Interpretation of statues

Doctrine of Harmonious Construction

H. Mohamed Abdul Raaziq
BC0150015
It is a sound canon of interpretation that courts must try to avoid a conflict between the
provisions of Statute. The rule of reconciliation on the Entries was propounded for the
first time in the case of in re C.P. and Bera Act. 1 It is the province of the courts to
determine the extent of the authority to deal with subjects falling within the legislative
purview of each legislature. To avoid conflict, the Courts should read Entries of two Lists
together and the language of one Entry can be interpreted, and modified too, with the
help of another Entry. Interpreting Entries 24 and 25 of the State List harmoniously, the
Supreme Court held that ‘gas and gas works’ being in Entry 25 would not fall in the
general Entry 24’Industry’ and observed:2
It is also well settled that widest amplitude should be given to the language of Entries but
some of the entries in the different Lists…may overlap and sometimes may also appear to
be in direct conflict with each other, it is then duty of this court to reconcile the entries
and bring about harmony between them. In this way it may, in most cases, be found
possible to arrive at a reasonable and practical construction of the language of the
sections, so as to reconcile the respective powers they contain and to give effect to all of
them.
In Tika Ramji v. State of Uttar Pradesh,3 the position of the industries was clarified by
Supreme Court. In the instant case the vires of U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and
Purchase) Act, 1953 was involved. It was contended that sugarcane being ‘controlled’
industry fall within the jurisdiction of the Union List by virtue of Entry 52 of List I falls
within the legislative purview of Parliament. The Supreme Court, therefore, had to
explain the Inter-relation between Entries 52 of List I, 24 and 27 of List II and 33 of List
III. Entry 24 of List II and 52 of List I establish that except ‘controlled’ industries, the
industries generally fells within the State Sphere. Entry 27 of List II gives power to State
to regulate the production, supply and distribution of ‘goods’ subject to provisions of
1
AIR 1939 FC 1
2
Calcutta Gas Co. v. State of W.B., AIR 1962 SC 1044
3
AIR 1956 SC 676
Entry 33 of List III. The sugar industry being controlled industry, the distribution, supply
and production of the product of this controlled industry viz. Sugar as a finished product,
would fall within the legislative jurisdiction of the both Central and State Legislature by
virtue of Entry 33of list III. But, by virtue of Entry 27 of List II, the sugarcane would be
within the State’s jurisdiction because sugarcane can be regarded as raw material for
sugar industry. Dealing of sugarcane under the term ‘goods’ in Entry 27 of List II, by the
U.P. Act Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1953, was held valid.

The position of industries after the Tika Ramji case may be explained as follows:
as regards the industries falling with the State Spheres the State have a comprehensive
regularity power covering all aspects of any such Industry. The States can regulate raw
materials for such industries under Entry 27, List II as ‘goods’ and also the finished
products of the same. As regard the centrally controlled industries, the process of
manufacture falls within the Central domain under Entry 52, List I; control over finished
products of these industries also falls under Central jurisdiction under Entry 22 in List III.
As regards the raw materials of these industries power lies mainly with the States under
Entry 27, List II, except in so far as the commodities specified in Entry 33, List III, which
the Centre may regulate. Regulatory power regarding centrally controlled industry would
thus appear to be somewhat fragmented in so far as some raw materials pertaining to
these industries may fall outside the Centre State co-ordination. Failure by a State to
ensure adequate supply of raw materials to an industry may hamper the same and the
Centre may be unable to take any corrective measures.
The Gujrat University4 case was quoted with approval by the Supreme Court in D.A.V.
College, Bhatinda V. State of Punjab. 5 In this case the Supreme Court struck down the
provisions of the Punjab University Act, 1961, prescribing Punjabi as the sole medium of
instruction on the ground that this aspect of education is covered under Entry 66, List I,
therefore the State was not competent to legislate in respect of medium of instruction in
the colleges and universities imparting higher education.

4
AIR 1963 SC 703
5
(1971) 2 SCC 261
 The rationale of Gujrat University case appears to have been limited by the
Supreme Court in Chitralekha v. State of Mysore. 6 The question before the Court was
whether prescribing of higher percentage of marks for extracurricular activities for
admission to medical and engineering colleges lowered the standard of the education and
affected the power of the Centre under Entry 66, List I. It was ruled by the Supreme
Court that if the impact of the State law is so heavy or devastating as to wipe out or
appreciably abridge the Centre field, it might be struck down. But it could not be decided
on speculative or hypothetical reasoning: that was a question of fact to be ascertained in
each case. It is not possible to hold that if a State legislature made a law prescribing
higher percentage of marks for extra curricular activities in the matter of admission to
colleges, it would be directly encroaching on the field covered by Entry 66 of List I.
The rule of avoidance between the two Entries in the two Lists is also applicable
in case of a conflict between two Entries in the Same List. Entry 3, List II of the
Constitution relates to ‘Administration of Justice, Constitution of Courts, while Entry 65
deals with jurisdiction and powers of…Courts’. The Supreme Court had an opportunity
to interpret these two entries in State of Bombay v. Narottam Das Jethabhai. 7 The
Supreme Court read the two Entries together and held that while Entry 3 of List II
conferred power on the State Legislature to provide general jurisdictions to court, Entry
65 conferred the special jurisdiction with regard to the matters included in List II, while
enacting a law in respect of those matters. To put in another words, the words
“Administration of Justice, Constitution of Courts must be construed restrictively
excluding from their scope ‘jurisdiction and powers of courts.’ The harmonious
construction prevents Entry 65, List II from being futile and meaningless.

6
AIR 1964 SC 1823
7
AIR 1951 SC 69