Review: Interpretive Practices and Political Designs: Reading Authenticity, Integrity, and

Reform in Jean-Jacques Rousseau

Author(s): Elizabeth Wingrove
Source: Political Theory, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Feb., 2001), pp. 91-111
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3072546
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REVIEW ESSAYS

INTERPRETIVE PRACTICES AND

POLITICAL DESIGNS
Reading Authenticity, Integrity, and Reform in
Jean-Jacques Rousseau

ROUSSEAUAND THE POLITICSOF AMBIGUITY:SELF CULTURE,

AND SOCIETYby Mira Morgenstern.UniversityPark:PennsylvaniaState
UniversityPress, 1996. 270 pp. + xviii.
HYPOCRISYAND INTEGRITY: MACHIAVELLI, ROUSSEAU,AND THE
ETHICSOF POLITICSby RuthW. Grant.Chicago:Universityof Chicago
Press, 1997. 201 pp. + xii.
DOMESTICATING PASSIONS:ROUSSEAU,WOMAN,AND NATIONby
Nicole Fermon. Hanover,NH: UniversityPress of New England, for Wes-
leyan UniversityPress, 1997. 231 pp. + xiii.

It is customarywhen writingaboutRousseauto begin with a sweeping ges-

ture.To some extent, this is a functionof the very divided and well-trodter-
rainthroughwhich any interpretermustmove:the multiplereiterationsof his
individualist,collectivist, rationalist,passionate,democratic,and antidemo-
cratic political vision are best surveyedfrom higher ground.So, too, Rous-
seau's texts seem to authorizesuch gestures. His unabashedacceptanceof
paradox,as well as his persistentlyimmoderateprose, bearwitness to a tex-
tual overabundancethat resists judicious address.Rousseau's writings and
their explication can thus provoke a language of expansive vision, an
all-embracingperspectivethatrecognizes multiple and contradictorypoliti-
cal and narrativepossibilities.
But this is only an openingmove. Authorscommonlyfollow up theirrhet-
oric of largesse by announcinga need for interpretivediscipline, andin short
orderthe excesses are recastas extremesthatrequirecareful navigation.On
these accounts,"gettingRousseauright"meanssteeringbetweenthe myriad
Scyllas and Charybdisesthat menace impetuousreaders.Both textual and
worldly, these monsters reflect the dire conclusions to which Rousseau's
POLITICALTHEORY,Vol. 29 No. 1, February2001 91-111
? 2001 Sage Publications,Inc.
91
92 POLITICALTHEORY/ February2001

writingscan lead andthe fanaticalends to which his political insights can be

put. He might invite, even initiate,outlandishreadingsthroughhis own tex-
tualdesigns, butthe interpreter'staskis to mapa trueandsteadycourseby tri-
angulatingaway from the extremes.
The threebooks underreview all insist thatRousseauspeaksin important
ways to issues of ongoing political concern, and they all locate this impor-
tance in a "thirdway,"a temperatemiddle course between what Rousseau's
prose and previousreadersoften configureas sharplydrawnalternatives.In
Rousseau and the Politics of Ambiguity:Self Culture,and Society, Mira
Morgensternlinks these alternativesto the axes of liberal thought-public
and private,individualismand communalism,masculineand feminine-all
of which Rousseauunsettlesin his pursuitof the notion andideal of authen-
ticity. In Hypocrisyand Integrity,RuthGrantteases out Rousseau'spolitical
insights througha comparisonwith that master of extremes, Machiavelli.
Rousseau emerges as neither nostalgic nor utopian but as a clear-eyed
observerof politics who can countenanceduplicityin theinterestsof preserv-
ing individual integrity.Nicole Fermon's Domesticating Passions: Rous-
seau, Womanand Nation identifies a thirdway in Rousseau's focus on the
family: its institutionaland sentimentalreform,Fermonargues,was key to
his republicanagenda.
Threadingthroughthese very different analyses is a sharedconcern to
overcome the conceptualand political dualisms that threatento undermine
the coherence and the relevance of Rousseau's thought.A more complex,
practical,subtle, and worldlypolitical vision can be found in his work, they
suggest, if one takescareto avoid the extremes.This is not a matterof selec-
tive reading(althoughthe questionof which texts assumeprominenceis not
irrelevant)but of an interpretiveimperative:as a misogynist, a democratic
purist,or a righteouslyuncompromisingmoralist,Rousseau is easy to dis-
miss. The threeauthorsthus set out to disabusereadersof these exaggerated
impressions,andin so doing they offer alternativeversionsof a theoristmore
sensible, prescient,discriminating,and unironicthanone might expect. But
the middleis not necessarilymiddling,andeach of these books makesa com-
pelling claim for the political insights thatemerge from a soberedup Rous-
seau. They also show how intemperatesobrietycan be or,perhaps,how read-
ing sobriety into his political vision introducesits own intemperance.My
claim is not aboutperformativecontradiction,the curiousreplicationof pre-
cisely what is being decried. Neither am I pointing to the inevitability of
excess, in Rousseau'sor any text. My point is thatthese books tell us some-
thing about how interpretationworks, in addition to telling us something
aboutRousseau.
 Wingrove/ REVIEWESSAY 93

Therearemultipleways of imposingform,thusmultiplemeaningsavail-
able in anytext, andno impositionis benign:these aretruismsof interpretive
practice. Less self-evident is how to understandthe relationshipbetween
imposing form on a text and the meanings we find there: how, in making
sense of a text, we make claims about what is politically intelligible. It is
tempting to assimilate the various sense-making moves used by
Morgenstern,Grant,andFermonto the paradigmof liberalism,inasmuchas
each of them associates Rousseau'srelevancewith his ability to circumvent
thatparadigm'slimitations.Thus, his contributionto political theory is dis-
tinguishedby a refusalto be constrainedby a choice between stateandecon-
omy, interestand virtue, or individualand community,and likewise, Rous-
seau's contribution becomes intelligible insofar as political theory is
organized around these incommensurablechoices. Within this political
grammar of (a highly attenuated) liberalism, complexity is indeed an
achievement,hard-nosedrealismmoreimpressivestill, andsensitivityto his-
torical variationnothingshortof a miracle.
But these books also speak to issues that exceed liberalism's definitive
concerns.Specifically,they each addressthe issue of how one findsmeaning
in texts. Morgenstern'sexplorationof ambiguityand authenticity,for exam-
ple, derivesfrom her commitmentto readthe text "on its own terms"(vii) in
the course of pursuinga feminist interpretation"thatunpacksthe implica-
tions of Rousseau'sconclusionsin a way thatcan ultimatelyproveliberating
to women and to all of humanity"(xv). She introducesher approachby dis-
tinguishingit from "acertain 'orthodox'tendencyin Rousseauscholarship"
that assesses his contributions"in terms of a particularpolitical agenda,"
insisting thather own feminist readingwill eschew this too convenientsim-
plification (vii). These framing concerns-literalism, feminism, and the
form emancipationtakes-reappear throughoutthe book at every interpre-
tive juncture.
Like Morgenstern's,Fermon'saccountpromises to attendto how Rous-
seau's texts speak of and to women; unlike Morgenstern,she does not label
her account feminist. She opens with the claim that Rousseau's appeals to
sentiment,love, andthe family show how he "questionstraditionalandmod-
ern tools of knowledge, and does so in the voice of woman, in the feminine
voice, becausethe Othervoice, thatof the patriarchyandof the male subject,
is inadequatealone to discuss the complicatedhumanmovementsof politics"
(3-4). Thus Fermonties Rousseau's narrativeperformanceto his project of
institutionalreform:the relationshipsnecessaryto his self-rulingcommunity
entail reworkingthe passions, most centrallythroughimaginedand remem-
bered experiences of the mother.The dangers and possibilities of passion,
94 POLITICALTHEORY/ February2001

and the need to transposemeaningbetweentext and world:these initialcon-

figurationsindicate the termson which she reads Rousseau.
A tension between formal principlesand the practiceof politics frames
Grant'sstudy, which opens with a comfortinglyfamiliarcondemnationof
hypocrisy thatis quickly made less so. "Butis hypocrisyalways such a bad
thing?"she asks, pointing to the counterexampleof the destructivelyand
unattractivelyself-righteousantihypocrite.In the courseof puzzling through
this question(whose answer,as I have alreadysuggested, is no), Grantsitu-
ateshertextson one orthe otherside of anancient-moderndivide:does Rous-
seau's apparentcommitmentto virtuemean thathe is too premodernto offer
viable alternativesto liberalism?Hersubsequentinterpretationof his ethical
contributionstakes its bearingsfrom a world emptiedof political ideals.
In highlightingquestions of interpretiveprocedure,these books issue an
invitation,perhapsa challenge, to considerhow their differentconclusions
reflect and incorporatedifferentreadingprotocols. Again, the observation
thatthey presentthreeincommensurableversionsof Rousseau's"teachings"
is, in and of itself, neithersurprisingnor particularlyinteresting.But what
warrantscloser inspectionis how theirdifferentreadingsilluminatethe rela-
tionshipbetweeninterpretiveandpoliticaldesigns:theyexemplifyhow read-
ing practices establish a logic of political intelligibility,and thus how any
conclusions aboutthe political sense that,for example,freedom,equality,or
sex can makedependon priorandtypicallyuntheorizedinterpretivechoices.
Whatemancipatoryand feministpoliticalideals emergefrom a readingpro-
tocol thatstrivesto be literalandagendafree?How does an interpretationthat
adjudicatesbetweenthe author'shistoricalreferentsandhis fluctuatingnar-
rativevoice define a reformistpolitics?And whatcounts as a realisticpoliti-
cal ethic within a framework that pits ancient virtue against modern
self-regard?

AMBIGUITYWITHOUTAMBIVALENCE
For Morgenstern,the commitmentto readRousseau'stexts on theirown
termsmeansfindingcoherencein theirapparentlymultipleclaims. Of partic-
ularconcernarehis portrayalsof women,which she presentsas being of two,
disparatesorts. The first correspondsto the familiar model of submissive
devotion and coquettishexcess, while the second suggests a woman willing
and able to assert independentviews. Morgensternsuggests that the key to
making sense of these differentrepresentationslies in the denouementsof
Rousseau's literaryworks. That his heroinesdie, his romancesfail, and his
naturalfamily leaves "terrorand bloodshed in its wake"(4) point to some-
 Wingrove/ REVIEWESSAY 95

thing more complex thanpreviousinterpretershave acknowledged.Further-

more, to accept the conclusion that women are the victims of a patriarchal
projectorientedtowardliberatingmen, or thatthe projectas a whole derives
from a despairingvision of irreconcilablealternatives,is to ignore the possi-
bility of a unified and positive scheme. Morgensternfinds this scheme and
thusRousseau'spoliticalandnarrativecoherencein the notionof ambiguity.
Ambiguity characterizesa life in which indeterminaciesare endemic.
Sketchedin contrastto liberalism'srigid demarcations-where "thereis no
middle ground,no shadesof grey"-ambiguity introduceschange andinsta-
bility as the definitivefeaturesof Rousseau'sworldview(6). To thrivein this
worldrequiresrecognizinga complexitywhose navigationMorgensternlik-
ens to moving along a continuum:what appearas antitheticaldispositions,
attitudes,and drives are indissolublylinked together,not as binarypairsbut
as adjacentpositions. Successfully negotiatingthis tightropecharacterizes
authenticity,a moral and personalimperativethat Morgensternsuggests is
bothuniqueto anindividualanda "sharedhumantrait":achievingan authen-
tic "sense of Self' confirmsa common humanity(xiii).
Morgensternrepeatedly underscoresthe difficulties inherentin such a
project.They arise not only from an unpredictableworld but also from the
necessarylinks betweenameliorativeanddegenerativeways of being. "Con-
sequently,"Morgensternconcludes,"thegreatestthreatto the achievementof
authenticity-particularly where women are concerned-is the ability of
inauthenticityto masqueradeas its opposite (i.e., authenticity)andtherefore
potentiallyto doom all of humanityto perpetrateits own moraland spiritual
destruction"(6-7). The tragicoutcomesthatMorgensternidentifiesin Rous-
seau's stories of moral and sexual maturationillustratethis point: Sophie,
Emile, Julie,andthe civilizing savagesof theDiscourse on Inequalityall bear
witness to the personal and political consequences of inauthenticchoices.
But anemancipatoryschemeis embeddedin thislitanyof failureinasmuchas
the charactersreveal how social values and principlescan militate against
authenticchoosing, particularlyfor women.Thus,accordingto Morgenstern,
Rousseauinvites his readersto rethinktheirown political andpersonallimi-
tations,by grapplingwith his imperfectliteraryresolutions.In so doing his
writings "serve as a metatextof political theory,engaging the audience not
merely as passive spectatorsbut also as active participantsin the ongoing
enterpriseof formulatinga dynamic and authenticpolitical theory"(241).
A greatdeal hinges on how one interpretsfailure.Some readerswill ques-
tion whetherJulie'sdeathin La NouvelleHeloise signalsthe inauthenticityof
her maritalchoice, for example, or whetherthe failureof Emile's marriage
andhis decision to leave his countryrevealthathe also "optsout of authentic-
ity" (119). Both the conventionsof the romanceformandthe uncertainstatus
96 POLITICALTHEORY/ February2001

of Emile's unfinishedsequel might suggest that a narrativeof loss is not

unequivocallya representationof failure.But Morgensternholds firmlythat
to leave the contradictionsbetween these stories' ideal beginningsand their
monstrousends unresolvedis "grosslyto misreadthem"(2). And yet, while
she insists on the self-evidenceof the stories'tragicends, the criticalinterpre-
tive workof her book is to constructjustificationsfor them:what unresolved
dilemmas are being signaled by adultery,enslavement,and death?
Morgenstern'sconstructionscovera rangeof textsandthemes,beginning,
appropriatelyenough, with language.Language,she suggests, "servesas a
paradigmof all humandevelopment"in thatits complexitiesreflectandenter
into the ambiguityof everyrelationship(10). On one hand,languageincludes
an "individualistic/humanistic" dimensionthatpromotesuniqueness;on the
otherhand,it includesa "social"elementthatestablishescommunitythrough
the communicationof love and need. Rousseau'sparadoxicalobservation,
accordingto Morgenstern,is that this twofold nature,of humansand their
language, can leave them both internally rent: individual interests might
appearat odds with social interests,andthe expressionsof a commonhuman-
ity mightbe used for manipulation.Whatcontainsthe threatof contradiction
inherentin languageandmen is Rousseau'snarrativedesign:by offeringtwo
differentpicturesof individualityand community,he points to an authentic
and an inauthenticresolution.
Morgensternidentifies the first of these doubled visions in the Essay on
Languages's twofold originarystory of southernand northernlanguages.
She then turnsto the Social Contract,where concerns about authenticlan-
guage emerge in discussions of the legislator's task; to the Letter to
d'Alembert,which introducesthe problemof theatricalitytogetherwith its
liberatoryvariation;and to La Nouvelle Heloise, where an everydaytheatri-
cality directedby Wolmarperpetuatesa life of inauthenticitythatpasses for
its contrary.The book's subsequentdiscussions of pity, imagination,love,
and the family all move along this explanatoryroute, where integrationis
simultaneouslypromisedand threatened.Imagination,for example, "makes
people able to reach out to one anotherin conceptual and practicalterms,
[but]it also establishesthe basis for a Self-referentialand selfish social rela-
tionship" (72). This is similar with love, whose "Self-referential"and
"Other-directed" dimensionseach pull in destructiveand salutarydirections
(81-83), and the family,which can "nurturewhateverembersof authenticity
might exist within an inauthenticworld"(181) butcan likewise producethe
"false consciousness"on display at Clarens(212).
As the elaborations of ambiguity multiply, the distinction between
authenticand inauthenticchoice grows more urgentand more tenuous.Per-
haps for this reason,Morgensternrepeatedlyinvokes the need for close and
 Wingrove/ REVIEWESSAY 97

careful reading. Chiding the likes of Starobinskiand de Man for missing

Rousseau'sunivocalmessage, she mustersa ferocioustextualdetailto docu-
ment an ambiguity whose transcendenceserves as the measure of correct
interpretation.Here the evidence of narratedalternatives-the portraitsof
authentic and inauthenticresolution-gives way to reading between the
lines, as the promiseof an uncompromisedmiddle begins to rely on substan-
tiating what is not there.My point is not thatMorgensternis makingthings
up;rather,she is insistingon the significanceof the characters'failureeverto
realize an implicit ideal. But as her persistentworrythat authenticitycan be
mistakenfor its oppositesuggests, this literalismis anythingbutself-evident.
Morgenstern'scentraltaskentailsholdingapartwhatRousseau'srepresenta-
tions always show as interwovenor coincident.
Consider the elucidation of Julie's inauthenticity.Morgensternrecon-
structsthe situationof the heroine of La Nouvelle Heloise by imagining it
throughthe complex arrayof love's possibilities. On one hand,Julie's deci-
sion not to runaway with her lover St. Preuxindicatesa selfless motivation:
giving up the exclusivity of passionatelove underscoresher commitmentto
broader social goods and goals. On the other hand, passionate love also
threatensa loss of self, by destabilizinginterpersonalboundaries;thus, "itis
precisely her own Self-concernthat motivatesher denial of love" (101). In
her search for individual happiness, Julie opts for the passionless love of
friendship.But "friendshipdoes not alwaysbringwith it truehonestyor hap-
piness,"Morgensternobserves, and the Clarenshouseholdrevealsjust how
insidiousfriendshipcan be: "Thefriendlyairof the estatemasksa centralized
system of authority,devised by Wolmarandexecutedby Julie"(102). Julie's
subsequentconfession thatshe is unhappyat Clarensannouncesthe failureof
thatsystem. The moralto the storyis thusrevealed:havingfled fromlove out
of self-concernonly to find that self destroyedby a loveless marriage,Julie
realizes that she cannot do without love. But of what sort? She needs a
"dynamic,authentic,and mutual"relationship,which means one that is not
shapedby the unfreedomsandinauthenticitiescharacteristicof the worldthat
the novel represents(106).
Morgensternderivesa crystal-clearmessage fromRousseau'sambivalent
story line, through an interpretivemethod that perforce exceeds the text:
authenticityis always whatfails to materialize.As a resultof this representa-
tional failure,we arepresentedwith an ideal thatknows no worldly or narra-
tive form.To be sure,this is often the way with ideals. But havingbeen urged
to recognize Rousseau'sliberatorycomplexity,it is odd to see this figuredas
an exercise in futile designs. So, too, it is difficultto see Morgenstern'soften
ingenuous formulationsdisciplined into predictabilityby the algorithmfor
authenticity.Most troublingabouther commitmentto unambivalentends is
98 POLITICAL / February
THEORY 2001

thatit removes politics from the texts. Like the language,pity, imagination,
and love on which Morgensternpersuasivelyshows that it depends, Rous-
seau's politics is made intelligibleby being made authentic.Thus a narrative
of citizens who are "forcedto be free"implicatesno actualpolitical designs,
inasmuch as that narrative remains a literal impossibility. And so
Morgenstern'sclose readingof the Social Contract,like her close readingof
La Nouvelle Heloise, makes the text meaningfulby positing a series of dis-
tinctionsthatcan only be imagined:authenticpoliticsentailsalienationbutof
a "good"sort(149), andit enablespositivetransformationbutonly when "the
people [are] in charge"(169).
At some point it is fair to ask, why laborto maintaindistinctionsthatthe
text consistently fails to keep clear?Whence this petition to authenticityas
the circumventionof everythingupsetting,lurid,equivocal,andrhetorically
exacting that Rousseau wrote? Why are political representationsauthentic
only when they elude the struggle,confusion,intemperance,andpain thathe
repeatedlyrepresents?Since I do not shareMorgenstern'sbelief thatreading
texts "on their own terms"requiresclarifyingthe author'sintentions,I will
not guess at hers.But the consequencesof herchoices areclearenough.Thus,
while she celebrates Rousseau's "metatextual"invitation to readers to
activelytheorizetheirpoliticallives, herown interpretivestrategyfiguresthe
text as hazardouswithoutthe directionof an interpreterwho readscarefully
enough to make intelligible an absentideal. Lackingthis firmhand,a reader
mightconcludethatlove actuallygives rise to impossiblechoices, thatdemo-
craticrule neverrendersstatepowerbenign,andthatRousseau'sadmiration
for women's wills is not a sign thathe meantto relieve theirsuffering.Aban-
donedto readingthese texts "ontheirown terms,"one mightcome to believe
that in Rousseau's ambivalentrepresentations-of contracts,romance,and
men-he shows how perversea realizedideal can be.
The political implications of Morgenstern'sversion of literalism also
inform her feminism. As alreadyindicated,she introducesher analysis by
underscoringthe unintelligibilityof the claim that Rousseau might have
meant women to suffer, and she returnsto this theme in the book's closing
discussion.And herdecision not to addressquestionsof genderin betweenis
utterly consistent with the general interpretiveplan: retrievingRousseau's
emancipatoryvision entails steering clear of the inauthenticityof actual
politicalrepresentations,be theythe forcedfreedomsrepresentedin his writ-
ings or the "particularpolitical agenda"that feminism represents.So when
MorgensternreassuresreadersthatRousseau'semphasison breast-feedingis
just "his attemptto reestablishthe family on an emotionally honest basis"
(182), we recognize in this soberingsimplificationanotherconsequence of
the decision to keep politics at a distancefromthe text:sexualequality,too, is
 Wingrove/ REVIEWESSAY 99

an ideal made meaningfulonly in its absence, and sexual emancipationwill

dependon the same literalismthatleaves readersrelianton the interpreter's
steadyinggaze. In the end, it seems thatwhile Rousseau'sgenius was to give
form to an inescapableflux and ambiguity,it is unimaginablethathe might
teachambiguouslessons. And when this becomes the necessaryconditionof
the text's intelligibility,we encountera feminist Rousseau unburdenedby
gender,a democraticRousseau who transcendspolitical subjection,and an
ideal of freedom that is sometimes indistinguishablefrom its opposite.

A FUNNYTHINGHAPPENEDON THE
WAYTO VINCENNES
Fermonis also attunedto textualambiguities,buthermethodfor negotiat-
ing them is not to press harderon the text. Rather,she is interestedin parsing
the unity of Rousseau's project against the historical backdropof ancien
regime France:"Asa study in the historyof political thought,this workpro-
poses to trace,throughthe interpretationof varioustexts and diverseexperi-
ences, the influences thatled Rousseauto the ardentadvocacyof his particu-
lar political vision" (14). The particularpolitical vision Fermonsketches is
centeredon a republicof sentiment,a politicalcommunitywhere "emotion-
ally secure citizens, confirmedin their individualand communal identity,"
make possible an associationof self-rulingmen (6). She underscoresat the
beginningthat "thepolitical problem"of genderand women figurespromi-
nently in her analysis: as mothers,which is to say, as agents and objects of
emotional and materialintimacy,women are pivotal to Rousseau's project
(4). Readily acknowledginghis ambivalenceaboutwomen's effect on men,
Fermon argues that the family's transformative potential depends on
women's domestication:as creaturesof passionateexcess, they will always
threatento disruptcivic life.
Fermonsuggests thatRousseau'spoliticalvision hadits real-lifecounter-
partin a reformprojectorientedtowardthe aristocratichousehold.Motivated
by a twofold antipathytowardemergingbourgeoisvalues andthe corruption
of ancien regime France, Rousseau turnedto the relatively self-sufficient
patriarchaldemesne for a model of domestic sociality: "this is because the
nobility alone combines both an inclusivehouseholdandan ethos of respon-
sibility to an entity more significantthanthe individual"(28). The archetype
is Clarens,which representsless an ideal than "a difficult accommodation
meant to correctthe worst abuses of materialand social life in the ancien
regime"(29). Among its correctionsarea marriageunencumberedby sexual
passion, a parentalpedagogy orientedtowardthe reformof characterandthe
100 THEORY
POLITICAL / February
2001

acceptanceof social roles, an extendedcommunitythatavoidsoverly privat-

ized interestsand identities,and an autarkicsystem of productionthatmini-
mizes marketinfluence.Unpersuadedthatthe heroine'sdeathsignals failure,
Fermonreadsit insteadas "therealandtragiccost"thatJulie(and"thosewho
need her") must pay, as well as a sign of a successful familial reform:
"institutionalizationprecedesloss," she observesin comparingJulie's death
to the disappearanceof the legislatorin the Social Contract(52).
Fermon'scentraltext is thus La Nouvelle Heloise, but she elucidates its
reformistmessage by drawingon a wide rangeof work. She reads in Emile,
for example, confirmationof a theoryof politics thataims for "accommoda-
tion ratherthanrevolution":moralfreedomdependson the developmentof
judgmentandunderstanding,not on any particularformof rule (117). While
the family's absence or, rather,its eliminationin Emile might give pause,
Fermonsees this as a "negativestrategy"in pursuitof the same educational
end: to promoteproperlysocial sentimentsby reiningin passion (114). The
Social Contractalso points to familialsociabilityas the linchpinof self-rule
and group cohesion by emphasizing the importanceof procreativeabun-
dance,the needfor patrioticattachment,the perniciouseffects of partialasso-
ciations, and the significanceof mores (the "only law Rousseau ultimately
thinks is important"[105]). Her argumentaboutdomestic reformthusjoins
an analysis of Rousseau'sexplicit familialdepictionswith an explorationof
the broadersocial, emotional, and economic contexts in which his families
would appear.
And as indicatedin Fermon'sintroduction,these contextualfigurations
are not limited to Rousseau'swritings.Readingin his appealsto Rome and
Geneva an attentionto real-worlddesigns, Fermon suggests that he offers
"whathe believes to be sound,practicaladvice basedon his opinionas a stu-
dentof historyanda politicalreformer,not as a prophetor philosopher"(34).
Thus, she includesa discussionof Calvin's sixteenth-centuryinitiativescon-
cerningmarriageandAugustus'sintroductionof the JulianLaws in response
to Rome's crises of civic and maritalmores. These events are importantfor
understandingRousseau's approach,Fermon suggests, because they sub-
stantiatethe importanceof state interventionto the maintenanceof republi-
can families while offering a method to "transfer[l]oyalty and power from
the clan to the state"(80). In other words, these juridicalreforms sketch a
logic and a historicalpracticeof precisely what Rousseau'spolitical vision
would entail.
In a similarfashionFermoncontextualizesRousseau'sattractionto agrar-
ian communalism through discussions of Cato's exemplary virtue and
Quesnay'sagrariancapitalism.The latter-together with English industrial-
ization-constitute developmentalpossibilitiesagainstwhich Rousseauwas
 Wingrove/ REVIEWESSAY 101

reacting. Fermon borrows from Walt Rostow to characterizeRousseau's

attemptedreform of the aristocratichousehold as "a prophylacticto the
take-offmodel"(132). She then assesses the patriarchalismof this preventa-
tive by perusing historical debates on authority.The dilemma of state and
paternalpowersketchedby Filmer,Locke, andothersmakesRousseau'soth-
erwise "incomprehensible"preferencefor an autarkicfeudal householdless
jarring,Fermonconcludes:his egalitarianimpulsesneverruledout imperfect
but extant remedies to pressing problems of corruptionand an ascendant
bourgeoisie (155).
The "politicalproblem"of women receives some of this contextualizing
treatment.Fermon links the theme of virtuous love threadingthroughLa
Nouvelle Heloise to contemporaneousconcerns aboutwomen's conduct,in
and outside of marriage, and concludes that the bourgeois ideal of
companionatemarriageand the aristocraticreality of libertinagemotivated
Rousseau'sliterarycreation.She also finds a significantcorrelationbetween
the content of his reformagendaand the form throughwhich he pursuedit:
novel readingwas the culturalpracticeof the targetedsocial classes and the
particularpassion of women. And while casting women as "specialistsin
sentimentaleducation"reflects a general shift in social values, she writes,
Rousseaumemorializedthatrole by placingit at the centerof his literaryand
political tale (46). In these ways Fermondrawson extratextualresourcesto
bringcoherenceto his apparentlydisparateandambiguousrepresentations:a
unified political agenda emerges out of narrativecomplexity through the
mediationsof historicalforms.
Sometimes these mediatingmoves are abrupt.Considerthe shift from a
discussion of Cato'spatriotismandthoughtson husbandry,to a reiterationof
Rousseau'spreferencefor the sentimentaland political virtuesof the aristo-
cratichousehold,to a gloss on the "practicalclimate"surroundingdebateson
Frencheconomic development(131). These sharpturnscan be challenging
and not only to readersworriedthatthe analysismight be conflatingtwo his-
torical figures-Cato the Censor and Cato the Younger-in elucidating
Rousseau'sreal-worldideal. A more generalchallenge is how to understand
the relationship between historical antecedents and textually wrought
visions. Whetheror not one is persuadedthat Rostow is a helpful resource,
this inventive possibility signals a new interpretiveimperative: finding
reformismin his novel designs meanssubjectingthemto the termsof histori-
cal inquiry.While one mightquibblewithFermon'sparticularchoices-why
so much Rome and so little Sparta?Why Quesnay and not Morelly?l And
why so little attentionto the Brennerdebates?2-the morepressingconcernis
whetherthe world beyond the text can offer the remedy of unreconstructed
originals:prototypes,free of all narrativeadornment.
102 POLITICALTHEORY/ February2001

This is emphaticallynot to rejecthistory,as contextfor or subjectof Rous-

seau's political thought, but merely to point out that neither antiquitynor
ancien regime Franceis any more transparentor fixed in its terms than the
storiesRousseauwritesaboutthem.So whenwe readthat"justrule,adminis-
tered by Julie's more 'passionatenature"'would help "roll back the bour-
geoisie's privatizationof the familial and, most significantly,its hegemonic
determinationof sentiments"(88), it is uncertainwhetherthe novel's figura-
tions of gender are being read off of changing class mores or whetherour
need for a politically coherent narrativeis giving form to bourgeois hege-
mony. And when, several paragraphslater, Fermon writes that "with the
eclipse of romanticlove as a public mode of discoursebetween spouses, the
social functionof aristocraticwomen became clearer,"it is entirely unclear
whether we are supposed to be in Rousseau's text or in his world (89). It
might seem safe to assume the former,given thatthe alleged eclipse defies
standardperiodizationsof class-based ideologies of love; but we can ill
affordto lose sight of the latter,given Fermon'semphasison the determina-
tive power of bourgeoissentimentality.
What might help to clarify the matteris an elaborationof historicaldis-
courses:the notionthatRousseau'sworldwas also a world of texts and thus
of socially negotiated ideological forms. This clarificationmight in turn
make more evident how Rousseau's relationshipto historical figures was
necessarilyrhetorical:his vision of history,whetherunifiedor not, was medi-
atedby narrative.Fermon'ssensitivityto these complexitiesis evidentwhen
she zeros in on the book'seponymousconcerns.Both herdiscussionof Rous-
seau's fear of women's sexual powerandherconcludingchapteron his figu-
rationof the nation-stateas feminine body stay trainedon his textualabun-
dance,ratherthanon the fit betweenfictionandhistory.In these discussions,
her prose seems to join in the narrativeextravaganceof her subject matter.
Reflecting on his metaphorsfor patriotismand the body politic, she writes
that"Rousseauattemptsan ideology of substitutionas transparentas it is illu-
sive: to hijackthe thrillof sexual love, of passion with the body (andancient
soul) of one's interlocutor-in this case of the sexual woman-in orderto
lubricatethe uncertainhydraulicsof the political project"(174).
The returnto literaryexcess is not surprising,inasmuchas it parallelsthe
twofold natureof whatFermonpresentsas Rousseau'sunifiedvision: re-cre-
ating the family as a scene of political socializationentails both its institu-
tional and imaginarytransformation.On Fermon'sreading,Rousseaufound
a juridical method and rationalefor the formerin his study of Geneva and
Rome;the latter,by contrast,seems to exceed this strategyof historicalexpli-
cation. Hijackedthrills and passionatelubricationare not the stuff of doc-
trinaland organizationalreformbutof the sensibilitythatFermonimpartsto
 / REVIEW
Wingrove ESSAY 103

Rousseau's readers.Moreover,insofaras this sentimentaltransformationis

said to depend on the body (and soul) of woman, it includes fantasizedand
remembereddimensions that will frustrateevery attempt at verification.
"Womanis ahistorical,"Fermonwrites, explainingRousseau'sfear of femi-
nine sexuality:neverwholly in or undercontrol,women constitutea passion-
ate threatto the institutional,chronological,and moral ordersthat political
life represents(66). But then insofaras historicalcontextmakes Rousseau's
vision of politicallife intelligible,perhapswomen'scentrality,to thatlife and
to thatvision, will elude the interpretivemethod.At issue is not whetherhis-
toryconfirmsor disproveshis fantasiesof femininitybutwhetherwe can ever
make sense of the "politicalproblem"of women and gendergiven the terms
of Fermon'sanalysis.
The imaginativeand institutionaldimensionsof Rousseau'svision seem
to pull Fermonin differentdirections:the firsttowarda logic of signification,
the second towarda logic of historicalpractice.The book's framingdiscus-
sion positionsthese concernsin intimaterelationone to the other.But in tying
the unity andultimatelythe utilityof Rousseau'spoliticalthoughtto its prac-
tical orientation,Fermonresituatesthem as opposites:his politics arerooted
in institutionaleffects, thus not in philosophic or propheticdesires. And so
she sees in his famous"illumination"on the roadto Vincennesthe momentof
historicalengagement,and from its rhetoricof bedazzledtransportFermon
derivesthe origins of a reformistbent. This derivationconsolidatesan inter-
pretiveposition:the headyexcesses of the text arepertinentonly to maternal
fantasies,while its political insightsaredeterminedby whatcould constitute
practicablereform.Thus, birthratesand landholdingpatternsfigure promi-
nently in Fermon'sexplicationof Rousseau'simaginedstate, but the notori-
ously unempiricalgeneralwill is mentionedalmostnot at all. To be sure,one
should not be obliged to choose. But when the grammarof Rousseau'spoli-
tics is circumscribedby an ideal of factuality,his paradoxeswill make sense
only as poetic abstractions.Conversely,his fictions appearinsightfulor baf-
fling, dependingon whethertheyconfirmor violate thatfactualideal. A suffi-
cient explanationof his assertionof naturalsexual inequalityis thus to point
out thatit does not make sense: "HereRousseauthe theoristcontradictshim-
self. The inequality between men and women is most assuredly a human,
civil institution"(95).
This way of decidingwhatdoes anddoes not makesense risks (re)produc-
ing a methodologicalandconceptualdividethattypifies andI would suggest
troublesthe analysis of gender:law, economics, anddemographicscomprise
the realmof the politicallycoherent,while an affectiverealmof desire,mem-
ory, and imaginationremains persistentlydisordered.Insofar as gender is
constructedthroughfantasiesof nurturanceand sexuality,it remainson the
104 POLITICALTHEORY/ February2001

politically unintelligibleside of the divide, andinsofaras juridicaland insti-

tutional structuresderive their coherence from extratextualevidence, they
alwaysremainat a removefromthe effects of gender.The problem,finally,is
not that Fermonties gender's intelligibilityto its historicalarticulationbut
that she takes historical articulationto be something that happens outside
texts.
On one hand,Fermon'sinterestin teasingout the possibilitiesrepresented
by Julie, Clarens,and a readingpublic captivatedby them suggests a keen
awarenessof narrative'shistoricaleffects. On theotherhand,whatshe under-
standsto be representedthereareeitherliteralcorrespondencesor "inexpli-
cable"elisions, bothof which obscurethe practiceof narrativeinterpretation:
the second by mystifying it, the firstby denying thatit even takesplace. But
Fermon'sown insights introducea politics of interpretationthatinvites us to
rethinkboth literal and imagined truthsand thus the interpretivemethods
throughwhich these differences are secured. If, as she claims, Rousseau's
goal is to establish a republicof sentiment,then his state is as implicatedin
metaphoras arehis unrealwomen.Andto makepolitical sense of his republi-
canism requiresrefusing any interpretivechoice that opposes passionateto
practicalintentionsand narrativeto historicaldesigns.

THEPOLITICSOF DECEPTION

Grantis also interestedin the fit betweenRousseau'sideals and political

practice,butshe does not pursuethis relationshipthrougha model of histori-
cal correspondence.Her centralquestionsare when and how one mightjus-
tify departuresfrom a "purelyprincipledstance,"most particularlyin the
realmof politics (2). The departuresthatinterestherarethose associatedwith
hypocrisy,a dissimulatingpracticethatplays on the gap betweenappearance
andreality:it entailsseeming to be whatone is not or seemingto believe what
one does not. Grantsuggests thatthis practiceis an indispensablefeatureof
political and social life. Entertainingthis possibility forces us to confront
what she presents as the uncritical-naive or optimistic-appeal to reason
and reasonablenessmade by liberal theorists.It also invites us to consider
how one might meaningfullydiscriminateamong betterand worse ways of
being hypocritical. To this end, Grantintroduces the notion of integrity,
which is the attributeof one "whocan be trustedto do the rightthing even at
some cost to himself."Her goal is to considerthe possibility of an ethically
unprincipledpolitics, and for this she turns to Machiavelli and Rousseau,
both of whom appreciated"theproblematiccharacterof any attemptto con-
duct politics honestly and rationally"(16).
 Wingrove/ REVIEWESSAY 105

Grantthus takes her bearingsfrom the political insights thatMachiavelli

and Rousseau shared,and these are not, as some readerswould have it, best
characterizedas a civic republicanbent. She points instead to their similar
understandingof dependence,passion,and"pressurestowardevil" as consti-
tutivefeaturesof all political relations(13). Extensivelysurveyingthe kinds
of deception that Machiavelli endorses, she concludes that his conviction
concerningthe exploitationof principlesderives from an understandingof
both the particularnatureof politicalrelationshipsandthe more generalten-
dencies of men. Humanfrailtyas much as unadornedduplicitywarrantsrec-
ognizing and using the fact that men will regularlybreakfaith, and in rela-
tions of dependencewith uncertainallies, manipulationis neededto motivate
action or acquiescence.
Grantcanvassesthis familiarterrainto arguefor the comprehensivenature
of Machiavelli'sconviction:deceptionis neithera last resortnor an unfortu-
nate byproduct of particularregimes but an essential political tool. This
applies equally to situations in which people's particularinterests would
appearto coincide. Here Grantaddressesthe alternativesrepresentedby a
model of economic rationality,whose accountof negotiatedtradeintroduces
the possibility of an honestly self-interestedpolitics and a realpolitikmodel
of openly pursuednationalinterest.Turningto Mandragolaas a studyin psy-
chological and ethical affects, she shows how outcomes that benefit every
characterin the play requiredeception:individualsatisfactiondepends on
maintainingthe appearanceof propriety."Inthis situation,"she observes,"to
ask why hypocrisy is necessary is to ask why law, religion, and honor-or
public moralityaltogether-are necessary"(48). The inevitabilityof decep-
tion arises from the simple fact thatmen are often immoraland yet society
cannotdo withoutmorality.So, too, it arisesfromthe less simple realitythat
political discoursemakes appealsto vanity,ambition,andotherpassions not
reducibleto a rationalcalculationof interest,and this passionaterealm"cre-
ate[s] opportunitiesfor hypocriticalmanipulation"(52). The full force of
these observationsis achievedwhen Granttracesout theirimplicationsfor a
democraticpolitics:becausethe principlesof egalitarianismandgovernmen-
tal accountabilityincreaseboth dependenceand the value of candor,hypoc-
risy is apt to be especially prevalentin democracies.
Rousseau enters the analysis afterthe political stage has been set. Grant
insists thathis politicalprescriptionsdo not mandatea righteousinflexibility
but rathera combinationof "purityand the pragmatism"that characterizes
integrity(61). She elaboratesthis point by contrastingMoliere's characters
and Rousseau's critiqueof them in the Letterto d'Alembert.The contrastis
capturedin a two-by-twomatrixthatcategorizesmoderateandmoralistver-
sions of integrityandhypocrisy.The moderatecategoriescomprisedegener-
106 POLITICALTHEORY/ February2001

ate and genuine ways of being morallyflexible: while bothtypes exhibit the
practical morality characteristicof "cool-headed, tolerant, and forgiving
peacemakers,"the degenerateone is marredby a complacentand ultimately
cravenwillingness to rationalizeinjustice(89). The moralistcategoriesintro-
duce similardistinctionsbetween ways of strictlyadheringto principle:the
degenerateand genuine types are equally passionatemoralists,but only the
latterremainsdisinterested,unsanctimonious,andthusconcernedaboutjus-
tice. Grantemphasizes that Rousseau intended the genuine moralist-his
own ideal of integrity-to impress and inspire his readers:"it is precisely
Rousseau's aim as an authorto alter the objects of our admirationand to
improveour moraljudgments"(78).
But whether genuine moralism represents a viable political position
remainsunclear:Grantsuggests that its premise of a naturalgoodness and
unityandits tendencyto encouragewithdrawalraiseconcerns.She alleviates
them by reassessingthe uncompromisingaspectof the ideal. Observingthat
both Considerationson the Governmentof Poland and the Social Contract
include prudentialpolitical prescriptionsat odds with Rousseau'sprinciples
of egalitarianismand political freedom, she suggests that his ideal is less
aboutmoralrigidity thanit is abouta consequentialistcalculation.Further-
more,his reflectionson lying sketcha practicalmoralityin which a clearcon-
science depends on pursuingjust ends. In these ways, Rousseau's writings
supportthe possibility of justifiable political deception even as they make
problematicwhatthe termsof thisjustificationmightbe:he bothintroducesa
distinctionbetween moraland factualtruthand "seemsto sever the connec-
tion between the two" (123).
Turningto the examplesof justifieddeceptionrepresentedby the legisla-
tor, Emile's tutor, and Wolmar,Grantidentifies in all three an orientation
toward securing their deceived beneficiaries' freedom. This "distinctive
understandingof freedom,"she elaborates,concerns the "absence of per-
sonal dependence, that is, the absence of subjection to the private will of
anotherindividual"(132). And althoughit is producedthroughmanipula-
tion, this freedom is not necessarilyillusory inasmuchas it allows for "the
psychological experience of autonomy"(134). The projectmight well fail
and it might be unacceptablypaternalistic,but one must neverthelesscon-
front the particularquality of Rousseauianfreedom:"self-consciousnessis
simply not a necessaryrequirement"(138).
Havingestablishedthatdeceptiondoes not per se compromiseindividual
integrity, Grant takes up Rousseau's own bleak estimation of how infre-
quentlyhis prudentialpolitics succeed.She ties thisbleakvision to his under-
standingof a humantendencytowardcorruption.A retracingof the Firstand
Second Discourse's devolutions provides opportunitiesto reiterateone of
 Wingrove/ REVIEWESSAY 107

Grant'scentralclaims, thatdependence-social, sexual, and economic-is

the source of all that threatensintegrity.And the greatestof these is social:
"Dependenceon opinion,"Grantconcludes, "emergesas the true source of
corruption"(153). Because the mechanism of this dependence is amour
propre,the relativesentimentof self-love tied to vanity,jealousy, and ambi-
tion, the key site of corruptionis in men's minds:"Thetransformationof nat-
ural man, free and good, into social man, dependentand corrupt,is funda-
mentally a psychological transformation"(154). The reason for Rousseau's
pessimism becomes clearer:corruptioncan be avoidedonly by avoidingthe
social dependenciesthatappearto be the necessaryconditionof ourpolitical
lives. But Grantinsists that this dire conclusion also suggests a strategyfor
maintainingpersonal integrity inasmuch as the dependence relations that
Rousseaudepicts are not of a piece: "Dependencethatis just and also either
mutual, impersonal,or personalbut hidden, can actually nurtureintegrity"
(167).
What, then, are the lessons to be drawnfor living ethically in the modem
political age? Insofaras Rousseau'swritingsdepictthe simultaneouspursuit
of moralpurityandprudentialcompromise,they substantiatethe possibility
of an ethical departurefrom principles.Whatpreservesmoralpurityare the
characterand sentimentsof the one who would depart.Thus, the terms of
integritypertainultimatelyto how we feel: "Rousseauissues a challenge to
open a pathto the heartthroughthe sophisticatedand sophistic moralwran-
gling of the modem age. And because the heart speaks clearly and with a
voice commonto all, his ideal does not collapse into the puresubjectivismof
authenticity.It has a genuinemoralcore"(174). This characterizationechoes
Grant'searlierclaim that self-consciousness is not germaneto Rousseau's
ideal. It also highlightsthe decidedlyun-Machiavellianpositionreadersmust
assume to find that ideal viable: the clear and common voice of the heart
speaks neitherto foxes nor to lions. Or rather,if it speaks, it speaks only of
opportunitiesfor manipulation.But could this indicatethatGrant'sRousseau
is more Machiavellianthanthe original?After all, she insists thathis goal is
precisely to change the ways readerschoose theirideals:he teaches that"we
must learnto judge people more by the heartthanby the head, more by their
sentimentsandcharacterthanby theirprinciplesandactions"(84). In a world
characterizedby persistentdeception,it is difficultto imaginea moreMachi-
avellian projectthan one that would sentimentalizepoliticaljudgment.
To entertainthis possibility is to confront the profound ambiguity of
Grant'sown conclusions. While she neverdirectly identifiesthis sentimen-
talizationas a Machiavellianmomentin Rousseau'sargument,neitherdoes
she close the gap between the subjectiveexperience of integrityand objec-
tive, worldly power.Indeed, she solidifies that gap by figuringdependence,
108 POLITICAL / February
THEORY 2001

passion, and "pressurestowardevil"-the definitive features of a politics

understoodto be insistently hypocritical-as fundamentallypsychological
conditions.Whetherit is the feeling of autonomyor the perceptionof a com-
mon interest,the characterswho exemplify Rousseau'sideal do so in their
heartsandminds,even as they remaindeeply identifiedwith a political soci-
ety over which most of themexertno control.Grantis of course awareof this
irony, but by expressing it as a problem of Rousseau's paternalism,she
obscureshow her own interpretivedesign severs the determinantsof ethical
action from the world in which thatactionmust be taken.We are thus led to
the conclusionthatthe ethicalpossibilitiesof moder politics applyprimarily
to affective states.
Consider her reading of the Second Discourse, which follows a
well-known line-that dependence breeds corruption-to arrive at the
less-knownconclusionthatthis corruptingdependenceis best understoodas
a function of internaldevelopments.There is, of course, nothing extraordi-
naryaboutemphasizingthe significanceof amourproprein Rousseau'stale.
Whatis notableis Grant'sgently persistentreiterationthatit must be under-
stood separatelyfrom social and economic developments.In other words,
sociopolitical inequality-whether shapedby juridical,economic, or sexual
difference-is not unjustin andof itself butin its psychologicaleffects. Like
his commitment to freedom, Rousseau's egalitarianismbears ultimately
uponourinnerconditions.As a result,justice becomes a functionof our sen-
timentsandperceptionsandpertainsonly secondarilyto economic or politi-
cal arrangements.In these ways, Grant's interpretationurges us to look
beyondthe mereappearanceof unequalprivilege,power,andcontrolto grasp
the realityrepresentedby characterand disposition.So we need not be trou-
bled by the disparatefreedomsRousseau sketches for his virtuouswomen
and virtuousmen becausein every case we arepresentedwith an honest and
admirablecharacter:theycan all be trustedto "dotherightthing,"nevermind
how differentthose things might be.
Like his exemplarywomen, Rousseau'ssocial contractorspresenta strik-
ing example of how minimallyhis genuinemoralismdependson real-world
effects: their integrity as citizens remains undiminishedby the fact that,
beneficentlyduped by the legislator,they "do not understandwhat they are
doing" (137). What, then, are the implicationsfor those who would wield
actualpower,in and on the political world?Is it enoughthatin maneuvering
throughthe "moralwranglingof the moder age,"Wolmar,Emile's tutor,and
lawgiversmean well? Again, Grant'sconclusionsareless thanclear.She elu-
cidates "three distinct standards"-truth, justice or morality, and free-
dom-that mightobtainin evaluatingtheirapparentdeceptions:"'Beneficial
manipulation'seems to violate the firstand the thirdin the name of promot-
 Wingrove/ REVIEWESSAY 109

ing the second. It sacrificestruthand freedom to promotejustice or virtue"

(128). We neverreada directaccountof whatjustice mightbe or entail,even
as Grantreflects on the "seriousabuse"to which this standardremainsopen.
But in concludingthatits "finaltest"is "themoralcharacterandhappinessof
the 'ruled,"'she appearsto suggestthatRousseauianjusticehas nothingto do
with democracy;rather,it has everythingto do with maintainingdemocracy
as a state of mind, perhapsmindlessness(131).
Are we then to conclude that the integrityof those who would exercise
actual political power depends on their antidemocraticconvictions? No
doubt, some readerswill find this a curiousconclusion to drawfrom Rous-
seau. But it becomes intelligible throughan interpretivepractice that con-
structsintegrityas a qualityof heartand head whose connectionto political
practices and institutionsis at best oblique. Thus, in Grant'sdescriptionof
Rousseau'slegislatoras a Machiavellianactorenmeshedin dependencerela-
tions thatnecessitatedeception,one can lose sight of the fact thathe plays no
role in actual political operations. A direct comparison between
Machiavelli'slawgiverandRousseau'smighthavemadethatclear:while the
formeris advisedto "concentrateall authorityin himself,"the latter"doesnot
andmustnot have anylegislativeright,"even if the people themselvesshould
thinkotherwise.3This introducesthe possibilitythatpreciselythe legislator's
political disenfranchisementauthorizeshis deceptions. But that interpreta-
tion awaitsan analysisof sovereignty,andRousseau'sprincipledjustification
of power remainsextraneousto an analysis of integrity.
This is not to say thatRousseau'selusive argumenton the moral truthof
majoritarianoutcomes could not benefit from Grant's inquiry into how
republicansunderstandthemselves to "do the right thing."On the contrary,
Rousseau's vision of direct democracyseems to offer a prime interpretive
opportunity:is his modal voter a prudentmoderate,a moderatemoralist,or
something else altogether?But Grantchooses not to explore the integrity
associatedwith directpoliticalparticipationin the state.Giventhe formthatI
have imposedin readingthese threebooks-that interpretivepracticeis itself
a political act-it is difficultto avoid assessing this choice in light of Grant's
own politicalinsightsandconvictions:is it an exampleof ajust deception?Is
an interpretationthat transformsMachiavelli's "dangerouspolitical reali-
ties" into a problem of psychological corrosion occluding as much as it
reveals? But to answer these questions would require assessing authorial
intentions,and while Grantoffers her typologies of integrityto facilitatejust
such assessments, it seems more prudentto stick to appearances.And it
appearsthatin choosing to figureRousseau'sgeneralwill as a unity of inter-
est andsentiment,butnot as a unityof practice,Grantsustainsan interpretive
110 POLITICALTHEORY/ February2001

vision thatsharplydifferentiatesbetweena politics of the stateandof the soul

and, in the process, leaves questionsof democraticpracticeunaddressed.
In retracingthe argumentsthese books make,withparticularregardto the
termsin whichtheymakethem,my aim has not beento guidereadersthrough
a dense field towardmoreaccuraterenditionsof Rousseau.Of course,the tru-
ism of multipleinterpretivepossibilities does not mean that all accountsare
equally viable or thatall imposed forms are equally fitting.But if canonical
texts are not profitablyapproachedas Rorschachinkblots, neitherare they
Rosettastones, and interpreterswill always face choices abouthow to make
meaningin whatthey findthere.My aimhas thusbeento elucidatethe ramifi-
cations of differentchoices, even or especially when they are not recognized
as such. This opens up interpretivepracticeto a political engagementthat
does not reduceto whetherthe argument"getsRousseauright."Instead,the
issue is how differenttermsof "rightness"forecloseon some possibilitiesand
enableothersand,in so doing, shapethe conditionsin which ourown politics
makes sense. In this murkymiddle, steering between the Scylla of textual
correctnessand the Charybdisof limitless designs allows us to considerhow
the practicesof sense makingareneitherpriorto nortranscendentof politics
but are its urgent,emphaticexpression.
The politics thattake shape throughthese threebooks' interpretiveprac-
tices are not, to be sure, of a piece. The tightropethat Morgensternwould
have her readersnegotiatebearslittle resemblanceto the matrixof good and
badcharactersthatGrantorganizesfor hers.And neitherauthorizesthe com-
binationof readerlycare and daringrequiredby Fermon.But I want to sug-
gest that common to all of these books' readingprotocolsis the representa-
tion of a nonconflictual politics. Limited to the quest for, alternatively,
unrealizableideals, a good character,or practicablereform,the politics that
take shape throughthese readingsof Rousseauperforcerestrictour notions
of intelligibly political confrontation,opportunity,and change. So perhaps
the authorshave succeeded in their sharedgoal to reclaim Rousseau's con-
temporarysignificanceinasmuchas, on theirinterpretations,his workbearsa
striking resemblance to currentpolitical searches for a "thirdway."And
while it is undoubtedlyintemperateto conjureimages of TonyBlair and Bill
Clintonwhenassessingthese Rousseaus,it is also soberingto noticethe com-
mon political pose-dedicated to emancipationbut weary of any attemptto
specify its content, committed to a democraticideal but obscure about its
practice,and attentiveto humandifferences but blind to the wordly power
that sustainsthem.

-Elizabeth Wingrove
Universityof Michigan,Ann Arbor
 Wingrove/ REVIEWESSAY 111

NOTES

1. Jean Morelly's Code de la Nature (1755) includedan attackon propertyvery similarto

Rousseau's,as well as makingmoralclaims for a social orderbased on reciprocatingandinterde-
pendentproductiverelations.
2. RobertBrenner's"AgrarianClass StructureandEconomicDevelopmentin Pre-Industrial
Europe," originally published in 1976 in Past and Present, challenged commercialization
accountsof Europeandevelopmentandinitiatedlong-runningdebatesaboutthe significanceof
(village anddemesne level) class relationsin the transitionfrom feudalto capitalisteconomies.
See T. H. Aston and CharlesPhilpin,eds., The BrennerDebate (Cambridge,UK: Cambridge
UniversityPress, 1985).
3. See Discourses on the First TenBooks of Titus Livius, I, chap. ix, in Machiavelli, The
Prince and the Discourses (New York:RandomHouse, 1950), 138, and Rousseau,Du Contrat
Social, II, chap. vii, in Oeuvres Completesde Jean-JacquesRousseau, ed. BernardGagnebin
and MarcelRaymond(Paris:Gallimard,Bibliothequede la P16iade,1959-1995), vol. 3, 383.

Elizabeth Wingroveteaches political theory andfeminist thoughtat the Universityof

Michigan,Ann Arbor.She has published workon Rousseau,Althusser,and Arendt.