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Sammy Seifeddine
HSB Reliability Technologies
Senior Project Manager
800 Rockmead Drive
Three Kingwood Place, Suite 180
Kingwood, TX 77339
(281) 358-1477 ext. 276
(281) 358-1871 fax
sseifeddine@hsbrt.com
12th International
Process Plant Reliability Conference
Houston, Texas
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Abstract
This paper describes a proven process for developing, optimizing, and managing
effective maintenance programs for new and in-service assets based on risk and cost-
benefit principles. The process calls for utilizing operational and maintenance experience
as long as the experience is documented for the proper class of assets in the form of
standard tasks. In absence of standard tasks, a more comprehensive analysis is
performed using Reliability-Centered Maintenance (RCM2) or Failure Modes Effects
Analysis (FMEA) to develop an optimum program. Asset performance data is used to
continually adjust the maintenance program to meet user objectives.
1.0 Introduction
This paper focuses on a process for developing effective asset (or optimizing existing)
maintenance programs. The process is a component of overall asset’s Life Cycle
Management (LCM).
Business objectives are set at the corporate and plant levels. They reflect market
conditions, shareholders expectations, and regulatory compliance. Objectives at this level
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include production levels, products qualities, safe operation policies and requirements,
environmental integrity requirements, and operating cost targets.
Major assets or systems performance expectations are further refined to the individual
equipment level. Here target vales for measures, such as Mean Time Between Failure
(MTBF), Mean Time To Repair (MTTR), availability, etc., are set and approved.
This process is repeated periodically, and the objectives are changed to reflect the
company’s position regarding the main business drivers. Figure 2 identifies the steps
involved in developing asset performance expectations.
Business objectives and performance expectations set the stage for defining equipment
performance standards for high risk equipment in which RCM2 is the utilized method for
developing/optimizing the maintenance programs.
The plant technical model (also known as asset hierarchy) is composed of a hierarchy of
systems and sub-systems that gradually represent increased levels of detail in describing
the asset. The model reflects how systems and sub-systems fit together, interrelate and
operate to provide the intended business function. As such, the hierarchy reflects both the
structural and process flow characteristics of the plant/asset.
The model starts with the process flow diagram representing the overall operation of a
plant. This level consists of the major plant production units, utility systems (such as
electricity, water, steam, air, fuel, etc.), feed and raw material preparation facilities, final
product storage, plant control systems and local area network(s), infrastructures, etc.
The next level breaks down each unit into systems and sub-systems as depicted on unit
process flow diagram and P&ID’s. Examples at this level include systems such as feed
filtration, feed pressurization, feed heating, atmospheric fractionation, etc. At
progressively lower levels of the model, the breakdown of the plant becomes more
detailed. At the end, the plant is reduced to a set of systems and sub-subsystems and the
equipment items that support each one of the systems or sub-sub-systems.
Control and protective systems are incorporated in the hierarchy at the appropriate levels.
In the case where a control or protective system is dedicated to one system or sub-system
then it should be setup as a sub-element of that system. In the case that a
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The steps involved in developing a plant technical model are as follows (see Figure 3):
Criticality and risk assessment is a qualitative analysis of assets failure events and the
ranking of those events according to their impact on the business goals of the company.
The process consists of the following main activities (see Figure 4):
The first step in the analysis is to use the organizational business objectives to define the
criticality assessment criteria. The following are some suggested criticality assessment
criteria.
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¾ Customer Service.
¾ Operating Cost.
Each criterion is given a maximum score to reflect the consequences and relative
importance. In Table 1, the safety criterion is given a maximum score of twenty (20)
while operating cost criterion is given a maximum score of ten (10).
Failure consequences within each criterion are defined and given an evaluation score.
Table 2 provides examples of safety, throughput/downtime, product quality, maintenance
and operating cost criteria and their associated consequences of failure and their scores.
Failure frequencies are defined based on systems and equipment performance. When
defining failure frequencies, consideration is given to aspects such as:
The frequency of failure score is used in the calculation of relative risk to determine how
likely the failure of the assessed system or equipment item will impact an organization’s
business. Table 3 shows a sample of frequency scores.
Criticality ranking rules are defined to assist in assigning criticality ranks to systems or
equipment during the analysis. The rules are established by considering the combined
consequence scores for all assessment criteria. For example, a rule can be defined as
“Assign criticality of 10 to a system/equipment, if any of safety or environmental
consequence scores are greater than 18, or any of throughput, product quality or
maintenance and operating cost consequence scores are equal to 10”, and so forth.
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The equipment criticality rank numbers, number range, and the rules for assigning the
numbers to systems or equipment under assessment are defined before conducting the
analysis.
Criticality rank numbers are assigned to systems and/or equipment based on the rules
developed. This is accomplished by comparing the equipment’s criteria consequence
scores to the criticality rank number’s rules. If the equipment matches the rules, the
equipment is assigned that criticality rank number. The equipment is always assigned the
highest criticality rank number it matches.
The assessment starts by analyzing the selected system and/or equipment failure
consequences. The most serious failure consequence in each defined consequence
criterion is identified and its score recorded.
System and equipment failure consequences are analyzed in terms of the resultant effects
on the asset as a whole and consider the impact of the failure on safety of personnel and
on the asset commercial performance. The later requires consideration of both direct and
indirect failure costs.
“If the system/equipment fails, could it result in a safety consequence? If yes, how
serious should the potential consequence be rated?”
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The probability of failure is used in combination with the total failure consequence of a
system/equipment to determine the RR value of the system/equipment. CARA uses the
concept of the relative risk (RR) to identify system/equipment that has the greatest
potential impact on the business goals of the company.
The RR of a system or equipment is the product of its Total Consequence Score (TC) and
the Frequency/Probability (F/P) Number. It is called “relative risk” because it only has
meaning relative to the other equipment evaluated by the same method.
The Total Consequence (TC) is the sum of all the scores assigned to each of the criteria
including: Safety (S), Environmental (E), Quality (Q), Throughput (T), Customer Service
(CS) and Operating Cost (OC).
TC = S + E + Q + T + CS + OC
RR = TC * F/P
The MTD/O process described in this paper establishes a structured framework for
developing or assessing maintenance programs for in-service or newly commissioned
assets. The process emphasizes the use of operation and maintenance experience
documented in a form of standard maintenance tasks (SMT).
The flowchart in Figure 5 describes the steps involved in carrying out the MTD/O
process.
1. A system is identified for review by selecting an element from the plant technical
hierarchy. As described earlier, the selected system boundary should be clearly
defined. The selected system includes all lower level elements.
2. A risk analysis is performed per section 4 of this paper. If an analysis was conducted
in the past, review of failure frequencies in lieu of the current system/equipment
items’ condition is conducted and the frequency scores changed as necessary. The
system/equipment items selected are then ranked by their risk ranking.
3. In the case that the system under review belongs to an equipment class group that has
a Standard Maintenance Task (SMT) documented, it is only necessary to verify for
low risk systems/equipment that any specific company, standards, and regulation
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requirements are applicable and simple service activities are adequate and cost
efficient. For high and medium risk systems/equipment, verification of all SMT
elements is required.
4. When an applicable SMT is not available, a more detailed analysis is required for
high and medium risk systems/equipment. For high risk items, a complete RCM2
analysis is recommended, while for medium risk items, RCM2 (FMEA) is sufficient
to develop/optimize the maintenance program. The outcome of RCM2 or RCM2
FMEA is a set of proposed tasks, their frequencies, and the crafts and skill levels of
individuals performing the work, or recommended actions in case suitable routine
tasks cannot be found.
5. For low risk items not governed by any company, standard or governmental
requirements a run-to-failure strategy is adapted. When requirements exist, routine
tasks are developed and incorporated into work packages.
6. From the output of RCM2 or RCM2 (FMEA), detailed routine task descriptions are
developed and then incorporated into work packages.
7. SMTs are developed to reduce tasks development time, efforts, and to ensure
consistency when dealing with equipment from the same equipment group.
Developed SMTs are kept in a library for future reference. Routine updates are made
to SMTs to reflect current condition of equipment, gained maintenance and operating
experience, and any new changes/modification to systems and equipment.
8. The final step in the analysis is to upload the developed work packages into Plant
Reliability Information Management Systems (PRIMS). PRIMS include maintenance
systems such as MAXIMO, SAP Plant Maintenance, Document Management
Systems, Inspection Systems, etc.
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The extent of documentation depends on the complexity and the risk assigned to the
assets under review. For low risk assets, it is only required to document items one to three
above and an assessment if simple service activities are adequate and cost effective. For
high and medium risk assets, it is recommended that the SMT documents all of the listed
items.
The MTD/O review will determine that the best maintenance strategy is to perform “on
condition maintenance.”
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After establishing the technical feasibility of condition monitoring, the economic viability
must be considered. The costs associated with the operation and on-going support of the
condition-monitoring program must be considered against the potential cost savings and
cost of alternative maintenance strategies.
7.0 Application
This process was introduced and implemented at several plants in North America. Assets’
condition assessment studies were conducted and baselines established for each facility.
The studies helped in developing the frequency score tables and provided points of
reference for future analysis to assess the effectiveness of the devised maintenance
programs.
Operational downtimes and slowdowns data were collected but not used for this analysis.
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Start
Start
Develop
Develop
Plant/Asset
Plant/Asset
Technical Model
Technical Model
Perform
Perform
Criticality & Risk
Criticality
Assessment & Risk
Assessment
Existing
New/Existing Assess Plant/Asset
Assess Plant/Asset
Plant/Asset? Condition
Condition
New
Develop /
Develop /
Optimize
Optimize
MP
MP
Develop / Monitor
Develop /
Optimize Modify/Load MP Monitor
MP
Optimize
Spares Strategy To PRIMS MP
Effectiveness
Spares Strategy Effectiveness
End
End
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Start
Corporate Objectives
Corporate Objectives
Plant Objectives
Plant Objectives
Major Assets/Systems
Major Assets/Systems
Performance Expectations
Performance Expectations
Equipment Item
Equipment Item
Performance Expectations
Performance Expectations
End
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Start
Start
Collect
Collect
Plant/Asset
Plant/Asset
Technical Data
Technical Data
Establish Develop
Establish Develop
Boundary Definition Plant/Asset
Boundary Definition Plant/Asset
Standards Technical Model
Standards Technical Model
Describe Systems’
Describe Systems’
Functions
Functions
End
End
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Start
Start
Establish Develop
Business Objectives Establish Develop
Assessment Select System Plant/Asset
Assessment Select System Plant/Asset
Criteria Technical Model
Criteria Technical Model
Determine Assign
Assess Plant/Asset Determine
Assess Plant/Asset Failure Frequencies Criticality & Risk Ranks To
Condition Failure Frequencies
Condition & Their Ratings System(s) / Equipment
& Their Ratings
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Start
Start
Select
Select
A System/Equipment End
End Risk?
A System/Equipment
Low Medium High
More
Yes
Systems/
Equipment?
No
End
End
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Criterion Score
Health and Safety 20
Environmental Integrity 20
Production Throughput 10
Operating Cost 10
Score Consequence
Safety
20 Fatalities.
18 Disabling injury.
14 Serious injury.
6 Minor or first aid injury such.
0 No injury.
Throughput/Downtime
10 Production downtime equal or greater than 7 days
9 Production downtime from 3 to 7 days.
8 Production downtime from 1 to 3 days.
7 One day production down time.
6 Production throughput at 25% of capacity.
4 Production throughput at 50% of capacity.
2 Production throughput at 75% of capacity.
0 No impact on throughput.
Product Quality
10 Unacceptable quality resulting in TOTAL product loss.
5 Unacceptable quality resulting in TOTAL product rework.
0 No effect on product quality.
Maintenance and Operating Cost
10 Incurred cost <$400K.
8 Incurred cost >$100K and <$400K.
6 Incurred cost >$50K and <$100K.
4 Incurred cost >$10K and <$50K.
2 Incurred cost >$1K and <$10K.
1 Incurred cost <$1K.
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Appendix A: Definitions
Failure Mechanism: Physical, chemical, or other processes which lead or have led to
failure.
Equipment Group: A set of equipment of the same class that functions in an identical
operating context.
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Appendix B: References
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