Abakada Guro Partylist vs Hon. Cesar V.

Purisima
August 14, 2008

FACTS:
RA 9335 or Attrition Act of 2005 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation
capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC. The law intends to encourage their
officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of
rewards and sanctions through the creation of Rewards and Incentives Fund and
Revenue Performance Evaluation Board. The Boards in the BIR and BOC to be
composed by their respective Commissioners, DOF, DBM, and NEDA, were tasked to
prescribe the rules and guidelines for the allocation, distribution and release of the fund,
to set criteria and procedures for removing service officials and employees whose
revenue collection fall short of the target; and further, to issue rules and regulations.
Also, the law tasked the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and the CSC to promulgate and
issue the IRR of RA 9335, subject to the approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee created solely for the purpose of approving the formulated IRR. Later, the
JCOO having approved a formulated IRR by the agencies, JCOO became functus
officio and ceased to exist. Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers, filed this
petition challenging the constitutionality of RA 9335 and sought to prevent herein
respondents from implementing and enforcing said law. Petitioners assail, among
others, the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that it
violates the doctrine of separation of powers, as it permits legislative participation in the
implementation and enforcement of the law, when legislative function should have been
deemed accomplished and completed upon the enactment of the law. Respondents,
through the OSG, counter this by asserting that the creation of the congressional
oversight committee under the law enhances rather than violates separation of powers,
as it ensures the fulfillment of the legislative policy.

ISSUE:
Whether the creation of the congressional oversight committee violates the doctrine of
separation of powers under the Constitution.

RULING
YES. Congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither
necessarily constitutes an encroachment on the executive power to implement laws nor
undermines the constitutional separation of powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks
and balances inherent in a democratic system of government. It may in fact even
enhance the separation of powers as it prevents the over-accumulation of power in the
executive branch.

In particular, congressional oversight must be confined to the following:

(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress‘ power of appropriation and the budget
hearings conducted in connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to
appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their
departments and its power of confirmation and

(2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of
Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.

Wherefore, the petition is hereby partially granted. Section 12 of RA 9335 creating a

Joint Congressional Oversight Committee to approve the implementing rules and
regulations of the law is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and therefore NULL and
VOID. The constitutionality of the remaining provisions of RA 9335 is upheld.