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Rappler, Inc. v. Andres Bautista

G.R. No. 222702 April 5, 2016
(constitutional law; freedom of the press)

FACTS
Rappler, Inc. signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) to sponsor the Presidential
and Vice-Presidential debates. Alleging that it is being discriminated particularly as
regards the MOA provisions on live audio broadcast via online streaming, Rappler
argues that the MOA grants radio stations the right to simultaneously broadcast live
the audio of the debates, even if the radio stations are not obliged to perform any
obligation under the MOA. However, the right to broadcast by online live streaming
the audio of the debates is denied to the petitioner and other online media entities
which also have the capacity to live stream the audio of the debates.

Rappler filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition against COMELEC Chairman
Andres Bautista to nullify MOA provisions on the ground of violating the
fundamental rights protected under the Constitution.

ISSUE
Whether petitioner has the right to live stream the debates

RULING
Yes, Rappler has the right to live stream the debates because the exercise to do so is
its contractual right under the MOA. Under the MOA, as long as it complies with the
copyright conditions for the debates, it can live stream the debates.

The MOA recognizes the right of other mass media entities, not parties to the MOA,
to reproduce the debates subject to the same copyright conditions. The freedom of the
press to report and disseminate the live audio can no longer be infringed or subject to
prior restraint. Such freedom of the press to report and disseminate the live audio of
the debates is now protected and guaranteed under Section 4, Article III of the
Constitution, which provides that, “No law shall be passed abridging the freedom…of
the press.”

The petition was partially granted. The COMELEC Chairman was directed to allow
the debates to be shown or live streamed unaltered on the petitioner’s website subject
to the copyright condition that the source is clearly indicated

CASE 2014-0058: ALROBEN J. GOH, PETITIONER, VERSUS HON. LUCILO

R. BAYRON AND COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RESPONDENTS (G.R.
NO. 212584, 25 NOVEMBER 2014, CARPIO, J.) SUBJECT/S: COMELEC
BUDGET; RECALL ELECTION (BRIEF TITLE:: GOH VS. HON. BAYRON
AND COMELEC).

DISPOSITIVE:

“WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

We PARTIALLY REVERSE and SET ASIDE Resolution No. 9864 insofar as it

directed the suspension of any and all proceedings in the recall petition. We
REVERSE and SET ASIDE Resolution No. 9882, and DIRECT the Commission
on Elections to immediately carry out the recall elections of Mayor Lucilo R.
Bayron of Puerto Princesa City, Palawan in accordance with the provisions of
the Local Government Code and COMELEC Resolution No. 7505.

This Decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.”

SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:

COMELEC SAYS THERE IS NO BUDGET IN THE 2014 GENERAL

APPROPRIATIONS ACT FOR THE CONDUCT OF RECALL ELECTION
AND THEREFORE THEY CANNOT CONDUCT RECALL ELECTIONS. IS
THIS CORRECT?

NO. THE 2014 GAA PROVIDES THE LINE ITEM APPROPRIATION TO

ALLOW COMELEC TO CONDUCT RECALL ELECTIONS.

“We grant the petition. We hold that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing Resolution Nos. 9864 and 9882. The 2014 GAA provides the
line item appropriation to allow the COMELEC to perform its constitutional
mandate of conducting recall elections. There is no need for supplemental
legislation to authorize the COMELEC to conduct recall elections for 2014.”

……………………………………….
TO BE VALID AN APPROPRIATION MUST INDICATE A SPECIFIC
AMOUNT AND A SPECIFIC PURPOSE. DOES THE PURPOSE ‘TO
CONDUCT ELECTIONS’ COVER RECALL ELECTIONS”?

YES. THE PURPOSE MAY BE BROKEN DOWN INTO DIFFERENT

RELATED SUB-CATEGORIES. THEREFORE THE PURPOSE “TO
CONDUCT ELECTIONS” COVERS, EVEN IF NOT EXPRESSLY SPELLED
OUT, REGULAR, SPECIAL AND RECALL ELECTIONS.

“Under these· factual circumstances, we find it difficult to justify the COMELEC

‘s reasons why it is unable to conduct recall elections in 2014 when the
COMELEC was able to conduct recall elections in 2002 despite lack of the
specific words “Conduct and supervision of x x x recall votes x x x” in the 2002
GAA. In the 2002 GAA, the phrase “Conduct and supervision of elections and
other political exercises” was sufficient to fund the conduct of recall elections. In
the 2014 GAA, there is a specific line item appropriation for the “Conduct and
supervision of x x x recall votes x x x.”

More importantly, the COMELEC admits in its Resolution No. 9882 that the
COMELEC has “a line item for the ‘Conduct and supervision of elections,
referenda, recall votes and plebiscites.”‘ This admission of the COMELEC is a
correct interpretation of this specific budgetary appropriation.· To be valid, an
appropriation must indicate a specific amount and a specific purpose. However,
the purpose may be specific even if it is broken down into different related sub-
categories of the same nature. For example, the purpose can be to “conduct
elections,” which even if not expressly spelled out covers regular, special, or
recall elections. The purpose of the appropriation is still specific -to fund
elections, which naturally and logically include, even if not expressly stated, not
only regular but also special or recall elections.

………………………………………….

CAN COMELEC TAP ITS SAVINGS TO FUND THE CONDUCT OF

RECALL ELECTIONS?

YES. IT CAN AUGMENT FROM SAVINGS ITS APPROPRIATIONS FOR

PERSONNEL SERVICES, MAINTENANCE AND OTHER OPERATING
EXPENSES. RECALL ELECTIONS ONLY NEED OPERATING EXEPENSES
BECAUSE THE EXISTING PERSONNEL ARE THE SAME PERSONNEL
WHO WILL EVALUATE THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE RECALL
PETITIONS.

However, contrary to the COMELEC’s assertion, the appropriations for

personnel services and maintenance and other operating expenses falling under
“Conduct and supervision of elections, referenda, recall votes and plebiscites”
constitute a line item which can be augmented from the COMELEC’s savings to
fund the conduct of recall elections in 2014. The conduct of recall elections
requires only operating expenses, not capital outlays. The COMELEC’s existing
personnel in Puerto Princesa are the same personnel who will evaluate the
sufficiency of the recall petitions. and conduct the recall elections
 GMA NETWORK, INC., Petitioner,

vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

G.R. No. 205357 September 2, 2014

PONENTE: Peralta

TOPIC: Freedom of expression, of speech and of the press, airtime limits

FACTS:

The five (5) petitions before the Court put in issue the alleged unconstitutionality
of Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 limiting the broadcast and radio
advertisements of candidates and political parties for national election positions to an
aggregate total of one hundred twenty (120) minutes and one hundred eighty (180)
minutes, respectively. They contend that such restrictive regulation
on allowablebroadcast time violates freedom of the press, impairs the people’s right to
suffrage as well as their right to information relative to the exercise of their right to choose
who to elect during the forthcoming elections

Section 9 (a) provides for an “aggregate total” airtime instead of the previous
“per station” airtime for political campaigns or advertisements, and also required prior
COMELEC approval for candidates’ television and radio guestings and appearances.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 on airtimelimits

violates freedom of expression, of speech and of the press.
HELD:

YES. The Court held that the assailed rule on “aggregate-based” airtimelimits is
unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly restricts and constrains the ability of candidates
and political parties to reach out and communicate with the people. Here, the adverted
reason for imposing the “aggregate-based” airtime limits – leveling the playing field –
does not constitute a compelling state interest which would justify such a substantial
restriction on the freedom of candidates and political parties to communicate their ideas,
philosophies, platforms and programs of government. And, this is specially so in the
absence of a clear-cut basis for the imposition of such a prohibitive measure.

It is also particularly unreasonable and whimsical to adopt the aggregate-based

time limits on broadcast time when we consider that the Philippines is not only composed
of so many islands. There are also a lot of languages anddialects spoken among the
citizens across the country. Accordingly, for a national candidate to really reach out to as
many of the electorates as possible, then it might also be necessary that he conveys his
message through his advertisements in languages and dialects that the people may more
readily understand and relate to. To add all of these airtimes in differentdialects would
greatly hamper the ability of such candidate to express himself – a form of suppression of
his political speech
 G.R. No. 207900 : April 22, 2014

MAYOR GAMAL S. HAYUDINI, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS AND MUSTAPHA J. OMAR,Respondents.

PERALTA, J.:

FACTS:

On October 5, 2012, Hayudini filed his Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for the
position of Municipal Mayor of South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi in the May 13, 2013
National and Local Elections held in the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao. Ten days after, Mustapha J. Omar (Omar) filed a Petition to Deny Due
Course or Cancel Hayudini's CoC. Omar basically asserted that Hayudini should
be disqualified for making false representation regarding his residence. He
claimed that Hayudini declared in his CoC that he is a resident of the
Municipality of South Ubian when, in fact, he resides in Zamboanga City.

Thereafter, Hayudini filed a Petition for Inclusion in the Permanent List of Voters
in Barangay Bintawlan, South Ubian before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC). Despite the opposition of Ignacio Aguilar Baki, the MCTC granted
Hayudini's petition on January 31, 2013. On that same day, the COMELEC's First
Division dismissed Omar's earlier petition to cancel Hayudini's CoC for lack of
substantial evidence that Hayudini committed false representation as to his
residency.

Oppositor Baki, subsequently, elevated the case to the Bongao Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 5. The RTC, on March 8, 2013, reversed the MCTC ruling
and ordered the deletion of Hayudini's name in Barangay Bintawlan's permanent
list of voters. In view of said decision, Omar filed before the COMELEC a Petition
to Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of Gamal S. Hayudini by Virtue of a
Supervening Event on March 26, 2013.

Hayudini appealed the March 8, 2013 RTC decision to the Court of Appeals but
was denied.

On May 13, 2013, Hayudini won the mayoralty race in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi.
He was proclaimed and, consequently, took his oath of office.

On June 20, 2013, the COMELEC Second Division issued a Resolution granting
 Omars second petition to cancel Hayudini's CoC.

Hayudini, thus, filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the COMELEC En Banc,
arguing that its Second Division committed grave error when it gave due course
to a belatedly filed petition and treated the March 8, 2013 RTC Decision as a
supervening event. The COMELEC En Banc denied Hayudinis Motion for
Reconsideration for lack of merit. The COMELEC declared Omar as the mayor.

Thus, Hayudini filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition.

Hayudini mainly advances the following arguments:

ISSUES: Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion

in declaring Omar as the duly-elected mayor

HELD: The Court finds the petition to be without merit.

REMEDIAL LAW: special civil action for certiorari under rule 65;
grave abuse of discretion

A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is an independent action based
on the specific grounds and available only if there is no appeal or any other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. It will only prosper if
grave abuse of discretion is alleged and is actually proved to exist.

Grave abuse of discretion has been defined as the arbitrary exercise of power due
to passion, prejudice or personal hostility; or the whimsical, arbitrary, or
capricious exercise of power that amounts to an evasion or refusal to perform a
positive duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law. For an act to
be condemned as having been done with grave abuse of discretion, such an abuse
must be patent and gross.

Here, Hayudini miserably failed to prove that the COMELEC rendered its
assailed Resolutions with grave abuse of discretion.

POLITICAL LAW: COMELEC rules of procedures; liberal construction

Hayudini contends that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion

when it admitted, and lPOLITICAL LAW: COMELEC rules of procedures;
liberal construction
 Hayudini contends that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
when it admitted, and later granted, Omars petition despite failure to comply
with Sections 2 and 4 of Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as
amended by Resolution No. 9523. The subject sections read:

Section 2. Period to File Petition. The Petition must be filed within five (5) days
from the last day for filing of certificate of candidacy; but not later than twenty
five (25) days from the time of filing of the certificate of candidacy subject of the
Petition. In case of a substitute candidate, the Petition must be filed within five
(5) days from the time the substitute candidate filed his certificate of candidacy.

xxxx

Notwithstanding the aforementioned procedural missteps, the Court sustains the

COMELECs liberal treatment of Omars petition.

As a general rule, statutes providing for election contests are to be liberally

construed in order that the will of the people in the choice of public officers may
not be defeated by mere technical objections. Moreover, it is neither fair nor just
to keep in office, for an indefinite period, one whose right to it is uncertain and
under suspicion. It is imperative that his claim be immediately cleared, not only
for the benefit of the winner but for the sake of public interest, which can only be
achieved by brushing aside technicalities of procedure that protract and delay the
trial of an ordinary action. This principle was reiterated in the cases of Tolentino
v. Commission on Elections and De Castro v. Commission on Elections, where
the Court held that in exercising its powers and jurisdiction, as defined by its
mandate to protect the integrity of elections, the COMELEC must not be
straitjacketed by procedural rules in resolving election disputes.

Settled is the rule that the COMELEC Rules of Procedure are subject to liberal
construction. The COMELEC has the power to liberally interpret or even suspend
its rules of procedure in the interest of justice, including obtaining a speedy
disposition of all matters pending before it. This liberality is for the purpose of
promoting the effective and efficient implementation of its objectives - ensuring
the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections, as well as
achieving just, expeditious, and inexpensive determination and disposition of
every action and proceeding brought before the COMELEC. Unlike an ordinary
civil action, an election contest is imbued with public interest. It involves not only
the adjudication of private and pecuniary interests of rival candidates, but also
the paramount need of dispelling the uncertainty which beclouds the real choice
of the electorate. And the tribunal has the corresponding duty to ascertain, by all
means within its command, whom the people truly chose as their rightful leader.

REMEDIAL LAW: supervening event

Given the finality of the RTC decision, the same should be considered a valid
supervening event. A supervening event refers to facts and events transpiring
after the judgment or order had become executory. These circumstances affect or
change the substance of the judgment and render its execution inequitable. Here,
the RTCs March 8, 2013 decision, ordering the deletion of Hayudinis name in the
list of voters, which came after the dismissal of Omars first petition, is
indubitably a supervening event which would render the execution of the ruling
in SPA No. 13106(DC)(F) iniquitous and unjust. As the COMELEC aptly ruled,
the decision to exclude Hayudini was still non-existent when the COMELEC first
promulgated the Resolution in SPA No. 13-106(DC)(F) on January 31, 2013, or
when the issues involved therein were passed upon. 27 The First Division even
expressed that although the Election Registration Board (ERB) denied Hayudinis
application for registration, it could not adopt the same because it was not yet
final as Hayudini was still to file a Petition for Inclusion before the MCTC. Thus,
it is not far-fetched to say that had this final RTC finding been existent before, the
COMELEC First Division could have taken judicial notice of it and issued a
substantially different ruling in SPA No. 13-106(DC)(F).

POLITICAL LAW: false representation in the certificate of candidacy

The same ruling adequately equipped Omar with the necessary ground to
successfully have Hayudinis CoC struck down. Under the rules, a statement in a
certificate of candidacy claiming that a candidate is eligible to run for public
office when in truth he is not, is a false material representation, a ground for a
petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Sections 74 and 78 read:

Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. The certificate of candidacy shall

state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated
therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the Batasang
Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly urbanized city or
district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to which he
belongs; civil status; his date \of birth; residence; his post office address for all
 election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support and defend
the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance
thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the
duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to
a foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily,
without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the
certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.

Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. A

verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy
may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The
petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of
the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and
hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.

The false representation mentioned in these provisions must pertain to a material

fact, not to a mere innocuous mistake. A candidate who falsifies a material fact
cannot run; if he runs and is elected, cannot serve; in both cases, he or she can be
prosecuted for violation of the election laws. These facts pertain to a candidate's
qualification for elective office, such as his or her citizenship and residence.
Similarly, the candidate's status as a registered voter falls under this classification
as it is a legal requirement which must be reflected in the CoC. The reason for this
is obvious: the candidate, if he or she wins, will work for and represent the local
government under which he or she is running. Even the will of the people, as
expressed through the ballot, cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if
they mistakenly believed, as in the instant case, that the candidate was qualified.

Aside from the requirement of materiality, a false representation under Section

78 must consist of a "deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact
which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible." Simply put, it must be
made with a malicious intent to deceive the electorate as to the potential
candidate's qualifications for public office.

Section 74 requires the candidate to state under oath in his CoC "that he is
eligible for said office." A candidate is eligible if he has a right to run for the
public office. If a candidate is not actually eligible because he is not a registered
voter in the municipality where he intends to be elected, but still he states under
oath in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to run for public office, then
the candidate clearly makes a false material representation, a ground to support a
 petition under Section 78. It is interesting to note that Hayudini was, in fact,
initially excluded by the ERB as a voter. On November 30, 2012, the ERB issued a
certificate confirm in the disapproval of Hayudini's petition for registration. This
is precisely the reason why he needed to file a Petition for Inclusion in the
Permanent List of Voters in Barangay Bintawlan before the MCTC. Thus, when
he stated in his CoC that he is eligible for said office," Hayudini made a clear and
material misrepresentation as to his eligibility, because he was not, in fact,
registered as a voter in Barangay Bintawlan.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

Civil Service Commission v. Cortes G.R. No.

200103 April 23, 2014 Nepotism, Powers and
Duties of Public Officers
AUGUST 17, 2018

FACTS:

Commission En Banc of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) issued a Resolution

approving the appointment to the position of Information Officer V (IO V) of respondent
Maricelle M. Cortes. Commissioner Eligio P. Mallari, father of respondent Cortes, abstained
from voting and requested the CHR to render an opinion on the legality of the respondent’s
appointment.

The CHR Legal Division Chief rendered an opinion that respondent Cortes’ appointment is not
covered by the rule on nepotism because the appointing authority, the Commission En Banc, has
a personality distinct and separate from its members. CHR Chairperson Quisumbing, however,
sent respondent a letter on the same day instructing her not to assume her position because her
appointment is not yet complete.

Later, CSC-NCR Field Office informed Chairperson Quisumbing that it will conduct an
investigation on the appointment of respondent Cortes.
Director Cornelio of the CSC-NCR Field Office informed Chairperson Quisumbing that the
appointment of respondent Cortes is not valid because it is covered by the rule on nepotism
under Section 9 of the Revised Omnibus Rules on Appointments and Other Personnel Actions.
According to the CSC-NCR, Commissioner Mallari is considered an appointing authority with
respect to respondent Cortes despite being a mere member of the Commission En Banc.

ISSUE:

Whether the appointment of respondent Cortes as IO V in the CHR is not covered by the
prohibition against nepotism.

RULING:

Nepotism is defined as an appointment issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree
of consanguinity or affinity of any of the following:

(1) appointing authority;

(2) recommending authority;

(3) chief of the bureau or office; and (4) person exercising immediate supervision over the
appointee.

Here, it is undisputed that respondent Cortes is a relative of Commissioner Mallari in the first
degree of consanguinity, as in fact Cortes is the daughter of Commissioner Mallari.
By way of exception, the following shall not be covered by the prohibition:

(1) persons employed in a confidential capacity;

(2) teachers;

(3) physicians; and

(4) members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

In the present case, however, the appointment of respondent Cortes as IO V in the CHR does not
fall to any of the exemptions provided by law.

In her defense, respondent Cortes merely raises the argument that the appointing authority
referred to in Section 59 of the Administrative Code is the Commission En Banc and not the
individual Commissioners who compose it.

The purpose of Section 59 on the rule against nepotism is to take out the discretion of the
appointing and recommending authority on the matter of appointing or recommending for
appointment a relative.

Clearly, the prohibition against nepotism is intended to apply to natural persons. It is one
pernicious evil impeding the civil service and the efficiency of its personnel.

Indeed, it is absurd to declare that the prohibitive veil on nepotism does not include appointments
made by a group of individuals acting as a body.

What cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly. This principle is elementary and does
not need explanation. Certainly, if acts that cannot be legally done directly can be done
indirectly, then all laws would be illusory.
In the present case, respondent Cortes’ appointment as IO V in the CHR by the Commission En
Banc, where his father is a member, is covered by the prohibition.

Commissioner Mallari’s abstention from voting did not cure the nepotistic character of the
appointment because the evil sought to be avoided by the prohibition still exists. His mere
presence during the deliberation for the appointment of IO V created an impression of influence
and cast doubt on the impartiality and neutrality of the Commission En Banc.

The CSC-NCR Decisioninvalidating the appointment of respondent Maricelle M. Cortes for

being nepotistic was REINSTATED.

147066, March 26 2001

FACTS:

Petitioner Akbayan Youth seek to direct the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to conduct a special registration before May 2001

General Elections for new voters ages 18 to 21. According to petitioners, around four million youth failed to register on or before the

December 27, 2000 deadline set by the respondent COMELEC under Republic Act No. 8189.

A request to conduct a two-day additional registration of new voters on February 17 and 18, 2001 was passed but it was denied by the

COMELEC. Section 8 of Republic Act No. 8189 explicitly provides that no registration shall be conducted during the period starting one

hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and that the Commission has no more time left to accomplish all pre-election activities.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court can compel respondent COMELEC, to conduct a special registration of new voters during the period between

the COMELEC’s imposed December 27, 2000 deadline and the May 14, 2001 general elections.

HELD:
The Supreme Court could not compel Comelec to conduct a special registration of new voters. The right to suffrage is not absolute and

must be exercised within the proper bounds and framework of the Constitution. Petitioners failed to register, thus missed their chance.

However, court took judicial notice of the fact that the President issued a proclamation calling Congress to a Special Session to allow the

conduct of special registration for new voters and that bills had been filed in Congress to amend Republic Act No. 8189.

LABELS: 1987 CONSTITUTION AKBAYAN YOUTH VS. COMELECCASE

DIGEST CONSTITUTIONAL LAW G.R. NO. 147066 M

Gonzales v Comelec G.R No. 192856

March 18, 2011
Facts: Petitioner Fernando Gonzales and Reno Lim both filed certificates of candidacy for the position of
Representative of the 3rd district of Albay in the May 10, 2010 election. Lim was the incumbent Congressman
while Gonzales was the former Governor of Albay. On March 30, 2010 a petiton for disqualification and
cancellation of certificate of candidacy was filed by Stephen Bichara on the ground that Gonzales is a Spanish
national, being the legitimate child of a spanish father and a filipino mother, and that failed to elect Philippines
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority in accordance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act no.
625. And that his certificate of candidacy contains misleading information. The Comelec second division
division disqualified Gonzales in the forthcoming National and Local elections. Gonzales thru counsel,
received a copy of the aforesaid resolution on May 11, 2010. Lim petitioned the Provincial Board of
Canvassers to consider the votes cast for Gonzales as stray or not counted and/or suspend his proclamation,
citing the second division’s May 8, 2010 resolution disqualifying Gonzales as a candidate. PBOC dismissed
the petition stating that the period for filing the of a motion for reconsideration of the comelec resolution has
not yet elapsed, and hence, the same is not yet final and executory. Based on the results of the counting,
Gonzales emerged as the winner having garnered a total vote of 96000 while Lim ranked second with a vote of
68701 votes. On May 12, 2010, PBOC officially proclaimed Gonzales as the duly elected Representative of
the 3rd district of Albay.

Issue: WON the Comelec has jurisdiction over a Representative which was officially proclaimed as a winner.

Held: We have constantly held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and
assumed office as a member of the house of rep. the comelec’s jurisdiction over election, returns, and
qualifications ends and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. We declared that the court does not have
jurisdiction to pass upon the eligibility of the private respondent who was already a member of the house at the
time of the filing of the petition for cerctiorari.
NO. 191771, MAY 06, 2010
 LIBERAL PARTY, REPRESENTED BY ITS
PRESIDENT MANUEL A. ROXAS II AND SECRETARY
GENERAL JOSEPH EMILIO A.
ABAYA,PETITIONERVS.COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS,NACIONALISTA PARTY, REPRESENTED
BY ITS PRESIDENT MANUEL B. VILLAR AND
NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION, ALLEGEDLY
REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN FAUSTINO S. DY,
JR.,
RESPONDENTS.

FACTS:

On February 12, 2010, the LP filed with the COMELEC its petition for accreditation as dominant minority
party. On the same date, the Nacionalista Party (NP) and the Nationalist People's Coalition (NPC) filed a
petition for registration as a coalition (NP-NPC) and asked that "it be recognized and accredited as the
dominant minority party for purposes of the May 10, 2010 elections." It was docketed as an SPP (DM) case,
indicating - pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 8752 - that it was an accreditation case

On February 12, 2010, the LP filed with the COMELEC its petition for accreditation as dominant minority
party. On the same date, the Nacionalista Party (NP) and the Nationalist People's Coalition (NPC) filed a
petition for registration as a coalition (NP-NPC) and asked that "it be recognized and accredited as the
dominant minority party for purposes of the May 10, 2010 elections." It was docketed as an SPP (DM) case,
indicating - pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 8752 - that it was an accreditation case.

ISSUES:

I. Preliminary Issues:

A. Should the petition be dismissed outright for procedural and technical infirmities?

B. Is the present petition premature since its object is to foreclose a ruling on the unsettled NP-NPC issue?
 C. Is the NP-NPC petition before the COMELEC, viewed as a petition for registration, time-barred?

D. Is the NP-NPC an "operative fact" that the COMELEC simply has to note and recognize without need of
registration?

II. Does the en banc have jurisdiction at the first instance to entertain the petition?

III. On the merits and assuming that the en banc has jurisdiction, did it gravely abuse its discretion when it
allowed the registration of the NP-NPC?

A. Was due process observed in granting the registration?

B. Did the coalition take place as required by law:

i. in terms of compliance with internal rules of the NP and the NPC?

ii.in terms of the consent to or support for, and the lack of objection to, the

coalition?

RULING:

The court see every reason to be liberal in the present case in view of interests involved which are
indisputably important to the coming electoral exercise now fast approaching. The registration of political
parties, their accreditation as dominant parties, and the benefits these recognitions provide - particularly,
the on-line real time electronic transmission of election results from the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI)
through the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machines; the immediate access to official election
results; the per diems from the government that watchers of accredited parties enjoy; and the
representation at the printing, storage and distribution of ballots that the dominant-party status brings -
constitute distinct advantages to any party and its candidates, if only in terms of the ready information
enabling them to react faster to developing situations. The value of these advantages exponentially rises
in an election under an automated system whose effectiveness and reliability, even at this late stage, are
question marks to some. To the public, the proper registration and the accreditation of dominant parties are
evidence of equitable party representation at the scene of electoral action, and translate in no small
measure to transparency and to the election's credibility, by-passing the technical and procedural questions
raised that do not anyway affect the integrity of the petition before us or prejudice the parties involved, and
concentrating as well on the issues that would resolve the case soonest so that the parties involved and
the COMELEC can move on to their assigned time-sensitive roles and tasks in the coming elections.
The respondents placed in issue defects in the attachments to the petition, their objection is a formal one
as they do not deny the existence and basic correctness of these attachments. We see no resulting harm
or prejudice therefore if we overrule the objection raised, given the weight of the counterbalancing factors
we considered above.

When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the
jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it did, every error committed by a court would
deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. This cannot be allowed.
The administration of justice would not survive such a rule. Consequently, an error of judgment that the
court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not correctable through the original civil action
of certiorari."

The root of the present petition is the NP-NPC petition before the COMELEC forregistration as a coalition
and accreditation as the dominant minority party. While the en banc claimed that it had jurisdiction over the
registration of coalitions and in fact decreed the NP-NPC's registration, it strangely did not rule on the
accreditation aspect of the petition.

The registration of a coalition and the accreditation of a dominant minority party are two separate matters
that are substantively distinct from each other. Registration is the act that bestows juridical personality for
purposes of our election laws; accreditation, on the other hand, relates to the privileged participation that
our election laws grant to qualified registered parties.

Where the registration is flawed for having been attended by grave abuse of discretion, as alleged in the
petition, the filing of a petition for prohibition with a prayer for a preliminary injunction can only be expected
as a logical remedial move; otherwise, accreditation, unless restrained, will follow. Thus, from the point of
view of prohibition, there is absolutely no prematurity as its avowed intent is in fact to forestall an event -
the accreditation - that according to the assailed Resolution shall soon take place. From the point of view
of the petition for certiorari questioning the registration made, no prematurity issue is involved as the
nullification of a past and accomplished act is prayed for. From these perspectives, the OSG objection
based on prematurity is shown to be completely groundless.

In fact, no substantial distinction exists among these entities germane to the act of registration that would
justify creating distinctions among them in terms of deadlines. Such distinctions in the deadlines for the
registration of political organizations and coalitions, if allowed, may even wreak havoc on the procedural
orderliness of elections by allowing these registrations to introduce late and confusing signals to the
electorate, not to mention their possible adverse effects on election systems and procedures. This, the en
banc very well knows, and their lack of unanimity on the disputed point of timeliness shows how unusual
the majority's reading has been.

We note in this regard that the registration of parties is the first in a list of election-related activities that
peaks in the voting on May 10, 2010. This list takes into account the close step-by-step procedure
the COMELEC has to undertake in implementing the automated election system (AES). We note, too, that
a closely related activity is the holding of political conventions to select and nominate official party
candidates for all election positions, scheduled on October 21, 2009, and November 20, 2009 was the
deadline for the filing of the certificates of candidacy for all elective positions - an undertaking that required
the candidates' manifestation of their official party affiliation. There is also a host of election activities in
which officially registered parties have to participate, principally: the examination and testing of equipment
or devices for the AES and the opening of source codes for review; the nomination of official watchers; and
the printing, storage and distribution of official ballots wherein accredited political parties may assign
watchers. Of course, registered political parties have very significant participation on election day, during
the voting and thereafter; theCOMELEC needs to receive advance information and make arrangements on
which ones are the registered political parties, organizations and coalitions.

All these are related to show that the COMELEC deadline cannot but be mandatory; the whole electoral
exercise may fail or at least suffer disruptions, if the deadlines are not observed. For this reason,
the COMELEC has in the past in fact rejected applications for registration for having been filed out of time.
A case in point is the application of the political party Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc., where
the COMELEC denied the plea for registration for having been filed out of time,among other grounds.
Philippine Guardians Brotherhood might not have been the only political party whose application for
registration was denied at the COMELEC level for late filing. We are sure that all these other organizations
would now cry foul - and rightly so - because of the denial of their applications on the ground of late filing,
when the NP-NPC has been made an exception without rhyme or reason.

Given the mandatory nature of the deadline, subject only to a systemic change the en banc acted in excess
of its jurisdiction when it granted the registration of NP-NPC as a coalition beyond the deadline
the COMELEC itself had set; the authority to register political parties under mandatory terms is only up to
the deadline. Effectively, the mandatory deadline is a jurisdictional matter that should have been satisfied
and was not.

Political coalitions need to register in accordance with the established norms and procedures, if they are to
be recognized as such and be given the benefits accorded by law to registered coalitions. Registered
political parties carry a different legal personality from that of the coalition they may wish to establish with
other similarly registered parties. If they want to coalesce with one another without the formal registration
of their coalition, they can do so on their own in the exercise of their and their members' democratic freedom
of choice, but they cannot receive official recognition for their coalition. Or they can choose to secure the
registration of their coalition in order to be accorded the privileges accruing to registered coalitions, including
the right to be accredited as a dominant majority or minority party. There are no ifs and buts about these
constitutional terms.

The court solely rule for now that the en banc gravely abused its discretion when it disregarded its own
deadline in ruling on the registration of the NP-NPC as a coalition. In so ruling, we emphasize that the
matter of party registration raises critical election concerns that should be handled with discretion
commensurate with the importance of elections to our democratic system. The COMELEC should be at its
most strict in implementing and complying with the standards and procedures the Constitution and our laws
impose.

the court grants the petition and nullify and set aside the Resolution of the Commission on Elections dated
April 12, 2010 in the application for registration of the Nacionalista Party-Nationalist People's Coalition as
a political coalition, docketed as SPP-10-(DM). The Commission on Elections is DECLARED
BARRED from granting accreditation to the proposed NP-NPC Coalition in the May 10, 2010 elections for
lack of the requisite registration as a political coalition. This Decision is declared immediately executory.

(G.R. NO. 191124; APRIL 27, 2010)

CASE DIGEST: LUIS A. ASISTIO, Petitioner, v. HON. THELMA
CANLAS TRINIDAD-PE AGUIRRE, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Caloocan City, Branch 129; HON. ARTHUR O. MALABAGUIO,
Presiding Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court, Caloocan City, Branch 52;
ENRICO R. ECHIVERRI, Board of Election Inspectors of Precinct
1811A, Barangay 15, Caloocan City; and the CITY ELECTION OFFICER,
Caloocan City, Respondents. (G.R. No. 191124; April 27, 2010).

FACTS: On January 26, 2010, private respondent Enrico R. Echiverri

(Echiverri) filed against petitioner Luis A. Asistio (Asistio) a Petition for
Exclusion of Voter from the Permanent List of Voters of Caloocan City (Petition
for Exclusion) before the MeTC, Branch 52,Caloocan City presided over by public
respondent Judge Arthur O. Malabaguio. Echiverri alleged that Asistio is not a
resident of Caloocan City, specifically not of123 Interior P. Zamora St.,Barangay
15,Caloocan City, the address stated in his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for
Mayor in the 2010 Automated National and Local Elections. Echiverri, also a
candidate for Mayor of Caloocan City, was the respondent in a Petition to Deny
Due Course and/or Cancellation of the Certificate of Candidacy filed by Asistio.
According to Echiverri, when he was about to furnish Asistio a copy of his Answer
to the latters petition, he found out that Asistios address is non-existent. To
support this, Echiverri attached to his petition a Certification issued by the
Tanggapan ng Punong Barangay of Barangay 15 Central, Zone 2, District II of
Caloocan City. He mentioned that, upon verification of the 2009 Computerized
Voters List (CVL) for Barangay 15, Asistios name appeared under voter number
8, with address at 109 Libis Gochuico,Barangay 15,Caloocan City. Judge
Malabaguio rendered a decision removing the name of Asistio from the list of
permanent voters of Caloocan City.

Meanwhile, Echiverri filed with the COMELEC a Petition for

Disqualification,which was docketed as SPA No. 10-013 (DC). The Petition was
anchored on the grounds that Asistio is not a resident ofCaloocanCityand that he
had been previously convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Asistio, in his
Answer with Special and Affirmative Defenses (Com Memorandum),raised the
same arguments with respect to his residency and also argued that the President
of thePhilippines granted him an absolute pardon.

ISSUE: Should Asistios name be removed from the permanent list of

voters in Precinct 1811A of Caloocan City?
HELD: The right to vote is a most precious political right, as well as a bounden
duty of every citizen, enabling and requiring him to participate in the process of
government to ensure that it can truly be said to derive its power solely from the
consent of its constituents. Time and again, it has been said that every Filipinos
right to vote shall be respected, upheld, and given full effect. A citizen cannot be
disenfranchised for the flimsiest of reasons. Only on the most serious grounds,
and upon clear and convincing proof, may a citizen be deemed to have forfeited
this precious heritage of freedom. In this case, even if the appellate docket fees
were not filed on time, this incident alone should not thwart the proper
determination and resolution of the instant case on substantial grounds. Blind
adherence to a technicality, with the inevitable result of frustrating and nullifying
the constitutionally guaranteed right of suffrage, cannot be countenanced.

The residency requirement of a voter is at least one (1) year residence in the
Philippines and at least six (6) months in the place where the person proposes or
intends to vote. Residence, as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for
suffrage and for elective office, is doctrinally settled to mean domicile, importing
not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that
place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention inferable from a persons
acts, activities, and utterances. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence
where, when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to
return. In the consideration of circumstances obtaining in each particular case,
three rules must be borne in mind, namely: (1) that a person must have a
residence or domicile somewhere; (2) once established, it remains until a new
one is acquired; and (3) that a person can have but one residence or domicile at a
time.

Domicile is not easily lost. To successfully effect a transfer thereof, one must
demonstrate: (1) an actual removal or change of domicile; (2) a bona fide
intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new
one; and (3) acts which correspond with that purpose. There must be animus
manendi coupled with animo non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the
domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of
residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new
domicile must be actual.

Asistio has always been a resident of Caloocan City since his birth or for more
than 72 years. His family is known to be among the prominent political families
in Caloocan City. In fact, Asistio served in public office as Caloocan City Second
District representative in the House of Representatives, having been elected as
such in the 1992, 1995, 1998, and 2004 elections. In 2007, he also sought election
as City Mayor. In all of these occasions, Asistio cast his vote in the same city.
Taking these circumstances into consideration, gauged in the light of the
doctrines above enunciated, it cannot be denied that Asistio has qualified, and
continues to qualify, as a voter of Caloocan City. There is no showing that he has
established domicile elsewhere, or that he had consciously and voluntarily
abandoned his residence in Caloocan City. He should, therefore, remain in the
list of permanent registered voters of Precinct No. 1811A,Barangay 15,Caloocan
 City.

That Asistio allegedly indicated in his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor, both for
the 2007 and 2010 elections, a non-existent or false address, or that he could not
be physically found in the address he indicated when he registered as a voter,
should not operate to exclude him as a voter of Caloocan City. These purported
misrepresentations in Asistios COC, if true, might serve as basis for an election
offense under the Omnibus Election Code (OEC),or an action to deny due course
to the COC.But they do not serve as proof that Asistio has abandoned his domicile
in Caloocan City, or that he has established residence outside of Caloocan
City. GRANTED.

JAPSON VS. COMELEC CASE DIGEST

Topic: Dual Citizenship/ Dual Allegiance

JAPSON VS. COMELEC
Facts:
 Both petitioner Manuel B. Japzon (Japzon) and private respondent Jaime S. Ty (Ty) were
candidates for the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, in
the local elections held on 14 May 2007.
 Japzon instituted SPA No. 07-568 by filing before the COMELEC a Petition[5] to disqualify and/or
cancel Ty's Certificate of Candidacy on the ground of material misrepresentation. Japzon averred
in his Petition that Ty was a former natural-born Filipino, having been born on 9 October 1943 in
what was then Pambujan Sur, Hernani Eastern Samar (now the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Easter Samar) to spouses Ang Chim Ty (a Chinese) and Crisanta Aranas Sumiguin
(a Filipino).
 Ty eventually migrated to the United States of America (USA) and became a citizen thereof. Ty
had been residing in the USA for the last 25 years. When Ty filed his Certificate of Candidacy on
28 March 2007, he falsely represented therein that he was a resident of Barangay6, Poblacion,
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for one year before 14 May 2007, and was not a permanent
resident or immigrant of any foreign country.
 While Ty may have applied for the reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship, he never actually
resided in Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for a period of one year
immediately preceding the date of election as required under Section 39 of Republic Act No. 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991
 Inspite of having reacquisition in his Philippine citizenship, Ty continued to make trips to the USA,
the most recent of which was on 31 October 2006 lasting until 20 January 2007.
 Ty already took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, he continued to comport
himself as an American citizen as proven by his travel records. He had also failed to renounce his
 foreign citizenship as required by Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship
Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003, or related laws.
 Japzon prayed for in his Petition that the COMELEC order the disqualification of Ty from running
for public office and the cancellation of the latter's Certificate of Candidacy.
 Ty admitted that he was a natural-born Filipino who went to the USA to work and subsequently
became a naturalized American citizen. Ty claimed, however, that prior to filing his Certificate of
Candidacy for the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on
28 March 2007, he already performed the following acts: (1) with the enactment of Republic Act
No. 9225, granting dual citizenship to natural-born Filipinos, Ty filed with the Philippine Consulate
General in Los Angeles, California, USA, an application for the reacquisition of his Philippine
citizenship; (2) on 2 October 2005, Ty executed an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines before Noemi T. Diaz, Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate General in Los
Angeles, California, USA; (3) Ty applied for a Philippine passport indicating in his application that
his residence in the Philippines was at A. Mabini St., Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar. Ty's application was approved and he was issued on 26 October 2005 a
Philippine passport; (4) on 8 March 2006, Ty personally secured and signed his Community Tax
Certificate (CTC) from the Municipality of General Macarthur, in which he stated that his address
was at Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar; (5) thereafter, on 17 July
2006, Ty was registered as a voter in Precinct 0013A, Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar; (6) Ty secured another CTC dated 4 January 2007 again stating therein his
address as Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar; and (7) finally, Ty
executed on 19 March 2007 a duly notarized Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship.
 He had reacquired his Philippine citizenship and renounced his American citizenship, and he had
been a resident of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for more than one year
prior to the 14 May 2007 elections. Therefore, Ty sought the dismissal of Japzon's Petition in SPA
No. 07-568.
Ty acquired the highest number of votes and was declared Mayor of the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, by the Municipal Board of Canvassers on 15 May 2007.[7]
 The COMELEC First Division found that Ty complied with the requirements of Sections 3 and 5 of
Republic Act No. 9225 and reacquired his Philippine citizenship, to wit:
Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office, and
the purpose of the citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no
person owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people and our country or a unit of
territory thereof.
 Evidences revealed that Ty executed an Oath of Allegiance before Noemi T. Diaz, Vice Consul
of the Philippine Consulate General, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. on October 2, 2005 and
executed a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship on March 19, 2007 in compliance with R.A.
[No.] 9225. Moreover, neither is Ty a candidate for or occupying public office nor is in active
service as commissioned or non-commissioned officer in the armed forces in the country of which
he was naturalized citizen
 Ty did not commit material misrepresentation in stating in his Certificate of Candidacy that he was
a resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for at least one year
before the elections on 14 May 2007. It reasoned that: Although Ty has lost his domicile in [the]
 Philippines when he was naturalized as U.S. citizen in 1969, the reacquisition of his Philippine
citizenship and subsequent acts thereof proved that he has been a resident of Barangay 6,
Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar for at least one (1) year before the elections held
on 14 May 2007 as he represented in his certificate of candidacy.
 The petition was denied and COMELEC was in favor of the defendant failing to obtain a favorable
resolution from the COMELEC, Japzon proceeded to file the instant Petition for Certiorari, that
the COMELEC had committed grave abuse of discretion and lack of discretion for dismissing the
petition.
 Japzon prays for the Court to annul and set aside the Resolutions dated 31 July 2007 and 28
September 2007 of the COMELEC First Division and en banc, respectively; to issue a new
resolution denying due course to or canceling Ty's Certificate of Candidacy; and to declare Japzon
as the duly elected Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar.
 Ty sought the dismissal of the present Petition. According to Ty, the COMELEC already found
sufficient evidence to prove that Ty was a resident of the Municipality of General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar, one year prior to the 14 May 2007 local elections. The Court cannot evaluate
again the very same pieces of evidence without violating the well-entrenched rule that findings of
fact of the COMELEC are binding on the Court.
 The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), meanwhile, is of the position that Ty failed to meet the
one-year residency requirement set by law to qualify him to run as a mayoralty candidate in the
14 May 2007 local elections.The Court finds no merit in the Petition at bar.
 . On 19 March 2007, he personally executed a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship before a notary
public. By the time he filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Office of Mayor of the Municipality
of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 28 March 2007, he had already effectively renounced
his American citizenship, keeping solely his Philippine citizenship.

 The Court of Appeals set aside the appealed orders of the COMELEC and the Court of Appeals
and annulled the election of the respondent as Municipal Mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan on the
ground that respondent's immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted an abandonment
of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. Being a green card holder, which was proof that
he was a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States, and in the absence of any waiver
of his status as such before he ran for election on January 18, 1988, respondent was held to be
disqualified under §68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (Batas Pambansa Blg.
881).

ISSUE:

Whether or not the defedant has complied with the residency requirement for elective positions.

RULING:
 Yes, the defendant solely complied the residency requirements for elective position.
 It bears to point out that Republic Act No. 9225 governs the manner in which a natural-born Filipino
may reacquire or retain[17] his Philippine citizenship despite acquiring a foreign citizenship, and
provides for his rights and liabilities under such circumstances. A close scrutiny of said statute
would reveal that it does not at all touch on the matter of residence of the natural-born Filipino
taking advantage of its provisions. Republic Act No. 9225 imposes no residency requirement for
the reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of such
reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship on the current residence of the concerned
natural-born Filipino. Clearly, Republic Act No. 9225 treats citizenship independently of residence.
This is only logical and consistent with the general intent of the law to allow for dual citizenship.
 There is no basis for this Court to require Ty to stay in and never leave at all the Municipality of
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for the full one-year period prior to the 14 May 2007 local
elections so that he could be considered a resident thereof. To the contrary, the Court has
previously ruled that absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or
registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected, does not constitute loss of
residence.[24] The Court also notes, that even with his trips to other countries, Ty was actually
present in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, for at least nine of
the 12 months preceding the 14 May 2007 local elections. Even if length of actual stay in a place
is not necessarily determinative of the fact of residence therein, it does strongly support and is
only consistent with Ty's avowed intent in the instant case to establish residence/domicile in the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar.
 Japzon repeatedly brings to the attention of this Court that Ty arrived in the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 4 May 2006 only to comply with the one-year residency
requirement, so Ty could run as a mayoralty candidate in the 14 May 2007 elections. In Aquino
v. COMELEC,[25] the Court did not find anything wrong in an individual changing residences so he
could run for an elective post, for as long as he is able to prove with reasonable certainty that he
has effected a change of residence for election law purposes for the period required by law. As
this Court already found in the present case, Ty has proven by substantial evidence that he had
established residence/domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, by 4
May 2006, a little over a year prior to the 14 May 2007 local elections, in which he ran as a
candidate for the Office of the Mayor and in which he garnered the most number of votes.

 To successfully challenge Ty's disqualification, Japzon must clearly demonstrate that Ty's
ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles that overriding such
ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people would ultimately create
greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and
laws so zealously protect and promote. In this case, Japzon failed to substantiate his claim that
Ty is ineligible to be Mayor of the Municipality, the instant Petition for Certiorari is dismiss.
 Penera vs. COMELEC GR 181613 September 11,
2009 & November 25, 2009 Premature
Campaigning
NOVEMBER 23, 2017

FACTS:

Penera and private respondent Edgar T. Andanar were mayoralty candidates in Sta. Monica
during the 14 May 2007 elections. On 2 April 2007, Andanar filed before the Office of the
Regional Election Director, Caraga Region (Region XIII), a Petition for Disqualification against
Penera, as well as the candidates for Vice-Mayor and Sangguniang Bayanwho belonged to her
political party, for unlawfully engaging in election campaigning and partisan political activity
prior to the commencement of the campaign period.

Rosalinda A. Penera’s filed a motion for reconsideration of this Court’s Decision of 11

September 2009.The assailed Decision dismissed Penera’s petition and affirmed the Resolution
dated 30 July 2008 of the COMELEC En Banc as well as the Resolution dated 24 July 2007 of
the COMELEC Second Division. The Decision disqualified Penera from running for the office
of Mayor in Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte and declared that the Vice-Mayor should succeed
Penera.

ISSUE:

Is Penera guilty of premature campaigning? May premature campaigning be committed by a

person who is not a candidate?

RULING:
No to both. Under the assailed September 11, 2009 Decision, a candidate may already be liable
for premature campaigning after the filing of the certificate of candidacy but even before the start
of the campaign period. Thus, such person can be disqualified for premature campaigning for
acts done before the start of the campaign period. In short, the Decision considers a person who
files a certificate of candidacy already “candidate” even before the start of the campaign period.

Now the Court holds thatthe assailed Decision is contrary to the clear intent and letter of the
law. In Lanot v. COMELEC,it held that a person who files a certificate of candidacy is not a
candidate until the start of the campaign period. Lanot was decided on the ground that one
who files a certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the campaign period.

Congress elevated the Lanot doctrine into a statute by specifically inserting it as the second
sentence of the third paragraph of the amended Section 15 of RA 8436. In RA 9369, Congress
inserted the word “only” so that the first proviso now reads:

x x x Provided, that, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only
upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period x x x.

Thus, Congress not only reiterated but also strengthened its mandatory directive that election
offenses can be committed by a candidate “only” upon the start of the campaign period. This
clearly means that before the start of the campaign period, such election offenses cannot be so
committed.

In layman’s language, this means that a candidate is liable for an election offense only for acts
done during the campaign period, not before. The law is clear as daylight — any election offense
that may be committed by a candidate under any election law cannot be committed before the
start of the campaign period. In ruling that Penera is liable for premature campaigning for
partisan political acts before the start of the campaigning, the assailed Decision ignores the clear
and express provision of the law.
 GAMINDE vs. COA

G.R. No. 140335, December 13, 2000

Facts: Thelma Gaminde was appointed by the President of the Philippines as

Commissioner of the Civil Service Commission, ad interim and assumed office on
June 22, 1993 after oath of office. The Commission on Appointments (COA) and the
Congress of the Philippines confirmed the appointment on September 7, 1993.
Gaminde, on February 24, 1998, sought the Office of the President for clarification on
the expiry date of her term of office. In response to her request, the Chief Presidential
Legal Counsel opined that her term office will expire on February 2, 2000 instead of
February 2, 1999. Relying on said advisory opinion, Gaminde remained in office after
February 2, 1999. However, on February 4, 1999, Chairman Corazon Alma de Leon
wrote COA requesting opinion whether or not Gaminde and her co-terminus staff may
be paid their salaries notwithstanding the expiration of their appointments on February
2, 1999. The General Counsel of COA issued an opinion on February 18, 1999 that
“the term of Commissioner Gaminde has expired on February 2, 1999 as stated in her
appointment conformably with the constitutional intent.” Consequently, on March 24,
1999, CSC Resident Auditor Flovitas Felipe issued a Notice of Disallowance,
disallowing in audit the salaries and emoluments of Gaminde and her co-terminus
staff effective February 2, 1999. Gaminde appealed COA’s disallowance but it was
dismissed, and affirmed the propriety of the disallowance; and held that the issue of
Gaminde’s office term may be properly addressed by mere reference to her
appointment paper which set the expiration date of February 2, 1999, and that the
Commission was bereft of power to recognize an extension of her term, not even with
the implied acquiescence of the Office of the President. Gaminde moved for
reconsideration, but was denied by COA.
Issue: Whether the term of office of Thelma Gaminde, as Commissioner, Civil
Service Commission, to which she was appointed on June 11, 1993, expired on
February 2, 1999, as stated in the appointment paper, or on February 2, 2000, as
claimed by her.

Held: The term of office of Thelma P. Gaminde as the CSC Commissioner, as

appointed by President Fidel V. Ramos, expired on February 2, 1999. However, she
served as de-facto officer in good faith until February 2, 2000. The term of office of
the Chairman and members of the Civil Service Commission is prescribed in the 1987
Constitution under Article IX-D, Section 1 (2):

“The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President withthe
consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without
reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for
seven years, a Commissioner for five years, and another Commissioner for three
years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the
unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed
or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.”

Therefore, COA erred in disallowing in audit such salary and other emoluments.
Gaminde and her co-terminus staff are entitled to receive their salary and other
emoluments for actual service rendered.

HARRY L. ROQUE, JR, et. al. vs COMELEC G.R.

188456 September 10, 2009 Poll Automation
Law
NOVEMBER 23, 2017

FACTS:
In this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for a restraining order
and/or preliminary injunction, petitioners H. Harry L. Roque, Jr., et al., suing as taxpayers and
concerned citizens, seek to nullify respondent Comelec’s award of the 2010 Elections
Automation Project (automation project) to the joint venture of Total Information Management
Corporation (TIM) and Smartmatic International Corporation (Smartmatic) and to permanently
prohibit the Comelec, TIM and Smartmatic from signing and/or implementing the corresponding
contract-award. They contend the mechanism of the PCOS machines would infringe the
constitutional right of the people to the secrecy of the ballot which, according to the petitioners,
is provided in Sec. 2, Art. V of the Constitution.

ISSUE:

Is the Poll Automation Law unconstitutional for infringing the constitutional right of the people
to the secrecy of the ballot?

RULING:

No. Parenthetically, the contention that the PCOS would infringe on the secrecy and sanctity of
the ballot because, as petitioners would put it, the voter would be confronted with a “three feet”
long ballot, does not commend itself for concurrence. Surely, the Comelec can put up such
infrastructure as to insure that the voter can write his preference in relative privacy. And as
demonstrated during the oral arguments, the voter himself will personally feed the ballot into the
machine. A voter, if so minded to preserve the secrecy of his ballot, will always devise a way to
do so. By the same token, one with least regard for secrecy will likewise have a way to make his
vote known.