validity of the confession substantiates the conclusion that the sworn statement is constitutionally
III. POLICE INVESTIGATION suspect and invalid. In relation to this, we stress that the right to counsel refers
G.R. No. 130189. June 25, 1999.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DOMINGO R. MULETA, accused-
appellant.
Criminal Law; Custodial Investigation; Extrajudicial Confessions; Confessions extracted without
the assistance of counsel are taboo and useless in a court of law.—The appellant claims that “it is not
true that [he] had executed an extrajudicial confession.” As correctly pointed out by the solicitor general,
however, the appellant actually admits to the execution of the said confession, albeit without the
assistance of counsel. But unlike the solicitor general, we are not ready to declare that such
“ambivalence only indicates the unreliability of [appellant’s] claim.” Indeed, confessions extracted
without the assistance of counsel are taboo and useless in a court of law.
Same; Same; Same; A confession is not valid and not admissible in evidence when it is obtained
in violation of any of the rights of persons under custodial investigation.—To be acceptable,
extrajudicial confessions must conform to constitutional requirements. A confession is not valid and not
admissible in evidence when it is obtained in violation of any of the following rights of persons under
custodial investigation: to remain silent, to have independent and competent counsel preferably of their
own choice, to be provided with counsel if they are unable to secure one, to be assisted by such
counsel during the investigation, to have such counsel present when they decide to waive these rights,
and to be informed of all these rights and of the fact that anything they say can and will be used against
them in court.
Same; Same; Same; The right to be informed of one’s constitutional rights during custodial
investigation refers to an effective communication between the investigating officer and the suspected
individual, with the purpose of making the latter understand these rights.—The right to be informed of
one’s constitutional rights during custodial investigation refers to an effective communication between
the investigating officer and the suspected individual, with the purpose of making the
latter understand these rights. Understanding would mean that the information transmitted was
effectively received and comprehended. Hence, the Constitution does not merely require the
investigating officers to “inform” the person under investigation; rather, it requires that the latter be
“informed.”
Same; Same; Same; Terse and perfunctory statements imply a superficial reading of the rights
of the accused.—The questions propounded to the appellant did not satisfy the strict requirements
mandated by the Constitution. Such “terse and perfunctory statements” implied a superficial reading of
the rights of the accused, without the slightest consideration of whether he understood what was read
to him. This Court will not subscribe to such manner of “informing” the accused of his constitutional
rights. We have stated this then, and we reiterate it now: “[The] stereotyped ‘advice’ appearing in
practically all extrajudicial confessions which are later repudiated has assumed the nature of ‘legal
form’ or model. Police investigators either automatically type it together with the court ‘Opo’ as the
answer or ask the accused to sign it or even copy it in their handwriting. Its tired, punctilious, fixed and
artificially stately style does not create an impression of voluntariness or even understanding on the
part of the accused. The showing of a spontaneous, free and unconstrained giving up of a right is
missing.”
Same; Same; Same; We have constitutionalized the right to counsel because of our hostility
against the use of duress and other undue influence in extracting confessions from a suspect.—As
observed by this Court in People v. Lucero, “[w]e have constitutionalized the right to counsel because
of our hostility against the use of duress and other undue influence in extracting confessions from a
suspect. Force and fraud tarnish confessions and render them inadmissible.” This Court has
consistently held, without equivocation, that no custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it is
done in the presence of counsel. The failure of the prosecution to present Atty. Daquiz to testify on the
to competent and independent lawyers preferably chosen by the accused persons themselves. This
Court, as well as the court a quo, did not have the opportunity to determine the competence and the
independence of the NBI-procured lawyer because, despite the denial of the accused that he was
assisted by counsel, the prosecution failed to present Atty. Daquiz.
Same; Same; Same; Republic Act 7438 includes as an integral part of custodial investigation the
practice of issuing “invitations” to persons being investigated in connection with an offense they are
suspected to have committed.—Based on the prosecution’s own evidence, the accused was already
singled out as the perpetrator of the crime. The supposed “invitation” by NBI Agent Ely Tolentino was in
reality a custodial investigation targeting the accused for the purpose of procuring a confession.
Republic Act 7438 includes as an integral part of custodial investigation the practice of issuing
“invitations” to persons being investigated in connection with an offense they are suspected to have
committed. Under the present factual milieu, Domingo Muleta should have been accorded the right to
counsel (and all the constitutional rights of the accused), from the time that he was brought to the NBI
office in Manila.
Same; Same; Same; The suspect’s waiver of his rights, in order to be valid, should be in a
language that clearly manifest his desire to do so.—Even if we were to assume that the appellant was
assisted by counsel when he waived his rights, the waiver itself was lamentably insufficient. After Atty.
Daquiz was allegedly called to assist the appellant, she posited this question: “Gusto mo bang talikdan
ang iyong mga karapatan na ibinibigay sa iyo ng ating Konstitusyon?” To this, the appellant replied:
“Tinatalikdan ko na po iyon dahil gusto ko nang ipagtapat ang pangyayari kay CHARITO DELGADO na
pamangkin ko.” To the Court, this was not the waiver that the Constitution clearly and strictly required.
Such waiver failed to show his understanding of his rights, his waiver of those rights, and the
implications of his waiver. The waiver, in order to be valid, should have been in a language that clearly
manifested his desire to do so. The part of the sworn statement in which the accused “waived” his
rights referred to them as “mga karapatan na ibinibigay sa iyo ng ating Konstitusyon” and “iyon”—words
that were utterly vague and insufficient to satisfy the Constitutional requirements. As presented, the
prosecution would have us refer to the first part of the sworn statement for guidance, as if it were a
footnote saying “Please see first part.” Such stratagem is woefully insufficient to constitute a waiver of
rights cherished and enshrined in our basic law.
Same; Circumstantial Evidence; Requisites for Conviction.—The rule is that “x x x in the
absence of direct proof, conviction may be based on circumstantial evidence, but to warrant such
conviction, the following requisites must concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts
from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is
such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.”
Same; Witnesses; Affidavits; An affidavit is hearsay if the affiant is not presented in court and
subjected to cross-examination.—Despite the efforts of the fiscal during cross-examination, the
appellant consistently denied that he worked in the place where the victim’s body was found. Also, the
prosecution failed to prove that he was at work around 9:30 p.m. on April 29, 1993 and that he went
home on April 30, 1993. All it could present was the testimony of NBI Agent Ely Tolentino, who merely
testified on what appellant’s co-workers related to him: that appellant left work earlier. This is clearly
hearsay. The affidavits of these co-workers do not help the prosecution’s case, since they themselves
were not presented during the trial. An affidavit is hearsay if the affiant is not presented in court and
subjected to cross-examination. Besides, the appellant’s wife, Emelinda Muleta, stated categorically
that her husband was with her at home on April 29 and 30, 1993. The appellant himself steadfastly
affirmed this during his cross-examination.
Same; Presumption of Innocence; Suspicion or accusation is not synonymous with guilt.—The
appellant’s rather strange behavior during the wake was, according to his testimony, due to his
perceived failure to take care of his niece. This was corroborated by the testimony of Danilo Delgado.
Moreover, the defense claims that the words he said during the wake were ambiguous. “Patawarin mo
ako Charito” could have meant that the appellant was blaming himself for being unable to protect the
victim. “Ikaw kasi lumaban pa” could have connoted frustration with what he imagined could have
saved the life of his niece. “Nakakahiya ako, mabuting mamatay na” also shows the appellant blaming
himself for being inutile, indicating his desire to take his own worthless life. If these words merit
anything, it is this: it places the appellant under suspicion. But suspicion or accusation is not
synonymous with guilt.
Same; Same; The prosecution must convict the accused based on the strength of its own case,
not on the weakness of the defense.—We have always considered alibi inherently weak, because it can
be either easily fabricated or difficult to disprove. However, we have consistently held that the
prosecution must convict the accused based on the strength of its own case, not on the weakness of
the defense: “True, alibi is a weak defense. But then, so also is the prosecution’s evidence in this case.
x x x Indeed, it is when the evidence is purely circumstantial that the prosecution is much more
obligated to rely on the strength of its own case and not on the weakness of the defense, and that
conviction must rest on nothing less than moral certainty.”
Same; Same; In our jurisdiction accusation is not synonymous with guilt—the freedom of the
accused is forfeited only if the requisite quantum of proof necessary for conviction be in existence.—
This principle is well-articulated in People v. Mejia. “In our jurisdiction accusation is not synonymous
with guilt. The freedom of the accused is forfeit[ed] only if the requisite quantum of proof necessary for
conviction be in existence. This, of course, requires the most careful scrutiny of the evidence for the
State, both oral and documentary, independent of whatever defense is offered by the accused. Every
circumstance favoring the accused’s innocence must be duly taken into account. The proof against the
accused must survive the test of reason. Strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment.
The conscience must be satisfied that on the accused could be laid the responsibility for the offense
charged. If the prosecution fails to discharge the burden, then it is not only the accused’s right to be
freed; it is, even more, the court’s constitutional duty to acquit him.”
Same; Rule of Law; The Court is saddened that law enforcement agents transgress the law
which they have sworn to defend and uphold—a mockery of the law must not be allowed to sully the
country’s quest for peace and order.—In acquitting appellant, the Court is not saying that he did not
commit the offense charged. We are only saying that the prosecution failed to present credible
and admissible evidence of appellant’s guilt. The strongest evidence of the prosecution is the
extrajudicial confession of appellant. But the Constitution is clear—a confession obtained in violation of
the rights of an accused cannot be used as evidence. Without Muleta’s confession, the other pieces of
circumstantial evidence lose their significance. Had the National Bureau of Investigation followed the
law in extracting appellant’s admission of guilt, perhaps—just perhaps—the result of this case would
have been different. The Court is saddened that law enforcement agents transgress the law which they
have sworn to defend and uphold. A mockery of the law—which was manifestly perpetrated in this
case—must not be allowed to sully the country’s quest for peace and order.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
An extra-judicial confession extracted in violation of constitutionally enshrined rights is
inadmissible in evidence. During custodial investigation, suspects have the rights, among
others, (1) to remain silent, (2) to have an independent and competent counsel, (3) to be
provided with such counsel, if unable to secure one, (4) to be assisted by one in case of
waiver, which should be in writing, of the foregoing; and (5) to be informed of all such rights
and of the fact that anything he says can and will be used against him. Where the remaining
pieces of evidence are insufficient to determine guilt with moral certainty, the appellant is
entitled to an acquittal. A conviction must rest on the strength of the admissible evidence of
the prosecution, not on the weakness or insufficiency of the defense.
The Case
Domingo R. Muleta appeals the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan,
Branch 14, in Criminal Case No. 3264-M-93, finding him guilty of the complex crime of rape
with homicide and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua.
The Information, dated October 1, 1993 and signed by Prosecution Attorney Emmanuel
Y. Velasco, charged appellant as follows:
“That on April 30, 1993, between the hours of 12:05 past midnight to 2:00 in the morning,
at a house in Malolos, Bulacan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
DOMINGO MULETA y ROCERO willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had carnal
knowledge of a woman in the person of Charito M. Delgado without her consent, by using
force and intimidation and while the latter was unconscious; and thereafter accused
Domingo Muleta y Rocero by reason or on occasion of the said rape incident, taking
advantage of his superior strength, stab[bed] Charito M. Delgado in the neck and at the
back causing the instantaneous death of the latter.”
Upon arraignment on December 10, 1993, the appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge.
After trial, the lower court rendered its assailed August 15, 1997 Judgment, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds accused Domingo R. Muleta guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of [r]ape with [h]omicide and hereby
sentences him to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA.
“The accused is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased victim Charito
Delgado death indemnity of P50,000.00, actual damages of P44,000.00, exemplary
damages of P20,000.00 and moral damages of P20,000.00.
“No pronouncement as to costs.”
Hence, this appeal.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The facts, as viewed by the prosecution, are summarized in the Appellee’s Brief thus:
“On April 15, 1993, nineteen-year-old Charito Delgado, a native of Oriental Mindoro, went
to Manila to find work. Once in Manila, Charito proceeded to 1347 Banaba Street,
Moriones, Tondo, Manila, where her uncle, Ruben Delgado lived. There, she stayed with
her sister Marissa. Shortly thereafter, Charito landed a job as a saleslady at the Ali Mall,
in Cubao, Quezon City.
“In the afternoon of April 29, 1993, Charito left Tondo, Manila and moved to
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, bringing with her some of her sister’s baggage. She, however,
returned to Tondo, Manila to pick up their remaining baggage. It was the last time she
was seen alive by her relatives.
“On April 30, 1993, Charito’s lifeless body was found naked in Mojon, Malolos,
Bulacan, tied to a post with the use of a pair of pants and both her hands were tied with
a bra. Charito’s body bore five (5) stab wounds, three (3) in the left side of her neck and
two (2) at her back.
“The initial investigation on Charito’s death was conducted by the police in Malolos,
Bulacan but the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Manila, later took over and the
case was assigned to NBI Agent Ely Tolentino on May 19, 1993.
“Based on Tolentino’s investigation, appellant is Charito’s uncle, [appellant] being the
brother of Charito’s mother, Milagros Delgado; that on April 29 and 30, 1993, appellant
was working at the Loadstar Shipping Lines located at Pier 16, North Harbor, Tondo,
Manila; that on April 29, 1993, appellant left his work at 9:30 in the evening; that appellant
 reported for work on April 30, 1993 at 8:00 in the evening; that according to appellant’s
wife, he left for work on April 29, 1993 but returned only in the morning of April 30, 1993.
“On September 19, 1993, Tolentino went to appellant’s house in Oriental Mindoro
and requested appellant to go with him to the NBI, Manila for investigation. Appellant
readily obliged. Danilo Delgado, Charito’s paternal uncle, accompanied Tolentino and
appellant to Manila.
“During his custodial investigation on September 19, 1993, appellant was assisted by
counsel, Atty. Deborah [D]aquis, with address at Room 401, D & D Building, Pedro Gil
and San Marcelino Street, Manila. There, he admitted having raped and later killed
Charito Delgado.
“Another prosecution witness, Danilo Delgado, testified that during the wake of
Charito Delgado on May 13, 1993 in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, appellant became
hysterical, crying, shaking his head and muttering: ‘Patawarin mo ako Charito, ikaw kasi
lumaban pa, nakakahiya, mabuti pang mamatay na.’
“Delgado saw appellant drink a bottle of ‘chlorux,’ after which he fell to the ground.
Appellant was brought to the Fatima Hospital.” (citations omitted)
Version of the Defense
The appellant, on the other hand, submits the following as the facts of the case:
“x x x [T]he defense presented the accused himself [Domingo Muleta] who testified that
he was not the one who committed the crime [he was] being charged [with]; that he was
just unscrupulously picked up by the NBI and forced to admit the crime in question; that
on April 30, 1993, he was in their rented house at Camias St., Magsaysay, Tondo, Manila;
that on that day, he left the house at 5:30 in the afternoon and went to the house where
Charito Delgado was then residing; that he learned from his sister Milagros Delgado that
the latter’s daughter Charito transferred to another house and she was then missing; that
he reported the matter to the police authorities; first, to the PNP Headquarters in Tondo;
second, to the PNP Headquarters at U.N. Avenue; and third, to the PNP Headquarters
situated at Caloocan; that on May 8, 1993, he found the body of Charito Delgado already
lying in state at Valenzuela, Metro, Manila; that he learned from his sister Milagros that
her body was found somewhere in Malolos; that he was working in the Load Star Shipping
as a welder on a contractual basis; that from April to May, 1993, he was applying to
another company because Load Star Shipping closed shop; that on September 19, 1993,
he was picked up by the NBI at Banos Gloria, Oriental Mindoro; that he was brought at
Taft Avenue; that he was tortured; that aside from boxing and kicking him, [they] brought
[him] to a secluded place; that he was blindfolded; that he was told to lie down on his
back, his feet were tied and water was poured on his nose; that he was forced to sign a
document which he was not able to read, that he was forced to sign the document
because he [could] no longer bear the torture; that he did not have a lawyer at that time;
that the NBI agent’s name is Ely Tolentino who testified earlier in this case; that he knows
that the reason why he was accused of raping his niece is that he gave an information
about a woman he saw in the room of his brother-in-law Rolando Delgado.
“x x x [T]hat the last time he [accused] visited his niece in her residence in Moriones
was April 26, 1993; that Marissa was present when he visited Charito Delgado; that he
used to work at Lawang Bato, Bagbaguin, Valenzuela, Bulacan; that he did not work in
Malolos; that when he saw the cadaver of Charito, he was so sad about her condition,
that he [could] no longer recall what he did because of his anger.
“x x x Emelinda Muleta testified that her husband, the accused-appellant, never left
the house in Tondo, Manila in the evening of April 29, 1993.”
Ruling of the Trial Court
Despite the absence of an eyewitness, the trial court held that the circumstantial evidence in
this case was enough to establish the guilt of the appellant. In so holding, it referred to the
following as sufficient circumstantial evidence to convict:
“First, the accused is familiar with the place VOP Compound, Bo. Mojon, Malolos,
Bulacan, where the crime was committed and where the body of the victim was found;
“Second, the accused left his place of work at around 9:30 in the evening of April 29,
1993;
“Third, the accused did not go home in the evening of April 29, 1993 but went home
only in the morning of April 30, 1993;
“Fourth, that during the wake of Charito, the accused went wild and hysterical and
uttered these words: ‘Patawarin mo ako Charito, ikaw kasi lumaban pa, nakakahiya ako,
mabuti pang mamatay na.’;
“Fifth, the accused admitted in his sworn statement, that he uttered these words;
“Sixth, the accused admitted that he drank chlorox and was brought to the Fatima
Hospital for treatment; and
“Seventh, the sworn statement executed by the accused contains details of the
manner in which the crime was committed which only he could have known.”
In upholding the validity of the extrajudicial confession, the lower court further ruled:
“The contention of the accused that his extrajudicial confession [was] inadmissible
because it was obtained through force and without the assistance of counsel is untenable.
Well-settled is the rule that a confession is presumed to be voluntary until the contrary is
proved. In th[is] case, the presumption has not been overcome. The narration contained
in the sworn statement bespeaks spontan[ei]ty and truth. Not only is the [confession of
the accused] replete with details only he could have supplied, but the circumstances
surrounding its execution belie his claim. Indubitably established is the fact that accused
was assisted by Atty. Deborah Daquis who even signed the statement; that before
accused made his extrajudicial confession he was first asked if he was amenable to the
services of Atty. Daquis to which query he answered affirmatively. Finally, while accused
recited a litany of alleged acts of maltreatment, no medical certificate had been shown to
prove that he did suffer inhuman treatment. Nor was there any proof that he even initiated
the filing of an administrative or criminal complaint against his alleged tormentors. Neither
did accused present any eyewitness to the alleged torture. In short, his allegation,
obviously self-serving, hardly deserves consideration. Noteworthy too, is the fact that he
did not repudiate said confession at the earliest opportunity and did so only during trial,
thus indicating that his repudiation [was] only a lastditch effort to avoid the consequences
of the crime.
“The court upholds the admissibility of accused’s extrajudicial confession which, by
itself, is sufficient basis for his conviction.
“The rule is, a confession constitutes evidence of high order since it is supported by
the strong presumption that no person of normal mind would deliberately and knowingly
confess to a crime unless prompted by truth and his conscience.
“Finally, accused’s defense of denial and alibi cannot negate his culpability because
these are not supported by any credible evidence other than his bare assertion.
Additionally, there was no evidence of any ulterior or evil motive on the part of the
prosecution witnesses that might have led them to give fabricated testimony against the
accused.” (citations omitted)
Assignment of Error
Appellant presents this lone assignment of error:
“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE
EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION AND IN THE PROCESS DISREGARDING THE
DEFENSE OF ALIBI OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.”
A reading of the Appellant’s Brief, however, yields the following issues to be resolved: (1)
the validity and admissibility of the extrajudicial confession of the appellant, (2) the
sufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence to prove appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, and (3) alibi as a defense.
 that the information transmitted was effectively received and comprehended. Hence, the
This Court’s Ruling Constitution does not merely require the investigating officers to “inform” the person under
The appeal is meritorious. The extrajudicial confession of appellant is inadmissible, and the investigation; rather, it requires that the latter be “informed.”
remaining circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution is sorely insufficient to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution’s purported compliance with this requisite appears in the following
portion of the extrajudicial confession:
First Issue: Validity of Extrajudicial Confession “SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY NI DOMINGO MULETA y ROCERO NA IBINIGAY KAY NBI
AGENT ELY T. TOLENTINO DITO SA TANGGAPAN NG NBI, ANTI-ORGANIZED
The appellant claims that “it is not true that [he] had executed an extrajudicial confession.” CRIME DIVISION NGAYONG IKA-19 NG SETYEMBRE, 1993 SA HARAP NG ILANG
SAKSI.
As correctly pointed out by the solicitor general, however, the appellant actually admits to
x------------------------------------------------------------------------x
the execution of the said confession, albeit without the assistance of counsel. But unlike the 01. TANONG: Bago kita tanungin hinggil sa pagkamatay ni CHARITO DELGADO y
solicitor general, we are not ready to declare that such “ambivalence only indicates the MULETA ay nais ipabatid sa iyo ang iyong mga karapatan na itinatadhana ng ating
unreliability of [appellant’s] claim.” Indeed, confessions extracted without the assistance of saligang batas, at ito ay ang mga sumusunod:
counsel are taboo and useless in a court of law. 01.Ikaw ay may karapatang manahimik at huwag sumagot sa mga katanungan sa iyo sa
imbestigasyong ito[.] Nauunawaan mo ba ito? (Sgd. Domingo Muleta)
To be acceptable, extrajudicial confessions must conform to constitutional 02.Ikaw ay may karapatan na kumuha ng abogado na sarili mong pili, pero kung wala
requirements. A confession is not valid and not admissible in evidence when it is obtained in kang ikakaya ay bibigyan ka namin ng abogado para matulungan ka sa imbestigasyong
ito[.] Nauunawaan mo ba ang karapatan mong ito? (Sgd. Domingo Muleta)
violation of any of the following rights of persons under custodial investigation: to remain
03.Ang lahat ng bagay na sasabihin mo sa imbestigasyong ito ay maaaring gamitin laban
silent, to have independent and competent counsel preferably of their own choice, to be sa iyo sa alinmang hukuman[.] Nauunawaan mo ba ito? (Sgd. Domingo Muleta)
provided with counsel if they are unable to secure one, to be assisted by such counsel Matapos na malaman mo ang iyong mga karapatan ikaw ay nakahanda pa ring
during the investigation, to have such counsel present when they decide to waive these magbigay ng pahayag?
rights, and to be informed of all these rights and of the fact that anything they say can and SAGOT: Nakahanda po akong sabihin lahat ng totoo.
will be used against them in court. In People v. Santos, we held: 02. T: Ikaw ba ay may abogado na
“A confession is not admissible unless the prosecution satisfactorily shows that it was matatawagan ngayon na sarili mong
obtained within the limits imposed by the 1987 Constitution. Section 12, Article III thereof, pili?
provides: S: Wala po.
‘(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have 03. T: Nais mo bang bigyan ka namin ng
the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and abogado?
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the S: Opo.
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived 04. T: Gusto naming ipakilala sa iyo si Atty.
except in writing and in the presence of counsel. Deborah Z. Daquiz isang abogada
xxx xxx xxx na pribado na handang asistihan at
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or section 17 tulungan ka sa imbestigasyong ito.
hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.’ Gusto mo bang tawagin natin siya
“If the extrajudicial confession satisfies these constitutional standards, it is bago natin ituloy ang pagbibigay mo
subsequently tested for voluntariness, i.e., if it was given freely—without coercion, ng pahayag?
intimidation, inducement, or false promises; and credibility, i.e., if it was consistent with S: Opo. (At this juncture, Atty. Daquiz
the normal experience of mankind. was called first and the statement
“A confession that meets all the foregoing requisites constitutes evidence of a high taking was temporarily stopped until
order because no person of normal mind will knowingly and deliberately confess to be the after her arrival).
perpetrator of a crime unless prompted by truth and conscience. Otherwise, it is 05. T: Ngayong naririto na si Atty.
disregarded in accordance with the cold objectivity of the exclusionary rule.” (citations DEBORAH DAQUIZ, ikaw ba ay nais
omitted) pa ring magbigay ng salaysay na
bukal sa iyong kalooban?
Flagrantly violated in the present case were the appellant’s right to be informed of his rights S: Opo.
06. T: Atty. Daquiz: Gusto mo bang talikdan
under custodial investigation, his right to counsel, as well as his right to have said counsel
ang iyong mga karapatan na
present during the waiver of his rights under custodial investigation. ibinibigay sa iyo ng ating
Konstitusyon?
The Right to Be Apprised of Constitutional Rights S: Tinatalikdan ko na po iyon dahil
The right to be informed of one’s constitutional rights during custodial investigation refers to gusto ko nang ipagtapat ang
an effective communication between the investigating officer and the suspected individual, pangyayari kay CHARITO
with the purpose of making the latter understand these rights. Understanding would mean DELGADO na pamangkin ko. (Sgd.
Domingo Muleta)
 xxx xxx xxx Q If the request of Atty. Daquis was the following day[,]
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 19th day of September, 1993 at the meaning September 20, are you saying that the
Office of the NBI Anti-Organized Crime Divsion, NBI Building, Taft Avenue, Manila and I statement of Muleta was given the following day[,] on
hereby certify that I have personally examined the herein Affiant and found him to have September 20?
fully read and understood the contents of his statement containing three (3) pages and A September 19, I started taking the statement. I think I
that he executed the same out of his own volition. just finished the question the following day I
(Sgd.) Atty. ARTEMIO M. SACAGUING continued. [sic]
Chief AOCD x x x x x x x x x” [Emphasis ours]
(By Authority of Rep. Act 157)
x x x x x x x x x” (emphasis ours) Atty. Quintana amplified this point on cross-examination:
“x x x xxx xxx
The questions propounded to the appellant did not satisfy the strict requirements mandated Q In the direct examination, you claimed that the accused
by the Constitution. Such “terse and perfunctory statements” implied a superficial reading of Domingo Muleta gave his statement and made a
the rights of the accused, without the slightest consideration of whether he understood what confession?
was read to him. This Court will not subscribe to such manner of “informing” the accused of A Yes, madam.
Q You also claimed that you started taking the statement of
his constitutional rights. We have stated this then, and we reiterate it now:
Domingo Muleta, the accused, without the presence of
“[The] stereotyped ‘advice’ appearing in practically all extrajudicial confessions which are
counsel?
later repudiated has assumed the nature of ‘legal form’ or model. Police investigators
A No, madam. I took his statement in the presence of Atty.
either automatically type it together with the curt ‘Opo’ as the answer or ask the accused
Daquis.
to sign it or even copy it in their handwriting. Its tired, punctilious, fixed and artificially
Q In the direct examination on May 27, 1994, page 81, last
stately style does not create an impression of voluntariness or even understanding on the
paragraph and I quote: ‘A. September 19, I started taking
part of the accused. The showing of a spontaneous, free and unconstrained giving up of
the statement. I think I just finished the question the
a right is missing.” (emphasis supplied)
following day I continued.’ Now, do you want to change
now your answer that you took the accused’ [sic]
The Right to Counsel statement with the presence of counsel?
The prosecution contends that this constitutional requirement was satisfied because A No, madam. Although I started to take his statement on
appellant executed the confession with the assistance and in the presence of Atty. Deborah the night of September 19, I continued it when Atty.
Daquiz. The participation of the counsel was described in the confession in this manner: Daquiz arrived x x x the following morning wherein the
“x x x xxx xxx accused conferred with the accused, madam. [sic]
04. T: Gusto naming ipakilala sa iyo si Atty. Q But, [is it] not true that on the night of September 19,
Deborah Z. Daquiz, isang abogada na 1993 you started taking the statement of the accused
pribado na handang asisti han at tulungan without the presence of Atty. Daquiz and only continued
ka sa imbestigasyong ito. Gusto mo bang the same on the early morning of September 20, 1993
tawagin natin siya bago natin ituloy ang when Atty. Daquiz arrived?
pagbibigay mo ng pahayag? A Yes, madam.
S: Opo. (At this juncture, Atty. Daquiz was Q Don’t you know that as a police officer NBI a[t] that, that
called first and the statement taking was before a suspected person can give his statement, a
temporarily stopped until after her arrival). counsel must be present at all times?
x x x x x x x x x” A Yes, madam.
x x x x x x x x x” (emphasis ours)
However, the testimony of Tolentino, the investigating NBI agent, clearly contradicts the
claim of the prosecution. The agent testified: Despite Agent Tolentino’s claim that the confession of the accused started to be taken on
“x x x x x x x x x September 19, 1993 and continued the next day, the sworn statement itself clearly showed
Q Did you inform her [Atty. Deborah Daquiz] x x x that what began on the 19th of September ended on the same day. According to
thr[ough] the phone x x x why you were soliciting her the jurat, the extrajudicial confession was subscribed and sworn to on September 19, 1993.
assistance? The importance of the jurat must be stressed. In People v. Relucio, we observed:
A Yes[,] sir. We told her that we have a subject to “At this point, it must be noted that Exhibit 2-A, the statement which Padrones claimed
confess what he [did,] will you kindly assist him in above to have been admittedly taken by Viloria on October 5, 1972 but, supposedly
this investigation[?] signed by him later and not on the same day before Judge Vicencio as he had previously
Q What was the response of Atty. Daquis? stated, bears the following heading:
A She [asked] me [if it] could x x x be made the ‘SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY NI MIGUEL PADRONES y ESPEJO SA
following day. PAGTATANONG NI P/CPL J. S. VILORIA DITO SA HIMPILAN NG PULISYA NG
Q What was you[r] answer? KABANATUAN NGAYONG IKA-19 NG OKTUBRE 1972 SA GANAP NA IKA 5:15 NG
A It is up to you, I said. HAPON . . .’
 and ends with the following jurat:
‘NILAGDAAN AT PINANUMPAAN sa aking harap ngayong ika 20 ng Oktubre 1972, dito
sa Lunsod ng Kabanatuan.’
With the dates October 19 and 20 thus appearing in this statements, how could there
be any proximity to the truth in the assertion of Padrones that his statement was first taken
by Viloria on October 5, 1972 and that it was signed by him before Fiscal del Rosario on
October 9, 1972 and that it was the very statement he had been referring to earlier as
having been signed by him before Judge Vicencio?” (emphasis in the original)
We note that the heading of the sworn statement refers to the same date: September 19,
1993. It is thus daylight clear that the purported sworn statement of the appellant was
prepared prior to the arrival of his NBI-procured counsel. In other words, the sworn
statement was executed and completed on September 19, 1993, while Atty. Daquiz arrived
only the following day, September 20, 1993. Thus, when the appellant executed and
completed his purported extrajudicial confession on September 19, 1993, he
was not assisted by counsel.
As observed by this Court in People v. Lucero, “[w]e have constitutionalized the right to
counsel because of our hostility against the use of duress and other undue influence in
extracting confessions from a suspect. Force and fraud tarnish confessions and render
them inadmissible.” This Court has consistently held, without equivocation, that no custodial
investigation shall be conducted unless it is done in the presence of counsel. The failure of
the prosecution to present Atty. Daquiz to testify on the validity of the confession
substantiates the conclusion that the sworn statement is constitutionally suspect and invalid.
In relation to this, we stress that the right to counsel refers
to competent and independent lawyers preferably chosen by the accused persons
themselves. This Court, as well as the court a quo, did not have the opportunity to
determine the competence and the independence of the NBI-procured lawyer because,
despite the denial of the accused that he was assisted by counsel, the prosecution failed to
present Atty. Daquiz.
Based on the prosecution’s own evidence, the accused was already singled out as the
perpetrator of the crime. The supposed “invitation” by NBI Agent Ely Tolentino was in reality
a custodial investigation targeting the accused for the purpose of procuring a confession.
Republic Act 7438 includes as an integral part of custodial investigation the practice of
issuing “invitations” to persons being investigated in connection with an offense they
are suspected to have committed. Under the present factual milieu, Domingo Muleta should
have been accorded the right to counsel (and all the constitutional rights of the accused),
from the time that he was brought to the NBI office in Manila.
No Valid Waiver
The illegality of the alleged confession is further demonstrated by the fact that appellant
exercised no satisfactory waiver of his rights. As stated in our earlier discussions, since he
was not assisted by a lawyer when the waiver was made, there was no valid waiver to
speak of.
Furthermore, even if we were to assume that the appellant was assisted by counsel
when he waived his rights, the waiver itself was lamentably insufficient. After Atty. Daquiz
was allegedly called to assist the appellant, she posited this question: “Gusto mo bang
talikdan ang iyong mga karapatan na ibinibigay sa iyo ng ating Konstitusyon?” To this, the
appellant replied: “Tinatalikdan ko na po iyon dahil gusto ko nang ipagtapat ang pangyayari
kay CHARITO DELGADO na pamangkin ko.”
To the Court, this was not the waiver that the Constitution clearly and strictly required.
Such waiver failed to show his understanding of his rights, his waiver of those rights, and
the implications of his waiver. The waiver, in order to be valid, should have been in a
language that clearly manifested his desire to do so. The part of the sworn statement in
which the accused “waived” his rights referred to them as “mga karapatan na ibinibigay sa
iyo ng ating Konstitusyon” and “iyon”—words that were utterly vague and insufficient to
satisfy the Constitutional requirements. As presented, the prosecution would have us refer
to the first part of the sworn statement for guidance, as if it were a footnote saying “Please
see first part.” Such stratagem is woefully insufficient to constitute a waiver of rights
cherished and enshrined in our basic law.
Moreover, Atty. Daquiz raised only one question: whether appellant would like to waive
his rights. This was odd, because she had been called to assist appellant in making his
confession, not his waiver. Atty. Daquiz made no effort to determine whether the accused
was treated well, or if he understood his rights. Such perfunctory, even cavalier, attempt
falls short of constitutional requirements.
Second Issue: Sufficiency of Evidence for the Prosecution
Having ruled the alleged confession as unconstitutional and inadmissible, we now
determine whether the other pieces of evidence—all circumstantial in nature—would be
sufficient to overturn yet another constitutional right: to be presumed innocent unless
otherwise proven.
The rule is that “x x x in the absence of direct proof, conviction may be based on
circumstantial evidence, but to warrant such conviction, the following requisites must
concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.”
Here, the solicitor general, as well as the trial court, posits that the conviction of the
appellant was sufficiently warranted by the aggregate of the following circumstantial
evidence:
1.The appellant was familiar with the place where the crime was perpetrated.
2.The appellant left work around 9:30 on the evening of April 29, 1993 and did not return
home until the morning of April 30, 1993.
3.The appellant, during the victim’s wake, became hysterical and allegedly
uttered: “Patawarin mo ako Chato, ikaw kasi lumaban pa, nakakahiya ako, mabuti pang
mamatay na,” after which he drank “chlorox.”
We do not agree. At the outset, we stress that a careful review of the records of this case
reveals that these pieces of circumstantial evidence were controverted by the defense and,
even more important, they were not sufficiently established.
Despite the efforts of the fiscal during cross-examination, the appellant consistently
denied that he worked in the place where the victim’s body was found. Also, the prosecution
failed to prove that he was at work around 9:30 p.m. on April 29, 1993 and that he went
home on April 30, 1993. All it could present was the testimony of NBI Agent Ely Tolentino,
who merely testified on what appellant’s co-workers related to him: that appellant left work must convict the accused based on the strength of its own case, not on the weakness of the
earlier. This is clearly hearsay. The affidavits of these co-workers do not help the defense:
prosecution’s case, since they themselves were not presented during the trial. An affidavit is “True, alibi is a weak defense. But then, so also is the prosecution’s evidence in this case.
hearsay if the affiant is not presented in court and subjected to cross-examination. Besides, x x x Indeed, it is when the evidence is purely circumstantial that the prosecution is much
the appellant’s wife, Emelinda Muleta, stated categorically that her husband was with her at more obligated to rely on the strength of its own case and not on the weakness of the
defense, and that conviction must rest on nothing less than moral certainty.” (emphasis
home on April 29 and 30, 1993. The appellant himself steadfastly affirmed this during his
supplied)
cross-examination.
Presumption of Innocence
The appellant’s rather strange behavior during the wake was, according to his
“Where the state fails to meet the quantum of proof required to overcome the constitutional
testimony, due to his perceived failure to take care of his niece. This was corroborated by
presumption, the accused is entitled to acquittal, regardless of the weakness or even the
the testimony of Danilo Delgado. Moreover, the defense claims that the words he said
absence of his defense, for any conviction must rest on the strength of the prosecution’s
during the wake were ambiguous. “Patawarin mo ako Charito” could have meant that the
case and not on the weakness of the defense.” Here, without the confession of the
appellant was blaming himself for being unable to protect the victim. “Ikaw kasi lumaban
appellant, the presumption of innocence prevails.
pa” could have connoted frustration with what he imagined could have saved the life of his
niece. “Nakakahiya ako, mabuting mamatay na” also shows the appellant blaming himself
This principle is well-articulated in People v. Mejia. “In our jurisdiction accusation is not
for being inutile, indicating his desire to take his own worthless life. If these words merit
synonymous with guilt. The freedom of the accused is forfeit[ed] only if the requisite
anything, it is this: it places the appellant under suspicion. But suspicion or accusation is not
quantum of proof necessary for conviction be in existence. This, of course, requires the
synonymous with guilt.
most careful scrutiny of the evidence for the State, both oral and documentary, independent
of whatever defense is offered by the accused. Every circumstance favoring the accused’s
Most importantly, even if we were to assume that all the foregoing were proven, they
innocence must be duly taken into account. The proof against the accused must survive the
are still not enough to establish an unbroken chain leading inexorably to the guilt of the
test of reason. Strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. The
appellant. That the appellant could have been familiar with the place where the body was
conscience must be satisfied that on the accused could be laid the responsibility for the
found did not legally prove anything. That he left work at 9:30 p.m. on April 29 1993 did not
offense charged. If the prosecution fails to discharge the burden, then it is not only the
necessarily mean he was at the scene of the crime. So many other possible conclusions
accused’s right to be freed; it is, even more, the court’s constitutional duty to acquit him.”
could be made regarding this circumstance. As for his statements during the wake, they are
ambiguous.
One final note. In acquitting appellant, the Court is not saying that he did not commit the
offense charged. We are only saying that the prosecution failed to present credible
We have said that “[i]n the absence of an eyewitness, the guilt of an accused may be and admissible evidence of appellant’s guilt. The strongest evidence of the prosecution is
established by circumstantial evidence. Such evidence, however, must still pass the test of
the extrajudicial confession of appellant. But the Constitution is clear—a confession
moral certainty. When inadequate and uncorroborated, circumstantial evidence cannot
obtained in violation of the rights of an accused cannot be used as evidence. Without
sustain a conviction. Specifically, where the state’s evidence does not constitute an
Muleta’s confession, the other pieces of circumstantial evidence lose their significance. Had
unbroken chain leading beyond reasonable doubt to the guilt of the accused, the
the National Bureau of Investigation followed the law in extracting appellant’s admission of
constitutional presumption of innocence prevails and the accused is entitled to an acquittal.”
guilt, perhaps—just perhaps—the result of this case would have been different. The Court is
Thus, in People v. Bato, the pieces of circumstantial evidence presented there—those
saddened that law enforcement agents transgress the law which they have sworn to defend
showing that the accused brothers invited the victim (and his son) for a drink, suddenly tied
and uphold. A mockery of the law—which was manifestly perpetrated in this case—must not
his hands and took him away; after which his body was recovered from the river the next
be allowed to sully the country’s quest for peace and order.
day—were ruled to be inadequate to sustain a conviction based on guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision is hereby
REVERSED and VACATED. Appellant Domingo R. Muleta is hereby ACQUITTED for
In this case, the circumstantial evidence presented acquires significance only when
insufficiency of evidence. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is hereby directed to
taken together with the appellant’s confession. The pattern of the tapestry, which the
cause the release of appellant forthwith, unless the latter is being lawfully held for another
prosecution would want us to see, is bound by only a single thread—the confession of the
cause; and to inform the Court of his release, or the reasons for his continued confinement,
appellant. Due to constitutional infirmity, that one strand has been cut, and thus the pattern
within ten days from notice. No costs.
disintegrates. The tapestry becomes an unreadable puzzle. SO ORDERED.
Third Issue: Alibi as a Defense
Note.—A signed admission (“pagpapatunay”) by the accused which was obtained in
violation of his rights under custodial investigation is not admissible in evidence. (People vs.
True, we have always considered alibi inherently weak, because it can be either easily
fabricated or difficult to disprove. However, we have consistently held that the prosecution Gireng, 241 SCRA 11 [1995] ——o0o——

G.R. No. 174471. January 12, 2016
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. JERRY PEPINO y RUERAS and
PRECIOSA GOMEZ y CAMPOS, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Arrests; Illegal Arrests; Warrantless Arrests; The illegal
arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient
complaint after a trial free from error.—It is settled that [a]ny objection to the procedure followed in the
matter of the acquisition by a court of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be opportunely
raised before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. As we held in People v.
Samson, 244 SCRA 146 (1995): [A]ppellant is now estopped from questioning any defect in the manner
of his arrest as he failed to move for the quashing of the information before the trial court.
Consequently, any irregularity attendant to his arrest was cured when he voluntarily submitted himself
to the jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a plea of “not guilty” and by participating in the trial. At
any rate, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment
rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error. Simply put, the illegality of the
warrantless arrest cannot deprive the State of its right to prosecute the guilty when all other facts on
record point to their culpability. It is much too late in the day to complain about the warrantless arrest
after a valid information had been filed, the accused had been arraigned, the trial had commenced and
had been completed, and a judgment of conviction had been rendered against her.
Criminal Law; Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention; Elements of.—The elements of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
are: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another or in any other manner
deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) in the
commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or
detention lasts for more than three (3) days; or (b) it is committed by simulating public authority; or (c)
serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are
made; or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer. If the victim of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention is a minor, the duration of his detention is immaterial. Likewise,
if the victim is kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose of extorting ransom, the duration of his
detention is also of no moment and the crime is qualified and becomes punishable by death even if
none of the circumstances mentioned in paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 267 is present.
Same; Kidnapping; For there to be kidnapping, it is enough that the victim is restrained from
going home.—It is settled that the crime of serious illegal detention consists not only of placing a
person in an enclosure, but also in detaining him or depriving him of his liberty in any manner. For there
to be kidnapping, it is enough that the victim is restrained from going home. Its essence is the actual
deprivation of the victim’s liberty, coupled with indubitable proof of the intent of the accused to effect
such deprivation.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Witnesses; Out-of-Court Identification; Totality of Circumstances Test;
In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have
adopted the totality of circumstances test where they consider the following factors, viz.: (1) the witness’
opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness’ degree of attention at that time;
(3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by
the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and (6)
the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.—In People v. Teehankee, Jr., 249 SCRA 54 (1995),
the Court explained the procedure for out-of-court identification and the test to determine the
admissibility of such identifications in this manner: Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police
in various ways. It is done thru show ups where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the
witness for identification. It is done thru mug shots where photographs are shown to the witness to
identify the suspect. It is also done thru lineups where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of
persons lined up for the purpose x x x In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court
identification of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they consider
the following factors, viz.: (1) the witness’ opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2)
the witness’ degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the
witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time
between the crime and the identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.
Applying the totality-of-circumstances test, we find Edward’s out-of-court identification to be reliable and
thus admissible. To recall, when the three individuals entered Edward’s office, they initially pretended to
be customers, and even asked about the products that were for sale. The three had told Edward that
they were going to pay, but Pepino “pulled out a gun” instead. After Pepino’s companion had taken the
money from the cashier’s box, the malefactors handcuffed Edward and forced him to go down to the
parked car. From this sequence of events, there was thus ample opportunity for Edward — before and
after the gun had been pointed at him — to view the faces of the three persons who entered his office.
In addition, Edward stated that Pepino had talked to him “[a]t least once a day” during the four days that
he was detained.
Same; Same; Same; Jurisprudence holds that the natural reaction of victims of criminal violence
is to strive to see the appearance of their assailants and observe the manner the crime was
committed.—Jurisprudence holds that the natural reaction of victims of criminal violence is to strive to
see the appearance of their assailants and observe the manner the crime was committed. As the Court
held in People v. Esoy, 617 SCRA 552 (2010): It is known that the most natural reaction of a witness to
a crime is to strive to look at the appearance of the perpetrator and to observe the manner in which the
offense is perpetrated. Most often the face of the assailant and body movements thereof, create a
lasting impression which cannot be easily erased from a witness’s memory. Experience dictates that
precisely because of the unusual acts of violence committed right before their eyes, eyewitnesses can
remember with a high degree of reliability the identity of criminals at any given time. While this
pronouncement should be applied with great caution, there is no compelling circumstance in this case
that would warrant its non-application.
Same; Criminal Procedure; Custodial Investigations; Police Lineups; Right to Counsel; Custodial
investigation commences when a person is taken into custody and is singled out as a suspect in the
commission of the crime under investigation. As a rule, a police lineup is not part of the custodial
investigation; hence, the right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution cannot yet be invoked at this
stage.—The right to counsel is a fundamental right and is intended to preclude the slightest coercion
that would lead the accused to admit something false. The right to counsel attaches upon the start of
the investigation, i.e., when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or
confessions or admissions from the accused. Custodial investigation commences when a person is
taken into custody and is singled out as a suspect in the commission of the crime under investigation.
As a rule, a police lineup is not part of the custodial investigation; hence, the right to counsel
guaranteed by the Constitution cannot yet be invoked at this stage. The right to be assisted by counsel
attaches only during custodial investigation and cannot be claimed by the accused during identification
in a police lineup.
Criminal Law; Conspiracy; Conspiracy exists when two (2) or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a crime and decide to commit it. It may be proved by direct or
circumstantial evidence consisting of acts, words, or conduct of the alleged conspirators before, during
and after the commission of the felony to achieve a common design or purpose.—Conspiracy exists
when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a crime and decide to
commit it. It may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence consisting of acts, words, or conduct of
the alleged conspirators before, during and after the commission of the felony to achieve a common
design or purpose. Proof of the agreement does not need to rest on direct evidence, as the agreement
may be inferred from the conduct of the parties indicating a common understanding among them with
respect to the commission of the offense. Corollarily, it is not necessary to show that two or more
persons met together and entered into an explicit agreement setting out the details of an unlawful
scheme or the details by which an illegal objective is to be carried out.
Same; Penalties; Death Penalty; With the passage of Republic Act (RA) No. 9346, entitled “An
Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines” (signed into law on June 24, 2006),
the death penalty may no longer be imposed. The Supreme Court (SC) sentenced Gomez to the
penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole pursuant to A.M. No. 15-08-02-SC.—Article
267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, mandates the imposition of the death penalty when the
kidnapping or detention is committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other
person. Ransom, as employed in the law, is so used in its common or ordinary sense; meaning, a sum
of money or other thing of value, price, or consideration paid or demanded for redemption of a
kidnapped or detained person, a payment that releases one from captivity. In the present case, the
malefactors not only demanded but received ransom for Edward’s release. The CA thus correctly
affirmed the RTC’s imposition of the death penalty on Pepino and Gomez. With the passage of
Republic Act No. 9346, entitled “An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines”
(signed into law on June 24, 2006), the death penalty may no longer be imposed. We thus sentence
Gomez to the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole pursuant to A.M. No. 15-08-02-
SC. The reduced penalty shall likewise apply to the non-appealing party, Pepino, since it is more
favorable to him.
Same; Kidnapping for Ransom; Civil Indemnity; Moral Damages; Exemplary Damages; In the
case of People v. Gambao, 706 SCRA 508 (2013), (also for kidnapping for ransom), the Supreme
Court (SC) set the minimum indemnity and damages where facts warranted the imposition of the death
penalty if not for prohibition thereof by Republic Act (RA) No. 9346, as follows: (1) P100,000.00 as civil
indemnity; (2) P100,000.00 as moral damages which the victim is assumed to have suffered and thus
needs no proof; and (3) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages to set an example for the public good.—In
the case of People v. Gambao, 706 SCRA 508 (2013), (also for kidnapping for ransom), the Court set
the minimum indemnity and damages where facts warranted the imposition of the death penalty if not
for prohibition thereof by R.A. No. 9346, as follows: (1) P100,000.00 as civil indemnity; (2) P100,000.00
as moral damages which the victim is assumed to have suffered and thus needs no proof; and (3)
P100,000.00 as exemplary damages to set an example for the public good. These amounts shall earn
interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of the finality of the Court’s Resolution
until fully paid.
BRION, J.:
This is an appeal filed by Jerry Pepino (Pepino) and Preciosa Gomez (Gomez) assailing
the June 16, 2006 decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02026.
Antecedents
The prosecution evidence showed that at 1:00 p.m., on June 28, 1997, two men and a
woman entered the office of Edward Tan at Kilton Motors Corporation in Sucat, Parañaque
City, and pretended to be customers. When Edward was about to receive them, one of the
men, eventually identified as Pepino, pulled out a gun. Thinking that it was a holdup,
Edward told Pepino that the money was inside the cashier’s box. Pepino and the other man
looted the cashier’s box, handcuffed Edward, and forced him to go with them. From the
hallway, Jocelyn Tan (mentioned as “Joselyn” in some parts of the record), Edward’s wife,
saw Pepino take her husband. She went to the adjoining room upon Edward’s instructions.
Pepino brought Edward to a metallic green Toyota Corolla where three other men were
waiting inside. The woman (later identified as Gomez) sat on the front passenger seat. The
abductors then placed surgical tape over Edward’s eyes and made him wear sunglasses.
After travelling for two and a half hours, they arrived at an apartment in Quezon City. The
abductors removed the tape from Edward’s eyes, placed him in a room, and then chained
his legs. Pepino approached Edward and asked for the phone number of his father so that
he could ask for ransom for his (Edward’s) liberty. Edward told Pepino to negotiate with his
wife, but the latter insisted on talking to his father.
At around 5:00 p.m. of the same day, the kidnappers called Edward’s father and
demanded a P40 million ransom for his release. Edward’s father told the kidnappers that he
did not have that amount. The abductors negotiated with Jocelyn who eventually agreed to
a P700,000.00 ransom. The kidnappers told Jocelyn to pack the money into two packages
and to drop these at a convenience store in front of McDonald’s at Mindanao Avenue. They
further demanded that Edward’s vehicle be used to bring the money.
After four days, or on July 1, 1997, Antonio Gepiga (the family driver) brought the
agreed amount to the 7-Eleven convenience store at Mindanao Avenue as instructed. That
evening, three men and Gomez blindfolded Edward, made him board a car, and drove
around for 30 minutes. Upon stopping, they told Edward that he could remove his blindfold
after five minutes. When Edward removed his blindfold, he found himself inside his own car
parked at the UP Diliman Campus. He drove home and reported his kidnapping to Teresita
Ang See, a known anti-crime crusader.
After five months, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) informed Edward that they
had apprehended some suspects, and invited him to identify them from a lineup consisting
of seven persons: five males and two females. Edward positively identified Pepino, Gomez,
and one Mario Galgo. Jocelyn likewise identified Pepino.
Pepino and Gomez did not testify for their defense. The defense instead presented
Zeny Pepino, Reynaldo Pepino, NBI Special Investigator Marcelo Jadloc and P/Sr. Insp.
Narciso Quano (mentioned as “Qano” in some parts of the record).
Zeny testified that she and her husband, Jerry Pepino, were inside their house in Cebu
City on December 7, 1997, when about 20 heavily armed men entered their house looking
for Jerry. When Jerry asked them if they had a warrant of arrest, one of the men pointed a
gun at him and handcuffed him; the armed men then hit him with the butt of an armalite and
punched him. The men also took Pepino’s wristwatch and wallet, as well as Zeny’s bag and
watch. Some of the armed men searched the second floor of the house, and found a .45
caliber gun. The armed men brought Zeny and Pepino outside their house where Zeny saw
Renato Pepino and Larex Pepino already handcuffed. The armed men brought them to the
Cebu City Police Headquarters before bringing them to the NBI Headquarters in Manila.
The following day, Jerry, Renato, and Larex were brought to the Department of Justice
(DOJ). Zeny, on the other hand, was released after being detained at the NBI for three (3)
days.
Reynaldo’s testimony was summarized by the CA as follows:
x x x On December 6, 1997, he accompanied accused-appellant Gomez to his
brother’s sister-in-law who happens to work in a recruitment agency. While they were
inside the latter’s house at Lot 2, Block 15, Marikina Heights, Marikina City, they heard a
noise at the gate. When he peeped through the window, he saw two (2) motorcycles and
two (2) Vannette vans. Shortly thereafter, someone kicked the back door and several
armed men emerged therefrom and announced their arrest. When he asked them if they
had any warrant, they replied: “Walang warrant, warrant. Walang search, search.” They
were then hogtied and made to lie face down. Five (5) of them then went upstairs and
seized his personal belongings together with his briefcase which contained P45,000.00,
documents of accused-appellant Gomez, and his .45 caliber pistol as well as his license
 and permit to carry the same. No receipts were issued for their personal effects which The case was automatically elevated to this Court in view of the death penalty that the
were confiscated. They were subsequently brought to Camp Crame and subjected to RTC imposed. We referred the case to the CA for intermediate review pursuant to our ruling
torture. The following day, they were brought to the Department of Justice and a case for in People v. Mateo.
kidnapping was filed against him. Upon reinvestigation, however, he was discharged from
the Information and the court dismissed the case against him.
In its decision dated June 16, 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision
with the modification that the amounts of moral and exemplary damages were increased
SI Jadloc and Police Senior Inspector Quano, Jr. were presented as hostile witnesses.
from P300,000.00 and P100,000.00, respectively.
Jadloc declared on the witness stand that NBI Assistant Director Edmundo Arugay
The CA held that Pepino and Gomez were deemed to have waived any objection to the
dispatched a team to Cebu City to investigate a kidnap-for-ransom case. The team
illegality of their arrests when they did not move to quash the information before entering
immediately conducted surveillance operations when they arrived at Calle Rojo, Lahug,
their plea, and when they participated at the trial.
Cebu City. One of the team members saw Renato and Larex Pepino with guns tucked in
their waists. When the team approached them, the two men ran inside their house. The
The CA further ruled that Pepino and Gomez conspired with each other to attain a
team went after them and on entering the house, they saw Jerry in possession of a .45
common objective, i.e., to kidnap Edward in exchange for ransom.
caliber gun. The team arrested Jerry, Renato and Larex, and then brought them to the NBI
Headquarters in Manila.
While the case was under review by the Supreme Court, Pepino filed an urgent motion
to withdraw his appeal, which the Court granted. Only Gomez’s appeal is now pending
Quano testified that he was designated as the leader of a team tasked to arrest
before us.
members of a kidnap-for-ransom group at their safe house in Lot 2, Block 50, Marikina
Heights, Marikina City. When they arrived there, they introduced themselves as police
In her brief and supplemental brief, Gomez maintained that it was impossible for Edward
officers. The police forcibly opened the door after the occupants of the house refused to
to have seen her in the front seat of the getaway car because he (Edward) was blindfolded.
open the ground floor door. During their search at the second floor, the operatives found an
She also alleged that the prosecution failed to prove that she had conspired with the other
armalite and a .45 caliber gun. The members of the team handcuffed Gomez and Reynaldo,
accused.
and then brought them to Camp Crame.
Gomez further claimed that Edward’s identification of her during trial “may have been
The prosecution charged Preciosa Gomez, Jerry Pepino, Reynaldo Pepino, Jessie
Pepino, George Curvera, Boy Lanyujan, Luisito “Tata” Adulfo, Henriso Batijon (a.k.a. Dodoy preconditioned x x x by suggestive identification” made at the police lineup. She further
argued that the death penalty imposed on her is no longer proper due to the enactment of
Batijon), Nerio Alameda, and an alias Wilan Tan with kidnapping for ransom and serious
illegal detention before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 259, Parañaque City. Republic Act No. 9346.
Reynaldo was subsequently discharged after reinvestigation. Only Pepino, Gomez, and
The Court’s Ruling
Batijon were arraigned; their other co-accused remained at large.
We affirm Gomez’s conviction, but we modify the penalty imposed and the
In its May 15, 2000 decision, the RTC convicted Pepino and Gomez of kidnapping and
awarded indemnities.
serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code (as amended) and
sentenced them to suffer the death penalty. The RTC also ordered them to pay Edward
Illegality of the Arrest
P700,000.00 representing the amount extorted from him; P50,000.00 as moral damages;
and P50,000 as exemplary damages. The trial court acquitted Batijon for insufficiency of
We point out at the outset that Gomez did not question before arraignment the legality
evidence.
of her warrantless arrest or the acquisition of RTC’s jurisdiction over her person. Thus,
Gomez is deemed to have waived any objection to her warrantless arrest.
The RTC held that Edward positively identified Pepino and Gomez as two of the
persons who forcibly abducted him at gunpoint inside Kilton Motors, and who consequently
It is settled that [a]ny objection to the procedure followed in the matter of the acquisition
detained him somewhere in Quezon City for four (4) days until he was released inside the
by a court of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be opportunely raised before
UP Diliman Campus after the payment of ransom. The RTC added that Jocelyn
he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. As we held in People v.
corroborated Edward’s testimony on material points. It also pointed out that Edward
Samson:
identified both Pepino and Gomez at the lineup conducted inside the NBI compound,
[A]ppellant is now estopped from questioning any defect in the manner of his arrest
although Jocelyn only recognized Gomez. as he failed to move for the quashing of the information before the trial court.
Consequently, any irregularity attendant to his arrest was cured when he voluntarily
The RTC further ruled that the accused were already estopped from questioning the submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a plea of “not guilty” and
validity of their arrest after they entered their respective pleas. by participating in the trial.
 At any rate, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a
valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error. Simply put,
the illegality of the warrantless arrest cannot deprive the State of its right to prosecute the
guilty when all other facts on record point to their culpability. It is much too late in the day to
complain about the warrantless arrest after a valid information had been filed, the accused
had been arraigned, the trial had commenced and had been completed, and a judgment of
conviction had been rendered against her.
Sufficiency of the Prosecution Evidence
a. Elements of kidnapping proved
The elements of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, are: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he
kidnaps or detains another or in any other manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the
act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense, any
of the following circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than
three (3) days; or (b) it is committed by simulating public authority; or (c) serious physical
injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made;
or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer. If the victim of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention is a minor, the duration of his detention is
immaterial. Likewise, if the victim is kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose of
extorting ransom, the duration of his detention is also of no moment and the crime is
qualified and becomes punishable by death even if none of the circumstances mentioned in
paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 267 is present.
All these elements have been established by the prosecution. Edward positively
identified Gomez and Pepino — both private individuals — as among the three persons who
entered his office and pretended to be Kilton Motors’ customers. He further declared that
Pepino pointed a gun at him, and forcibly took him against his will. To directly quote from
the records:
ATTY. WILLIAM CHUA:
Q: Can you tell us if anything unusual happened to you on June 28, 1997?
EDWARD TAN:
A: I was kidnapped.
xxxx
Q: Can you tell this Court how the kidnapping was initiated?
A: At around 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon, there were three persons who entered the office
of Kilton Motors and pretended to be customers.
Q: What was the gender of these three persons that you are referring to?
A: Two men and a woman.
Q: After they pretended to be customers, tell us what happened?
A: They told me they were going to pay but instead of pulling out money, they pulled out
a gun.
Q: How many people pulled out guns as you said?
A: Only one, sir.
Q: Will you look around this courtroom now and tell us if the person who pulled out a gun
is in court?
A: (WITNESS POINTED TO A PERSON AT THE RIGHT SECTION, SECOND ROW
WHO, WHEN ASKED HIS NAME, ANSWERED JERRY PEPINO)
Q: Now, you said that there were two men and a woman who went up the Kilton Motors
Office and you pointed to one of the men as Jerry Pepino, can you look around the
courtroom and tell us if any of the two others are in court?
A: (WITNESS POINTED TO A WOMAN INSIDE THE COURTROOM WHO, WHEN
ASKED HER NAME, ANSWERED AS PRECIOSA GOMEZ)
xxxx
Q: You said Mr. Pepino pulled out his gun, what happened after he pulled out his gun?
A: He told me just to be quiet and go with him.
Q: What was your reaction when he pointed a gun to you and he stated those
words?
A: I thought it was only a holdup and so I told him there was money with the cashier and
told him to get it.
Q: What happened after you told him the money was in the cashier’s box?
A: His companion took the money and told me to still go with them.
Q: When they told you to go with them, what happened next?
A: I told them why should I still go with them and then, I was handcuffed and was forced
to go down.
xxxx
Q: As they were bringing you down, what happened next, Mr. Witness?
A: When we went down nearing his car, I was boarded on [in] his car.
xxxx
Q: When they boarded you inside that car, what did they do to you, Mr. Witness?
A: They put surgical tape on my eyes and also sunglasses.
xxxx
Q: Who was at the passenger’s front seat of the car?
A: It was Preciosa Gomez.
xxxx
Edward further declared on the witness stand that Pepino, Gomez, and their other co-
accused brought him to a safe house in Quezon City; detained him there for four (4) days;
and demanded ransom from his (Edward’s) family.
It is settled that the crime of serious illegal detention consists not only of placing a
person in an enclosure, but also in detaining him or depriving him of his liberty in any
manner. For there to be kidnapping, it is enough that the victim is restrained from going
home. Its essence is the actual deprivation of the victim’s liberty, coupled with indubitable
proof of the intent of the accused to effect such deprivation.
Notably, Jocelyn corroborated Edward’s testimony on the following points: Pepino
poked a handgun at Edward while they were on the second floor of Kilton; Pepino and his
companion brought him downstairs and out of the building, and made him board a car; and
the kidnappers demanded ransom in exchange for Edward’s release.
Both the RTC and the CA found the respective testimonies of Edward and Jocelyn
credible and convincing. We affirm the credibility accorded by the trial court (and affirmed by
the CA) to these prosecution witnesses, in the absence of any showing that this factual
finding had been arbitrarily arrived at. There is nothing in the records that would put the
testimonies of Edward and Jocelyn under suspicion. We recall that Edward had close
contacts with Pepino at Kilton Motors and at the safe house. He also saw Gomez (a) seated
at the front seat of the getaway Toyota Corolla vehicle; (b) at the safe house in Quezon
City; and (c) inside the car before the kidnappers released him.
Jocelyn, for her part, stated that she was very near Pepino while he was taking away
her husband.
 In People v. Pavillare, the Court found the testimonies of the private complainant
Sukhjinder Singh and his cousin, Lakhvir Singh, to be credible and convincing, and
reasoned out as follows:
Both witnesses had ample opportunity to observe the kidnappers and to remember
their faces. The complainant had close contact with the kidnappers when he was
abducted and beaten up, and later when the kidnappers haggled on the amount of the
ransom money. His cousin met Pavillare face to face and actually dealt with him when he
paid the ransom money. The two-hour period that the complainant was in close contact
with his abductors was sufficient for him to have a recollection of their physical
appearance. Complainant admitted in court that he would recognize his abductors if he
sees them again and upon seeing Pavillare he immediately recognized him as one of the
malefactors as he remembers him as the one who blocked his way, beat him up, haggled
with the complainant’s cousin and received the ransom money. x x x It bears repeating
that the finding of the trial court as to the credibility of witnesses is given utmost respect
and as a rule will not be disturbed on appeal because it had the opportunity to closely
observe the demeanor of the witness in court.
b. Admissibility of Identification
We find no merit in Gomez’s claim that Edward’s identification of her during
trial might have been preconditioned by the “suggestive identification” made during the
police lineup.
In People v. Teehankee, Jr., the Court explained the procedure for out-of-court
identification and the test to determine the admissibility of such identifications in this
manner:
Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done
thru show ups where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for
identification. It is done thru mug shots where photographs are shown to the witness to
identify the suspect. It is also done thru lineups where a witness identifies the suspect
from a group of persons lined up for the purpose x x x In resolving the admissibility of and
relying on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of
circumstances test where they consider the following factors, viz.: (1) the witness’
opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness’ degree of attention
at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of
certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between
the crime and the identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.
Applying the totality-of-circumstances test, we find Edward’s out-of-court identification to
be reliable and thus admissible. To recall, when the three individuals entered Edward’s
office, they initially pretended to be customers, and even asked about the products that
were for sale. The three had told Edward that they were going to pay, but Pepino “pulled out
a gun” instead. After Pepino’s companion had taken the money from the cashier’s box, the
malefactors handcuffed Edward and forced him to go down to the parked car. From this
sequence of events, there was thus ample opportunity for Edward — before and after the
gun had been pointed at him — to view the faces of the three persons who entered his
office. In addition, Edward stated that Pepino had talked to him “[a]t least once a day” during
the four days that he was detained.
Edward also saw Gomez seated at the front seat of the getaway metallic green Toyota
Corolla vehicle. In addition, the abductors removed the tape from Edward’s eyes when they
arrived at the apartment, and among those whom he saw there was Gomez. According to
Edward, he was able to take a good look at the occupants of the car when he was about to
be released.
On the part of Jocelyn, she was firm and unyielding in her identification of Pepino as the
person who pointed a gun at her husband while going down the stairs, and who brought him
outside the premises of Kilton Motors. She maintained that she was very near when Pepino
was taking away her husband; and that she could not forget Pepino’s face. For accuracy,
we quote from the records:
ATTY. CORONEL:
Q: You stated that you were able to see one of the persons who kidnapped your husband,
if you see this person again, would you be able to identify him?
JOCELYN SY TAN:
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Can you look around the courtroom and see if the person you are referring to is here
today?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Can you point to him?
A: (WITNESS POINTED TO A MALE PERSON INSIDE THE COURTROOM WHO WHEN
ASKED HIS NAME ANSWERED AS JERRY PEPINO)
Q: Ms. Witness, what role did this person whom you identified and gave his name as Jerry
Pepino, what role did he play in the kidnapping of your husband?
A: Siya po bale ‘yong nakayakap sa husband ko tapos nakatutok ng baril.
xxxx
ATTY. ESTRUCO:
Q: When Jerry Pepino was at Kilton Motors, he embraced your husband?
JOCELYN SY TAN:
A: Yes, sir. And pointed a gun at my husband.
Q: And he was not blindfolded at that time?
A: No, he was not blindfolded, he was only wearing a cap.
Q: You are very sure that he is Jerry Pepino?
A: Yes, I am very, very sure. I could not forget his face.
Q: You are very sure?
A: Yes, sir. Kahit sa nightmare ko, kasama siya.
xxxx
We add that no competing event took place to draw Edward’s and Jocelyn’s attention
from the incident. Nothing in the records shows the presence of any distraction that could
have disrupted the witnesses’ attention at the time of the incident.
Jurisprudence holds that the natural reaction of victims of criminal violence is to strive to
see the appearance of their assailants and observe the manner the crime was
committed. As the Court held in People v. Esoy:
It is known that the most natural reaction of a witness to a crime is to strive to look at
the appearance of the perpetrator and to observe the manner in which the offense is
perpetrated. Most often the face of the assailant and body movements thereof, create a
lasting impression which cannot be easily erased from a witness’s memory. Experience
dictates that precisely because of the unusual acts of violence committed right before
their eyes, eyewitnesses can remember with a high degree of reliability the identity of
criminals at any given time.
While this pronouncement should be applied with great caution, there is no compelling
circumstance in this case that would warrant its non-application.
Contrary to what Gomez claimed, the police lineup conducted at the NBI was not
suggestive. We note that there were seven people in the lineup; Edward was not compelled
to focus his attention on any specific person or persons. While it might have been ideal if
there had been more women included in the lineup instead of only two, or if there had been A: They identified that the person we identified was Jerry Pepino. We first
a separate lineup for Pepino and for Gomez, the fact alone that there were five males and pinpointed na heto ang mukha at saka sinabi na ‘yan si Jerry Pepino.
two females in the lineup did not render the procedure irregular. There was no evidence that xxxx
the police had supplied or even suggested to Edward that the appellants were the
suspected perpetrators. These exchanges show that the lineup had not been attended by any suggestiveness
on the part of the police or the NBI agents; there was no evidence that they had supplied or
The following exchanges at the trial during Edward’s cross- examination prove this even suggested to either Edward or Jocelyn that the appellants were the kidnappers.
point:
ATTY. ESTURCO: We are not unaware that the Court, in several instances, has acquitted an accused
Q: When they were lined up at the NBI, where were they placed, in a certain room? when the out-of-court identification is fatally flawed. In these cases, however, it had been
EDWARD TAN: clearly shown that the identification procedure was suggestive.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: With a glass window? One way? In People v. Pineda,42 the Court acquitted Rolando Pineda because the police
A: No, sir. suggested the identity of the accused by showing only the photographs of Pineda and his
Q: You mean to say you were face to face with the alleged kidnappers?
co-accused Celso Sison to witnesses Canilo Ferrer and Jimmy Ramos. According to the
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And before you were asked to pinpoint the persons who allegedly kidnapped you, you Court, “there was impermissible suggestion because the photographs were only of
conferred with the NBI agents? appellant and Sison, focusing attention on the two accused.”
A: The NBI agents told me not to be afraid.
Q: No, my question is, you conferred with the NBI agents? Similarly, the Court in People v. Rodrigo acquitted appellant Lee Rodrigo since only a
A: Yes, sir. lone photograph was shown to the witness at the police station. We thus held that the
Q: What is the name of the NBI agent? appellant’s in-court identification proceeded from, and was influenced by, impermissible
A: I cannot remember, sir. suggestions in the earlier photographic identification.
Q: And how many were lined up?
A: Seven, sir.
Q: And the NBI agent gave the names of each of the seven? The lack of a prior description of the kidnappers in the present case should not lead to a
A: No, sir. conclusion that witnesses’ identification was erroneous. The lack of a prior description of the
kidnappers was due to the fact that Jocelyn (together with other members of Edward’s
We also note that Jocelyn’s and Edward’s out-of-court identifications were made on the family), for reasons not made known in the records, opted to negotiate with the kidnappers,
same day. While Jocelyn only identified Pepino, the circumstances surrounding this out-of- instead of immediately seeking police assistance. If members of Edward’s family had
court identification showed that the whole identification process at the NBI was not refused to cooperate with the police, their refusal could have been due to their desire not to
suggestive. To directly quote from the records: compromise Edward’s safety. In the same manner, Edward, after he was freed, chose to
ATTY. ESTURCO: report the matter to Teresita Ang See, and not to the police.
Q: How about the alleged kidnappers, where were they placed during that time?
JOCELYN TAN: Given these circumstances, the lack of prior description of the malefactors in this case
A: They were in front of us. should not in any way taint the identification that Edward and Jocelyn made.
Q: Without any cover?
A: None, sir.
c. The Right to Counsel
Q: Without any glass cover?
A: See-through glass window. The right to counsel is a fundamental right and is intended to preclude the slightest
Q: One-way mirror? coercion that would lead the accused to admit something false. The right to counsel
A: Not one way, see-through. attaches upon the start of the investigation, i.e., when the investigating officer starts to ask
Q: And before you were asked to pinpoint the alleged kidnappers, you were already questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from the accused.
instructed by the NBI what to do and was told who are the persons to be lined
up? Custodial investigation commences when a person is taken into custody and is singled
A: No, sir. out as a suspect in the commission of the crime under investigation. As a rule, a police
xxxx
lineup is not part of the custodial investigation; hence, the right to counsel guaranteed by
Q: And between the alleged length of time, you were still very positive that it was
Gerry (sic) Pepino inside the NBI cell? the Constitution cannot yet be invoked at this stage. The right to be assisted by counsel
A: At first, I did not know that he was Jerry Pepino but we know his face. attaches only during custodial investigation and cannot be claimed by the accused during
Q: At first, you did not know that it was Jerry Pepino? identification in a police lineup.
A: Yes, sir.
xxxx Our ruling on this point in People v. Lara is instructive:
Q: It was the NBI officer who told you that the person is Jerry Pepino, am I correct? x x x The guarantees of Sec. 12(1), Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, or the so-
called Miranda rights, may be invoked only by a person while he is under custodial
 investigation. Custodial investigation starts when the police investigation is no longer a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect
taken into custody by the police who starts the interrogation and propounds questions to
the person to elicit incriminating statements. Police lineup is not part of the custodial
investigation; hence, the right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution cannot yet be
invoked at this stage.
Defense witness Reynaldo, however, maintained that Pepino and Gomez were among
those already presented to the media as kidnapping suspects by the DOJ a day before
the police lineup was made. In this sense, the appellants were already the focus of the
police and were thus deemed to be already under custodial investigation when the out-of-
court identification was conducted.
Nonetheless, the defense did not object to the in-court identification for having
been tainted by an irregular out-of-court identification in a police lineup. They
focused, instead, on the legality of the appellants’ arrests.
Whether Edward and Jocelyn could have seen Pepino and Gomez in various media
fora that reported the presentation of the kidnapping suspects to the media is not for the
Court to speculate on. The records merely show that when defense counsel, Atty. Caesar
Esturco, asked Jocelyn during cross-examination whether she was aware that there were
several kidnap-for-ransom incidents in Metro Manila, the latter answered that she “can read
in the newspapers.”50 At no time did Jocelyn or Edward ever mention that they saw the
appellants from the news reports in print or on television.
At any rate, the appellants’ respective convictions in this case were based on
an independent in-court identification made by Edward and Jocelyn, and not on the
out-of-court identification during the police lineup. We reiterate that the RTC and the
CA found the court testimonies of these witnesses to be positive and credible, and that
there was no showing that their factual findings had been arrived at arbitrarily. The in-court
identification thus cured whatever irregularity might have attended the police lineup.
As the Court ruled in People v. Algarme:
Even assuming arguendo the appellants’ out-of-court identification was defective,
their subsequent identification in court cured any flaw that may have initially attended it.
We emphasize that the “inadmissibility of a police lineup identification x x x should not
necessarily foreclose the admissibility of an independent in-court identification.” We also
stress that all the accused-appellants were positively identified by the prosecution
eyewitnesses during the trial.
It is also significant to note that despite the overwhelming evidence adduced by the
prosecution, Pepino and Gomez did not even testify for their respective defenses.
d. The Presence of Conspiracy
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a crime and decide to commit it. It may be proved by direct or circumstantial
evidence consisting of acts, words, or conduct of the alleged conspirators before, during
and after the commission of the felony to achieve a common design or purpose.
Proof of the agreement does not need to rest on direct evidence, as the agreement may
be inferred from the conduct of the parties indicating a common understanding among them
with respect to the commission of the offense. Corollarily, it is not necessary to show that
two or more persons met together and entered into an explicit agreement setting out the
details of an unlawful scheme or the details by which an illegal objective is to be carried out.
In the present case, the records establish the following facts: Pepino, Gomez, and
another man entered Edward’s office, and initially pretended to be customers; the three told
Edward that they were going to pay, but Pepino pulled out a gun. After Pepino’s companion
took the money from the cashier’s box, the malefactors handcuffed him and forced him to
go down to the parked car; Gomez sat at the front passenger seat of the car which brought
Edward to a safe house in Quezon City; the abductors removed the tape from Edward’s
eyes, placed him in a room, and then chained his legs upon arrival at the safe house; the
abductors negotiated with Edward’s family who eventually agreed to a P700,000.00 ransom
to be delivered by the family driver using Edward’s own car; and after four days, three men
and Gomez blindfolded Edward, made him board a car, drove around for 30 minutes, and
left him inside his own car at the UP Diliman campus.
The collective, concerted, and synchronized acts of the accused before, during, and
after the kidnapping constitute undoubted proof that Gomez and her co-accused conspired
with each other to attain a common objective, i.e., to kidnap Edward and detain him illegally
in order to demand ransom for his release.
The Proper Penalty
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, mandates the imposition of the
death penalty when the kidnapping or detention is committed for the purpose of extorting
ransom from the victim or any other person. Ransom, as employed in the law, is so used in
its common or ordinary sense; meaning, a sum of money or other thing of value, price, or
consideration paid or demanded for redemption of a kidnapped or detained person, a
payment that releases one from captivity.
In the present case, the malefactors not only demanded but received ransom for
Edward’s release. The CA thus correctly affirmed the RTC’s imposition of the death penalty
on Pepino and Gomez.
With the passage of Republic Act No. 9346, entitled “An Act Prohibiting the Imposition
of Death Penalty in the Philippines” (signed into law on June 24, 2006), the death penalty
may no longer be imposed. We thus sentence Gomez to the penalty of reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole pursuant to A.M. No. 15-08-02-SC.
The reduced penalty shall likewise apply to the non-appealing party, Pepino, since it is
more favorable to him.
The Awarded Indemnities
In the case of People v. Gambao (also for kidnapping for ransom), the Court set the
minimum indemnity and damages where facts warranted the imposition of the death penalty
if not for prohibition thereof by R.A. No. 9346, as follows: (1) P100,000.00 as civil indemnity;
(2) P100,000.00 as moral damages which the victim is assumed to have suffered and thus
needs no proof; and (3) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages to set an example for the
public good. These amounts shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from the date of the finality of the Court’s Resolution until fully paid.

We thus reduce the moral damages imposed by the CA from P300,000.00 to

P100,000.00 to conform to prevailing jurisprudence on kidnapping cases. This reduced
penalty shall apply to Pepino for being more favorable to him. However, the additional
monetary award (i.e., P100,000.00 civil indemnity) imposed on Gomez shall not be applied
to Pepino.

We affirm the P700,000.00 imposed by the courts below as restitution of the amount of
ransom demanded and received by the kidnappers. We also affirm the CA’s award of
P100,000.00 as exemplary damages based on Gambao.

WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing, we AFFIRMthe challenged June 16,
2006 decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02026 with the
following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) the penalty imposed on Gomez and Pepino shall be reduced from death to reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole;
(2) they are jointly and severally ordered to pay the reduced amount of P100,000.00 as
moral damages;
(3) Gomez is further ordered to pay the victim P100,000.00 as civil indemnity; and
(4) the awarded amounts shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from the date of the finality of the Court’s Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.

Notes.—There is no law or police regulation requiring a police lineup for proper identification in
every case. Even if there was no police lineup, there could still be proper and reliable identification as
long as such identification was not suggested or instigated to the witness by the police. (People vs.
Macapanas, 620 SCRA 54 [2010])

It is settled that the crime of serious illegal detention consists not only of placing a person in an
enclosure, but also in detaining him or depriving him in any manner of his liberty — for there to be
kidnapping, it is enough that the victim is restrained from going home. (People vs. Anticamara, 651
SCRA 489 [2011])

——o0o——
 G.R. No. 205412. September 9, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ADRIAN GUTING y TOMAS,
accused-appellant.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Circumstantial Evidence; To justify a conviction upon circumstantial
evidence, the combination of circumstances must be such as to leave no reasonable doubt in the mind
as to the criminal liability of the accused.—To justify a conviction upon circumstantial evidence, the
combination of circumstances must be such as to leave no reasonable doubt in the mind as to the
criminal liability of the accused. Rule 133, Section 4 of the Rules of Court enumerates the conditions
when circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction, thus: SEC. 4. Circumstantial Evidence, when
sufficient.—Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) There is more than one
circumstance; (b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) The combination
of all circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
Criminal Law; Parricide; Elements of.—Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2)
the deceased is killed by the accused; and (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse
of the accused. The key element in Parricide — other than the fact of killing — is the relationship of the
offender to the victim. All the elements are present in this case. Jose, the victim, was killed by accused-
appellant, his own son. Accused-appellant’s birth certificate, which was presented before the RTC,
establishes that accused-appellant was the legitimate son of Jose and Flora.
Same; Same; Penalties; The crime of Parricide is punishable by the indivisible penalties
of reclusion perpetua to death.—The crime of Parricide is punishable by the indivisible penalties
of reclusion perpetua to death. With one mitigating circumstance, namely, voluntary surrender, and no
aggravating circumstance, the imposition of the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua on accused-
appellant was proper.
Same; Damages; Death Occurs Due to a Crime; When death occurs due to a crime, the
following damages may be awarded: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual
or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; and (5) temperate
damages.—We modify though the monetary awards imposed by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. When death occurs due to a crime, the following damages may be awarded: (1) civil
indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral
damages; (4) exemplary damages; and (5) temperate damages.
Same; Same; Loss of Earning Capacity; To be able to claim damages for loss of earning
capacity despite the nonavailability of documentary evidence, there must be oral testimony.—To be
able to claim damages for loss of earning capacity despite the nonavailability of documentary evidence,
there must be oral testimony that: (a) the victim was self-employed earning less than the minimum
wage under current labor laws and judicial notice was taken of the fact that in the victim’s line of work,
no documentary evidence is available; or (b) the victim was employed as a daily wage worker earning
less than the minimum wage under current labor laws.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
For Our consideration is an appeal from the Decision 1 dated May 23, 2012 of the Court
of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04596, which affirmed the Decision dated June 24,
2010 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Camiling, Tarlac, Branch 68, in Criminal Case No.
06-93, finding accused-appellant Adrian Guting y Tomas guilty of the crime of Parricide
under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code.
In an Information dated August 1, 2006, docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-93, accused-
appellant was charged before the RTC with Parricide, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about 4:50 in the rainy afternoon of July 30, 2006 at Plaridel
St., Poblacion B, Camiling, Tarlac, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with
evident premeditation, that is, having conceived and deliberated to kill his own father Jose
Guting y Ibarra, 67 years old, married, while inside their residential house, and armed with
a bladed weapon, suddenly and unexpectedly stabbed several times the victim,
employing means, manner and form in the execution thereof which tender directly and
specially to insure its commission without danger to the person of said accused, the result
of which attack was that said victim received multiple stab wounds on his body which
directly caused his instantaneous death.
When arraigned on September 19, 2006, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the
crime charged. Thereafter, pretrial and trial on the merits ensued.
Below is a summary of the prosecution witnesses’ testimonies.
Police Officer (PO)1 Fidel Torre (Torre) testified that on the rainy afternoon of July 30,
2005, at around 5:00 o’clock, he and PO1 Alexis Macusi (Macusi) were standing in front of
the Camiling Police Station when accused-appellant, all wet from the rain and with a bladed
weapon in his hand, suddenly approached them and told them that he had stabbed his
father. Hearing accused-appellant’s statement, PO1 Torre immediately got the bladed
weapon from accused-appellant and turned it over to PO1 Macusi for proper disposition.
PO1 Macusi corroborated PO1 Torre’s testimony. PO1 Macusi narrated that accused-
appellant suddenly appeared before them at the Police Station, all wet and holding a knife.
Accused-appellant proclaimed that his father was already dead. Unsuspecting, PO1 Macusi
asked who killed accused-appellant’s father. Accused-appellant answered, “Sinaksak ko po
yong tatay ko! Napatay ko na po!” PO1 Torre then got the knife from accused-appellant and
gave it to PO1 Macusi. PO1 Macusi placed the knife in the custodian cabinet in the Police
Station. Thereafter, PO1 Macusi, Senior Police Officer (SPO)2 Eliseo Hermosado
(Hermosado), and SPO2 Noli Felipe (Felipe) went to the residence of Jose Guting (Jose),
accusedappellant’s father, to verify the reported crime, while other police officers informed
Flora Guting (Flora), Jose’s wife (also accused-appellant’s mother), who was still in the
market with Emerlito Guting (Emerlito), Jose and Flora’s other son (accused-appellant’s
brother), who was then driving a tricycle for hire. While waiting for Flora and Emerlito, PO1
Macusi, SPO2 Hermosado, and SPO2 Felipe inquired from the neighbors if anybody had
witnessed the crime, but no one did. When Flora and Emerlito arrived, they entered the
house and saw Jose’s lifeless body with blood still oozing from his wounds. Immediately,
Flora and Emerlito brought Jose to the hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival.
Subsequently, Flora and Emerlito executed their respective Sinumpaang Salaysay and filed
a case for Parricide against accused-appellant.
On cross-examination, PO1 Macusi divulged that when the knife was given to him by
PO1 Torre for safekeeping, he did not ask accused-appellant if it was the knife he used to
kill his father. Neither did accused-appellant mention to PO1 Macusi that it was the knife he
used in stabbing Jose. All that accused-appellant said was, “Sinaksak ko po yong tatay ko!
Napatay ko na po!” PO1 Macusi also admitted that he did not request for the examination of
the knife because it was clean; any trace or stain of blood on it would have been washed
away by the rains at that time. PO1 Macusi was further questioned as to why he did not put
into writing accused-appellant’s admission that he killed his father, and PO1 Macusi
explained that it escaped his mind as he was still new at the job then and he was carried
away by the fast flow of events.
Flora conceded that she was not present when Jose, her husband, was killed by
accused-appellant, their son. Flora only learned of the stabbing incident and accused-
appellant’s surrender from the police officers of the Camiling Police Station. Flora declared
that she spent for the wake and burial of Jose and that Jose, who was a tricycle driver, had
been earning around P200.00 a day at the time of his death.
Doctor Valentin Theodore Lomibao (Dr. Lomibao) conducted the autopsy of Jose’s
body. Dr. Lomibao reported that Jose suffered around 39 stab wounds on the head, neck,
thorax, abdomen, and extremities. Jose’s internal organs were heavily damaged by the stab
wounds, resulting in his instantaneous death. Dr. Lomibao also showed several pictures of
Jose’s body which were taken before he conducted the autopsy.
Accused-appellant opted not to present any evidence in his defense.
The RTC promulgated its Decision on June 24, 2010 finding accused-appellant guilty of
Parricide based on his verbal admission that he killed his father, Jose. Even assuming that
accused-appellant’s admission was inadmissible in evidence, the RTC adjudged that the
prosecution was still able to establish sufficient circumstantial evidence which, taken
collectively, pointed to accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the brutal killing of his father.
The dispositive portion of the RTC judgment reads:
WHEREFORE, accused Adrian Guting y Tomas is hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense of Parricide punishable under Article 246 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended and hereby sentences him to a penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.
Accused is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00
as civil indemnity, another amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages, and still another
amount of P30,000.00 as temperate damages.
Accused-appellant appealed his conviction before the Court of Appeals, docketed as
C.A.-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04596. The appellate court promulgated its Decision on May 23,
2012, decreeing thus:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Camiling, Tarlac, Branch 68 convicting herein accused-appellant
Adrian Guting y Tomas for the crime of Parricide under Article 246 of the
Revised Penal Code is AFFIRMED.
Hence, accused-appellant comes before us via the instant appeal with the same
assignment of errors he raised before the Court of Appeals, to wit:
I Accused-appellant was also merely standing before PO1 Torre and PO1 Macusi in front of
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT ON THE BASIS OF HIS EXTRAJUDICIAL ADMISSION.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT ON THE BASIS OF INSUFFICIENT CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE
PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO OVERTHROW THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE IN HIS FAVOR.
We find no merit in accused-appellant’s appeal.
Accused-appellant argues that his oral confession to PO1 Torre and PO1 Macusi,
without the assistance of counsel, is inadmissible in evidence for having been made in
blatant violation of his constitutional right under Article III, Section 12 of the 1987
Constitution.
Section 12, paragraphs 1 and 3, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution
mandate that:
SEC. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services
of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing
and in the presence of counsel.
xxxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof
shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
The “investigation” in Section 12, paragraph 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
pertains to “custodial investigation.” Custodial investigation commences when a person is
taken into custody and is singled out as a suspect in the commission of a crime under
investigation and the police officers begin to ask questions on the suspect’s participation
therein and which tend to elicit an admission. As we expounded in People v. Marra:
Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom
of action in any significant way. It is only after the investigation ceases to be a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect is
taken into custody, and the police carries out a process of interrogations that lends itself
to eliciting incriminating statements that the rule begins to operate. (Citation omitted)
Applying the foregoing definitions, accused-appellant was not under custodial
investigation when he admitted, without assistance of counsel, to PO1 Torre and PO1
Macusi that he stabbed his father to death. Accused-appellant’s verbal confession was so
spontaneously and voluntarily given and was not elicited through questioning by the police
authorities. It may be true that PO1 Macusi asked accused-appellant who killed his father,
but PO1 Macusi only did so in response to accused-appellant’s initial declaration that his
father was already dead. At that point, PO1 Macusi still had no idea who actually committed
the crime and did not consider accused-appellant as the suspect in his father’s killing.
the Camiling Police Station and was not yet in police custody.
Accused-appellant cites in support of his argument People v. Cabintoy, where we held
that an uncounselled extrajudicial confession without a valid waiver of the right to counsel
— that is, in writing and in the presence of counsel — is inadmissible in evidence. The
situation of accused-appellants in Cabintoy is not similar to that of accused-appellant
herein. The accused-appellants in Cabintoy, when they executed their extrajudicial
confessions without assistance of counsel, were already suspects under custodial
investigation by the San Mateo Police for robbery with homicide committed against a taxi
driver. Accused-appellant in the instant case, on his own volition, approached unsuspecting
police officers standing in front of the police station with a knife in his hand and readily
confessed to stabbing his father to death. Accused-appellant was arrested and subjected to
custodial investigation by the police officers only after his confession. Hence, herein
accused-appellant’s confession, even if done without the assistance of a lawyer, is not in
violation of his constitutional right under Section 12, paragraph 1, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. The present case is more akin to People v. Andan17 wherein we allowed into
evidence the uncounselled confession of therein accused-appellant given under the
following circumstances:
Under these circumstances, it cannot be successfully claimed that appellant’s
confession before the mayor is inadmissible. It is true that a municipal mayor has
“operational supervision and control” over the local police and may arguably be deemed
a law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section 12(1) and (3) of Article III of
the Constitution. However, appellant’s confession to the mayor was not made in response
to any interrogation by the latter. In fact, the mayor did not question appellant at all. No
police authority ordered appellant to talk to the mayor. It was appellant himself who
spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the mayor for a private meeting. The mayor
did not know that appellant was going to confess his guilt to him. When appellant talked
with the mayor as a confidant and not as a law enforcement officer, his uncounselled
confession to him did not violate his constitutional rights. Thus, it has been held that the
constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous
statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary
manner whereby appellant orally admitted having committed the crime. What the
Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. The
rights under Section 12 are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the
state as would lead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him from freely
and voluntarily telling the truth. Hence, we hold that appellant’s confession to the mayor
was correctly admitted by the trial court.
Moreover, accused-appellant’s verbal confession that he stabbed his father to death
made to PO1 Torre and PO1 Macusi, established through the testimonies of said police
officers, falls under Rule 130, Section 26 of the Rules of Court, which provides that “[t]he
act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against
him.” This rule is based upon the notion that no man would make any declaration against
himself, unless it is true. Accused-appellant’s declaration is admissible for being part of
the res gestae. A declaration is deemed part of the res gestae and admissible in evidence
as an exception to the hearsay rule when these three requisites concur: (1) the principal act,
the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant
had time to contrive or devise; and (3) the statements concern the occurrence in question
and its immediately attending circumstances.19 All the requisites are present in this case.
Accused-appellant had just been through a startling and gruesome occurrence, that is, his
father’s death. Accused-appellant made the confession to PO1 Torre and PO1 Macusi only
a few minutes after and while he was still under the influence of said startling occurrence,
before he had the opportunity to concoct or contrive a story. In fact, accused-appellant
seemed to still be in shock when he walked to the Police Station completely unmindful of
the rain and the knife in his hand, and headed directly to PO1 Torre and PO1 Macusi, who
were standing in front of the Police Station, to confess to stabbing his father to death. The
police officers who immediately went to the house of Jose, accused-appellant’s father,
found Jose’s lifeless body with blood still oozing from his stab wounds. As res gestae,
accused-appellant’s spontaneous statement is admissible in evidence against him.
Accused-appellant’s confession was further corroborated by the circumstantial
evidence.
To justify a conviction upon circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances
must be such as to leave no reasonable doubt in the mind as to the criminal liability of the
accused. Rule 133, Section 4 of the Rules of Court enumerates the conditions when
circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction, thus:
SEC. 4. Circumstantial Evidence, when sufficient.—Circumstantial evidence is
sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
The RTC, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, found that the aforequoted requisites have
been satisfied in this case given the following circumstantial evidence:
1. On or about 4:50 o’clock in the afternoon of July 30, 2006, the victim was stabbed
to death.
2. Thirty minutes later, [accused-appellant] personally went to Camiling Police
Station and surrendered himself and the bladed weapon he used in killing his father to
the police authorities of the said police station.
3. When his mother learned about the incident, [accused-appellant] did nothing to
appease his responding mother. “It has always been said that criminal case are primarily
about human nature.” Here is a case of a son doing nothing to explain the death of his
father to his grieving mother. Such inaction is contrary to human nature.
4. When he was detained after police investigation, [accused-appellant] did not
object to his continued detention.
These circumstances constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and
reasonable conclusion that points to accused-appellant, to the exclusion of all others, as the
guilty person. The incriminating collage of facts against accused-appellant was created by
circumstantial evidence anchored on the credible and unbiased testimony of the
prosecution’s witnesses. We will not disturb but shall accord the highest respect to the
findings of the RTC on the issue of credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies, it
having had the opportunity to observe their deportment and manner of testifying during the
trial.
Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code defines Parricide as follows:
Art. 246. Parricide.—Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall
be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the
accused; and (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of
the accused. The key element in Parricide — other than the fact of killing — is the
relationship of the offender to the victim. All the elements are present in this case. Jose, the
victim, was killed by accused-appellant, his own son. Accused-appellant’s birth certificate,
which was presented before the RTC, establishes that accused-appellant was the legitimate
son of Jose and Flora.
 The crime of Parricide is punishable by the indivisible penalties of reclusion perpetua to Region III. We take judicial notice that there is no documentary evidence available to
death. With one mitigating circumstance, namely, voluntary surrender, and no aggravating establish the daily earning capacity of a tricycle driver. We thus compute the award of
circumstance, the imposition of the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua on accused- damages for the loss of Jose’s earning capacity as follows:
appellant was proper.

We modify though the monetary awards imposed by the RTC and affirmed by the Court
of Appeals. When death occurs due to a crime, the following damages may be awarded: (1)
civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages;
(3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; and (5) temperate damages.

Prevailing jurisprudence pegs the amount of civil indemnity and moral damages
awarded to the heirs of the victim of Parricide at P75,000.00 each.25 The temperate
damages awarded by the RTC in the amount of P30,000.00 should be decreased to
P25,000.00 to also conform with the latest jurisprudence. It is fitting to additionally award
exemplary damages in the sum of P30,000.00 considering the presence of the qualifying
circumstance of relationship.
Damages for the loss of earning capacity of Jose should be awarded as well given the
testimony of his wife, Flora, on this particular fact. We refer to our pronouncements
in People v. Verde that:
The heirs are also entitled to damages for the loss of earning capacity of the
deceased Francisco Gealon. The fact that the prosecution did not present documentary
evidence to support its claim for damages for loss of earning capacity of the deceased
does not preclude recovery of said damages. The testimony of the victim’s wife, Delia
Gealon, as to the earning capacity of her husband Francisco Gealon sufficiently
establishes the basis for making such an award. It was established that Francisco Gealon
was 48 years old at the time of his death in 1991. His average income was P200.00 a
day. Hence, in accordance with the American Expectancy Table of Mortality adopted in
several cases decided by this Court, the loss of his earning capacity is to be calculated
as follows:
Finally, in conformity with current policy, we impose interest on all monetary awards for
damages at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this Decision
until fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04596,
finding accused-appellant, Adrian Guting y Tomas, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Parricide, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.Accused-appellant is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim the
amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 as
temperate damages, P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P316,455.00 as
compensation for loss of earning capacity. All monetary awards for damages shall be
subject to interest of six percent (6%) per annum from date of finality of this Decision until
they are fully paid.
SO ORDERED.

Notes.—In the case of parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the relationship between the
accused and the deceased would be the marriage certificate. (People vs. Paycana, Jr., 551 SCRA 657
[2008])

Jurisprudence, however, has established the following formula for computing compensation for
loss of earning capacity: net earning capacity = [2/3 x (80-age at time of death) x (gross annual income
– reasonable and necessary living expenses], and pegged reasonable and necessary reasonable
expenses at 50% of earnings in the absence of contrary evidence. (People vs. Tambis, 560 SCRA343
[2008])

——o0o——
To be able to claim damages for loss of earning capacity despite the nonavailability of
documentary evidence, there must be oral testimony that: (a) the victim was self-employed
earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws and judicial notice was taken
of the fact that in the victim’s line of work, no documentary evidence is available; or (b) the
victim was employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under
current labor laws.

In the case at bar, Jose was 67 years old at the time of his death and was earning a
daily wage of P200.00 as a tricycle driver, which was below the P252.00 to P263.50
minimum wage rate for non-agriculture under Wage Order No. 11 dated June 16, 2005 for
 G.R. No. 208404. February 24, 2016
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. VICENTE LUGNASIN and
DEVINCIO GUERRERO, accused-appellants.
Criminal Law; Kidnapping for Ransom; Elements of.—In prosecuting a case involving the crime
of Kidnapping for Ransom, the prosecution must establish the following elements: (i) the accused was
a private person; (ii) he kidnapped or detained or in any manner deprived another of his or her liberty;
(iii) the kidnapping or detention was illegal; and (iv) the victim was kidnapped or detained for ransom. A
painstaking review of the present case clearly shows that all the aforestated elements were proven in
the criminal case on review. The testimony of Cordero sufficiently established the commission of the
crime and both the accused-appellants’ culpability. He positively identified in and out of court accused-
appellants Vicente and Devincio as two of his abductors. As the kidnap victim, a private individual,
Cordero’s positive identification of both accused-appellants — as two of several men who abducted him
from the gate of his house, who brought him to a hut somewhere in the south, who chained him to a
bed, who essentially deprived him of liberty without lawful cause for four days, and, which deprivation of
his liberty was for the purpose of extorting ransom from his family — collectively establish the crime
of kidnapping for ransom as the actions of both the accused-appellants were certain and clear, and
their intent was explicit and made known to Cordero himself.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Witnesses; When the credibility of a witness is in issue, the findings of
fact of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of the
probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings are accorded high
respect if not conclusive effect.—This Court cannot sustain both accused-appellants’ arguments casting
doubt on Cordero’s positive identification of their participation in the commission of the crime. As oft-
explained, when the credibility of a witness is in issue, the findings of fact of the trial court, its calibration
of the testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its
conclusions anchored on said findings are accorded high respect if not conclusive effect. This holds
truer if such findings are affirmed by the appellate court. Without any clear showing that the trial court
and the appellate court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of
weight and substance, the rule should not be disturbed.
Same; Same; Out-of-Court Identification; Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in
various ways. It is done thru show-ups where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness
for identification. It is done thru mug shots where photographs are shown to the witness to identify the
suspect. It is also done thru lineups where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons
lined up for the purpose.—The trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly found the out-of-court
identification made by Cordero to have satisfied the totality of circumstances test. People v.
Teehankee, Jr., 249 SCRA 54 (1995), is instructive on the rules and test for a valid out-of-court
identification: Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru show-
ups where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification. It is done thru
mug shots where photographs are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru
lineups where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose. Since
corruption of out-of-court identification contaminates the integrity of in-court identification during the trial
of the case, courts have fashioned out rules to assure its fairness and its compliance with the
requirements of constitutional due process. In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court
identification of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they consider
the following factors, viz.: (1) the witness’ opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2)
the witness’ degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the
witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time
between the crime and the identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.
Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Illegal Arrests; An accused is estopped from assailing
any irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the information
against him on this ground before arraignment.—Accused-appellant Devincio insists that his
warrantless arrest was illegal for not falling under the permissible warrantless arrests enumerated in
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. This being the case, accused-appellant Devincio says, the
RTC had no jurisdiction to render judgment over his person. He also claims that there was no showing
that he was informed of his Constitutional rights at the time of his arrest and his rights under Sections 2
and 3 of Republic Act No. 7438 during investigation. As the Court of Appeals has already pointed out,
that accused-appellant Devincio raised none of these issues anytime during the course of his trial.
These issues were raised for the first time on appeal before the Court of Appeals. We affirm the ruling
of the Court of Appeals and quote below Miclat, Jr. v. People, 656 SCRA 539 (2011), on this Court’s
treatment of an accused’s belated allegation of the illegality of his warrantless arrest: At the outset, it is
apparent that petitioner raised no objection to the irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment.
Considering this and his active participation in the trial of the case, jurisprudence dictates that petitioner
is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing any defect in his arrest.
An accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to
move for the quashal of the information against him on this ground before arraignment. Any objection
involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of
the accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. In the
present case, at the time of petitioner’s arraignment, there was no objection raised as to the irregularity
of his arrest. Thereafter, he actively participated in the proceedings before the trial court. In effect, he is
deemed to have waived any perceived defect in his arrest and effectively submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court trying his case. At any rate, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient
cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from
error. It will not even negate the validity of the conviction of the accused. (Citations omitted) The
foregoing ruling squarely applies to accused-appellants Devincio and Vicente who failed to raise their
allegations before their arraignment. They actively participated in the trial and posited their defenses
without mentioning the alleged illegality of their warrantless arrests. They are deemed to have waived
their right to question their arrests.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
For review is the January 23, 2013 Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR-
H.C. No. 02971, which affirmed with modification the March 24, 2003 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 76, Quezon City, in Criminal Case No. Q-99-87600,
entitled “People of the Philippines v. Vicente Lugnasin, Tito Lugnasin, Excelso Lugnasin,
Elmer Madrid, Rogelio Baldaba and Devincio Guerrero,” wherein accusedappellants
Vicente Lugnasin (Vicente) and Devincio Guerrero (Devincio) were found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping for ransom.
On October 15, 1999, the Department of Justice filed an Information against Vicente,
Devincio and four other individuals, namely, Tito E. Lugnasin (Tito), Excelso B. Lugnasin
(Excelso), Elmer A. Madrid (Elmer), Rogelio D. Baldaba (Rogelio), and five other
unidentified individuals: John Doe, Peter Doe, Richard Doe, George Doe, and James Doe,
for the crime of kidnapping for ransom defined and penalized under Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code. The Information reads:
That on or about April 20, 1999 in Quezon City and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court accused VICENTE LUGNASIN, TITO LUGNASIN, EXCELSO
LUGNASIN, ELMER MADRID, ROGELIO BALDABA, DEVINCIO GUERRERO, and other
persons whose identities ha[ve] not yet been ascertained, while conspiring, conniving and
confederating with one another, did then and there with criminal and malicious intent, with
the use of force, threat and intimidation, with firearms, take and carry away the person of
Nicassius Cordero, to the Municipality of Tanauan, Province of Batangas, detaining him
thereat, depriving Nicassius Cordero of his liberty, against his free will and consent, for
the purpose of extorting ransom money for his safe release from detention said demand
for the payment of ransom money was made on the relatives of Nicassius Cordero, and
 the same was release[d] in the evening of April 24, 1999 along the South Luzon
Expressway.
When arraigned on November 5, 2001, accused-appellant Vicente pleaded not guilty to
the crime charged. Accused-appellant Devincio likewise pleaded not guilty when he was
arraigned on March 6, 2002. Both accused-appellants made no stipulation during their
respective pretrial conferences except for their identities and the jurisdiction of the court.
The nine other accused remain at large.
The facts succinctly synthesized by the RTC are as follows:
The prosecution’s lone witness, Nicassius Cordero narrated in court how he was
abducted while opening the garage door of his residence in Mindanao Avenue in the late
evening of April 20, 1999 by three armed men. He identified Devincio Guerrero as the
man with a 38 cal. revolver who came from his left side and pushed him inside the car.
The man who came from his right side and identified later as Tito Lugnasin drove the car
with Elmer Madrid riding at the back. After divesting him of his P5,000.00 cash and asking
some questions, he realized he was being kidnapped for ransom. Repeatedly, he
declared that he was not a rich man. Along Libis, another cohort, Celso Lugnasin, rode
with them until they reached the South Superhi[gh]way and after paying the toll fee, they
drove on for about fifteen minutes and stopped just behind an owner-type jeepney before
they switched places. The jeepney driver introduced himself as Commander and drove
the car. [Cordero] saw Commander’s face. He was later identified as Vicente Lugnasin.
After driving for some minutes more, they alighted, [Cordero’s] abductors placed the car’s
sunvisor around his face and ordered him to walk barefooted towards a small house.
[Cordero] was kept there for four days, while they negotiated with Saleena, his sister-in-
law for the ransom money. On the fourth day, Commander was already angry and
threatened to finish him off. He was eventually released, without ransom money being
paid.
Vicente Lugnasin, a resident of Luzviminda I, Dasmariñas, Quezon City denied the
accusation, saying he only saw Cordero for the first time at the Department of Justice and
Cordero could not even identify him. He recounted that on May 14, 1999[,] while preparing
for the town fiesta celebration, policemen came to his residence and arrested him and his
brother Tito [and] cousin Excelsio for alleged involvement in a robbery case. They were
tortured, then put on display for media men to feast on and for alleged victims to identify.
After posting bail, he was later arrested for illegal possession of firearms. He was also
charged with two other cases, a bank robbery and the Mercury Bank robbery, both
pending before the sala of Judge Jose Mendoza.
Devincio Guerrero, a fish vendor at the Pasig Market, likewise denies any
involvement in the kidnap[ping] of Cordero. He swears he saw him for the first time only
in the courtroom. He recalled that nearing Holy Week in 2002[,] five uniformed policemen
arrested him without a warrant in Lucena City, where he used to buy smoked fish to sell.
He was transferred to Camp Karingal before being detained at the QC Jail, where he is
detained up to the present. On May 14, 1999[,] he was a sponsor at a baptism of the child
of his kumpadre in Bgy. Luzviminda, Dasmariñas, Cavite. On his way home, he was
accosted by police officers while urinating along the roadside. He was detained first at the
Cavite City Jail then at the Trece Martires jail. He saw Vicente Lugnasin only at the
Quezon City Jail.
The Court of Appeals also made a finding that accused-appellant Vicente made known
their intentions when he asked Cordero about his work, family, and a contact person, and
told him that they would be demanding 30 Million Pesos as ransom for his release.
Ruling of the RTC
On March 24, 2003, the RTC, resolving the lone issue of “whether [or not] Cordero’s
identification of Vicente Lugnasin and Devincio Guerrero as among his kidnappers is
reliable,”6promulgated its Decision, finding both accused-appellants guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged, to wit:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused Vicente Lugnasin and Devincio Guerrero guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping for ransom described and penalized
under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 in
conspiracy with each other and other Does, the Court hereby sentences them to each
suffer the penalty of Death and to indemnify jointly and severally the private complainant
Nicassius Cordero the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages.
The warrants of arrest issued against the other accused remain.
In convicting the accused-appellants, the RTC found Cordero to be a careful, truthful,
and candid witness, whose story was supported by the evidence submitted. It added that
this was in contrast to the accused-appellants’ bare denial of their participation in the
kidnapping. The RTC also pointed out that Cordero was able to identify both accused-
appellants as he saw their faces before he was blindfolded.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On January 23, 2013, the Court of Appeals affirmed the accused-appellants’ conviction
with modification as to the penalty. The falloof the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeals are
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
The Decision dated March 24, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 76, Quezon
City, in Criminal Case No. Q-99-87600, is MODIFIED in that the penalty of death imposed
upon appellants is AMENDED to Reclusion Perpetua, without the possibility of
parole.
The Court of Appeals held that the elements of the crime of kidnapping for ransom were
established by the prosecution through its lone witness, Cordero, whose credible testimony
should be accorded great weight. It also ruled that Cordero’s identification of his abductors
conformed to the stringent guidelines of out-of-court identification, contrary to accused-
appellant Devincio’s assertion that it was marked with suggestiveness.
As regards accused-appellant Devincio’s argument that his warrantless arrest was
illegal since it did not fall under Section 6, Rule 109 of the Rules of Procedure, as amended,
the Court of Appeals held that accused-appellant Devincio’s right to question his arrest and
subsequent inquest/preliminary investigation is deemed waived due to his failure to raise
such argument before his arraignment.
Addressing accused-appellant Devincio’s claim that his rights under Republic Act No.
7438, entitled “An Act Defining Certain Rights of Person Arrested, Detained or Under
Custodial Investigation as well as the Duties of the Arresting, Detaining and Investigating
Officers and Providing Penalties for Violations Thereof” were violated, the Court of Appeals
pointed out that he neither offered any evidence nor executed an extrajudicial confession or
admission for such allegation.
 Finally, in light of Republic Act No. 9346, which prohibits the imposition of the death
penalty, the Court of Appeals modified the penalty from Death to reclusion perpetua without
the possibility of parole.
Both accused-appellants are now before this Court praying for a reversal of their
conviction on the same arguments upon which their appeal to the Court of Appeals were
anchored.
Issues
Accused-appellant Devincio assigned the following errors in his Appellant’s Brief:
I The testimony of Cordero sufficiently established the commission of the crime and both
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND
CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE LONE PROSECUTION WITNESS.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING [DEVINCIO] GUILTY
NOTWITHSTANDING THE PRESENCE OF SUGGESTIVENESS IN [THE]
IDENTIFICATION BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT OF THE APPELLANT AS ONE OF
HIS ABDUCTORS.
III
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING [DEVINCIO]’S
WARRANTLESS ARREST AS ILLEGAL.
IV
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT [DEVINCIO]’S
RIGHTS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7438 (AN ACT DEFINING CERTAIN RIGHTS OF
PERSONS ARRESTED, DETAINED OR UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION AS
WELL AS THE DUTIES OF THE ARRESTING, DETAINING AND INVESTIGATING
OFFICERS, AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF) WERE
VIOLATED.
Accused-appellant Vicente, for his part, posed a lone error:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING [VICENTE] DESPITE THE
PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
Ruling of this Court
This Court finds no compelling reason to overturn the assailed judgment of conviction.
Elements of Kidnapping for Ransom established.
The accused-appellants were charged and convicted under Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, viz.:
ART. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention.—Any private individual who
shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped
or detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is
any of the parents, female, or a public officer.
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the
purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the
circumstances above mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is
subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.
From the aforequoted provision, in prosecuting a case involving the crime of Kidnapping
for Ransom, the prosecution must establish the following elements: (i) the accused was a
private person; (ii) he kidnapped or detained or in any manner deprived another of his or
her liberty; (iii) the kidnapping or detention was illegal; and (iv) the victim was kidnapped or
detained for ransom.
A painstaking review of the present case clearly shows that all the aforestated elements
were proven in the criminal case on review.
the accused-appellants’ culpability. He positively identified in and out of court accused-
appellants Vicente and Devincio as two of his abductors. As the kidnap victim, a private
individual, Cordero’s positive identification of both accused-appellants — as two of several
men who abducted him from the gate of his house, who brought him to a hut somewhere in
the south, who chained him to a bed, who essentially deprived him of liberty without lawful
cause for four days, and, which deprivation of his liberty was for the purpose of extorting
ransom from his family — collectively establish the crime of kidnapping for ransom as the
actions of both the accused-appellants were certain and clear, and their intent was explicit
and made known to Cordero himself.
Identification of the Accused-Appellants.
This Court cannot sustain both accused-appellants’ arguments casting doubt on
Cordero’s positive identification of their participation in the commission of the crime. As oft-
explained, when the credibility of a witness is in issue, the findings of fact of the trial court,
its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight
thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings are accorded high respect if
not conclusive effect. This holds truer if such findings are affirmed by the appellate court.
Without any clear showing that the trial court and the appellate court overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance, the rule
should not be disturbed.
Herein, there is nothing far-fetched or incredible in Cordero’s testimony. Both accused-
appellants failed to show that it was physically impossible for Cordero to recognize them, as
in fact, Cordero had the unhindered view of his captors’ faces before he was even
blindfolded. Therefore, Cordero’s eyewitness account deserves full faith and credit.
But accused-appellant Devincio avers that the length of time, which has elapsed from
the time Cordero was released, up to the time he identified his abductors would have
already affected his memory, such that the possibility of error in his identification of the
abductors could not be discounted. He also insists that Cordero’s “subsequent identification
of [him] in open court should be disregarded since the initial identification was seriously
flawed, i.e., it was characterized by suggestiveness.”
On the other hand, accused-appellant Vicente argues that although denial is an
inherently weak defense, it assumes importance and acquires commensurate strength
when the prosecution’s evidence, particularly as to the identity of the accused as the author
of the crime, is feeble, doubtful, inconclusive, or unreliable. He says that Cordero’s
identification of his abductors was questionable due to the circumstances during his
abduction and detention, i.e., it was dark when he was abducted, he was instructed to go
down on the floor of the vehicle and not to look at his kidnappers, he was blindfolded, and
his eyeglasses were removed.
With the foregoing, both accused-appellants claim that the RTC erred in relying on
Cordero’s identification of them as two of his abductors as it was doubtful and unreliable.
This Court disagrees.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly found the out-of-court identification
made by Cordero to have satisfied the totality of circumstances test.
People v. Teehankee, Jr. is instructive on the rules and test for a valid out-of-court
identification:
Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru
show-ups where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for
identification. It is done thru mug shots where photographs are shown to the witness to
identify the suspect. It is also done thru lineups where a witness identifies the suspect
from a group of persons lined up for the purpose. Since corruption of out-of-court
identification contaminates the integrity of in-court identification during the trial of the case,
courts have fashioned out rules to assure its fairness and its compliance with the
requirements of constitutional due process. In resolving the admissibility of and relying on
out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances
test where they consider the following factors, viz.: (1) the witness’ opportunity to view the
criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness’ degree of attention at that time; (3) the
accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty
demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime
and the identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure. (Citation
omitted)
Cordero was able to see the faces of the men who abducted him from his house due to
the light emanating from the pedestrian gate. He was also able to describe how these men
approached him, the kind of firearms they were carrying, how the men acted where they
passed, where he was taken, and even the sounds he heard. Cordero’s testimonies were
replete with detailed descriptions of how he was abducted and who abducted him. To top it
all, he was confident that he could identify his abductors, as he did at the Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG), Camp Pantaleon Garcia, Imus, Cavite,22and in
open court.
This Court notes with approval the observation of the RTC, viz.:
Cordero gave a detailed narration of his abduction that fateful night of April 20, 1999.
We observed his demeanor, his reactions to questions asked of him. He was a careful
witness, truthful and candid. At times, we noted that he was in tears at the painful
recollection of the horror he went through. His story was supported by the evidence
submitted.
And as the Court of Appeals said, “Cordero was endeavoring to remember faces and
incidents and etch these in his memory.” In People v. Martinez, we held:
Common human experience tells us that when extraordinary circumstances take
place, it is natural for persons to remember many of the important details. This Court has
held that the most natural reaction of victims of criminal violence is to strive to see the
features and faces of their assailants and observe the manner in which the crime is
committed. x x x. All too often, the face of the assailant and his body movements create
a lasting impression on the victim’s mind and cannot thus be easily erased from his
memory.
Cordero positively identified both accused-appellants Devincio and Vicente as two of his
kidnappers. He saw both accused-appellants’ faces before he was blindfolded. Thus, it
cannot be said that the length of time between the crime and the identification of the
accused-appellants, which was only 26 days, had any effect on Cordero’s memory, to
render his positive identification flawed.
Accused-appellant Devincio’s contention that Cordero’s out-of-court identification was
marked by suggestiveness must similarly fail for his failure to support it by solid evidence.
The only reason he gave for such argument was Cordero’s knowledge that the persons who
were being investigated in connection with a robbery case were included in the police or
photographic lineup. However, that is not enough to strike down Cordero’s identification for
being tainted. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was on point when it quoted this
Court’s ruling in People v. Villena as follows:
Eyewitness identification is often decisive of the conviction or acquittal of an accused.
Identification of an accused through mug shots is one of the established procedures in
pinning down criminals. However, to avoid charges of impermissible suggestion,
there should be nothing in the photograph that would focus attention on a single
person. x x x. (Citation omitted)
As the OSG averred, the photographs shown to Cordero contained nothing to suggest
whom he should pick and identify as his abductors. Cordero testified as follows:
Cordero They asked me to see a lineup
and I said I was still very afraid of them so they
showed me different photographs and asked if
I co[u]ld identify who my abductors were and
from a series of photos, I was able to identify
Vicente Lugnasin, Celso Lugna sin, Elmer
Madrid, Guerrero and I could not yet identify de
Chaves but I saw him there walking around.
But assuming for the sake of argument that Cordero’s out-of-court identification was
improper, it will have no bearing on the conviction of the accused-appellants. We have ruled
as follows:
[I]t is settled that an out-of-court identification does not necessarily foreclose the
admissibility of an independent in-court identification and that, even assuming that an out-
of-court identification was tainted with irregularity, the subsequent identification in court
cured any flaw that may have attended it. x x x. (Citation omitted)
Cordero’s in-court identification was made with certainty when he pointed to both
accused-appellants in court when he was asked to identify them from among the people
inside the courtroom.
It is apparent in the case at bar that Cordero was able to categorically, candidly, and
positively identify both accused-appellants as two of his abductors both outside and inside
the court. Thus, his identification of the accused is worthy of credence and weight. This
Court, in People v. Cenahonon said:
An affirmative testimony merits greater weight than a negative one, especially when
the former comes from a credible witness. Categorical and positive identification of an
 accused, without any showing of ill motive on the part of the witness testifying on the
matter, prevails over alibi and denial, which are negative and self-serving evidence
undeserving of real weight in law unless substantiated by clear and convincing evidence.
(Citation omitted)
As to the Alleged Illegality of Accused-appellant Devincio Guerrero’s Warrantless
Arrest and the Violation of His Rights Under Republic Act No. 7438.
Accused-appellant Devincio insists that his warrantless
arrest was illegal for not falling under the permissible warrantless arrests enumerated in
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.31This being the case, accused-appellant Devincio
says, the RTC had no jurisdiction to render judgment over his person. He also claims that
there was no showing that he was informed of his Constitutional rights at the time of his
arrest and his rights under Sections 2 and 3 of Republic Act No. 7438 during investigation. 32
As the Court of Appeals has already pointed out, that accused-appellant Devincio raised
none of these issues anytime during the course of his trial. These issues were raised for the
first time on appeal before the Court of Appeals. We affirm the ruling of the Court of Appeals
and quote below Miclat, Jr. v. People33 on this Court’s treatment of an accused’s belated
allegation of the illegality of his warrantless arrest:
At the outset, it is apparent that petitioner raised no objection to the irregularity of his
arrest before his arraignment. Considering this and his active participation in the trial of
the case, jurisprudence dictates that petitioner is deemed to have submitted to the
jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing any defect in his arrest. An accused is
estopped from assailing any irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to
move for the quashal of the information against him on this ground before arraignment.
Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the court acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea;
otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.
In the present case, at the time of petitioner’s arraignment, there was no objection
raised as to the irregularity of his arrest. Thereafter, he actively participated in the
proceedings before the trial court. In effect, he is deemed to have waived any perceived
defect in his arrest and effectively submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court trying
his case. At any rate, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting
aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error. It
will not even negate the validity of the conviction of the accused. (Citations omitted)
The foregoing ruling squarely applies to accused-appellants Devincio and Vicente who
failed to raise their allegations before their arraignment. They actively participated in the trial
and posited their defenses without mentioning the alleged illegality of their warrantless
arrests. They are deemed to have waived their right to question their arrests.
As regards accused-appellant Devincio’s argument that his rights under Republic Act
No. 7438 were violated, we likewise uphold the following ruling of the Court of Appeals:
With respect to appellant Devincio’s argument that his rights under RA 7438 were
violated while he was under custodial investigation, aside from his barefaced claim, he
has offered no evidence to sustain such claim; and appellant Devincio (or appellant
Vicente, for that matter) has not executed an extrajudicial confession or admission for, as
stated in People v. Buluran and Valenzuela:
There is no violation of the constitutional rights of the accused during
custodial investigation since neither one executed an extrajudicial confession or
admission. In fact, the records show that appellant Cielito Buluran opted to remain
silent during custodial investigation. Any allegation of violation of rights during
custodial investigation is relevant and material only to cases in which an
extrajudicial admission or confession extracted from the accused becomes the
basis of their conviction. (Citation omitted)
Damages Awarded
The RTC awarded Cordero Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages.
However, pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence, the Court finds it proper to modify such
award as follows:
1. P100,000.00 as civil indemnity;
2. P100,000.00 as moral damages; and
3. P100,000.00 as exemplary damages to set an example for the public good.
“The award of exemplary damages is justified, the lowering of the penalty to reclusion
perpetua in view of the prohibition of the imposition of the death penalty notwithstanding, it
not being dependent on the actual imposition of the death penalty but on the fact that a
qualifying circumstance warranting the imposition of the death penalty attended the
kidnapping.”
The accused-appellants shall be jointly and severally liable for these amounts awarded
in favor of Cordero. In addition, these amounts shall accrue interest at the rate of six
percent (6%) per annum, to earn from the date of the finality of this Court’s Decision until
fully paid.37
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 23, 2013 in C.A.-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02971 finding accused-appellants Vicente Lugnasin and Devincio
Guerrero GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping for ransom under
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 8 of Republic Act No. 7659,
and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility of parole
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellants Vicente Lugnasin and Devincio
Guerrero are ordered to pay Nicassius Cordero the following:
1. P100,000.00 as civil indemnity;
2. P100,000.00 as moral damages; and
3. P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
The foregoing amounts shall accrue interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum, to
earn from the date of the finality of this Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
Notes.—Even assuming arguendo that the out-of-court identification was defective, the defect was
cured by the subsequent positive identification in court for the ‘inadmissibility of a police lineup
identification should not necessarily foreclose the admissibility of an independent in-court identification.’
(People vs. Manigo, 714 SCRA 551 [2014])
Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru show-ups
where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification. It is done thru mug
shots where photographs are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru lineups
where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose. (People vs.
Dandanon, 771 SCRA 483 [2015])
——o0o——