Decision 102 GR No, 217910 Lacking even the indispensable minimum required by this Court, the Petition here cannot be resuscitated by an unthinking parroting of extraordinary doctrines, XU The primordial duty of lawyers to their clients and cause is to act to the best of their knowledge and discretion, and with all good fidelity.” Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states: CANON 17 — A bnwyer owes Fidelity to the cause ol his eticnt and he shall be mindful of che trust und corfidence reposed in him, Competence and diligence should be a lawyer's watchwords: CANON 18 —A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence, Rule 18.01 A fawyer shall not undertake a legal service which be knows or should know that he is wot qualified wo render, However, be way render such service if, with the vonseat of his clieal, he can obtain as collaboratiog counsel a lawyer who is competent on the matter, Rule 18,02 A lawyer shall not hsmdle any legal muiter without atequate preparation, Rule 18.03 A lawyer shull pot negleut a legal matter entrusted to him, and Lis segligence in eonnevtion therewith shall render him liable. Rule [8.03 4 lawyer shall keep the clicrt informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the oliene’s request for information. XII (Ay Lawyers should be mindful thet their acts or omissions bind their clients." ‘They are bound to zealously detend their client’s cause, diligently and competently, with care and dewolion: ‘Once he wprees to take up che cause ofa client, the lawyer owes fidelity 10 such cause and must alvays be mindiil of the crust and confidence repossé in him. He must scrve the clicut with competence und diligence, and champion the latter's cause with vholehcarled fidelity, eure, and devotion. Tsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of the clicnt, warm zeal in the maininance and detense of his client's rights. and the exertion of his utmos! learning and ability to the end thal rothing, be Vewyer’s Oath Ranoar v Aas daooda, AUS Phil $46 (2001) [er Merstozn, Second DivisionDecision 108 GAL. No. 2179190 taken of withheld tram his client, suve by the mules af lan, legally applied. és simply means that his clicut is eutitled to the benefit of any end every remedy and defenve that is scthorized by the lew of the Inndl and he msy expec! hiis lawyer lo assert every such remedy or defense. If much is demanded {rom an attorney, i ix because the entrusted privilewe to prautive Jaw carries with it the correlative duties not only to the elfent out also to the court, to the bar, and co the public. A lawyer who perfoms bis duty with diligence and candor not only protects the inrerest of his elicnt; he also serves the ends nf justice, docs hones (@ the bur, snd helps maintain the respect of the community ty the legal profession”? (Citations omitted) XIEL(B) Here, petitioner wagered in litigation no less than the future of a marginalized and disadvantaged minority group. With palpable vainglory, he made himself the lead plaintiff and also represented himself, only seeking, assistance trom other counsel for oral arguments." By deciding to place this burden upon himself, petitioner should have acted with utmost care and thoughtfulness, drawing upon the limits of his skill and knowledge, to represent the LGBTOQI+ cause. However, at every stage of theve proceedings, petitioner anly exposed. his utter lack of preparation, recklessness, and orudeness. Petitioner had already been previously sanctioned for his negligence and incompetence during the June 5, 2018 preliminary conference. There, this Court underscored his ignorance of basic court procedure. In ils July 3, 2018 Resolution," this Court already reminded petitioner of the duty and responsibility that counsels have to the cause they purport lo represent; Lawyers must serve their clients with competence and dil ne. Cnnler Rule 18.02 of the Cade of Professional Responsibility, “Tal lavser shall not handle any legal autler without adequate preparation,” Atty Valeis’ appearance and bebavior during the preliminary conference reveal the inadecuuey of his preparation. Considering that the Advisory for Oral Arguments Was served on the parties three (3) months prior to the mrctiminary conference, it was inexcusubly carcless for any af them to appear before (his Court so barely prepared The preliminary comievence was not were muke-work. Ruther if was esscntial to the orderly conduct of proceedings and, ultimately, to the judicious éisposition of this esse. Appesrance in it by counsels and parties should not he taker lightly. ft Ally Feleis jeopardived the ease of his cliems. Without even Senstiggo » Fegan, 318 Vil 2 Badly py. 200 793, Ider 0 4ns he 87 (1995) [Per J. Davide, Ju, Fast Divi)Decision joa GR.No, 217910 uttering @ word, ho recklossly courted disfaver will this Court, His bearing and demeanor were a disservive to his clients and to the human rights nclvacseyy he purports to represent." As 4 resull, petitioner was found guilty of direct contempt of court and admonished. He was sternly warned that any further contemptuous acts: shall be dealt with more severely. (C) Undeterred by this Court’s stern warning, petitioner, along with co- counsels, Attys. Angeles, Guangko, and Maranan of Molo Sia Dy Tuazon Ty and Coloma Law Office, failed to comply with this Court's June 26, 2018 Order to submit the required memorandum of both petitioner and petitioners- intervenors within 30 days, or until July 26, 2018477 Because of this, the Memorandum was dispensed with, Petitioner and his co-counsels were all ordered Lo show cause why they should not be cited in indirect contempr.”* Their’ explanations’ are patently unsatisfactory, ‘They fault. the impulsivity of youth, other supposedly equally urgent professional worl, reliance on Court pronouncements in other cases, and work disruptions caused by floods and typhovas.'® These were he same bases raised in their prior Motion for Extension, which this Court found to be utterly lacking in merit and denied. These reasons failed to impress then, and they fail lo impress now. As we observed then, the complexity of issues and other professional work did not delay the filing of memoranda by other parties.’*! There is no compelling reason to treat petitioner and his co-counsels differently. After all, it was petitioner who set all of these events in motion; the other parties merely responded to what he sought, Petitioner and his co-counsel’s reference to the “impulsivity of youth}* utterly fails to impress, If at ull, this Court sees this as 9 deodorized admission of unreudiness and impotence. in any case, as this Court has already stated in its July 3, 2018 Resolution: Adty. Valois is not an uainformed layperson. He has been a 2° Md ol 603-604. ee 2 ied © 1d, at LAS-ISS3, Mexnkstation ne Complianee. oH a I.Decision 105 member of the Philippine Bar for a number of years, As an officer of the court, be is dury bound te eaintain towards this Court a respeetlul altitude essenlial to the proper administration of justice. Me is charged with Knowledge of the proper manner by which lawyers are to conduct themselves during judicial proceedings. His Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Kesponsibilisy exhort him to maintain the requisite dleeency and &) afford dignity tp this Court. Youth and professional inexperience do not excuse the manifest inability of sworn court ollicers w follow lavlul orders, Like petitioner, Atty. Angeles, Atty, Guangko and Auly, Maranan are members of te Philippine Bar, charged with baste knowledge of the rules of pleading and pructice before the courts, especially this Court. They are not uninformed laypersons whose ignorance can be excused by inexperience, It bears noting, that Amy, Angeles, Atty. Guungko, and Ally, Maranan are part of the law finn Mole Sia Dy Tuazon ‘Ty and Coloma Law Offices and are, thus, presumably guided by more experienced litigators who should have been able to competently advise them on what is expected of thase who appear before this Court. XIV Diligence is even more important when the cause lawyers tale upon themselves to defend involves assertions of fundamental rights. By voluntarily taking up this euse, petitioner and his co-counsels gave their “unqualified commitment to advance ind defend (it,|" ‘The bare minimum of this couunitcut is wo observe end comply with the deadlines set by a vourt. Lawyers who wish to practice public interest litigation should be ever mindful that their acts and omissions before the courts do not only atfect themselves. In truth, by thrusting themselves into the limelight lo lake up the cudgels on behalf of a minority class, they represent the hopes and aspirations of a greater mass of people, not alweys with the consent of all its members. Their errors and mistakes have a ripple effect even on persons who did not agree with or had no opportunity io consent to the stratagems and tactics they employed, One who touts himself an advocate for the margiaalized must know better than to hijack the cause of those whom he himself proclaims w be oppressed. Public interest lawyering demands more than the cursory invocation of legal doctrines, as though they were magical incantations swiftly disengauing obstacles at their mere utterance. Public interest © dat 603 1 Somomten dete Jeu 815 bil 795, 303 (2017) [Per J. Perias-Remube, Mrs Division) wnDecision 106 GR. No, 217910 advocacy is not about fabricating prestige. It is about the discomfort of taking the cudgels for the weak und the danuers of standing against the powerful, The test of how lawyers truly become worthy of esteem and approval is in how they are capable of buckling dows in silence, anonymity, and utter modesty doing the spartan work of research and study, of writing and self-correciion. It is by their geit in these unassuming, tasks, not by hollow, swift appeals to fame, thal they are scasoned and, in due time, become luminaries, the standard by which all othars are measured. Pelitioner courted disaster Lar the cause he chose to represent. He must have known whal was at stale, Yel, lic came to this Court scandalously unprepared, equipped with nothing more then empty braggadocio, For a shot ut fame, he toyed with the hopes und tribulations of a marginalized class, By failing to represent his cause with even the haresl, competence and diligence, petitioner betrayed the standards of legal practice. His failure to file the required memorandum on time is just the most recent manifestation of this betrayal. He disrespected not only his cause, but also this Court—an unequivocal avt of indirzel contempt. A person adjudged guilty of indireet contempt may be punished by a fine not exceeding 730,000.00 or imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months, or both.“ To serve as. 2 reminder to the bench and bar, amd in light of petitioner's being earlier adjudged guilty of contempt of court for a similar offense—for which he was specifically warned that any further contemptuous acts shall be deal with more severely this Cour, while declining to mete out the penalty of imprisonment by way of clemency, imposes on petitioner the penalty of a fine. Similarly, parties who come before this Court to intervene in a proceeding should be prepared to fully participate in all its stages, whenever this Court requires them to, Records show that after oral arguments, intervenor-oppositar Perito also never filed a memorandum pursuant to the Fane 26, 2018 Order. He has not made any manilestation or explanation for his noncompliance, His failure to comply with this Court’s order likewise constitutes indireet contempt. What we do in the name of public interest should be the result of a collective decision that comes trom well-thought-out strategies of the movement in whose name we bring s case before this Court. Otherwise, premature petitions filed by those who seck to sve their names in our jurisprudental records may only de more harm than goad. Good intentions RLS OF COUNT, Rutt 71, see. 7,107 GRNo. 27916 areno substitute for deliberate, conscious, and responsible action. Litigation for the public interest of those who have been marginalized and oppressed deserves much more than the way that it has been handled in this case. A Final Note Our freedom to choose the way we structure our intimate relationships with our chosen significant other in a ktrge sense defines us as human beings. Liven opposite-sex couples continually adjust the day-to-day terms of their partership ax their relationships mature. It is in the sanctuary of heir ypaces that we authentically evolve, become better human beings, and thus contribute meaninglully within our socicly, After all, the companionship and understanding that we inevitably discover with the person we choose to spend the rest of our fives with provide the faundarion for an ethic of care that enriches a democracy This Court sympathizes with the petitioner with his obvious longing, to lind a partner, We understand the Uesire of same-sex couples to seek, not moral judament based on discrimination from any of our laws, but rather, a balanced recognition of their true, authentic, and responsive choices. Yer, the time for a definitive judicial fiat may not yet be here. ‘This is not the case that presents the clearest actual Factual backdrop to make the precise reasoned judgment our Constitution requires. Perhaps, even before that actual cuse arrives, our democraticully-elected representatives in Congress will have seen the wisdom of acting with dispatch to address the suffering of many of those who choose to love distinetively, uniquely, bul ne senuinely and passionately. WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorasi and Prohibition and the Petition-in-Inlervention are DISMISSED, This Court finds petitioner Auy, Jesus Nicardo M. Faleis III, his co counsels Alty, Darwin P. Angeles, Auy, Keisha Trina M. Guangko, Atty. Christopher Ryan R. Maranan, as well as intervenoroppositor Atty. Femando P. Perito, all GUILTY of INDIRECT CONTEMPT OF COURT. Ally. Falcis is sentenced to pay a fine of Five ‘Thousand Pesos (5,000.00) within thirly (30) days from notice. Atty, Angeles, Arty. Guangko, Auy. Maranan, and Any, Perito ate REPREMANDED and ADMONISHED to be more circumspect of their duties es counsel. They are STERNLY WARNED that any further contemptuous acts shall be dealt with more severely,Devision 108 GR No, 217910 Let copies of this Decision be included in the personal records of Ally. Paleis, Atty, Angeles, Atty, Guanglo, Atty. Maranan, and Atty. Perito, and entered in their files in the Office of the Bar Confidant. SO ORDERED. MLV. LEONE! soviute Justive WL CONCUR: ONG De Nit DIOSDADO M\ PERALTA Associate Justice Associate Shstice : ~ fee ikke Concur 4 ESTELAM. PERLAS-BERNABE — FRANCISIAARDEREZA a, Assptiate Jpstide Associate Justice v is eA ANDRES B/REYES, IR. Associate Justice ian cas AL GC. SMUNDO JOSE C. REA ES, JR. : ciate Justive (7 Associate JusticeDecision 19) GR No. 227910 PAULL. HERNARDO——1 % . CARANDANG Associate Justice = Associale Justice a A fp - iB AM = heirs LUENRU SEAN PA) . INTIN' Associate Justice Associate Justice CERTIFICATION [ certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the court.G.R. No. 217910 (Jesus Fatsis 111 v, Civil Registrar General). Promulgated: septenber 3, 2019 SEPARATE OPINION The Court ought to dismiss the case outrighton the ground that there is no actual case or controversy ripe for judicial determination, Also, the petitioner does not have any /ocus stand’. And even if we were to touch on the merits, he has not made out a clear case for a declaration of the unconstitutionality of the peovisions of the Family Code (Executive Order No. 209) relative to its definition of marriage as a union between a man and awoman, AL the outset, it is to be pointed out that the role of the Court in constitutional adjudication is to determine the rights of the people under the Constitution, an undertaking that demands, among others, the presence of an actual case of controversy ripe for judicial pronouncement, und thal the case must be raised by one who has the personality or standing to do so. Here, the petitioner fails to satisfy both requisites. He is practically beseeching the Court to come up with an advisory opinion about the presence of constitutionally protected right to same-sex marriages in effect seeking 10 “convert the Court into an Office of Ombudsman lor the ventilation of generalized grievances. An actual case or controversy refers to an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or antiviputory. ‘The controversy needs to be definite und concrete, bearing upon the legal relations of parties who are pitted against cach other due to their adverse legal interests? Further, “[a]n aspect of the ‘caso-or-controversy” requirement is the requisite of ‘ripeness.’ In the United States, courts are centrally concerned with whether a case involves unceriain contingent future cyents that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not accur at all. Anouier concern is the evaluation of the 1wofold aspect of ripeness: firse, the fitness of the issues for judicial decision: and second, the hardship to the parties entailed by withholding court consideration. In our jurisdiction, the e Opinion of then Associate Justice Vicente V. Meralera inn Patad wy Cores de. 3)3 Phi sn <0 Pil 30, 545 (2003) U ofSepantte Opiniva 22+ GR. Ne. 217910 issue of ripeness is generally treated in terms of actual injury to the plaintiff. Hence, a question is ripe for adjudication whan the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it.” Tt has been held that “as to the clement of injury. such aspect is not something that just anybody with some griewanve or pain may assert. It has to be direct and substantial to make it worth the court’s time, as well as the effort of inquiry into the constitutionalily of the acts of another department of government, If the asserted injury is more imagined than real, or is merely superficial and insubstantial, then the courts may end up being importuned to decide a maticr thal does not really justify such an excursion into constitutional adjudication. The rationale for this constitutional requirement of focus sfandi iy by no meuna trifle. Not only does it ussure the vigorous adversary presentation of the case; more importantly, it must suffice to warrant the Judiciary’s overruling the determination of a coordinate. democratically elected organ of government, such as the President, and the clear approval by Congress, in this case. Indeed, the rationale goes to the very essence of representative democracies”* Intrinsieally related to the presence of an actual case or controversy ripe for adjudication is the requirement that the issue be raised by the proper party, or the issue of Jocus standi. Even as this Court is the repository af the final word an what the law is, we should always be aware of the need for some restraint on the exercise of the power of judicial review. As then Associate Justice, later Chief Justice, Reynalo S. Puno then intoned in one of his dissents: “Stated otherwise, courts ure neither free to decide aif kinds of cases dumped into their laps nor are they free to open their doors to aif parties or entities claiming a grievance. The rationale for this constitutional requirement of focus standi is by no means trifle. It is intended ‘to assure « vigorous adversary presentation of the ease, and, perhaps more importantly to warrant the judiciary’s overruling the determination of a coordinate, democratically elected organ of government.” It, thus, goes to the very essence of representutive democracies.”* Otherwise slated, “[al party must show that he has been, or is about to be denied some personal right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled. A party must also show that he has a real interest in the suit. By ‘real interest” is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mete expectancy or future, contingent, subordinale, or inconsequential interest."> pees dgannst Mumigaly amd Piney (LAME) v. Sucrosasy of Buniget cine! Managansen, 69 (201125. Galieeo % agntne sf, 683 Vhil. 141, 172 201), citing Gurespe. Soups, Siagves and Shadows Revisiting Loser Stacvd! fo Ee ts Pergie Mower Provissone OF five 1987 Consutetion, UST (A Ve RFV 16. citing Adenterille » Civdl Service Connaitsvi, 417 Phil 524 my, Hiege, dnc». Cer! yf 1. 839 (1999), end Tafa Angora, (200%, and, then Associts Iudice Reyzato §. Puno's Divwenting Opini Katoahape » 6 Jr, 302 Phil, (0%, (4a (ys), jal, Guingoma, Jb, eng escharoy ». Coveindeston ran Fieerions, 433 486 4 621, 035-636 (2002),Separate Opinion - Relative to the foregoing matter is the need to give the legislature space to do its job of determining policies as an aspect of the democratic process. In this reward, then Associate Justice Santiago M. Kapunan noted: “The idea that a norm of constitutional adjudication could be lightly brushed aside on the mere supposition thut un issue before the Court is of paramount public concern does greut hurm to 2 democratic system which espouses a delivate bulunce between three separale but co-equal branches ol government. 11 is equally of paramount public concern, certainly paraniount to the survival of our democracy, that acts of the other branches of government are accorded due respect by this Court. xx x, Notwithstanding Article VLIL, Section | of the Constitution, since the exercise of the power of judicial review by thig Court is inherently unti-democtatic, this Couit should exercise a becoming modesty in acting as « revisor of an act of the executive or legislative branch.” Prudential considerations should caution the Court fiom having to accept und decide each and every case presented to it just because the questions raised may’ be interesting, novel or challenging. There is a time for coffee table discussions of exotic ideas, but the Court does not sit to do such a discourse. In undertaking judicial review, it decides in accordance with the Fundamental Law issues that have particular rel ice and application to actual facts and circumstances, not imagined or anticipated situations, Petitioner Falsis does not assert that he has been directly injured by the provisions of the Family Code. If ever he would be prevented from marrying, thal is still in the uncertain future, a contingency that may never happen. Lowever, he tries to rectify this problem by making reference to the petition-in-intervention filed by LGBTS Christian Church, Inc., et al. who allegedly were prevented from having a same-sex marriage ceremony when the same-sex couple wus not granted marriage license. In this connection. intervention should never be allowed ta be utilized as a means to correct a fatal omission in the principal action. Intervention is only aneillary to the main case and it should not be conveniently resorted to us a means to save the day for un intrinsically flawed petition. And even if we were to go to the merits, [ would like to call attention to the fact that the laws and judicial decisions are reflective of the reality in society — a recognition of the values and norms that the people hold, recognize and cherish. Congress is the democratic institution which initially may tackle issues and policies about interpersonal relations and justitutions affecting its citizens, including the propricty or desirability of same-sex marriage. It is not for the courts to jwiup into the fray on the pretext that it i Dissenting opinion it Bmyphasis supyeisa)Separate Opinion . GR, No, 217910 merely reading for the people the rights and Tiberties under the Constitution, Only in the presence of a clear violation of the tenets of the Fundamental Law may the courts proceed to declare that an unmistakable constitutional right has been impaired or otherwise trampled upoa by the government. In the absence of such, the courts should stay their hand, In this perticulur instance, T do not see any such violation that would justify the Court getting into this social and political debate on same-sex marriazes. In any case, what is not to be overlooked is the reality that judicial adjudication has to be rooted in the Constitution and the laws which gre expressions or manifestations of what socicty and the people aspire for, and the courts must necessarily get their bearings from them. Decisions cannot be oblivious to, nor detached from, what is the reality in society. In this particular instance, the petitioner keeps harking on the fundamental right to marry and by extension, right to same-sex marriage, claiming that it is a constitutional right pursuant to the guarantee of equal protection. However, there is nothing in the text or background of the constitutional provision that would allow for such an expansive reading. 'o society, the framers of the Fundamental Law, and the people who ratified it, there is no indication that they understood marriage to be other thin the union between people of the ‘opposite sex, This has heen the traditional, history-bound understanding of marriage in Philippine setting, Accordingly. if radical or seismic departure from the commonly understood notion of mariage is to be had, the same has to be decreed by Congress and the President, and not imposed by judicial fiat, Debates about policy on maticrs like this are for the. political departments, as elected representatives of the people, to decide on. ia regard to the American case recognizing same-sex murriages, the US. Supreme Court itself was quite careful to make reference to the changing social milica which allowed for a shifi in legal thinking, We do not have a similar situation here. Whut the U.S. Supreme Court said in this tegard is quite instructive: the ancicer origins of marriage confirm its centeality, but it has not isolation rom developments in law and society. The history of tnarriuge is one of both conlinuily and change, That institution—oven as ol Lo oppowite-sex relations—hes evolved over time. For example, mantiage was once viewod as an atcangement by the couple’s parents baset! on political, religious, and financial concerns; but doy the time of the Nation's founding it was understood to bs a voluntary: contract belwcen a imam and a woman, Sec N, Cott, Public Vows: A History of Marriage und the Nation 9 17 (2000); S. Coontz, Marriave, History 18 16 (2005) As the role aud stulus of women chauged, the Institution firther evolved. Under the eenturies-old doctrine of coverture, a mautied man are! woman were uested by the State as a single, male- uominated Togal entity. See | W. Blackstone, Commentiries on the Laws of Piglund 430 11765). As women gaince legal, political, and property rights, and as society began In understand that women have their own,Separate Opinion - GR Nv. 217916 equal dignity, the law of covertuce was abandoned. Sce Brief for Wistarins of Marriage et al, as Amici Curiae 16-9, These and other developments in the institution of marriage ower the past cemturles were ROL mere superficial changes. Rather, they worked deep transformations in ts structure, affecting aspects uf marriage lorig viewed Sy muny as essential, See genorally N. Cott, Public Vows; S. Coontz, Marriage: H Haring, Man & Wile in America: A [story (2000). These new insights have strengtlened. noi weakened. the institution of marriays, Indeed. changed understandings of marriaue sre shaructetisti of a Nation where new dimensions of freedom become apparent 4 new goncrations, ofen through perspectives thal heyin in ph or protests and then are considered in the political sphere and the judi process, ‘This dynamic can be seen in the Nation’s experiences with the righls of gays anal lesbians, Until the aiiu-20c1 century, same-sex inlimacy long had been condemned as inimural by the state iisel! in most Western nations, & belief afien embodied in the criminal law. For this reason, among pihers, many persuns did not deom homosexuals to have dignity in their own distinct identity, A tnochfil declaration by snme-sex couples oi” what was in their hearts had ta remain urspoken. ven when a greater aisareness of the humanity and integrity of homosexual persons eame in she period afler World War TI, the argument thal yays and lesbians had a just claim to dignity was in conflie| with both law and widesaread social couventions. Same-sex intitnavy remained a crime in many States. Gi aad lesbians were prohibited from most govenunent employment, barred from military services, exchided under immigrotion liws, uargeted by palicy, and durdened in their tights 10 msociatc. See Nrief for Organization of American Historians a8 Amicus Curiae 3. 28 For much of the 20th century, morcover, bumosexuality was trevted as an {llness, When the American Psychiatric Association Published the first Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders in 1952, homosexuality was classified as a mental disorder, a position adnered to until 1973. See Position Statement on Homosexuality andl Civil Rights, 1973, in 131 Am, J. Psyehlavy 497 (1974), Only in amore recent years have paychiaisists sed others recognized that sexuul orientation is both a normal expression of humun sexuality and iaunutable. See Brie? fur American Psychological Association et al. as Amici Chriae 7-17. In the late 20th century, following substantial cultural und political developments, same-sex couples heysin lo kead moore open and public lives am) to cstablish families. This development was followed hy a quite extensive discussion of the issue in both governmental and private sectors and by a shift in public attitudes toward greater tolerance. As a result, questions about the rights of goys and lesbians soon reached the courts, whore the issue could he discussed in the formal discourse of the law. This Court first gave detailed consideration to the legal status of homosexuals in Bowers v, Hardwick, 178 U.S. 186 (1986). here it upheld the constitutionslity of a Gearyla Inw deemed to criminalize certain homesextal ucts ‘Ton years laler, in Romer «. Byans, 517 1S. 620 (1996), the Cout inveliduted an amendment to Colorado’s Constitution hal soughs to foreclose my brane or political subdivision of the State from protecting persons against diserimination based on sexual orientation, Then, in 2003, the Court overnled Bowers, hokling that laws MNSeparate Opinion GR. No. 217910 raking same-sex intimacy & ctime “détwea] the tives of homosexual persons.” Lawrenve v, Texas, $39 U.S. 358, XXX ‘The right s marry is lundamemal as a matter of history and tradition, but rights come not from ancient sources alone, ‘Lhey rise, too, From a hetscr informed understanding of how constitutional imperatives define a liberty that remains urgent in our own era. Many who deem sarne- sex marriage lo be wrong reach that conclusion based on decent and honorabie religious ar philesaphical premises, and neither they nor their beliefs wre disparaged here. But when that sincere, personal opposition becomes enavicil lw and public policy, the necessury consequence is 10 pur the imprimatur of the Suite itsclf on an exclusion that soon demeans or stigmatizes thase whose own liberty is then denied. Under the Constitution, ssime-nex couples scek in marriage the sume legal treatment as opposite-sex couples, aril il would disparage their choices und diminish their personhood to deny them this right? Th fine, the claim of alleged unconstitutionality of the Family Code provisions defiuing murriage as a union between a man and a woman has no leg to stand on. Itis not for this Court ww write into the law purported rights when they are not expressly or by clear implication deemed available under the Fundamental Law, Same-sex marriage is a policy matter better left wo the deliberations of the elected officials of the country, DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice ‘HELLD TRUK COPY elerk off ‘Snpremae Court Oherysfell 9, Hoan 4 7 LS 2015}, at 648, Slip Dasision thins: sunsemeowir guvupinions!lasHM4-S8h WL pot accessed ) FEL 68 1N-19, Slip Opinion,SUS NICARDO M. FALCIS Hl, Petitioner v. RAL, Respondent; LGBYS CHRISTIAN CHURCH, INC, REVEREND = CRESCENCIO “CEFJAY” AGBAYANI JR, MARLON FELIPE, and MARIA ARLYN “SUGAR” Zs Petitioners-in-intervention; FERNANDO P. PERITO, Intervene; and ATTYS. RONALDO ‘t, REYES, JEREMY & GATDULA, CRISTINA A. MONTES, AND RUFINO POLICAPRIO LIL, fatervenors-oppositors. Promulgated: tenber Tel: “Whesl— may | gnssver dhis inthe fori of a rhewrical question’? When dal it become uneousttutional 2 ome uncinstisulionall xx Courts decile there are constitutioned rights when they have before hess a case that presents the issue, and whem they know — anid society knows — enoreglt abortl the insite to raube informed decisions T vote to DISMISS the petition, not the idea of murriage equality: Petitioner Jesus Nicardo M, Faleis 111 (petitioner) is not the proper 10. rt a liberty interest in same-sex marriage. He did not suffer any ry ava resull of the enforvement of Articles 1 and 2 of Executive Order ) No, 209, otherwise known as “The Fumily Code off the Philippines” Garaily Code), The subsequent intervention by Reverend Crescencio Agbayani, Jr. (Rev. Ceejay), Marlon Felipe (Marlon) of LGYBS Charch (LGTBS Church), and Maria Arlyn “Sugar” tbafiez (collectively, the two couples), did not core this defect in theConentring Opinion 2 GR. No. 217910 [also find dismissal to be proper because direet recourse to the Court in this case ig unwarranted. Poritioner asserts that he raises legal questions, principally that Artieles | and 2 of the Family Cade violate his fundamental right to enter info @ same-sex marriage. This, however, eannot be farther from the truth, The issues he mises implicate underlying questions of fact which, in turn, condition the constitutionality of the legal provisions he questions.” In his exuberant rush to bring this case ditectly to the Court as both lead party and counsel, petitioner chose w skip building a factual foundation of record upon which the Coun can make an informed judgment. The underlying questions of fact that underpin his legal argument include whether: (a) couples of the same-sex can satisly the essential requirements of marriage equally as heterosexual couples; (b) procreation is an essential requirement of marriage: {¢} couples of the same-sex can raise children equally as well as heterosexual couples; (d) Filipino tradition accepts same- sex marriage; and (c) the Li Church is a religion whose members, including the two couples, hold a sincere helief in same-sex marriage as a central venet of their Faith A ‘The petition presents no actual case or controversy. There is an aviual case or controversy when the case is appropriate or ripe for determination, ot conjectural or anticipatory. lest the decision of de court would amount to an advisory opinion.’ This means that there must be a contlict of lewal rights or an assertion of opposite leal claims which can be resolved on the basis of existing Jaw and jurisprudence. An abstract dispute, in stark contrast, only seeks for an opinion that advises what the law would be on hypothetical stale of facts.’ Vurthermore, a case is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged hus had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging, it. Something must have been accomplished or performed by either branch of Goverment hefore @ court may come into the picture, and a petitioner must allege the caistence of an immediate or threatened injury Lo him/her as a result of the challenged action.” On its face, it presents a hypothetical and contingent event, not ripe for adjudication, which is hinged on petitioner's fulure plan of settling down with 3 person of Lhe same-sex. ssaiiai, fie af af x The Sonora Clty Mgr of 196%, 21 SCRA 449, 151-152, citing O'Gon 93 rk, etn Pemarten Ci GR, R. No. 125532, July 10, 1s Giernorent, G.R, No, 183 292 SCRA 402, A144, Delober 14, 2008, 584 SORA 462 451Conevering Opinion GR. bo. 217910. Petitioner all d that “the prohibition against the right to marry the same-sex injures {his| plans to settle down and have a compunion for life in huis beloved country.” ¥et as of the filing of the petition, petitioner has ne partner, He lamented that his “ability to find and enter into a long-term monogamous same-sex relationship is impaired because of the absence of legal incentive for gay individuals to seek such relationship.”® Significantly, however, even if he has a partner, petitioner admiued in open court that it is not automatic that his partner might want to marry him.’ ‘Thus, petitioner cannot, did not or even attempted to, file an application for marriage license belore the vivil registry of his residence. Consequently. the Civil Registrar General (CRG) or any other aiicial in any of the branches of the government has nothing to uct upon. They could not and have not performed an act which injured or would injure petitioner's asserted right. It is clear that pelitioner’s eause oF uction does not enist B Petitioner has no legal stinding to tile the suit, Standing or focus sicanelé is defined uy the right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question," l'o determine whether a party has standing, the direct injury fest is applicd,' Under this test, the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and. substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direc! injury a resull of its enforeement.'* Despite this, however, there have been cases wherein the Court has allowed the follovsing non-traditional suitors to bring a case before it despite lack of direct injury: 1. For taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public [unds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional; 2. Vor voters, there must he a yhowing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question: 3. For concerned citizens, there must be « showing thal the issues raised are of transcendental importance whith must be settled early: 4. For legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators!” 5. For associations, its members must be ufleeted by the action:" and 768. Wy 3, 76, 489 SCRA 160, 216. Arripan GRNe UTLSSS, Ms 56, 8919371 ees sina ae ADL TANIConeurri g Opinion 4 GR. No. 217910 6. Tor those bringiag suit on behalf of third parties, the litigant must have suffered an ‘injury-in-facl" thus giving him or her a “sulficiently concrete interest” in the outcome of the issue in dispute; the litigant must have a close relation to the third party and there must exist some hindrance to the third parly’s ability to protect his or her own interesta.!* In this case, petitioner is not in a long-term monogamous same-sex relationship. He hus not attempted to matry nor was prevented by the State trom doing so. This makes his lack of direct interest in the enforcement of the assailed provisions of the Family Code patent. Neither docs petitioner quality as a taxpayer as he fas not alleged illegal disbursement of public funds or that a tax meusure is involved in this case, Le does not ussail the validity of an election lav, se he alsa docs not have standing as a valer, Finally, he is nota legislator nor sn association and therefore cannot claim standing, as such. & ‘The petition-in-intervention cannot cure the defects of the petition. An intervention is merely ancillary and supplemental to an existing litigation, It is not an independent action. It presupposes the pendency of a uit in a court of competent juriscietion; in other words, jurisdiction over the same ig govemed by jurisdiction over the main action. Perforce, a court which has ao jurisdiction over the peineipal action has no jurisdiction over a complaint-in-intervention."" As slated earlier, the petition before Us lacks the essential requisites for judicial review. This ousts the Court of jurisdiction to take cognizance of the same, More, jurisprudence instructs that a pelition-in-intervention cannot create an actual controversy for the main petition, The cause of action must be mae out by the allepations of the petition without the aid of any other pleading.”” In any event, the petition-in-intervention is, in itself, wanting and cannot lend any validity to the main petition, ‘The TGBTS Church, while claiming to intervene on behalf of its members, failed to satisfy the following requirements to successfillly maintain third-party standing: (1) the . Cont of Anpooly, GR Ro, 157 9, May 25, 2004, 429 SERA M1, 98, See alan _ebenary $5, 2007, 316 SORA 24 and Sorat Benson 182, Mey 4. 2008, 489 SCRA RD, fu, G.R, Ne, IDG 26, 200, $26 SCRA 16, A ag Pip GR. Wo. 185879, Macch 16, 2016, 787 SCRA 475, 298, 1600), Ceobee 27 2006, S05 SCRA TAB, 763 «= Pingiaias ne Lipavan ne Heit na Asiagingada ng face, Mindanan of Pisa, GR. 6 183568, April 19, 2017, 829 SCRA S58, $70,Concurring Opinion s GR_No, 217910 must have suffered an ‘injury-inefact,’ thus giving hinvher a “sufficiently concrete interest” in the outcome of the case in dispute; (2) the litigant must have a close relation to the third party; and (3) there inust be some hindrance to the third parly’s ability to protect his/her awn interests." The first and third clements ure missing, As will be discussed in detil luter, the LGBTS Church failed to show how the chullenged law injures it and its members, Qn the other hand, the filing of the petition-in-intervention by the two couples, who are members of the LGBTS Church, proved that they are sufficiently capable to acting to protect their own interest. Any invocation of third party-standing is thus misplaced. D Neither can the transcendental importance doctrine save the petition and the petition-in-intervention. This doctrine dispenses anly with the requirement of focus standi. | does not overtide the requirements of actus! and justiciable controvers judicial power." a condition size qua nom lor the exercise of Very recently in Gios-Samur, few. v. Department of Transportation and Communications,” the Court held that mere invocation of the transcendental impartence doctrine eannot, absent a showing, that the issue raised is one of Jaw, excuse « violation of the rule oa hierarchy of cou Hence, when a question before the Court involves the determination of factual issues indispensable to the resolution of a legal issue, the Court will refuse to resolve the factual question regardless of the invocation of the transcendental or paramount importance of the cuse.”" As stated at the outset, the petition and the petition-in-intervention vaise issues which the Coun cannot resolve in the absence of a factual foundation of record. Their decision to bring the case directly before the Court is unwarranted and constitutes ground for the outright dismissal of the petition. While the Court has original and concurrent jurisdiction with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the Court of Appeals (CA) over petitions seeking the issuance of writs of certiorari and prohibision, litigants do not have unfettered discretion to invoke the Court’s original jurisdiction, Lhe doctrine of hierarchy of courts dictates thar direct recourse to this Court is allowed only Lo resalve questions of law cy 20, 2008, $76 SCRA 418, 2 a3 Bo Bey ro Upaoya aoc 17 ak 928, Cains united, GR No. 217 HowsonConcurring Opinion a GRNo. 217910 1 note that petitioner did couch his petition and the petition-in- intervention in a inanner as to purport te present a pure legal question, that is, whether Articles | and 2 of the Family Code are constitutional. He argued that the assailed provisions are unconstitutional because they violale his (and other homosexuals"): (|) due process tightiberty Lo marry a person of the sanic-sexs" (2) right to equal protection of the faws:"* and (3) right to found a family within a marriage in accord with their religious convictions under Section 3(1), Article VX of the Constitution.” Before this Court can rea the issue of constilutionality. however, it first uveds to determine whether petitioner's asserted libeny interest exists, The query at the outset is, therefore, is: “Did petitioner lose something that fits into one of the three protected cateories of life, liberty, or property?” If in the affirmative, the next question to ask is: “Is it a fundamental right protected by the Constitution?” Thad oecasion to express my views on the concept of fundamental rights under constitutional law in my Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in Fersoza v People: af the Philippines, et al! decided ioday. They bear some repetition here, A The concept of fundamental rights, once described as “liberties that operate as trumps."* wus first extensively covered by the Courl through Chief Justice Puno, in Central Bank Eniployees Association, Inc. v. Bangho Sentral ng Pilipinas.” There, the Court, citing Gerald Gunther, traced its history and development in the context of American constitutional equal protection analysis." ‘The recognition of an asserted liberty interest as “Tundamental™ has. significant legal eonscquences, Traditionally, liberty interests are protected only against anbirary government interlerence, [f the government can show a rational basis for believing that its interference advances a legitimate 4,11-12 Seen 3 prc The Site el defend ages to foun lamily in accursianve with their rligioue sonvietines andi the parenihondl: xs ¥. Lervuiagy.G It No, LIBR, Peotnimy 1 204, 421 SCRA $50, 555-556 2005, due process efnim, the court must determine whether Wife, tiberey, ar property interest eats, and iso, witet preceduces ave eanstinationally voquired to protect that sight, Otherwise stale, the due process clam call Tor two separate inquiries in cvaluating an alleged FF lise sunmeshing Hast fis intv ome of the these protected categories of life, il, 39, dice plalwiff receive che minimurt meastre of procedural prokersion £87 (Rphesis pple) comand: Pasecbrai Policy (198), pp. 91-03. G.R-No. M8208, Decemper 15, 2001, 1b SCRA 299, fil at 371-376 is ef Axmuciesions” Vol. 10 Hacvard Journal of Lew anaConcurring Opiaion GR. No. 217910 legislative objective. « claim ta libery interest may fail.’! Where, however, a liberty interest las been accorded an “elevated” slalus — that is, by churantorizing it as a right (or a fundamental right), then the government is subject lu a igher burden of proof to justify intrusions inta these interests, namely, the requirements of strict scrutiny in equal protection eases" and that of compelling, state interest in duc process cases.” As the United States Supreme Court (US Supreme Court) has warmed, affixing the lubel “fundamental” to such liberty interests would place them outside the urcua of public debate and legislative action.* Resultantly, and as is also true in his jurisdiction, fundamental rights have been deemed to include only those basic liberties explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Hill of Rights of the Constitution. B There seems to me litle disagreement as to the “fundamental” nature of an asserted liberty interest when the same ean be read from the text of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution itsell. Thus, when a state act is alleged to have implicated an eaplicit “Iundamental right,” de., a rizht textually found in the Bill of Rights, the Court has beew wout to subject the government to a higher burden Ww justify its challenged action: This the Court did in Fhratinag v. The Division Superintenctent of Schools af Cobu’® (on religious belicls); Legaspi v. Civil Service Comunission,”’ (on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern); Disini, Jey. Secretary of Justice. (on the right to freedom of eapression, right te privacy, and right against unreasonable searches and Kabataan (SPARK) Ganzales, ures); Samahan ng mga Progresihong Quezon City?” (on the right w travel); Chavez v (on the freedom of the press); Mewsounds Brocedccsiing uw rumeraset Prandanvenal & Pub, Pol'y 795 1990), sriin, ic.) Bony Con i215 R. No, 221029, April 76. 2018, chong Brian, Separate Opinion fa Byavse ‘2o8 of 2010, GR Mo. 199938, Decainbwe 7, 2010, 657 SCRA 28, 359-260. J, 1945, 219 SCRA 256, The Court ammulles sn set ade orders petitioners trun sehuol, laerrey aphule under the Constitutioa w refuse to 64 Philippine flag as gueramteed uncer Seriiun 5, Aitice UL "GAL Nu, Le 72118 May 29, 0987, 186 SCRA 330. The CSC was ervera, ver rarulannas, Secsion?, Antic 14, 716 SCI 237, Ihe Coue itasck down ws uncoastitational Sees S424) ul 19) af the Cyscrerime Law for being violative of Seckme <, 5, and 2 respectively, of Article I uP Uke Cust of [eons Sepiwate Cpinion in Semcines rer mee f sag Kateniane (SPCRR Quecone € GR Nu WHAM, Aupust # 207, 835 SCRA 250 vel a challenge azuinst curtew ‘otdinences for nino tor being visliive wf Suction & Arele IE ot the Constination ‘Thine, the Cow tes} ane! Tone chat salle the poveenment was able ty son «-cumpel ts, ca get tor sees fe lent tesrictive ann fp pretact suck alist ie interest SSCRA “il. The Court nullvied ee oifteutl grveruinent 1 veirelayed eonesation between the President [to restrict the exerviae guucainect! werConcurring Opinion 8 GR, No. 217910 Network, Ine. v. Dy,"' (on the right to free speech and fieedom ol the press); and Kabataan Party-List v. Commission on Elections.” (on the right to vote}. c ould the Court proceed if the right asserted to be fundamental ig not explicitly found in the Bill of Rights or other provisions of the Constitution, or where the fundumental right is assed to flow from generally-stated tights such ax due process and equal protection? Justice arlan of the US Supreme Court has famously noted that “the full scope of the Tibeny yuaranteed by the Due Process Clause cannot be found in, or ¢ terms of the specific guarantees elsewhere provided In this jurisdiction, this Court has had occasion to rule on assertions of unenumerated fundamental rights: In the 1924 cuse of People ¥. Pomar."' and reminiscent of the Loetmer-era wulines, this Court declared unconstitutional provisions of law which required employers to pay # woman employce, who may become pregnant, her wages lor 30 days before and 30 days afler confinement, Citing a long Tine of US Supreme Court Lochner-era decisions, this Court found that the right to liberty includes the right to enter into (and terminate) contracts.” Section 4, Anigle HI aust Se mei wih “an examinacion so erin sosem sould hw allowed tocurta | GAR. Nos, LTUITO.& 1FOHL 1, April 2, 2008, 583 SCRA 333, aclions, whieh ranged trom widtwitling, sennits to operate fo the siysical closure oF thone stations under color of kegel aeto-isy, Caled te: pass the jest ul det seu cel appropriate to sees weat-based ‘estniconms on speech. According tn the Cuuri, “laJs content msaletion cannot be core iv ite sbsence oF eny compelling nsason, the burden lies wilt the povernmert to esaablish euch compelling, reason to intringe Ihe viet to eee exerevsion.” Dus tw tae govemment’s failure to show a compelling, fate inrest, the Cone esnined geticonar’s praye for se wet of mandamur seal ovreeed responders 19 sj hie reese errs. 318, Decemizer 16, 208, 997 SCRA, that only a danger that is elear and ‘The Court hele that neypondnits! A dualleage wex made iaginst « COMELEC resolitior sein a shorter deeine for water egitracon, one outse ahs pied provided by Seti 8 OF Republic Act No. SIN, otherwise nore dae "Voter's Reuisitalion Aet of 1996." The Cou final vs art the COMELEC the poser as ots periods and aes fr wesclostan acti is cannot 3e reasonably wele within the period prov ies hy law. Singe the COME FC was ‘mole ta jutity why Lie mawbste of ecatinuing voter ree not be reasonably held within the Period pnivisil, the Cocreaullified the desstine set by the COMELEC for being, andy restietive of the 7 right ns wore Cima, 367 US, 492, 3 £2961), J. Harkey (en Opinian in Ferscoa on hoot the US Supreme Cont bas given unssumeraed rigs GR. No, L-220U8. 46 Mil 140 (192. ‘or ereeies a term oF eon iay ie 12 Opinions sce aku ny © ‘umadarnesval” status {0 others! oy contract nuale by every person, fire, o& vehis imp, duieg the course of her eruskymet. baconte pregonml, ind & viure to include in said contract the verms [isod by the Lavy, makes tie weasloyer criminally Hisble abject w a fine nee iepesonment. Cuecrly, Uverfine, tho law hus deprived, every person, firm, or Eurpornion ovvaing or meraging 2 firwry, shoe nr place af aabor uf avy deserincion within dhe Pit yypine Iands of iy iuhl in etter into contrasts of enplnsmen! upon such terms i tre and the melayer may force pon, “The ins ersales a fern In very act, Without the consent uf te parties. Such porsons ace, thetetare, dexcived uf their liberty 1 commas, The [CJoustiution of the Pnilippine Islands writes (6 custy elmer his Liber’ abe ane of his Viberties is the liberty to contrac ¢Fmphasis supplicd,) 43, a A38,Concuering Opinion 9 GR, Bo. 217910 Philippine adherence to this ruling would, however, be short-lived.” As Justice Fernando would later explain in Edy v. Aricta,” the decision in Poman was largely brought about by the fact that “our Supreme Court had no other choice as the Philippines was then under the United States,” where only a year before Pomar, a statute providing lor minimum waves was declared in Adkins to be constitutionally infirm, The Court (and the Constitutional Convention) would adopt a more deferential attitude towards wovernment regulation of economic relations and covering such subjects as “collective bargaining, security of tenure, minimum wages, compulsory arbitration, the regulation of tenancy as well as the issuance of securities, and control of public services.” In the meantime, and taking ils cue from the LS Supreme Court, this Court would also go on to recognize unenumerated, yet fundamental, non- economic rights. For example, although the Bill of Rights speaks only of a right of privacy over communication and cortespondence, the Court, in the 1968 case of Monfo v. Mute," adopted the reasoning in Griswold and recognized a constitutional right lo personal privacy. ln Qposa v, Factoran, Je? this Court accorded fundamental right status to an asserted liberty interest in “a balanced and healthful ecology” under Section 16, Article Tat the 1987 Constitution. In émbong v. Ochoa, Jr," which involved a number of challenges against the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 10354.° this Court recognized the conslilutional right ol parents to exercise parental contol over their minorchild and a liberty interest in the access to safe and non-abortifacient contraceptives hinged on a right to health under Section 13, Article 1" and other sections of the Constitution, In Capin-Cadiz v. Brent Haspital and Colleges, tne." the Court held that the constitutional 0 Phil. 726 (1940); Autonet BEL 140} See ast Fur Compoagy ». Cavwt af su Noe, CAR, No, b= Io 483, Citions ume. Hast oe Pecnanda finther weltos: +. 4.<[T]o etsse any doubts, the Consthuticnal Convention saw ay {tobt the eorseph al kaicses-kaire wa IL entrusted Uo our goverment the responsibility of copivg with soctal and economy rates witht of control over ceonentie affairs. Thereby ft could five 42 40 fag ecmew te joual objection to fim, is Hkely da be huaded, autons “Pearse an the clearest aud west satisfactory proat of invasion ‘of rights guairanived iy the Constitution.» ¥ x is in te sec faire jwineiale that during the Commonwealtt sa, no vonstiasiona’ i hed (a Iesisleian covering such subsets a collective # tonne, winivuen wages, earnpulsory arbitration, fw regulacinn at tenancy as ¥ iblic servivex Sw ity likewive vcnler the Repaslie sey Iaws, nationalization of the ‘sit! separation pay Zor oe arginine, see nity a tie Ssuanee of securities, and cucntet ul von the seal wf apyuoval tn shove fevers ¥ fa ol price eotzel, 1a : ncsis supplicd: citstions cited.) fo. a 491-493, Jamry 31, 1968, 22 SCA, No, 11083, July 5, 1993, 224 SCRA 7% GR Mo 204819, Api 8, ANTM. 72) SERA [48 ‘Ales kann 8 ie Kespoas bls Patenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 20:2 CHASTITITION, Am. Tl Soe. 15: Vine Sie shall pratect sus sopeoie One ight te) health of th anseng shen Sia. 187917, Feteuary 24, 21 instill health consciousness a 16, 785 SCRA 18.Coneuering Opinion 16 GR. No, 217910 sight to personal liberty and privacy should be read to include a woman's right to choose whether to marry and to decide whether she will bear and rear her child outside of marriage. Most recently, this Court in Repnblie v. Manalo. applying, equal protection analysis. upheld, pursuant to a fundamental right to marry, a liberty interest on the part of a Filipino spouse ta be recapacitated to many, in vases where a valid foreign divorce has heen oblained q Unlike the case of rights that cau be located on the text of the Bill of Rights, the rules with respect to localing unenumerated “fundamental” rights, however, are not clear. According Wo Justice Harlan, speaking in the context of identifying the full scope of liberty protected under the Due Process Clause. the endeavor essentially entails an attempt at finding a balance between “respect lor the liberty of the individual x x x and the demands of organized society?” ‘The question that presents itself then is how one determines whether an implied liberty interest being asserted is “fundamental,” as to call for the application of strict scrutiny. For ils part, the US Supreme Court has allempted, over time, to craft principled formulations on how to identity such “tinenumerated” or “implied” rights: A .8 [Tfhe Court has used a wide variety of methods, rangitg from the restrsined upproach of locating protected interesis in the constitutional text to the gencrous test af evaluating Iterests by the importance they have for contemporary individuals, Because: the Justices do not uniformly apres upon these methods. it is also turde:standable that opinions for the Court rately express: comensus about the way the methods ore chosen, or whether they fit inle the biermehy, or whether some methods are preferable in some situations and athers in bother situations, x3. These methods lie long » comtinaum. all the way from haie-rrigysr formulas that can support a comucopia of fundariental rights to stingy theories that protect virtually noting thar is not andeninbly enumerated. x x x filo ome method is comprehensive or exclusive, and indeed, the dustices themmelves ofien have used twtr or three different thourie nalyzing a single interest. in combinativa sshile tations omitted.) a SF Farlan Dissenting Opinion in 7 Crump, “ior: tho the Con saiosuing the Meth TLL ub: Paty 795 (1006), p. RFD, In his ani. Cramp surveyed! tone than 10 methiadalogias sed hy the court Tor ne elite Those include the “history and erecition” test unsier Wi sanizing eatcuumerated! fundameetal inprort v Obwskabong, S21 US. 302Concurting, Opinion, u GR. No. 217018 This Court has not laid down clear guidelines on this matter. ‘Thus, reference to American scholarly commentary is again instructive In his article An Axess of Methods: Identifving Implied Fundamental Rights in the Supreme Court, Robert Barrell wrote that the US Supreme Court uses “x multiplicity of methods of identifying implicd fundamental rights.” Afler a survey of US Supreme Court cuses, Farrell has clussified the different methods used by the Court in categorizing certain rights as fundamental. These are either because the asserted rights: (1) are important: (2) are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution” (3) are deeply rooted in the Nation history and tradition; (4) aed protection from government gction that 0», Commeetivat, 102 LS, 319 (1937), 5,254 (1970) Serene Cart, 2094 (2095), the essen reg lo the"usortney it Ute ¥ Fanrll, “dn Bveees of ening, fe fouls U.)P4 Fo Res, 20 ARIE p28 217-221, Tae US Supreme Court used tks “in weadarventat Ri pocance® test in Shiner ws Ota, 16 US Ina king cow a stae stave provid for the stevia ian uP ashi creel, hick by iced co pesperatirs o’ Felonies involving moral rmpinide. the US Sepreane Cums did spald the Lunalamestal cig. b> szaceeale en the busis of any Language in ths Bill of Rights; “ah siunply assected, incoawovenible fan ‘considered anc used by tte Court Son Opase %, Facto acted Fuses hey 2a che Sopvence Covet, suse US. 31 (1937), the LS Supreme Cour: coninest se that are in she eote of undone’ libery™ suc that tests i fiey were suerisiecd.” Pubic concezted a state statace which allows sed if made apoa tke instovee af the Stele. Viner, Uae acensetl, sha ey in cer we secu degree and serveaced tc lil in prisea, was, upor 6 fof rrurdle= in the Fr degre and sentoracd ty doh Aw sation to chil ‘ts Loan selure the LS Suprems Court whieh thereatter ypliels it, saying “fiTte lal 2p cure wad the sreeruaits fiom prosecution except asthe result of an indiclevenl nay. foe, ! ven +o, thew ane nol al [ne ¥ecy euRence of a scheme of ordered Lect. To ebolish ww siolas x ‘principle of justice 9 ceted in the ta ranked as fundarmewal.”” Sco alte Crump. “sow De tie Cour Fos Caaagnaoy thes ested of uaa! Ab 1198), Fall “lee Brcess ef Mesh $8 224-225. "The US Supe * lertibring tayolted ndnented Rights sn bie Suprense Craw, sepre = Court algo used tie “mpl” lest in Nave ovine fncapeciea Aodbigace, (UL. 1, 19 (9733, oer ib jected an assorted “implied right 1 relzetiu ot he oeponinacs lest, the LS Susseme Court declared yx x [Uae importince of a scrviow performed by thw Siaie dows not selerten setter 1 mnnse be regarded 9s fundamevaal for purposes of excitation aes dhe Figal Protection Coagie. x x x 1. is mut the province of this Cout 10 evento sulssten'ive cewstindiowsl righls in le samy of duavamtecing equal prerection uf se kines, Tiwi, che key 19 discovering whether education is Ffindaneatal” 1s nel a be tour! in comparisens of the rlative aneietel sipaiticawe ul eleestan ‘opposed to subssiance o° easing. Nor isi to 9e found by weighing whether education 5 cs importa: as the righ! a (eavel Bather, the augwer lies an aavessing whether thava ia « Fight 49 aduewion explelly o lenplicitly gueranved ty tle Consaitutien. Kduention, of course, is not among the rights afforded explicit protection uncer our Fevers! Constitution, Nar da sve find any tnasis far saying it is implicitly so protected. As we have said, the mdsputel impertince of education will not, alone, cause this Court e depart frock the wsua ‘s social and economic legislation, (Einpitesis supplies.) ta le Rigas s0 de Suprente Gomis, supe fot a right ise assorted Ihemry hes aoe 1tho enbijet of teal tioasl ge histwival prutectioa (See: « ert of sci phew Ceongut Der Rewity seme wed Munbarvertol Rigite — Cava Heogy.” supio note SR nt RED). In Bosnrs +, Harcesed, the US Suprere ©Coneurting Opinion 12 GR No. 207910 shacks the conseie eaces* (5) are necessarily implied from the structure of government’ or from the structure of the Constitution; (6) provide neeessary access lo government processes;"” and (7) ure identified in previous Supreme Court precedents. ‘sodomy stotete. 1. claimed thar the rig spoented, which it cewer' bea as the el aflhomossxucls to-engase in gece of sadomy” was nut considered findarrental within he nation ins traditions, as Us eviderszed try aslew of ant-eorton ‘he tine of the ersctmstt of the Bill of “as fe Rights to sts the time the ease wr eocided. See also the 197 ease Of Saveter v. Aacsacieusets, 291 U.S. 97 (L934), where an accuse! soagin uv diallengs his conviction for the exime of mender on the tend tat ho was denied sereission to attend a view. which was ordered by Ihe curt an lesion ote prosecution, at lve opewiny, of the wil, The Jusurs. veer # sora Doi Eoeompanic’ hy Ike yadgs, the counsel for hath pacts, and fle eourl semogranhes. the Count affirmt 6 theke Bas ng showin hacTRore was a hisiory ue uritinn in the State of Massachesetts sed such right Ishekl tha: °|the vousitution at statutes und uicial decisions oF the Cummorecalh of Mascainasetis ac che autientic Farm: thnnneh which the sease of justioe of che Poole u: ac Commonwcalh expres Asef in lew. We are ol i supersede there on te grouné ta toy ouine opinions muy difer their policy or fies.” Far name cots appitcayinns. ze AMichaed Ki. said ay WL US. 119, 13 (N80) aad Hastngten Gleckorerg, 521 US. 70241997). See, J Kermedy's Opinion in Ohorgeail 9. Haciges, S26 US. (2015), where te Court held that “[histry aul traditios peed aad dlsciptine dis inquiry but do ut sets exter borndares x x x Vhal asthed reepeest our history end learns from it Stout allowin the post alone ur rule the pesca." arse, “An Bucs of Metin: fe sanding, the plied Fndarweni! Rights 40 the Sapiawae Court, cpr acte $0 at 23 pir, 62 US. 169 (19521. the US 8 eld it dhe se? of the police in arcangine, iu have a suspact's stornaca purnped in produes evidence of illegal srugs cunslilved s kind of eoaduet thet "skocles the Conseianee’ and theretore violates the Dne T'maoess ‘Clause of the Com His test wes again goon sppruprinte to evaluate “abusive exerw ive sole in said ease wae st polite ext else whieh rognlted “nthe seal of one of thase Bem chaser 1 Court eventwally feand tn favor of goverwnren ts vehi was desecrainant of whettie the challonged action “ghocks the conscience” wae net nsgiigence o- deliberate indifterance but whesher there ws “an inf 20 hase supeets pst of re thei Lgal i” Fuel “a Bee of Mead: Renting Skprome Cort, 26 86 Lou's U. Pub, L, Rev. ME CAV}, p. 236. eertsng,impiecd Pencianccewet Rigs da the Saga eme Cases, eugore Theampsen, 2M US, 618 {1469}, the 17S Cour considered the Sac w a least one yer, Acconlit to the Court, while umierten in Swe C9 “foonkorrantal te the coacest of our Beda Linon.” wh sowsrelu states suming \ogetbe Tite Ne Un eould not kave ecw passe, snd wml Nave made no sense. unos vin oF that Union sere free ts travel finns ot2 oF 3t to another, Farral, “An haces ete lef wma! ey Sige Cours, 26 $1, Louis (, Pub. 1, Rev, 203 (2007 ution, the Teh! io Unive! is Su wes, by and large, mice ops of seveeal se ths Farrell, “tn troess of Afloat aig Cwpttet Mueclanrntt Raley sn che saoce £9 ut 40-241, In Girdwald + Cunnnseiond, 281 US 479 (1965), which deal with the right of siasried couples to une comtreceptives, the US Supreme Gaur, speaking dimaayt.£ Douglas, “spoke of fie ‘pemannas formed by emenations” frum the zrirannen of spoeitie kinds of privacy i the Will of RRishls ail usar these x 3 a a basis for finding | mone generalized, more encompassing right ot privacy.” Farell, “Ay Peon af Mestad: Kerang, linediee Fanolomenital Rights fa bse Suysraine 16 St, Lonis U, Pub, 1. Hew. 821 (20 Parcell writes that the US Court os to vote (Soe Reged v SFT. 214 [1964] and ta some leve of access so eoart procesees (See Gray fino%s, 381 LS. 12 196) and Gude Cosvavediong, 401 (8. YF) [1971] on the round lol “ogislution wid esjudication in the cours ere essential elements of a democracy end that a Timitetion on oecess 4 these 190 this io the institution of govermen itelt™ Farwell. “de Ercess of Methods. biwitrine ie Suprise Court, 26 St. Lous U Peed. 1. Rev, 206 (20073. pp. 241- wyaeme Cour sepa Th Fleaaed Paventiand a wenn: Honawatvanies «Casey, $05 US. Court used tare vig, peticnie ity decision in the case of foe y Wee, $018. 119 (1093), t0 slain the mtare vl the Tundaviectal eight to privacy 26 i related te aborior, Mew, 1 ter, alsa enamerued several cass from vive muleestoes! to hace recogrized a bead acul yenersived right te priveey (which includes « women's decision whether ornatto terminals her vegnancy) that fe part ofthe Fourteen Atmerulneat “‘iborty.” (Famell, "An Excess of Method Adonifving hinptied Ficedomenal igive to the. Snore Coors, 26 $2 Taos U. Peb, b, Rev. 203 (01), 9 245216) This approwch 3 C982), he SuetCaneurring Opinion 13 There is noone mode of constitutional interpretation that has been recognized as appropriate under all circumstances. In fact, one would find critiques for every approach in scholarly commentaries on the subject.” Nevertheless, and despite the particular shortcomings of cach individusl approach, it is my view that the Court should endeavor to be deliberate and open about its choice of approach in fundamental rights cases. This, to my mind, would help greatly not oaly in furthering the public's waderstanding of the Court's decisions in complex constitutional cases; it would reinforce the credibility of Our decisions, by exacting upon the Court and its members the duly to clearly and consistently articulate the bases of its decisions diflicull constitutional cus A The method by which the US Su of the fundamental right to same-sex. marri (Obergefeti) is instructive, preme Court determined the existence in Obergefeil v. Hodges” there, the US of mariage but also ‘ty devclopm Supreme Court considered not only the ancient history ent through time, To quote Justice 1 Kennedy: “The history of marriage is one of both continuity and change.” The US Supreme Court also noted the legal and societal progression of the rights of homosexuals [rom being condemned as immorul o being accorded protection under the law, as depicted in the case of Lawrenve v, Texas.” It must be stressed, however, that the US Supreme Court did not receive and evaluate evidence on these matters for the first time on appeal. The plaintiti’s in Obergefeil did not file a suit directly to the US Supreme Court. Rather. they instituted original actions betore their respective Federal District Courts whieh conducted Uisls and hearings, Thus, the fuets upon which the US Supreme Court based its devision were already a matter of record. In DeBoer v. Spnder (DeBuer,”* one of die cases that comprised Obergefel!, plaimills April DeBoer and Jayne Rowse challenged the validity of the Michigan Marriage Amendment (MMA) which prohibited same-sex marriage on the ground of violation of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, They claimed that they and their children were injured by their ineligibility to petition for joint adoption it In Peep few. Ponaae, 46 Phil $41 (192A) ape dae i i appears to hws bean uses by this € i Cotes. dis OLR NO Concur rie 8 & Pub, ented Rigi a SS.CL ASB 2015), Sypremie art, F MO), Ue farwrenncn, tke US Supreme C Hows wot, $78 U.S. 186 (985) nal re Y 772 P 3d 3882054), The Disiet Coun cecloresd WATS and ‘te imple. or siokitingthe equal praction ckisse, wrt reverie! i eter riling in Rowers y jae « liberty of consersuel senul conde. wing cules urconstitucionslGAR, No. 217910, Concurring Opinion 1 hecause the State of Michigan perinits only a single person or, if married, couples of opposite-sex, to adapt." ‘Thus, they argue that each of their three ehilelren can have only one of them as hissher legal parent, In case tragedy wete to befall either DeBoer or Rowse, the other would have no legal rights over their children.” The Distict Court assumed that the appropriate level of scrutiny is rational basis test, hence, it framed the issue as whether the MMA proseribed a conduct in a manner that is rationally-related to any conceivable Icgilimate governmental purpose.” Tt then declared that wherher the rationales for the Michigan laws furthered a legitimate state interest is 2 “triable issue of fact” and held a nine-day trial on the issue,” The State ef Michigan offered the following reasons for excluding, same-sex couples from marriage: (1) to provide children with “biologically-connected” role- madels of both genders that are necessary to foster healthy psychological development; (2) to avoid the unintended consequences that might result (com redefining marriauc; (3) to uphold tradition and morality; and (4) 10 promote the transition of “naturally procreative relationships into stable unions. Roth purlics presented expert witnesses {which — included psychologists, sociologists, law professors, and historians) to prove their respective arguments, The psycholouist testified with respect to. the relation/non-relation of the quality of a person's child-rearing skills to hissher sexual orientation. The sociologist testified about the stability of ume-sex couples and the progress of the children they raised as compared to children raised by heterasexual married couples, ‘The law professor spoke: about the effect of the MMA to children raised by same-sex couples if the sole legal parent dies or is incapacitated. The historian narrated the history and bases of civil mattiages not only in Michigan but in every state in the country.” Meunwhile, similar to Deboer and also instructive here, is Perry v, Schwarzeneyger,”” which involved two same-sex couples who challenged ihe yulidity of “Proposition 8,” a voter-enacted amendment to the California Constitution restricting murriage Lo one between a man and a woman. Perry, et af. alleged that they were denicd murriage licenses by their respective county aullioritics on the basis of Proposition 8, which, in turn, deprived them of their rights to duc process and equal protection of the laws."! Specifically, they asserted that the freedom to marry the person of one’s wast ¥ Sayer, 973 ¥. Supp, 2d 757, 76th Ohergsfelly ttadlzes, 135 8. CL 25% 2015}. Babar © & ns = Dedwee v. Say * Deboer v, Snyder, pas 512014 >Use, Supp. A921 GUID), Noke da Pony is not ane of the ances that eannico Obereefell “ful a 927. The elected state officials af Calitoraia, on the other herd, refused ko defend the ccostiitions iy 7 Propositin 8 si vs asc vas Laken uy By ibs prejoness.Concurring Opinion Is GR No, 217910 choice iy a fundamental right protected by the due process clause. Proposition 8 should thus be subjected to a heightened seruliny under the equal protection clause because gays and lesbians constitute 4 suspect class, singled out for unequal treatment and discriminated based on sexucl 2 orientation, Since the factual premises underlying Perry, ef a's cluim were disputed, the US District Court for the Norther District of Culifurnia (California District Court) set the matter for wiel, The action was tried for more than two weeks (or trom January 11 vo 27, 20103." The Culifornia District Court determined the following issues: (1) whether any evidence supports Calitornia’s refusal to recognize marriage between two people of the (same) sex; (2) whether any evidence shows California has an interest in differentiating between same-sex and opposite-sex unions; and (3) whether the evidence shows Proposition 8 enacted a private moral view without advancing a legitimate government interest. The parties were given full opportunity to present evidence in support of their positions and engaged in significant discovery procedures, including third-party discovery, to build an evidentiary record." Perry, ef af, preseated nine expert witnesses, which include historians, economists, psychologists, political scivntists, and « social epidemiclogist, who, dfer alia, testified that there is no meaningful difference between same-sex couples and opposite-sex couples. Proposition § proponents, for their part, presented only twa expert witnesses. In the end, the California Distwict Court found that Proposition 8 proponents “failed to build a credible factual record to Support their claim that [the law] served a legitimate government interest." It thereafter proceeded to declare Proposition 8 i 920 BE the Cal (0) tie istry ef disrimanotion wry and lesbians Rave: faced: (2) whether the characteristics defining. gaye and Veshinns as a class. ght 9 any ct their ably ty conte ro society, (98 olether soxacl ofianration ear he changed, and isa, wh ins sue hs enone gi change a4; (6) the rohative prwer ov» ses Wi holt pre ery lation: Sythe longestand Diistiies Cour asked she paveies 10 suns evidence le aeldeess 1 ‘anal feos, fnclnadiny, ae sranse-sex couples io mir cstablies upzeites 1 and fatter prcyide the optiaal cliic-reaviag environ voctler exchiding samoes couples then mercies promotes this snviraanent; (10) wheter and how Califa hes ueted to promote thse int © eorlenls; or both; (12) -hether the availability of 0324s and lesbians; (13) wheter the dan an sareo-sex marrage meanineully rwstriets options a hhevesovenuels; (14) uae yw al ane weEye it mMrriNE prumoley sterwutypicel ender reles: (15) whsther Propnsition 8 was passed with a discriminatory ‘een: (6) sbveilipearecnty wii if reristers ars fornia voters: (17) the dillerenee in te) (181 shetbor the righy [lo roary ae] asserbal y Oe Js “dgeply cooted i tbls Nation's bistery gid radiion” aad thes sbjest ca strict scrainy anger the we pevicnos efine Cita! fa David Hole abst Thivdary Ose, Revlswnting the Onearn, Prosi & ar the Struggle ‘bc Mazriage Equality. (2514), pp. 77 WO Perey, Sebuwars HEME Supe 18 * kee * HaConcurring Opinion 16 GR No. 217910 unconstitutional because the evidence shows, among others, that it does athing more than to enshrine in the Constitution the notion that oppc sex couples are superior to same-sex couples.” ite B In this case, petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention, as professed hamosexuals, BAYS sed lesbians. asscrt a fundamental right to enter into same-sex marriage.” ‘They argue that the legal requirement that marriage be a union between a male and a female violates their rights to due process™ and the equul protection of the laws.” On the former, they claim that there is xno rational nexus between limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples and the state interest of protecting marriage as the foundation of the family.” They ert. that! homosexuals can fulfill the essential marital obligations, heterosexuals are no better pareats than homosextals, and homosexuals can taise children well in the sume manner that heterosexuals can.” With respect to their equal protection claim, petitioner asserts that classification on the hasis of seaual orientation is suspect.” because, among others, sexual orientation is an immutable trait, Since the classification is suspect, strict scrutiny review must he resorted to. Petitioner further argues that even applying the ratioualiry test, no substantial distinction can be made beoween sume-sex and opposite-sex couples, because gay couples ean do everything that opposite-sex couples are required lo do by the Family Cade, even if they cannot by themselves procreat ‘To my mind, however, these conflated claims to violations of duc process and equal rights are uniformly anchored on assertions thal preseat jriable questions of fact, the resolution of which needs the reception of ones: ‘Thess: questions, among others, include: (a) whether homosexuals, gays and lesbians can fulfill the essential marital obligations; (b) whether or how procreation is an essential marital obligation; (¢) whether homosexuals, gays and lesbians can raise children in a manner as well as heterosexuals can; (d) whether Pilipino tradition can accommodatefaecept same-sex mattiage: and {e) whether homosexuals are, and should be, treated as a separate cluss. ris elven not 20 appeal front the naling of the Galioraie Distr a however, fled at eppeal with the Ninth Cereal Coxt af Appeds. Ibe Cnc Cou feund te propanens have ssa defend Proposition Ws cx ity. but rovertnoless anerits, On further appeal Supssms Cowl il Ged the ¢eporsn c I conseguently vated tho decision of the Ninlit Citas Court of with che dirvetive to dismiss the appeal tor lack of U8. 603 2017),Concwrsiny Opinion GR. No, 217910 With particular reference lo cqual protection, petitioner maintains thet classifying individuals by scaual oricntation and gender, so as to distinguish between same-sex and opposite-sex couples, is a suspect classification, thus triggering slrict serutiny.”” Me is reminded, however, thal in Ang Ladle LGBT Party v. Commission on Efections,”© We withheld culing, in the absence of sufficient evidence, on whether homosexuals should be treated as a scparale less, viz. x XX We disagree with the OSC’s position that homosesuals ace a class in themselves for the purposes of the cguul protection clause, We are not prepared to single out homoseauzils 1s 4 separate class meriting special or differentiated tweatment. We have not received sufficient evidence to this effect, and itis simply unnecessary to make such & ruling today. x x x" (Enaphasis supplied; ci Pelitioner’s reference t Chief Justice Puno’s Separate Concurring Opinion in Any Ladiad™ does not help his cause. In fact, it only underscores the need for the reception of evidence, before homosexuals, ways and lesbians can be considered a suspect classification with respect tt marriage rights. Particulurly, evidence need tw be received on: (a) whether there is a history of invidious discrimination against the class; (6) whether the distinuuishing characteristic af the class indicate a typical class member's ability to contribute tw soviet; (e) whicther the distinguishing characteristic is immutable; and (4) the political power of the subject class.” Petitioner aliges that even if only the rational basis test is applied, the assailed provisions will fail since here is no substuntial distinction between opposite-sex couples and same-sex couples respecting marriage. Both can perfoem the essential marital obligations under the Family Code. These are: (a) the obligation to live together, observe mutual love, respeet, and lidelity, and render mulual help and support; (b) fix the Emily demicile; and (¢} support the family and pay the expenses for such support and other conjugal obligations." ‘To reiterate, this argument still requires the presentation of doctmenuiry and testimonial evidence. Tt cannot be assumed especially since there are conflicting claims on these assertions. With respeet to petitioner's claim that same-sex couples can raisé children as well as opposite-sex couples,’ We note that the intervenors~ oppositors expressed a strong contrary view and argue that children raised by heterosexua! couples fare better than those who are not.'"* The reception s Apsil¥, 2018, 618 SCRA 73 cite, pp. A830. weolto. pM 4, 4.299, Paragraph 4 of Oppo tion to-tntervention,Coseurring Opinion es GR.No. 217910 of seicntific and expert opinion is probably necessary to assist the Court in resolving this issue. Petitioner and petilioner-intervenors’ argument. that the Family Code. by exelnding same-sex couples from marriage, have placed an undue burden on their religious freedom by failing to legally recognize their relationship * similarly calls for the reception of evidence Petitioner contends that Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code are unconstitutional because they prohibit same-sex couples from founding, a family through the vehicle of marriage in accordance with their religious convictions, a right protected under Section 3(1) Article XV of the Constitution."”* Petitioners-intervenors, meanwhile, cluim that they are of the religious conviction that Christianily does not treat homosexuality a3 a sin, und that Christianity does not prohibit same-sex marriages hence, pay and lesbian Chiistians cua also enter into marriage.“ They further submit that there exists no substantial distinction hepween their religious convictions and the religious conviciions of Filipino Catholics and Filipino Muslims, and yet the latter's religious beliefs enjoy legal recognition from the Stare." For its part, the CRG argues that sex-based conceptions af marriage do not violate religious freedom. Lt claims that the limitation of marriage to opposite-sex couples is a valid state regulation grounded on a purcly leitimate secular purpose. The compelling state interests in procreation, foundation of the family, and preservation of the tradition and history of marriage. are enshrined in the Constitution. The CRG maintains that limiting civil marriages to opposite-sex couples is not unconstitutional simply because a particular religion or religious group claims that it goes ugainst their religious beliefs. According to the CRG, ullowing such situation will render, the State subservient to the beliefs of said religion or religious group. Relevant to the Court's consideration of the religious argument is the free exercive clause of the 1987 Constitution.” Thi clause guarantees the liberty of religious conscience and prohibits any degree of compulsion or fo. at S58, Peragraph 44, Pe‘ tion's opening statement, oral areuments Mi. 12, Section 3 provides: The Stats sald dotsn U0) The tight af spouses: to found a Zemily in accordance with thei-relixious convictions w semands OF responsible parertbood:

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