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Dr. RAM MANOHAR LOHIYA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY

History

Project

On

Role of Muslim League in struggle for freedom

Submitted to Submitted by

Dr. Vandana Singh Adhipatya Singh

Asstt. Prof. (History) Enrollment no. 180101007
Ist Year (IInd Semester)
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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that the project work entitled “Role of Muslim League in struggle for
freedom” submitted to the Dr. Ram Manohar Lohiya National Law University, Lucknow is a
record ofan original work done by me under the guidance of Dr. Vandana Singh, Assistant
Professor (History), Dr. Ram Manohar Lohiya National Law University and this project work
issubmitted in the partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree of
B.A.LLB. (hons). The results embodied in this thesis have not been submitted to any other
University or Institute for the award of any degree or diploma.
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Index

Contents
DECLARATION .................................................................................................................................... 2
Index........................................................................................................................................................ 3
Historical backdrop of muslim struggle and problems in the early phase ............................................. 5
After 1858, Muslims perceived India as darulharb(abode of war) and quite a few of them continued
the armed resistance. ............................................................................................................................... 5
Formation of the league ......................................................................................................................... 6
Reasons for the formation of the league ................................................................................................ 7
Demand for separate electorates in the imperial council ...................................................................... 9
Khilafat movement and the partnership ................................................................................................ 11
Communalism grows ............................................................................................................................ 13
Consolidation of the league in 1937 ..................................................................................................... 14
Quit India movement and Jinaah .......................................................................................................... 19
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Acknowledgement

I express my gratitude and deep regards to my teacher for the subject DR. Vandana Singh for
giving me such a challenging topic and also for her exemplary guidance, monitoring and
constant encouragement throughout the course of this thesis.

I would also like to thank the librarians of Dr. Madhu Limaye Library who extended their
assistance to me by helping me out consult the relevant books and provided me with research
material and good books to work upon and the distinguished authors, jurists and journals for
providing in the public domain such invaluable information. I also thank all of my friends and
seniors who aided me along the way.

Lastly, I thank almighty, my family and friends for their constant encouragement without
which this assignment would not have been possible.

I know that despite my best efforts some discrepancies might have crept in which I believe
my humble Professor would forgive.

Thanking You All.

Adhipatya Singh.
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Historical backdrop of Muslim struggle and problems in the early

phase

After 1858, Muslims perceived India as darulharb(abode of war) and quite a few of them
continued the armed resistance.1 Gradually all their isolated pocket of resistance within
British India were eliminated, and their remnants were either exiled to the Andaman Islands
or they themselves migrated to other Muslim lands or moved to sanctuaries in the North est
Frontier, the tribal areas or stayed within India but devoting their energies to religious
education of the Muslims and avoiding direct contact with the British. The overwhelming
majority of the Muslims accepted the British dominance and regarded India as darul Islam
( the adobe of peace ) as there were no restrictions on them to practice the basic tenants of
Islam. The British looked upon any untoward political move on their part with suspicion.
They also faced a challenge to their religious identity and survival from the onslaught of the
Christian, and Hindu revivalist, missionaries whose target was often Prophet Mohammad and
Islam. They published scurlious literature like Sir William’s The life of Mahomet (1858) and
Swami Dayanand’s (1824-1883) Satyarth Prakash (1875) which deeply hurt muslim
sentiments.

1
M. Naeem Qureshi, Pan-Islam in British India:The politics of the Khilafat Movement,1918-1924, Karachi, 2008
(Rev. ed.) pp. 8-9
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Formation of the league

The majority Muslim leadership such as Sir Syed Ahmed Khan and Syed Amir Ali constantly
rejected the notion that India’s ‘two distinct communities’ can be represented by the
Congress.

In 1886, Sir Syed founded the Muhammadan Educational Conference, but a self-imposed ban
prevented it from discussing politics. Its original goal was to advocate for British education,
especially science and literature, among India's Muslims. The conference, in addition to
generating funds for Sir Syed's Aligarh Muslim University, motivated the Muslim upper class
to propose an expansion of educational uplift elsewhere, known as the Aligarh Movement. In
turn, this new awareness of Muslim needs helped stimulate a political consciousness among
Muslim elites.

The formation of a Muslim political party on the national level was seen as essential by 1901.
The first stage of its formation was the meeting held at Lucknow in September 1906, with the
participation of representatives from all over India. The decision for re-consideration to form
the all-Indian Muslim political party was taken and further proceedings were adjourned until
the next meeting of the All India Muhammadan Educational Conference. The Simla
Deputation reconsidered the issue in October 1906 and decided to frame the objectives of the
party on the occasion of the annual meeting of the Educational Conference, which was
scheduled to be held in Dhaka. Meanwhile, Nawab Salimullah Khan published a detailed
scheme through which he suggested the party to be named All-India Muslim Confederacy.

Pursuant upon the decisions taken earlier at the Lucknow meeting and later in Simla, the
annual meeting of the All-India Muhammadan Educational Conference was held in Dhaka
from 27 December until 30 December 1906. Three thousand delegates attended, headed by
both Nawab Waqar-ul-Mulk and Nawab Muhasan-ul-Mulk (the Secretary of the
Muhammaden Educational Conference), in which they explained its objectives and stressed
the unity of Muslims under the banner of an association.[9] It was formally proposed
by Nawab Salimullah Khan and supported by Hakim Ajmal Khan, Maulana Muhammad Ali
Jauhar, Zafar Ali Khan, Syed Nabiullah, a barrister from Lucknow, and Syed Zahur Ahmad,
an eminent lawyer, as well as several others.
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Reasons for the formation of the league

Loss of Sovereignty by Mughal Rulers - The British established their absolute rule over the
Indian peninsula when they dethroned the Mughal rulers. Since the Mughal throne had a
symbolic importance and emotional value for common Muslims in India it was seen as an
attack on Muslim identity itself. As a result, Muslims became bitter critics of British rule and
vigorously participated in the 1857 rebellion. The British in response persecuted Muslims
after quelling the rebellion. However, after 1870 there was a sea change in their attitude as
there was a realisation that dividing Hindus and Muslims was necessary in order to quell the
rising tide of nationalism. As a result, the colonial government adopted a policy of
appeasement towards the Muslims and encouraged them to form their own political
associations.
British Policy of Divide and Rule - In order to maintain their hold over India, the British
government began to follow their infamous policy of ‘Divide and Rule’. In 1871, the
government adopted a resolution which made Urdu the medium of instruction for Muslims in
primary and secondary schools and increased the government aid to Muslim education
institutions. Muslim rulers were portrayed as plunderers and Hindu rulers as cruel to their
Muslim subjects. The partition of Bengal was also publicized as a move in the interest of
Muslims. Caste and religion Faultline were magnified on purpose through the Press, posters,
literature, etc, and communal leaders were accepted as authentic representatives of their
communities.
Relative Backwardness of Muslim Community - The communal and separatist trend of
thinking grew among the Muslims because of their then relative backwardness in education,
trade and industry. Because of the hostility of upper class Muslim zamindars and aristocrats
towards the British, Muslim largely remained aloof from modern western education. Since
the British also regarded them as responsible for the 1857 rebellion, they were discriminated
against. Muslims were not very involved in the growth of any organised industry and didn’t
take advantage of western education to enter government services. As a result, they did not
get influenced with liberalism as the Hindus of that time did.
Conjectured negligence of Muslims by Congress leaders- People like M. A. Jinnah thought
that they are getting no attention from the congress leadership and their ideas are not being
incorporated which according to him were Muslim interest but the question or the doubt that
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remains was that this move was only for promotion of muslim interest or this was a move
only for personal political benefits?
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Demand for separate electorates in the imperial council

The Muslim League's insistence on separate electorates and reserved seats in the Imperial
Council were granted in the Indian Councils Act after the League held protests in India and
lobbied London.2

The draft proposals for the reforms communicated on 1 October 1908 provided Muslims with
reserved seats in all councils, with nomination only being maintained in Punjab. The
communication displayed how much the Government had accommodated Muslim
demands 3 and showed an increase in Muslim representation in the Imperial and provincial
legislatures.4But the Muslim League's demands were only fully met in UP and Madras.
However, the Government did accept the idea of separate electorates. The idea had not been
accepted by the Secretary of State, who proposed mixed electoral colleges, causing the
Muslim League to agitate and the Muslim press to protest what they perceived to be a
betrayal of the Viceroy's assurance to the Simla deputation.5

On 23 February Morley told the House of Lords that Muslims demanded separate
representation and accepted them. This was the League's first victory. But the Indian
Councils Bill did not fully satisfy the demands of the Muslim League. It was based on the
October 1908 communique in which Muslims were only given a few reserved seats. The
Muslim League's London branch opposed the bill and in a debate obtained the support of
several parliamentarians. In 1909 the members of the Muslim League organised a Muslim
protest. The Reforms Committee of Minto's council believed that Muslims had a point and
advised Minto to discuss with some Muslim leaders. The Government offered a few more
seats to Muslims in compromise but would not agree to fully satisfy the League's demand.

Minto believed that the Muslims had been given enough while Morley was still not certain
because of the pressure Muslims could apply on the government. The Muslim League's
central committee once again demanded separate electorates and more representation on 12
September 1909. While Minto was opposed, Morley feared that the Bill would not pass

2
Ian Talbot; Gurharpal Singh (23 July 2009). The Partition of India. Cambridge University Press.
p. 30. ISBN 978-0-521-85661-4.
3
Francis Robinson (1974). Separatism Among Indian Muslims: The Politics of the United Provinces' Muslims,
1860-1923. Cambridge University Press. p. 153. ISBN 978-0-521-04826-2.
4
Francis Robinson (1974). Separatism Among Indian Muslims: The Politics of the United Provinces' Muslims,
1860-1923. Cambridge University Press. p. 153–154. ISBN 978-0-521-04826-2.
5
"Establishment of All India Muslim League". Story of Pakistan. June 2003. p. 2. Retrieved 11 May 2007.
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parliament without the League's support and he once again discussed Muslim representation
with the League leadership. 6 This was successful. The Aga Khan compromised so that
Muslims would have two more reserved seats in the Imperial Council. The Muslim League
hesitantly accepted the compromise.

6
Francis Robinson (1974). Separatism Among Indian Muslims: The Politics of the United Provinces' Muslims,
1860-1923. Cambridge University Press. p. 153–154. ISBN 978-0-521-04826-2
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Khilafat movement and the partnership

The Indian political scenario further provided the common platform to both the communities.
Hindus and Muslims in particular and the others in general, to come together and fight
against the British imperialism. Already the national leaders like Annie Besant, M.A.Jinnah,
MazharulHaq, Raja ofMahamudabad, Wazir Hasan, Sarojini Naidu, Tilak, etc. were
attempting for a rapprochement between the Hindus and the Muslims and to erase the
differences between the National Congress and the League. The environment suited them
best and the leaders of Muslim League and National Congress signed an agreement at the
Lucknow session of the Congress in December 1916. Separate electorates was accepted by
Congress and an agreement was reached as to the distribution ofseats for the communities by
which the Muslims got a weightage in the provinces where they constituted a minority, but
abandoned their majority in Bengal and Punjab. Moreover, they also gave up their right to
vote in the general electorates. Thus, concessions were made by both, but the Muslims got the
best ofit. Coupland argued that it was mainlythe Muslims who were shy of adopting a
responsible government on the British parliamentary pattern, because in such a case they
could becrushed by the Hindu majority. Even Tilak and Gokhale reconciled and supported
the plan. Raja of Mahmudabad who presided over the Calcutta session of the Muslim League
spoke thus: “The interests ofthe country are paramount. We need not try to argue whether we
are Muslims first or Indians. The fact is we are both; to us the question of precedence has no
meaning. The League has inculcated among the Muslims a spirit of sacrifice for their country
as their own religion.” Mohammed Ali Jinnah explained that the understanding between the
two would give them a chance to come together and take a decision on the future policies of
India. Appreciating the role played by Jinnah in the Lucknow pact, Mohammed Ali wrote to
Moulvi Abdullah Ahmed “We will not lose by conferring with the Hindus...” This pact was
like dream come true for Maulana Azad who had been insisting on “the cooperation between
the two communities.” He believed “For the Hindus patriotism might be a secular obligation,
but for the Muslims it was a religious duty.” Emphasizing on the ‘Hizbullah Party’ (Party
ofthe God), L.RajmohanGandhi;believesThat‘ Maulana Azad planned “to enlist and organise
a body of dedicated Muslims, make an agreement with the Hindus, and launch a joint
struggle against the British.”7But this attempt was not successful because the ulemas opposed
him believing that political involvement might make Muslims neglectful of their prayers and

7
Sumit Sarkar (1989) [First published 1983]. Modern India: 1885–1947. Macmillan. p. 233. ISBN 978-0-333-
43805-3.
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bring them into “contact with unveiled non-Muslim women, which might create
cnsomefitnah (temptation).Many important Muslim leaders esteemed Lucknow agreement. In
September 1917, M.A.Ansari addressed a Provincial Congress meeting at Lucknow and
spoke on self-government and passive resistance and called for its immediate adoption.58 In
December 1918, he was invited to chair the reception committee ofthe Muslim League
session held in Delhi. In this, he admitted that the Holy places were going out of the hands of
the Muslims sovereign and blamed the English.59 He called for a bold and emphatic action of
ra passive resistance which impressed everybody including Gandhi. Abdul Majid Khwaja,
Syed Hasan Imam, Mr. AsafAli and many others echoed the same sentiments.
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Communalism grows

Politically, there was a degree of unity between Muslim and Hindu leaders after World War I,
as typified by the Khilafat Movement. Relationships cooled sharply after that campaign
ended in 1922. Communalism grew rapidly, forcing the two groups apart.8 Major riots broke
out in numerous cities, including 91 between 1923 and 1927 in Uttar Pradesh alone. At the
leadership level, the proportion of Muslims among delegates to the Congress party fell
sharply, from 11% in 1921 to under 4% in 1923.9

Muhammad Ali Jinnah became disillusioned with politics after the failure of his attempt to
form a Hindu-Muslim alliance, and he spent most of the 1920s in Britain. The leadership of
the League was taken over by Sir Muhammad Iqbal, who in 1930 first put forward the
demand for a separate Muslim state in India. The "Two-Nation Theory", the belief that
Hindus and Muslims were two different nations who could not live in one country, gained
popularity among Muslims. The two-state solution was rejected by the Congress leaders, who
favoured a united India based on composite national identity. Congress at all times rejected
"communalism" — that is, basing politics on religious identity. Iqbal's policy of uniting the
North-West Frontier Province, Baluchistan, Punjab, and Sindh into a new Muslim majority
state became part of the League's political platform.

The League rejected the Committee report (the Nehru Report), arguing that it gave too little
representation (only one quarter) to Muslims, established Devanagari as the official writing
system of the colony, and demanded that India turn into a de facto unitary state, with
residuary powers resting at the centre – the League had demanded at least one-third
representation in the legislature and sizeable autonomy for the Muslim provinces. Jinnah
reported a "parting of the ways" after his requests for minor amendments to the proposal were
denied outright, and relations between the Congress and the League began to sour.10

8
Markovits, Claude, ed. (2004) [First published 1994 as Histoire de l'IndeModerne]. A History of Modern India,
1480–1950. London: Anthem Press. pp. 371–372. ISBN 978-1-84331-004-4.
9
Brown, Judith M. (1985). Modern India: The Origins of an Asian Democracy. Oxford University Press.
p. 228. ISBN 978-0-19-913124-2.
10
P. M. Holt; Peter Malcolm Holt; Ann K. S. Lambton (1977). The Cambridge History of Islam. Cambridge
University Press. p. 103ff. ISBN 978-0-521-29137-8.
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Consolidation of the league in 1937

The end of 1937 began to offer glimpses ofthe possible consolidation of Muslim League in
UP. To be more precise it was the Lucknow session of Muslim League held in October 1937
that initiated a phase of political strengthening for League, even though there were significant
overlaps between the phases of crises and of consolidation. The Lucknow session was a
landmark in Muslim League politics because it facilitated a coming together of different
groups within Muslim League and diverse strands in Muslim communal politics under the
umbrella of Muslim League. It was also at the Lucknow session that the agenda of the
League was articulated fairly sharply. The session was referred to as the "opening of another
glorious chapter of Muslim history in India" by Star of India, a newspaper from Calcutta
which functioned as a spokesman of 'Muslim viewpoint' in politics. Haig called it a
declaration of war against Congress and the Pioneer accused Jinnah of leading his community
back to the barren fields of isolation. There was much about the Lucknow session which
signified a definite consolidation for Muslim League. In a nutshell it was at the Lucknow
session that League took a decisive leap forward in two directions - anti-imperialism and
anti.11 "Muslim opinion seemed to me very uncertain at the moment and irritable. The
(Lucknow) Conference discharged its irritation in full measure against the Congress .... But
the sense of uncertainty has for the time being at any rate been removed, for the Muslims
have now been given a very strong and definite communal lead which seems to have inspired
a great enthusiasm, and will obviously have a most important bearing on political
developments in the near future. War has been declared unmistakably between the Congress
and the Muslim League."12 The Pioneer asks if Mr. Jinnah is not leading his community back
to the barren fields of isolation. If we might answer, we would not say " barren field" but to
the fortress of security under the crescent and the star." The two strands were linked together
through communalism, that is to say, both were motivated and fostered essentially by
communalism. This meant that the Lucknow session set in motion the process of Muslim
League transforming itself into a definite, uncompromising, communal organization. All
these were to have implications in the years to follow. 3.2.1 Overcoming Dissensions This
consolidation occurred at many levels. First, there was a tiding over of internal dissensions.
As has been pointed out earlier, in spite of the best efforts of Jinnah to achieve unity in the
ranks, Muslim League remained divided among broadly three strands which could be

11
Star of India, 18 October 193 7.
12
Haig to Linlithgow, 24 October 1937, IE, p. 1069.
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identified as loyalist, exclusivist and anti-imperialist. Although the three had agreed to come
together under the League umbrella, each refused to merge its identity into the other. Each
strand was also working towards transforming Muslim League in its own direction. It may
seem like making an obvious point but should nonetheless be highlighted that the two ideas -
of anti-imperialism and anti-Congressism - did not spring overnight or were created by the
leaderof the Lucknow session. Expressions of both variety had been simmering among
Muslims both within and outside League. The political pressure being exerted on League
leadership to take a clearly anti-imperialist stance have been noted earlier. But forces against
Congress were also very active. An appeal made by the Mopla leaders to the voters of Jhansi
during the bye-election held in July before Congress accepted office, makes interesting
reading: "Congress out to destroy Islam .... Brethren of Jhansi! Awake and do your duty by
Islam. All India is watching your efforts. We, 15 Lakh of Muslims of Malabar, in whose
veins courses the blood of the pioneers of Islam from Arabia, pray to success of your fight
against the ruthless forces which are out to divide and destroy, the house of Islam which has
the proud heritage of 15 countries. May Allah crown your fight against such an enemy with
overwhelming success! Amen!". Similarly, the editorial of the Star of India commented on
the Congress decision to form the government: "the Congress is now in government in a
majority of Indian provinces and in each of them the Muslims are in the unhappy position of
compulsory dependence on the mercies of men who, their much talked of idealism not
withstanding, have never looked with sympathy on Muslim aspirations. The fate of those
Muslim minorities now and henceforth will be in the keeping of some who have been open,
of others who have been clever enough to shield their anti-Muslim proclivities under a flow
of sugary words, and of a few others who may truly and honestly see no difference between
the interests of the Muslims as a community and those of the Hindus.". The loyalists, mainly
landlords, some of whom (like Chhatari and Yusuf) had temporarily abandoned Muslim
League before the elections and had received a setback afterwards, were now trying to
explore ways of either returning to the League fold or trying to forge ties with it. The
exclusivists, or the followers of Jinnah (like ZahirulHusnainLari) were trying to push Muslim
League ahead as a communal organization without coming close either to Congress or British
government, wanting to remain more or less equidistant from both. The third group - anti-
imperialists - consisted of Congress sympathizers such as Wazir Hasan, Suleman Ansari, Ali
Zaheer, Khaliquzzaman and Nawab Ismail Khan on the one hand and anti-Congress Leaguers
like Shaukat Ali and Maulana HasratMohani on the other. They were also called the 'left
wingers' within Muslim League. This strand had expressed dissatisfaction with the slogan of
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'full responsible government' and had favoured the adoption of a sharper and more
unambiguous expression of anti-imperialism. Some of them also worked towards cooperation
with Congress. When that did not come about, most of Congress sympathizers - except
Khaliquzzaman and Ismail Khan - joined Congress, thereby weakening this strand within
Muslim League. Jinnah h~d resisted the change in the creed of Muslim League, but Lucknow
provided an opportunity for the convergence of these various strands. Creed of League was,
therefore, changed to 'full independence' at the Lucknow session. This must have pleased
those desirous of independence. Moving the resolution, HasratMohani explained that the new
creed of Muslim League was 'full independence' and not 'complete independence' (as in the
Congress resolution at Lahore in 1929) because "its interpretation by the Congress had made
it meaningless."50 The independence resolution 50 25th session of AIML at LucJmow, 15-18
October 1937, in Pirzada (ed.), Foundation of Pakistan, Vol. 2, p. 274. 138 also contained a
clause regarding safeguarding the rights and 'interests' of Muslims. This, explained
HasratMohani, had been done to satisfy the moderates. It was for the same reason that there
had been no reference to the severance of the British connection. "It was possible within the
terms of the resolution to remain within the British fold, if necessary."51 Anti-imperialists
and moderates were not the only ones to be pleased. Chhatari expressed satisfaction at the
new turn that Muslim League had taken and promised support: ''I can assure the Muslim
public that every member of the Independent Partf2 wholeheartedly agrees with and supports
the policy and programme of the League."53 Why did the loyalist landlords feel so agreeable
towards the change in Muslim League in an anti-British direction? Perhaps it was the
clarification made by HasratMohani regarding the possibility of achieving independence
within the British fold. Or, more likely, it was their perception that they desperately needed
the support of Muslim League as an ally in the Legislative Assembly against the Congress
government. Congress had already threatened to implement their agrarian programme.
Muslim League's anti-imperialism could, therefore, be put up with so long as it did not bring
League closer to Congress. The manner in which the Lucknow session proceeded must have
been reassuring to Chhatari as it completely ruled out any proximity developing between
League and Congress. Indeed if there was one theme which dominated the session, it was that
of antiCongressism. A resolution strongly condemned the Congress government for imposing
51 Thi.d. 52 In the UPLA the Agriculturist party had changed its name to Independent party
in August 1937. Proceedin2s ofthe UPLA, Vol. I, p. 95. Also The Pioneer, 3 August 1937. 53
Interview to the Press, ibid, 20 October 193 7. 139 the "positively anti-Islamic and
idolatrous" song, BandeMatram, on Muslims. 54he "positively anti-Islamic and idolatrous"
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song, BandeMatram, on Muslims. 54 Jinnah's presidential address concentrated almost

entirely on attacking Congress. He was emphatic that ''No settlement with the majority is
possible .... " He accused the Congress leadership of double standards: "Those who talk of
complete independence the most mean the least (of) what it means." He charged Congress
with alienating Muslims by pursuing a policy ''which is exclusively Hindu .... " Obviously
taking almost direct digs at Nehru, Rajendra Prasad, and Gandhi, Jinnah declared: The
Congress High Command speaks in different voices. One opinion is that there is no such
thing as Hindu-Muslim question and there is no such thing as Minorities' question in the
country. The other high opinion is that if a few crumbs are thrown to the Mussalmans in their
present disorganized and helpless state, you can manage them. They are sadly mistaken if
they think that the Mussalmans can be imposed upon ..... The third opinion is that there is no
light to be seen through the impenetrable darkness; but as the Congress goes on acquiring
strength and power so the past promises of the blank cheques remain unfilled and unsigned. 5
5 Interestingly Congress was no longer rebuked for its economic radicalism or socialism but
for being a Hindu party which, on becoming a government, had ushered in a 'Hindu Raj'.
What made Jinnah so bitter against the organization of which he had been a member till
1920? Was it a part of his new strategic design or did he feel simply let down by Congress?
Was he retaliating against Congress for making overtures overtures to Muslims or was he
merely stating the truth when he accused Congress of being a Hindu party and government?
The question of Congress having become a Hindu force requires a detailed elaboration and
will be taken up later. But the other questions can be examined here. Jinnah could not
possibly have been upset about Congress refusing to 54 Pirzada, Foundation ofPakistan, Vol.
2, p. 278. 55 Waheed Ahmad (ed.), The Nation's Voice. Vol. 1: Towards Consolidation.
(Speeches and statements of M.A.Jinnah, 1935-40) (Karachi, 1992), pp. 177-79. 140
cooperate with Muslim League (as he pointed out in his speech), because, as has been
examined earlier, Jinnah himself did not want it and did all he could to stop ~aliquzzaman
from reaching out to Congress leadership. It is therefore more likely that he was reacting to
the Congress decision to launch the Muslim mass contact programme. He may also have been
reflecting the general deterioration in the CongressLeague relationship during the two bye-
elections. More importantly Jinnah's new mood was indicative, not so much of hurt as of
initiating a new strategy. His priorities of bringing about Muslim unity have been spelt out
earlier in this thesis. That he had not been successful in it may have also conveyed to him the
futility of pursuing open ended politics. Clearly it was not enough to bring Muslims of
different shades and opinions on a common platform. They had also to be homogenized
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through the instrumentality of a defined ideology powerful enough to accommodate Muslims

from diverse political streams. In other words strong communalism would have appeared to
Jinnah the only instrument with which to unite together both the loyalists and the anti-
imperialists. Such a strategic design demanded re-defining not only the League's agenda but
that of Congress as well. Congress had to be declared a Hindu organization which was,
therefore, essentially incapable of representing Muslims:'
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Quit India movement and Jinaah

Gandhi decided to launch Quit India movement, Jinnah wrote an article in the Time and Tide
expressing his strong views on „Two Nation Theory‟, He says that constitution should be
drawn to permit two nations to exist in India and he added further as support a piece from the
Report of the Joint select Committee on Indian 82 Constitutional Reforms 1933-34, Vol. I,
Part I.6 Though two nations could not be formed since then, yet when elections were held in
Bengal, Punjab, Sindh, NWEF, Assam provinces on the basis of the report, where Muslims
were densely populated, to his contentment the Congress was defeated. Inspired by this, he
went on provoking more and more communal feelings saying that the Congress had no claim
to be called national party in those areas and that Gandhi could not be called the national
leader. Thus he became an arch rival to both the Congress and Gandhi and gave no scope to
them for compromise in the settlement of national affairs but worked solely for the formation
of separate nation for Muslims. But an insight into his early personal life reveals that he was a
strange person, who in 1910s strove for national unity but later, within a span of just three
decades became a totally changed person. By 1937 he was a staunch anti Hindu and this is
evident in his address to the All India Muslim League at Lucknow conference in October in
that year when he openly demanded a separate nation to be carved for Muslims: “Hindustan
is for Hindus; only the Congress masquerades under the name of nationalism. The result of
the present Congress party will be calm bitterness, communal war, and strengthening of the
imperialistic hold.”13 But he did not realise that under Gandhi‟s leadership in the Congress
there was fairly a good number of Muslims like Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, Muhammad Ali
brothers, Ghaffar Khan who did not reveal at any time his type of peace of mind for a
separate nation. So his opposition reflected some personal bias but not the views of the
majority of Muslims. He was quite open and used to say that he was dedicated for the
creation of a separate nation for Muslims, and the Congress under no circumstances should
succeed the British in case the latter withdrew from India.14 Not contented, he intensified his
tirade against Gandhi with his writings and speeches most of which were apathetic and
splenetic a year before Quit India movement broke out. His main forte was that Muslims
were in danger and that democracy was not workable because they constituted a minority
community. Sometimes he twisted Gandhi’s words in a way that the latter took to heart and

13
Liaquat Khan, comp. Resolution of All India Muslim League from May 1924 to December 1936 Delhi:
Muslim League Printing Press, 1944.
14
Abul Kalam Azad, India wins freedom: An Autobiographical Narrative. Bombay: Orient Longmans, 1959.
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aguishly said once, “Not a week passes but these weeklies contain what to me appear to be
distortion of truth and vilification of the Congress and Congressmen and Hindus.” Thus he
tried to draw public’s attention to his viewpoint that the Indian leader’s aim was to poison the
Hindu mind against Muslims and himself and thereby 83 suppress the latter.15 As he thus
began rebelling against Gandhi openly, indirectly he got some benefit of personal popularity
and leadership over Muslims. But why he thus was changed and reacted indifferently, it is
difficult to say. At one time as everybody knows, he was amicable with the Congress and
Gandhi. But from 1930 onwards he began to change. Perhaps the reason was that new leaders
like Nehru, Patel, Azad, Raja Goplachari with high potential began to emerge in Congress
and they even threatened to capture leadership from Gandhi, in as much as they commanded
much respect over millions of people all over the country. Hence it seems he wished to
capture all India leadership from Gandhi to himself with constant criticism and opposition to
Gandhi. But many wondered how he, who at one time, was a staunch nationalist and worked
for Hindu Muslim unity in the Bombay Congress of 1915 became suddenly so irascible, anti-
Hindu, and even went to the extent of dictating terms to Gandhi for a separate nation at least
in Muslim majority areas.16 How this drastic change came from such a person a staunch
nationalist to obstinate anti-Hindu and what made him to pursue the Muslim because thus
only on communal grounds-all these are difficult questions to answer. But in trying to capture
all India leadership he tried to provoke the elite and the masses with deep religious
sentiments. But Jinnah did not understand C. R.’s logic and diplomacy in asking the British to
go out of India and seeking to set up national government. Internally he was a better
integrationist than the Muslim leader expected. So Jinnah couldn‟t understand him. The
former developed only animosity towards Gandhi. When the politician saint moved his draft
on Quit India in the Allahabad and Wardha sessions, the Muslim leader too parallely
convened All India Muslim League‟s meetings at Allahabad in April 1942 and took support
from Liaqut Ali Khan.17 But he provoked the Muslim masses with sharp racial and religious
sentiments and in his speeches he used to say that India could never be one nation because of
the obvious differences in race, language and religion which could never be concealed and
Muslim self-determination was the only thing that was required in the existing circumstances.
Thus while at Allahabad and Wardha sessions the CWC gave Gandhi full powers to launch

15
K.K. Aziz, The Making of Pakistan: A study in Nationalism Islamabad: National book foundation, 1976.
p.262.
16
Sumit Sarkar, Modern Indian (1885-1947), Macmillan, New Delhi, 1985. PP.226-227
17
P.N. Rastogi, Ethnic Tensions in Indian Society: Explanation, Prediction, Monitoring and Control, Mittal
Publications, Delhi, 1986. p.266.
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Quit India movement, similarly the Muslim League‟s Working Committee also endorsed
Jinnah to pursue for the cause of Pakistan‟s creation or for formation of two nations in all
negotiations with the Congress or the Congress or the Government, Hence the Muslim
League under Jinnah‟s influence and imposing personality took parallel decisions that the
Muslims should have equal share either in mobilizing military support to the country or in the
control over Central and provincial Governments or in the expansion of the Viceroy‟s,
Executive Council.18 It is queer that he, who was fighting for separate nation thus, was not in
fact an original Muslim but hailed from a converted Muslim stock and most of his fellow
members of the Muslim League too were sons of the soil and got egotistic under religious
sentiments provoked by him.17 Thus he gained some superiority over Sikandar, his senior
leader, who had just died before the Quit India movement started. So to attract the Muslim
masses some more, the former rejected Cripps‟ negotiations for the simple reason that the
British statesman did not come out with a clear cut plan for the creation of Pakistan. But the
truth is that the British leader showed some favor to the Muslims to opt out of the union so
that Muslim provinces could be formed in course of time into a separate dominion. Under the
existing circumstances this was the best solution to the Muslims but the Muslim leader was
not satisfied.18 He wanted to capture all India leadership from Gandhi and for this he
demanded equal parity with Congress on every political issue so that the Congress would be
bound to recognize the Muslims‟ right to form Pakistan in any future settlement. But this was
not feasible as nobody appreciated his demand and so he took the other way round
misinterpreting Gandhi‟s writings just before the AICC Bombay Congress session that the
latter could not achieve Swaraj all these years though with Hindu Muslim unity and that he
was a total failure. But the Indian leader had no time to refute Jinnah‟s such specious
arguments. By that time the AICC had passed the Quit India resolution at Bombay and he
was arrested soon after and this created a vacuum of political leadership in the country. Not
only Gandhi but others like Nehru and Patel were also arrested and so there was none to
represent Indian cause properly and effectively before the Government. Jinnah seized this
opportunity and harangued more and more with his verbal attacks on Gandhi
unscrupulously.19 He went on blaming him that the latter launched Quit India movement
without Muslim League‟s support at his own risk. Not contented, he criticized him further
that the latter built up a conspiracy to establish Hindu hegemony over the Muslims and thus

18
A.B Rajput, Muslim League: Yesterday and Today, Mohammad Ashraf, Lahore, 1948. p.233.
19
Roger D Lone, - (ed.). Dear Mr. Jinnah selected correspondence and speeches of Liquat Ali Khan, 1937-1947.
Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2004. p.105.
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tried to strike a blow to the evolving awakening in the country. Even the Muslim League‟s
working Committee members too lost their objectivity and fell under Jinnah‟s influence.
Instead of showing sympathy over Gandhi‟s arrest, they criticized him in their meeting held
on 11th August and Gandhi for having resolved to launch the Quit India movement and the
Congress for having passed Quit India resolution.20The Committee members said that the
Congress resolution was ill motivated and thus they encouraged everything that could be
done to weaken Gandhi‟s movement and to assist the British in their war effort., hence they
in a resolution said, “The Congress policy is to cajole or coerce the British Government into
surrendering power to Congress-a Hindu body with microscopic following of other
communities in utter suppression of one hundred millions of Mussalmans.”23 This they
indirectly blamed the AICC and Gandhi that it was they who closed the doors for
negotiations with the Government and themselves. But the fact is such internal squabbles
between Hindus and Muslims helped the British to stay in India.24 But in making those
allegations through the Working Committee members, Jinnah tried to enlist British sympathy
and to create an impression that it was the Muslims who refrained the Axis powers from
entering into India and getting internal help. So they should get due recognition and be
enabled to form Pakistan in future.25 So while Gandhi said „Quit India‟, Jinnah „Divide and
Quit‟. Further, he also used to show some paper cuttings from Gandhi‟sHarijan, misinterpret
them in a way: that the latter advocated Hindu Muslim separation and it was difficult to attain
independence till the communal problem was solved. He went further and blamed Gandhi‟s
movement as one to coarse the British to hand over power to the Congress party that was
dominated by the Hindus and to place the Muslims at a subordinate level and get them
dominated by the traditional tyrannical Hindu majority.26 But in these circumstances the
only Hindu leader who shared with Jinnah‟s feelings and dared to differ with Gandhi was C.
Rajagopalachari. But his approach was too shrewd to be understood by Jinnah. C. R. said that
the Muslim leader spoke 86 plainly what he wanted and he would have succeeded, had
Cripps entertained the idea of setting up national government with Vice Regal Rule at the
Centre. But the British representative recommended dominion government at the end of war
and it created all deadlock., So C, R. suggested intelligently why not the national government
be set up in a way that it should be answerable to the Viceroy. Hindus would lose nothing by
this but Muslim cooperation would be obtained. Then Hindu Muslim unity would prevail and
the Congress would join with the Muslim League and one day the British would grant

Sikander Hayat Khan, Quaid-i-Azams Personality and its Role in the Achievement of Pakistan”, The Jinnah
20

Anthology. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2009.

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freedom. In the meanwhile every Muslim would forget the concept of Pakistan and it would
be shelved. So his theory was, “Let us give to the Musalmans what they are asking. They will
themselves say that they do not want if you do not keep it in your pocket but throw it on the
table.” So to move the country in this direction he raised the issue at the Wardha CWC
meeting. But he was not properly understood. He was heckled with cries „Rajaji Moradabad‟
and somebody even hit a missile at him. Nehru also said that the Tamil leader was trying to
break to pieces Gandhi‟s weapon of Satyagraha which had been fashioned for the last 22
years with many sacrifices. As the tension thus increased, inside the Congress Gandhi
advised C. R. to resign from the Congress, which the latter dutifully did. But the Tamil leader
wrote to Gandhi that in case the whole civil and military power was to be withdrawn
according to the latter‟s wish the British Government would certainly be in a worse form. But
Gandhi did not mind his advice. He took it lightly and said that better he should go the other
side of Jinnah and Muslim League friends. Taking advantage of the ideological differences
existing in the Congress, Jinnah tried to hit Gandhi‟s popularity as much as he could. When
the latter was arrested, he did not worry about the consequences or the fate of the country. He
felt that let the British play their own game; “This is one of those cases where neutrality is the
most effective policy on our part. “ He further added that if he was allowed a free hand, he
would set up the Muslim League Committee, keep it in touch with the Muslims of the
affected areas, and explain the programme of civil defense. But he could not go ahead or was
successful in this divisive activity except getting some sympathy from C. R. Further he could
not yet understand the latter‟s deep lime of thinking which was diplomatic, meant to appease
him or sidetrack the whole idea of the formation of Pakistan into cold storage. But Jinnah
blurted over Gandhi often. When the latter did fast, the former did not care but tried to incite
Bengali Muslims not to press any resolution in the latter‟sfavor to release him. But his
protests did not carry any weight. On the other hand, waves of unrest mounted against the
Government throughout the country over Gandhi‟s health. At one stage Sapru, a Moderate, to
cut down the size of Jinnah, insisted the latter to come to Delhi and settle the matters
amicably so that Gandhi’s life could be saved. But the Muslim leader refused and showed
extreme indifference. Yet Gandhi from the jail hoped that a day “will certainly dawn when
Jinnah will realize that I have never wronged him or the Muslims.” He knew Jinnah‟s fixed
notion of Pakistan, which was at one time considered philosophical but became a living voice
in the throats of Muslims. Whether it was done provokingly or not, it became communal
issue and Jinnah’s critical expression, single mindedness, and fusillade against the Hindus
were evident. But it goes to Jinnah’s credit that it was due to this propaganda the membership
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of the Muslim League rose from 1330 in 1925 to two millions in 1942 and this increase was
achieved in a span of seventeen years though at the cost of national unity. So Jinnah’s two
nation theory became a strong political issue in 1940s but it was still premature because
differences between Hindus and Muslims had been existing for the last several centuries, but
Jinnah made an issue out of them only from religious viewpoint. His angle of assessment was
only from one side. Unlike Gandhi, he did not take into account the interests of the nation or
teeming millions of Hindus on the other side. Religion cannot be said to be the only one
factor but more than one for the creation of a nation. Yet he strove for it as a camouflage to
cover up the humiliation he and his admirers felt in the political field. He forgot that at one
time in 1915 he was a fervent nationalist but then was turned into an anti-Hindu due to the
ramifications of circumstances which he faced or over which he had no control. He was not
really an original Muslim to hailing from Muslim countries to put up such lofty claim but a
son of the soil. But yet his claim for Pakistan created problemsand complexities not only to
the nation and Gandhi but also to himself and fellow Muslim.21

21
All-India Muslim League Papers (MLP) Vol.163. See, Proceeding of the Muslim Conference at Delhi.
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Bibliography
Books:
History of all India Muslim League 1906-1947 – Afzal, m Rafique.
Jinnah: India-partition-Independence by Yashwant Sinha.
A.B Rajput, Muslim League: Yesterday and Today

Sumit Sarkar, Modern Indian

Reports:
Nehru report

Congress Working Committee reports

All-India Muslim League Papers

Research papers:
Roger D Lone, - (ed.). Dear Mr. Jinnah selected correspondence and speeches of Liquat Ali Khan, 1937-1947.
Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2004. p.105.
Ian Talbot; Gurharpal Singh (23 July 2009). The Partition of India. Cambridge University Press.
p. 30. ISBN 978-0-521-85661-4

"Establishment of All India Muslim League". Story of Pakistan. June 2003. p. 2. Retrieved 11 May 2007.