ILICAN, JULIOUS CAESAR C.

CASE DIGEST IN CONLICT OF LAWS

FRANCISCO T. KOH vs.COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-40428, December 17, 1975

FACTS:

Private respondent Coloma filed a complaint for damages against the

petitioner in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte for alleged "malicious, baseless,
and unfounded criminal complaint" filed by petitioner against Coloma. The basis of the
action for damages is the criminal prosecution of respondent Coloma for the crime of
estafa in the C.F.I. of Rizal because of the complaint of petitioner arising from the post-
dated check admittedly issued by respondent Coloma which was dishonored for lack of
funds. The check was the payment for the compromise settlementon a complaint filed
by Koh before the Municipal Court of Mandaluyong, Rizal, of Forcible Entry and
Detainer against the Coloma for the possession of a house and lot located at 480,
Barangka Drive, Mandaluyong, Rizal, on which Coloma and his family were all residing.

Coloma convinced the trial court, although he admitted that he is presently

residing at No. 57 K-6th Street, Kamias, Quezon City, that he could be considered a
legal resident domiciled at San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, because he was born and he grew
up there; that his parents and his brothers and sisters still live there; that their ancestral
home and lands are situated there; that he studied in Ilocos Norte up to his graduation
in the Ilocos Norte High School; that if ever he came to Manila, it was for the purpose of
pursuing a college carrer; that he goes home time and again to oversee their properties'
harvests as he is the oldest; that if he is staying in Quezon City now, it is because his
wife is a government employee as staff nurse in the Philippine General Hospital; and
after her retirement, he and his family intends to return to his hometown of San Nicolas,
Ilocos Norte, and establish his permanent home there.

Petitioner contends that on May 8, 1974, he filed a Manifestation before

the lower court apprising it that the copy of the motion to dismiss was sent to private
respondent Coloma in his alleged address of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, but the same
was returned unserved by the Bureau of Posts for the reason that Coloma was
unknown in the said address of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte; that in pleadings under oath
filed in several judicial proceedings involving petitioner and private respondent, the latter
asserted his actual and present residence as either 486 Barangka Drive, Mandaluyong,
Rizal or No. 57, K-6th Kamias, Quezon City, Rizalthat both private respondent Coloma
and his wife Crisanta A. Coloma are registered voters in the Greater Manila Area; that
the complaint filed against petitioner for damages in the C. F. 1. of Ilocos Norte, was
prepared in Manila, signed by a Manila lawyer, verified in Manila by private respondent
who showed his Residence Certificate issued in Manila (R.C.A-324643, issued on
March 8, 1973, in Manila); that the filing of the complaint for damages before the C.F.I.
of Ilocos Norte was "purely for the purpose of harrassment and that venue of the action
was improperly laid".

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent Appellate Court committed grave abuse of

discretion in dismissing the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner before it; in holding
that private respondent Jose P. Coloma is a resident of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, and
thereby holding that venue of the action before the Court of First Instance of Ilocos
Norte was proper.

HELD:

Yes. Private respondent does not reside or may be found in San Nicolas,
Ilocos Norte. The admission of Coloma that when he brought the action for damages
against petitioner in the C.F.I. of Ilocos Norte, he was "residing at No. 57 K-6th Street,
Kamias, Quezon City" is absolutely fatal to all his contentions of good faith in bringing
that action in a distant place and at the same time quite revealing of his motive for doing
so.

The law on venue in Courts of First Instance (Section 2, of Rule 4, Rules

of Court) in referring to the parties utilizes the words "resides or may be found," and not
"is domiciled." thus respondent Coloma's protestations of domicile in San Nicolas, Ilocos,
Norte, based on his manifested intention to return there after the retirement of his wife
from government service to justify his bringing of an action for damages against
petitioner in the C.F.I. of Ilocos Norte, is entirely of no moment since what is of
paramount importance is where he actually resided or where he may be found at the
time he brought the action, to comply substantially with the requirements of Sec. 2 (b) of
Rule 4, Rules of Court, on venue of personal actions.

The Court held in the case of Uytengsu vs. Republic, there is a difference
between domicile and residence. Residence is used to indicate a place of abode,
whether permanent or temporary; domicile, denotes a fixed permanent residence to
which when absent, one has the intention of returning. A man may have a residence in
one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is
residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have
but one domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous
places of residence. His place of residence generally is his place of domicile, but is not
by any means, necessarily so since no length of residence without intention of
remaining will constitute domicile.

At any rate, the court was convinced that the misunderstanding between
petitioner and private respondent Coloma has gone to such an extent that it would not
be surprising for respondent Coloma to be motivated by vengeance when he filed his
action for damages against the petitioner in the C.F.I. of Ilocos Norte in order to get
even with and impose all kinds of inconveniences on the petitioner.
GALLEGO vs VERRA
G.R. No. L-48641, November 24, 1941

FACTS:

This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the CA affirming the
decision of the CFI-Leyte, which declared illegal the petitioner’s election to the office of
municipal mayor of Abuyog, Leyte in the election of December 1940, on the ground that
he did not meet the residence qualification.Gallego is a native of Abuyog. After his
studies, he was employed as a school teacher in Catarman, Samar, as well as in some
municipalities in Leyte.In 1937, he ran as municipal mayor in Abuyog but lost. In June
1938, he worked in Malaybalay, Bukidnon in a plantation of Bureau of Forestry to make
up for the financial drawback caused by his loss in the previous election, and stayed
there until he resigned in September 1940.Gallego registered himself as an elector in
Bukidnon and voted in the election for assemblymen held in December 1938, and in
January 1940. He obtained and paid for his residence certificate it was stated that he
had resided in the said municipality for one and a half years.

The CA declared that Gallego lost his domicile in Abuyog at the time he was
elected mayor on the grounds that: (1) He registered as a voter in Malaybalay,Bukidnon
(2) He actually voted in Malaybalay in the 1938 election for assemblymen, and (3) He
obtained a residence certificate from Malaybalay.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Gallego lost his domicile of origin in Abuyog, Leyte and acquired
a new domicile in Malaybalay, Bukidnon.

HELD:

No. In the definition of “residence”in the election law, it states that in order to
acquire a domicile by choice, there must concur: (1) residence or bodily presence in the
new locality; (2) an intention to remain there; and (3) an intention to abandon the old
domicile.

The purpose to remain in the domicile should be for an indefinite period of time.
The court believed that Gallego had no intention to stay in Malaybalay indefinitely
because: (1) When he was employed as a teacher in Samar, he always returned in
Abuyog and even resigned when he ran for office in 1937; (2) His departure was only
for the purpose of making up for the financial drawback caused by his loss in the
election; (3) He did not take his wife and children to Malaybalay with him; (4) He bought
a piece of land in Abuyog and did not avail of the land in the plantation offered to him by
the government; and (5) He visited his family thrice despite the great distance between
Leyte and Bukidnon.
 The Court said that the manifest intent of the law in fixing a residence
qualification is to “exclude a stranger, or a newcomer, unacquainted with the conditions
and needs of a community and not identified with the latter from an elective office to
serve that community.”Moreover, the petitioner was a native there, had run for the same
office before, and was now elected with a majority of votes in a third class municipality.
DIEGO DE LA VIÑA vs. ANTONIO VILLAREAL,
G.R. No. L-13982, July 31, 1920

FACTS:

This is an original petition presented in the Supreme Court. Its purpose is

to obtain an order declaring: (a) That the respondent, the Honorable Antonio Villareal,
as Auxiliary Judge sitting in the Court of First Instance of the province of Iloilo, has no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of a certain action for divorce instituted in said court by
the respondent Narcisa Geopano against her husband, Diego de la Viña, the petitioner
herein; (b) that the said respondent judge has exceeded his power and authority in
issuing, in said action, a preliminary injunction against the said petitioner prohibiting him
from alienating or encumbering any part of the conjugal property during the pendency of
the action; and (c) that all the proceedings theretofore had in said court were null and
void.

The defendant Diego de la Viña, petitioner herein, opposed the said

motion for a preliminary injunction, and, subsequently, demurred to the complaint upon
the ground that the court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the cause, "nor over
the person of the defendant."

After hearing the respective parties the respondent judge, into separate
orders, dated November 1 and November 2, 1917, respectively, overruled the
defendant's demurrer, and granted the preliminary injunction prayed for by the plaintiff.

ISSUES:

1. May a married woman ever acquire a residence or domicile separate from that of
her husband during the existence of the marriage?

2. In an action for divorce, brought by the wife against her husband, in which the
partition of the conjugal property is also prayed for, may the wife obtain a
preliminary injunction against the husband restraining and prohibiting him from
alienating or encumbering any part of the conjugal property during the pendency
of the action?

HELD:

On the first issue.

This contention of the petitioner is not tenable. It is true, as a general of

law, that the domicile of the wife follows that of her husband. Although article 64 of the
Law of Civil Procedure provides that the domicile of a married woman, not legally
separated from her husband, is that of the latter, yet, when the tacit consent of the
husband and other circumstances justify it, for the purpose of determining jurisdiction,
the habitual residence of the woman should be considered as her domicile where her
right may be exercised in accordance with article 63. (Scaevola, Civil Code, p. 354.)

The court finds noreason why the law will not allow the wife to acquire a
separate residence when as alleged in the present case, the husband unlawfully ejects
her from the conjugal home in order that he may freely indulge in his illicit relations with
another woman. Under no other circumstance could a wife be more justified in
establishing a separate residence from that of her husband. For her to continue living
with him, even if he had permitted it, would have been a condonation of his flagrant
breach of fidelity and marital duty.

It is clear, therefore, that a married woman may acquire a residence or

domicile separate from that of her husband, during the existence of the marriage, where
the husband has given cause for divorce.

On the second issue.

The law making the husband the sole administrator of the property of the
conjugal partnership is founded upon necessity and convenience as well as upon the
presumption that, from the very nature of the relating between husband and wife, the
former will promote and not injure the interests of the latter. So long as this harmonious
relation, as contemplated by law, continues, the wife cannot and should not interfere
with the husband in his judicious administration of the conjugal property. But when that
relation ceases and, in a proper action, the wife seeks to dissolve the marriage and to
partition the conjugal property, it is just and proper, in order to protect the interests of
the wife, that the husband's power of administration be curtailed, during the pendency of
the action, insofar as alienating or encumbering the conjugal property is concerned.
Thus, Narcisa Geopano alleged that the defendant was about to alienate or encumber
the property belonging to the conjugal partnerships, with the object of injuring her
interests.

The court, therefore conclude, that in an action for divorce brought by the
wife against the husband, in which the partition of the conjugal property is also prayed
for, the wife may obtain a preliminary injunction against the husband, prohibiting the
latter from alienating or encumbering any part of the conjugal property during the
pendency of the action.

Therefore, the petition should be and is hereby denied, with costs against
the petitioner. So ordered.
JUAN MICIANO vs. ANDRE BRIMO
G.R. No. L-22595, November 1, 1927

FACTS:

The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo is in

question in this case. Juan Miciano, judicial administrator of the estate in question, filed
a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased (Joseph Brimo)
opposed Miciano’s participation in the inheritance. Joseph Brimo is a Turkish citizen.

The testator further provided that whoever would oppose his wishes that
his estate should be distributed in accordance with Philippine laws would forfeit their
inheritance.

ISSUE:

Whether Turkish law or Philippine law will be the basis on the distribution
of Joseph Brimo’s estates.

HELD:

Though the last part of the second clause of the will expressly said that “it
be made and disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine Island”,
this condition, described as impossible conditions, shall be considered as not imposed
and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the
testator otherwise provide. Impossible conditions are further defined as those contrary
to law or good morals. Thus, national law of the testator shall govern in his
testamentary dispositions.

The court approved the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial

administrator, in such manner as to include Andre Brimo, as one of the legatees.

Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is directed that
the distribution of this estate be made in such a manner as to include the herein
appellant Andre Brimo as one of the legatees, and the scheme of partition submitted by
the judicial administrator is approved in all other respects, without any pronouncement
as to costs.
DE JESUS VS SYQUIA
G.R. NO. L-39110 NOVEMBER 28, 1933

FACTS:

Antonia Loanco, a likely unmarried girl 20 years of age was a cashier in a

barber shop owned by the defendant’s brother in law Vicente Mendoza. Cesar Syquia,
the defendant, 23 years of age and an unmarried scion of a prominent family in Manila
was accustomed to have his haircut in the said barber shop. He got acquainted with
Antonio and had an amorous relationshipas a consequence, Antonia got pregnant and a
baby boy was born on June 17, 1931. In the early months of Antonia’s pregnancy,
defendant was a constant visitor. On February 1931, he even wrote a letter to a rev
father saying that the child is his and he wanted his name to be given to the
child. Though he was out of the country, he continuously wrote letters to Antonia
reminding her to eat on time for her and “junior’s” sake. The defendant also employed
his friend Dr. Talavera to attend at the birth and hospital arrangements for the
hospitalization of the mother at St. Joseph Hospital in Manila.

After giving birth, Syquia brought Antonia and his child at a House in
Camarines Street Manila where they lived together for about a year. When Antonia
showed signs of second pregnancy, defendant suddenly departed and that he was now
married with another woman at that time.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the note to the padre in connection with the other letters written by
defendant to Antonia during her pregnancy proves acknowledgement of paternity.

2. Whether trial court erred in holding that Ismael Loanco had been in the
uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child, justified by the conduct
of the father himself, and that as a consequence, the defendant in this case
should be compelled to acknowledge the said Ismael Loanco.

HELD:

On the first issue.

The letter written by Syquia to Rev. Father serves as admission of

paternity and the other letters are sufficient to connect the admission with the child
carried by Antonia there is no requirement in the law that the writing shall be addressed
to one, or any particular individual. It is merely required that the writing shall be
indubitable.Also, “the law fixes no period during which a child must be in the continuous
possession of the status of a natural child; and the period in this case was long enough
to reveal the father's resolution to admit the status”.
On the second issue.

Supreme Court held that they agree with the trial court in refusing to
provide damages to Antonia Loanco for supposed breach of promise to marry since
action on this has no standing in civil law. Furthermore, there is no proof upon which a
judgment could be based requiring the defendant to recognize the second baby,
PacitaLoanco. Finally, SC found no necessity to modify the judgment as to the amount
of maintenance allowed to Ismael Loanco in the amount of P50 pesos per month. They
likewise pointed out that it is only the trial court who has jurisdiction to modify the order
as to the amount of pension.
GELUZ V COURT OF APPEALS
2 SCRA 801

FACTS:
Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant (Antonio Geluz) for the first
time in 1948—through her aunt Paula Yambot. In 1950 she became pregnant by her
present husband before they were legally married. Desiring to conceal her pregnancy
from her parent, and acting on the advice of her aunt, she had herself aborted by the
defendant. After her marriage with the plaintiff, she again became pregnant. As she was
then employed in the Commission on Elections and her pregnancy proved to be
inconvenient, she had herself aborted again by the defendant in October 1953. Less
than two years later, she again became pregnant. On February 21, 1955, accompanied
by her sister Purificacion and the latter’s daughter Lucida, she again repaired to the
defendant’s clinic on Carriedo and P. Gomez streets in Manila, where the three met the
defendant and his wife. Nita was again aborted, of a two-month old foetus, in
consideration of the sum of fifty pesos, Philippine currency. The plaintiff was at this time
in the province of Cagayan, campaigning for his election to the provincial board; he did
not know of, nor gave his consent, to the abortion.
It is the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiff’s basis in filing this
action and award of damages.
The Court of Appeals and the trial court predicated the award of damages
in the sum of P3,000.00 upon the provisions of the initial paragraph of Article 2206 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Antonio, as father of the foetus, is entitled to damages
from the liable practioner of abortion?

HELD:
The decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint ordered
dismissed. Without costs.

This we believe to be an error, for the said article, in fixing a minimum

award of P3,000.00 for the death of a person, does not cover the case of an unborn
foetus that is not endowed with personality. Under the system of our Civil Code, being
incapable of having rights and obligations.
 Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or
death pertains primarily to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such
damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of the injuries it
received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact,
even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was
extinguished by its pre-natal death,
The prevailing American jurisprudence is to the same effect; and it is
generally held that recovery can not be had for the death of an unborn child and
numerous cases collated.a
ABLANG V. FERNANDEZ
25 PHIL 33

FACTS:
Vicente Donato claimed to be the legitimate son and private administrator
of Chan-Peco, who was alleged to be absent from the Philippines. The complaint was
later substituted by Gregoria Ablang who alleged to be the legitimate wife of Chan-Peco.
She claimed that she did not know the whereabouts of her husband, and that he, Chan-
Peco was the absolute and true owner of the lands in question and was in possession
of the same through Donato, for a period of thirty years. Current possessor of land,
defendants, Mariano Fernandez and CatalinoJandoc, alleged that plaintiff does not
have a legal capacity to do so, and that the facts of their complaints is insufficient to
constitute a cause of action.
After hearing the evidence the lower court found that the plaintiff was
entitled to the possession of the lands in question, and rendered a judgment accordingly.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the plaintiff has authority to maintain the present action?

HELD:
The judgment of the lower court overruling the demurrer to the complaint
is therefore hereby reversed, and it is hereby ordered that the cause be remanded to
the lower court, with permission to the plaintiff to amend her complaint within a period of
ten 'days after notice of the foregoing decision.
No allegation is made in the complaint that she had been appointed, in
accordance with the provisions of the law, by the courts to administer the property of her
absent husband, nor to maintain an action with reference to the same.

Said article 181 provides:

"When a person has disappeared from his domicile and his whereabouts is
unknown, and he has not left any attorney to manage his property, the judge, on
petition of a lawful party or the public attorney, may appoint some person to
represent him in whatever may be necessary."
 The complaint shows upon its face that the plaintiff, Gregoria Ablang, is
the wife of Chan-Peco, the admitted owner of the property in question; that he is absent
and that his whereabouts are unknown. The plaintiff as the wife of the absentee has
failed utterly to allege sufficient facts to show that she has complied with the conditions
mentioned in the articles above quoted of the Civil Code. In the absence of such
allegations, it is clear that she has not legal capacity to maintain the present action.
REPUBLIC V COURT OF APPEALS
GR NO. 97906

FACTS:
Private respondent Maximo Wong is the legitimate son of Maximo Alcala,
Sr. and Segundina Y. Alcala. When he was but two and a half years old and then known
as Maximo Alcala, Jr., and his sister Margaret Alcala, was then nine years old, they
were, with the consent of their natural parents and by order of the court in Special Case
No. 593 issued on September 9, 1967, adopted by spouses Hoong Wong and
Concepcion Ty Wong, both naturalized Filipinos. Hoong Wong, now deceased, was an
insurance agent while Concepcion Ty Wong was a high school teacher. They decided
to adopt the children as they remained childless after fifteen years of marriage. The
couple showered their adopted children with parental love and reared them as their own
children.
Upon reaching the age of twenty-two, herein private respondent, by then
married and a junior Engineering student at Notre Dame University, Cotabato City, filed
a petition to change his name to Maximo Alcala, Jr. It was averred that his use of the
surname Wong embarrassed and isolated him from his relatives and friends, as the
same suggests a Chinese ancestry when in truth and in fact he is a Muslim Filipino
residing in a Muslim community, and he wants to erase any implication whatsoever of
alien nationality; that he is being ridiculed for carrying a Chinese surname, thus
hampering his business and social life; and that his adoptive mother does not oppose
his desire to revert to his former surname.
The matter was resolved in favor of private respondent, the trial court
decreeing that, the jurisdictional requirements having been fully complied with,
petitioner's prayer to change his name from Maximo Wong to Maximo Alcala, Jr, was
granted.
On appeal to respondent court, and over the opposition of petitioner
Republic through the Solicitor General, the decision of the court below was affirmed in
full, hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the reasons given by private respondent in his petition for
change of name are valid, sufficient and proper to warrant the granting of said petition
HELD:

The petition is DENIED and the decision of respondent Court of Appeals is

hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
 True, the law prescribes the surname that a person may employ; but the
law does not go so far as to unqualifiedly prohibit the use of any other surname, and
only subjects such recourse to the obtention of the requisite judicial sanction. What the
law does not prohibit, it permits.
A petition for change of name is a remedy allowed under our law only by
way of exception to the mandatory provisions of the Civil Code on the use of surnames.
The law fixes the surname that may be used by a person, at least inceptively, and it
may be changed only upon judicial permission granted in the exercise of sound
discretion. Section 1 of Rule 103, in specifying the parties who may avail of said remedy,
uses the generic term "persons" to signify all natural persons regardless of status. If a
legitimate person may, under certain judicially accepted exceptional circumstances,
petition the court for a change of name, we do not see any legal basis or logic in
discriminating against the availment of such a remedy by an adopted child.
ONG HUANG TIN V. REPUBLIC

FACTS:
This case involves the petition to change the name of Ong Huan Tin to
Teresita Tan. Due publication was had. The petition was set for hearing. But, before the
petition could be heard on the merits, the court, motu proprio, in its order of November 6,
1962 expressed the opinion “that an alien cannot avail himself of the provisions of our
Rules of Court relating to change of name” and thereupon denied the petition. A move
to reconsider was rejected in the court’s order of November 24, 1962.
While in a recent jurisprudence, (In the Petition for the Change of Name of
JOSELITO YU, G.R. L-20874, May 25, 1966). We held that Philippine citizenship of the
applicant is not a prerequisite for a petition to change name; and, that, accordingly, an
alien may petition for a change of name.
There, this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Makalintal, declared:

“Rule 103 does not say that only citizens of the Philippines may petition for a change of
name. [Neither does Public Act No. 1386 of the Philippine Commission (enacted
September 1, 1905) from which the Rule has been adopted.] Section 1 provides that ‘a
person desiring to change his name shall present the petition to the Court of First
Instance of the province in which he resides, or, in the City of Manila, to the Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court’ Here the word ‘person’ is a generic term which is not
limited to Filipino citizens, but embraces all natural persons. The rule does not even
require that the citizenship of the petitioner be stated in his petition. It is enough that the
petition be verified, signed by the petitioner or some other person in his behalf, and set
forth (a) that the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where the
petition is filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date of filing; (b) the cause for
which the change of name is sought; and (c) the name asked for (Section 2). The rule is
clear and affords no room for interpretation, It sets forth all the requirements, and
Filipino citizenship is not one of them.

ISSUE:
Whether an alien may petition for a change of name.
HELD:
Considering that the petition herein complies with the requisites set forth in
the Rules of Court, we vote to set aside the orders of the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court of November 6, 1962 and November 24, 1962; and to direct said Court
to proceed with the hearing and determination of Special Proceeding 03521, entitled “In
the Matter of the Petition to Change Name of Ong Huan Tin to Teresita Tan.”
Change of name—under our own law—is a special proceeding to
establish the status of a person involving his relations with others, that is, his legal
position in, or with regard to, the rest of the community. The petition therefor is directed
against all. It is in rem. So it is, that under Section 3 of Rule 103, publication of the
petition is required.
The broad general doctrine is that the status of an alien individual is
governed and controlled by the lexdomicilii. Implicit in this precept is that an alien may
be allowed to change his name here only if he be domiciled in the Philippines. And
“domicile” means “permanent home, the place to which, whenever absent for business
or pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances, in the
sense that they disclose intent.
An alien who temporarily stays in the Philippines may not there avail of the
right to change his name. For, what good will that be if, after all, his stay will be for a
short period of time? It would not be of much benefit to him; court proceedings for the
purpose could yet be a useless ceremony; that salutary effects f lowing from a change
of his social relation and condition may not thus be achieved, And then, stock should be
taken of the fact that in a change of name, third persons and the State are concerned,
Correct, then, it is to say that change of name is not temporary in nature; the new name
may not be shunted aside at will.
We, accordingly, lay down the rule that only alien domiciled in the
Philippines may apply for change of name in the courts thereof.
BASAS V REPUBLIC

FACTS:
This case is for a change of names of the minors Antonio Ang Gui, Alberto
Basas Ang, Ernesto Basas Ang and Evelyn Basas Ang, petitioned by VirgniaBasas.
In her petition, appellant alleges that said minors are her children, born out
of wedlock, on August 23, 1953, July 4, 1956, December 17, 1958 and May 22, 1960,
respectively; that, although the children had been registered, in the Off iceic e o f the
Local Civil Reg is trar of Manil a, under aforementioned, they were baptized as Antonio
Chua, Jr., Alberto Chua, Jose Ernesto Chua y Basas, and Evelyn Chua, respectively;
and that these discrepancies, between their names as registered in the aforementioned
office and as entered in the records of the parish churches in which they were,
respectively, baptized, are "very confusing and may mislead the people and the
authorities of their true identities." Appellant prayed, therefore, that the names of said
minors be changed to Antonio Basas, Alberto Basas, Ernesto Basas and Evelyn Basas.
After due publication of the corresponding notice and hearing, the
aforementioned Court rendered the appealed decision, dismissing appellant's petition
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner can avail of the change of name proceedings for
her children?

HELD:
No. The Court denied the petition.
In a recent case (Lim v. De la Rosa, L-17790, March 31, 1964), a
statement made by the trial court in a change of name proceedings to the effect that
petitioner was a Filipino was deemed by the Supreme Court to be an indication that
petitioner was indeed a Filipino. The ruling confirms the advisability of this court's
denying a change of name where a petitioner's claim of Filipino citizenship is open to
doubt.
'lt is highly desirable that courts should at all times be keenly aware that
certain aliens are apt to resort to desperate means in order to obtain the benefits of
Filipino citizenship, and that they should ever endeavor to bar the possibility that judicial
proceedings should not be utilized to circumvent the policy of our Constitution and
statutes, even temporarily.'

In the case at bar, the children involved would be Chinese citizens if they
are natural children, or if their parents are legally married. The Court has grave doubts
in respect of the allegation made in their behalf that they are illegitimate. Of late, there
has been a trend for claims of illegitimacy being made by children of Chinese fathers
and Filipino mothers with the obvious aim of obtaining judicial recognition, however,
indirect, that they are entitled to be considered Filipino citizens. The Court has refused
to give due course to petitions based on such claim. Thus, the following statements,
among others, have been made:
RAFAEL ENRIQUEZ ET AL. v. FRANCISCO ENRIQUEZ ET AL

GR No. 3474, Sep 20, 1907

FACTS:

Antonio Enriquez and Doña Ciriaca Villanueva were legally married prior to the
year 1860 that in 1861 the property in question was acquired by Antonio Enriquez,
thereby became a part of the property belonging to the conjugal partnership. Doña
Ciriaca Villanueva died in 1882 that upon her death an undivided half of the property
passed to her heirs. In 1883, Antonio Enriquez undertook to convey the entire property
to the defendant Doña Carmen de la Cavada he, as a matter of law, conveyed only one
half thereof, and that the other half remained and now is the property of the plaintiffs.
The court found, and the evidence sustains that finding, that a marriage ceremony was
duly performed between these persons in 1865, but held that the fact that prior to 1861
they had lived together as husband and wife, had been recognized as such, and had
had children who were baptized as the legitimate children of their lawful marriage was
sufficient evidence to raise the presumption that they were at that time legally married.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Antonio Enriquez and Doña Ciriaca Villanueva were legally
married in 1861.

HELD:

In the case at bar, a marriage ceremony having been duly celebrated

between these persons in 1865, is necessary to show that they were legally married
before that time, to prove that the same kind of a marriage ceremony had therefore
been celebrated. Although, as held by the Supreme Court of the United States, by the
common law of England, a valid marriage might be contracted without the intervention
of any ecclesiastical or civil functionary, yet such was never the law in these Islands
during the Spanish domination here.

the entire period of that domination no valid marriage could exist unless
some ecclesiastical or civil functionary intervened in its celebration, and the intervention
of civil functionaries was limited to the short time elapsing between the 8th day of
December, 1889, when the Civil Code took effect here, and the 29th day of the same
month, when the provisions of Tittle IV, Book I, of that code were suspended. During the
time covered by the lives of Antonio Enriquez and Doña Ciriaca Villanueva no valid
marriage between them could be contracted by their mere agreement to live together as
husband and wife. There is proof in this case that a marriage, valid in accordance with
the laws then in force in these Islands, was celebrated between these persons in 1865.

In order to show that they were before that time husband and wife, it was
necessary to prove that a marriage ceremony in which an ecclesiastical functionary
intervened was duly celebrated. No proof of any such marriage was offered.

As has been said, the fact that prior to 1865 they lived together as
husband and wife and had children is not evidence in this case to show that they were
married prior to that time. Nor is the fact that in the certificates of baptism of these
children it is stated that they were the legitimate children of the lawful marriage of their
parents.

The court below said:

Loss of the record of the first marriage, or some like reason, might have
made the second ceremony seem necessary and for that reason it was celebrated. This
consideration is to our minds entirely insufficient to explain the celebration of the second
marriage. If the former marriage had taken place, it must have been celebrated before
some priest or other officer of the Roman Catholic Church. The law required that a
record of such marriages should be kept in the parish registry, and if such marriage in
fact had been performed, it probably would have been easy to have obtained a certified
copy of such record.

No evidence was offered in this case of any attempt to obtain such record
or that the records of the church where the ceremony had been performed had been
destroyed. In fact, no proof whatever was offered in the case to show the celebration of
such prior marriage, except the facts herein before stated, that the parties lived together
as husband and wife and had children who were baptized as aforesaid. We hold that
this evidence is insufficient to prove in this case a prior marriage, where it appears that
a marriage ceremony was duly performed between the parties at a later date; and we
therefore hold that Antonio Enriquez and Doña Ciriaca Villanueva were not legally
married prior to 1865, and that, therefore, when this property was acquired by Antonio in
1861 it did not become a part of the property belonging to the conjugal partnership, but
on the contrary was a part of the capital which he brought to the marriage.

The judgment of the court, rests solely upon the proposition that at the
time of the death of Doña Ciriaca Villanueva one half of this property passed to her
heirs, cannot, therefore, be sustained. That judgment is reversed, without costs to either
party in this court, and judgment is entered acquitting the defendants of the complaint,
with the costs of the first instance against the plaintiffs.
Sempio- Diy and Karl Wiegel
No. L-53703 August 19, 1986

Facts:

Private respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel asked for the declaration of Nullity of his
marriage celebrated on July 1978 with petitioner Lilia Wiegel in an action filed before the
erstwhile Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan City on the ground of
Lilia’s previous marriage to Eduardo Maxion on June 25, 1972.

Petitioner claimed that her first marriage was null and void, for she and the first
husband Maxion have been allegedly forced to enter said marital union. Petitioner then
asked the respondent court for an opportunity to present evidence that her first marriage
was void. Respondent judge ruled against the presentation of evidence because
the existence of force exerted on both parties of the first marriage has already
been agreed upon.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner’s prior marriage was merely voidable assuming the
presence of force exerted against both parties.

Held:

The Supreme Court upheld that there is no need for petitioner to prove that her
first marriage was initiated by force committed against both parties because assuming
that this is so, the marriage will not be void but merely voidable (Article 85, Civil Code)
and therefore valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it
is clear that when she married private respondent, she was still validly married to her
first husband, consequently, her marriage to respondent is void. Hence, petitioner’s
prior marriage is merely voidable but valid until annulled.
Vda de Conseguerra vs GSIS
37SCRA315

Facts:

This is an appeal on questions of law from the decision of the Court of

First Instance of Surigao del Norte, dated March 7, 1967, in its Special Proceeding No.
1720. The late Jose Consuegra was employed as a shop foreman in the province of
Surigao del Norte. He contracted two marriages, the first with Rosario Diaz and the
second, which was contracted in good faith while the first marriage was subsisting, with
BasiliaBerdin. Consuegra died, while the proceeds of his GSIS life insurance were paid
to petitioner BasiliaBerdin and her children who were the beneficiaries named in the
policy. They received Php 6,000. Consuegra did not designate any beneficiary who
would receive the retirement insurance benefits due to him. Respondent Rosario Diaz,
the widow by the first marriage, filed a claim with the GSIS asking that the retirement
insurance benefits be paid to her as the only legal heir of Consuegra, considering that
the deceased did not designate any beneficiary with respect to his retirement insurance
benefits.

Petitioner Berdin and her children, likewise, filed a similar claim with the
GSIS, asserting that being the beneficiaries named in the life insurance policy of
Consuegra, they are the only ones entitled to receive the retirement insurance benefits
due the deceased Consuegra. The GSIS ruled that the legal heirs of the late Jose
Consuegra were Rosario Diaz, his widow by his first marriage who is entitled to one-half,
or 8/16, of the retirement insurance benefits, on the one hand; and BasiliaBerdin, his
widow by the second marriage and their seven children, on the other hand, who are
entitled to the remaining one-half, or 8/16. BasiliaBerdin didn’t agree. She filed a petition
declaring her and her children to be the legal heirs and exclusive beneficiaries of the
retirement insurance.

The trial court affirmed stating that: "when two women innocently and in
good faith are legally united in holy matrimony to the same man, they and
their children, born of said wedlock, will be regarded as legitimate children and each
family be entitled to one half of the estate.”
Hence the present appeal by BasiliaBerdin and her children.

Issue:

To whom should this retirement insurance benefits of Jose Consuegra be paid,

because he did not designate the beneficiary of his retirement insurance?
Held:

Petition denied.

Berdin averred that because the deceased Jose Consuegra failed to designate
the beneficiaries in his retirement insurance, the appellants who were the beneficiaries
named in the life insurance should automatically be considered the beneficiaries to
receive the retirement insurance benefits. The GSIS offers two separate and distinct
systems of benefits to its members one is the life insurance and the other is the
retirement insurance.

These two distinct systems of benefits are paid out from two distinct and
separate funds that are maintained by the GSIS.

In the case of the proceeds of a life insurance, the same are paid to whoever is
named the beneficiary in the life insurance policy. As in the case of a life insurance
provided for in the Insurance Act, the beneficiary in a life insurance under the GSIS may
not necessarily be a heir of the insured. The insured in a life insurance may designate
any person as beneficiary unless disqualified to be so under the provisions of the Civil
Code. And in the absence of any beneficiary named in the life insurance policy, the
proceeds of the insurance will go to the estate of the insured.

Retirement insurance is primarily intended for the benefit of the employee,

to provide for his old age, or incapacity, after rendering service in the government for a
required number of years. If the employee reaches the age of retirement, he gets the
retirement benefits even to the exclusion of the beneficiary or beneficiaries named in his
application for retirement insurance.

The beneficiary of the retirement insurance can only claim the proceeds of
the retirement insurance if the employee dies before retirement. If the employee failed
or overlooked to state the beneficiary of his retirement insurance, the retirement benefits
will accrue to his estate and will be given to his legal heirs in accordance with law, as in
the case of a life insurance if no beneficiary is named in the insurance policy.

GSIS had correctly acted when it ruled that the proceeds should be
divided equally between his first living wife and his second. The lower court
has correctly applied the ruling of this Court in the case of Lao v Dee. Gomez vs.
Lipana- in construing the rights of two women who were married to the same man, held
"that since the defendant's first marriage has not been dissolved or declared void the
conjugal partnership established by that marriage has not ceased. Nor has the first wife
lost or relinquished her status as putative heir of her husband under the new Civil Code,
entitled to share in his estate upon his death should she survive him. Consequently,
whether as conjugal partner in a still subsisting marriage or as such putative heir she
has an interest in the husband's share in the property here in dispute....
 With respect to the right of the second wife, although the second marriage
can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was
still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of such nullity. And inasmuch as
the conjugal partnership formed by the second marriage was dissolved before judicial
declaration of its nullity, "the only lust and equitable solution in this case would be to
recognize the right of the second wife to her share of one-half in the property acquired
by her and her husband and consider the other half as pertaining to the conjugal
partnership of the first marriage."
Domingo vs. CA
226 SCRA 572

FACTS:

Soledad Domingo, married with Roberto Domingo in 1976, filed a petition for the
declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of property. She did not know that
Domingo had been previously married to Emerlindadela Paz in 1969.
Soledad Domingo came to know the previous marriage when the latter filed a suit
of bigamy against her. Also, when she came home from Saudi during her one-month
leave from work, she discovered that Roberto cohabited with another woman and had
been disposing some of her properties which is administered by Roberto.
The latter claims that because their marriage was void ab initio, the declaration of
such voidance is unnecessary and superfluous. On the other hand, Soledad insists the
declaration of the nullity of marriage not for the purpose of remarriage, but in order to
provide a basis for the separation and distribution of properties acquired during the
marriage.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petition for judicial declaration should only be filed for
purposes of remarriage.

Ruling:

The declaration of the nullity of marriage is indeed required for purposed of

remarriage. However, it is also necessary for the protection of the subsequent spouse
who believed in good faith that his or her partner was not lawfully married marries the
same. With this, the said person is freed from being charged with bigamy.

When a marriage is declared void ab initio, law states that final judgment shall
provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the
custody and support of the common children and the delivery of their presumptive
legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial
proceedings. Soledad’s prayer for separation of property will simply be the necessary
consequence of the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage. Hence, the
petitioner’s suggestion that for their properties be separated, an ordinary civil action has
to be instituted for that purpose is baseless.

The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of
marriage, one of which is the separation of property according to the regime of property
relations governing them.
NAVARRO VS. DOMAGTOY
259 SCRA 129, July 19, 1996

FACTS:

Complainant Mayor Rodolfo Navarro of Dapa, Surigao del Norte filed this
case to the Supreme Court against respondent Judge HenandoDomagtoy of MCTC of
Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte, for gross misconduct as well as inefficiency and
ignorance of the law.

First, on Sept. 24, 1994, Judge Domagtoy solemnized the marriage of

Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borja despite his knowledge that Tagadan was merely
separated from his wife. Second, her performed a marriage ceremony between
FlorianoSumaylo and Gemma del Rosario in October 1994 at respondent judge’s
residence in Dapa, SDN. As to the first, Domagtoy contended that he merely relied on
the affidavit issued by the RTC Judge of Bassey, Samar, which stated that Tagadan
and his wife have not seen each other for almost seven years. However, the certified
true copy of the marriage contract between Tagadan and Borja showed that his civil
status was “separated”.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a court may solemnize another marriage of a husband who
was merely separated from his wife for almost seven years.

Whether or not a Judge may solemnize a marriage at his residence.

Ruling:

Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides that a marriage

contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null
and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage the prior spouse
had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded
belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there
is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of
the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient. For the purpose of
contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse
present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in the Code for the
declaration of presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains to be
married to Peñaranda. Wittingly or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of
respondent judge to have accepted the joint affidavit submitted by Tagadan. Such
neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous and therefore void marriage.

Art. 7. A marriage may be solemnized by (1) any incumbent member of the

judiciary within the court’s jurisdiction xxx . Article 8, however, states that
 marriages shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in
open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the consul-
general, consul or vice consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except
in cases of marriages contracted on the point of death or in remote places in
accordance with Art. 29 of the Family Code, or where both parties in which
case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them
in a sworn statement to that effect.

There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of
death or in a remote place. Moreover, the written request presented
addressed to the respondent judge is the “authority of the solemnizing
officer”. Under Art. 8, which is only a discretionary provision, refers only to the
venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of
the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision. Non-
compliance herewith will not invalidate the marriage.

Judges who are appointed to specific jurisdiction may officiate in

marriages only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a
marriage outside his court’s jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the
formal requisite laid down in Article 3 which while it may not affect the validity of
the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.

Judge Domagtoy was suspended for six months for demonstrating

gross ignorance of the law.
AGUEDA BENEDICTO DE LA RAMA, vs.
ESTEBAN DE LA RAMA

G.R. No. 1056 , March 13, 1907

FACTS:

That Agueda Benedicto De La Rama filed a divorce against Estaban De

La Rama on the grounds of adultery, that on July 5, 1902, the Court of First Instance of
the Province of Iloilo entered a final judgment in this case, decreeing a divorce to the
plaintiff, as well as the payment of 81,042.76 pesos due her as her unpaid share of the
property belonging to the conjugal partnership, as well as the sum of 3,200 pesos as an
allowance for their support since the date on which the action was instituted.

From the judgment the defendant appealed to this court, which, on

December 8, 1903, reversed the decree of the Court of First Instance, incorporated in
its opinion certain findings of fact, and ordered judgment absolute that the complaint be
dismissed. Thereafter the plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States,
which on April 2, 1906, reversed the judgment of this Court.

The action of this court upon relating to adultery was reversed by the
Supreme Court of the United States, and by the decision of that court there were
definitely disposed of. The other assignment of error relate to that part of the decision of
the Court of First Instance with treats of the division of the conjugal property, the
allowance of alimony, and the order of the court below that the case be referred to the
fiscal for criminal proceedings against the defendant.

The claim of the appellant now is, however, that the whole case was finally
disposed of by the decision of the latter court, and that the only thing remaining for this
court as to do is to affirm the judgment of the Court of First Instance in its entirely.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Supreme Court of the Philippines should recognize the
judgement done by the Supreme court of the United States or affirmed the decision of
the court of first instance entirely.

HELD:

The Philippine Court can not agree with the court of first instance. The
only thing considered by the Supreme Court of the United States was that part of the
decision of the Court of First Instance which related to the right of the plaintiff to a
divorce. It did not pass upon the division of the conjugal property. Its order was that the
case be remanded to this court for further proceedings not inconsistent with its opinion.
If the contention of the plaintiff is true, it seems that the order of that court and affirming
that of the Court of First Instance. By remanding the case to this court for further
proceedings not inconsistent with the opinion of the Supreme Court, it seems to have
been the intention of that court that this court should dispose of the assignments of error
not already of.

In our opinion, however, this assignment of error was disposed of by the

decision of the Supreme Court of the United States. As was said in that decision , the
jurisdiction of that court depended entirely upon that part of the judgment of the Court of
First Instance which directed the payment of 81,000 pesos. If the Court of First Instance
had no jurisdiction to make any order for the payment of money in a divorce proceeding,
that part of the judgment would have to be eliminated. In taking jurisdiction of the case
the Supreme Court of the United States necessarily held that a liquidation of the affairs
of the conjugal partnership could be had in a divorce proceeding. It is thus seen that the
conjugal property which is to be divided when the partnership is dissolved, is
determined not with reference to the income or profits, which may have been received
during the partnership by the spouses but rather by the amount of the actual property
possessed by them at such dissolution after making the deductions and payments
aforesaid. This is positively provided by article 1424.

An examination of the decision of the Court of First Instance shows that no

attempt was made to comply with any of these statutory provisions. No inventory of the
partnership property existing at the time of the trial, at which the liquidation was made,
was ever formed.

It needs no argument to show that this manner of liquidating the affairs of

the conjugal partnership is entirely unwarranted by the law. The Theory of the Civil
Code is that the conjugal property is the actual property which is left at the dissolution of
the partnership. It, can therefore, never be determined by adding up the profits, which
had been made each year during its existence, and then saying that the result is the
conjugal property.
IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL vs.
HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA
(in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila)

G.R. No. 80116, June 30, 1989

FACTS:

On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda ManalaysayPilapil, a Filipino

citizen, and private respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were
married at Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany and the couple lived
together for some time in Malate, Manila where their only child, Isabella PilapilGeiling,
was born on April 20, 1980. Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations
between the spouses and after about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial
disharmony eventuated in private respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against
petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January, 1983. He claimed
that there was failure of their marriage and that they had been living apart since April,
1982. Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and
separation of property before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.

On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal

Republic of Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of
marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to petitioner. The records
show that under German law said court was locally and internationally competent for the
divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of said marriage was legally founded on and
authorized by the applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction.

On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the
divorce decree, private respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City
Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to said respondent, petitioner "had an
affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named
Jesus Chua sometime in 1983". On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the
Secretary of Justice asking that the aforesaid resolution of respondent fiscal be set
aside and the cases against her be dismissed.

On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action

for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order, seeking the
annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash. The petition is
anchored on the main ground that the court is without jurisdiction "to try and decide the
charge of adultery, which is a private offense that cannot be prosecuted de officio (sic),
since the purported complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as an offended spouse
having obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior to his filing the
criminal complaint." 15
ISSUE:

Whether or not the divorce decree obtained in the Germany could be

applied in the case at hand.

RULING:

Yes. The court find the petition meritorious. Under Article 344 of the
Revised Penal Code, the crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes against chastity,
cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended
spouse. It has long since been established, with unwavering consistency, that
compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement. While
in point of strict law the jurisdiction of the court over the offense is vested in it by the
Judiciary Law, the requirement for a sworn written complaint is just as jurisdictional a
mandate since it is that complaint which starts the prosecutory proceeding and without
which the court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to try the case.

Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and
concubinage the person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended
spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of
lasciviousness, no provision is made for the prosecution of the crimes of adultery and
concubinage by the parents, grandparents or guardian of the offended party.

This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party who
might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through the scandal of a
public trial. 20 Hence, as cogently argued by petitioner, Article 344 of the Revised Penal
Code thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the
institution of the criminal action for, adultery. This is a logical consequence since
the raison d'etre of said provision of law would be absent where the supposed offended
party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the filing of the
criminal case.

In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid
divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and
its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is
concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on Under the same
considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband of
petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture
that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

The allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought this
case before the decree of divorce for lack of knowledge, even if true, is of no legal
significance or consequence in this case. When said respondent initiated the divorce
proceeding, he obviously knew that there would no longer be a family nor marriage
vows to protect once a dissolution of the marriage is decreed. the matter of status of
persons.
MANUELA BARRETTO GONZALEZ VS
AUGUSTO C. GONZALEZ

G.R. No. L-37048, March 7, 1933

FACTS:

Plaintiff and defendant are citizens of the Philippine Islands and at present
residents of the City of Manila. They were married on January 19, 1919, and lived
together as man and wife. They voluntarily separated and since that time have not lived
together as man and wife. Of this union four children were born who are now 11, 10, 8
and 6 years of age. Negotiations between the parties, both being represented by
attorneys, continued for several months, whereupon it was mutually agreed to allow the
plaintiff for her support and that of her children, five hundred pesos (P500) monthly; this
amount to be increased in case of illness or necessity, and the title of certain properties
to be put in her name. Shortly after this agreement the husband left the Islands, betook
himself to Reno, Nevada, and secured in that jurisdiction an absolute divorce on the
ground of desertion, which decree was dated November 28, 1927. Shortly thereafter the
defendant moved to California and returned to these Islands in August 1928, where he
has since remained. On the same date that he secured a divorce in Nevada he went
through the forms of marriage with another citizen of these Islands and now has three
children as a result of that marriage. Defendant, after his departure from these Islands,
reduced the amount he had agreed to pay monthly for the support of his wife and four
minor children and has not made the payments fixed in the Reno divorce as alimony.
Shortly after his return his wife brought action in the Court of First Instance of Manila
requesting that the courts of the Philippine Islands confirm and ratify the decree of
divorce issued by the courts of the State of Nevada; that section 9 of Act No. 2710,
which reads as follows:

The decree of divorce shall dissolve the community of property as soon as

such decree becomes final, but shall not dissolve the bonds of matrimony until one year
thereafter.

The bonds of matrimony shall not be considered as dissolved with regard

to the spouse who, having legitimate children, has not delivered to each of them or to
the guardian appointed by the court, within said period of one year, the equivalent of
what would have been due to them as their legal portion if said spouse had died
intestate immediately after the dissolution of the community of property. It is also prayed
that the community existing between plaintiff and defendant be declared dissolved and
the defendant be ordered to render an accounting and to deliver to the plaintiff her
share of the community property, that the defendant be ordered to pay the plaintiff
alimony at the rate of five hundred pesos (P500) per month, that the defendant be
ordered to pay the plaintiff, as counsel fees, the sum of five thousand pesos (P5000),
and that the defendant be ordered to pay plaintiff the expenses incurred in educating
the three minor sons.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the divorce decree obtain in Nevada could be enforce in

the Philippines.

HELD:

No, while the parties in this action are in dispute over financial matters
they are in unity in trying to secure the courts of this jurisdiction to recognize and
approve of the Reno divorce. On the record here presented this can not be done. The
public policy in this jurisdiction on the question of divorce is clearly set forth in Act No.
2710.

The entire conduct of the parties from the time of their separation until the
case was submitted to this court, in which they all prayed that the Reno divorce be
ratified and confirmed, clearly indicates a purpose to circumvent the laws of the
Philippine Islands regarding divorce and to secure for themselves a change of status for
reasons and under conditions not authorized by our law. At all times the matrimonial
domicile of this couple has been within the Philippine Islands and the residence
acquired in the State of Nevada by the husband of the purpose of securing a divorce
was not a bona fide residence and did not confer jurisdiction upon the Court of that
State to dissolve the bonds if matrimony in which he had entered in 1919. While the
decisions of this court heretofore in refusing to recognize the validity of foreign divorce
has usually been expressed in the negative and have been based upon lack of
matrimonial domicile or fraud or collusion, we have not overlooked the provisions of the
Civil Code now in force in these Islands. Article 9 thereof reads as follows:

The laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and
legal capacity or persons, are binding upon Spaniards even though they reside in a
foreign country.

And article 11, the last part of which reads:

. . . the prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts and their property, and those
intended to promote public order and good morals, shall nor be rendered without effect
by any foreign laws or judgments or by anything done or any agreements entered into a
foreign country.

It is therefore a serious question whether any foreign divorce relating to citizens

of the Philippine Islands, will be recognized in this jurisdiction, except it be for a cause,
and under conditions for which the courts of Philippine Islands would grant a divorce.
 The lower court in granting relief as prayed for frankly stated that the
securing of the divorce, the contracting of another marriage and the bringing into the
world of innocent children brings about such a condition that the court must grant relief.
The hardships of the existing divorce laws of the Philippine Islands are well known to
the members of the Legislature. It is of no moment in this litigation what he personal
views of the writer on the subject of divorce may be. Courts have no right to say that
such laws are too strict or too liberal. Litigants by mutual agreement can not compel the
courts to approve of their own actions or permit the personal relations of the citizens of
these Islands to be affected by decrees of foreign courts in a manner which our
Government believes is contrary to public order and good morals. Holding the above
views it becomes unnecessary to discuss the serious constitutional question presented
by appellant in his first assignment.
VAN DORN vs ROMILLO, JR.
No. L-68470. October 8, 1985

FACTS:

Petitioner Alicia Reyes Van is citizen of the Philippines while private respondent
Richard Upton is a citizen of the United States were married on 1972 at Hongkong.
After the marriage, they established their residence in the Philippines; that the parties
were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982; and that petitioner has re-married also
in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.On July 8, 1983, private respondent filed
suit against petitioner, stating that petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila, is conjugal
property of the parties, asking that the petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of
her business and be declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner
moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by prior
judgment in the divorce proceeding before American Court where respondent
acknowledged that they had no community property.

The lower court denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that the property
involved is located in the Philippines, that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the
case. Respondent avers that Divorce Decree abroad cannot prevail over the prohibitive
laws of the Philippines.

ISSUE:

(1) Whether or not the divorce obtained the spouse valid to each of them.
(2) Whether or not Richard Upton may assert his right on conjugal properties.

HELD:

On the first issue.

Private respondent, Richard Upton as an American Citizen, the divorce is

binding on him as he is bound by the Decision of his own country’s Court, which validly
exercised jurisdiction over him. Only Philippine Nationals are covered by the policy
against absolute divorce the same being considered contrary to our concept of public
policy and morality.

Alicia Reyes under our National law is still considered married to private
respondent. However, petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe
respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not
continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not
be discriminated against her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.
On the second issue.

Pursuant to the national law of private respondent, he is no longer the

husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as
petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by
the Decision of his own country's Court and byhis own representation before said Court,
he is estopped from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III
G.R. No.154881, October 5, 2005

FACTS:

On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United
Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City, their marriage was blessed
with a son and a daughter. In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing
along their son.

A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an
American citizen.Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to
remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed.
Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner,
through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was
denied.

The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable
to the instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage
celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent can remarry under Article 26 of the Family

Code.

HELD:

Yes. The Court’s unanimous decision in holding Article 26, paragraph 2 of

the Family Code be interpreted as allowing a Filipino citizen who has been divorced by
a spouse who had acquired a citizenship and remarried, also to remarry under
Philippine law.The article should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who,
at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on,one of
them became naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtained a divorce decree.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.

In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen,

there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano,
subsequently the wife obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the
twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this
case, that 1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner; and2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry. Thus Cipriano, the "divorced" Filipino spouse, should
be allowed to remarry.

However, since Orbecido was not able to prove as fact his wife’s
naturalization, he was still barred from remarrying.