SPECPRO

I. SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF DECEASED PERSON

JAO VS COURT OF APPEALS - G.R. NO. 128314. May 29, 2002

Facts: Petitioner (Rodolfo Jao) and Private Respondent (Perico Jao) were the sons of the deceased Spouses Ignacio and Andrea Jao who died intestate in 1988
and 1989. Private respondent filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration in the RTC of Quezon City over the estate of his parents. Pending the
appointment of a regular administrator, private respondent Perico moved that he be appointed as special administrator, alleging that petitioner Rodolfo was
dissipating the assets of the estate. Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of improper venue. He alleged that his parents did not
reside in Quezon City during their lifetime but in Angeles City, Pampanga. He submitted documentary evidence showing that his deceased parents were
residents of Angeles City, Pampanga.
Private respondent Perico countered that his parents resides in Quezon City and in fact, actually resided in petitioner’s house as shown in the death
certificate presented before the court. Petitioner argued that his parents stay in Quezon City was merely transitory and that the death certificates could not be
deemed conclusive evidence of the decedents’ residence. The trial court ruled in favor of private respondent Perico. The CA affirmed in toto the trial court’s
decision. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the settlement proceeding was properly laid in Quezon City.
Held: Yes. The settlement proceeding was properly laid in Quezon City.
As provided for under the Rules of Court, the estate of an inhabitant of the Philippines shall be settled or letters of administration granted in the proper
court located in the province where the decedent resides at the time of his death.
The Rules of Court refers to residence at the time of death, not to the permanent residence or domicile. In the case of Garcia-Fule vs CA, it was held
that the term resides connotes ex vi termini “actual residence” as distinguished from legal residence or domicile. xxx resides should be viewed or understood
in its popular sense, meaning the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a
place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence
simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence and also an intention to make it one’s domicile. No
particular length of time is required; however, the residence must me more than temporary.
In the case at bar, it was found that the decedents’ have been living in Quezon City at the time of their death and some time prior thereto, and as was also
shown in the death certificate presented by private respondent. Thus, the venue for the settlement of the decedents’ intestate was properly laid in the Quezon
City.

AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON v. MA. LOURDES BELEN, GR No. 189121, 2013-07-31

Facts: This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of Eliseo Quiazon (Eliseo), filed by herein respondents who are Eliseo's
common-law wife and daughter. The petition was opposed by herein petitioners Amelia Garcia-Quaizon (Amelia) to whom Eliseo... was married. Amelia
was joined by her children, Jenneth Quiazon (Jenneth) and Maria Jennifer Quiazon (Jennifer). Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992.
On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), represented by her mother, Ma. Lourdes Belen (Lourdes), filed a Petition for Letters of
Administration before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City. Elise claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo having been conceived and born at
the time when her parents were both capacitated to marry each other. Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned the
validity of Eliseo's marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for having been contracted during the subsistence of the latter's marriage with one
Filipito Sandico (Filipito). To prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise, among others, attached to the Petition for Letters... of Administration her Certificate
of Live Birth[4] signed by Eliseo as her father.
Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia, together with her children, Jenneth and Jennifer, opposed the issuance of the
letters of administration by filing an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss.[5] The petitioners asserted that as... shown by his Death Certificate,[6] Eliseo was a
resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Piñas City, at the time of his death. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court,[7] the petition for
settlement of... decedent's estate should have been filed in Capas, Tarlac and not in Las Piñas City.
In a Decision[8] dated 11 March 2005, the RTC directed the issuance of Letters of Administration to Elise upon posting the necessary bond. The
lower court ruled that the venue of the petition was properly laid in Las Piñas City, thereby discrediting... the position taken by the petitioners that Eliseo's last
residence was in Capas, Tarlac, as hearsay. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto in the 28 November 2008 Decision[10] rendered by
the Court of Appeals
In validating the findings of the RTC, the Court of Appeals held that Elise was able... to prove that Eliseo and Lourdes lived together as husband and
wife by establishing a common residence at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City, from 1975 up to the time of Eliseo's death in
1992. For purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement... of Eliseo's estate, the Court of Appeals upheld the conclusion reached by the RTC that the
decedent was a resident of Las Piñas City.

Issues: THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THAT ELISEO QUIAZON WAS A RESIDENT OF LAS PIÑAS AND
THEREFORE[,] THE PETITION FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION WAS PROPERLY FILED WITH THE [RTC] OF LAS PIÑAS; THE COURT
OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT ELISE QUIAZON HAS NOT SHOWN ANY INTEREST IN THE PETITION FOR LETTERS OF
ADMINISTRATION[.]

Ruling: We find the petition bereft of merit. Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of a
decedent should be filed in the RTC of the province where the decedent resides at the time of his death. Some cases make a distinction between the terms
"residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the... terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant."
In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual
residence or... place of abode.
As thus defined, "residence," in the context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a person's actual residence or place of abode, provided he
resides therein with continuity and consistency.
Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for affirming the ruling of the RTC that the venue for the settlement
of the estate of Eliseo was properly laid in Las Piñas City. It is evident from the records that during his lifetime,... Eliseo resided at No. 26 Everlasting Road,
Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City. For this reason, the venue for the settlement of his estate may be laid in the said city.
Neither are we inclined to lend credence to the petitioners' contention that Elise has not shown any interest in the Petition for Letters of Administration.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the preferred persons who are entitled to the issuance of letters of administration. An "interested
party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. Also,
in estate proceedings, the phrase "next of kin" refers to those whose relationship with the... decedent is such that they are entitled to share in the estate as
distributees.
In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the distribution of Eliseo's estate, is deemed to be an interested party.
With the overwhelming evidence on record produced by Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo, the petitioners' pounding... on her lack of interest in the
administration of the decedent's estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway this Court to reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals. Certainly, the right of
Elise to be appointed administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on good... grounds. It is founded on her right as a compulsory heir, who, under the law, is
entitled to her legitime after the debts of the estate are satisfied.[29] Having a vested right in the distribution of Eliseo's estate as one of his natural...
children, Elise can rightfully be considered as an interested party within the purview of the law.
CUENCO VS. CA G.R. No. L-24742, October 26, 1973
The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts

FACTS: Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died in Manila. He was survived by his widow and two minor sons, residing in Quezon City, and children of the first
marriage, residing in Cebu. Lourdes, one of the children from the first marriage, filed a Petition for Letters of Administration with the Court of First Instance
(CFI) Cebu, alleging that the senator died intestate in Manila but a resident of Cebu with properties in Cebu and Quezon City.
The petition still pending with CFI Cebu, Rosa Cayetano Cuenco, the second wife, filed a petition with CFI Rizal for the probate of the last will and
testament, where she was named executrix. Rosa also filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Cebu but this court held in abeyance resolution over
the opposition until CFI Quezon shall have acted on the probate proceedings.
Lourdes filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Quezon, on ground of lack of jurisdiction and/or improper venue, considering that CFI Cebu
already acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the case. The opposition and motion to dismiss were denied. Upon appeal CA ruled in favor of Lourdes and
issued a writ of prohibition to CFI Quezon.

ISSUEs: Whether or not CA erred in issuing the writ of prohibition; Whether or not CFI Quezon acted without jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion in
taking cognizance and assuming exclusive jurisdiction over the probate proceedings in pursuance to CFI Cebu's order expressly consenting in deference to the
precedence of probate over intestate proceedings

HELD: The Supreme Court found that CA erred in law in issuing the writ of prohibition against the Quezon City court from proceeding with the testate
proceedings and annulling and setting aside all its orders and actions, particularly its admission to probate of the last will and testament of the deceased and
appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof without bond pursuant to the deceased testator's wish.
On Venue and Jurisdiction: Under Rule 73, the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts. The residence of the decent or the location of his estate is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of
venue. If this were otherwise, it would affect the prompt administration of justice. The court with whom the petition is first filed must also first take
cognizance of the settlement of the estate in order to exercise jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of all other courts.

ROBERTS V. LEONIDAS (129 SCRA 754) G.R. No. L-55509 April 27, 1984

FACTS: The question in this case is whether a petition for allowance of wills and to annul a partition, approved in an intestate proceeding by Branch 20 of the
Manila Court of First Instance, can be entertained by its Branch 38 (after a probate in the Utah district court). Edward M. Grimm an American resident of
Manila, died at 78 in the Makati Medical Center. He was survived by his second wife, Maxine Tate Grimm and their two children, named Edward Miller
Grimm II (Pete) and Linda Grimm and by Juanita Grimm Morris and Ethel Grimm Roberts (McFadden), his two children by a first marriage which ended in
divorce. He executed two wills in San Francisco, California. One will disposed of his Philippine estate which he described as conjugal property of himself and
his second wife. The second win disposed of his estate outside the Philippines.
Ethel Grimm Roberts (McFadden) filed a petition for intestate proceeding. Maxine. Grimm’s second wife , opposed on the ground of pendency of the
probate proceeding in Utah. She later filed a petition for probate of the two (2) wills, already probated in Utah and prayed that the partition approved by
Branch 20, the intestate court, be set aside. This was approved by Branch 38 of Manila Court of First Instance.
ISSUE: Was the testate proceeding proper?
RULING: We hold that respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in denying Ethel's motion to
dismiss. A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died with two wills and "no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is
proved and allowed" (Art. 838, Civil Code; sec. 1, Rule 75, Rules of Court).
The probate of the will is mandatory (Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479 and 98 Phil. 249; Baluyot vs. Panio, L-42088, May 7, 1976, 71 SCRA 86). It
is anomalous that the estate of a person who died testate should be settled in an intestate proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should be consolidated with
the testate proceeding and the judge assigned to the testate proceeding should continue hearing the two cases.
The probate of the will is mandatory. It is anomalous that the estate of a person who died testate should be settled in an intestate proceeding. Therefore,
the intestate case should be consolidated with the testate proceeding and the judge assigned to the testate proceeding should continue hearing the two cases.

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF DECEASED ISMAEL REYES, THE HEIRS OF OSCAR R. REYES vs. CESAR R. REYES
FACTS: Spouses Ismael Reyes and Felisa Revita Reyes are the registered owners of parcels of land situated in Arayat Street, Cubao, Quezon City covered by
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 4983 and 3598. The spouses have seven children, namely: Oscar, Araceli, Herminia, Aurora, Emmanuel, Cesar and
Rodrigo, all surnamed Reyes.
In 1973, Ismael Reyes died intestate. Prior to his death, Ismael Reyes was notified by the BIR of his income tax deficiency which arose out of his sale
of a parcel land located in Tandang Sora, Quezon City. For failure to settle his tax liability and since no payment was made by the heirs, the property covered
by TCT No. 4983 was levied, sold and eventually forfeited. Petitioners’ predecessor Oscar Reyes availed of the BIR’s tax amnesty and he was able to
redeem the property .
Later, the Office of the City Treasurer sent a notice to Felisa Revita Reyes informing her that the Arayat properties will be sold at public for her failure
to settle the real estate tax delinquency from 1974-1981.Oscar Reyes entered into an amnesty compromise agreement with the City Treasurer and settled the
accounts of Felisa R. Reyes.[9]

On May 10, 1989, private respondent Cesar Reyes, brother of Oscar Reyes, filed a petition for issuance of letters of administration with the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City praying for his appointment as administrator of the estate of the deceased Ismael Reyes which estate included 50% of the Arayat
properties covered by TCT Nos. 4983 and 3598.
The probate court subsequently issued letters of administration in favor of Cesar Reyes where the latter was ordered to submit a true and complete
inventory of properties pertaining to the estate of the deceased. Oscar Reyes filed his conditional opposition thereto on the ground that the Arayat properties
do not form part of the estate of the deceased as he (Oscar) had acquired the properties by redemption and or purchase.
Cesar Reyes filed an inventory of real and personal properties of the deceased which included the Arayat properties with a total area of 1,009 sq.
meters.On the other hand, Oscar Reyes filed his objection to the inventory reiterating that the Arayat properties had been forfeited in favor of the government
and he was the one who subsequently redeemed the same from the BIR using his own funds.
Petitioners argue that a probate court’s jurisdiction is not limited to the determination of who the heirs are and what shares are due them as regards the
estate of a deceased person since the probate court has the power and competence to determine whether a property should be excluded from the inventory of
the estate or not, thus the Court a quo committed a reversible error when it included the Arayat properties in the inventory of the estate of Ismael Reyes
despite the overwhelming evidence presented by petitioner-oppositor Oscar Reyes proving his claim of ownership.
Petitioners contend that their claim of ownership over the Arayat properties as testified to by their predecessor Oscar was based on two (2) grounds: (1)
his redemption of the Arayat properties and (2) the abandonment of the properties by his co-heirs.
Petitioners claim that private respondent is already barred from claiming the Arayat properties since he only filed this petition 16 years after the death
of Ismael Reyes and after the prices of the real properties in Cubao have already escalated tremendously.
ISSUE: Whether or not a trial court, acting as an intestate court, hear and pass questions of ownership involving properties claimed to be part of the
decedent’s estate?
HELD: NO. A probate court or one in charge of the proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a
part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to others. The jurisdiction of the probate court merely relates to matters having to do with the settlement of
the estate and the probate of wills of deceased persons, and the appointment and removal of administrators, executors, guardians and trustees.[18] The
question of ownership is as a rule, an extraneous matter which the Probate Court cannot resolve with finality.[19] Thus, for the purpose of determining
whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory of estate proceeding, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto, but such
determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title
The general rule that question of title to property cannot be passed upon in the probate court admits of exceptions, i.e. if the claimant and all other
parties having legal interest in the property consent, expressly or impliedly, to the submission of the question to the probate court for adjudication, such has no
application in the instant case since petitioner-appellee and oppositor-appellant are not the only parties with legal interest in the subject property as they are
not the only heirs of the decedent; that it was never shown that all parties interested in the subject property or all the heirs of the decedent consented to the
submission of the question of ownership to the intestate court.
Settled is the rule that the Regional Trial Court acting as a probate court exercises but limited jurisdiction, thus it has no power to take cognizance of
and determine the issue of title to property claimed by a third person adversely to the decedent, unless the claimant and all other parties having legal interest
in the property consent, expressly or impliedly, to the submission of the question to the Probate Court for adjudgment, or the interests of third persons are not
thereby prejudiced.
The facts in this case, however, do not call for the application of the exception to the rule. It bears stress that the purpose why the probate court
allowed the introduction of evidence on ownership was for the sole purpose of determining whether the subject properties should be included in the inventory
which is within the probate court’s competence. This ruling then, cannot be a final adjudication on the present and existing legal ownership of the
properties. Whatever is declared herein ought not to preclude oppositor from prosecuting an ordinary action for the purpose of having his claims or rights
established over the properties.

MORALES vs. OLONDRIZ G.R. No. 198994, February 3, 2016

PRINCIPLES: Preterition is the complete and total omission of a compulsory heir from the testator’s inheritance without the heir’s express disinheritance.
Under the Civil Code, the preterition of a compulsory heir in the direct line shall annul the institution of heirs, but the devises and legacies shall remain valid
insofar as the legitimes are not impaired. Consequently, if a will does not institute any devisees or legatees, the preterition of a compulsory heir in the direct
line will result in total intestacy.

FACTS: Alfonso Juan P. Olondriz, Sr. died on June 9, 2003. He was survived by his widow, Ana Maria Ortigas de Olondriz, and his children: Alfonso Juan
O. Olondriz, Jr., Alejandro Marino O. Olondriz, Isabel Rosa O. Olondriz, Angelo Jose O. Olondriz, and Francisco Javier Maria Bautista Olondriz. Believing
that the decedent died intestate, the respondent heirs filed a petition with the Las Piñas RTC for the partition of the decedent's estate and the appointment of a
special administrator on July 4, 2003. On July 11, 2003, the RTC appointed Alfonso Juan O. Olondriz, Jr. as special administrator.
However, on July 28, 2003, Iris Morales filed a separate petition with the RTC alleging that the decedent left a will dated July 23, 1991. Morales
prayed for the probate of the will and for her appointment as special administratrix.
Notably, the will omitted Francisco Javier Maria Bautista Olondriz, an illegitimate son of the decedent. The respondent heirs moved to dismiss the
probate proceedings because Francisco was preterited from the will.
The RTC observed: (1) that Morales expressly admitted that Francisco Javier Maria Bautista Olondriz is an heir of the decedent; (2) that Francisco was
clearly omitted from the will; and (3) that based on the evidentiary hearings, Francisco was clearly preterited. Thus, the RTC reinstated Alfonso Jr. as
administrator of the estate and ordered the case to proceed in intestacy.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was no preterition because Francisco received a house and lot inter vivos as an advance on his legitime.
RULING: Yes. Preterition consists in the omission of a compulsory heir from the will, either because he is not named or, although he is named as a father,
son, etc., he is neither instituted as an heir nor assigned any part of the estate without expressly being disinherited — tacitly depriving the heir of his legitime.
Preterition requires that the omission is total, meaning the heir did not also receive any legacies, devises, or advances on his legitime. In other words,
preterition is the complete and total omission of a compulsory heir from the testator’s inheritance without the heir’s express disinheritance.
The decedent's will evidently omitted Francisco Olondriz as an heir, legatee, or devisee. As the decedent's illegitimate son, Francisco is a compulsory
heir in the direct line. Unless Morales could show otherwise, Francisco's omission from the will leads to the conclusion of his preterition. Under the Civil
Code, the preterition of a compulsory heir in the direct line shall annul the institution of heirs, but the devises and legacies shall remain valid insofar as the
legitimes are not impaired. Consequently, if a will does not institute any devisees or legatees, the preterition of a compulsory heir in the direct line will result
in total intestacy.
During the proceedings in the RTC, Morales had the opportunity to present evidence that Francisco received donations inter vivos and advances on his
legitime from the decedent. However, Morales did not appear during the hearing dates, effectively waiving her right to present evidence on the issue. We
cannot fault the RTC for reaching the reasonable conclusion that there was preterition.

PACIOLES, JR. VS. CHUATOCO-CHING [G.R. No. 127920. August 9, 2005]

TOPIC: Distribution and closure of estate

FACTS: Miguelita died intestate. She was survived by her husband, petitioner Pacioles, Jr. and two minor children. He filed a verified petition for the
settlement of her estate before RTC. He prayed that (a) letters of administration be issued in his name, and (b) that the net residue of the estate be divided
among the compulsory heirs.
Respondent Miguela, who is the mother of Miguelita, filed an opposition on the grounds that (a) petitioner is incompetent and unfit to exercise the
duties of an administrator; and (b) the bulk of Miguelita’s estate is composed of “paraphernal properties.” Respondent prayed that the letters of administration
be issued to her instead. Afterwards, she also filed a motion for her appointment as special administratrix.
Petitioner moved to strike out respondent’s opposition, alleging that the latter has no direct and material interest in the estate, she not being a
compulsory heir, and that he, being the surviving spouse, has the preferential right to be appointed as administrator under the law. Respondent countered that
she has direct and material interest in the estate because she gave half of her inherited properties to Miguelita on condition that both of them “would undertake
whatever business endeavor they decided to, in the capacity of business partners.”
In her omnibus motion, she nominated her son, Emmanuel Ching, to act as special administrator. Intestate court ruled for joint administration between
petitioner and Emmanuel. Both were issued letters of administration after taking their oath and paying the docket fees. Notice to creditors was published.
Petitioner submitted to the intestate court an inventory of Miguelita’s estate. Emanuel did not submit an inventory. Intestate court declared petitioner and his
two minor children as the only compulsory heirs of Miguelita. Petitioner filed before intestate court an omnibus motion including, among others, a partition
and distribution of the estate among the declared heirs. Respondent opposed on the ground that partition and distribution is premature considering that there is
yet no determination “whether the properties specified in the inventory are conjugal, paraphernal or owned in a joint venture.”
Respondent contends that she owns bulk of Miguelita’s estate as an heir and co-owner. Intestate court ruled in favor of respondent – It denied the
action for partition and distribution of estate. There should be a hearing to determine the issue – W/N the properties are entirely conjugal or paraphernal
properties of Miguelita or a co-ownership between the oppositor and the petitioner in their partnership venture. Petitioner filed before CA a Petition for
Certiorari. – This was denied.
ISSUE: May a trial court, acting as an intestate court, hear and pass upon questions of ownership involving properties claimed to be part of the decedent’s
estate?
RULING: GR: The jurisdiction of the trial court either as an intestate or a probate court relates only to matters having to do with the settlement of the estate
and probate of will of deceased persons but does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings.
XPN: When its purpose is to determine whether or not a property should be included in the inventory. The adjudication is merely incidental and
provisional. Pastor, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals --- “As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot resolve with
finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory of estate properties, the probate
court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve
title.”
The Court of Appeals relied heavily on the above principle in sustaining the jurisdiction of the intestate court to conduct a hearing on respondent’s
claim. Such reliance is misplaced. Under the said principle, the key consideration is that the purpose of the intestate or probate court in hearing and passing
upon questions of ownership is merely to determine whether or not a property should be included in the inventory. The facts of this case show that such was
not the purpose of the intestate court.

First - The inventory was not disputed. Respondent could have opposed petitioner’s inventory and sought the exclusion of the specific properties which she
believed or considered to be hers. BUT instead of doing so, she expressly adopted the inventory, taking exception only to the low valuation placed on the real
estate properties.

Second - Emmanuel did not file an inventory. He could have submitted an inventory, excluding therefrom those properties which respondent considered to be
hers. The fact that he did not endeavor to submit one shows that he acquiesced with petitioner’s inventory.

Obviously, respondent’s purpose here was not to obtain from the intestate court a ruling of what properties should or should not be included in the inventory.
She wanted something else, i.e., to secure from the intestate court a final determination of her claim of ownership over properties comprising the bulk of
Miguelita’s estate.

Clearly, the RTC, acting as an intestate court, had overstepped its jurisdiction. Its proper course should have been to maintain a hands-off stance on the matter.
It is well- settled in this jurisdiction, sanctioned and reiterated in a long line of decisions, that when a question arises as to ownership of property alleged to be
a part of the estate of the deceased person, but claimed by some other person to be his property, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased but
by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate, such question cannot be determined in the course of an intestate or probate proceedings.
The intestate or probate court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such contentions, which must be submitted to the court in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction as a regional trial court. Jurisprudence states that: probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or
determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside parties. All that the said court could do as regards
said properties is to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If
there is no dispute, well and good, but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final
determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so.
Hence, respondent’s recourse is to file a separate action with a court of general jurisdiction. The intestate court is not the appropriate forum for the
resolution of her adverse claim of ownership over properties ostensibly belonging to Miguelita's estate.

THELMA M. ARANAS, Petitioner, vs. TERESITA V. MERCADO

Facts: Emigdio S. Mercado died intestate on January 12, 1991, survived by his second wife, Teresita V. Mercado, and their five children, namely: Allan V.
Mercado, Felimon V. Mercado, Carmencita M. Sutherland, Richard V. Mercado, and Maria Teresita M. Anderson; and his two children by his first marriage,
namely: respondent Franklin L. Mercado and petitioner Thelma M. Aranas.
The deceased inherited and acquired real properties during his lifetime. He also owned corporate shares in Mervir Realty Corporation and Cebu
Emerson Transporation Corporation. He assigned his real properties in exchange for corporate stocks of Mervir Realty, and sold his real property in Badian,
Cebu to mervir Realty.
In June 1991, petitioner filed with RTC Cebu City a petition for the appointment of Teresita as the administrator of Emigdio’s estate, which the RTC
granted. Teresita submitted an inventory of the estate indicating that the at the time of his death, Emigdio had "left no real properties but only personal
properties" worth ₱6,675,435.25 in all. Claiming that Emigdio had owned other properties that were excluded from the inventory, Thelma moved that the
RTC direct Teresita to amend the inventory, and to be examined regarding it, which was granted by the RTC.
In an order by the RTC, the court found that the inventory submitted by Teresita had excluded properties that should be included. Teresita, joined by
other heirs of Emigdio, timely sought the reconsideration of the order of March 14, 2001 on the ground that one of the real properties affected, Lot No. 3353
located in Badian, Cebu, had already been sold to Mervir Realty, and that the parcels of land covered by the deed of assignment had already come into the
possession of and registered in the name of Mervir Realty. RTC denied. Upon appeal, CA partly granted Teresita’s petition disposing that Teresita, et al. had
properly filed the petition for certiorari because the order of the RTC directing a new inventory of properties was interlocutory.
Issue: Whether the CA properly determine that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in directing the
inclusion of certain properties in the inventory notwithstanding that such properties had been either transferred by sale or exchanged for corporate shares in
Mervir Realty by the decedent during his lifetime.
Ruling: NO. First, the SC clarified that the assailed order of March 14, 2001 denying Teresita’s motion for the approval of the inventory and the order dated
May 18, 2001 denying her motion for reconsideration were interlocutory. This is because the inclusion of the properties in the inventory was not yet a final
determination of their ownership. Hence, the approval of the inventory and the concomitant determination of the ownership as basis for inclusion or exclusion
from the inventory were provisional and subject to revision at anytime during the course of the administration proceedings.
The prevailing rule is that for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory, the probate court
may pass upon the title thereto but such determination is not conclusive and is subject to the final decision in a separate action regarding ownership which
may be instituted by the parties.
The probate court is authorized to determine the issue of ownership of properties for purposes of their inclusion or exclusion from the inventory to be
submitted by the administrator, but its determination shall only be provisional unless the interested parties are all heirs of the decedent, or the question is one
of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired. Its
jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the determination of the status of each heir and
whether property included in the inventory is the conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse.
The RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in directing the inclusion of certain properties in the
inventory notwithstanding that such properties had been either transferred by sale or exchanged for corporate shares in Mervir Realty by the decedent during
his lifetime.
The usage of the word all in Section 1, Rule 78, demands the inclusion of all the real and personal properties of the decedent in the inventory. However,
the word all is qualified by the phrase which has come into his possession or knowledge, which signifies that the properties must be known to the
administrator to belong to the decedent or are in her possession as the administrator. Section 1 allows no exception, for the phrase true inventory implies that
no properties appearing to belong to the decedent can be excluded from the inventory, regardless of their being in the possession of another person or entity.

There is no dispute that the jurisdiction of the trial court as an intestate court is special and limited. The trial court cannot adjudicate title to properties claimed
to be a part of the estate but are claimed to belong to third parties by title adverse to that of the decedent and the estate, not by virtue of any right of
inheritance from the decedent. All that the trial court can do regarding said properties is to determine whether or not they should be included in the inventory
of properties to be administered by the administrator. Such determination is provisional and may be still revised.
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate court or an intestate court, relates only to matters having to do with the probate of
the will and/or settlement of the estate of deceased persons, but does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the
proceedings.

However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by expediency and convenience. First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an
intestate or a testate proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to final determination of
ownership in a separate action. Second, if the interested parties are all heirs to the estate, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties
consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to resolve
issues on ownership. Verily, its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the determination
of the status of each heir and whether the property in the inventory is conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse

HEIRS OF MAGDALENO YPON vs. GAUDIOSO PONTERAS RICAFORTE

Facts: On July 29, 2010, petitioners, together with some of their cousins, filed a complaint for Cancellation of Title and Reconveyance with Damages against
respondent. In their complaint, they alleged that Magdaleno Ypon died intestate and childless on June 28, 1968, leaving behind lot properties which were then
covered by TCTs. Claiming to be the sole heir of Magdaleno, Gaudioso executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and caused the cancellation of the said
certificates of title, leading to their subsequent transfer in his name under TCT Nos. T-2637 and T-2638, to the prejudice of petitioners who are Magdaleno’s
collateral relatives and successors-in-interest.
The respondent, in his answer, alleged that he is the lawful son of Magdaleno thereby presenting certificate of live birth, letters from Polytechnic
School, and certified true copy of his passport. He alleged that petitioners have no cause of action against him, that the complaint fails to state a cause of
action, and the case is not prosecuted by the real parties-in-interest, as there is no showing that the petitioners have been judicially declared as Magdaleno’s
lawful heirs. The RTC ruled in favour of respondent. It observed that while the plaintiffs therein had established their relationship with Magdaleno in a
previous special proceeding for the issuance of letters of administration, this did not mean that they could already be considered as the decedent’s compulsory
heirs. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the direct recourse.

Issue: Whether or not the RTC is correct in ruling that there is a need to institute the proper special proceeding in order to determine the heirship of the parties
involved.

Ruling: YES. The determination of who are the decedent’s lawful heirs must be made in the proper special proceeding for such purpose, and not in an
ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and/or possession.
Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased must be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not
in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and possession of property.1âwphi1 This must take precedence over the action for recovery of possession and
ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration
can only be made in a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as one by which a party sues
another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to
establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as
the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right.
By way of exception, the need to institute a separate special proceeding for the determination of heirship may be dispensed with for the sake of
practicality, as when the parties in the civil case had voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial court and already presented their evidence regarding the issue
of heirship, and the RTC had consequently rendered judgment thereon,23 or when a special proceeding had been instituted but had been finally closed and
terminated, and hence, cannot be re-opened. In this case, none of the foregoing exceptions, or those of similar nature, appear to exist.
In this light, it must also be pointed out that the RTC erred in ruling on Gaudioso’s heirship which should, as herein discussed, be threshed out and
determined in the proper special proceeding. As such, the foregoing pronouncement should therefore be devoid of any legal effect.

VITA VS MONTANANO, GR NO L.-50553, 19 FEB 1991

FACTS: Isidra Montanano, wife of Edilberto Vita, donated her paraphernal properties in favor of the respondents herein. It was first donated on Nov. 22,
1938 by virtue of donation mortis causa. Another, document was also executed on Dec 20, 1940 pertaining to the same properties and donees, which contains
the following provisions:Na bagaman at sa kasulatang ito ay lubusan ng ibinibigay at ipinagkakaloob sa bawat isa ng pag-aaring dito'y itinungod sa
kani-kanila, matangi ang ganang napaukol sa kay Dr. Vicente C. Chipongian at kay Maria Osuna, na iyon ay patuluyan nang ngayo'y iginagawad sa kanila ng
walang pasubali, na magagawa na nila ang buong karapatan ngayon bilang tunay na may-ari, gayon man, ay kami pa ring mag-asawa ang mananatili sa
pag-mamayari, pakikinabang at pamomosision sa kani-kaniyang pag-aaring ditoy ipinagkakaloob, sa buong panahon na ang bawat isa sa amin mag-asawa'y
nabubuhay, at kung kailan bawian kami ng hiram na buhay, ay saka at saka pa lamang maaring matamo nila ang ganap na pagmamayari at pakikinabang sa
mgapag-aaring iyan na dito'y inihayag nila ang pagtangap. Nazario Vita, judicial administrator of Edilberto Vita, filed a complaint against the respondents
seeking recovery of the property

ISSUE: (1) Whether acceptance is required in donation mortis causa. (2)Whether the donation on Dec 20,1940 is mortis causa or inter vivos.

RULING: (1) It is explicit in Article 725 * of the Civil Code that acceptance is necessary in a donation. This applies to all kinds of donation because the law
does not make any distinction.(2) It is true that the last paragraph in each donation contains the phrase "that after the death of the donor the aforesaid donation
shall become effective." . . . However, said expression must be construed together with the rest of the paragraph. When from the body of the instrument or
donation it is to be gathered that the main consideration of the donation is not the death of the donor but rather services rendered to him by the donee or his
affection for the latter, then the donation should be considered as inter vivos.

ALIPIO V. CA G.R. No. 134100, 29 September 2000

FACTS: (1) Respondent Romeo Jaring was the lessee of a 14.5 hectare fishpond in Barito, Mabuco, Hermosa, Bataan. The lease was for a period of five years
ending on September 12, 1990. On June 19, 1987, he subleased the fishpond, for the remaining period of his lease, to the spouses Placido and Purita Alipio
and the Manuel Spouses.; (2) The sublessees only satisfied a portion thereof, leaving an unpaid balance of P50,600.00.; (3) Purita Alipio moved to dismiss the
case on the ground that her husband, Placido Alipio, had passed away on December 1, 1988.
RTC: Surviving spouse should pay. The trial court denied petitioner’s motion on the ground that since petitioner was herself a party to the sublease contract,
she could be independently impleaded in the suit together with the Manuel spouses and that the death of her husband merely resulted in his exclusion from the
case. CA: Surviving spouse should pay. It is noted that all the defendants, including the deceased, were signatories to the contract of sub-lease. The remaining
defendants cannot avoid the action by claiming that the death of one of the parties to the contract has totally extinguished their obligation.

ISSUE: (1) Whether a creditor can sue the surviving spouse for the collection of a debt which is owed by the conjugal partnership of gains, or (2) Whether
such claim must be filed in proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the decedent.
RULING: (1) Surviving spouse is not liable. The conjugal partnership of gains is liable. It is clear that Climaco had a cause of action against the persons
named as defendants therein. It was, however, a cause of action for the recovery of damages, that is, a sum of money and the corresponding action is,
unfortunately, one that does not survive upon the death of the defendant, in accordance with the provisions of Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. As
held in Calma v. Tañedo, after the death of either of the spouses, no complaint about the collection of indebtedness chargeable against the conjugal
partnership can be brought against the surviving spouse. Instead, the claim must be made in the proceedings for the liquidation and settlement of the conjugal
property. The reason for this is that upon the death of one spouse, the powers of administration of the surviving spouse ceases and is passed to the
administrator appointed by the court having jurisdiction over the settlement of estate proceedings. Indeed, the surviving spouse is not even a de facto
administrator such that conveyances made by him of any property belonging to the partnership prior to the liquidation of the mass of conjugal partnership
property is void. the inventory of the Alipios’ conjugal property is necessary before any claim chargeable against it can be paid. Needless to say, such power
exclusively pertains to the court having jurisdiction over the settlement of the decedent’s estate and not to any other court; (2) The obligation is joint. Indeed,
if from the law or the nature or the wording of the obligation the contrary does not appear, an obligation is presumed to be only joint, i.e., the debt is divided
into as many equal shares as there are debtors, each debt being considered distinct from one another. Clearly, the liability of the sublessees is merely joint.
Since the obligation of the Manuel and Alipio spouses is chargeable against their respective conjugal partnerships, the unpaid balance of P50,600.00 should
be divided into two so that each couple is liable to pay the amount of P25,300.00.

II. SUMMARY AND EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE

JESUSA DUJALI BUOT VS. ROQUE RASAY DUJALI G.R. No. 199885, October 02, 2017

This is a petition for review on certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner Jesusa Dujali Buot (Buot) challenged the Orders of Branch 34 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Panabo City, dated September 19, 2011[2]and December 8, 2011,[3] dismissing her petition and denying her subsequent
motion for reconsideration, respectively.

Buot filed before the RTC a petition[4] for letters of administration of the estate of deceased Gregorio Dujali (Gregorio). In her petition, Buot alleged that she
was a surviving heir, along with Roque Dujali, Constancia Dujali-Tiongson, Concepcion Dujali-Satiembre, Marilou Sales-Dujali, Marietonete Dujali,
Georgeton Dujali, Jr. and Geomar Dujali, of Gregorio who died intestate.[5] Buot annexed[6] to her petition a list of Gregorio's properties that are allegedly
publicly known. She claimed that since Gregorio's death, there had been no effort to settle his estate. Roque Dujali (Dujali) purportedly continued to manage
and control the properties to the exclusion of all the other heirs. Buot further alleged that Dujali for no justifiable reason denied her request to settle the
estate.[7] Thus, Buot asked that: (1) an administrator be appointed to preserve Gregorio's estate; (2) a final inventory of the properties be made; (3) the heirs
be established; and (4) the net estate be ordered distributed in accordance with law among the legal heirs.[8]

Dujali filed an opposition with motion to dismiss,[9] arguing that Buot had no legal capacity to institute the proceedings. He asserted that despite Buot's claim
that she was Gregorio's child with his first wife Sitjar Escalona, she failed to attach any document, such as a certificate of live birth or a marriage certificate,
to prove her filiation. Dujali, on the other hand, attached a certificate of marriage between Gregorio and his mother Yolanda Rasay. This certificate also
indicated that Gregorio had never been previously married to a certain Sitjar Escalona. Thus, as Buot failed to prove that she is an heir, Dujali prayed that her
petition be dismissed outright.

Buot filed her comment[10] to Dujali's opposition with motion to dismiss. She argued that under the Rules of Court, only ultimate facts should be included in
an initiatory pleading. The marriage certificate and certificate of live birth which Dujali demands are evidentiary matters that ought to be tackled during trial.
Nevertheless, to answer Dujali's allegations, Buot attached to her comment a copy of the necrological services program[11] where she was listed as one of
Gregorio's heirs, a certification[12] from the municipal mayor that she is Gregorio's child, and a copy of the Amended Extrajudicial Settlement[13] dated July
4, 2001 which includes both Buot and Dujali as Gregorio's heirs. Notably, this Amended Extrajudicial Settlement pertained to parcels of land not included in
the list of properties annexed in Buot's petition.

On May 3, 2011, the RTC denied Dujali's motion to dismiss. It agreed with Buot that the issues raised by Dujali are evidentiary matters that should be
addressed during trial.[14]

Dujali filed a motion for reconsideration.[15] He argued that under the Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence, a party's lack of legal capacity to sue
should be raised in a motion to dismiss. Further, he took issue with the existence of the Amended Extrajudicial Settlement. According to him, when an estate
has no debts, recourse to administration proceedings is allowed only when there are good and compelling reasons. Where an action for partition (whether in or
out of court) is possible, the estate should not be burdened with an administration proceeding.

The RTC, in its Order dated September 19, 2011, granted Dujali's motion for reconsideration. It held that under the law, there are only two exceptions to the
requirement that the settlement of a deceased's estate should be judicially administered—extrajudicial settlement and summary settlement of an estate of small
value.[16] According to the RTC, in the case of Buot's petition, administration has been barred by the fact that Gregorio's estate has already been settled
extrajudicially as evidenced by the Amended Extrajudicial Settlement. It also noted that Gregorio had no creditors since Buot failed to allege it in her
petition.[17] Since recourse to judicial administration of an estate that has no debt is allowed only when there are good reasons for not resorting to
extrajudicial settlement or action for partition, the RTC dismissed Buot's petition. Buot filed a motion for reconsideration which the RTC denied in its Order
dated December 8, 2011. According to the RTC, not only was Buot's motion a second motion for reconsideration prohibited under the Rules, there was also
no sufficient reason to reverse its earlier dismissal of the petition.[18]

Buot filed this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court challenging the RTC's Orders on pure questions of law. In her petition,
Buot argues that her motion for reconsideration is not a prohibited second motion for reconsideration. Section 2 of Rule 52 of the Rules of Court states that a
prohibited second motion for reconsideration is one filed by the same party. In this case, Buot's motion for reconsideration was her first, since the motion for
reconsideration subject of the Order dated September 19, 2011 was filed by Dujali. She also argued that the Amended Extrajudicial Settlement did not cover
all of Gregorio's properties.[19]

Further, Buot maintains that heirs are not precluded from instituting a petition for administration if they do not, for good reason, wish to pursue an ordinary
action for partition. In her case, she claims that there are good reasons justifying her recourse to administration proceedings: (1) the Amended Extrajudicial
Settlement did not cover the entire estate; (2) there has been no effort to partition the property; (3) Dujali seeks to challenge Buot's status as an heir; (4) other
heirs have been deprived of the properties of the estate; and (5) other heirs, particularly Constancia Dujali and Marilou Dujali, have already manifested that
they are amenable to the appointment of an administrator.

In his comment, Dujali argues that Buot is not an interested person allowed to file a petition for administration of the estate. While she claims to be Gregorio's
heir, public documents, such as Buot's certificate of live birth and the certificate of marriage between Gregorio and Yolanda Rasay, reveal otherwise. Dujali
also attached to his comment certain documents that appear to show that there has been an extrajudicial settlement of some of the properties of the estate and
that Buot has already received her share from the proceeds of the sale of these properties by the true heirs.[22] Further, he explains that Buot was only
allowed to participate in the Amended Extrajudicial Settlement by Gregorio's legitimate heirs out of humanitarian considerations, not because she is a true
heir. All these, Dujali argues, clearly indicate that there is no good and compelling reason to grant Buot's petition for administration.[23] In her reply,[24]
Buot contends that the issue of whether she is a person interested in the estate is a matter that should be raised during the trial by the RTC of her petition for
administration.
We deny the petition. First, we must emphasize that this is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. This recourse to the Court
covers only a review of questions of law. In this case, the question of law presented before us is whether the RTC properly dismissed the petition for
administration on the ground that there has already been an extrajudicial settlement of certain properties of the estate. An additional question of procedure
raised here is whether the RTC was correct in holding that Buot's motion for reconsideration should be denied as it is a prohibited second motion for
reconsideration.

All other issues raised in the pleadings before us are questions of fact that we cannot resolve at this time. As we shall shortly explain in this Decision, these
questions of fact ought to be resolved by a trial court in the appropriate proceeding.
We will first rule on the procedural issue raised in the petition. In its Order dated September 19, 2011, the RTC held that Buot's motion for reconsideration is
a second motion for reconsideration prohibited under the Rules of Court. Thus, the motion was denied. We reviewed the motions filed by the parties before
the RTC and rule that the RTC erred in its finding.

When Buot filed her petition for administration, Dujali filed an opposition with a motion to dismiss. When the RTC denied his motion to dismiss, Dujali filed
a motion for reconsideration. This led to the RTC's issuance of the Order of September 19, 2011 granting Dujali's motion for reconsideration and holding that
Buot's petition for administration should be dismissed. It was only at this point that Buot filed, for the first time, a motion seeking for reconsideration of the
Order which declared the dismissal of her petition for administration. Clearly, this is not the motion for reconsideration contemplated in Section 2 of Rule 52
of the Rules of Court which states: Sec. 2. Second motion for reconsideration. - No second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the
same party shall be entertained. Section 2 of Rule 52 is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. What it prohibits is a second motion for reconsideration
filed by the same party involving the same judgment or final resolution. In the present case, Buot's motion for reconsideration was only her first motion
challenging the Order dismissing her petition for administration of Gregorio's estate. The RTC clearly erred in denying her motion on the ground that it is a
second motion for reconsideration prohibited under the Rules.

Nevertheless, we rule that the RTC properly ordered the dismissal of Buot's petition for administration. When a person dies intestate, his or her estate may
generally be subject to judicial administration proceedings. There are, however, several exceptions. One such exception is provided for in Section 1 of Rule
74 of the Rules of Court. This Section states: Sec. 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. - If the decedent left no will and no debts and the
heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may, without securing
letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and
should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means of an
affidavit filed in the office of the register of deeds. The parties to an extrajudicial settlement, whether by public instrument or by stipulation in a pending
action for partition, or the sole heir who adjudicates the entire estate to himself by means of an affidavit shall file, simultaneously with and as a condition
precedent to the filing of the public instrument, or stipulation in the action for partition, or of the affidavit in the office of the register of deeds, a bond with the
said register of deeds, in an amount equivalent to the value of the personal property involved as certified to under oath by the parties concerned and
conditioned upon the payment of any just claim that may be filed under Section 4 of this rule. It shall be presumed that the decedent left no debts if no
creditor files a petition for letters of administration within two (2) years after the death of the decedent.

The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided in the next
succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof.

According to this provision, when the deceased left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, the heirs may divide the estate among themselves without
judicial administration. The heirs may do so extrajudicially through a public instrument filed in the office of the Register of Deeds. In case of disagreement,
they also have the option to file an action for partition. Section 1 of Rule 74, however, does not prevent the heirs from instituting administration proceedings
if they have good reasons for choosing not to file an action for partition. In Rodriguez, et al. v. Tan, etc. and Rodriguez,[26] we said:

[S]ection 1 [of Rule 74] does not preclude the heirs from instituting administration proceedings, even if the estate has no debts or obligation, if they do not
desire to resort for good reasons to an ordinary action of partition. While section 1 allows the heirs to divide the estate among themselves as they may see fit,
or to resort to an ordinary action of partition, it does not compel them to do so if they have good reasons to take a different course of action. Said section is not
mandatory or compulsory as may be gleaned from the use made therein of the word may. If the intention were otherwise the framer of the rule would have
employed the word shall as was done in other provisions that are mandatory in character. x x x.[27] (Italics in the original.)

Since such proceedings are always "long," "costly," "superfluous and unnecessary,"[28] resort to judicial administration of cases falling under Section 1, Rule
74 appears to have become the exception rather than the rule. Cases subsequent to Rodriguez emphasized that "[w]here partition is possible, either in or out of
court, the estate should not be burdened with an administration proceeding without good and compelling reasons."[29]

In Pereira v. Court of Appeals[30] we had the opportunity to explain what the "good reason exception" means. What constitutes good reason depends on the
circumstances of each case. We said:

"Again the petitioner argues that only when the heirs do not have any dispute as to the bulk of the hereditary estate but only in the manner of partition does
section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court apply and that in this case the parties are at loggerheads as to the corpus of the hereditary estate because respondents
succeeded in sequestering some assets of the intestate. The argument is unconvincing, because, as the respondent judge has indicated, questions as to what
property belonged to the deceased (and therefore to the heirs) may properly be ventilated in the partition proceedings, especially where such property is in the
hands of one heir."

In another case, We held that if the reason for seeking an appointment as administrator is merely to avoid a multiplicity of suits since the heir seeking such
appointment wants to ask for the annulment of certain transfers of property, that same objective could be achieved in an action for partition and the trial court
is not justified in issuing letters of administration. In still another case, We did not find so powerful a reason the argument that the appointment of the husband,
a usufructuary forced heir of his deceased wife, as judicial administrator is necessary in order for him to have legal capacity to appear in the intestate
proceedings of his wife's deceased mother, since he may just adduce proof of his being a forced heir in 2 intestate proceedings of the latter.[31] (Citations
omitted.)

Thus, in Pereira, we refused to allow administration proceedings where the only reason why the appointment of an administrator was sought so that one heir
can take possession of the estate from the other heir. We held that this was not a compelling reason to order judicial administration. We added that in cases
like this, "the claims of both parties as to the properties left by the deceased may be properly ventilated in simple partition proceedings where the creditors,
should there be any, are protected in any event."[32]

We have reviewed the reasons which Buot proffers to warrant the grant of her petition for letters of administration and rule that these do not suffice to warrant
the submission of Gregorio's estate to administration proceedings. That the extrajudicial settlement in this case did not cover Gregorio's entire estate is, by no
means, a sufficient reason to order the administration of the estate. Whether the extrajudicial settlement did in fact cover the entire estate and whether an
extrajudicial settlement that does not cover the entire estate may be considered valid do not automatically create a compelling reason to order the
administration of the estate. Parties seeking to challenge an extrajudicial settlement of estate possess sufficient remedies under the law and procedural rules.
As to Buot's other allegations that: (1) there has been no effort to partition the estate; (2) that Dujali challenges her status as an heir; (3) that other heirs have
been deprived of the estate; and (4) these heirs are amenable to the appointment of an administrator, we find that none of these allegations actually prevent the
filing of an ordinary action for partition. In fact, if it is indeed true that there has been no effort to partition Gregorio's entire estate, the filing of an action for
partition before the proper court will leave his heirs with no choice but to proceed. An action for partition is also the proper venue to ascertain Buot's
entitlement to participate in the proceedings as an heir.[33] Not only would it allow for the full ventilation of the issues as to the properties that ought to be
included in the partition and the true heirs entitled to receive their portions of the estate, it is also the appropriate forum to litigate questions of fact that may
be necessary to ascertain if partition is proper and who may participate in the proceedings. WHEREFORE, this petition for review on certiorari is DENIED.
The Orders of Branch 34 of the Regional Trial Court, Panabo City, dated September 19, 2011 and December 8, 2011 are AFFIRMED insofar as they ordered
the dismissal of the petition for letters of administration.

CUA vs. VARGAS G.R. No. 156536 October 31, 2006 Rule 74
Re: Extrajudicial Settlement

FACTS: A parcel of residential land was left behind by the late Paulina Vargas. A notarized Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs was executed by and
among the heirs, partitioning and adjudicating unto themselves the lot in question and was published for 3 weeks. An Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs
with Sale was again executed by and among the same heirs over the same property and also with the same sharings. Only 5 of the 9 heirs signed the document
and their respective shares were sold to Joseph Cua, petitioner herein.
After knowing of such sale to petitioner, Gloria Vargas tried to redeem the property. When the offer to redeem was refused, Gloria Vargas and her
children filed a case for annulment of Extra Judicial Settlement and Legal Redemption of the lot with the MTC. The MTC dismissed the complaint, declaring
the Deed of Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale valid and binding. The RTC affirmed the MTC decision. The CA reversed the ruling of both
lower courts, declaring that the Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs and the Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale were void and without any
legal effect. The CA held that, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, the extrajudicial settlement made by the other co-heirs is not binding upon
respondents considering the latter never participated in it nor did they ever signify their consent to the same.
Petitioner argued among others, that the acquisition by petitioner of the subject property subsequent to the extrajudicial partition was valid because the
partition was duly published. The publication of the same constitutes due notice to respondents and signifies their implied acquiescence thereon. Respondents
are therefore estopped from denying the validity of the partition and sale at this late stage. Considering that the partition was valid, respondents no longer
have the right to redeem the property.
ISSUE: Whether heirs are deemed constructively notified and bound, regardless of their failure to participate therein, by an extrajudicial settlement and
partition of estate when the extrajudicial settlement and partition has been duly published.
RULING: The petition lacks merit. The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex parte proceeding. The rule plainly states, however, that persons
who do not participate or had no notice of an extrajudicial settlement will not be bound thereby. It contemplates a notice that has been sent out or issued
before any deed of settlement and/or partition is agreed upon (i.e., a notice calling all interested parties to participate in the said deed of extrajudicial
settlement and partition), and not after such an agreement has already been executed as what happened in the instant case with the publication of the first deed
of extrajudicial settlement among heirs.
The publication of the settlement does not constitute constructive notice to the heirs who had no knowledge or did not take part in it because the same
was notice after the fact of execution. The requirement of publication is geared for the protection of creditors and was never intended to deprive heirs of their
lawful participation in the decedent’s estate. Following Rule 74, these extrajudicial settlements do not bind respondents, and the partition made without their
knowledge and consent is invalid insofar as they are concerned. This is not to say, though, that respondents’ co-heirs cannot validly sell their hereditary rights
to third persons even before the partition of the estate. The heirs who actually participated in the execution of the extrajudicial settlements, which included the
sale to petitioner of their pro indiviso shares in the subject property, are bound by the same. Nevertheless, respondents are given the right to redeem these
shares pursuant to Article 1088 of the Civil Code. The right to redeem was never lost because respondents were never notified in writing of the actual sale by
their co-heirs. Based on the provision, there is a need for written notice to start the period of redemption, thus: Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary
rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale,
provided they do so within the period of one month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor.
It bears emphasis that the period of one month shall be reckoned from the time that a co-heir is notified in writing by the vendor of the actual sale.
Written notice is indispensable and mandatory, actual knowledge of the sale acquired in some other manner by the redemptioner notwithstanding. It cannot be
counted from the time advance notice is given of an impending or contemplated sale. The law gives the co-heir thirty days from the time written notice of the
actual sale within which to make up his or her mind and decide to repurchase or effect the redemption. It should be kept in mind that the obligation to serve
written notice devolves upon the vendor co-heirs because the latter are in the best position to know the other co-owners who, under the law, must be notified
of the sale. Considering, therefore, that respondents’ co-heirs failed to comply with this requirement, there is no legal impediment to allowing respondents to
redeem the shares sold to petitioner.

NAPOLEON D. NERI vs. HEIRS OF HADJI YUSOP UY

G.R. No. 194366 October 10, 2012

FACTS: Anunciacion Neri had seven children: first marriage with Gonzalo Illut, namely: Eutropia and Victoria and second marriage with Enrique Neri,
namely: Napoleon, Alicia, Visminda, Douglas and Rosa. Throughout the marriage of spouses Enrique and Anunciacion, they acquired several homestead
properties located in Samal, Davao del Norte. In 1977, Anunciacion died intestate. Enrique, in his personal capacity and as natural guardian of his minor
children Rosa and Douglas, with Napoleon, Alicia, and Visminda executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale on 7/7/1979,
adjudicating among themselves the said homestead properties and thereafter, conveying them to the late spouses Uy for a consideration of P 80,000.00.
In June 1996, the children of Enrique filed a complaint for annulment of sale of the homestead properties against spouses Uy before the RTC, assailing
the validity of the sale for having been sold within the prohibited period. The complaint was later amended to include Eutropia and Victoria additional
plaintiffs for having been excluded and deprived of their legitimes as children of Anunciacion from her first marriage.

RTC Ruling: Rendered the sale void because Eutropia and Victoria were deprived of their hereditary rights and that Enrique had no judicial authority to sell
the shares of his minor children, Rosa and Douglas.
CA Ruling: Reversed the RTC ruling and declared the extrajudicial settlement and sale valid. While recognizing Rosa and Douglas to be minors at that time,
they were deemed to have ratified the sale when they failed to question it upon reaching the age of majority. It also found laches to have set in because of
their inaction for a long period of time.

ISSUES: Whether the father or mother, as the natural guardian of the minor under parental authority, has the power to dispose or encumber the property of the
minor?

RULING: All the petitioners are legitimate children of Anunciacion from her first and second marriages and consequently, they are entitled to inherit from
her in equal shares, pursuant to Articles 979 and 980 of the Civil Code. In the execution of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of
Sale in favor of spouses Uy, all the heirs of Anunciacion should have participated. Considering that Eutropia and Victoria were admittedly excluded and that
then minors Rosa and Douglas were not properly represented therein, the settlement was not valid and binding upon them.
While the settlement of the estate is null and void, the subsequent sale of the properties made by Enrique and his children, Napoleon, Alicia and
Visminda, in favor of the spouses is valid but only with respect to their proportionate shares. With respect to Rosa and Douglas who were minors at the time
of the execution of the settlement and sale, their natural guardian and father, Enrique, represented them in the transaction. However, on the basis of the laws
prevailing at that time, Enrique was merely clothed with powers of administration and bereft of any authority to dispose of their 2/16 shares in the estate of
their mother.
Administration includes all acts for the preservation of the property and the receipt of fruits according to the natural purpose of the thing. Any act of
disposition or alienation, or any reduction in the substance of the patrimony of child, exceeds the limits of administration. Thus, a father or mother, as the
natural guardian of the minor under parental authority, does not have the power to dispose or encumber the property of the latter. Such power is granted by
law only to a judicial guardian of the ward’s property and even then only with courts’ prior approval secured in accordance with the proceedings set forth by
the Rules of Court. Consequently, the disputed sale entered into by Enrique in behalf of his minor children without the proper judicial authority, unless
ratified by them upon reaching the age of majority, is unenforceable in accordance with Articles 1317 and 1403(1) of the Civil Code. However, records show
that Napoleon and Rosa had ratified the extrajudicial settlement of the estate with absolute deed of sale. In their Joint-Affidavit and Manifestation before the
RTC, “they both confirmed, respect and acknowledge the validity of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale in 1979.”
The ratification thus purged all the defects existing at the time of its execution and legitimizing the conveyance of Rosa’s 1/16 share in the estate of
Anunciacion to spouses Uy. The same, however, is not true with respect to Douglas for lack of evidence showing ratification.

DELFIN TAN V. ERLINDA BENOLIRAO, ET. AL. G.R. №. 153820 , October 16, 2009; Brion, J.

Facts: A 689 sq.m. parcel of land in Tagaytay City with TCT №. 26432, co-owned by respondent spouses Lamberto and Erlinda Benolirao and spouses
Reynaldo and Norma Taningco, was the subject of a Deed of Conditional Sale in favor of petitioner Delfin Tan for P 1,378,000. Pursuant to the deed,
petitioner paid the P 200,000 downpayment. Then, Lamberto Benolirao died and an extrajudicial settlement of his estate was executed which caused the
issuance of a new certificate of title over the property (TCT №. 27355) with a corresponding annotation in accordance with Section 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of
Court. Despite a second extension, petitioner failed to comply with his obligation to pay the remaining balance due. In response to the demand letter
subsequently sent by the vendors, petitioner demanded the return of his downpayment, contending that the annotation on the title was an encumberance on the
property that would prevent the vendors from delivering a clear title to him. When the vendors refused, petitioner filed a complaint for specific performance
and caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on the title. Respondents filed a motion for cancellation of the notice of lis pendens and was granted. The
lower court, after due proceedings, ruled that the forfeiture was proper while the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto hence, the present petition.

Issue: WON an annotation made pursuant to Section 3, Rule 74 of the ROC on a COT conveying real property considered an encumberance on the property?

Held: Court ruled in the affirmative. The litigation subject of a notice of lis pendens must directly involve a specific property which is necessarily affected by
the judgment. While the deed does have real property for its object, petitioner’s complaint is an in personam action since it asks the court to compel the
respondent to do something — either to rescind or reform the contract — and enforces his personal rights against the respondent, not against the property
subject of the deed. The contract between the parties was merely a contract to sell where the vendor retained title and ownership to the property until
petitioner has fully paid the purchase price. Since he had no claim of ownership or title yet, he had no right to ask for the annotation of a lis pendens notice on
the title of the property. Jurisprudence has established that where the seller promises to execute a deed of absolute sale upon the completion by the buyer of
the payment of the price, contract is only a contract to sell.
An annotation is placed on new certificates of title issued pursuant to the distribution and partition of a decedent’s real properties to warn third persons
on the possible interests of excluded heirs or unpaid creditors in these properties. The annotation, therefore, creates a legal encumbrance or lien on the real
property in favor of the excluded heirs or creditors. Where a buyer purchases the real property despite the annotation, he must be ready for the possibility that
the title could be subject to the rights of excluded parties. The remedy of rescission under Art. 1191 cannot apply to mere contracts to sell. In a contract to sell,
the vendor remains the owner for as long as the vendee has not complied fully with the condition of paying the purchase price. If the vendor should eject
vendee for failure to meet the condition precedent, he is enforcing the contract and not rescinding it. (Termination is the proper remedy. Unless time is of the
essence to the contract, slight delay is not a ground for rescission.

TAN vs. BENOLIRAO G.R. No. 153820 October 16, 2009

FACTS: Spouses Lamberto and Erlinda Benolirao and the Spouses Reynaldo and Norma Taningco were the co-owners of a parcel of land located in Tagaytay
City. On October 6, 1992, the co-owners executed a Deed of Conditional Sale over the property in favor of Tan for the price of P1,378,000.00. The deed
stated: a) An initial down-payment of TWO HUNDRED (P200,000.00) THOUSAND PESOS, upon signing of the contract; then the remaining balance of
ONE MILLION ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND (P1,178,000.00) PESOS, shall be payable within a period of one hundred fifty (150)
days from date hereof without interest; b) That for any reason, BUYER fails to pay the remaining balance within above mentioned period, the BUYER shall
have a grace period of sixty (60) days within which to make the payment, provided that there shall be an interest of 15% per annum on the balance amount
due from the SELLERS; c) That should in case (sic) the BUYER fails to comply with the terms and conditions within the above stated grace period, then the
SELLERS shall have the right to forfeit the down payment, and to rescind this conditional sale without need of judicial action; d) That in case, BUYER have
complied with the terms and conditions of this contract, then the SELLERS shall execute and deliver to the BUYER the appropriate Deed of Absolute Sale.
Tan issued and delivered to the co-owners/vendors check for P200,000 as down payment for the property, respective receipt issued by vendors. On
November 6, 1992, Lamberto Benolirao died intestate. The heirs of the deceased executed an extrajudicial settlement of Lamberto’s estate on January 20,
1993. A new certificate of title over the property was issued on March 26, 1993 in the names of the Spouses Reynaldo and Norma Taningco and Erlinda
Benolirao and her children. As stated in the Deed of Conditional Sale, Tan had until March 15, 1993 to pay the balance of the purchase price. This period was
extended by two months as agreed by the parties, Tan had until May 15, 1993 to pay the balance. Tan failed to pay and another extension was granted by the
vendors. Tan still failed to pay the remaining balance due on May 21, 1993. The vendors demanded payment of the balance of the purchase price within five
(5) days from notice; otherwise, they would declare the rescission of the conditional sale and the forfeiture of his down payment based on the terms of the
contract. Tan refused to comply with the vendors’ demand and instead wrote them a letter dated May 28, 1993 claiming that the annotation on the title
constituted an encumbrance on the property that would prevent the vendors from delivering a clean title to him. Thus, he alleged that he could no longer be
required to pay the balance of the purchase price and demanded the return of his down payment. The vendors refused to refund the down payment, Tan,
through counsel, sent another demand letter to the vendors on June 18, 1993. The vendors still refused to heed Tan’s demand, prompting Tan to file on June
19, 1993 a complaint with the RTC for specific performance against the vendors. Tan alleged that there was a novation of the Deed of Conditional Sale done
without his consent since the annotation on the title created an encumbrance over the property. Tan prayed for the refund of the down payment and the
rescission of the contract.
On August 9, 1993, Tan amended his Complaint, contending that if the respondents insist on forfeiting the down payment, he would be willing to pay
the balance of the purchase price provided there is reformation of the Deed of Conditional Sale. In the meantime, Tan caused the annotation on the title of a
notice of lis pendens. On August 21, 1993, the respondents the property to Hector de Guzman (de Guzman) for P689,000. The respondents moved for the
cancellation of the notice of lis pendens on the ground that it was inappropriate since the case that Tan filed was a personal action which did not involve either
title to, or possession of, real property. The RTC issued an order dated October 22, 1993 granting the respondents’ motion to cancel the lis pendens annotation
on the title. Meanwhile, based on the Deed of Absolute Sale in his favor, de Guzman registered the property and TCT No. 28104 was issued in his name. Tan
then filed a motion to carry over the lis pendens annotation to TCT No. 28104 registered in de Guzman’s name, but the RTC denied the motion.
On September 8, 1995, after due proceedings, the RTC rendered judgment ruling that the respondents’ forfeiture of Tan’s down payment was proper in
accordance with the terms and conditions of the contract between the parties.The RTC ordered Tan to pay the respondents the amount of P30,000.00,
plus P1,000.00 per court appearance, as attorney’s fees, and to pay the cost of suit. On appeal, the CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the ruling of the
trial court in toto. Hence, the petition.
ISSUE:Whether or not the contract between the parties is a contract of sale or a contract of sale.
RULING: The petition is granted. The contract between the parties was merely a contract to sell where the vendors retained title and ownership to the
property until Tan had fully paid the purchase price. Since Tan had no claim of ownership or title to the property yet, he obviously had no right to ask for the
annotation of a lis pendens notice on the title of the property. A contract is what the law defines it to be, taking into consideration its essential elements, and
not what the contracting parties call it as stated by Article 1485 of the Civil Code. The very essence of a contract of sale is the transfer of ownership in
exchange for a price paid or promised.
In contrast, a contract to sell is defined as a bilateral contract whereby the prospective seller, while expressly reserving the ownership of the property
despite delivery thereof to the prospective buyer, binds himself to sell the property exclusively to the prospective buyer upon fulfilment of the condition
agreed, i.e., full payment of the purchase price. A contract to sell may not even be considered as a conditional contract of sale where the seller may likewise
reserve title to the property subject of the sale until the fulfilment of a suspensive condition, because in a conditional contract of sale, the first element of
consent is present, although it is conditioned upon the happening of a contingent event which may or may not occur. Jurisprudence has established that where
the seller promises to execute a deed of absolute sale upon the completion by the buyer of the payment of the price, the contract is only a contract to
sell.12 Thus, while the contract is denominated as a Deed of Conditional Sale, the presence of the above-quoted provision identifies the contract as being a
mere contract to sell.
Contract to sell is not rescinded but terminated. What then happens to the contract? We have held in numerous cases that the remedy of rescission
under Article 1191 cannot apply to mere contracts to sell. We explained the reason for this in Santos v. Court of Appeals,19 where we said: In a contract to
sell, title remains with the vendor and does not pass on to the vendee until the purchase price is paid in full. Thus, in a contract to sell, the payment of the
purchase price is a positive suspensive condition. Failure to pay the price agreed upon is not a mere breach, casual or serious, but a situation that prevents the
obligation of the vendor to convey title from acquiring an obligatory force. This is entirely different from the situation in a contract of sale, where
non-payment of the price is a negative resolutory condition. The effects in law are not identical. In a contract of sale, the vendor has lost ownership of the
thing sold and cannot recover it, unless the contract of sale is rescinded and set aside. In a contract to sell, however, the vendor remains the owner for as long
as the vendee has not complied fully with the condition of paying the purchase price. If the vendor should eject the vendee for failure to meet the condition
precedent, he is enforcing the contract and not rescinding it. x x x Article 1592 speaks of non-payment of the purchase price as a resolutory condition. It does
not apply to a contract to sell. As to Article 1191, it is subordinated to the provisions of Article 1592 when applied to sales of immovable property. Neither
provision is applicable [to a contract to sell].
We, therefore, hold that the contract to sell was terminated when the vendors could no longer legally compel Tan to pay the balance of the purchase
price as a result of the legal encumbrance which attached to the title of the property. Since Tan’s refusal to pay was due to the supervening event of a legal
encumbrance on the property and not through his own fault or negligence, we find and so hold that the forfeiture of Tan’s down payment was clearly
unwarranted.

NATIVIDAD DEL ROSARIO VDA. DE ALBERTO v. CA, GR No. L-29759, 1989-05-18

Facts: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the August 31, 1968 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 34750-R* entitled "Antonio J.
Alberto, Jr., thru his mother as his natural guardian, Andrea Jongco, plaintiff-appellant, vs. Natividad del Rosario Vda. de Alberto, in her individual capacity
and as judicial guardian of the minors, Lourdes Alberto and Antonio Alberto, Jr.,... defendants-appellees", reversing the August 10, 1964 Decision** of the
then Court of First Instance of Manila.
The case originated from a complaint for acknowledgment and partition filed on September 8, 1960 with the then Court of First Instance of Manila by
the herein private respondent, a minor, 18 years of age, assisted by his mother, Andrea Jongco, as his natural... guardian, against the herein petitioners In the
said Complaint, private respondent alleged, in substance, that in 1941 his alleged father, Antonio C. Alberto, and his mother, Andrea Jongco, lived together as
husband... and wife and as a result of which, he was born on September 10, 1942... hat during the time that his alleged father and mother lived together as
husband and wife and up to the time of his birth, both were single and had no legal impediment to marry each other;... that after his... birth, his father and
mother continued living together as husband and wife, his father supporting them and introducing him to the public as his natural child; that even the family
of his father recognized him as such; that on or about the year 1944, his father and mother... separated, and subsequently, his father married herein petitioner
Natividad del Rosario... that as a result of the marriage, two (2) children were born - herein petitioners Lourdes Alberto and Antonio Alberto, Jr. although his
father was separated from his... mother, he continued to support him and recognized him as his own child; that on July 3, 1949, his father died, and without
notice to him, petitioner Natividad del Rosario Vda. de Alberto, on July 17, 1949, instituted before the then Court of First Instance of Manila an intestate
proceedings for the estate of his deceased father, docketed therein as Special Proceedings No. 9092... in the said intestate proceedings, petitioners deliberately
omitted him as one of the heirs and for this reason they succeeded in having the... properties of his deceased father adjudicated and partitioned among
themselves; that the said intestate proceedings were terminated on November 9, 1953; that his father left properties valued at P74,963.81, and accordingly, as
a natural child of his father, he... is entitled to at least P18,000.00; and that he had absolutely no previous knowledge of the intestate proceedings and came to
know about it only recently and thereupon made a demand from the petitioners who refused to give him his... share. Accordingly, he prays that the
petitioners be ordered to acknowledge him as the natural child of Antonio C. Alberto; that his one-fourth share be turned over to him; and that petitioners be
sentenced to pay him the sum of P5,000.00... as attorney's fee and the cost of suit (Record on Appeals, pp. 2-9).
On September 21, 1960, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that (1) the cause of action is barred by prior judgment; and (2) that the
cause of action is also barred by the statute of limitation "Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and set aside and another rendered
declaring plaintiff Antonio J. Alberto, Jr., an acknowledged Natural Child of the deceased Antonio C. Alberto; declaring said plaintiff the owner... pro
indiviso of one-fifth (1/5) of the hereditary estate of Antonio C. Alberto

Issues: THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA (TRIAL
COURT) HAD NO JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE INSTANT CASE.

Ruling: It is the contention of petitioners that inasmuch as the instant case was filed on September 8, 1960, almost five (5) years after the enactment of R.A.
No. 1401 - creating the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, the questions of paternity and acknowledgment fall... beyond the jurisdictional pale of the
Court of First Instance of Manila and instead comes within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. While
petitioners admitted that this objection to lack... of jurisdiction by the Court of First Instance of Manila over the subject matter of the present action had not
been raised either in the said court or in the Court of Appeals and is brought to this Court for resolution for the first time on... appeal, they contend that a party
may object to the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the action at any stage of the proceedings, even for the first time on appeal since lack of
jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter cannot be... waived. Such contention is untenable.
This Court has already ruled that the question of jurisdiction not raised in the trial court cannot be raised on appeal (Dalman vs. City Court of Dipolog
City, Branch II, 134 SCRA 243 [1985]). Besides, a party who had... voluntarily participated in the trial, like the herein petitioners, cannot later on raise the
issue of the court's lack of jurisdiction (Philippine National Bank vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 143 SCRA 299 [1986]; Royales vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 127 SCRA 470 [1984]; Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29 [1968]). Moreover, there are no more Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Courts today. Under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the functions of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court have been transferred to the Regional Trial
Courts (Divinagracia vs. Bellosillo, 143 SCRA 356 [1986]).

II. Petitioners alleged that the intestate proceedings for the settlement of estate of the deceased Antonio C. Alberto (Special Proceedings No. 9092) had
already been terminated on November 9, 1953 by the order of distribution directing the delivery of the residue of the... estate to the persons entitled thereto
and that in said proceedings the court also declared who are the heirs of the deceased. Consequently, the instant case which seeks to secure the recognition
of Antonio J. Alberto, Jr. as an acknowledged natural child of... the deceased in order to establish his rights to the inheritance is already barred by prior
judgment (Petitioners' Brief, p. 47) despite private respondent's insistence that he had no knowledge or notice of the intestate proceedings of his alleged
natural father.
Petitioners' submission is impressed with merit. This Court has invariably ruled that insolvency proceedings and settlement of a decedent's estate are
both proceedings in rem which are binding against the whole world. All persons having interest... in the subject matter involved, whether they were notified
or not, are equally bound (Philippine Savings Bank vs. Lantin, 124 SCRA 483 [1983]). The court acquires jurisdiction over all persons interested, through
the publication of the notice... prescribed x x x and any order that may be entered therein is binding against all of them (Ramon vs. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 741
[1951] citing in re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156). It was ruled... further that a final order of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to
the land of the estate in the distributees; and that the only instance where a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set... aside is
when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence. Even then, the better
practice to secure relief is reopening of the same case by proper motion within the... reglementary period, instead of an independent action, the effect of which,
if successful, would be, as in the instant case, for another court or judge to throw out a decision or order already final and executed and reshuffle... properties
long ago distributed and disposed of (Ramon vs. Ortuzar, supra; Santos vs. Roman Catholic Bishop of Nueva Caceres, 45 Phil. 895).
Intestate proceedings were terminated as alleged in the complaint itself on November 9, 1953 so that said four years prescriptive period expired on
November 9, 1957. Hence, the present action filed... on September 8, 1960 and which has for one of its objects the rescission of the agreement of partition
among the petitioners, as approved by the intestate court, is already barred by prescription. That an action for rescission is also the proper action in case of an
alleged preterition of a compulsory heir by reason of alleged bad faith or fraud of the other persons interested, which is what the complaint in this case alleges
in substance, is... indicated in Article 1104 of the Civil Code as follows: "Art. 1104. A partition made with preterition of any of the compulsory heirs shall
not be rescinded, unless it be proved that there was bad faith or fraud on the part of the other persons interested; x... x x."
It has also been ruled by this Court that the four years period provided in Article 1100 of the Civil Code (formerly Art. 1076 of the old Civil Code)
should commence to run from the approval of the agreement of partition by the Court (Samson vs. Araneta). Thus, in the case at bar, it is evident that the
action to rescind the Agreement of Partition which was approved by the Court on November 9, 1953, had already prescribed when respondent filed the
complaint in the case at bar on September 8, 1960.
While as a general rule the action for partition among co-owners does not prescribe so long as the co-ownership is expressly or impliedly recognized
(Art. 494, Civil Code), petitioners herein had never recognized respondent as a co-owner or co-heir either... expressly or impliedly. Consequently, the rule
on non-prescription of action for partition of property owned in common (Art. 494) does not apply to the case at bar. Respondent Alberto, Jr. who has a living
parent, his mother, Andrea Jongco, who in fact filed the complaint in the case at bar for him, falls squarely under the above-cited provision. Granting
arguendo that respondent is a natural child of the deceased Antonio Alberto, Sr., the action for recognition of natural child may be brought only during the
lifetime of the presumed parent. And if the presumed father or mother died during the minority of the child, the latter may file the action within four (4) years
from the attainment of majority (Art. 285 [1]). However, if the minor has a guardian as in this case, prescription runs against him... even during minority
(Wenzel, etc., et al. vs. Surigao Consolidated Mining, Inc., 108 Phil. 530 [1960]). In such case, the action for recognition must be instituted within four (4)
years after the death of the natural father (Magallanes, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 95 Phil. 795 [1954]). Antonio C. Alberto, Sr., the alleged father,
died on July 3, 1949. The complaint for acknowledgment and... partition was filed eleven (11) years later, on September 8, 1960. Hence, prescription had
set in.
Neither can it be claimed that the present action is in substance one for recovery of property in order to avoid the consequences of prescription, for as
correctly stated by the petitioners, to be entitled to the recovery of the property from the... estate. Alberto, Jr. must first rescind the partition and distribution
approved by the intestate proceedings, otherwise, the recovery of any property from the petitioners is not possible. Be that as it may, such... partition can no
longer be rescinded having been already barred by the Statute of Limitations. Furthermore, even granting that Article 1104 of the Civil Code does not apply
and there is an injury to the rights of plaintiff, this action would still not prosper under Articles 1146 and 1149 of the same Code which provide that the action
must be brought within four and five years, respectively, from the time the right of action accrues.

IV. The other explanation might have been the minority of Antonio Alberto, Jr. at the time of his supposed father's death. But such explanation as discussed
earlier is unavailing even in case of prescription under Article 1108 of... the Civil Code where minority does not stop the running of the prescriptive period for
minors who have parents, guardians or legal representatives. The record shows, however, that both admissions were correct, the first marriage was a secret
civil marriage celebrated in Pililla, Rizal while the second was a religious ratification of the former. The lack of... marriage certificate as evidence was also
considered by the Court of Appeals as an impairment of credibility despite a certification to the effect that all pre-war records in the Municipality of Pililla
Rizal were destroyed during the last... war. Said Appellate Court is of the view that if they did plan to marry secretly at that time, they could have chosen a
city or municipality near Manila and that Pililla must have been chosen as the place of the supposed marriage so that... petitioners could have an apparent
good reason for the non-presentation of the marriage certificate.

NUNAL vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 94005 April 6, 1993

FACTS: Sometime in December 1974, after trial and hearing, the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial court) rendered its judgment in favor of
private respondents and ordered the partition of the property of the late Frank C. Lyon and Mary Ekstrom Lyon. The order of partition was affirmed in toto by
the Court of Appeals in July 1982 then remanded to the lower court and two years later, a writ of execution was issued by the latter. On July 17, 1984, Mary
Lyon Martin, daughter of the late Frank C. Lyon and Mary Ekstrom Lyon, assisted by her counsel filed a motion to quash the order of execution with
preliminary injunction. In her motion, she contends that not being a party to the above-entitled case her rights, interests, ownership and participation over the
land should not be affected by a judgment in the said case; that the order of execution is unenforceable insofar as her share, right, ownership and participation
is concerned, said share not having been brought within the Jurisdiction of the court a quo. She further invokes Section 12, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court. On
January 1987, the lower court issued the assailed order directing the inclusion of Mary Lyon Martin as co-owner with a share in the partition of the property
The petitioner filed an appeal before the CA assailing the decision of the lower court whether or not the trial court may order the inclusion of Mary L. Martin
as co-heir entitled to participate in the partition of the property considering that she was neither a party plaintiff nor a party defendant in Civil Case No. 872
for partition and accounting of the aforesaid property and that the decision rendered in said case has long become final and executory.

ISSUE: Whether or not the proper remedy to enforce a right of an excluded heir to a final and executory judgment of partition is a motion to quash said
judgment?

HELD: The Court held in the negative. The Court said that when a final judgment becomes executory, it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. The
judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or
law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the Court rendering it or by the highest Court of land. The only recognized
exceptions are the correction of clerical errors or the making of so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, and, of course, where
the judgment is void." Furthermore, "any amendment or alteration which substantially affects a final and executory judgment is null and void for lack of
jurisdiction, including the entire proceedings held for that purpose."
In the case at bar, the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 872 has become final and executory. Thus, upon its finality, the trial judge lost his
jurisdiction over the case. Consequently, any modification that he would make, as in this case, the inclusion of Mary Lyon Martin would be in excess of his
authority. The remedy of Mary Lyon Martin is to file an independent suit against the parties in Civil Case No. 872 and all other heirs for her share in the
subject property, in order that all the parties in interest can prove their respective claims.

TEOFILO BAUTISTA, represented by FRANCISCO MUÑOZ, Attorney-in-Fact v. ALLEGRIA BAUTISTA, et al. (2007)

FACTS: Since the deed of extra-judicial partition is invalid, it confers no rights upon the transferees under the principle of nemo dat quod non habet. During
her lifetime, Teodora Rosario was the owner of a 211.80 square meter parcel of land (the property) in Pangasinan. She died intestate leaving the said property
behind to her spouse Isidro Bautista, and five children namely: Teofilo, Alegria, Angelica, Pacita, and Gil Bautista. Later on, Isidro and four of his five
children, Pacita, Gil, Alegria and Angelica (Teofilo not included), executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition of the property where Isidro waived his share in
favor of his four children.
Alegria and Angelica, sold the ½ of the property they have acquired to Pacita and her common-law husband Pedro Tandoc, by Deed of Absolute Sale.
Pacita, with Pedro‘s consent, later sold ½ of the property in favor of Cesar Tamondong, Pedro‘s nephew via Deed of Absolute Sale. Teofilo, represented by
his Attorney-in-Fact Francisco Muñoz, then filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court against his siblings claiming that his co-heirs defrauded him of his
rightful share of the property and that the Deed of Sale executed by Pacita in favor of Cesar was fictitiousbecause she was already seriously ill that time.
The RTC ruled in favor of Teofilo declaring null and void and no force and effect the documents mentioned. On appeal by Tandoc and Tamondong, the
Court of Appeals(CA) reversed the trial court‘s decision and dismissed Teofilo‘s complaint on the ground of prescription. The CA denied the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by Teofilo. Thus, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the extra-judicial partition executed by Teofilo Bautista‘s co-heirs is valid

HELD: The Court of Appeals applied the prescriptive periods for annulment on the ground of fraud and for reconveyance of property under a constructive
trust. The extra-judicial partition executed by Teofilo‘s co-heirs was invalid, however. As previously held by this Court in Segura v. Segura, ―no
extra-judicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof.‖ As the partition was a total nullity and
did not affect the excluded heirs, it was not correct for the trial court to hold that their right to challenge the partition had prescribed after two years.
The deed of extra-judicial partition in the case at bar being invalid, the action to have it annulled does not prescribe. Since the deed of extra-judicial partition
is invalid, it transmitted no rights to Teofilo‘s co-heirs. Consequently, the subsequent transfer by Angelica and Alegria of ½ of the property to Pacita and her
husband Pedro, as well as the transfer of ½ of the property to Cesar Tamondong is invalid, hence, conferring no rights upon the transferees under the principle
of nemo dat quod non habet.

MACABABBAD vs. MASIRAG G.R. NO. 161237 : January 14, 2009

FACTS: On April 28, 1999, respondents Fernando Masirag (Fernando), Faustina Masirag (Faustina), Corazon Masirag (Corazon), Leonor Masirag (Leonor)
and Leoncio Masirag Goyagoy (Leoncio) (collectively called the respondents), filed with the RTC a complaint[5] against Macababbad, Chua and Say.[6] On
May 10, 1999, they amended their complaint to allege new matters. The deceased spouses Pedro Masirag (Pedro) and Pantaleona Tulauan (Pantaleona) were
the original registered owners of Lot No. 4144 of the Cadastral Survey of Tuguegarao (Lot No. 4144), as evidenced by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No.
1946. Respondents Fernando, Faustina, Corazon and Leonor Masirag are the children of Valeriano and Alfora Goyagoy, while Leoncio is the son of Vicenta
and Braulio Goyagoy. The respondents allegedly did not know of the demise of their respective parents; they only learned of the inheritance due from their
parents in the first week of March 1999 when their relative, Pilar Quinto, informed respondent Fernando and his wife Barbara Balisi about it. They
immediately hired a lawyer to investigate the matter. The investigation disclosed that the petitioners falsified a document entitled Extra-judicial Settlement
with Simultaneous Sale of Portion of Registered Land (Lot 4144) dated December 3, 1967[12] (hereinafter referred to as the extrajudicial settlement of estate
and sale) so that the respondents were deprived of their shares in Lot No. 4144. The document purportedly bore the respondents signatures, making them
appear to have participated in the execution of the document when they did not; they did not even know the petitioners. The document ostensibly conveyed
the subject property to Macababbad for the sum of P1,800.00.[13] Subsequently, OCT No. 1946 was cancelled and Lot No. 4144 was registered in the names
of its new owners under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 13408,[14] presumably after the death of Pedro and Pantaleona. However, despite the
supposed sale to Macababbad, his name did not appear on the face of TCT No. 13408.[15] Despite his exclusion from TCT No. 13408, his Petition for
another owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 13408, filed in the Court of First Instance of Cagayan, was granted on July 27, 1982. Subsequently, Macababbad
registered portions of Lot No. 4144 in his name and sold other portions to third parties.[17]
On May 18, 1972, Chua filed a petition for the cancellation of TCT No. T-13408 and the issuance of a title evidencing his ownership over a subdivided
portion of Lot No. 4144 covering 803.50 square meters. On May 23, 1972, TCT No. T-18403 was issued in his name. The RTC, after initially denying the
motion to dismiss, reconsidered its ruling and dismissed the complaint in its Order[19] dated May 29, 2000 on the grounds that: 1) the action, which was filed
32 years after the property was partitioned and after a portion was sold to Macababbad, had already prescribed; and 2) there was failure to implead
indispensable parties, namely, the other heirs of Pedro and Pantaleona and the persons who have already acquired title to portions of the subject property in
good faith. The petitioners moved to dismiss the appeal primarily on the ground that the errors the respondents raised involved pure questions of law that
should be brought before the Supreme Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The respondents insisted that their
appeal involved mixed questions of fact and law and thus fell within the purview of the CAs appellate jurisdiction. The appellate court reversed and set aside
the RTCs dismissal of the complaint
ISSUE: WON CA erred in reversing the RTC decision?
HELD: A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as
to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.[34] A question of law may be resolved by the court without reviewing or evaluating the evidence.[35] No
examination of the probative value of the evidence would be necessary to resolve a question of law.[36] The opposite is true with respect to questions of fact,
which necessitate a calibration of the evidence. The nature of the issues to be raised on appeal can be gleaned from the appellants notice of appeal filed in the
trial court and in his or her brief as appellant in the appellate court.[38] In their Notice of Appeal, the respondents manifested their intention to appeal the
assailed RTC order on legal grounds and on the basis of the environmental facts.[39] Further, in their Brief, the petitioners argued that the RTC erred in ruling
that their cause of action had prescribed and that they had slept on their rights.[40] All these indicate that questions of facts were involved, or were at least
raised, in the respondents appeal with the CA.
Since the appeal raised mixed questions of fact and law, no error can be imputed on the respondents for invoking the appellate jurisdiction of the CA
through an ordinary appeal. (1) ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error, where judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal action by the RTC in the
exercise of original jurisdiction, covered by Rule 41; (2) petition for review, where judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction,
covered by Rule 42; and (3) petition for review to the Supreme Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The first mode of appeal is taken to the CA on
questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. The second mode of appeal is brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact
and law. The third mode of appeal is elevated to the Supreme Court only on questions of law.
A ruling on prescription necessarily requires an analysis of the plaintiffs cause of action based on the allegations of the complaint and the documents
attached as its integral parts. A motion to dismiss based on prescription hypothetically admits the allegations relevant and material to the resolution of this
issue, but not the other facts of the case.
Dismissal based on laches cannot also apply in this case, as it has never reached the presentation of evidence stage and what the RTC had for its
consideration were merely the parties pleadings. Laches is evidentiary in nature and cannot be established by mere allegations in the pleadings.[49] Without
solid evidentiary basis, laches cannot be a valid ground to dismiss the respondents complaint. When a party is left out is to implead the indispensable party at
any stage of the action. The court, either motu proprio or upon the motion of a party, may order the inclusion of the indispensable party or give the plaintiff
opportunity to amend his complaint in order to include indispensable parties. If the plaintiff to whom the order to include the indispensable party is directed
refuses to comply with the order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court's own motion.[51] Only upon
unjustified failure or refusal to obey the order to include or to amend is the action dismissed. In an action for reconveyance, all the owners of the property
sought to be recovered are indispensable parties. Thus, if reconveyance were the only relief prayed for, impleading petitioners Macababbad and the spouses
Chua and Say would suffice. On the other hand, under the claim that the action is for the declaration of the nullity of extrajudicial settlement of estate and sale,
all of the parties who executed the same should be impleaded for a complete resolution of the case. This case, however, is not without its twist on the issue of
impleading indispensable parties as the RTC never issued an order directing their inclusion. Under this legal situation, particularly in light of Rule 3, Section
11 of the Rules of Court, there can be no basis for the immediate dismissal of the action.
MARIA ELENA RODRIGUEZ PEDROSA vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 118680 March 5, 2001

FACTS: Maria Elena Rodriguez Pedrosa, petitioner herein, is the adopted child of Spouses Miguel and Rosalina Rodriguez. Miguel died intestate, and then
petitioner and Rosalina entered into an extrajudicial settlement of Miguel’s estate. Private respondents filed an action to annul the adoption of petitioner
before the CFI of Ozamis City, which the latter denied and upheld the validity of adoption. Respondents appealed to the CA, and on March 11, 1983, while
the said appeal was pending, the Rodriguezes, private repondents herein, entered into an extrajudicial settlement with Rosalina for the partition of the estate of
Miguel. Through the deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition, the Rodriguezes were able to secure TCT and were able to transfer some parcels of land
to the other respondents herein. CA upheld CFI’s decision.
On January 28, 1987, petitioner filed a complaint to annul the partition made by Rodriguezes before the RTC but the latter dismissed the complaint.
Petitioner then appealed to the CA, but the latter affirmed RTC’s decision. One of CA’s grounds is that the participation of Rosalina has already estopped her
from questioning the validity of the partition. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WON the complaint for annulment of the "Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition" had already prescribed.

DECISION: NO. Section 4, Rule 74 provides for a two year prescriptive period (1) to persons who have participated or taken part or had notice of the
extrajudicial partition, and in addition (2) when the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74 have been strictly complied with, i.e., that all the persons or heirs of the
decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial settlement or are represented by themselves or through guardians.
Petitioner, as the records confirm, did not participate in the extrajudicial partition. Patently then, the two-year prescriptive period is not applicable in
her case. The applicable prescriptive period here is four (4) years as provided in Gerona vs. De Guzman, 11 SCRA 153 (1964), which held that: “[The action
to annul] a deed of "extrajudicial settlement" upon the ground of fraud...may be filed within four years from the discovery of the fraud. Such discovery is
deemed to have taken place when said instrument was filed with the Register of Deeds and new certificates of title were issued in the name of respondents
exclusively.”
Considering that the complaint of the petitioner was filed on January 28, 1987, or three years and ten months after the questioned extrajudicial
settlement dated March 11, 1983, was executed, we hold that her action against the respondents on the basis of fraud has not yet prescribed. Section 1 of Rule
74 of the Rules of Court is the applicable rule on publication of extrajudicial settlement. It states: The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration
shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided in the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding
upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof.
Under said provision, without the participation of all persons involved in the proceedings, the extrajudicial settlement cannot be binding on said
persons. The rule contemplates a notice which must be sent out or issued before the Deed of Settlement and/or Partition is agreed upon, i.e., a notice calling
all interested parties to participate in the said deed of extrajudicial settlement and partition, not after, which was when publication was done in the instant case.
Following Rule 74 and the ruling in Beltran vs. Ayson, since Maria Elena did not participate in the said partition, the settlement is not binding on her. ***

SPOUSES DOMINGO v. ROCES G.R. No.147468April 9, 2003

DOCTRINE: The annotation at the title of a property pursuant to Rule 74, Sec. 4 is not confined to the heirs or original distributes of the estate properties.

Facts: Cesar and Lilia Roces were owners of two contiguous parcels of land. In 1962, the GSIS caused the annotation of an adverse claim on their titles,
alleging that the spouses had mortgaged the same to it. Later on, when the titles were to be surrendered to GSIS, the spouses failed to do so, and the GSIS had
such title duplicates in their possession declared null and void. Cesar Roces died intestate. He was survived by his widow and their children.
In 1992, a certain Reynaldo Montinola, a nephew of Lilia Roces, executed an affidavit of self-adjudication over the subject properties. A year later, he
filed a petition against GSIS for the cancellation of the title which was in the possession of GSIS. GSIS lost the case, and it’s titles were cancelled, and
ownership awarded to Montinola. Later in the same year, Montinola sold the property in favor of the Petitioners, the Domingo Spouses. Such sale was subject
to the provision of Section 4 of Rule 74: “Subject to the provision of Sec. 4, Rule 74 of the RoC with respect to the inheritance left by the deceased Sps. Cesar
Roces and Lilia Montinola”.
Now came the Defendants Roces siblings. They alleged that the affidavit of selfadjudication Montinola executed was null and void for Lilia Roces was
not even dead. Because of this, the sale of the property was done without authority, and therefore null and void as well. But the Domingo Spouses, the buyers,
contended that despite the annotation of the provision of Rule 74, they were buyers in good faith, and by that very fact, in addition to the siblings’ being in
estoppel and guilty of laches, the sale was valid.

Issue: Could the sale have been valid, in light of a fact that the Spouses Domingo were not covered by the Rule 74 annotation? (AKA: Were the spouses
buyers in good faith? Were the respondents guilty of laches and estoppel?

Held: Rule 74 clearly covers transfers of real property to any person. Contrary to petitioner's’ contention, the effects of this provision are not confined to the
heirs or original distributes of the estate properties; As the provision provides, such effects affect any transferee of the property. There is no doubt the Spouses
Domingo were covered by ―any transferee. Therefore, buyers of real property the title of which contains an annotation pursuant to Section 4, Rule 74 cannot
be considered innocent purchasers for value; The presence of an irregularity in the title which excites or arouses suspicion should prompt the buyer to look
beyond the certificate and investigate the title of the vendor; This the spouses did not do, and hence cannot at all be considered buyers in good faith.As to the
claim that the respondents were guilty of laches and estoppel, it is untenable.
Estoppel by laches arises from the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to
assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
In the case at bar, only four months elapsed from the time respondents discovered Montinolas fraudulent acts, sometime in May 1993, to the time they
filed their complaint on September 6, 1993. This relatively short span of time can hardly be called unreasonable, especially considering that respondents used
this period of time to investigate the transfers of the property