are presumed to have been at fault or to
have acted negligently, unless they
prove that they observed extraordinary
diligence as prescribed in articles 1733
and 1755
ART. 1759. Common carriers are liable
for the death of or injuries to passengers
through the negligence or willful acts of
the former's employees, although such
employees may have acted beyond the
scope of their authority or in violation of
the order of the common carriers.
This liability of the common carriers
does not cease upon proof that they
exercised all the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and
supervision of their employees.
ART. 1763. A common carrier
responsible for injuries suffered by a
passenger on account of the willful acts
or negligence of other passengers or of
strangers, if the common carrier's
employees through the exercise of the
diligence of a good father of a family
could have prevented or stopped the act
or omission.
We agree with the trial court that the case
involves a breach of contract of transportation
for hire, the Medina Transportation having
undertaken to carry Bataclan safely to his
destination, Pasay City. We also agree with the
trial court that there was negligence on the part
of the defendant, through his agent, the driver
Saylon. There is evidence to show that at the
time of the blow out, the bus was speeding, as
testified to by one of the passengers, and as
shown by the fact that according to the
testimony of the witnesses, including that of the
defense, from the point where one of the front
tires burst up to the canal where the bus
overturned after zig-zaging, there was a distance
of about 150 meters. The chauffeur, after the
blow-out, must have applied the brakes in order
to stop the bus, but because of the velocity at
which the bus must have been running, its
momentum carried it over a distance of 150
meters before it fell into the canal and turned
turtle.
There is no question that under the
circumstances, the defendant carrier is liable.
The only question is to what degree. The trial
court was of the opinion that the proximate
cause of the death of Bataclan was not the
overturning of the bus, but rather, the fire that
burned the bus, including himself and his co-
passengers who were unable to leave it; that at
the time the fire started, Bataclan, though he
must have suffered physical injuries, perhaps
serious, was still alive, and so damages were
awarded, not for his death, but for the physical
injuries suffered by him. We disagree. A
satisfactory definition of proximate cause is
found in Volume 38, pages 695-696 of American
jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffs-appellants in
their brief. It is as follows:
. . . 'that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury, and without which the result
would not have occurred.' And more
comprehensively, 'the proximate legal
cause is that acting first and producing
the injury, either immediately or by
setting other events in motion, all
constituting a natural and continuous
chain of events, each having a close
causal connection with its immediate
predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as a
natural and probable result of the cause
which first acted, under such
circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event should, as
an ordinary prudent and intelligent
person, have reasonable ground to
expect at the moment of his act or
default that an injury to some person
might probably result therefrom.
It may be that ordinarily, when a passenger bus
overturns, and pins down a passenger, merely
causing him physical injuries, if through some
event, unexpected and extraordinary, the
overturned bus is set on fire, say, by lightning, or
if some highwaymen after looting the vehicle
sets it on fire, and the passenger is burned to
death, one might still contend that the proximate
cause of his death was the fire and not the
overturning of the vehicle. But in the present
case under the circumstances obtaining in the
same, we do not hesitate to hold that the
proximate cause was the overturning of the bus,
this for the reason that when the vehicle turned
not only on its side but completely on its back,
the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not
unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the
men with a lighted torch was in response to the
call for help, made not only by the passengers,
but most probably, by the driver and the
conductor themselves, and that because it was
dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers
had to carry a light with them, and coming as
they did from a rural area where lanterns and
flashlights were not available; and what was
more natural than that said rescuers should
innocently approach the vehicle to extend the
aid and effect the rescue requested from them.
In other words, the coming of the men with a
torch was to be expected and was a natural
sequence of the overturning of the bus, the
trapping of some of its passengers and the call
for outside help. What is more, the burning of the
bus can also in part be attributed to the
negligence of the carrier, through is driver and
its conductor. According to the witness, the
driver and the conductor were on the road
walking back and forth. They, or at least, the
driver should and must have known that in the
position in which the overturned bus was,
gasoline could and must have leaked from the
gasoline tank and soaked the area in and
around the bus, this aside from the fact that
gasoline when spilled, specially over a large
area, can be smelt and directed even from a
distance, and yet neither the driver nor the
conductor would appear to have cautioned or
taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the
lighted torch too near the bus. Said negligence
on the part of the agents of the carrier come
under the codal provisions above-reproduced,
particularly, Articles 1733, 1759 and 1763.
As regard the damages to which plaintiffs are
entitled, considering the earning capacity of the
deceased, as well as the other elements
entering into a damage award, we are satisfied
that the amount of SIX THOUSAND (P6,000)
PESOS would constitute satisfactory
compensation, this to include compensatory,
moral, and other damages. We also believe that
plaintiffs are entitled to attorney's fees, and
assessing the legal services rendered by
plaintiffs' attorneys not only in the trial court, but
also in the course of the appeal, and not losing
sight of the able briefs prepared by them, the
attorney's fees may well be fixed at EIGHT
HUNDRED (P800) PESOS for the loss of
merchandise carried by the deceased in the bus,
is adequate and will not be disturbed.
There is one phase of this case which disturbs if
it does not shock us. According to the evidence,
one of the passengers who, because of the
injuries suffered by her, was hospitalized, and
while in the hospital, she was visited by the
defendant Mariano Medina, and in the course of
his visit, she overheard him speaking to one of
his bus inspectors, telling said inspector to have
the tires of the bus changed immediately
because they were already old, and that as a
matter of fact, he had been telling the driver to
change the said tires, but that the driver did not
follow his instructions. If this be true, it goes to
prove that the driver had not been diligent and
had not taken the necessary precautions to
insure the safety of his passengers. Had he
changed the tires, specially those in front, with
new ones, as he had been instructed to do,
probably, despite his speeding, as we have
already stated, the blow out would not have
occurred. All in all, there is reason to believe that
the driver operated and drove his vehicle
negligently, resulting in the death of four of his
passengers, physical injuries to others, and the
complete loss and destruction of their goods,
and yet the criminal case against him, on motion
of the fiscal and with his consent, was
provisionally dismissed, because according to
the fiscal, the witnesses on whose testimony he
was banking to support the complaint, either
failed or appear or were reluctant to testify. But
the record of the case before us shows the
several witnesses, passengers, in that bus,
willingly and unhesitatingly testified in court to
the effect of the said driver was negligent. In the
public interest the prosecution of said erring
driver should be pursued, this, not only as a
matter of justice, but for the promotion of the
safety of passengers on public utility buses. Let
a copy of this decision be furnished the
Department of Justice and the Provincial Fiscal
of Cavite.
In view of the foregoing, with the modification
that the damages awarded by the trial court are
increased from ONE THOUSAND (P1,000)
PESOS TO SIX THOUSAND (P6,000) PESOS,
and from SIX HUNDRED PESOS TO EIGHT
HUNDRED (P800) PESOS, for the death of
Bataclan and for the attorney's fees,
respectively, the decision appealed is from
hereby affirmed, with costs.
[G.R. No. 75369. November 26, 1990.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-
Appellee, v. FERNANDO ILIGAN y JAMITO,
EDMUNDO ASIS y ILIGAN and JUAN
MACANDOG (at large), Defendants,
FERNANDO ILIGAN y JAMITO and
EDMUNDO ASIS y ILIGAN, Defendants-
Appellants.
The Solicitor General for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Cesar R. Canonizado, for Defendants-
Appellants.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; APPEAL; THROWS THE
CASE OPEN FOR A COMPLETE REVIEW OF
ALL ERRORS AS MAY BE IMPUTABLE TO
THE TRIAL COURT. — While the factual
findings of the trial court are generally given due
respect by the appellate court, an appeal of a
criminal case throws it open for a complete
review of all errors, by commission or omission,
as may be imputable to the trial court. (People v.
Valerio, Jr., L-4116, February 25, 1982, 112
SCRA 208, 231) In this instance, the lower court
erred in finding that the maceration of one half of
the head of the victim was also caused by Iligan
for the evidence on record point to a different
conclusion. We are convinced beyond
peradventure that indeed, after Quiñones, Jr.
had fallen from the bolo-hacking perpetrated by
Iligan, he was run over by a vehicle. This finding,
however, does not in any way exonerate Iligan
from liability for the death of Quiñones, Jr.
2. CRIMINAL LAW; LIABILITY; REQUISITES
THEREOF, PRESENT IN THE CASE AT BAR.
— Under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code,
criminal liability shall be incurred "by any person
committing a felony (delito) although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended." Based on the doctrine that "el que es
causa de la causa es causa del mal causado"
(he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of
the evil caused), (People v. Ural, G.R. No. L-
30801, March 27, 1974, 56 SCRA 138, 144) the
essential requisites of Article 4 are: (a) that an
intentional felony has been committed, and (b)
that the wrong done to the aggrieved party be
the direct, natural and logical consequence of
the felony committed by the offender. (People v.
Mananquil, L-35574, September 28, 1984, 132
SCRA 196, 207). We hold that these requisites
are present in this case.
3. ID.; ID.; PROXIMATE LEGAL CAUSE,
DEFINED. — The intentional felony committed
was the hacking of the head of Quiñones, Jr. by
Iligan. That it was considered as superficial by
the physician who autopsied Quiñones is beside
the point. What is material is that by the
instrument used in hacking Quiñones, Jr. and
the location of the wound, the assault was meant
not only to immobilize the victim but to do away
with him as it was directed at a vital and delicate
part of the body: the head. (See: People v.
Diana, 32 Phil. 344 [1915]). The hacking incident
happened on the national highway where
vehicles are expected to pass any moment. One
such vehicle passed seconds later when Lukban
and Zaldy Asis, running scared and having
barely negotiated the distance of around 200
meters, heard shouts of people. Quiñones, Jr.,
weakened by the hacking blow which sent him to
the cemented highway, was run over by a
vehicle. Under these circumstances, we hold
that while Iligan’s hacking of Quiñones, Jr.’s
head might not have been the direct cause, it
was the proximate cause of the latter’s death.
Proximate legal cause is defined as "that acting
first and producing the injury, either immediately
or by setting other events in motion, all
constituting a natural and continuous chain of
events, each having a close causal connection
with its immediate predecessor, the final event in
the chain immediately effecting the injury as a
natural and probable result of the cause which
first acted, under such circumstances that the
person responsible for the first event should, as
an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of
his act or default that an injury to some person
might probably result therefrom. (Urbano v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72964,
January 7, 1988, 157 SCRA 1 quoting Vda. De
Bataclan v. Medina, 102 Phil. 181). In other
words, the sequence of events from Iligan’s
assault on him to the time Quiñones, Jr. was run
over by a vehicle is, considering the very short
span of time between them, one unbroken chain
of events. Having triggered such events, Iligan
cannot escape liability.
4. ID.; ALIBI; NOT CONSIDERED WHEN
ACCUSED IS POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED BY
WITNESSES. — We agree with the lower court
that the defense of alibi cannot turn the tide in
favor of Iligan because he was positively seen at
the scene of the crime and identified by the
prosecution witnesses. (People v. Pineda, G.R.
No. 72400, January 15, 1988, 157 SCRA 71).
5. ID.; AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES;
TREACHERY AND EVIDENT
PREMEDITATION, WRONGLY APPRECIATED
IN THE CASE AT BAR. — But we disagree with
the lower court with regards to its findings on the
aggravating circumstances of treachery and
evident premeditation. Treachery has been
appreciated by the lower court in view of the
suddenness of the attack on the group of
Quiñones, Jr. Suddenness of such attack,
however, does not by itself show treachery.
(People v. Gadiano, L-31818, July 30, 1982, 115
SCRA 559) There must be evidence that the
mode of attack was consciously adopted by the
appellant to make it impossible or hard for the
person attacked to defend himself. (People v.
Crisostomo, L-32243, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA
47). In this case, the hacking of Edmundo Asis
by Iligan followed by the chasing of the trio by
the group of Iligan was a warning to the
deceased and his companions of the hostile
attitude of the appellants. The group of
Quiñones, Jr. was therefore placed on guard for
any subsequent attacks against them. (People v.
Mercado, L-33492, March 30, 1988, 159 SCRA
455). The requisites necessary to appreciate
evident premeditation have likewise not been
met in this case. Thus, the prosecution failed to
prove all of the following: (a) the time when the
accused determined to commit the crime; (b) an
act manifestly indicating that the accused had
clung to their determination to commit the crime;
and (c) the lapse of sufficient length of time
between the determination and execution to
allow him to reflect upon the consequences of
his act. (People v. Batas, G.R. Nos. 84277-78,
August 2, 1989, 176 SCRA 46).
6. ID.; CONSPIRACY; NOT SUFFICIENTLY
CONSTITUTED BY MERE KNOWLEDGE,
ACQUIESCENCE OR APPROVAL OF THE
ACT WITHOUT COOPERATION OR
AGREEMENT TO COOPERATE NOR BY
MERE PRESENCE AT THE SCENE OF THE
CRIME. — Absent any qualifying circumstances,
Iligan must be held liable only for homicide.
Again, contrary to the lower court’s finding, proof
beyond reasonable doubt has not been
established to hold Edmundo Asis liable as
Iligan’s co-conspirator. Edmundo Asis did not
take any active part in the infliction of the wound
on the head of Quiñones, Jr., which led to his
running over by a vehicle and consequent death.
As earlier pointed out, the testimony that he was
carrying a stone at the scene of the crime hardly
merits credibility being uncorroborated and
coming from an undeniably biased witness.
Having been the companion of Iligan, Edmundo
Asis must have known of the former’s criminal
intent but mere knowledge, acquiescense or
approval of the act without cooperation or
agreement to cooperate, is not enough to
constitute one a party to a conspiracy. There
must be intentional participation in the act with a
view to the furtherance of the common design
and purpose. (People v. Izon, 104 Phil. 690
[1958]) Such being the case, his mere presence
at the scene of the crime did not make him a co-
conspirator, a co-principal or an accomplice to
the assault perpetrated by Iligan. (Orobio v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 57519, September
13, 1988, 165 SCRA 316) Edmundo Asis
therefore deserves exoneration.
7. ID.; HOMICIDE; PENALTY; ABSENT ANY
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE AND
APPLYING THE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE
LAW. — There being no mitigating
circumstance, the penalty imposable on Iligan is
reclusion temporal medium (Arts. 249 and 64,
Revised Penal Code). Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the proper penalty
is that within the range of prision mayor as
minimum and reclusion temporal medium as
maximum. We find insufficient proof to warrant
the award of P256,960 for the victim’s unrealized
income and therefore, the same is disallowed.
DECISION
FERNAN, J.:
In this appeal, uncle and nephew, Fernando
Iligan and Edmundo Asis, seek a reversal of the
decision of the then Court of First Instance of
Camarines Norte, Branch II 1 convicting them of
the crime of murder and sentencing them to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify the heirs of Esmeraldo Quiñones, Jr.
in the amounts of P30,000 for the latter’s death
and P256,960 representing the victim’s
unrealized income.
On October 21, 1980, the following information
for murder was filed against Fernando Iligan,
Edmundo Asis and Juan
Macandog:chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law
library
"That on or about 3:00 a.m., August 4, 1980, at
sitio Lico II, barangay Sto. Domingo, municipality
of Vinzons, province of Camarines Norte,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the
Honorable Court, the above named accused,
conspiring and mutually helping one another,
with treachery and evident premeditation, one of
the accused Fernando Iligan armed with a bolo
(sinampalok) and with deliberate intent to kill, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, gang up and in a sudden
unexpected manner, hacked Esmeraldo
Quiñones, Jr., on his face, thus causing fatal
injuries on the latter’s face which resulted to (sic)
the death of said Esmeraldo Quiñones.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."cralaw virtua1aw library
Juan Macandog was never apprehended and he
remains at large. At their arraignment on
January 12, 1981 Fernando Iligan and Edmundo
Asis pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
Thereafter, the prosecution presented the
following version of the commission of the
crime.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
At around 2:00 o’clock in the morning of August
4, 1980, Esmeraldo Quiñones, Jr. and his
companions, Zaldy Asis and Felix Lukban, were
walking home from barangay Sto. Domingo,
Vinzons, Camarines Norte after attending a
barrio fiesta dance. In front of the ricemill of a
certain Almadrones, they met the accused
Fernando Iligan, his nephew, Edmundo Asis,
and Juan Macandog. Edmundo Asis pushed
("winahi") them aside thereby prompting Zaldy
Asis to box him. 2 Felix Lukban quickly told the
group of the accused that they had no desire to
fight. 3 Fernando Iligan, upon seeing his nephew
fall, drew from his back a bolo and hacked Zaldy
Asis but missed. Terrified, the trio ran pursued
by the three accused. They ran for about half an
hour, passing by the house of Quiñones, Jr.
They stopped running only upon seeing that they
were no longer being chased. After resting for a
short while, Quiñones, Jr. invited the two to
accompany him to his house so that he could
change to his working clothes and report for
work as a bus conductor. 4
While the trio were walking towards the house of
Quiñones, Jr., the three accused suddenly
emerged on the roadside and without a word,
Fernando Iligan hacked Quiñones, Jr. with his
bolo hitting him on the forehead and causing him
to fall down. 5 Horrified, Felix Lukban and Zaldy
Asis fled to a distance of 200 meters, but
returned walking after they heard shouts of
people. Zaldy Asis specifically heard someone
shout "May nadale na." 6
On the spot where Quiñones, Jr. was hacked,
Zaldy Asis and Felix Lukban saw him already
dead with his head busted. 7 They helped the
brother of Quiñones, Jr. in carrying him to their
house. 8
That same day, August 4, 1980, the body of
Quiñones, Jr. was autopsied at the Funeraria
Belmonte in Labo, Camarines Norte by the
municipal health officer, Dr. Marcelito E. Abas.
The postmortem examination report which is
found at the back of the death certificate reveals
that Esmeraldo Quiñones, Jr., who was 21 years
old when he died, sustained the following
injuries:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. Shock and massive cerebral hemorrhages
due to multiple fracture of the entire half of the
frontal left, temporal, parietal and occipital bone
of the head, with massive maceration of the
brain tissue.
"2. Other findings — Incised wound at the right
eyebrow, medial aspect measuring about 4 cms.
in length, 0.5 cm. in width and 0.5 cm. in depth,
abrasion on the left shoulder and right side of
the neck." 9
The death certificate also indicates that
Quiñones, Jr. died of "shock and massive
cerebral hemorrhages due to a vehicular
accident."cralaw virtua1aw library
The defendants denied having perpetrated the
crime. They alleged that they were in their
respective houses at the time the crime was
committed.chanrobles law library
Accused Fernando Iligan testified that at around
midnight of August 4, 1980, he left his house to
fetch his visitors at the dance hall. 10 Along the
way, he met his nephew, Edmundo Asis, whom
he presumed was drunk. He invited his nephew
to accompany him to the dance hall. However,
they were not able to reach their destination
because Edmundo was boxed by somebody
whom he (Edmundo) sideswiped. 11 Instead,
Fernando Iligan brought his nephew home. 12
On their way, they were overtaken by Juliano
Mendoza whom Fernando Iligan invited to his
house to help him cook. 13 After bringing his
nephew home, Fernando Iligan and Juliano
Mendoza proceeded to Iligan’s house and
arrived there between 1:30 and 2:00 o’clock in
the morning of the same day. 14
Edmundo Asis corroborated Iligan’s testimony.
He testified that while they were walking in front
of the Almadrones ricemill, he sideswiped
someone whom he did not recognize because
there were several persons around. He said,
"Sorry, pare" but the person to whom he
addressed his apology boxed him on his left
face. He fell down and Iligan helped him. Later,
Iligan accompanied him to his home in Lico II. 15
After Iligan and Juliano Mendoza had left his
house, he slept and woke up at 7:00 o’clock the
following morning. 16
The defense made capital of the testimony of
prosecution witness Dr. Abas to the effect that
Quiñones, Jr. died because of a vehicular
accident. In ruling out said theory, however, the
lower court, in its decision of May 7, 1986,
said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The accused, to augment their alibi, have
pointed to this Court that the Certificate of Death
have shown that the victim’s death was caused
by a vehicular accident. To this, notwithstanding,
the Court cannot give credit for some reasons.
First, the fact of the alleged vehicular accident
has not been fully established. Second,
Esmeraldo Quiñones, Sr., (the) father of the
victim, testified that Dr. Abas told him that if his
son was hacked by a bolo on the face and then
run over the entire head by a vehicle’s tire, then
that hacking on the face could not be visibly
seen on the head (t.s.n., pp. 16-17, October 13,
1981) Third, Exhibit ‘2’ (the photograph of the
victim taken immediately after his body had been
brought home) is a hard evidence. It will attestly
(sic) show that the entire head was not crushed
by any vehicle. On the contrary, it shows that
only half of the face and head, was damaged
with the wound starting on a sharp edge
horizontally. There are contusions and abrasions
on the upper left shoulder and on the neck while
the body downwards has none of it, while on the
right forehead there is another wound caused by
a sharp instrument. Therefore, it is simple, that if
the victim was run over by a vehicle, the other
half portion of his head and downward part of his
body must have been likewise seriously
damaged, which there are none." 17
The lower court also found that Iligan’s group
conspired to kill anyone or all members of the
group of the victim to vindicate the boxing on the
face of Edmundo Asis. It appreciated the
aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation and treachery and accordingly
convicted Iligan and Edmundo Asis of the crime
of murder and imposed on them the
aforementioned penalty.
Iligan and Edmundo Asis interposed this appeal
professing innocence of the crime for which they
were convicted. For the second time, they
attributed Quiñones, Jr.’s death to a vehicular
accident.
No eyewitnesses were presented to prove that
Quiñones, Jr. was run over by a vehicle. The
defense relies on the testimony of Dr. Abas, a
prosecution witness, who swore that the multiple
fracture on the head of Quiñones, Jr. was
caused by a vehicular accident 18 which opinion
was earlier put in writing by the same witness in
the postmortem examination. Dr. Abas justified
his conclusion by what he considered as tire
marks on the victim’s left shoulder and the right
side of his neck. 19 He also testified that the
incised wound located at the victim’s right
eyebrow could have been caused by a sharp
bolo but it was so superficial that it could not
have caused the victim’s death. 20
Circumstantial evidence on record indeed point
to the veracity of the actual occurrence of the
vehicular mishap. One such evidence is the
testimony of prosecution witness Zaldy Asis that
when he helped bring home the body of
Quiñones, Jr., he told the victim’s father,
Esmeraldo Quiñones, Sr. that "before
Esmeraldo Quiñones (Jr.) was run over by a
vehicle, he was hacked by Fernando Iligan." 21
When asked why he mentioned an automobile,
Zaldy Asis said that he did not notice any vehicle
around but he mentioned it "because his
(Quiñones, Jr.) head was busted." 22 It is
therefore not farfetched to conclude that Zaldy
Asis had actual knowledge of said accident but
for understandable reasons he declined to
declare it in court. Defense witness Marciano
Mago, the barangay captain of Sto. Domingo,
also testified that when he went to the scene of
the crime, he saw bits of the brain of the victim
scattered across the road where he also saw tire
marks. 23
For its part, the prosecution, through the victim’s
father, presented evidence to the effect that
Iligan authored the maceration of half of the
victim’s head. Quiñones, Sr. testified that from
their house, which was about five meters away
from the road, he saw Fernando Iligan holding a
"sinampalok" as he, together with Edmundo Asis
and Juan Macandog, chased someone. During
the second time that he saw the three accused,
he heard Iligan say, "Dali, ayos na yan." 24
Hence, the lower court concluded that the
victim’s head was "chopped" resulting in the
splattering of his brain all over the place. 25 It
should be emphasized, however, that the
testimony came from a biased witness and it
was uncorroborated.
While the factual findings of the trial court are
generally given due respect by the appellate
court, an appeal of a criminal case throws it
open for a complete review of all errors, by
commission or omission, as may be imputable to
the trial court. 26 In this instance, the lower court
erred in finding that the maceration of one half of
the head of the victim was also caused by Iligan
for the evidence on record point to a different
conclusion. We are convinced beyond
peradventure that indeed, after Quiñones, Jr.
had fallen from the bolo-hacking perpetrated by
Iligan, he was run over by a vehicle. This finding,
however, does not in any way exonerate Iligan
from liability for the death of Quiñones,
Jr.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
Under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code,
criminal liability shall be incurred "by any person
committing a felony (delito) although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended." Based on the doctrine that "el que es
causa de la causa es causa del mal causado"
(he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of
the evil caused), 27 the essential requisites of
Article 4 are: (a) that an intentional felony has
been committed, and (b) that the wrong done to
the aggrieved party be the direct, natural and
logical consequence of the felony committed by
the offender. 28 We hold that these requisites
are present in this case.
The intentional felony committed was the
hacking of the head of Quiñones, Jr. by Iligan.
That it was considered as superficial by the
physician who autopsied Quiñones is beside the
point. What is material is that by the instrument
used in hacking Quiñones, Jr. and the location of
the wound, the assault was meant not only to
immobilize the victim but to do away with him as
it was directed at a vital and delicate part of the
body: the head. 29
The hacking incident happened on the national
highway 30 where vehicles are expected to pass
any moment. One such vehicle passed seconds
later when Lukban and Zaldy Asis, running
scared and having barely negotiated the
distance of around 200 meters, heard shouts of
people. Quiñones, Jr., weakened by the hacking
blow which sent him to the cemented highway,
was run over by a vehicle.
Under these circumstances, we hold that while
Iligan’s hacking of Quiñones, Jr.’s head might
not have been the direct cause, it was the
proximate cause of the latter’s death. Proximate
legal cause is defined as "that acting first and
producing the injury, either immediately or by
setting other events in motion, all constituting a
natural and continuous chain of events, each
having a close causal connection with its
immediate predecessor, the final event in the
chain immediately effecting the injury as a
natural and probable result of the cause which
first acted, under such circumstances that the
person responsible for the first event should, as
an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of
his act or default that an injury to some person
might probably result therefrom." 31 In other
words, the sequence of events from Iligan’s
assault on him to the time Quiñones, Jr. was run
over by a vehicle is, considering the very short
span of time between them, one unbroken chain
of events. Having triggered such events, Iligan
cannot escape liability.chanrobles law library
We agree with the lower court that the defense
of alibi cannot turn the tide in favor of Iligan
because he was positively seen at the scene of
the crime and identified by the prosecution
witnesses. 32
But we disagree with the lower court with
regards to its findings on the aggravating
circumstances of treachery and evident
premeditation. Treachery has been appreciated
by the lower court in view of the suddenness of
the attack on the group of Quiñones, Jr.
Suddenness of such attack, however, does not
by itself show treachery. 33 There must be
evidence that the mode of attack was
consciously adopted by the appellant to make it
impossible or hard for the person attacked to
defend himself. 34 In this case, the hacking of
Edmundo Asis by Iligan followed by the chasing
of the trio by the group of Iligan was a warning to
the deceased and his companions of the hostile
attitude of the appellants. The group of
Quiñones, Jr. was therefore placed on guard for
any subsequent attacks against them. 35
The requisites necessary to appreciate evident
premeditation have likewise not been met in this
case. Thus, the prosecution failed to prove all of
the following: (a) the time when the accused
determined to commit the crime; (b) an act
manifestly indicating that the accused had clung
to their determination to commit the crime; and
(c) the lapse of sufficient length of time between
the determination and execution to allow him to
reflect upon the consequences of his act. 36
Absent any qualifying circumstances, Iligan must
be held liable only for homicide. Again, contrary
to the lower court’s finding, proof beyond
reasonable doubt has not been established to
hold Edmundo Asis liable as Iligan’s co-
conspirator. Edmundo Asis did not take any
active part in the infliction of the wound on the
head of Quiñones, Jr., which led to his running
over by a vehicle and consequent death. As
earlier pointed out, the testimony that he was
carrying a stone at the scene of the crime hardly
merits credibility being uncorroborated and
coming from an undeniably biased witness.
Having been the companion of Iligan, Edmundo
Asis must have known of the former’s criminal
intent but mere knowledge, acquiescense or
approval of the act without cooperation or
agreement to cooperate, is not enough to
constitute one a party to a conspiracy. There
must be intentional participation in the act with a
view to the furtherance of the common design
and purpose. 37 Such being the case, his mere
presence at the scene of the crime did not make
him a co-conspirator, a co-principal or an
accomplice to the assault perpetrated by Iligan.
38 Edmundo Asis therefore deserves
exoneration.
There being no mitigating circumstance, the
penalty imposable on Iligan is reclusion temporal
medium (Arts. 249 and 64, Revised Penal
Code). Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the proper penalty is that within the range
of prision mayor as minimum and reclusion
temporal medium as maximum. We find
insufficient proof to warrant the award of
P256,960 for the victim’s unrealized income and
therefore, the same is disallowed.cralawnad
WHEREFORE, appellant Fernando Iligan y
Jamito is hereby convicted of the crime of
homicide for which he is imposed the
indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen
(14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal medium as maximum and he
shall indemnify the heirs of Esmeraldo
Quiñones, Jr. in the amount of fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000). Appellant Edmundo Asis is
hereby acquitted of the crime charged against
him. Costs against appellant Iligan.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 72964 January 7, 1988
FILOMENO URBANO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition to review the decision of the
then Intermediate Appellate Court which
affirmed the decision of the then Circuit Criminal
Court of Dagupan City finding petitioner
Filomeno Urban guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of homicide.
The records disclose the following facts of the
case.
At about 8:00 o'clock in the morning of October
23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano went to his
ricefield at Barangay Anonang, San Fabian,
Pangasinan located at about 100 meters from
the tobacco seedbed of Marcelo Javier. He
found the place where he stored his palay
flooded with water coming from the irrigation
canal nearby which had overflowed. Urbano
went to the elevated portion of the canal to see
what happened and there he saw Marcelo Javier
and Emilio Erfe cutting grass. He asked them
who was responsible for the opening of the
irrigation canal and Javier admitted that he was
the one. Urbano then got angry and demanded
that Javier pay for his soaked palay. A quarrel
between them ensued. Urbano unsheathed his
bolo (about 2 feet long, including the handle, by
2 inches wide) and hacked Javier hitting him on
the right palm of his hand, which was used in
parrying the bolo hack. Javier who was then
unarmed ran away from Urbano but was
overtaken by Urbano who hacked him again
hitting Javier on the left leg with the back portion
of said bolo, causing a swelling on said leg.
When Urbano tried to hack and inflict further
injury, his daughter embraced and prevented
him from hacking Javier.
Immediately thereafter, Antonio Erfe, Emilio
Erfe, and Felipe Erfe brought Javier to his house
about 50 meters away from where the incident
happened. Emilio then went to the house of
Barangay Captain Menardo Soliven but not
finding him there, Emilio looked for barrio
councilman Felipe Solis instead. Upon the
advice of Solis, the Erfes together with Javier
went to the police station of San Fabian to report
the incident. As suggested by Corporal Torio,
Javier was brought to a physician. The group
went to Dr. Guillermo Padilla, rural health
physician of San Fabian, who did not attend to
Javier but instead suggested that they go to Dr.
Mario Meneses because Padilla had no
available medicine.
After Javier was treated by Dr. Meneses, he and
his companions returned to Dr. Guillermo Padilla
who conducted a medico-legal examination. Dr.
Padilla issued a medico-legal certificate (Exhibit
"C" dated September 28, 1981) which reads:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that I have
examined the wound of Marcelo
Javier, 20 years of age, married,
residing at Barangay Anonang,
San Fabian, Pangasinan on
October 23, 1980 and found the
following:
1 -Incised wound 2 inches in
length at the upper portion of
the lesser palmar prominence,
right.
As to my observation the
incapacitation is from (7-9) days
period. This wound was
presented to me only for
medico-legal examination, as it
was already treated by the other
doctor. (p. 88, Original Records)
Upon the intercession of Councilman Solis,
Urbano and Javier agreed to settle their
differences. Urbano promised to pay P700.00 for
the medical expenses of Javier. Hence, on
October 27, 1980, the two accompanied by Solis
appeared before the San Fabian Police to 1:30 AM Still having frequent
formalize their amicable settlement. Patrolman muscle spasm. With diffi-
Torio recorded the event in the police blotter
(Exhibit A), to wit: #35, 421 culty opening his
mouth. Restless at times.
xxx xxx xxx Febrile

Entry Nr 599/27 Oct '80/103OH/ 11-15-80 Referred. Novaldin 1

Re entry Nr 592 on page 257 amp. inj. IM. Sudden cessa-
both parties appeared before
this Station accompanied by t
brgy. councilman Felipe Solis i
and settled their case amicably, o
for they are neighbors and close n
relatives to each other. Marcelo o
Javier accepted and granted f
forgiveness to Filomeno Urbano r
who shoulder (sic) all the e
expenses in his medical s
treatment, and promising to him p
and to this Office that this will i
never be repeated anymore and r
not to harbour any grudge a
against each other. (p. 87, t
Original Records.) i
o
Urbano advanced P400.00 to Javier at the police n
station. On November 3, 1980, the additional a
P300.00 was given to Javier at Urbano's house n
in the presence of barangay captain Soliven. d
H
At about 1:30 a.m. on November 14, 1980, R
Javier was rushed to the Nazareth General a
Hospital in a very serious condition. When f
admitted to the hospital, Javier had lockjaw and t
was having convulsions. Dr. Edmundo Exconde e
who personally attended to Javier found that the r
latter's serious condition was caused by tetanus m
toxin. He noticed the presence of a healing u
wound in Javier's palm which could have been s
infected by tetanus. c
u
l
On November 15, 1980 at exactly 4:18 p.m.,
a
Javier died in the hospital. The medical findings
r
of Dr. Exconde are as follows:
s
p
Date Diagnosis a
s
11-14-80 ADMITTED due to m
trismus .

adm. at DX TETANUS 0
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In an information
a dated April 10, 1981, Filomeno
Urbano wasd charged with the crime of homicide
before thea then Circuit Criminal Court of
Dagupanv City, Third Judicial District.
e
r
Upon arraignment, Urbano pleaded "not guilty."
b the trial court found Urbano guilty as
After trial,
charged.r He was sentenced to suffer an
o
indeterminate prison term of from TWELVE (12)
YEARS u of prision mayor, as minimum to
SEVENTEEN g (17) years, FOUR (4) MONTHS
and ONEh (1) DAY of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, t together with the accessories of the
h
law, to indemnify the heirs of the victim, Marcelo
Javier, ino the amount of P12,000.00 without
subsidiarym imprisonment in case of insolvency,
and to paye the costs. He was ordered confined
at the Newb Bilibid Prison, in Muntinlupa, Rizal
y of the decision, in view of the nature
upon finality
r
of his penalty.
e
l
The then Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed
a
the conviction of Urbano on appeal but raised
-
the award of indemnity to the heirs of the
deceased to P30,000.00 with costs against the
appellant.t
i
v
The appellant filed a motion for reconsideration
and/or newe trial. The motion for new trial was
based ons an affidavit of Barangay Captain
.
Menardo Soliven (Annex "A") which states:
(
p
. That in 1980, I was the barrio
1 captain of Barrio Anonang, San
0 Fabian, Pangasinan, and up to
0 the present having been re-
, elected to such position in the
O last barangay elections on May
17, 1982;
 That sometime in the first week
of November, 1980, there was a
typhoon that swept Pangasinan
and other places of Central
Luzon including San Fabian, a
town of said province;
That during the typhoon, the
sluice or control gates of the
Bued irrigation dam which
irrigates the ricefields of San
Fabian were closed and/or
controlled so much so that water
and its flow to the canals and
ditches were regulated and
reduced;
That due to the locking of the
sluice or control gates of the
dam leading to the canals and
ditches which will bring water to
the ricefields, the water in said
canals and ditches became
shallow which was suitable for
catching mudfishes;
That after the storm, I
conducted a personal survey in
the area affected, with my
secretary Perfecto Jaravata;
That on November 5, 1980,
while I was conducting survey, I
saw the late Marcelo Javier
catching fish in the shallow
irrigation canals with some
companions;
That few days there after,or on
November l5, l980, I came to
know that said Marcelo Javier
died of tetanus. (p. 33, Rollo)
The motion was denied. Hence, this petition.
In a resolution dated July 16, 1986, we gave due
course to the petition.
The case involves the application of Article 4 of
the Revised Penal Code which provides that
"Criminal liability shall be incurred: (1) By any
person committing a felony (delito) although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended ..." Pursuant to this provision "an
accused is criminally responsible for acts
committed by him in violation of law and for all
the natural and logical consequences resulting
therefrom." (People v. Cardenas, 56 SCRA 631).
The record is clear that Marcelo Javier was
hacked by the petitioner who used a bolo as a
result of which Javier suffered a 2-inch incised
wound on his right palm; that on November 14,
1981 which was the 22nd day after the incident,
Javier was rushed to the hospital in a very
serious condition and that on the following day,
November 15, 1981, he died from tetanus.
Under these circumstances, the lower courts
ruled that Javier's death was the natural and
logical consequence of Urbano's unlawful act.
Hence, he was declared responsible for Javier's
death. Thus, the appellate court said:
The claim of appellant that there
was an efficient cause which
supervened from the time the
deceased was wounded to the
time of his death, which covers
a period of 23 days does not
deserve serious consideration.
True, that the deceased did not
die right away from his wound,
but the cause of his death was
due to said wound which was
inflicted by the appellant. Said
wound which was in the process
of healing got infected with
tetanus which ultimately caused
his death.
Dr. Edmundo Exconde of the
Nazareth General Hospital
testified that the victim suffered
lockjaw because of the infection
of the wound with tetanus. And
there is no other way by which
he could be infected with
tetanus except through the
wound in his palm (tsn., p. 78,
Oct. 5, 1981). Consequently, the
proximate cause of the victim's
death was the wound which got
infected with tetanus. And the
settled rule in this jurisdiction is
that an accused is liable for all
the consequences of his
unlawful act. (Article 4, par. 1,
R.P.C. People v. Red, CA 43
 O.G. 5072; People v. Cornel 78
Phil. 418).
Appellant's allegation that the
proximate cause of the victim's
death was due to his own
negligence in going back to
work without his wound being
properly healed, and lately, that
he went to catch fish in dirty
irrigation canals in the first week
of November, 1980, is an
afterthought, and a desperate
attempt by appellant to wiggle
out of the predicament he found
himself in. If the wound had not
yet healed, it is impossible to
conceive that the deceased
would be reckless enough to
work with a disabled hand. (pp.
20-21, Rollo)
The petitioner reiterates his position that the
proximate cause of the death of Marcelo Javier
was due to his own negligence, that Dr. Mario
Meneses found no tetanus in the injury, and that
Javier got infected with tetanus when after two
weeks he returned to his farm and tended his
tobacco plants with his bare hands exposing the
wound to harmful elements like tetanus germs.
The evidence on record does not clearly show
that the wound inflicted by Urbano was infected
with tetanus at the time of the infliction of the
wound. The evidence merely confirms that the
wound, which was already healing at the time
Javier suffered the symptoms of the fatal
ailment, somehow got infected with tetanus
However, as to when the wound was infected is
not clear from the record.
In Vda. de Bataclan, et al. v. Medina (102 Phil.
1181), we adopted the following definition of
proximate cause:
xxx xxx xxx
... A satisfactory definition of
proximate cause is found in
Volume 38, pages 695-696 of
American Jurisprudence, cited
by plaintiffs-appellants in their
brief. It is as follows:
... "that cause, which, in natural
and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the
injury, and without which the
result would not have
occurred."And more
comprehensively, "the
proximate legal cause is that
acting first and producing the
injury, either immediately or by
setting other events in motion,
all constituting a natural and
continuous chain of events,
each having a close causal
connection with its immediate
predecessor, the final event in
the chain immediately effecting
the injury as a natural and
probable result of the cause
which first acted, under such
circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event
should, as an ordinarily prudent
and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at
the moment of his act or default
that an injury to some person
might probably result
therefrom." (at pp. 185-186)
The issue, therefore, hinges on whether or not
there was an efficient intervening cause from the
time Javier was wounded until his death which
would exculpate Urbano from any liability for
Javier's death.
We look into the nature of tetanus-
The incubation period of
tetanus, i.e., the time between
injury and the appearance of
unmistakable symptoms, ranges
from 2 to 56 days. However,
over 80 percent of patients
become symptomatic within 14
days. A short incubation period
indicates severe disease, and
when symptoms occur within 2
or 3 days of injury the mortality
rate approaches 100 percent.
Non-specific premonitory
symptoms such as restlessness,
irritability, and headache are
encountered occasionally, but
the commonest presenting
complaints are pain and
stiffness in the jaw, abdomen, or
back and difficulty swallowing.
As the progresses, stiffness
gives way to rigidity, and
patients often complain of
difficulty opening their mouths.
In fact, trismus in the
commonest manifestation of
tetanus and is responsible for
the familiar descriptive name of
lockjaw. As more muscles are
involved, rigidity becomes
generalized, and sustained
contractions called risus
sardonicus. The intensity and
sequence of muscle
involvement is quite variable. In
a small proportion of patients,
only local signs and symptoms
develop in the region of the
injury. In the vast majority,
however, most muscles are
involved to some degree, and
the signs and symptoms
encountered depend upon the
major muscle groups affected.
Reflex spasm usually occur
within 24 to 72 hours of the first
symptom, an interval referred to
as the onset time. As in the
case of the incubation period, a
short onset time is associated
with a poor prognosis. Spasms
are caused by sudden
intensification of afferent stimuli
arising in the periphery, which
increases rigidity and causes
simultaneous and excessive
contraction of muscles and their
antagonists. Spasms may be
both painful and dangerous. As
the disease progresses, minimal
or inapparent stimuli produce
more intense and longer lasting
spasms with increasing
frequency. Respiration may be
impaired by laryngospasm or
tonic contraction of respiratory
muscles which prevent
adequate ventilation. Hypoxia
may then lead to irreversible
central nervous system damage
and death.
Mild tetanus is characterized by
an incubation period of at least
14 days and an onset time of
more than 6 days. Trismus is
usually present, but dysphagia
is absent and generalized
spasms are brief and mild.
Moderately severe tetanus has
a somewhat shorter incubation
period and onset time; trismus is
marked, dysphagia and
generalized rigidity are present,
but ventilation remains
adequate even during spasms.
The criteria for severe tetanus
include a short incubation time,
and an onset time of 72 hrs., or
less, severe trismus, dysphagia
and rigidity and frequent
prolonged, generalized
convulsive spasms. (Harrison's
Principle of Internal Medicine,
1983 Edition, pp. 1004-1005;
Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, medically speaking, the reaction to
tetanus found inside a man's body depends on
the incubation period of the disease.
In the case at bar, Javier suffered a 2-inch
incised wound on his right palm when he parried
the bolo which Urbano used in hacking him. This
incident took place on October 23, 1980. After
22 days, or on November 14, 1980, he suffered
the symptoms of tetanus, like lockjaw and
muscle spasms. The following day, November
15, 1980, he died.
If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the
appellant was already infected by tetanus germs
at the time, it is more medically probable that
Javier should have been infected with only a
mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms of
tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the
hacking incident or more than 14 days after the
infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time
should have been more than six days. Javier,
however, died on the second day from the onset
time. The more credible conclusion is that at the
time Javier's wound was inflicted by the
appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed
him was not yet present. Consequently, Javier's
wound could have been infected with tetanus
after the hacking incident. Considering the
circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his
wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or
3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died.
The rule is that the death of the victim must be
the direct, natural, and logical consequence of
the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused.
(People v. Cardenas, supra) And since we are
dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that
the accused caused the victim's death must
convince a rational mind beyond reasonable
doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to
a distinct possibility that the infection of the
wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening
cause later or between the time Javier was
wounded to the time of his death. The infection
was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.
(People v. Rellin, 77 Phil. 1038).
Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that the
wound was but the remote cause and its
subsequent infection, for failure to take
necessary precautions, with tetanus may have
been the proximate cause of Javier's death with
which the petitioner had nothing to do. As we
ruled in Manila Electric Co. v. Remoquillo, et al.
(99 Phil. 118).
"A prior and remote cause
cannot be made the be of an
action if such remote cause did
nothing more than furnish the
condition or give rise to the
occasion by which the injury
was made possible, if there
intervened between such prior
or remote cause and the injury a
distinct, successive, unrelated,
and efficient cause of the injury,
even though such injury would
not have happened but for such
condition or occasion. If no
danger existed in the condition
except because of the
independent cause, such
condition was not the proximate
cause. And if an independent
negligent act or defective
condition sets into operation the
instances which result in injury
because of the prior defective
condition, such subsequent act
or condition is the proximate
cause." (45 C.J. pp. 931-932).
(at p. 125)
It strains the judicial mind to allow a clear
aggressor to go scot free of criminal liability. At
the very least, the records show he is guilty of
inflicting slight physical injuries. However, the
petitioner's criminal liability in this respect was
wiped out by the victim's own act. After the
hacking incident, Urbano and Javier used the
facilities of barangay mediators to effect a
compromise agreement where Javier forgave
Urbano while Urbano defrayed the medical
expenses of Javier. This settlement of minor
offenses is allowed under the express provisions
of Presidential Decree G.R. No. 1508, Section
2(3). (See also People v. Caruncho, 127 SCRA
16).
We must stress, however, that our discussion of
proximate cause and remote cause is limited to
the criminal aspects of this rather unusual case.
It does not necessarily follow that the petitioner
is also free of civil liability. The well-settled
doctrine is that a person, while not criminally
liable, may still be civilly liable. Thus, in the
recent case of People v. Rogelio Ligon y Tria, et
al. (G.R. No. 74041, July 29, 1987), we said:
xxx xxx xxx
... While the guilt of the accused
in a criminal prosecution must
be established beyond
reasonable doubt, only a
preponderance of evidence is
required in a civil action for
damages. (Article 29, Civil
Code). The judgment of
acquittal extinguishes the civil
liability of the accused only
when it includes a declaration
that the facts from which the
civil liability might arise did not
exist. (Padilla v. Court of
Appeals, 129 SCRA 559).
The reason for the provisions of
article 29 of the Civil Code,
which provides that the acquittal
of the accused on the ground
that his guilt has not been
proved beyond reasonable
doubt does not necessarily
exempt him from civil liability for
the same act or omission, has responsibility,
been explained by the Code and to
Commission as follows: determine the
logical result of
The old rule that the distinction.
the acquittal of The two
the accused in liabilities are
a criminal case separate and
also releases distinct from
him from civil each other. One
liability is one of affects the
the most social order and
serious flaws in the other,
the Philippine private rights.
legal system. It One is for the
has given use punishment or
to numberless correction of the
instances of offender while
miscarriage of the other is for
justice, where reparation of
the acquittal damages
was due to a suffered by the
reasonable aggrieved party.
doubt in the The two
mind of the responsibilities
court as to the are so different
guilt of the from each other
accused. The that article 1813
reasoning of the present
followed is that (Spanish) Civil
inasmuch as Code reads
the civil thus: "There
responsibility is may be a
derived from the compromise
criminal upon the civil
offense, when action arising
the latter is not from a crime;
proved, civil but the public
liability cannot action for the
be demanded. imposition of
the legal
This is one of penalty shall not
thereby be
those causes
extinguished." It
where confused
is just and
thinking leads to
proper that, for
unfortunate and
deplorable the purposes of
consequences. the
imprisonment of
Such reasoning
or fine upon the
fails to draw a
accused, the
clear line of
offense should
demarcation
between be proved
criminal liability beyond
reasonable
and civil
doubt. But for
 the purpose of examined. This aspect of the case calls for fuller
indemnity the development if the heirs of the victim are so
complaining minded.
party, why
should the WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby
offense also be GRANTED. The questioned decision of the then
proved beyond Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of
reasonable Appeals, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
doubt? Is not petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime of
the invasion or homicide. Costs de oficio.
violation of
every private
SO ORDERED.
right to be
proved only by
a G.R. No. 103119 October 21, 1992
preponderance
of evidence? Is SULPICIO INTOD, petitioner,
the right of the vs.
aggrieved HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and
person any less PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
private because
the wrongful act
is also
punishable by CAMPOS, JR., J.:
the criminal
law?
Petitioner, Sulpicio Intod, filed this petition for
review of the decision of the Court of
"For these Appeals 1 affirming in toto the judgment of the
reasons, the Regional Trial Court, Branch XIV, Oroquieta
Commission City, finding him guilty of the crime of attempted
recommends murder.
the adoption of
the reform
From the records, we gathered the following
under
facts.
discussion. It
will correct a
serious defect In the morning of February 4, 1979, Sulpicio
in our law. It will Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio and
close up an Avelino Daligdig went to Salvador Mandaya's
inexhaustible house in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis
source of Occidental and asked him to go with them to the
injustice-a house of Bernardina Palangpangan. Thereafter,
cause for Mandaya and Intod, Pangasian, Tubio and
disillusionment Daligdig had a meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan.
on the part of He told Mandaya that he wanted Palangpangan
the innumerable to be killed because of a land dispute between
persons injured them and that Mandaya should accompany the
or wronged." four (4) men, otherwise, he would also be killed.

The respondent court increased the P12,000.00
indemnification imposed by the trial court to
P30,000.00. However, since the indemnification
was based solely on the finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt in the homicide case, the civil
liability of the petitioner was not thoroughly
At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of the
same day, Petitioner, Mandaya, Pangasian,
Tubio and Daligdig, all armed with firearms,
arrived at Palangpangan's house in Katugasan,
Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental. At the
instance of his companions, Mandaya pointed
the location of Palangpangan's bedroom.
Thereafter, Petitioner, Pangasian, Tubio and
Daligdig fired at said room. It turned out,
however, that Palangpangan was in another City
and her home was then occupied by her son-in-
law and his family. No one was in the room
when the accused fired the shots. No one was
hit by the gun fire.
Petitioner and his companions were positively
identified by witnesses. One witness testified
that before the five men left the premises, they
shouted: "We will kill you (the witness) and
especially Bernardina Palangpangan and we will
come back if (sic) you were not injured". 2
After trial, the Regional Trial Court convicted
Intod of attempted murder. The court (RTC), as
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, holding that
Petitioner was guilty of attempted murder.
Petitioner seeks from this Court a modification of
the judgment by holding him liable only for an
impossible crime, citing Article 4(2) of the
Revised Penal Code which provides:
Art. 4(2). CRIMINAL
RESPONSIBILITY. — Criminal
Responsibility shall be incurred:
xxx xxx xxx
2. By any person performing an
act which would be an offense
against persons or
property, were it not for the
inherent impossibility of its
accomplishment or on account
of the employment of
inadequate or ineffectual
means.
Petitioner contends that,
Palangpangan's absence from her room
on the night he and his companions
riddled it with bullets made the crime
inherently impossible.
On the other hand, Respondent People of the
Philippines argues that the crime was not
impossible. Instead, the facts were sufficient to
constitute an attempt and to convict Intod for
attempted murder. Respondent alleged that
there was intent. Further, in its Comment to the
Petition, respondent pointed out that:
. . . The crime of murder was not
consummated, not because of
the inherent impossibility of its
accomplishment (Art. 4(2),
Revised Penal Code), but due
to a cause or accident other
than petitioner's and his
accused's own spontaneous
desistance (Art. 3., Ibid.)
Palangpangan did not sleep at
her house at that time. Had it
not been for this fact, the crime
is possible, not impossible. 3
Article 4, paragraph 2 is an innovation 4 of the
Revised Penal Code. This seeks to remedy the
void in the Old Penal Code where:
. . . it was necessary that the
execution of the act has been
commenced, that the person
conceiving the idea should have
set about doing the deed,
employing appropriate means in
order that his intent might
become a reality, and finally,
that the result or end
contemplated shall have been
physically possible. So long as
these conditions were not
present, the law and the courts
did not hold him criminally
liable. 5
This legal doctrine left social interests entirely
unprotected. 6 The Revised Penal Code,
inspired by the Positivist School, recognizes in
the offender his formidability, 7 and now
penalizes an act which were it not aimed at
something quite impossible or carried out with
means which prove inadequate, would constitute
a felony against person or against
property. 8 The rationale of Article 4(2) is to
punish such criminal tendencies. 9
Under this article, the act performed by the
offender cannot produce an offense against
person or property because: (1) the commission
of the offense is inherently impossible of
accomplishment: or (2) the means employed is
either (a) inadequate or (b) ineffectual. 10
That the offense cannot be produced because
the commission of the offense is inherently
impossible of accomplishment is the focus of this
petition. To be impossible under this clause, the
act intended by the offender must be by its
nature one impossible of
accomplishment. 11 There must be either
impossibility of accomplishing the intended
act 12 in order to qualify the act an impossible
crime.
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended
acts, even if completed, would not amount to a
crime. 13 Thus:
Legal impossibility would apply
to those circumstances where
(1) the motive, desire and
expectation is to perform an act
in violation of the law; (2) there
is intention to perform the
physical act; (3) there is a
performance of the intended
physical act; and (4) the
consequence resulting from the
intended act does not amount to
a crime. 14
The impossibility of killing a person already
dead 15 falls in this category.
On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs
when extraneous circumstances unknown to the
actor or beyond his control prevent the
consummation of the intended crime. 16 One
example is the man who puts his hand in the
coat pocket of another with the intention to steal
the latter's wallet and finds the pocket empty. 17
The case at bar belongs to this category.
Petitioner shoots the place where he thought his
victim would be, although in reality, the victim
was not present in said place and thus, the
petitioner failed to accomplish his end.
One American case had facts almost exactly the
same as this one. In People vs. Lee
Kong, 18 the accused, with intent to kill, aimed
and fired at the spot where he thought the police
officer would be. It turned out, however, that the
latter was in a different place. The accused
failed to hit him and to achieve his intent. The
Court convicted the accused of an attempt to kill.
It held that:
The fact that the officer was not
at the spot where the attacking
party imagined where he was,
and where the bullet pierced the
roof, renders it no less an
attempt to kill. It is well settled
principle of criminal law in this
country that where the criminal
result of an attempt is not
accomplished simply because of
an obstruction in the way of the
thing to be operated upon, and
these facts are unknown to the
aggressor at the time, the
criminal attempt is committed.
In the case of Strokes vs. State, 19 where the
accused failed to accomplish his intent to kill the
victim because the latter did not pass by the
place where he was lying-in wait, the court held
him liable for attempted murder. The court
explained that:
It was no fault of Strokes that
the crime was not committed. . .
. It only became impossible by
reason of the extraneous
circumstance that Lane did not
go that way; and further, that he
was arrested and prevented
from committing the murder.
This rule of the law has
application only where it is
inherently impossible to commit
the crime. It has no application
to a case where it becomes
impossible for the crime to be
committed, either by outside
interference or because of
miscalculation as to a supposed
opportunity to commit the crime
which fails to materialize; in
short it has no application to the
case when the impossibility
grows out of extraneous acts
not within the control of the
party.
In the case of Clark vs. State, 20 the court held
defendant liable for attempted robbery even if
there was nothing to rob. In disposing of the
case, the court quoted Mr. Justice Bishop, to wit:
It being an accepted truth that
defendant deserves punishment
by reason of his criminal intent,
no one can seriously doubt that
 the protection of the public
requires the punishment to be
administered, equally whether in
the unseen depths of the
pocket, etc., what was
supposed to exist was really
present or not. The community
suffers from the mere alarm of
crime. Again: Where the thing
intended (attempted) as a crime
and what is done is a sort to
create alarm, in other words,
excite apprehension that the
evil; intention will be carried out,
the incipient act which the law of
attempt takes cognizance of is
in reason committed.
In State vs. Mitchell, 21 defendant, with intent to
kill, fired at the window of victim's room thinking
that the latter was inside. However, at that
moment, the victim was in another part of the
house. The court convicted the accused of
attempted murder.
The aforecited cases are the same cases which
have been relied upon by Respondent to make
this Court sustain the judgment of attempted
murder against Petitioner. However, we cannot
rely upon these decisions to resolve the issue at
hand. There is a difference between the
Philippine and the American laws regarding the
concept and appreciation of impossible crimes.
In the Philippines, the Revised Penal Code, in
Article 4(2), expressly provided for impossible
crimes and made the punishable. Whereas, in
the United States, the Code of Crimes and
Criminal Procedure is silent regarding this
matter. What it provided for were attempts of the
crimes enumerated in the said Code.
Furthermore, in said jurisdiction, the impossibility
of committing the offense is merely a defense to
an attempt charge. In this regard, commentators
and the cases generally divide the impossibility
defense into two categories: legal versus factual
impossibility. 22 In U.S. vs. Wilson 23 the Court
held that:
. . . factual impossibility of the
commission of the crime is not a
defense. If the crime could have
been committed had the
circumstances been as the
defendant believed them to be,
it is no defense that in reality the
crime was impossible of
commission.
Legal impossibility, on the other hand, is a
defense which can be invoked to avoid criminal
liability for an attempt. In U.S.
vs. Berrigan, 24 the accused was indicated for
attempting to smuggle letters into and out of
prison. The law governing the matter made the
act criminal if done without knowledge and
consent of the warden. In this case, the offender
intended to send a letter without the latter's
knowledge and consent and the act was
performed. However, unknown to him, the
transmittal was achieved with the warden's
knowledge and consent. The lower court held
the accused liable for attempt but the appellate
court reversed. It held unacceptable the
contention of the state that "elimination of
impossibility as a defense to a charge of criminal
attempt, as suggested by the Model Penal Code
and the proposed federal legislation, is
consistent with the overwhelming modern view".
In disposing of this contention, the Court held
that the federal statutes did not contain such
provision, and thus, following the principle of
legality, no person could be criminally liable for
an act which was not made criminal by law.
Further, it said:
Congress has not yet enacted a
law that provides that intent plus
act plus conduct constitutes the
offense of attempt irrespective
of legal impossibility until such
time as such legislative changes
in the law take place, this court
will not fashion a new non-
statutory law of criminal attempt.
To restate, in the United States, where the
offense sought to be committed is factually
impossible or accomplishment, the offender
cannot escape criminal liability. He can be
convicted of an attempt to commit the
substantive crime where the elements of attempt
are satisfied. It appears, therefore, that the act is
penalized, not as an impossible crime, but as an
attempt to commit a crime. On the other hand,
where the offense is legally impossible of
accomplishment, the actor cannot be held liable
for any crime — neither for an attempt not for an
impossible crime. The only reason for this is that
in American law, there is no such thing as an
impossible crime. Instead, it only recognizes
impossibility as a defense to a crime charge —
that is, attempt.
This is not true in the Philippines. In our
jurisdiction, impossible crimes are recognized.
The impossibility of accomplishing the criminal
intent is not merely a defense, but an act
penalized by itself. Furthermore, the phrase
"inherent impossibility" that is found in Article
4(2) of the Revised Penal Code makes no
distinction between factual or physical
impossibility and legal impossibility. Ubi lex non
distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos.
The factual situation in the case at bar present a
physical impossibility which rendered the
intended crime impossible of accomplishment.
And under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised
Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act an
impossible crime.
To uphold the contention of respondent that the
offense was Attempted Murder because the
absence of Palangpangan was a supervening
cause independent of the actor's will, will render
useless the provision in Article 4, which makes a
person criminally liable for an act "which would
be an offense against persons or property, were
it not for the inherent impossibility of its
accomplishment . . ." In that case all
circumstances which prevented the
consummation of the offense will be treated as
an accident independent of the actor's will which
is an element of attempted and frustrated
felonies.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED. the
petition is hereby GRANTED, the decision of
respondent Court of Appeals holding Petitioner
guilty of Attempted Murder is hereby MODIFIED.
We hereby hold Petitioner guilty of an impossible
crime as defined and penalized in Articles 4,
paragraph 2, and 59 of the Revised Penal Code,
respectively. Having in mind the social danger
and degree of criminality shown by Petitioner,
this Court sentences him to suffer the penalty of
six (6) months of arresto mayor, together with
the accessory penalties provided by the law, and
to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES SUPREME
COURT G. R. No. L-3634 Promulgated: May 30,
1951 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-
Appellee, -versusBARTOLO SALADINO and
ANASTACIA ALEJO, Defendants-Appellants.
Present: Paras, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Bengzon,
Tuason, Montemayor, Jugo, & Baustista Angelo,
JJ. DECISION Bartolo Saladino and Anastacio
Alejo have appealed from two decisions of the
court of first instance of Ilocos Norte convicting
them of the murder of Luis Bernabe. Accused in
one information, they asked, and were granted,
separate trials. But with their consent, the
prosecution presented its evidence against both
at the same time. Bartolo Saladino submitted his
defense first. Judge Manuel F. Barcelona found
him guilty and sentenced him to reclusion
perpetua, with the accessories, and to indemnify
the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P6000,
without subsidiary imprisonment, and to pay one
half of the costs. Thereafter Anastacio Alejo
presented his witnesses. Rebuttal and sub-
rebuttal testimony followed. Judge Antonio
Belmonte, convicted and sentenced him to
reclusion perpetua with the accessories, and to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the
amount of P3000 with subsidiary imprisonment
and to pay on half of the costs. In this appeal,
the appellants submitted, by their respective
counsel, two briefs, which the Solicitor-General
answered in one. The evidence for the
prosecution consisted of documentary evidence
and the testimony of five witnesses: Januaria
Corpus, Dr. Juan Pedro Blanco, Melchor
Quevedo, Wilfredo Oaman and Jesus Menor.
These related in substance the following facts
and circumstances: In the night of June 23, 1948
Corporal Bartolo Saladino and Private Anastacia
Alejo of the Philippine Constabulary were resting
in the house of Celso Abucay in Paoay, Ilocos
Norte, together with policemen Melchor
Quevedo, Wilfredo Osman and George Plan of
that municipality. They had gone on patrol duty
to the barrio for the purpose of apprehending
those who on a previous night had fired upon the
dwelling. About midnight they were suddenly
awakened by cries for help. They went down
and were approached by one Felix Pasion who
reported he had been robbed, one of the robbers
being Luis Bernabe. The next morning, Saladino
and Alejo, accompanied by the policemen
proceeded to the house of Luis Bernabe in
Barrio Samac of San Nicolas same province.
Having found the suspect, they brought him, for
questioning, to the residence of Felix Pasion in
Barrio Singao same municipality. It was about
ten in the morning. As Pasion reiterated his
imputation, Saladino led Bernabe up the house
for further investigation. He was followed by
Anastacio Alejo and the policemen. Bernabe
denied the charge. To extract a confession,
Saladino repeatedly boxed and kicked him in
different parts of the body. Bernabe continued
denying his guilt. Saladino got a piece of wood,
two inched thick and one yard long, and clubbed
him several times on the chest, abdomen and
the back. Then he called on Alejo to take his
turn. Alejo reluctantly whipped Bernabe four
times with the branch of a tree, and then retired
to the kitchen. Saladino again questioned his
prisoner and as the latter would not admit his
culpability, he repeated the severe beating, and
tying Bernabe’s wrists together with a rubber
strap, made him stand on a chair, tied the strap
to a beam in the ceiling and then pushed the
chair from under Bernabe with the result that the
latter was left hanging in the air. While in that
position Bernabe was cudgeled by Saladino,
with the wooden club, on the sides, armpits,
stomach, hips and back. It was at this juncture
that policeman Plan interceded for the victim
saying, Stop now corporal. Better bring him to
your headquarters and there you will investigate
him”. But Saladino ignored plea, and resumed
the maltreatment, loudly predicting that Bernabe
would confess before noon. After Bernabe had
remained suspended for five minutes, Saladino
untied him, made him sit on a chair and urged
him to acknowledge his offense. As Bernabe
persisted in his refusal, Saladino kicked the chair
and Bernabe fell on the floor, even as Saladino
pouncing on his captive booted him several
times until the latter lay motionless on the floor.
“It seems he is dead,” Policeman Oaman
exclaimed. Saladino replied “No, he is only
feigning death” and presently stepped on
Bernabe’s throat and chest. Then Saladino let
him alone for fifteen minutes, during which time
Bernabe did not stir nor breathe. An old man
approaching Bernabe and taking his pulse said
that the man was dead. Suddenly realizing his
predicament, Saladino ordered two civilians to
carry Bernabe down and told Alejo: “shoot him
now and we will say that he ran away”.
Complying with the corporal’s order Alejo shot
Bernabe four times with his carbine, after the
latter had been laid down flat on his stomach
about thirty meters away from the house. Three
days afterwards Bernabe was intered. Saladino
lost no time preparing his defense. On that same
day, June 24, he swore before the assistant
fiscal an affidavit stating that, while he was
conversing with Pasion inside the house, Luis
Bernabe was downstairs under the vigilance of
Anastacio Alejo; that four shots were suddenly
heard; and that Alejo, it turned out, had fired at
Bernabe because the latter had attempted to
escape. We also wrote a joint affidavit of the
three policemen corroborating his own version of
the affair. He requested the said officers to sign,
and they had not the courage to decline.
However a few days afterwards the fiscal
quizzed Quevedo, and this man gave a different
story: one that subsequently accorded with the
account given by the People’s witnesses during
the trial. On the witness stand, Bartolo Saladino
stuck to his version, which was corroborated by
Felix Pasion, the man who having charged Luis
Bernabe, was indirectly the cause of the
outrage, and who was understandably interested
in Saladino’s exoneration. However it was
rejected by the trial judge, correctly we believe,
because it was contradicted (1) by the three
policemen who had no reason to falsify (2) by
the nature and direction of the wounds described
by the doctor who saw them, wounds which
could not have been inflicted while Bernabe was
running away and (3) by the discovery of one of
the bullets embedded in the ground underneath
the corpse of Luis Bernabe. There is no doubt in
our minds that this man is guilty of having cruelly
tortured and treacherously caused the death of
Luis Bernabe. On the other hand Anastacio
Alejo admitted having whipped and shot Luis
Bernabe upon orders of Saladino, who allegedly
backed his command to shoot by pointing his
pistol at Alejo. His attorneys also insist that Luis
Bernabe was already dead when Alejo fired at
the corpse. Of course obedience to the order of
a superior official is not an excuse where the
order was not for a lawful purpose. (People v.
Bañaga 54 Phil. 247; People v. Moreno 43 Of.
Gaz. 4644) Like the trial judge, we do not
believe Alejo fired the shots at the point of
Saladino’s gun. We believe the shooting
occurred in the manner described by the
prosecution witnesses. Yet the matter of
Bernabe’s moment of death is of grave doubt.
Two eye-witnesses who declared for the
prosecution, namely, policemen Quevedo and
Oaman repeatedly stated on the witness stand
that after the maltreatment, and before Bernabe
was carried downstairs to be shot, he had
already expired. Policeman Jorge Plan, another
eye-witness confirming Alejo’s testimony
declared that when Bernabe lay flat on the floor
and did not stir, an old man felt his pulse and
pronounced him dead. The medical expert, on
the contrary, asserted that death was due to the
loss of blood occasioned by the three shots that
pierced the body of Bernabe. Alejo’s attorney-
de-officio made a thorough analysis of such
testimony, pointing out that the medical
examination was superficial, because it took
place a few moments before the burial when the
body was already in a “moderately advance
state of decomposition”, and that the conclusion
derived by said expert from the amount of blood
in the garments worn by the corpse which he
examined were not those worn at the time of the
shooting; second because the cadaver had been
embalmed and the stains on the clothing might
have been produced by the embalming fluid that
oozed out; and third because in post-mortem
wounds blood comes out too from the blood
vessels. (Angeles, Legal Medicine Sec. 105) All
of which raise, at least, a doubt that Bernabe,
was already dead when shot. Such doubt must
be resolved in favor of appellant Alejo. From the
foregoing it is plain that Bernabe having died as
a consequence of the violent mauling by
Saladino, the latter must be declared guilty of
assassination. Anastacio Alejo does not appear
to have conspired with him, and is not liable
either as principal or as accomplice of the
murder. But he is guilty as accessory after the
fact for having performed acts tending to conceal
Saladino’s crime by making it appear that
Bernabe had run away. U.S. v. Cuison 20 Phil.
433 is a relevant example. Facundo Balangac
was shot from behind by Private Valentin
Fortuna in the cemetery of Barili, Cebu. “Some
hours afterwards, the defendant Cuison with
several constabulary privates, among them
Valentin Fortuna, went by order of Lieutenant
Poggi to the place where the body of the
deceased lay, and commanded the soldiers to
spread out in skirmish like and discharge their
firearms into the air; then the defendant, with the
private Fortunam, went to the house of Epimaco
Sosa to ask him for a dagger to place beside the
body of a man whom they had shot, thereby to
give the appearance that the deceased had
been carrying a dagger.” This court declared the
defendant Cuison guilty of accessory after the
fact saying: “But we do find criminal liability in
the acts performed by Corporal Cuison, even
though he obeyed orders from his Lieutenant,
Poggi; such liability consists in his having
intervened subsequently to the commission of
the crime, by furnishing the means to make it
appear that the deceased was armed and that it
was necessary to kill him on account of his
resistance to the constabulary man, who, to lend
color to such pretended resistance, discharged
their firearms into the air, under the direction of
Cuison, at the place there where the corpse was
lying; and also consists in his having tried to find
a dagger to place beside the deceased. Such
acts must be characterized as concealment, and
since they are not only wrong but also unlawful,
the defendant is not exempt from liability, even
though he acted in obedience to a command
from his superior, because such command was
illegal and in conflict with law and justice.
Therefore it can not be alleged that obedience
was due, or that it exempts the defendant from
criminal liability.” As accessory after the fact,
Alejo is liable to a penalty lower by two degrees
than that prescribed by law for the consummated
felony of murder, namely, prision correctional in
its maximum period to prision mayor in its
medium period. (Art. 53 in connection with Art.
248 of the Revised Penal Code.) Therefore,
inasmuch as the penalty imposed on appellant
Saladino accords with the law, the judgment
against him is affirmed, with costs. As to
appellant Alejo the appealed decision is revoked
and one will be entered sentencing him to
imprisonment for not less than 3 years of prision
correctional nor more than six years and two
months, of prision mayor; and in case of
insolvency of Saladino to indemnify the heirs of
the deceased in the sum of P6000 without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of his own
inability to pay. No costs against this appellant.
So ordered.