traffic violation.—In Berkemer, the U.S.
Court also noted that the Miranda warnings must also be given
IV. ARREST
G.R. No. 197788. February 29, 2012.
RODEL LUZ y ONG, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Arrests; Land Transportation and Traffic Code (R.A. No.
4136); Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general procedure for
dealing with a traffic violation is not the arrest of the offender, but the confiscation of the driver’s license
of the latter.—Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to
answer for the commission of an offense.It is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested
or by that person’s voluntary submission to the custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the
application of actual force, manual touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal declaration
of arrest, is required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the
other, and that there be an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that
submission is necessary. Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general
procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is not the arrest of the offender, but the confiscation of the
driver’s license of the latter: SECTION 29. Confiscation of Driver’s License.—Law enforcement and
peace officers of other agencies duly deputized by the Director shall, in apprehending a driver for any
violation of this Act or any regulations issued pursuant thereto, or of local traffic rules and regulations
not contrary to any provisions of this Act, confiscate the license of the driver concerned and issue a
receipt prescribed and issued by the Bureau therefor which shall authorize the driver to operate a motor
vehicle for a period not exceeding seventy-two hours from the time and date of issue of said receipt.
The period so fixed in the receipt shall not be extended, and shall become invalid thereafter. Failure of
the driver to settle his case within fifteen days from the date of apprehension will be a ground for the
suspension and/or revocation of his license.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Procedure Being Observed in Flagging Down Vehicles During the
Conduct of Checkpoints.—The Philippine National Police (PNP) Operations Manualprovides the
following procedure for flagging down vehicles during the conduct of checkpoints: SECTION
7. Procedure in Flagging Down or Accosting Vehicles While in Mobile Car. This rule is a general
concept and will not apply in hot pursuit operations. The mobile car crew shall undertake the following,
when applicable: x x x m. If it concerns traffic violations, immediately issue a Traffic Citation Ticket
(TCT) or Traffic Violation Report (TVR). Never indulge in prolonged, unnecessary conversation or
argument with the driver or any of the vehicle’s occupants.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Custodial Interrogation; The roadside questioning of a motorist does
not fall under custodial interrogation, nor can it be considered a formal arrest.—In Berkemer v.
McCarty, the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court discussed at length whether the roadside questioning
of a motorist detained pursuant to a routine traffic stop should be considered custodial interrogation.
The Court held that, such questioning does not fall under custodial interrogation, nor can it be
considered a formal arrest, by virtue of the nature of the questioning, the expectations of the motorist
and the officer, and the length of time the procedure is conducted.
Same; Same; Same; Same; At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting
officer to inform the latter of the reason for the arrest and must show that person the warrant of arrest, if
any.—This Court has held that at the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting
officer to inform the latter of the reason for the arrest and must show that person the warrant of arrest, if
any. Persons shall be informed of their constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any
statement they might make could be used against them. It may also be noted that in this case, these
constitutional requirements were complied with by the police officers only after petitioner had been
arrested for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Miranda Doctrine; In Berkemer vs. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984),
the U.S. Court noted that the Miranda warnings must also be given to a person apprehended due to a
to a person apprehended due to a traffic violation: The purposes of the safeguards prescribed by
Miranda are to ensure that the police do not coerce or trick captive suspects into confessing, to relieve
the “inherently compelling pressures” “generated by the custodial setting itself,” “which work to
undermine the individual’s will to resist,” and as much as possible to free courts from the task of
scrutinizing individual cases to try to determine, after the fact, whether particular confessions were
voluntary. Those purposes are implicated as much by in-custody questioning of persons suspected of
misdemeanors as they are by questioning of persons suspected of felonies. If it were true that petitioner
was already deemed “arrested” when he was flagged down for a traffic violation and while he was
waiting for his ticket, then there would have been no need for him to be arrested for a second time—
after the police officers allegedly discovered the drugs—as he was already in their custody.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Warrantless Searches; Instances When a Warrantless Search is
Allowed.—The following are the instances when a warrantless search is allowed: (i) a warrantless
search incidental to a lawful arrest; (ii) search of evidence in “plain view”; (iii) search of a moving
vehicle; (iv) consented warrantless search; (v) customs search; (vi) a “stop and frisk” search; and (vii)
exigent and emergency circumstances. None of the above-mentioned instances, especially a search
incident to a lawful arrest, are applicable to this case.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Whether consent to the search was in fact voluntary is a
question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances.—Whether consent to the
search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the
circumstances. Relevant to this determination are the following characteristics of the person giving
consent and the environment in which consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether the
defendant was in a public or a secluded location; (3) whether the defendant objected to the search or
passively looked on; (4) the education and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive
police procedures; (6) the defendant’s belief that no incriminating evidence would be found; (7) the
nature of the police questioning; (8) the environment in which the questioning took place; and (9) the
possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting. It is the State that has the burden of
proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained, and was freely and
voluntarily given. In this case, all that was alleged was that petitioner was alone at the police station at
three in the morning, accompanied by several police officers. These circumstances weigh heavily
against a finding of valid consent to a warrantless search.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Stop and Frisk; The stop and frisk is merely a limited protective
search of outer clothing for weapons.—Neither does the search qualify under the “stop and frisk” rule.
While the rule normally applies when a police officer observes suspicious or unusual conduct, which
may lead him to believe that a criminal act may be afoot, the stop and frisk is merely a limited protective
search of outer clothing for weapons.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Warrantless Searches; In Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113 (1998),
the U.S. Supreme Court held that when a police officer stops a person for speeding and
correspondingly issues a citation instead of arresting the latter, this procedure does not authorize the
officer to conduct a full search of the car.—In Knowles v. Iowa,the U.S. Supreme Court held that when
a police officer stops a person for speeding and correspondingly issues a citation instead of arresting
the latter, this procedure does not authorize the officer to conduct a full search of the car. The Court
therein held that there was no justification for a full-blown search when the officer does not arrest the
motorist. Instead, police officers may only conduct minimal intrusions, such as ordering the motorist to
alight from the car or doing a patdown.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.—The
Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.Any evidence obtained in violation of said right
shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. While the power to search and seize may at
times be necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law implemented without
contravening the constitutional rights of citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient
importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government.
SERENO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to set aside the Court
of Appeals (CA) Decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 32516 dated 18 February 2011 and Resolution
dated 8 July 2011.
Statement of the Facts and of the Case
The facts, as found by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), which sustained the version of
the prosecution, are as follows:
“PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza, who was then assigned at the Sub-Station 1 of the Naga
City Police Station as a traffic enforcer, substantially testified that on March 10, 2003 at
around 3:00 o’clock in the morning, he saw the accused, who was coming from the
direction of Panganiban Drive and going to Diversion Road, Naga City, driving a
motorcycle without a helmet; that this prompted him to flag down the accused for violating
a municipal ordinance which requires all motorcycle drivers to wear helmet (sic) while
driving said motor vehicle; that he invited the accused to come inside their sub-station
since the place where he flagged down the accused is almost in front of the said sub-
station; that while he and SPO1 Rayford Brillante were issuing a citation ticket for violation
of municipal ordinance, he noticed that the accused was uneasy and kept on getting
something from his jacket; that he was alerted and so, he told the accused to take out the
contents of the pocket of his jacket as the latter may have a weapon inside it; that the
accused obliged and slowly put out the contents of the pocket of his jacket which was a
nickel-like tin or metal container about two (2) to three (3) inches in size, including two (2)
cellphones, one (1) pair of scissors and one (1) Swiss knife; that upon seeing the said
container, he asked the accused to open it; that after the accused opened the container,
he noticed a cartoon cover and something beneath it; and that upon his instruction, the
accused spilled out the contents of the container on the table which turned out to be four
(4) plastic sachets, the two (2) of which were empty while the other two (2) contained
suspected shabu.”
Arraigned on 2 July 2003, petitioner, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of “Not guilty”
to the charge of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Pretrial was terminated on 24
September 2003, after which, trial ensued.
During trial, Police Officer 3 (PO3) Emmanuel Alteza and a forensic chemist testified for
the prosecution. On the other hand, petitioner testified for himself and raised the defense of
planting of evidence and extortion.
In its 19 February 2009 Decision, the RTC convicted petitioner of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs committed on 10 March 2003. It found the prosecution evidence sufficient
to show that he had been lawfully arrested for a traffic violation and then subjected to a valid
search, which led to the discovery on his person of two plastic sachets later found to
contain shabu. The RTC also found his defense of frame-up and extortion to be weak, self-
serving and unsubstantiated. The dispositive portion of its Decision held:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding accused RODEL
LUZ y ONG GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of violation of Section 11,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty
of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and (1) day, as minimum, to thirteen (13)
years, as maximum, and to pay a fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00).
The subject shabu is hereby confiscated for turn over to the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency for its proper disposition and destruction in accordance with law.
SO ORDERED.”
Upon review, the CA affirmed the RTC’s Decision.
On 12 September 2011, petitioner filed under Rule 45 the instant Petition for Review
on Certiorari dated 1 September 2011. In a Resolution dated 12 October 2011, this Court
required respondent to file a comment on the Petition. On 4 January 2012, the latter filed its
Comment dated 3 January 2012.
Petitioner raised the following grounds in support of his Petition:
(i) THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF THE ALLEGED SUBJECT SHABUIS INVALID.
(ii) THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF DUTY OF
THE POLICE OFFICER CANNOT BE RELIED UPON IN THIS CASE.
(iii) THE INTEGRITY AND EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF THE ALLEGED SUBJECT
SPECIMEN HAS BEEN COMPROMISED.
(iv) THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-PETITIONER WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND
THE REASONABLE DOUBT (sic).
Petitioner claims that there was no lawful search and seizure, because there was no
lawful arrest. He claims that the finding that there was a lawful arrest was erroneous, since
he was not even issued a citation ticket or charged with violation of the city ordinance. Even
assuming there was a valid arrest, he claims that he had never consented to the search
conducted upon him.
On the other hand, finding that petitioner had been lawfully arrested, the RTC held thus:
“It is beyond dispute that the accused was flagged down and apprehended in this
case by Police Officers Alteza and Brillante for violation of City Ordinance No. 98-012, an
ordinance requiring the use of crash helmet by motorcycle drivers and riders thereon in
the City of Naga and prescribing penalties for violation thereof. The accused himself
admitted that he was not wearing a helmet at the time when he was flagged down by the
said police officers, albeit he had a helmet in his possession. Obviously, there is legal
basis on the part of the apprehending officers to flag down and arrest the accused
because the latter was actually committing a crime in their presence, that is, a violation of
City Ordinance No. 98-012. In other words, the accused, being caught in flagrante
delicto violating the said Ordinance, he could therefore be lawfully stopped or arrested by
the apprehending officers. x x x.”
We find the Petition to be impressed with merit, but not for the particular reasons
alleged. In criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review and the
reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even
reverse the trial court’s decision based on grounds other than those that the parties raised
as errors.
First, there was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged down for
committing a traffic violation, he was not, ipso facto and solely for this reason, arrested.
Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to
answer for the commission of an offense. It is effected by an actual restraint of the person to
be arrested or by that person’s voluntary submission to the custody of the one making the
arrest. Neither the application of actual force, manual touching of the body, or physical
restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that there be an
intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other, and that there be an intent on
the part of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that submission is
necessary.
Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general procedure
for dealing with a traffic violation is not the arrest of the offender, but the confiscation of the
driver’s license of the latter:
“SECTION 29. Confiscation of Driver’s License.—Law enforcement and peace
officers of other agencies duly deputized by the Director shall, in apprehending a driver
for any violation of this Act or any regulations issued pursuant thereto, or of local traffic
rules and regulations not contrary to any provisions of this Act, confiscate the license of
the driver concerned and issue a receipt prescribed and issued by the Bureau therefor
which shall authorize the driver to operate a motor vehicle for a period not exceeding
seventy-two hours from the time and date of issue of said receipt. The period so fixed in
the receipt shall not be extended, and shall become invalid thereafter. Failure of the driver
to settle his case within fifteen days from the date of apprehension will be a ground for
the suspension and/or revocation of his license.”
Similarly, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Operations Manual provides the following
procedure for flagging down vehicles during the conduct of checkpoints:
“SECTION 7. Procedure in Flagging Down or Accosting Vehicles While in Mobile
Car. This rule is a general concept and will not apply in hot pursuit operations. The mobile
car crew shall undertake the following, when applicable: x x x
m. If it concerns traffic violations, immediately issue a Traffic Citation Ticket
(TCT) or Traffic Violation Report (TVR). Never indulge in prolonged,
unnecessary conversation or argument with the driver or any of the vehicle’s
occupants”;
At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation ticket, petitioner could
not be said to have been “under arrest.” There was no intention on the part of PO3 Alteza to
arrest him, deprive him of his liberty, or take him into custody. Prior to the issuance of the
ticket, the period during which petitioner was at the police station may be characterized
merely as waiting time. In fact, as found by the trial court, PO3 Alteza himself testified that
the only reason they went to the police sub-station was that petitioner had been flagged
down “almost in front” of that place. Hence, it was only for the sake of convenience that they
were waiting there. There was no intention to take petitioner into custody.
In Berkemer v. McCarty, the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court discussed at length
whether the roadside questioning of a motorist detained pursuant to a routine traffic stop
should be considered custodial interrogation. The Court held that, such questioning does
not fall under custodial interrogation, nor can it be considered a formal arrest, by virtue of
the nature of the questioning, the expectations of the motorist and the officer, and the length
of time the procedure is conducted. It ruled as follows:
“It must be acknowledged at the outset that a traffic stop significantly curtails the
“freedom of action” of the driver and the passengers, if any, of the detained vehicle. Under
the law of most States, it is a crime either to ignore a policeman’s signal to stop one’s car
or, once having stopped, to drive away without permission. x x x
However, we decline to accord talismanic power to the phrase in the Miranda opinion
emphasized by respondent. Fidelity to the doctrine announced in Miranda requires that it
be enforced strictly, but only in those types of situations in which the concerns that
powered the decision are implicated. Thus, we must decide whether a traffic stop exerts
upon a detained person pressures that sufficiently impair his free exercise of his privilege
against self-incrimination to require that he be warned of his constitutional rights.
Two features of an ordinary traffic stop mitigate the danger that a person questioned
will be induced “to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely,” Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S., at 467. First, detention of a motorist pursuant to a traffic stop is
presumptively temporary and brief. The vast majority of roadside detentions last only
a few minutes. A motorist’s expectations, when he sees a policeman’s light flashing
behind him, are that he will be obliged to spend a short period of time answering questions
and waiting while the officer checks his license and registration, that he may then be given
a citation, but that in the end he most likely will be allowed to continue on his way. In this
respect, questioning incident to an ordinary traffic stop is quite different from stationhouse
interrogation, which frequently is prolonged, and in which the detainee often is aware that
questioning will continue until he provides his interrogators the answers they seek.
See id., at 451.
Second, circumstances associated with the typical traffic stop are not such that
the motorist feels completely at the mercy of the police. To be sure, the aura of
authority surrounding an armed, uniformed officer and the knowledge that the officer has
some discretion in deciding whether to issue a citation, in combination, exert some
pressure on the detainee to respond to questions. But other aspects of the situation
substantially offset these forces. Perhaps most importantly, the typical traffic stop is
public, at least to some degree. x x x
In both of these respects, the usual traffic stop is more analogous to a so-called
“Terry stop,” see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), than to a formal arrest. x x x The
comparatively nonthreatening character of detentions of this sort explains the absence of
any suggestion in our opinions that Terry stops are subject to the dictates of Miranda. The
similarly noncoercive aspect of ordinary traffic stops prompts us to hold that persons
temporarily detained pursuant to such stops are not “in custody” for the purposes of
Miranda.
xxx xxx xxx
We are confident that the state of affairs projected by respondent will not come to
pass. It is settled that the safeguards prescribed by Miranda become applicable as soon
as a suspect’s freedom of action is curtailed to a “degree associated with formal
arrest.” California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam). If a motorist who
has been detained pursuant to a traffic stop thereafter is subjected to treatment that
renders him “in custody” for practical purposes, he will be entitled to the full panoply of
protections prescribed by Miranda. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977)
(per curiam).” (Emphasis supplied.)
The U.S. Court in Berkemer thus ruled that, since the motorist therein was only
subjected to modest questions while still at the scene of the traffic stop, he was not at that
moment placed under custody (such that he should have been apprised of
his Mirandarights), and neither can treatment of this sort be fairly characterized as the
functional equivalent of a formal arrest. Similarly, neither can petitioner here be considered
“under arrest” at the time that his traffic citation was being made.
It also appears that, according to City Ordinance No. 98-012, which was violated by
petitioner, the failure to wear a crash helmet while riding a motorcycle is penalized by a fine
only. Under the Rules of Court, a warrant of arrest need not be issued if the information or
charge was filed for an offense penalized by a fine only. It may be stated as a corollary that
neither can a warrantless arrest be made for such an offense.
This ruling does not imply that there can be no arrest for a traffic violation. Certainly,
when there is an intent on the part of the police officer to deprive the motorist of liberty, or to
take the latter into custody, the former may be deemed to have arrested the motorist. In this
case, however, the officer’s issuance (or intent to issue) a traffic citation ticket negates the
possibility of an arrest for the same violation.
Even if one were to work under the assumption that petitioner was deemed
“arrested” upon being flagged down for a traffic violation and while awaiting the
issuance of his ticket, then the requirements for a valid arrest were not complied
with.
This Court has held that at the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the
arresting officer to inform the latter of the reason for the arrest and must show that person
the warrant of arrest, if any. Persons shall be informed of their constitutional rights to remain
silent and to counsel, and that any statement they might make could be used against them.
It may also be noted that in this case, these constitutional requirements were complied with
by the police officers only after petitioner had been arrested for illegal possession of
dangerous drugs.
In Berkemer, the U.S. Court also noted that the Miranda warnings must also be given to
a person apprehended due to a traffic violation:
“The purposes of the safeguards prescribed by Miranda are to ensure that
the police do not coerce or trick captive suspects into confessing, to relieve the
“inherently compelling pressures” “generated by the custodial setting itself,”
“which work to undermine the individual’s will to resist,” and as much as possible
to free courts from the task of scrutinizing individual cases to try to determine,
after the fact, whether particular confessions were voluntary. Those purposes
are implicated as much by in-custody questioning of persons suspected of
misdemeanors as they are by questioning of persons suspected of felonies.”
If it were true that petitioner was already deemed “arrested” when he was flagged down
for a traffic violation and while he was waiting for his ticket, then there would have been no
need for him to be arrested for a second time—after the police officers allegedly discovered
the drugs—as he was already in their custody.
Second, there being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that resulted from it
was likewise illegal.
The following are the instances when a warrantless search is allowed: (i) a warrantless
search incidental to a lawful arrest; (ii) search of evidence in “plain view”; (iii) search of a
moving vehicle; (iv) consented warrantless search; (v) customs search; (vi) a “stop and
frisk” search; and (vii) exigent and emergency circumstances. None of the above-mentioned
instances, especially a search incident to a lawful arrest, are applicable to this case.
It must be noted that the evidence seized, although alleged to be inadvertently
discovered, was not in “plain view.” It was actually concealed inside a metal container inside
petitioner’s pocket. Clearly, the evidence was not immediately apparent.
Neither was there a consented warrantless search. Consent to a search is not to be
lightly inferred, but shown by clear and convincing evidence. It must be voluntary in order to
validate an otherwise illegal search; that is, the consent must be unequivocal, specific,
intelligently given and uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. While the prosecution
claims that petitioner acceded to the instruction of PO3 Alteza, this alleged accession does
not suffice to prove valid and intelligent consent. In fact, the RTC found that petitioner was
merely “told” to take out the contents of his pocket.
Whether consent to the search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be
determined from the totality of all the circumstances. Relevant to this determination are the
following characteristics of the person giving consent and the environment in which consent
is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether the defendant was in a public or a
secluded location; (3) whether the defendant objected to the search or passively looked on;
(4) the education and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive police
procedures; (6) the defendant’s belief that no incriminating evidence would be found; (7) the
nature of the police questioning; (8) the environment in which the questioning took place;
and (9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting. It is the State that
has the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary consent was
obtained, and was freely and voluntarily given. In this case, all that was alleged was that
petitioner was alone at the police station at three in the morning, accompanied by several
police officers. These circumstances weigh heavily against a finding of valid consent to a
warrantless search.
Neither does the search qualify under the “stop and frisk” rule. While the rule normally
applies when a police officer observes suspicious or unusual conduct, which may lead him
to believe that a criminal act may be afoot, the stop and frisk is merely a limited protective
search of outer clothing for weapons.
In Knowles v. Iowa, the U.S. Supreme Court held that when a police officer stops a
person for speeding and correspondingly issues a citation instead of arresting the latter, this
procedure does not authorize the officer to conduct a full search of the car. The Court
therein held that there was no justification for a full-blown search when the officer does not
arrest the motorist. Instead, police officers may only conduct minimal intrusions, such as
ordering the motorist to alight from the car or doing a patdown:
“In Robinson, supra, we noted the two historical rationales for the “search incident to
arrest” exception: (1) the need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody,
and (2) the need to preserve evidence for later use at trial. x x x But neither of these
underlying rationales for the search incident to arrest exception is sufficient to justify the
search in the present case.
We have recognized that the first rationale—officer safety—is “ ‘both legitimate and
weighty,’ ” x x x The threat to officer safety from issuing a traffic citation, however, is a
good deal less than in the case of a custodial arrest. In Robinson, we stated that a
custodial arrest involves “danger to an officer” because of “the extended exposure which
follows the taking of a suspect into custody and transporting him to the police station.”
414 U.S., at 234-235. We recognized that “[t]he danger to the police officer flows from the
fact of the arrest, and its attendant proximity, stress, and uncertainty, and not from the
grounds for arrest.” Id., at 234, n. 5. A routine traffic stop, on the other hand, is a
relatively brief encounter and “is more analogous to a so-called ‘Terry stop’ . . .
than to a formal arrest.” Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984). See also Cupp
v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 296 (1973) (“Where there is no formal arrest . . . a person might
well be less hostile to the police and less likely to take conspicuous, immediate steps to
destroy incriminating evidence”).
This is not to say that the concern for officer safety is absent in the case of a
routine traffic stop. It plainly is not. See Mimms, supra, at 110; Wilson, supra, at 413-
414. But while the concern for officer safety in this context may justify the
“minimal” additional intrusion of ordering a driver and passengers out of the car,
it does not by itself justify the often considerably greater intrusion attending a full
fieldtype search. Even without the search authority Iowa urges, officers have other,
 independent bases to search for weapons and protect themselves from danger. For With respect to the public and third persons, the registered owner of a motor vehicle is directly and
example, they may order out of a vehicle both the driver, Mimms, supra, at 111, and any primarily responsible for the consequences of its operation regardless of who the actual vehicle owner
passengers, Wilson, supra, at 414; perform a “patdown” of a driver and any passengers might be; Well-settled is the rule that the registered owner of the vehicle is liable for quasi-delicts
upon reasonable suspicion that they may be armed and dangerous, Terry v. Ohio, 392 resulting from its use. (FEB Leasing and Finance Corporation vs. Baylon, 653 SCRA 22 [2011])
U.S. 1 (1968); conduct a “Terry patdown” of the passenger compartment of a vehicle upon
reasonable suspicion that an occupant is dangerous and may gain immediate control of
a weapon, Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983); and even conduct a full search ——o0o——
of the passenger compartment, including any containers therein, pursuant to a custodial
arrest, New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981).
Nor has Iowa shown the second justification for the authority to search incident to
arrest—the need to discover and preserve evidence. Once Knowles was stopped for
speeding and issued a citation, all the evidence necessary to prosecute that offense had
been obtained. No further evidence of excessive speed was going to be found either on
the person of the offender or in the passenger compartment of the car.” (Emphasis
supplied.)

The foregoing considered, petitioner must be acquitted. While he may have failed to
object to the illegality of his arrest at the earliest opportunity, a waiver of an illegal
warrantless arrest does not, however, mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence
seized during the illegal warrantless arrest.

The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Any evidence
obtained in violation of said right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
While the power to search and seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still it
must be exercised and the law implemented without contravening the constitutional rights of
citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to
the basic principles of government.

The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are inadmissible. The drugs are the
very corpus delicti of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Thus, their
inadmissibility precludes conviction and calls for the acquittal of the accused.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The 18 February 2011 Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32516 affirming the judgment of conviction dated 19
February 2009 of the Regional Trial Court, 5th Judicial Region, Naga City, Branch 21, in
Criminal Case No. RTC 2003-0087, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner
Rodel Luz y Ong is hereby ACQUITTED. The bail bond posted for his provisional liberty is
CANCELLED and RELEASED.
SO ORDERED.

Notes.—The long standing rule in this jurisdiction is that “reliable information” alone is not sufficient
to justify a warrantless arrest—the rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt act
that would indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
(People vs. Racho, 626 SCRA 633 [2010])

A search may be conducted by law enforcers only on the strength of a valid search warrant;
Exceptions: (1) consented searches; (2) as an incident to a lawful arrest; (3) searches of vessels and
aircraft for violation of immigration, customs, and drug laws; (4) searches of moving vehicles; (5)
searches of automobiles at borders or constructive borders; (6) where the prohibited articles are in
“plain view”; (7) searches of buildings and premises to enforce fire, sanitary, and building regulations;
and (8) stop and frisk operations. (Esquillo vs. People, 629 SCRA 370 [2010])
 G.R. No. 182601. November 10, 2014
JOEY M. PESTILOS, DWIGHT MACAPANAS, MIGUEL GACES, JERRY FERNANDEZ
and RONALD MUÑOZ, petitioners, vs. MORENO GENEROSO and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Arrests; Warrantless Arrests; Probable Cause; Section 5(b),
Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure was further amended with the incorporation of the
word “probable cause” as the basis of the arresting officer’s determination on whether the person to be
arrested has committed the crime.—Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure
was further amended with the incorporation of the word “probable cause” as the basis of the arresting
officer’s determination on whether the person to be arrested has committed the crime. Hence, as
presently worded, Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that:
When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it.
Same; Same; Same; Same; As presently worded, the elements under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure are: first, an offense has just been committed;
and second, the arresting officer has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts
or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it.—From the current phraseology of the
rules on warrantless arrest, it appears that for purposes of Section 5(b), the following are the notable
changes: first, the contemplated offense was qualified by the word “just,” connoting immediacy;
and second, the warrantless arrest of a person sought to be arrested should be based on probable
cause to be determined by the arresting officer based on his personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it. It is clear that the present rules
have ‘‘objectified” the previously subjective determination of the arresting officer as to the (1)
commission of the crime; and (2) whether the person sought to be arrested committed the crime.
According to Feria, these changes were adopted to minimize arrests based on mere suspicion or
hearsay. As presently worded, the elements under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure are: first, an offense has just been committed; and second, the arresting officer
has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person
to be arrested has committed it.
Same; Same; Same; Same; In determining the existence of probable cause, the arresting officer
should make a thorough investigation and exercise reasonable judgment.—In determining the
existence of probable cause, the arresting officer should make a thorough investigation and exercise
reasonable judgment. The standards for evaluating the factual basis supporting a probable cause
assessment are not less stringent in warrantless arrest situation than in a case where a warrant
is sought from a judicial officer. The probable cause determination of a warrantless arrest is based
on information that the arresting officer possesses at the time of the arrest and not on the information
acquired later. In evaluating probable cause, probability and not certainty is the determinant of
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment. Probable cause involves probabilities similar to the
factual and practical questions of everyday life upon which reasonable and prudent persons act. It is
a pragmatic question to be determined in each case in light of the particular circumstances and
the particular offense involved.
Same; Same; Preliminary Investigations; The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to
determine whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the
accused is guilty of the crime and should be held for trial.—The purpose of a preliminary
investigation is to determine whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable
cause to believe that the accused is guilty of the crime and should be held for trial. In Buchanan
v. Viuda de Esteban, 32 Phil. 363 (1915), we defined probable cause as the existence of facts and
circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the
knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was
prosecuted.
Same; Same; Probable Cause; Warrant of Arrest; Before issuing a warrant of arrest, the judge
must be satisfied that based on the evidence submitted, there is sufficient proof that a crime has been
committed and that the person to be arrested is probably guilty thereof.—Hence, before issuing a
warrant of arrest, the judge must be satisfied that based on the evidence submitted, there is
sufficient proof that a crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested is probably
guilty thereof. At this stage of the criminal proceeding, the judge is not yet tasked to review in detail
the evidence submitted during the preliminary investigation. It is sufficient that he personally evaluates
the evidence in determining probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest.
Same; Same; Same; Arrests; Warrantless Arrests; The arresting officer’s determination of
probable cause under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is based on
his personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person sought to be arrested has committed
the crime.—In contrast, the arresting officer’s determination of probable cause under Section
5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is based on his personal knowledge of facts
or circumstances that the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime. These facts or
circumstances pertain to actual facts or raw evidence, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable
suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the
peace officers making the arrest.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Under the present rules and jurisprudence, the arresting
officer should base his determination of probable cause on his personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances that the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime; the public prosecutor
and the judge must base their determination on the evidence submitted by the parties.—It is clear
therefore that the standard for determining “probable cause” is invariable for the officer arresting without
a warrant, the public prosecutor, and the judge issuing a warrant of arrest. It is the existence of such
facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe
that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested or held for trial, as the
case may be. However, while the arresting officer, the public prosecutor and the judge all determine
“probable cause,” within the spheres of their respective functions, its existence is influenced heavily by
the available facts and circumstance within their possession. In short, although these officers use the
same standard of a reasonable man, they possess dissimilar quantity of facts or circumstances, as
set by the rules, upon which they must determine probable cause. Thus, under the present rules and
jurisprudence, the arresting officer should base his determination of probable cause on his personal
knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime;
the public prosecutor and the judge must base their determination on the evidence submitted by the
parties. In other words, the arresting officer operates on the basis of more limited facts, evidence or
available information that he must personally gather within a limited time frame.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court (SC) holds that the following must be
present for a valid warrantless arrest: 1) the crime should have been just committed; and 2) the
arresting officer’s exercise of discretion is limited by the standard of probable cause to be determined
from the facts and circumstances within his personal knowledge.—The clincher in the element of
“personal knowledge of facts or circumstances” is the required element of immediacy within which
these facts or circumstances should be gathered. This required time element acts as a safeguard to
ensure that the police officers have gathered the facts or perceived the circumstances within a very
limited time frame. This guarantees that the police officers would have no time to base their probable
cause finding on facts or circumstances obtained after an exhaustive investigation. The reason for the
element of the immediacy is this — as the time gap from the commission of the crime to the arrest
widens, the pieces of information gathered are prone to become contaminated and subjected to
external factors, interpretations and hearsay. On the other hand, with the element of immediacy
imposed under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the police officer’s
determination of probable cause would necessarily be limited to raw or uncontaminated facts or
circumstances, gathered as they were within a very limited period of time. The same provision adds
another safeguard with the requirement of probable cause as the standard for evaluating these facts of
circumstances before the police officer could effect a valid warrantless arrest. In light of the discussion
above on the developments of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and
our jurisprudence on the matter, we hold that the following must be present for a valid warrantless
arrest: 1) the crime should have been just committed; and 2) the arresting officer’s exercise of
discretion is limited by the standard of probable cause to be determined from the facts and
circumstances within his personal knowledge. The requirement of the existence of probable
cause objectifies the reasonableness of the warrantless arrest for purposes of compliance with the
Constitutional mandate against unreasonable arrests.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; With these facts and circumstances that the police officers
gathered and which they have personally observed less than one hour from the time that they have
arrived at the scene of the crime until the time of the arrest of the petitioners, we deem it reasonable to
conclude that the police officers had personal knowledge of facts or circumstances justifying the
petitioners’ warrantless arrests.—To summarize, the arresting officers went to the scene of the crime
upon the complaint of Atty. Generoso of his alleged mauling; the police officers responded to the scene
of the crime less than one (1) hour after the alleged mauling; the alleged crime transpired in a
community where Atty. Generoso and the petitioners reside; Atty. Generoso positively identified the
petitioners as those responsible for his mauling and, notably, the petitioners and Atty. Generoso lived
almost in the same neighborhood; more importantly, when the petitioners were confronted by the
arresting officers, they did not deny their participation in the incident with Atty. Generoso, although they
narrated a different version of what transpired. With these facts and circumstances that the police
officers gathered and which they have personally observed less than one hour from the time that they
have arrived at the scene of the crime until the time of the arrest of the petitioners, we deem it
reasonable to conclude that the police officers had personal knowledge of facts
or circumstances justifying the petitioners’ warrantless arrests. These circumstances were well within
then police officers’ observation, perception and evaluation at the time of the arrest. These
circumstances qualify as the police officers’ personal observation, which are within their personal
knowledge, prompting them to make the warrantless arrests.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is enough that evidence of the recent commission of the
crime is patent (as in this case) and the police officer has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances, that the person to be arrested has recently committed the
crime.—To reiterate, personal knowledge of a crime just committed under the terms of the above cited
provision, does not require actual presence at the scene while a crime was being committed; it is
enough that evidence of the recent commission of the crime is patent (as in this case) and the police
officer has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances, that the
person to be arrested has recently committed the crime. Considering the circumstances of the stabbing,
particularly the locality where it took place, its occasion, the personal circumstances of the parties, and
the immediate on-the-spot investigation that took place, the immediate and warrantless arrests of the
perpetrators were proper. Consequently, the inquest proceeding that the City Prosecutor conducted
was appropriate under the circumstances.
Same; Same; Judgments; No less than the Constitution itself provides that it is the decision that
should state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. In resolving a motion, the
court is only required to state clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor.—We do not see any taint of
impropriety or grave abuse of discretion in this Order. The RTC, in resolving the motion, is not required
to state all the facts found in the record of the case. Detailed evidentiary matters, as the RTC decreed,
is best reserved for the full-blown trial of the case, not in the preliminary incidents leading up to the trial.
Additionally, no less than the Constitution itself provides that it is the decision that should state clearly
and distinctly thefacts and the law on which it is based. In resolving a motion, the court is only
required to state clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor. A contrary system would only prolong the
proceedings, which was precisely what happened to this case. Hence, we uphold the validity of the
RTC’s order as it correctly stated the reason for its denial of the petitioners’ Urgent Motion for Regular
Preliminary Investigation.
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
challenging the decision dated January 21, 2008 and the resolution dated April 17, 2008 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.G.R. S.P. No. 91541.
The appealed decision affirmed the Order dated March 16, 2005 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 96, Quezon City, denying Joey M. Pestilos, Dwight Macapanas,
Miguel Gaces, Jerry Fernandez, and Ronald Muñoz’s (petitioners) Urgent Motion for
Regular Preliminary Investigation, as well as their subsequent motion for reconsideration.
The Antecedent Facts
The records of the case reveal that on February 20, 2005, at around 3:15 in the
morning, an altercation ensued between the petitioners and Atty. Moreno Generoso (Atty.
Generoso) at Kasiyahan Street, Barangay Holy Spirit, Quezon City where the petitioners
and Atty. Generoso reside.
Atty. Generoso called the Central Police District, Station 6 (Batasan Hills Police Station)
to report the incident. Acting on this report, Desk Officer SPO1 Primitivo Monsalve (SPO1
Monsalve) dispatched SPO2 Dominador Javier (SPO2 Javier) to go to the scene of the
crime and to render assistance. SPO2 Javier, together with augmentation personnel from
the Airforce, A2C Alano Sayson and Airman Ruel Galvez, arrived at the scene of the crime
less than one hour after the alleged altercation6 and they saw Atty. Generoso badly beaten.
Atty. Generoso then pointed to the petitioners as those who mauled him. This prompted
the police officers to “invite” the petitioners to go to Batasan Hills Police Station for
investigation.
The petitioners went with the police officers to Batasan Hills Police Station. At the
inquest proceeding, the City Prosecutor of Quezon City found that the petitioners stabbed
Atty. Generoso with a bladed weapon. Atty. Generoso fortunately survived the attack.
In an Information dated February 22, 2005, the petitioners were indicted for attempted
murder allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 20th day of February, 2005, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said
accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one another, with
intent to kill, qualified with evident premeditation, treachery and taking advantage of
superior strength, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commence the
commission of the crime of Murder directly by overt acts, by then and there stabbing one
Atty. MORENO GENEROSO y FRANCO, with a bladed weapon, but said accused were
not able to perform all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of Murder by
reason of some cause/s or accident other than their own spontaneous desistance, that is,
said complainant was able to parry the attack, to his damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On March 7, 2005, the petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary
Investigation12 on the ground that they had not been lawfully arrested. They alleged that no
valid warrantless arrest took place since the police officers had no personal knowledge that
they were the perpetrators of the crime. They also claimed that they were just “invited” to
the police station. Thus, the inquest proceeding was improper, and a regular procedure for
preliminary investigation should have been performed pursuant to Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court.
On March 16, 2005, the RTC issued its order denying the petitioners’ Urgent Motion for
Regular Preliminary Investigation. The court likewise denied the petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration.
The petitioners challenged the lower court’s ruling before the CA on a Rule 65 petition
for certiorari. They attributed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, on the RTC for the denial of their motion for preliminary investigation.
The Assailed CA’s Decision
On January 21, 2008, the CA issued its decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit.
The CA ruled that the word “invited” in the Affidavit of Arrest executed by SPO2 Javier
carried the meaning of a command. The arresting officer clearly meant to arrest the
petitioners to answer for the mauling of Atty. Generoso. The CA also recognized that the
arrest was pursuant to a valid warrantless arrest so that an inquest proceeding was called
for as a consequence. Thus, the RTC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in
denying the Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation.
The CA saw no merit in the petitioners’ argument that the order denying the Urgent
Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation is void for failure to clearly state the facts and
the law upon which it was based, pursuant to Rule 16, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of
Court. The CA found that the RTC had sufficiently explained the grounds for the denial of
the motion.
The petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion in its
Resolution of April 17, 2008;18 hence, the present petition.
The Issues
The petitioners cited the following assignment of errors:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS WERE VALIDLY ARRESTED WITHOUT A
WARRANT.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS WERE LAWFULLY ARRESTED WHEN THEY
WERE MERELY INVITED TO THE POLICE PRECINCT.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE ORDER DENYING THE MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION IS VOID FOR FAILURE TO STATE THE FACTS AND THE LAW UPON
WHICH IT WAS BASED.
The petitioners primarily argue that they were not lawfully arrested. No arrest warrant
was ever issued; they went to the police station only as a response to the arresting officers’
invitation. They even cited the Affidavit of Arrest, which actually used the word “invited.”
The petitioners also claim that no valid warrantless arrest took place under the terms of
Rule 112, Section 7 of the Revised Rules of Court. The incident happened two (2) hours
before the police officers actually arrived at the crime scene. The police officers could not
have undertaken a valid warrantless arrest as they had no personal knowledge that the
petitioners were the authors of the crime.
The petitioners additionally argue that the RTC’s Order denying the Urgent Motion for
Regular Preliminary Investigation is void because it was not properly issued.
The Court’s Ruling
We find the petition unmeritorious and thus uphold the RTC Order. The criminal
proceedings against the petitioners should now proceed.
It is unfortunate that the kind of motion that the petitioners filed has to reach this Court
for its resolution. The thought is very tempting that the motion was employed simply to delay
the proceedings and that the use of Rule 65 petition has been abused.
But accepting things as they are, this delay can be more than compensated by fully
examining in this case the legalities surrounding warrantless warrants and establishing the
proper interpretation of the Rules for the guidance of the bench and the bar. These Rules
have evolved over time, and the present case presents to us the opportunity to retrace their
origins, development and the current applicable interpretation.
I. Brief history on warrantless arrests
The organic laws of the Philippines, specifically, the Philippine Bill of 1902, and the
1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions all protect the right of the people to be secure in their
persons against unreasonable searches and seizures. Arrest falls under the term “seizure.”
This constitutional mandate is identical with the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution
of the United States. The Fourth Amendment traces its origins to the writings of Sir Edward
Coke24and The Great Charter of the Liberties of England (Magna Carta Libertatum), sealed
under oath by King John on the bank of the River Thames near Windsor, England on June
15, 1215. The Magna Carta Libertatum limited the King of England’s powers and required
the Crown to proclaim certain liberties26 under the feudal vassals’ threat of civil war. The
declarations in Chapter 29 of the Magna Carta Libertatum later became the foundational
component of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. It provides:
No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseised29 of his Freehold, or
Liberties, or free Customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any otherwise destroyed; nor will
we not pass upon him, nor condemn him, but by lawful Judgment of his Peers, or by
the Law of the Land, We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either
Justice or Right. [Emphasis supplied]
In United States v. Snyder, the United States Supreme Court held that this constitutional
provision does not prohibit arrests, searches and seizures without judicial warrant, but only
those that are unreasonable. With regard to an arrest, it is considered a seizure, which
must also satisfy the test of reasonableness.
In our jurisdiction, early rulings of the Court have acknowledged the validity of
warrantless arrests. The Court based these rulings on the common law of America and
England that, according to the Court, were not different from the Spanish laws. These court
rulings likewise justified warrantless arrests based on the provisions of separate laws then
existing in the Philippines.
In 1905, the Court held in The United States v. Wilson that Section 37 of Act No. 183, or
the Charter of Manila, defined the arresting officer’s power to arrest without a warrant, at
least insofar as the City of Manila was concerned.
In The United States v. Vallejo, et al., the Court held that in the absence of any
provisions under statutes or local ordinances, a police officer who held similar functions as
those of the officers established under the common law of England and America, also had
the power to arrest without a warrant in the Philippines.
The Court also ruled in The United States v. Santos39 that the rules on warrantless
arrest were based on common sense and reason. It further held that warrantless arrest
found support under the then Administrative Code41 which directed municipal policemen to
exercise vigilance in the prevention of public offenses.
In The United States v. Fortaleza, the Court applied Rules 27, 28, 29 and 30 of the
Provisional Law for the Application of the Penal Code which were provisions taken from the
Spanish Law.
These rules were subsequently established and incorporated in our Rules of Court and
jurisprudence. Presently, the requirements of a warrantless arrest are now summarized in
Rule 113, Section 5 which states that:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.—A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be
proceeded against in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 112.
A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) above
has been denominated as one “in flagrante delicto,” while that under Section 5(b) has been
described as a “hot pursuit” arrest.
For purposes of this case, we shall focus on Section 5(b) — the provision applicable in
the present case. This provision has undergone changes through the years not just in its
phraseology but also in its interpretation in our jurisprudence.
We shall first trace the evolution of Section 5(b) and examine the applicable American
and Philippine jurisprudence to fully understand its roots and its appropriate present
application.
II. Evolution of Section 5(b), Rule 113
A. Prior to the 1940 Rules of Court
Prior to 1940, the Court based its rulings not just on American and English common law
principle on warrantless arrests but also on laws then existing in the Philippines.
In Fortaleza,45 the Court cited Rule 28 of the Provisional Law for the Application of the
Penal Code which provided that:
Judicial and administrative authorities have power to detain, or to cause to be
detained, persons whom there is reasonable ground to believe guilty of some
offense. It will be the duty of the authorities, as well as of their agents, to arrest:
First. Such persons as may be arrested under the provisions of Rule 27.
Second. A person charged with a crime for which the code provides a penalty greater
than that of confinamiento.
Third. A person charged with a crime for which the code provides a penalty less than
that of confinamiento, if his antecedents or the circumstances of the case would warrant
the presumption that he would fail to appear when summoned by the judicial authorities.
The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not apply, however, to a defendant
who gives sufficient bond, to the satisfaction of the authority or agent who may arrest him,
and who it may reasonably be presumed will appear whenever summoned by the judge
or court competent to try him.
Fourth. A person coining under the provisions of the preceding paragraph
may be arrested, although no formal complaint has been filed against him, provided
the following circumstances are present:
First. That the authority or agent had reasonable cause to believe that an
unlawful act, amounting to a crime had been committed.
Second. That the authority or agent had sufficient reason to believe that the
person arrested participated in the commission of such unlawful act or
crime. [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
In the same decision, the Court likewise cited Section 37 of the Charter of Manila, which
provided that certain officials, including police officers may, within the territory defined in
the law, pursue and arrest without warrant, any person found in suspicious places or
under suspicious circumstances, reasonably tending to show that such person has
committed, or is about to commit any crime or breach of the peace.
In Santos, the Court cited Miles v. Weston, which ruled that a peace officer may arrest
persons walking in the street at night when there is reasonable ground to suspect the
commission of a crime, although there is no proof of a felony having been
committed.
The Court ruled in Santos that the arresting officer must justify that there was
a probable cause for an arrest without a warrant. The Court defined probable cause as a
reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves as to warrant a reasonable man in believing that the accused is guilty. Besides
reasonable ground of suspicion, action in good faith is another requirement. Once these
conditions are complied with, the peace officer is not liable even if the arrested person
turned out to be innocent.
Based on these discussions, it appears clear that prior to the 1940 Rules of Court, it
was not necessary for the arresting officer to first have knowledge that a crime was actually
committed. What was necessary was the presence of reasonably sufficient grounds to
believe the existence of an act having the characteristics of a crime; and that the same
grounds exist to believe that the person sought to be detained participated in it. In addition,
it was also established under the old court rulings that the phrase “reasonable suspicion”
was tantamount to probable cause without which, the warrantless arrest would be invalid
and the arresting officer may be held liable for its breach.
In The U.S. v. Hachaw, the Court invalidated the warrantless arrest of a Chinaman
because the arresting person did not state in what way the Chinaman was acting
suspiciously or the particular act or circumstance which aroused the arresting person’s
curiosity.
It appears, therefore, that prior to the establishment in our Rules of Court of the
rules on warrantless arrests, the gauge for a valid warrantless arrest was the arresting
officer’s reasonable suspicion (probable cause) that a crime was committed and the person
sought to be arrested has participated in its commission. This principle left so much
discretion and leeway on the part of the arresting officer. However, the 1940 Rules of Court
has limited this discretion.
B. The 1940 Rules of Court (Restricting the arresting officer’s determination of
probable cause)
Rules 27 and 28 of the Provisional Law for the Application of the Penal Code were
substantially incorporated in Section 6, Rule 109 of the 1940 Rules of Court as follows:
SEC. 6. Arrest without warrant — When lawful.—A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about
to commit an offense in his presence;
(b) When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground
to believe that the person to be arrested hascommitted it;
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another. [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
These provisions were adopted in toto in Section 6, Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of
Court.
Notably, the 1940 and 1964 Rules have deviated from the old rulings of the Court. Prior
to the 1940 Rules, the actual commission of the offense was not necessary in determining
the validity of the warrantless arrest. Too, the arresting officer’s determination of probable
cause (or reasonable suspicion) applied both as to whether a crime has been
committed and whether the person to be arrested has committed it.
However, under the 1940 and the 1964 Rules of Court, the Rules required that there
should be actual commission of an offense, thus, removing the element of the
arresting officer’s “reasonable suspicion of the commission of an
offense.” Additionally, the determination of probable cause, or reasonable suspicion, was
limited only to the determination of whether the person to be arrested has committed the
offense. In other words, the 1940 and 1964 Rules of Court restricted the arresting officer’s
discretion in warrantless arrests under Section 6(b), Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of Court.
C. The more restrictive 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure
Section 6, Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of Court again underwent substantial changes
and was reworded and renumbered when it became Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules
of Criminal Procedure, to wit:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.—A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant
shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded
against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7. [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
As amended, Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Court retained the restrictions
introduced under the 1964 Rules of Court. More importantly, however, it added a
qualification that the commission of the offense should not only have been “committed” but
should have been “just committed.” This limited the arresting officer’s time frame for
conducting an investigation for purposes of gathering information indicating that the person
sought to be arrested has committed the crime.
D. The Present Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure was further amended
with the incorporation of the word “probable cause” as the basis of the arresting officer’s
determination on whether the person to be arrested has committed the crime.
Hence, as presently worded, Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides that:
When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based
on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it.
From the current phraseology of the rules on warrantless arrest, it appears that for
purposes of Section 5(b), the following are the notable changes: first, the contemplated
offense was qualified by the word “just,” connoting immediacy; and second, the warrantless
arrest of a person sought to be arrested should be based on probable cause to be
determined by the arresting officer based on his personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it.
It is clear that the present rules have ‘‘objectified” the previously subjective
determination of the arresting officer as to the (1) commission of the crime; and (2) whether
the person sought to be arrested committed the crime. According to Feria, these changes
were adopted to minimize arrests based on mere suspicion or hearsay.
As presently worded, the elements under Section 5(b), Rule 113of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure are: first, an offense has just been committed; and second, the
arresting officer has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it.
For purposes of this case, we shall discuss these elements separately below, starting
with the element of probable cause, followed by the elements that the offense has just been
committed, and the arresting officer’s personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed the crime.
i) First Element of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure: Probable cause
The existence of ‘‘probable cause” is now the “objectifier” or the determinant on how the
arresting officer shall proceed on the facts and circumstances, within his personal
knowledge, for purposes of determining whether the person to be arrested has committed
the crime.
i.a) U.S. jurisprudence on probable cause in warrantless arrests
In Payton v. New York, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment of the
Federal Constitution does not prohibit arrests without a warrant although such arrests must
be reasonable. According to State v. Quinn, the warrantless arrest of a person who was
discovered in the act of violating the law is not a violation of due process.
The U.S. Supreme Court, however indicated in Henry v. United States that the Fourth
Amendment limited the circumstances under which warrantless arrests may be made. The
necessary inquiry is not whether there was a warrant or whether there was time to
get one, but whether at the time of the arrest probable cause existed. The term
probable cause is synonymous to “reasonable cause” and “reasonable grounds.”
In determining the existence of probable cause, the arresting officer should make a
thorough investigation and exercise reasonable judgment. The standards for evaluating
the factual basis supporting a probable cause assessment are not less stringent in
warrantless arrest situation than in a case where a warrant is sought from a judicial
officer. The probable cause determination of a warrantless arrest is based on information
that the arresting officer possesses at the time of the arrest and not on the information
acquired later.
In evaluating probable cause, probability and not certainty is the determinant of
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment. Probable cause involves probabilities similar
to the factual and practical questions of everyday life upon which reasonable and prudent
persons act. It is a pragmatic question to be determined in each case in light of the
particular circumstances and the particular offense involved.
In determining probable cause, the arresting officer may rely on all the information in his
possession, his fair inferences therefrom, including his observations. Mere suspicion does
not meet the requirements of showing probable cause to arrest without warrant especially if
it is a mere general suspicion. Probable cause may rest on reasonably trustworthy
information as well as personal knowledge. Thus, the arresting officer may rely on
information supplied by a witness or a victim of a crime; and under the circumstances, the
arresting officer need not verify such information.
In our jurisdiction, the Court has likewise defined probable cause in the context of
Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
In Abelita III v. Doria, et al., the Court held that personal knowledge of facts must be
based on probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of
suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of
the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of
committing the offense is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A
reasonable suspicion, therefore, must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good
faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.
i.b) Probable cause under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, distinguished from probable cause in preliminary investigations and the
judicial proceeding for the issuance of a warrant of arrest
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to determine whether a crime has
been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is
guilty of the crime and should be held for trial.60 In Buchanan v. Viuda de Esteban, we
defined probable cause as the existence of facts and circumstances as would excite
the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the
prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.
In this particular proceeding, the finding of the existence of probable cause as to the
guilt of the respondent was based on the submitted documents of the complainant, the
respondent and his witnesses.
On the other hand, probable cause in judicial proceedings for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest is defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances that would
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been
committed by the person sought to be arrested.
Hence, before issuing a warrant of arrest, the judge must be satisfied that based on
the evidence submitted, there is sufficient proof that a crime has been committed and
that the person to be arrested is probably guilty thereof. At this stage of the criminal
proceeding, the judge is not yet tasked to review in detail the evidence submitted during the
preliminary investigation. It is sufficient that he personally evaluates the evidence in
determining probable cause63 to issue a warrant of arrest.
In contrast, the arresting officer’s determination of probable cause under Section
5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is based on his personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person sought to be arrested has committed
the crime. These facts or circumstances pertain to actual facts or raw evidence, i.e.,
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause
of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on
probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.
The probable cause to justify warrantless arrest ordinarily signifies a reasonable
ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with
which he is charged,64 or an actual belief or reasonable ground of suspicion, based on
actual facts.65
It is clear therefore that the standard for determining “probable cause” is invariable for
the officer arresting without a warrant, the public prosecutor, and the judge issuing a
warrant of arrest. It is the existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been
committed by the person sought to be arrested or held for trial, as the case may be.
However, while the arresting officer, the public prosecutor and the judge all determine
“probable cause,” within the spheres of their respective functions, its existence is
influenced heavily by the available facts and circumstance within their possession. In short,
although these officers use the same standard of a reasonable man, they possess
dissimilar quantity of facts or circumstances, as set by the rules, upon which they must
determine probable cause.
Thus, under the present rules and jurisprudence, the arresting officer should base his
determination of probable cause on his personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that
the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime; the public prosecutor and the
judge must base their determination on the evidence submitted by the parties.
In other words, the arresting officer operates on the basis of more limited facts,
evidence or available information that he must personally gather within a limited time frame.
Hence, in Santos, the Court acknowledged the inherent limitations of determining
probable cause in warrantless arrestsdue to the urgency of its determination in these
instances. The Court held that one should not expect too much of an ordinary policeman.
He is not presumed to exercise the subtle reasoning of a judicial officer. Oftentimes, he has
no opportunity to make proper investigation but must act in haste on his own belief to
prevent the escape of the criminal.
ii) Second and Third Elements of Section 5(b), Rule 113:
The crime has just been committed/personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it
We deem it necessary to combine the discussions of these two elements as our
jurisprudence shows that these were usually taken together in the Court’s determination of
the validity of the warrantless arrests that were made pursuant to Section 5(b), Rule 113 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
In Posadas v. Ombudsman, the killing of Dennis Venturina happened on December 8,
1994. It was only on December 11, 1994 that Chancellor Posadas requested the NBI’s
assistance. On the basis of the supposed identification of two (2) witnesses, the NBI
attempted to arrest Francis Carlo Taparan and Raymundo Narag three (3) days after the
commission of the crime. With this set of facts, it cannot be said that the officers have
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the persons sought to be arrested
committed the crime. Hence, the Court invalidated the warrantless arrest.
Similarly, in People v. Burgos, one Cesar Masamlok personally and voluntarily
surrendered to the authorities, stating that Ruben Burgos forcibly recruited him to become a
member of the NPA, with a threat of physical harm. Upon receipt of this information, a joint
team of PC-INP units was dispatched to arrest Burgos who was then plowing the field.
Indeed, the arrest was invalid considering that the only information that the police officers
had in effecting the arrest was the information from a third person. It cannot be also said in
this case that there was certainty as regards the commission of a crime.
In People v. Del Rosario, the Court held that the requirement that an offense
has just been committed means that there must be a large measure of immediacy between
the time the offense was committed and the time of the arrest. If there was an appreciable
lapse of time between the arrest and the commission of the crime, a warrant of arrest must
be secured.
The Court held that the arrest of del Rosario did not comply with these requirements
because he was arrested only a day after the commission of the crime and not immediately
thereafter. Additionally, the arresting officers were not present and were not actual
eyewitnesses to the crime. Hence, they had no personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the person to be arrested had committed the offense. They became aware of del Rosario’s
identity as the driver of the getaway tricycle only during the custodial investigation.
In People v. Cendana, the accused was arrested one (1) day after the killing of the
victim and only on the basis of information obtained from unnamed sources. The unlawful
arrest was held invalid.
In Rolito Go v. Court of Appeals, the arrest of the accused six (6) days after the
commission of the crime was held invalid because the crime had not just been committed.
Moreover, the “arresting” officers had no “personal knowledge” of facts indicating that the
accused was the gunman who had shot the victim. The information upon which the police
acted came from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting; one stated that
the accused was the gunman; another was able to take down the alleged gunman’s car’s
plate number which turned out to be registered in the name of the accused’s wife. That
information did not constitute “personal knowledge.”
In People v. Tonog, Jr., the warrantless arrest which was done on the same day was
held valid. In this case, the arresting officer had knowledge of facts which he personally
gathered in the course of his investigation, indicating that the accused was one of the
perpetrators.
In People v. Gerente, the policemen arrested Gerente only about three (3) hours after
Gerente and his companions had killed the victim. The Court held that the policemen had
personal knowledge of the violent death of the victim and of facts indicating that Gerente
and two others had killed him. The warrantless arrest was held valid.
In People v. Alvario, the warrantless arrest came immediately after the arresting officers
received information from the victim of the crime. The Court held that the personal
knowledge of the arresting officers was derived from the information supplied by the victim
herself who pointed to Alvario as the man who raped her at the time of his arrest. The Court
upheld the warrantless arrest.
 In People v. Jayson, there was a shooting incident. The policemen who were
summoned to the scene of the crime found the victim. The informants pointed to the
accused as the assailant only moments after the shooting. The Court held that the arresting
officers acted on the basis of personal knowledge of the death of the victim and of facts
indicating that the accused was the assailant. Thus, the warrantless arrest was held valid.
In People v. Acol, a group held up the passengers in a jeepney and the policemen
immediately responded to the report of the crime. One of the victims saw four persons
walking towards Fort Bonifacio, one of whom was wearing his jacket. The victim pointed
them to the policemen. When the group saw the policemen coming, they ran in different
directions. The Court held that the arrest was valid.
In Cadua v. Court of Appeals, there was an initial report to the police concerning a
robbery. A radio dispatch was then given to the arresting officers, who proceeded to Alden
Street to verify the authenticity of the radio message. When they reached the place, they
met with the complainants who initiated the report about the robbery. Upon the officers’
invitation, the victims joined them in conducting a search of the nearby area where the
accused was spotted in the vicinity. Based on the reported statements of the complainants,
he was identified as a logical suspect in the offense just committed. Hence, the arrest was
held valid.
In Doria, the Court held that Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure does not require the arresting officers to personally witness the commission of
the offense.
In this case, P/Supt. Doria alleged that his office received a telephone call from a
relative of Rosa Sia about a shooting incident. He dispatched a team headed by SPO3
Ramirez to investigate the incident. SPO3 Ramirez later reported that a certain William Sia
was wounded while Judge Abelita III, who was implicated in the incident, and his wife just
left the place of the incident. P/Supt. Doria looked for Abelita III and when he found him, he
informed him of the incident report. P/Supt. Doria requested Abelita III to go with him to the
police headquarters as he had been reported to be involved in the incident. Abelita III
agreed but suddenly sped up his vehicle and proceeded to his residence where P/Supt.
Doria caught him up as he was about to run towards his house.
The police officers saw a gun in the front seat of the vehicle beside the driver’s seat as
Abelita III opened the door. They also saw a shotgun at the back of the driver’s seat. The
police officers confiscated the firearms and arrested Abelita III. The Court held that the
petitioner’s act of trying to get away, coupled with the incident report which they
investigated, were enough to raise a reasonable suspicion on the part of the police
authorities as to the existence of probable cause.
Based on these discussions, it appears that the Court’s appreciation of the elements
that “the offense has just been committed” and ‘‘personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances that the person to be arrested committed it” depended on the particular
circumstances of the case.
However, we note that the element of “personal knowledge of facts or circumstances”
under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires
clarification.
The phrase covers facts or, in the alternative, circumstances. According to the Black’s
Law Dictionary,80 “circumstances are attendant or accompanying facts, events or
conditions.” Circumstances may pertain to events or actions within the actual perception,
personal evaluation or observation of the police officer at the scene of the crime. Thus, even
though the police officer has not seen someone actually fleeing, he could still make a
warrantless arrest if, based on his personal evaluation of the circumstances at the scene of
the crime, he could determine the existence of probable cause that the person sought to be
arrested has committed the crime. However, the determination of probable cause and the
gathering of facts or circumstances should be made immediately after the commission of
the crime in order to comply with the element of immediacy.
In other words, the clincher in the element of “personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances” is the required element of immediacy within which these facts or
circumstances should be gathered. This required time element acts as a safeguard to
ensure that the police officers have gathered the facts or perceived the circumstances
within a very limited time frame. This guarantees that the police officers would have no time
to base their probable cause finding on facts or circumstances obtained after an exhaustive
investigation.
The reason for the element of the immediacy is this — as the time gap from the
commission of the crime to the arrest widens, the pieces of information gathered are prone
to become contaminated and subjected to external factors, interpretations and hearsay. On
the other hand, with the element of immediacy imposed under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the police officer’s determination of probable cause
would necessarily be limited to raw or uncontaminated facts or circumstances, gathered
as they were within a very limited period of time. The same provision adds another
safeguard with the requirement of probable cause as the standard for evaluating these facts
of circumstances before the police officer could effect a valid warrantless arrest.
In light of the discussion above on the developments of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and our jurisprudence on the matter, we hold that the
following must be present for a valid warrantless arrest: 1) the crime should have been
just committed; and 2) the arresting officer’s exercise of discretion is limited by the standard
of probable cause to be determined from the facts and circumstances within his personal
knowledge. The requirement of the existence of probable cause objectifies the
reasonableness of the warrantless arrest for purposes of compliance with the Constitutional
mandate against unreasonable arrests.
Hence, for purposes of resolving the issue on the validity of the warrantless arrest of the
present petitioners, the question to be resolved is whether the requirements for a valid
warrantless arrest under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
were complied with, namely: 1) has the crime just been committed when they were
arrested? 2) did the arresting officer have personal knowledge of facts and circumstances
that the petitioners committed the crime? and 3) based on these facts and circumstances
that the arresting officer possessed at the time of the petitioners’ arrest, would a
reasonably discreet and prudent person believe that the attempted murder of Atty.
Generoso was committed by the petitioners?
We rule in the affirmative.

III. Application of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
in the present case: there was a valid warrantless arrest
We deem it necessary to review the records of the CA because it has misapprehended
the facts in its decision.81 From a review of the records, we conclude that the police officers
had personal knowledge of facts or circumstances upon which they had properly
determined probable cause in effecting a warrantless arrest against the petitioners. We
note, however, that the determination of the facts in the present case is purely limited to the
resolution of the issue on the validity of the warrantless arrests of the petitioners.
Based on the police blotter82 entry taken at 4:15 a.m. on February 20, 2005, the date
that the alleged crime was committed, the petitioners were brought in for investigation at the
Batasan Hills Police Station. The police blotter stated that the alleged crime was committed
at 3:15 a.m. on February 20, 2005, along Kasiyahan St., Brgy. Holy Spirit, Quezon City.
The time of the entry of the complaint in the police blotter at 4:15 a.m., with Atty.
Generoso and the petitioners already inside the police station, would connote that the arrest
took place less than one hour from the time of the occurrence of the crime. Hence, the CA
finding that the arrest took place two (2) hours after the commission of the crime is
unfounded.
The arresting officers’ personal observation of Atty. Generoso’s bruises when they
arrived at the scene of the crime is corroborated by the petitioners’ admissions that Atty.
Generoso indeed suffered blows from petitioner Macapanas and his brother Joseph
Macapanas83 although they asserted that they did it in self-defense against Atty. Generoso.
Atty. Generoso’s bruises were also corroborated by the Medico-Legal Certificate84 that
was issued by East Avenue Medical Center on the same date of the alleged mauling. The
medical check-up of Atty. Generoso that was made about 8:10 a.m. on the date of the
incident, showed the following findings: Contusion Hematoma, Left Frontal Area; Abrasion,
T6 area, right midclavicular line periorbital hematoma, left eye; Abrasion, distal
3rd posterolateral aspect of right forearm; Abrasion, 4th and fifth digit, right hand; Abrasion
on area of 7th rib (L ant. Chest wall), tenderness on L peripheral area, no visible abrasion.
In addition, the attending physician, Dr. Eva P. Javier, diagnosed Atty. Generoso
of contusion hematoma, periorbital L., and traumatic conjunctivitis, o.s.
To summarize, the arresting officers went to the scene of the crime upon the complaint
of Atty. Generoso of his alleged mauling; the police officers responded to the scene of the
crime less than one (1) hour after the alleged mauling; the alleged crime transpired in a
community where Atty. Generoso and the petitioners reside; Atty. Generoso positively
identified the petitioners as those responsible for his mauling and, notably, the petitioners
and Atty. Generoso lived almost in the same neighborhood; more importantly, when the
petitioners were confronted by the arresting officers, they did not deny their participation in
the incident with Atty. Generoso, although they narrated a different version of what
transpired.
With these facts and circumstances that the police officers gathered and which they
have personally observed less than one hour from the time that they have arrived at the
scene of the crime until the time of the arrest of the petitioners, we deem it reasonable to
conclude that the police officers had personal knowledge of facts or circumstances justifying
the petitioners’ warrantless arrests. These circumstances were well within then police
officers’ observation, perception and evaluation at the time of the arrest. These
circumstances qualify as the police officers’ personal observation, which are within their
personal knowledge, prompting them to make the warrantless arrests.
Similar to the factual antecedents in Jayson,88 the police officers in the present case
saw Atty. Generoso in his sorry bloodied state. As the victim, he positively identified the
petitioners as the persons who mauled him; however, instead of fleeing like what happened
in Jayson, the petitioners agreed to go with the police officers.
This is also similar to what happened in People v. Tonog, Jr. where Tonog did not flee
but voluntarily went with the police officers. More than this, the petitioners in the present
case even admitted to have been involved in the incident with Atty. Generoso, although they
had another version of what transpired.
In determining the reasonableness of the warrantless arrests, it is incumbent upon the
courts to consider if the police officers have complied with the requirements set under
Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, specifically, the
requirement of immediacy; the police officer’s personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances; and lastly, the propriety of the determination of probable cause that the
person sought to be arrested committed the crime.
The records show that soon after the report of the incident occurred, SPO1 Monsalve
immediately dispatched the arresting officer, SPO2 Javier, to render personal assistance to
the victim. This fact alone negates the petitioners’ argument that the police officers did not
have personal knowledge that a crime had been committed — the police immediately
responded and had personal knowledge that a crime had been committed.
To reiterate, personal knowledge of a crime just committed under the terms of the
above cited provision, does not require actual presence at the scene while a crime was
being committed; it is enough that evidence of the recent commission of the crime is patent
(as in this case) and the police officer has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances, that the person to be arrested has recently committed
the crime.
Considering the circumstances of the stabbing, particularly the locality where it took
place, its occasion, the personal circumstances of the parties, and the immediate on-the-
spot investigation that took place, the immediate and warrantless arrests of the perpetrators
were proper. Consequently, the inquest proceeding that the City Prosecutor conducted was
appropriate under the circumstances.
IV. The term “invited” in the Affidavit of Arrest is construed to mean as an
authoritative command
After the resolution of the validity of the warrantless arrest, the discussion of the
petitioners’ second issue is largely academic. Arrest is defined as the taking of a person into
custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. An
arrest is made by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested, or by his submission to
the custody of the person making the arrest.91Thus, application of actual force, manual
touching of the body, physical restraint or a formal declaration of arrest is not required. It is Notes.—A valid warrantless arrest which justifies a subsequent search is one that is carried out
enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other and the under the parameters of Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court which requires that the
intent of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that mission is necessary. apprehending officer must have been spurred by probable cause to arrest a person caught in flagrante
delicto. (Martinez vs. People, 690 SCRA 656 [2013])
Notwithstanding the term “invited” in the Affidavit of Arrest,93SPO2 Javier could not but Having established the validity of the warrantless arrest in this case, the Supreme Court holds that
have the intention of arresting the petitioners following Atty. Generoso’s account. SPO2 the warrantless seizure of the illegal drugs from the appellant is likewise valid. (People vs. Vasquez,
Javier did not need to apply violent physical restraint when a simple directive to the 714 SCRA 78 [2014])
petitioners to follow him to the police station would produce a similar effect. In other words,
the application of actual force would only be an alternative if the petitioners had exhibited
resistance. ——o0o——
To be sure, after a crime had just been committed and the attending policemen have
acquired personal knowledge of the incidents of the crime, including the alleged
perpetrators, the arrest of the petitioners as the perpetrators pointed to by the victim, was
not a mere random act but was in connection with a particular offense. Furthermore, SPO2
Javier had informed the petitioners, at the time of their arrest, of the charges against them
before taking them to Batasan Hills Police Station for investigation.

V. The Order denying the motion for preliminary investigation is valid

In their last ditch attempt at avoidance, the petitioners attack the RTC Order denying the
petitioners’ urgent motion for regular preliminary investigation for allegedly having been
issued in violation of Article VIII, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 16, Section 3
of the Revised Rules of Court.

The RTC, in its Order dismissing the motion, clearly states that the Court is not
persuaded by the evidentiary nature of the allegations in the said motion of the accused.
Aside from lack of clear and convincing proof, the Court, in the exercise of its sound
discretion on the matter, is legally bound to pursue and hereby gives preference to the
speedy disposition of the case.

We do not see any taint of impropriety or grave abuse of discretion in this Order. The
RTC, in resolving the motion, is not required to state all the facts found in the record of the
case. Detailed evidentiary matters, as the RTC decreed, is best reserved for the full-blown
trial of the case, not in the preliminary incidents leading up to the trial.

Additionally, no less than the Constitution itself provides that it is the decision that
should state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. In resolving
a motion, the court is only required to state clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor. A
contrary system would only prolong the proceedings, which was precisely what happened to
this case. Hence, we uphold the validity of the RTC’s order as it correctly stated the reason
for its denial of the petitioners’ Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition, and

hereby AFFIRM the decision dated January 21, 2008 and the resolution dated April 17,
2008 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 91541. The City Prosecutor of Quezon
City is hereby ORDERED to proceed with the criminal proceedings against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
 G.R. Nos. 95847-48. March 10, 1993
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GABRIEL GERENTE y BULLO,
accused-appellant.
Constitutional Law; Illegal Search and Seizure; Search and Seizure incident to a lawful arrest,
considered valid.—The appellant contends that the trial court erred in admitting the marijuana leaves as
evidence in violation of his constitutional right not to be subjected to illegal search and seizure, for the
dried marijuana leaves were seized from him in the course of a warrantless arrest by the police officers.
We do not agree. The search of appellant's person and the seizure of the marijuana leaves in his
possession were valid because they were incident to a lawful warrantless arrest.
Criminal Procedure; Warrantless Arrest; Personal knowledge on commission of crime by
policemen makes warrantless arrest effected, likewise lawful.—The policemen arrested Gerente only
some three (3) hours after Gerente and his companions had killed Blace. They saw Blace dead in the
hospital and when they inspected the scene of the crime, they found the instruments of death: a piece
of wood and a concrete hollow block which the killers had used to bludgeon him to death. The eye-
witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, reported the happening to the policemen and pinpointed her neighbor,
Gerente, as one of the killers. Under those circumstances, since the policemen had personal
knowledge of the violent death of Blace and of facts indicating that Gerente and two others had killed
him, they could lawfully arrest Gerente without a warrant. If they had postponed his arrest until they
could obtain a warrant, he would have fled the law as his two companions did.
Same; Same; Search conducted as an incident to valid arrest lawful; Rationale.—The search
conducted on Gerente's person was likewise lawful because it was made as an incident to a valid
arrest. This is in accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court. xxx The frisk and
search of appellant's person upon his arrest was a permissible precautionary measure of arresting
officers to protect themselves, for the person who is about to be arrested may be armed and might
attack them unless he is first disarmed.
Criminal Law; Murder; Conspiracy; Conspiracy proven, the act of one becomes the act of all;
Case at bar.—What Dr. Bernales stated was a mere possibility that only one person dropped the
concrete hollow block on the head of the victim, smashing it. That circumstance, even if true, does not
absolve the other two coconspirators in the murder of Blace for when there is a conspiracy to commit a
crime, the act of one conspirator is the act of all. The conspiracy was proven by the eyewitness-
testimony of Edna Edwina Reyes, that she overheard the appellant and his companions conspire to kill
Blace, that acting in concert, they attacked their victim with a piece of wood and a hollow block and
caused his death.
Same; Same; Same; Evidence; Credibility of Witnesses; Testimony of prosecution witness
entitled to full faith and credit in the absence of proof that said witness moved by improper motive.—
When there is no evidence indicating that the principal witness for the prosecution was moved by
improper motive, the presumption is that he was not so moved and his testimony is entitled to full faith
and credit" (People vs. Belibet, 199 SCRA 587, 588). Hence, the trial court did not err in giving full
credit to Edna Reyes' testimony.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila,
Branch 172, which found the appellant guilty of Violation of Section 8 of Republic Act 6425
(Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for
a term of twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to twenty (20) years, as
maximum; and also found him guilty of Murder for which crime he was sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The dispositive portion of the appealed decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing the Court finds the accused Gabriel Gerente in
Criminal Case No. 10255-V-90 guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 8
of R.A. 6425 and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of twelve
years and one day as minimum to twenty years as maximum, and a fine of twelve
thousand, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
"In Criminal Case No. 10256-V-90, the Court finds the accused Gabriel Gerente guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, and there by (sic) no aggravating
circumstances nor mitigating circumstances, is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua; to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the sum of P30,000.00, and in
the amount of P17,609.00 as funeral expenses, without subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The accused Gabriel Gerente shall be credited with
the full term of his preventive imprisonment." (p. 25, Rollo.)
Appellant Gabriel Gerente y Bullo was charged with violation of Section 8, Art. II of R.A.
6425, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 10255-V-90 of the Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila. The Information reads:
"That on or about the 30th day of April, 1990, in the municipality of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, without justification, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
in his possession and control dried flowering tops wrapped in \foil with markings and place
in a transparent plastic bag which are considered prohibited drugs." (p. 2, Rollo.)
The same accused, together with Totoy and Fredo Echigoren who are both at large, was
charged with Murder in Criminal Case No. 10256-V-90 in an information of the same date
and signed by the same Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, as follows:
"That on or about the 30th day of April, 1990, in the municipality of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused together with two (2) others who are still at large and against whom the
preliminary investigation has not yet been terminated by the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Bulacan, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one
another, armed with a piece of wood and hallow (sic) block and with intent to kill one
Clarito B. Blace, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with evident
premeditation and treachery, attack, assault and hit with the said piece of wood and hollow
block the said Clarito B. Blace, hitting the latter on the different parts of his body, thereby
inflicting serious physical injuries which directly caused the death of the said victim." (p.
3, Rollo.)
Edna Edwina Reyes testified that at about 7:00 a.m. of April 30, 1990, appellant Gabriel
Gerente, together with Fredo Echigoren and Totoy Echigoren, started drinking liquor and
smoking marijuana in the house of the appellant which is about six (6) meters away from
the house of the prosecution witness who was in her house on that day. She overheard the
three men talking about their intention to kill Clarito Blace. She testified that she heard
Fredo Echigoren saying, "Gabriel, papatayin natin si Clarito Blace," and Totoy Echigoren
allegedly seconded Fredo's suggestion saying: "Papatayin natin 'yan mamaya." Appellant
allegedly agreed: "Sigue, papatayin natin mamaya." (pp. 3-4, tsn, August 24, 1990.)
Fredo and Totoy Echigoren and Gerente carried out their plan to kill Clarito Blace at
about 2:00 p.m. of the same day. The prosecution witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, testified
that she witnessed the killing. Fredo Echigoren struck the first blow against Clarito Blace,
followed by Totoy Echigoren and Gabriel Gerente who hit him twice with a piece of wood in
the head and when he fell, Totoy Echigoren dropped a hollow block on the victim's head.
Thereafter, the three men dragged Blace to a place behind the house of Gerente.
 At about 4:00 p.m. of the same day, Patrolman Jaime Urrutia of the Valenzuela Police
Station received a report from the Palo Police Detachment about a mauling incident. He
went to the Valenzuela District Hospital where the victim was brought. He was informed by
the hospital officials that the victim died on arrival. The cause of death was massive fracture
of the skull caused by a hard and heavy object. Right away, Patrolman Urrutia, together
with Police Corporal Romeo Lima and Patrolman Alex Umali, proceeded to Paseo de Blas
where the mauling incident took place. There they found a piece of wood with blood stains,
a hollow block and two roaches of marijuana. They were informed by the prosecution
witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, that she saw the killing and she pointed to Gabriel Gerente
as one of the three men who killed Clarito.
The policemen proceeded to the house of the appellant who was then sleeping. They
told him to come out of the house and they introduced themselves as policemen. Patrolman
Urrutia frisked appellant and found a coin purse in his pocket which contained dried leaves
wrapped in cigarette foil. The dried leaves were sent to the National Bureau of Investigation
for examination. The Forensic Chemist found them to be marijuana.
Only the appellant, Gabriel Gerente, was apprehended by the police. The other
suspects, Fredo and Totoy Echigoren, are still at large.
On May 2, 1990, two separate informations were filed by Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Benjamin Caraig against him for Violation of Section 8, Art. II, of R.A. 6425, and
for Murder.
When arraigned on May 16, 1990, the appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. A
joint trial of the two cases was held. On September 24, 1990, the trial court rendered a
decision convicting him of Violation of Section 8 of R.A. 6425 and of Murder.
In this appeal of the appellant, the following errors are ascribed to the trial court:
1.the court a quo gravely erred in admitting the marijuana leaves adduced in evidence by
the prosecution; and2. the court a quo gravely erred in convicting the accused appellant
of the crimes charged despite the absence of evidence required to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
The appellant contends that the trial court erred in admitting the marijuana leaves as
evidence in violation of his constitutional right not to be subjected to illegal search and
seizure, for the dried marijuana leaves were seized from him in the course of a warrantless
arrest by the police officers. We do not agree.
The search of appellant's person and the seizure of the marijuana leaves in his
possession were valid because they were incident to a lawful warrantless arrest.
Paragraphs (a) and (b), Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court provide:
'Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.—A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
"(a)When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
"(b)When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; x x
x.
The policemen arrested Gerente only some three (3) hours after Gerente and his
companions had killed Blace. They saw Blace dead in the hospital and when they inspected
the scene of the crime, they found the instruments of death: a piece of wood and a concrete
hollow block which the killers had used to bludgeon him to death. The eye-witness, Edna
Edwina Reyes, reported the happening to the policemen and pinpointed her neighbor,
Gerente, as one of the killers. Under those circumstances, since the policemen had
personal knowledge of the violent death of Blace and of facts indicating that Gerente and
two others had killed him, they could lawfully arrest Gerente without a warrant. If they had
postponed his arrest until they could obtain a warrant, he would have fled the law as his two
companions did.
In Umil vs. Ramos, 187 SCRA 311, the arrest of the accused without a warrant was
effected one (1) day after he had shot to death two Capcom soldiers. The arrest was held
lawful by this Court upon the rationale stated by us in People vs. Malasugui, 63 Phil. 221,
228, thus:
"To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and searched for the evidence and
tokens of his crime without a warrant, would be to leave society, to a large extent, at the
mercy of the shrewdest, the most expert, and the most depraved of criminals, facilitating
their escape in many instances."
The search conducted on Gerente's person was likewise lawful because it was made as an
incident to a valid arrest. This is in accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the Revised
Rules of Court which provides:
"Section 12. Search incident to lawful arrest.—A person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of an offense, without a search warrant."
The frisk and search of appellant's person upon his arrest was a permissible precautionary
measure of arresting officers to protect themselves, for the person who is about to be
arrested may be armed and might attack them unless he is first disarmed. In Adams vs.
Williams, 47 U.S. 143, cited in Justice Isagani A. Cruz's Constitutional Law, 1991 Edition, p.
150, it was ruled that "the individual being arrested may be frisked for concealed weapons
that may be used against the arresting officer and all unlawful articles found in his person,
or within his immediate control may be seized."
There is no merit in appellant's allegation that the trial court erred in convicting him of
having conspired and cooperated with Fredo and Totoy Echigoren to kill Blace despite the
testimony of Dr. Valentin Bernales that the fracture on the back of the victim's skull could
have been inflicted by one person only.
What Dr. Bernales stated was a mere possibility that only one person dropped the
concrete hollow block on the head of the victim, smashing it. That circumstance, even if
true, does not absolve the other two co-conspirators in the murder of Blace for when there
is a conspiracy to commit a crime, the act of one conspirator is the act of all. The conspiracy
was proven by the eyewitness-testimony of Edna Edwina Reyes, that she overheard the
appellant and his companions conspire to kill Blace, that acting in concert, they attacked
their victim with a piece of wood and a hollow block and caused his death. When there is no
evidence indicating that the principal witness for the prosecution was moved by improper
motive, the presumption is that he was not so moved and his testimony is entitled to full
faith and credit" (People vs. Belibet, 199 SCRA 587, 588). Hence, the trial court did not err
in giving full credit to Edna Reyes' testimony.
 Appellant's failure to escape (because he was very drunk) is no indicium of his
innocence.

The Solicitor General correctly pointed out in the appellee's brief that the award of
P30,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of Clarito Blace should be increased to
P50,000.00 in accordance with our ruling in People vs. Sison, 189 SCRA 643.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with modification of the

civil indemnity awarded to the heirs of the victim, Clarito Blace, which is hereby increased to
P50,000.00.
SO ORDERED.

Note.—Where search was made without a warrant, the marijuana cigarette or cigarettes seized in
the raid were inadmissible in evidence (People vs. Zapanta, 195 SCRA 200).

——o0o——
 A.M. No. RTJ-16-2472. January 24, 2017.
(formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 13-4141-RTJ)
JUDGE MARTONINO R. MARCOS (Retired), complainant, vs. HON. PERLA V.
CABRERA-FALLER, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, Dasmariñas City,
Cavite, respondent.
Administrative Law; Judges; Judge Cabrera-Faller demonstrated lack of knowledge and
understanding of the basic rules of procedure when she issued the questioned orders.—Without a
quibble, Judge Cabrera-Faller demonstrated lack of knowledge and understanding of the basic rules of
procedure when she issued the questioned orders.
Same; Same; Archiving of Cases; Administrative Circular (A.C.) No. 7-A-92 enumerated the
circumstances when a judge may order the archiving of a criminal case.—Judge Cabrera-Faller
violated Administrative Circular No. 7-A-92 when she issued the June 3, 2013 Order directing the
immediate archiving of Criminal Case No. 11862-13, after ordering the issuance of the warrants of
arrest against the accused in the same order. The archiving of cases is a generally acceptable measure
designed to shelve cases but is done only where no immediate action is expected. A.C. No. 7-A-92
enumerated the circumstances when a judge may order the archiving of a criminal case as follows: (a)
If after the issuance of the warrant of arrest, the accused remains at large for six (6) months from the
delivery of the warrant to the proper peace officer, and the latter has explained the reason why the
accused was not apprehended; or (b) When proceedings are ordered suspended for an indefinite
period because: (1) the accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which
effectively renders him unable to fully understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently, or to
undergo trial, and he has to be committed to a mental hospital; (2) a valid prejudicial question in a civil
action is invoked during the pendency of the criminal case unless the civil and the criminal cases are
consolidated; and 3) an interlocutory order or incident in the criminal case is elevated to, and is pending
resolution/decision for an indefinite period before a higher court which has issued a temporary
restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction; and 4) when the accused has jumped bail before
arraignment and cannot be arrested by his bondsman.
Same; Same; Same; When Judge Cabrera-Faller issued the warrants, she also archived the
case. She, however, did not cite any ground in Administrative Circular (A.C.) No. 7-A-92 for the
suspension of the proceedings.—When Judge Cabrera-Faller issued the warrants, she also archived
the case. She, however, did not cite any ground in A.C. No. 7-A-92 for the suspension of the
proceedings. What she did was unprecedented. She did not even bother to wait for the return of the
warrants or wait for the six (6)-month period. By doing so, she exhibited bias, if not incompetence and
ignorance of the law and jurisprudence. It could also be that she knew it, but she opted to completely
ignore the law or the regulations. Certainly, it was a case of grave abuse of discretion as her
actuations were not in accord with law or justice.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Probable Cause; In the judicial determination of probable
cause, no less than the Constitution mandates a judge to personally determine the existence of
probable cause before issuing a warrant of arrest.—Judge Cabrera-Faller showed manifest bias and
partiality, if not gross ignorance of the law, when she issued the June 13, 2013 Order recalling the
warrants of arrest against accused Alim, Amante and Rosales claiming that they were issued
inadvertently. In the judicial determination of probable cause, no less than the Constitution mandates a
judge to personally determine the existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant of arrest. This
has been embodied in Section 2, Article III of the Philippine Constitution and Section 6, Rule 112 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Clearly, Judge Cabrera-Faller was mandated to personally evaluate the
report and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor regarding the existence of probable
cause and, on the basis thereof, to issue a warrant of arrest. Though she was not required to personally
examine the complainant or his witnesses, she was obliged to personally evaluate the report and the
supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor before ordering the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
In the June 13, 2013 Order, Judge Cabrera-Faller recalled the warrants of arrest against three of the
accused. She, however, failed to explain why she issued the warrants inadvertently. She merely wrote
that the warrants of arrest were “inadvertently issued” without any explanation why there was such
inadvertence in the issuance. The Court cannot accept this. There was clearly an abdication of the
judicial function. The records of the case were forwarded by the OCP and they contained not only the
information but all the supporting documents like the statement of Cornelio Marcelo and the
corroborating statements of Cabansag and Ragaza and those of Rene Andaya and Roger Atienza, the
farm overseers at the Veluz Farm.
Administrative Law; Judges; When the inefficiency springs from failure to consider so basic and
elemental a rule, law or principle in the discharge of duties, the judge is either insufferably incompetent
and undeserving of the position she holds or is too vicious that the oversight or omission was
deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority.—As the presiding judge, it was
her task, upon the filing of the Information, to first and foremost determine the existence or
nonexistence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused. It was incumbent upon her to assess the
resolution, affidavits and other supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor to satisfy herself that
probable cause existed and before a warrant of arrest could be issued against the accused. If she did
find the evidence submitted by the prosecutor to be insufficient, she could order the dismissal of the
case, or direct the investigating prosecutor either to submit more evidence or to submit the entire
records of the preliminary investigation, or she could even call the complainant and the witness to
answer the courts probing questions to enable her to discharge her duty. Most probably, she did her
duty to examine and analyze the attached documents but because she took pity on the young accused
(never mind the victim), she chose to ignore or disregard them. Nonetheless, “when the inefficiency
springs from failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, law or principle in the discharge
of duties, the judge is either insufferably incompetent and undeserving of the position she
holds or is too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in
grave abuse of judicial authority.”
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Information; The well-settled rule that once a complaint or
information is filed before the trial court, any disposition of the case, whether as to its dismissal or
the conviction or acquittal of the accused, rests on the sound discretion of the said court is not
absolute.—Judge Cabrera-Faller should be held administratively accountable for hastily dismissing the
Criminal Case No. 11862-13. The Court cannot ignore her lack of prudence for it is the Court’s duty to
protect and preserve public confidence in our judicial system. The well-settled rule that once a
complaint or information is filed before the trial court, any disposition of the case, whether as to its
dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused, rests on the sound discretion of the said court is
not absolute. Although a motion to dismiss the case or withdraw the Information is addressed to the
court, its grant or denial must always be in the faithful exercise of judicial discretion and
prerogative. For the judge’s action must neither impair the substantial rights of the accused nor
the right of the State and the offended party to due process of law.
Administrative Law; Judges; Precipitate dismissal of the case, in the face of overwhelming
evidence, can only raise quizzical eyebrows.—Considering the strong evidence on hand presented by
the OCP, it would have been more prudent for Judge Cabrera-Faller to conduct summary hearings in
view of the conflicting statements of the prosecution and defense witnesses. Although this is not
actually required by the rules, when the direct and circumstantial evidence are so detailed and
corroborative of one another in every particular, it behooved upon her to make further inquiries.
Precipitate dismissal of the case, in the face of overwhelming evidence, can only raise quizzical
eyebrows. Indeed, in her Omnibus Order dismissing the case, her reasoning that there was no
probable cause was strained and taxed one’s credulity. As earlier stated, Judge Cabrera-Faller wrote
that the statement of Marcelo simply depicted the stages of initiation rites and failed to show that the
accused conspired to inflict fatal injuries on Marc Andrei. Despite the admission on the part of the
accused that initiation rites were indeed conducted on July 29, 2012 and that they were present in the
different stages of the initiation rites, she brushed aside these admissions and the narrations of the
prosecution witnesses and simply opted to believe the claim of the accused that it was Marcelo, and
Marcelo alone, who inflicted the fatal blow on his recruit.
 Criminal Law; Hazing; The Anti-Hazing Law; Under Section 4 of Republic Act (RA) No. 8049, if
the person subjected to hazing or other forms of initiation rites suffers any physical injury or dies as a
result thereof, the officers and members of the fraternity, sorority or organization who actually
participated in the infliction of physical harm shall be liable as principals, and the officers and members
present during the hazing are prima facie presumed to have actually participated, unless it can be
shown that he or she prevented the commission of the punishable acts.—Judge Cabrera-Faller should
know that the presence or absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter
of defense that may be passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits. A hearing is absolutely
indispensable before a judge can properly determine whether the prosecution’s evidence is strong or
weak. Under Section 4 of R.A. No. 8049, if the person subjected to hazing or other forms of initiation
rites suffers any physical injury or dies as a result thereof, the officers and members of the fraternity,
sorority or organization who actually participated in the infliction of physical harm shall be liable as
principals, and the officers and members present during the hazing are prima facie presumed to
have actually participated, unless it can be shown that he or she prevented the commission of the
punishable acts. This disputable presumption arises from the mere presence of the offender during the
hazing. Judge Cabrera-Faller must be reminded that a finding of probable cause does not require an
inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed
that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged for it would be unfair to require
the prosecution to present all the evidence needed to secure the conviction of the accused upon the
filing of the information against the latter.
Administrative Law; Judges; A judge may dismiss the case for lack of probable cause only in
clear-cut cases when the evidence on record plainly fails to establish probable cause — that is when
the records readily show uncontroverted, and thus, established facts which unmistakably negate the
existence of the elements of the crime charged.—A judge may dismiss the case for lack of probable
cause only in clear-cut cases when the evidence on record plainly fails to establish probable cause —
that is when the records readily show uncontroverted, and thus, established facts which unmistakably
negate the existence of the elements of the crime charged. Hazing is commonly characterized by
secrecy and silence and to require the prosecution to indicate every step of the planned initiation rite in
the information at the inception of the criminal case would be a strenuous task. Although a speedy
determination of an action or proceeding implies a speedy trial, it should be borne in mind that speed is
not the chief objective of a trial. It must be stressed that a careful and deliberate consideration for the
administration of justice is more important than a race to end the trial.
Same; Same; Gross Ignorance of the Law; When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to
his office to simply apply it; anything less than that would be constitutive of gross ignorance of the
law.—Time and again, the Court has earnestly reminded judges to be extra prudent and circumspect in
the performance of their duties. This exalted position entails a lot of responsibilities, foremost of which
is proficiency in the law. They are expected to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with
statutes and procedural rules and to apply them properly in all good faith. When the law is sufficiently
basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply apply it; anything less than that would be
constitutive of gross ignorance of the law.
Same; Same; Grave Abuse of Authority; The immediate archiving of Criminal Case No. 11862-
13, the recall of the warrant of arrest which she claimed were issued inadvertently and the hasty
dismissal of the case displayed her lack of competence and probity, and can only be considered as
grave abuse of authority.—Judges are duty-bound to render just, correct and impartial decisions at all
times in a manner free of any suspicion as to his fairness, impartiality or integrity. The records must be
free from the slightest suspicion that the trial court seized upon an opportunity to either free itself from
the usual burdens of presiding over a full-blown court battle or worse, to give undue advantage or
favors to one of the litigants. Public confidence in the Judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper
conduct of judges. The appearance of bias or prejudice can be as damaging to public confidence and
the administration of justice as actual bias or prejudice. Thus, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
requires a judge to be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence. They are likewise
mandated to be faithful to the law and to maintain professional competence at all times. A judge owes
the public and the court the duty to be proficient in the law. He is expected to keep abreast of the laws
and prevailing jurisprudence. Basic rules must be at the palms of their hands for ignorance of the law
by a judge can easily be the mainspring of injustice. Unfortunately, Judge Cabrera-Faller fell short of
this basic canon. Her utter disregard of the laws and rules of procedure, to wit: the immediate archiving
of Criminal Case No. 11862-13, the recall of the warrant of arrest which she claimed were issued
inadvertently and the hasty dismissal of the case displayed her lack of competence and probity, and
can only be considered as grave abuse of authority. All these constitute gross ignorance of the law and
incompetence.
Same; Same; Dismissal from the Service; Considering the blatant violation of the law and rules
committed by Judge Cabrera-Faller and her grievous exercise of discretion, the appropriate penalty
should be dismissal from the service, with forfeiture of retirement benefits, except leave credits, and
with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including
government-owned and -controlled corporations (GOCCs).—Under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, gross ignorance of the law is a serious charge, punishable
by dismissal from service, suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three
(3) but not exceeding six (6) months, or a fine of more than twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) but
not exceeding forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00). In the case of Chua Keng Sin v. Judge Mangente,
750 SCRA 262 (2015), the respondent judge was found guilty of gross ignorance of the law due to
procedural lapses in disposing the motions in the criminal case pending before his sala. The Court
stated that his careless disposition of the motions was a reflection of his incompetence as a judge in
discharging his official duties, thus, he could not be relieved from the consequences of his actions
simply because he was a newly appointed judge and his case load was heavy. Accordingly,
considering the blatant violation of the law and rules committed by Judge Cabrera-Faller and her
grievous exercise of discretion, the appropriate penalty should be dismissal from the service, with
forfeiture of retirement benefits, except leave credits, and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch
or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned and -controlled corporations.
Per Curiam:
Before the Court is an administrative complaint1 against Judge Perla V. Cabrera-Faller
(Judge Cabrera-Faller) of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, Dasmariñas City, Cavite
(RTC), filed by Martonino R. Marcos, a retired judge (complainant), for ignorance of the law,
misconduct, violation of the anti-graft and corrupt practices act, and for knowingly rendering
an unjust judgment/order.
The Antecedents
The controversy stemmed from the death of complainant’s grandson, Marc Andrei
Marcos (Marc Andrei), during the initiation rites of Lex Leonum Fratemitas (Lex Leonum)
held on July 29, 2012 at the Veluz Farm, Dasmariñas City, Cavite.
A preliminary investigation was conducted and, thereafter, the Office of the City
Prosecutor (OCP) issued its Resolution, dated May 8, 2013, recommending the prosecution
of several members of Lex Leonum for Violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8049, otherwise
known as The Anti-Hazing Law. In the same resolution, the OCP also recommended that
Cornelio Marcelo (Marcelo), the person assigned to be the buddy or “angel” of Marc Andrei
during the initiation rites, be discharged as a state witness pursuant to the provisions of
Section 12 of R.A. No. 6981.
Thereafter, the Information4 for Violation of R.A. No. 8049 was filed against Jenno
Antonio Villanueva (Villanueva), Emmanuel Jefferson Santiago, Richard Rosales (Rosales),
Mohamad Fyzee Alim (Alim), Chino Daniel Amante (Amante), Julius Arsenio Alcancia,
Edrich Gomez, Dexter Circa, Gian Angelo Veluz, Glenn
Meduen, alias Tanton, alias Fidel, alias E.R., and alias Paulo, before the RTC. The case
was docketed as Criminal Case No. 11862-13.
Finding probable cause to sustain the prosecution of the accused, Judge Cabrera-Faller
issued the Order, dated June 3, 2013, directing the issuance of a warrant of arrest and, at
the same time, the archiving of the entire record of the case until the arrest of the
accused.
On June 13, 2013, acting on the Omnibus Motion filed by Rosales, Alim and Amante,
Judge Cabrera-Faller issued another Order6 directing the recall of the warrants of arrest
of the three accused which she claimed were issued inadvertently.
On August 15, 2013, acting on the separate motions for the determination of probable
cause and to withhold issuance of warrants of arrest7 and extremely urgent motion to quash
warrant of arrest8 filed by the accused, Judge Cabrera-Faller issued the Omnibus Order,
quashing, lifting and setting aside the warrants for their arrest and
ultimately dismissing the case against all of them for lack of probable cause.
According to Judge Cabrera-Faller, she found no probable cause to indict the accused
for violation of R.A. No. 8049 as the statement of Marcelo and those of the other accused
“were not put in juxtaposition with each other for a clearer and sharper focus of their
respective weight and substance.” To her, “there were nagging questions left unanswered
by the testimony of Marcelo and some improbabilities therein that boggle the mind and
disturb the conscience into giving it absolute currency and credence.” In her view, “the
statement of Marcelo simply depicted the stages of initiation rites” and failed to show that
the accused conspired to inflict fatal injuries on Marc Andrei. She found the statements of
the prosecution witnesses, Marcelo Cabansag (Cabansag) and Jan Marcel V. Ragaza
(Ragaza) either untruthful, immaterial and incompetent or brimming with flip-flopping
testimonies. She brushed aside the admission of the accused that initiation rites were
indeed conducted on July 29, 2012 and that they were allegedly present in the different
stages of the initiation rites, and simply believed the version of the accused that it was
Marcelo, the recruiter and “angel’’ of Marc Andrei, who inflicted the fatal blows on him,
causing his death. Thus, the decretal portion of the Omnibus Order reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the court holds to grant the motions filed by the
following accused, to wit:
(a) The motion for determination of probable cause filed by the accused Gian Veluz
and Edrich Gomez, which was received by this court on May 20, 2013;
](b) The motion for determination of probable cause, filed by the accused Julius
Arsenio A. Alcancia and Dexter S. Garcia;
(c) The motion for the determination of probable cause, filed by the accused
Mahammad Fyzee Alim, Richard Rosales and Chino Amante, which was received
by this court on May 23, 2013; although a warrant was issued inadvertently
against the accused on June 3, 2013, the same was lifted and recalled in view of
the subject motion;
(d) The motion for the determination of probable cause, filed by Emmanuel Jefferson
A. Santiago, which was received by this court on May 29, 2013, although a warrant
was issued inadvertently against the accused on June 3, 2013; the same was
lifted and recalled in view of the subject motion; [and]
(e) The extremely urgent motion to quash the warrant of arrest, filed by the accused
Jenno Antonio Villanueva on June 14, 2013.
ACCORDINGLY, the warrant for the arrest, dated June 3, 2013, is hereby quashed,
lifted and set aside, and this case is hereby DISMISSEDinsofar as all the accused named
in the information is concerned, for the reasons already aforestated.
SO ORDERED. [Emphases supplied]
The order of dismissal prompted complainant to file this administrative case against
Judge Cabrera-Faller. In his Letter-Complaint, he alleged, among others, that:
1. On June 3, 2013, the Hon. Perla V. Cabrera-Faller issued an Order in Crim. Case
No. 11862-13 stating that “Finding probable cause to sustain the prosecution of the above
named accused for the crime charged in the criminal information, let a warrant for their
arrest be issued, in the meantime sent the entire record of this case to the ARCHIVES
until the said accused shall have been arrested.”
However, on June 13, 2013, the Hon. Perla V. Cabrera-Faller issued another order
recalling the warrant against accused Emmanuel Jefferson A. Santiago because the
same was allegedly INADVERTENTLY issued.
The actuations of the Hon. Perla V. Cabrera-Faller clearly demonstrate her
incompetence and gross ignorance of the law and jurisprudence. Section 6, Rule 112 of
the Rules of Court provides that “the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the
prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the
evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause,
he shall issue a warrant of arrest.” When she issued the Order dated June 3, 2013, she
certified that she personally evaluated the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting
evidence and ruled that there was probable cause so she directed the issuance of
warrants of arrest against all the accused. When she subsequently held that the warrant
of arrest was inadvertently issued against accused Emmanuel Jefferson A. Santiago,
does this mean that she did not personally evaluate the records of the case before
directing the issuance of a warrant of arrest against all the accused? Does this mean that
the warrants of arrests issued against all the other accused were also INADVERTENTLY
issued? Does this mean that the Order dated June 3, 2013 finding probable cause against
all the other accused was likewise INADVERTENTLY issued considering the fact that the
basis for the issuance of the warrants of arrest against all the accused is the said order
dated June 3, 2013? A judge who issues a warrant of arrest INADVERTENTLY has no
place in the judiciary because such actuation clearly shows her incompetence and gross
ignorance of both substantive and procedural laws.
The Hon. Perla V. Cabrera-Faller could likewise not claim that the warrant of arrest
was INADVERTENTLY issued because of the filing of the Omnibus Motion by accused
Emmanuel Jefferson A. Santiago. It must be pointed out that when the Hon. Perla V.
Cabrera-Faller issued the Order, dated June 3, 2013, finding probable cause against all
the accused and directed the issuance of a warrant of arrest against all the accused, the
said motion was already filed with the Honorable Court. Despite the fact that the said
Omnibus Motion was already filed with the court, the Hon. Perla V. Cabrera-Faller still
found probable cause and directed the issuance of warrants of arrests against all the
accused in its Order dated June 3, 2013. Consequently, it could not be said that the
warrant of arrest issued against the accused was INADVERTENTLY issued. It could
only be surmised that there are far more other reasons why the warrant of arrest
was recalled but definitely not due to its alleged INADVERTENT issuance. Unless,
of course, the Hon. Perla V. Cabrera-Faller admits issuing the Order dated June 3, 2013
without evaluating the resolution of the public prosecutor and its supporting evidence.
Very clearly, the Hon. Perla V. Cabrera-Faller manifested her incompetence and/or
gross ignorance of the law by issuing the Order, dated June 13, 2013. She was probably
swayed by reasons not based on the law but probably for some other reasons to the great
damage and prejudice of the relatives of Marc Andrei Marcos whose life was lost at such
a very young age.
xxxx
2. On August 15, 2013, Hon. Perla V. Cabrera-Faller again issued an Omnibus Order
in Criminal Case No. 11862-13 quashing, lifting and setting aside the warrant of arrest,
dated June 3, 2013, and dismissingthe case against all the accused in Criminal Case
No. 11862-13. In issuing the said Omnibus Order, the Hon. Perla V. Cabrera-Faller again
demonstrated her incompetence and/or gross ignorance of the law as well as manifest
biased in favor of the accused in the said case.
In dismissing the case against the accused, the Hon. Perla V. Cabrera-Faller ruled in
its Findings and Conclusions that Marcelo’s statement and the statements of the accused
were not put in juxtaposition with each other for a clearer and sharper focus of their
respective weight and substance. She then further held that the information in Criminal
Case No. 11862-13 was filed by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Dasmariñas City only
on the basis of the lone statement of Cornelio Marcelo, without any corroborating
testimony and that the Office of the City Prosecutor of Dasmariñas City, Cavite, was
swayed by public pulse, considering the media mileage caused by the incident. These
rulings of the Hon. Perla V. Cabrera-Faller are based solely on her own conjectures
and pre-determined decision to dismiss the case as clearly shown by the fact that
she recalled the warrants of arrests she earlier directed to be issued even without
conducting hearings and without waiting for any comment from the public and
private prosecutors.
A perusal of the Resolution, dated March 1, 2013, will readily show that the counter-
affidavits of the accused who submitted their counter-affidavits were duly considered in
the issuance of the resolution. In fact, a summary of their allegations were even put in the
body of the said Resolution. While the Office of the City Prosecutor of Dasmariñas City,
Cavite, might not have presented the resolution in the format desired by the Hon. Perla
V. Cabrera-Faller, it does not mean that the Office of the City Prosecutor did not weigh
the substance of the statements of the accused and the witnesses presented for purposes
of determining probable cause. The ruling of the Hon. Perla V. Cabrera-Faller that the
information in the case was filed by the Office of the City Prosecutor only on the basis of
the statement of Cornelio Marcelo, without any corroborating testimony, likewise shows
her incompetence and manifests biased in favor of the accused. The statement of
Cornelio Marcelo was corroborated by the statements of Manuel Adrian Cabansag
and Jan Marcel V. Ragasa. A perusal of the statements of the said neophytes clearly
shows that they were subjected to hazing, together with the late Marc Andrei Marcos and
other neophytes, at the Veluz Farm in Dasmariñas City, Cavite, by the members of the
Lex Leonum Fraternity. The fact of hazing at the Veluz Farm was likewise
corroborated by statements of Rene Andaya and Roger Atienza, farm overseers at
the Veluz Farm. Consequently, the sweeping ruling by the Hon. Perla V. Cabrera-
Faller that the information was filed only on the basis of the statement of Cornelio
Marcelo, without corroborating testimony, and that the Office of the City Prosecutor
was swayed by public pulse is absolutely false and without any basis.
In dismissing the case, the Hon. Perla V. Cabrera-Faller likewise held that the
statement of Marcelo merely depicted the stages of the initiation rites. However, she
conceded that there were physical infliction of the neophytes but further ruled that the
statement did not as much show that the accused conspired to inflict fatal injuries on this
particular neophyte, Andrei Marcos, and further ruled that conspiracy was not even
established. She further ruled that the story of Marcelo that the neophytes were subjected
to excessive beating with paddles and belts during the initiation rites is incredible and
uncorroborated. These rulings of the Hon. Perla V. Cabrera-Faller show
her incompetence and gross ignorance as a judge. Contrary to said rulings of the
Hon. Perla V. Cabrera-Faller, the statement of Cornelio Marcelo did not just depict the
stages of initiation rites but detailed what was actually done to Marc Andrei Marcos and
other neophytes during the initiation rites which resulted to the death of the late Marc
Andrei Marcos. This was corroborated by the statement of Manuel Adrian Cabansag and
Jan Marcel V. Ragasa. Cornelio Marcelo stated that Marc Andrei Marcos was hit with
paddle, belt, and/or punched on the thighs and upper arms during the different parts of
the initiation rites. This was corroborated by the statements of Manuel Adrian Cabansag
and Jan Marcel V. Ragasa, two (2) neophytes who underwent initiation rites with Marc
Andrei Marcos and other neophytes, who stated that they were likewise beaten with
paddle at their thighs and/or arms during the different stages of the initiation rites. Very
clearly, the Hon. Perla V. Cabrera-Faller is incompetent and/or blindfolded just like the
neophytes and failed or refused to see that the statement of Cornelio Marcelo was
corroborated by the statements of Manuel Adrian Cabansag and Jan Marcel V. Ragasa.
The Hon. Perla V. Cabrera-Faller likewise ruled that the statement of Marcelo did not
show that the accused have conspired to inflict fatal injuries on this particular neophyte,
Andrei Marcos, then proceeds to posit the question “Is it reasonable and normal to
suppose that all the accused resolved to paddle and hit Andrei Marcos to death?” Then
ruled finally that no one is to be blamed for the death of Andrei Marcos. These rulings of
the Hon. Perla V. Cabrera-Faller clearly shows her incompetence and gross
ignorance of our existing laws. It likewise shows her manifest bias in favor of the
accused in this case. Section 4 of RA 8049 provides that “If the person subjected to
hazing or other forms of initiation rites suffers any physical injury or dies as a result
thereof, the officers and members of the fraternity, sorority or organization who
actually participated in the infliction of physical harm shall be liable as principals
x x x.” Based on this provision of law, there is no need to prove that the accused has
conspired to inflict fatal injuries to Marc Andrei Marcos during the latter’s initiation
rites. There is no need to prove that the accused resolved to paddle and hit Marc
Andrei Marcos to death. It is more than sufficient to prove that Marc Andrei Marcos
was subjected to hazing and initiation rites and he died as a result thereof. In
fact, mere presence during the hazing or initiation rites is already a prima facie
evidence of the participation therein as principal unless he prevented the
commission of the acts (Section 4, RA 8049).
The Hon. Perla V. Cabrera-Faller then ruled that she “cannot somehow consign the
above named accused to a life of untold infamy and cannot in conscience consign all the
accused to the dustbin of history simply on the basis of the uncorroborated and incredible
lone statement of Cornelio Marcelo” and proceeded to dismiss the case. In coming up
with this ruling and dismissing the case, the Hon. Perla V. Cabrera-Faller again
manifested her incompetence and gross ignorance of existing laws. It must be pointed
out that the Hon. Perla V. Cabrera-Faller is only called upon to determine the existence
of probable cause for purposes of the issuance of warrants of arrest against the accused.
She is not being called upon yet to determine the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt. As held by the Supreme Court in Pp. v. CA, et al. (G.R. No. 126005, January 21,
1999), the judge should not override the public prosecutor’s determination of probable
cause to hold an accused for trial on the ground that the evidence presented to
substantiate the issuance of an arrest warrant was insufficient. If the information is valid
on its face, and there is no showing of manifest error, grave abuse of discretion and
prejudice on the part of the public prosecutor, the trial court should respect such
determination. The Supreme Court further held in the same case that the rights of the
people from what could sometimes be an “oppressive” exercise of government
prosecutorial powers do need to be protected when circumstances so require. But just as
we recognize this need, we also acknowledge that the State must likewise be accorded
due process. Thus, when there is no showing of nefarious irregularity or manifest error in
the performance of a public prosecutor’s duties, courts ought to refrain from interfering
with such lawfully and judicially mandated duties. [Emphases and underscoring supplied]
In her Very Respectful Comment, Judge Cabrera-Faller denied the accusations and
asserted that:
3) The undersigned very respectfully honors the grief of this grandfather who lost a
beloved grandson, but, charging the undersigned judge administratively for performing a
judicial function would cause a heavy toll on this respondent judge that always tries her
best to dispose of cases pending in the Regional Trial Court of Dasmariñas City, Branch
90, with justice and equity, regardless of the personalities involved in a particular case;
4) The grapevine, as well as newspaper accounts, has it that the private
complainant in Criminal Case No. 11862-13 has already received settlement from
all of the accused, except for the self-proclaimed witness for the prosecution, Cornelio
 Marcelo, allegedly for the amount of 5 million pesos, and now Mr. Martonino R. Marcos
charges the undersigned with his perceived notions of corruption and dishonesty. If the
alleged “pay-off” is true, then, the cries of injustice of Mr. Martonino R. Marcos has
become a charade.
The undersigned respondent judge humbly and modestly states that the questioned
order is a twenty-page resolution, where the respective postures of the parties were
explicitly and painstakingly incorporated, and in the mind of the undersigned respondent
judge, negates corruption, malicious rendering of an unjust judgment and any signs of
shoddy disposition of the case. The private complainant has remedies under the law to
question the order of this court in Criminal Case No. 11862-13 for violation of the Anti-
Hazing Law; in fact, the private complainant, through its private counsel, had filed a motion
for reconsideration of the order of this court, and dated August 15, 2013, which is yet
pending resolution.
Jurisprudence held that the “alleged errors committed by a judge pertaining to the
exercise of his adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through administrative
proceedings but should instead be assailed through judicial remedies. (A.M. No. MTJ-
001311, 459 Phil. 214 [2003])” [Emphasis supplied]
In his Reply, complainant insisted that Judge Cabrera-Faller did not simply commit an
error of judgment but she knowingly rendered an unjust judgment which was contrary to
law, and prayed that she be held accountable for having committed patent gross ignorance
of the law, grave abuse of discretion and complete disregard of the law and the rules of
criminal procedure. Furthermore, complainant denied that they had been paid the amount of
P5 million pesos and asserted that Judge Cabrera-Faller should not have believed or given
credence to the “pay-off,” which she heard from the “grapevine.” “Pay-off” was a term that
she should not have even used as it did not exist under the rules of criminal procedure.
Granting that there was a “pay-off,” Judge Cabrera-Faller should know the basic rule that
payment of civil liability was not equivalent to dismissal of the criminal case.
Report of the OCA
In its Report, dated June 10, 2016, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found
Judge Cabrera-Faller liable for gross ignorance of the law [1] for inadvertently issuing the
warrants of arrest against the accused; [2] for sending the record of the case to the
archives, even prior to the return/report that the accused could not be apprehended in
violation of the six (6)-month period under Administrative Circular (A.C.) No. 7-A-92; and [3]
for precipitately dismissing Criminal Case No. 11862-13. The OCA recommended that
Judge Cabrera-Faller be suspended from the service for a period of six (6) months without
salary and other benefits.
The Ruling of the Court
The findings of the OCA are well-taken, but the Court differs as to the recommended
penalty.
Without a quibble, Judge Cabrera-Faller demonstrated lack of knowledge and
understanding of the basic rules of procedure when she issued the questioned orders.
A. On the immediate archiving of Criminal Case No. 11862
Judge Cabrera-Faller violated Administrative Circular No. 7-A-92 when she issued the
June 3, 2013 Order directing the immediate archiving of Criminal Case No. 11862-13, after
ordering the issuance of the warrants of arrest against the accused in the same order. The
archiving of cases is a generally acceptable measure designed to shelve cases but is done
only where no immediate action is expected.2 A.C. No. 7-A-92 enumerated the
circumstances when a judge may order the archiving of a criminal case as follows:
(a) If after the issuance of the warrant of arrest, the accused remains at large for six (6)
months from the delivery of the warrant to the proper peace officer, and the latter has
explained the reason why the accused was not apprehended; or
(b) When proceedings are ordered suspended for an indefinite period because:
(1) the accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which
effectively renders him unable to fully understand the charge against him and
to plead intelligently, or to undergo trial, and he has to be committed to a
mental hospital;
(2) a valid prejudicial question in a civil action is invoked during the pendency of
the criminal case unless the civil and the criminal cases are consolidated; and
(3) an interlocutory order or incident in the criminal case is elevated to, and is
pending resolution/decision for an indefinite period before a higher court which
has issued a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction; and
(4) when the accused has jumped bail before arraignment and cannot be arrested
by his bondsman.
When Judge Cabrera-Faller issued the warrants, she also archived the case. She,
however, did not cite any ground in A.C. No. 7-A-92 for the suspension of the proceedings.
What she did was unprecedented. She did not even bother to wait for the return of the
warrants or wait for the six-month period. By doing so, she exhibited bias, if not
incompetence and ignorance of the law and jurisprudence. It could also be that she knew it,
but she opted to completely ignore the law or the regulations. Certainly, it was a case
of grave abuse of discretion as her actuations were not in accord with law or justice.
B. On the recall of the warrants of arrest that were allegedly issued inadvertently
Judge Cabrera-Faller showed manifest bias and partiality, if not gross ignorance of the
law, when she issued the June 13, 2013 Order recalling the warrants of arrest against
accused Alim, Amante and Rosales claiming that they were issued inadvertently.
In the judicial determination of probable cause, no less than the Constitution mandates
a judge to personally determine the existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant of
arrest. This has been embodied in Section 2, Article III of the Philippine Constitution and
Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Clearly, Judge Cabrera-Faller was mandated to personally evaluate the report and the
supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor regarding the existence of probable
cause and, on the basis thereof, to issue a warrant of arrest. Though she was not required
to personally examine the complainant or his witnesses, she was obliged to personally
evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor before
ordering the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
In the June 13, 2013 Order, Judge Cabrera-Faller recalled the warrants of arrest against
three of the accused. She, however, failed to explain why she issued the warrants
inadvertently. She merely wrote that the warrants of arrest were “inadvertently issued”
without any explanation why there was such inadvertence in the issuance. The Court
cannot accept this. There was clearly an abdication of the judicial function. The records of
the case were forwarded by the OCP and they contained not only the information but all the
supporting documents like the statement of Cornelio Marcelo and the corroborating
statements of Cabansag and Ragaza and those of Rene Andaya and Roger Atienza, the
farm overseers at the Veluz Farm.
It could only mean that she failed to comply with her constitutional mandate to
personally determine the existence of probable cause before ordering the issuance of the
warrants of arrest. As the presiding judge, it was her task, upon the filing of the Information,
to first and foremost determine the existence or nonexistence of probable cause for the
arrest of the accused.23 It was incumbent upon her to assess the resolution, affidavits and
other supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor to satisfy herself that probable
cause existed and before a warrant of arrest could be issued against the accused. 24 If she
did find the evidence submitted by the prosecutor to be insufficient, she could order the
dismissal of the case, or direct the investigating prosecutor either to submit more evidence
or to submit the entire records of the preliminary investigation, or she could even call the
complainant and the witness to answer the courts probing questions to enable her to
discharge her duty.
Most probably, she did her duty to examine and analyze the attached documents but
because she took pity on the young accused (never mind the victim), she chose to ignore or
disregard them. Nonetheless, “when the inefficiency springs from failure to consider so
basic and elemental a rule, law or principle in the discharge of duties, the judge is
either insufferably incompetent and undeserving of the position she holds or is too
vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave
abuse of judicial authority.”
C. On the hasty dismissal of Criminal Case No. 11862-13
In the same vein, Judge Cabrera-Faller should be held administratively accountable for
hastily dismissing the Criminal Case No. 11862-13. The Court cannot ignore her lack of
prudence for it is the Court’s duty to protect and preserve public confidence in our judicial
system.
The well-settled rule that once a complaint or information is filed before the trial court,
any disposition of the case, whether as to its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the
accused, rests on the sound discretion of the said court 26 is not absolute. Although a motion
to dismiss the case or withdraw the Information is addressed to the court, its grant or denial
must always be in the faithful exercise of judicial discretion and prerogative. For the judge’s
action must neither impair the substantial rights of the accused nor the right of the
State and the offended party to due process of law. In the case of People v. Court of
Appeals, the Court elucidated:
We are simply saying that, as a general rule, if the information is valid on its face and
there is no showing of manifest error, grave abuse of discretion or prejudice on the part
of the public prosecutor, courts should not dismiss it for “want of evidence,” because
evidentiary matters should be presented and heard during the trial. The functions and
duties of both the trial court and the public prosecutor in “the proper scheme of things” in
our criminal justice system should be clearly understood.
The rights of the people from what could sometimes be an “oppressive” exercise of
government prosecutorial powers do need to be protected when circumstances so
require. But just as we recognize this need, we also acknowledge that the State must
likewise be accorded due process. Thus, when there is no showing of nefarious
irregularity or manifest error in the performance of a public prosecutor’s duties, courts
ought to refrain from interfering with such lawfully and judicially mandated duties.
In the present case, the Court agrees with the observation of the OCA that there was
haste in the disposition of Criminal Case No. 11862-13. It must be noted that the
Information for the said case was instituted by the OCP on May 10, 2013. Thereafter, on
June 3, 2013, Judge Cabrera-Faller issued the order finding probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest. Barely 10 days had lapsed, however, or on June 13, 2013,
she recalled the warrants of arrest against three (3) accused due to oversight or
inadvertence. And on August 15, 2013, in the Omnibus Order, she lifted the warrants of
arrest she issued and dismissed the case for lack of probable cause.
Although no direct evidence was presented to show that Judge Cabrera-Faller was
influenced by improper considerations, the Court cannot close its eyes in the manner by
which Criminal Case No. 11862-13 was dismissed. Her actuations put in serious doubts her
integrity and honesty, both as a person and a member of the Bench, qualities which every
magistrate should possess.
Judge Cabrera-Faller dismissed Criminal Case No. 11862-13 without taking into
consideration the earlier resolution of the OCP and failed to evaluate the evidence in
support thereof, which sustained a finding of probable cause against the accused.
A perusal of the records would show that the OCP resolution was based on
the Sinumpaang Salaysay32 and the Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay33 executed by
Marcelo, who recounted in detail the initiation rites that transpired on July 29, 2012, and his
participation as the designated “buddy or angel” of Marc Andrei, and enumerated the names
of those who were present and participated in the said initiation rites. This testimony of
Marcelo was corroborated by the two neophytes who were also present during the initiation
rites, Cabansag34 and Ragaza.35 In their respective statements, they bravely narrated their
harrowing experience on that fateful night. The sworn statements and affidavits of these
prosecution witnesses all presented a consistent and coherent version of the events that
took place on July 29, 2012.
Considering the strong evidence on hand presented by the OCP, it would have been
more prudent for Judge Cabrera-Faller to conduct summary hearings in view of the
conflicting statements of the prosecution and defense witnesses. Although this is not
actually required by the rules, when the direct and circumstantial evidence are so detailed
and corroborative of one another in every particular, it behooved upon her to make further
inquiries. Precipitate dismissal of the case, in the face of overwhelming evidence, can only
raise quizzical eyebrows.
Indeed, in her Omnibus Order dismissing the case, her reasoning that there was no
probable cause was strained and taxed one’s credulity. As earlier stated, Judge Cabrera-
Faller wrote that the statement of Marcelo simply depicted the stages of initiation rites and
failed to show that the accused conspired to inflict fatal injuries on Marc Andrei. Despite the
admission on the part of the accused that initiation rites were indeed conducted on July 29,
2012 and that they were present in the different stages of the initiation rites, she brushed
aside these admissions and the narrations of the prosecution witnesses and simply opted to
believe the claim of the accused that it was Marcelo, and Marcelo alone, who inflicted the
fatal blow on his recruit.

Judge Cabrera-Faller should know that the presence or absence of the elements of the
crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may be passed upon after a
full-blown trial on the merits. A hearing is absolutely indispensable before a judge can
properly determine whether the prosecution’s evidence is strong or weak. Under Section 4
of R.A. No. 8049, if the person subjected to hazing or other forms of initiation rites suffers
any physical injury or dies as a result thereof, the officers and members of the fraternity,
sorority or organization who actually participated in the infliction of physical harm shall be
liable as principals, and the officers and members present during the hazing are prima
facie presumed to have actually participated, unless it can be shown that he or she
prevented the commission of the punishable acts. This disputable presumption arises from
the mere presence of the offender during the hazing.
Judge Cabrera-Faller must be reminded that a finding of probable cause does not
require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is
enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense
charged39for it would be unfair to require the prosecution to present all the evidence needed
to secure the conviction of the accused upon the filing of the information against the latter.
A judge may dismiss the case for lack of probable cause only in clear-cut cases when
the evidence on record plainly fails to establish probable cause — that is when the records
readily show uncontroverted, and thus, established facts which unmistakably negate the
existence of the elements of the crime charged.
Hazing is commonly characterized by secrecy and silence and to require the
prosecution to indicate every step of the planned initiation rite in the information at the
inception of the criminal case would be a strenuous task. Although a speedy determination
of an action or proceeding implies a speedy trial, it should be borne in mind that speed is
not the chief objective of a trial. It must be stressed that a careful and deliberate
consideration for the administration of justice is more important than a race to end the trial.
Although judges are generally not accountable for erroneous judgments rendered in
good faith, such defense in situations of infallible discretion adheres only within the
parameters of tolerable judgment and does not apply where the basic issues are so simple
and the applicable legal principle evident and basic as to be beyond permissible margins of
error.
Time and again, the Court has earnestly reminded judges to be extra prudent and
circumspect in the performance of their duties. This exalted position entails a lot of
responsibilities, foremost of which is proficiency in the law. They are expected to exhibit
more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules and to apply them
properly in all good faith. When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office
to simply apply it; anything less than that would be constitutive of gross ignorance of
the law.
Moreover, judges are duty-bound to render just, correct and impartial decisions at all
times in a manner free of any suspicion as to his fairness, impartiality or integrity. The
records must be free from the slightest suspicion that the trial court seized upon an
opportunity to either free itself from the usual burdens of presiding over a full-blown court
battle or worse, to give undue advantage or favors to one of the litigants. Public confidence
in the Judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct of judges. The appearance
of bias or prejudiceccan be as damaging to public confidence and the administration of
justice as actual bias or prejudice.
Thus, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires a judge to be the embodiment
of competence, integrity and independence. They are likewise mandated to be faithful to the
law and to maintain professional competence at all times. A judge owes the public and the
court the duty to be proficient in the law. He is expected to keep abreast of the laws and
prevailing jurisprudence. Basic rules must be at the palms of their hands for ignorance of the
law by a judge can easily be the mainspring of injustice.
Unfortunately, Judge Cabrera-Faller fell short of this basic canon. Her utter disregard of
the laws and rules of procedure, to wit: the immediate archiving of Criminal Case No.
11862-13, the recall of the warrant of arrest which she claimed were issued inadvertently
and the hasty dismissal of the case displayed her lack of competence and probity, and can
only be considered as grave abuse of authority. All these constitute gross ignorance of the
law and incompetence.
Under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC,
gross ignorance of the law is a serious charge, punishable by dismissal from service,
suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not
exceeding six (6) months, or a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.
In the case of Chua Keng Sin v. Judge Mangente, the respondent judge was found guilty of
gross ignorance of the law due to procedural lapses in disposing the motions in the criminal
case pending before his sala. The Court stated that his careless disposition of the motions
was a reflection of his incompetence as a judge in discharging his official duties, thus, he
could not be relieved from the consequences of his actions simply because he was a newly
appointed judge and his case load was heavy.
Accordingly, considering the blatant violation of the law and rules committed by Judge
Cabrera-Faller and her grievous exercise of discretion, the appropriate penalty should be
dismissal from the service, with forfeiture of retirement benefits, except leave credits, and
with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government,
including government-owned and -controlled corporations.
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Judge Perla V. Cabrera-Faller, Presiding Judge of
Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, Dasmariñas City, Cavite, GUILTY of gross ignorance of
the law and for violating Rule 1.01 and Rule 3.01, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct,
the Court imposes the penalty of DISMISSALfrom the service, with FORFEITURE of
retirement benefits, except leave credits, and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch
or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned and controlled
corporations.
SO ORDERED.
——o0o——
 G.R. No. 170672. August 14, 2009.
JUDGE FELIMON ABELITA III, petitioner, vs. P/SUPT. GERMAN B. DORIA and SPO3
CESAR RAMIREZ, respondents.
Searches and Seizures; Warrantless Arrests; Hot Pursuit; Requisites; Personal knowledge of
facts must be based on probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of
suspicion; A reasonable suspicion, therefore, must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good
faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.—For the warrantless arrest under this Rule to
be valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the offender has just committed an offense; and (2) the
arresting peace officer or private person has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to
be arrested has committed it. Personal knowledge of facts must be based on probable cause, which
means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable
when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be
arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be
arrested. A reasonable suspicion, therefore, must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good
faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.
Same; Same; Same; The act of the person to be arrested of trying to get away, coupled with the
incident report which the policemen investigated, is enough to raise a reasonable suspicion on the part
of the police authorities as to the existence of probable cause.—Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure does not require the arresting officers to personally witness the
commission of the offense with their own eyes. In this case, P/Supt. Doria received a report about the
alleged shooting incident. SPO3 Ramirez investigated the report and learned from witnesses that
petitioner was involved in the incident. They were able to track down petitioner, but when invited to the
police headquarters to shed light on the incident, petitioner initially agreed then sped up his vehicle,
prompting the police authorities to give chase. Petitioner’s act of trying to get away, coupled with the
incident report which they investigated, is enough to raise a reasonable suspicion on the part of the
police authorities as to the existence of probable cause.
Same; Warrantless Searches; Plain View Doctrine; Requisites.
—Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the
position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. The plain view
doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (1) the law enforcement officer in search of the
evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular
area; (2) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (3) it is immediately apparent to
the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to
seizure.
Actions; Judgments; Res Judicata; Words and Phrases; “Bar by Prior Judgment” and
“Conclusiveness of Judgment,” Distinguished.
—Bar by prior judgment and conclusiveness of judgment differ as follows: There is “bar by prior
judgment” when, as between the first case where the judgment was rendered and the second case that
is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. In this instance,
the judgment in the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the second action. Otherwise put, the
judgment or decree of the court of competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the litigation between
the parties, as well as their privies, and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same
cause of action before the same or other tribunal. But where there is identity of parties in the first and
second cases, but no identity of causes of action, the first judgment is conclusive only as to those
matters actually and directly controverted and determined and not as to matters merely involved
therein. This is the concept of res judicata known as “conclusiveness of judgment.” Stated differently,
any right, fact or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an
action before a competent court in which judgment is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by
the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies whether or not
the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the same.
Same; Same; Same; Requisites.—For res judicata to apply, the following requisites must be
present: (a) the former judgment or order must be final; (b) it must be a judgment or order on the merits,
that is, it was rendered after a consideration of the evidence or stipulations submitted by the parties at
the trial of the case; (c) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties; and (d) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties,
of subject matter, and of cause of action; this requisite is satisfied if the two actions are substantially
between the same parties.
Same; Same; Same; There is no identity of causes of action where one is an administrative case
dealing with the administrative liability of the respondent judge for the commission of certain acts
complained of while the present case deals with the civil liability for damages of the police authorities
who arrested him.—While the present case and the administrative case are based on the same
essential facts and circumstances, the doctrine of res judicata will not apply. An administrative case
deals with the administrative liability which may be incurred by the respondent for the commission of
the acts complained of. The case before us deals with the civil liability for damages of the police
authorities. There is no identity of causes of action in the cases. While identity of causes of action is not
required in the application of res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment, it is required
that there must always be identity of parties in the first and second cases. There is no identity of parties
between the present case and the administrative case. The administrative case was filed by Benjamin
Sia Lao (Sia Lao) against petitioner. Sia Lao is not a party to this case. Respondents in the present
case were not parties to the administrative case between Sia Lao and petitioner. In the present case,
petitioner is the complainant against respondents. Hence, while res judicata is not a defense to
petitioner’s complaint for damages, respondents nevertheless cannot be held liable for damages as
discussed above.
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review assailing the 10 July 2004 Decision and 18
October 2004 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 217 (trial court), in
Civil Case No. Q-98-33442 for Damages.
The Antecedent Facts
Judge Felimon Abelita III (petitioner) filed a complaint for Damages under Articles 32(4)
and (9) of the Civil Code against P/Supt. German B. Doria (P/Supt. Doria) and SPO3 Cesar
Ramirez (SPO3 Ramirez). Petitioner alleged in his complaint that on 24 March 1996, at
around 12 noon, he and his wife were on their way to their house in Bagumbayan, Masbate,
Masbate when P/Supt. Doria and SPO3 Ramirez (respondents), accompanied by 10
unidentified police officers, requested them to proceed to the Provincial PNP Headquarters
at Camp Boni Serrano, Masbate, Masbate. Petitioner was suspicious of the request and told
respondents that he would proceed to the PNP Headquarters after he had brought his wife
home. Petitioner alleged that when he parked his car in front of their house, SPO3 Ramirez
grabbed him, forcibly took the key to his Totoya Lite Ace van, barged into the vehicle, and
conducted a search without a warrant. The search resulted to the seizure of a licensed
shotgun. Petitioner presented the shotgun’s license to respondents. Thereafter, SPO3
Ramirez continued his search and then produced a .45 caliber pistol which he allegedly
found inside the vehicle. Respondents arrested petitioner and detained him, without any
appropriate charge, at the PNP special detention cell.
P/Supt. Doria alleged that his office received a telephone call from a relative of Rosa
Sia about a shooting incident in BarangayNursery. He dispatched a team headed by SPO3
Ramirez to investigate the incident. SPO3 Ramirez later reported that a certain William Sia
was wounded while petitioner, who was implicated in the incident, and his wife just left the
place of the incident. P/Supt. Doria looked for petitioner and when he found him, he
informed him of the incident report. P/Supt. Doria requested petitioner to go with him to the
police headquarters as he was reported to be involved in the incident. Petitioner agreed but
suddenly sped up his vehicle and proceeded to his residence. P/Supt. Doria and his
companions chased petitioner. Upon reaching petitioner’s residence, they caught up with
petitioner as he was about to run towards his house. The police officers saw a gun in the
front seat of the vehicle beside the driver’s seat as petitioner opened the door. They also
saw a shotgun at the back of the driver’s seat. The police officers confiscated the firearms
and arrested petitioner. P/Supt. Doria alleged that his men also arrested other persons who
were identified to be with petitioner during the shooting incident. Petitioner was charged with
illegal possession of firearms and frustrated murder. An administrative case was also filed
against petitioner before this Court.
The Decision of the Trial Court
In its 10 July 2004 Decision, the trial court dismissed petitioner’s complaint.
The trial court found that petitioner was at the scene of the shooting incident
in Barangay Nursery. The trial court ruled that the police officers who conducted the search
were of the belief, based on reasonable grounds, that petitioner was involved in the incident
and that the firearm used in the commission of the offense was in his possession. The trial
court ruled that petitioner’s warrantless arrest and the warrantless seizure of the firearms
were valid and legal. The trial court gave more credence to the testimonies of respondents
who were presumed to have performed their duties in accordance with law. The trial court
rejected petitioner’s claim of frame-up as weak and insufficient to overthrow the positive
testimonies of the police officers who conducted the arrest and the incidental search. The
trial court concluded that petitioner’s claim for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code is
not warranted under the circumstances.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.
In its 18 October 2004 Order, the trial court denied the motion.
Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issues
The issues in this case are the following:
1. Whether the warrantless arrest and warrantless search and seizure were illegal under
Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure;
2. Whether respondents are civilly liable for damages under Articles 32(4) and (9) of the
Civil Code; and
3. Whether the findings in the administrative case against petitioner are conclusive in
this case.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has no merit.
Application of Section 5, Rule 113 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
Petitioner alleges that his arrest and the search were unlawful under Section 5, Rule
113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. Petitioner alleges that for the warrantless
arrest to be lawful, the arresting officer must have personal knowledge of facts that the
person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense. Petitioner alleges that the alleged shooting incident was just relayed to the
arresting officers, and thus they have no personal knowledge of facts as required by the
Rules.
We do not agree.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure states:
“Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.—A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.”
For the warrantless arrest under this Rule to be valid, two requisites must concur: (1)
the offender has just committed an offense; and (2) the arresting peace officer or private
person has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it.
Personal knowledge of facts must be based on probable cause, which means an actual
belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when,
in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be
arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is based on actual facts, i.e., supported
by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of
the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion, therefore, must be founded on probable
cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure does not require the
arresting officers to personally witness the commission of the offense with their own eyes. In
this case, P/Supt. Doria received a report about the alleged shooting incident. SPO3
Ramirez investigated the report and learned from witnesses that petitioner was involved in
the incident. They were able to track down petitioner, but when invited to the police
headquarters to shed light on the incident, petitioner initially agreed then sped up his
vehicle, prompting the police authorities to give chase. Petitioner’s act of trying to get away,
coupled with the incident report which they investigated, is enough to raise a reasonable
suspicion on the part of the police authorities as to the existence of probable cause.
Plain View Doctrine
The seizure of the firearms was justified under the plain view doctrine.
Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a
right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as
evidence. The plain view doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (1) the law
enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in
a position from which he can view a particular area; (2) the discovery of the evidence in
plain view is inadvertent; and (3) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he
observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.
In this case, the police authorities were in the area because that was where they caught
up with petitioner after the chase. They saw the firearms inside the vehicle when petitioner
opened the door. Since a shooting incident just took place and it was reported that
petitioner was involved in the incident, it was apparent to the police officers that the firearms
may be evidence of a crime. Hence, they were justified in seizing the firearms.
Civil Liability Under Article 32 of the Civil Code
Petitioner alleges that respondents are civilly liable under paragraphs (4) and (9) of
Article 32 of the Civil Code.
Paragraphs (4) and (9) of Article 32 of the Civil Code respectively state:
“Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or
indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the
following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
xxxx
(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;
xxxx
(9) The right to be secure in one’s person, house, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures;
x x x”
In this case, it was established that petitioner was lawfully arrested without a warrant
and that firearms were validly seized from his possession. The trial court found that
petitioner was charged with illegal possession of firearms and frustrated murder. We agree
with the trial court in rejecting petitioner’s allegation that he was merely framed-up. We also
agree with the trial court that respondents were presumed to be performing their duties in
accordance with law. Hence, respondents should not be held civilly liable for their actions.
Res Judicata Does Not Apply
Respondents raise the defense of res judicata against petitioner’s claim for damages.
Res judicata has two aspects: bar by prior judgment and conclusiveness of judgment
provided under Section 47(b) and (c), Rule 39, respectively, of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure which provide:
“Sec. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders.—The effect of a judgment or final
order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment
or final order, may be as follows:
xxx
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly
adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto,
conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the
commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under
the same title and in the same capacity; and
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest,
that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which
appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily
included therein or necessary thereto.”
Bar by prior judgment and conclusiveness of judgment differ as follows:
“There is “bar by prior judgment” when, as between the first case where the judgment
was rendered and the second case that is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties,
subject matter, and causes of action. In this instance, the judgment in the first case
constitutes an absolute bar to the second action. Otherwise put, the judgment or decree
of the court of competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the litigation between the
parties, as well as their privies, and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the
same cause of action before the same or other tribunal.
But where there is identity of parties in the first and second cases, but no identity of
causes of action, the first judgment is conclusive only as to those matters actually and
directly controverted and determined and not as to matters merely involved therein. This
is the concept of res judicata known as “conclusiveness of judgment.” Stated differently,
any right, fact or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the
determination of an action before a competent court in which judgment is rendered on the
merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated
between the parties and their privies whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or
subject matter of the two actions is the same.”
For res judicata to apply, the following requisites must be present:
(a) the former judgment or order must be final;
(b) it must be a judgment or order on the merits, that is, it was rendered after a
consideration of the evidence or stipulations submitted by the parties at the trial of the
case;
(c) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the parties; and
(d) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of
subject matter, and of cause of action; this requisite is satisfied if the two actions are
substantially between the same parties.
While the present case and the administrative case are based on the same essential
facts and circumstances, the doctrine of res judicata will not apply. An administrative case
deals with the administrative liability which may be incurred by the respondent for the
commission of the acts complained of. The case before us deals with the civil liability for
damages of the police authorities. There is no identity of causes of action in the cases.
While identity of causes of action is not required in the application of res judicatain the
concept of conclusiveness of judgment, it is required that there must always be identity of
parties in the first and second cases.
There is no identity of parties between the present case and the administrative case.
The administrative case was filed by Benjamin Sia Lao (Sia Lao) against petitioner. Sia Lao
is not a party to this case. Respondents in the present case were not parties to the
administrative case between Sia Lao and petitioner. In the present case, petitioner is the
complainant against respondents. Hence, while res judicata is not a defense to petitioner’s
complaint for damages, respondents nevertheless cannot be held liable for damages as
discussed above.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 10 July 2004 Decision and 18
October 2004 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 217, in Civil Case
No. Q-98-33442.
SO ORDERED.
——o0o——