Certiorari and Prohibition

Different Writs and their Importance

Writ of Prohibition:

A writ of prohibition is issued primarily to prevent an inferior court from exceeding its
jurisdiction, or acting contrary to the rule of natural justice, for example, to restrain a Judge from
hearing a case in which he is personally interested.

The term “inferior courts” comprehends special tribunals, commissions, magistrates and officers
who exercise judicial powers, affecting the property or rights of the citizen and act in a summary
way or in a new course different from the common law. It is well established that the writ lies
only against a body exercising public functions of a judicial or quasi- judicial character and
cannot in the nature of things be utilised to restrain legislative powers

These Writs are issued as “alternative” or “peremptory.” An alternative Writ directs the recipient
to immediately act, or desist, and “Show Cause” why the directive should not be made
permanent. A peremptory Writ directs the recipient to immediately act, or desist, and “return”
the Writ, with certification of its compliance, within a certain time.

The writ can be issued only when the proceedings are pending in a court if the proceeding has
matured into decision, writ will not lie

Writ of Certiorari

It is a writ (order) of a higher court to a lower court to send all the documents in a case to it so
the higher court can review the lower court’s decision. Appellate review of a case that is granted
by the issuance of certiorari is sometimes called an appeal, although such review is at the
discretion of the appellate court. A party, the petitioner, files a petition for certiorari with the
appellate court after a judgment has been rendered against him in the inferior court.

However, unlike a writ of prohibition, superior courts issue writs of certiorari to review decisions
which inferior courts have already made. The writ of prohibition is the counterpart of the writ to
certiorari which too is issued against the action of an inferior court. The difference between the
two was explained by Justice Venkatarama Ayyar of the Supreme Court in the following terms:

“When an inferior court takes up for hearing a matter over which it has no jurisdiction, the
person against whom the proceedings are taken can move the superior court for a writ of
prohibition and on that an order will issue forbidding the inferior court from continuing the
proceedings.
On the other hand, if the court hears the cause or matter and gives a decision, the party aggrieved
would have to move the superior court for a writ of certiorari and on that an order will be made
quashing the decision on the ground of want of jurisdiction.”

Locus Standi

Petitioner lacks locus standi. “Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal
and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct
injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged.

The OSG attacks the legal personality of the petitioners-legislators to file their petition for failure
to demonstrate their personal stake in the outcome of the case. It argues that the petitioners have
not shown that they have sustained or are in danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable
to the creation of the PTC. Not claiming to be the subject of the commission’s investigations,
petitioners will not sustain injury in its creation or as a result of its proceedings.[20]

The Court disagrees with the OSG in questioning the legal standing of the petitioners-legislators
to assail Executive Order No. 1. Evidently, their petition primarily invokes usurpation of the
power of the Congress as a body to which they belong as members. This certainly justifies their
resolve to take the cudgels for Congress as an institution and present the complaints on the
usurpation of their power and rights as members of the legislature before the Court. As held in
Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez,[21]

To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof,
since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.

An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but
nonetheless substantial injury, which can be questioned by a member of Congress. In such a
case, any member of Congress can have a resort to the courts.

Indeed, legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges
vested by the Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the
validity of any official action which, to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as
legislators.[22]

With regard to Biraogo, the OSG argues that, as a taxpayer, he has no standing to question the
creation of the PTC and the budget for its operations.[23] It emphasizes that the funds to be used
for the creation and operation of the commission are to be taken from those funds already
appropriated by Congress. Thus, the allocation and disbursement of funds for the commission
will not entail congressional action but will simply be an exercise of the President’s power over
contingent funds.
As correctly pointed out by the OSG, Biraogo has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of
sustaining, any personal and direct injury attributable to the implementation of Executive Order
No. 1. Nowhere in his petition is an assertion of a clear right that may justify his clamor for the
Court to exercise judicial power and to wield the axe over presidential issuances in defense of the
Constitution. The case of David v. Arroyo[24] explained the deep-seated rules on locus standi.
Thus:

Locus standi is defined as “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.” In

private suits, standing is governed by the “real-parties-in interest” rule as contained in Section 2,
Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It provides that “every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.” Accordingly, the “real-
party-in interest” is “the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit
or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.” Succinctly put, the plaintiff’s standing is based on
his own right to the relief sought.

The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a
“public right” in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the
general public. He may be a person who is affected no differently from any other person. He
could be suing as a “stranger,” or in the category of a “citizen,” or ‘taxpayer.” In either case, he
has to adequately show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. In other words, he has to
make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a
“citizen” or “taxpayer.

Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both “citizen” and “taxpayer” standing in public
actions. The distinction was first laid down in Beauchamp v. Silk, where it was held that the
plaintiff in a taxpayer’s suit is in a different category from the plaintiff in a citizen’s suit. In the
former, the plaintiff is affected by the expenditure of public funds, while in the latter, he is but
the mere instrument of the public concern. As held by the New York Supreme Court in People
ex rel Case v. Collins: “In matter of mere public right, however…the people are the real
parties…It is at least the right, if not the duty, of every citizen to interfere and see that a public
offence be properly pursued and punished, and that a public grievance be remedied.” With
respect to taxpayer’s suits, Terr v. Jordan held that “the right of a citizen and a taxpayer to
maintain an action in courts to restrain the unlawful use of public funds to his injury cannot be
denied.”

However, to prevent just about any person from seeking judicial interference in any official
policy or act with which he disagreed with, and thus hinders the activities of governmental
agencies engaged in public service, the United State Supreme Court laid down the more stringent
“direct injury” test in Ex Parte Levitt, later reaffirmed in Tileston v. Ullman. The same Court
ruled that for a private individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of an
executive or legislative action, he must show that he has sustained a direct injury as a result
of that action, and it is not sufficient that he has a general interest common to all members
of the public.

This Court adopted the “direct injury” test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held that
the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have “a personal and substantial interest
in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.” The Vera
doctrine was upheld in a litany of cases, such as, Custodio v. President of the Senate, Manila
Race Horse Trainers’ Association v. De la Fuente, Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works and
Anti-Chinese League of the Philippines v. Felix. [Emphases included. Citations omitted]

Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that “the rule on standing is a matter of
procedure, hence, can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers,
and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental
importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.”[25]

Thus, in Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres,[26] the Court held that in cases of
paramount importance where serious constitutional questions are involved, the standing
requirements may be relaxed and a suit may be allowed to prosper even where there is no direct
injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review. In the first Emergency Powers
Cases,[27] ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of
several executive orders although they had only an indirect and general interest shared in
common with the public.

The OSG claims that the determinants of transcendental importance[28] laid down in CREBA v.
ERC and Meralco[29] are non-existent in this case. The Court, however, finds reason in
Biraogo’s assertion that the petition covers matters of transcendental importance to justify the
exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition which
deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents.
Where the issues are of transcendental and paramount importance not only to the public but also
to the Bench and the Bar, they should be resolved for the guidance of all.[30] Undoubtedly, the
Filipino people are more than interested to know the status of the President’s first effort to bring
about a promised change to the country. The Court takes cognizance of the petition not due to
overwhelming political undertones that clothe the issue in the eyes of the public, but because the
Court stands firm in its oath to perform its constitutional duty to settle legal controversies with
overreaching significance to society.

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/december2010/192935.htm

Petitioner, through its three party-list representatives, contends that the issue of the validity or
invalidity of the Agreement carries with it constitutional significance and is of paramount
importance that justifies its standing. Cited in this regard is what is usually referred to as the
emergency powers cases,[12] in which ordinary citizens and taxpayers were accorded the
personality to question the constitutionality of executive issuances.

Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given

question.”[13] Specifically, it is “a party’s personal and substantial interest in a case where he
has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result”[14] of the act being challenged, and “calls
for more than just a generalized grievance.”[15] The term “interest” refers to material interest,
as distinguished from one that is merely incidental.[16] The rationale for requiring a party who
challenges the validity of a law or international agreement to allege such a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy is “to assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.”[17]

Locus standi, however, is merely a matter of procedure and it has been recognized that, in some
cases, suits are not brought by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law
or any other government act, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers, or voters who actually sue in
the public interest.[18] Consequently, in a catena of cases,[19] this Court has invariably adopted
a liberal stance on locus standi.

Going by the petition, petitioner’s representatives pursue the instant suit primarily as concerned
citizens raising issues of transcendental importance, both for the Republic and the citizenry as a
whole.

When suing as a citizen to question the validity of a law or other government action, a petitioner
needs to meet certain specific requirements before he can be clothed with standing. Francisco,
Jr. v. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc.[20]
expounded on this requirement, thus:

In a long line of cases, however, concerned citizens, taxpayers and legislators when specific
requirements have been met have been given standing by this Court.

When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a statute
must be direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or any government
act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury
as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It
must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege
to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties
by reason of the statute or act complained of. In fine, when the proceeding involves the assertion
of a public right, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal
interest.[21]

In the case at bar, petitioner’s representatives have complied with the qualifying conditions or
specific requirements exacted under the locus standi rule. As citizens, their interest in the
subject matter of the petition is direct and personal. At the very least, their assertions
questioning the Agreement are made of a public right, i.e., to ascertain that the Agreement did not
go against established national policies, practices, and obligations bearing on the State’s
obligation to the community of nations.

At any event, the primordial importance to Filipino citizens in general of the issue at hand impels
the Court to brush aside the procedural barrier posed by the traditional requirement of locus
standi, as we have done in a long line of earlier cases, notably in the old but oft-cited emergency
powers cases[22] and Kilosbayan v. Guingona, Jr.[23] In cases of transcendental importance, we
wrote again in Bayan v. Zamora,[24] “The Court may relax the standing requirements and allow
a suit to prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial
review.”
https://bataspinoy.wordpress.com/quotations/locus-standi-or-legal-standing/

Non-establishment Clause Case Doctrines

SECTION 5, Philippines Constitution- No law shall be made respecting an

establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference shall forever be ed. No religious test shall be
required for the exercise of civil or political rights.

R.A. No. 10966 violates the Non-Establishment Clause stated under our Constitution. R.A.
10966 is a law created respecting an establishment of religion because under such law December
8 will be declared as a nonworking holiday as a commemoration for the feast day of the
Immaculate Conception of Mary. It has an effect of favoring Catholic Religion because it will
honor the Immaculate Conception of Mary and not all religion are recognizing her.

A. Non-establishment of religion

Aglipay v. Ruiz - commemorative postage stamp – Act. No. 4052 contemplates no religious
purpose. What it gives is the discretionary power to determine when the issuance if special
postage stamps would be advantageous to the government. The only purpose of the
commemorative postage stamps was to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourists.

Petitioner Aglipay, the head of Phil. Independent Church, filed a writ of prohibition
against respondent Ruiz, the Director of Post, enjoining the latter from issuing and
selling postage stamps commemorative of the 33rd Intl Eucharistic Congress organized
by the Roman Catholic. The petitioner invokes that such issuance and selling, as
authorized by Act 4052 by the Phil. Legislature, contemplates religious purpose – for the
benefit of a particular sect or church. Hence, this petition.

The issuing and selling of commemorative stamps by the respondent does not contemplate any
favor upon a particular sect or church, but the purpose was only ‘to advertise the Philippines
and attract more tourist’ and the government just took advantage of an event considered of
international importance, thus, not violating the Constitution on its provision on the separation of
the Church and State. Moreover, the Court stressed that ‘Religious freedom, as a constitutional
mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not denial of its influence in
human affairs’. Emphasizing that, ‘when the Filipino people ‘implored the aid of Divine
Providence’, they thereby manifested reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and
nations. The elevating influence of religion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere. In
fact, certain general concessions are indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and
denominations.’

Garces v. Estenzo – statue of San Vicente Ferrer – A resolution of the barangay council for
soliciting contributions to buy a statue of the barangay’s patron saint and the use of such fund for
said purpose does not violate the Constitution’s provision prohibiting use of public funds for
religious purpose; statue was purchased by barangay funds so it belongs to the barangay and not
to the parish

wo resolutions of the Barangay Council of Valencia, Ormoc City were passed:

a. Resolution No. 5- Reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration every fifth of April. This
provided for the acquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and the construction of a waiting
shed. Funds for the said projects will be obtained through the selling of tickets and cash
donations.
b. Resolution No. 6- The chairman or hermano mayor of the fiesta would be the caretaker of the
image of San Vicente Ferrer and that the image would remain in his residence for one year and
until the election of his successor. The image would be made available to the Catholic Church
during the celebration of the saint’s feast day.

These resolutions have been ratified by 272 voters, and said projects were implemented. The
image was temporarily placed in the altar of the Catholic Church of the barangay. However, after
a mass, Father Sergio Marilao Osmeña refused to return the image to the barangay council, as it
was the church’s property since church funds were used in its acquisition.

Resolution No. 10 was passed for the authorization of hiring a lawyer for the replevin case
against the priest for the recovery of the image. Resolution No. 12 appointed Brgy. Captain
Veloso as a representative to the case. The priest, in his answer assailed the constitutionality of
the said resolutions. The priest with Andres Garces, a member of the Aglipayan Church,
contends that Sec. 8 Article IV1 and Sec 18(2) Article VIII) 2 of the constitution was violated.

As said by the Court this case is a petty quarrel over the custody of the image. The image was
purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta and not for the purpose of
favoring any religion nor interfering with religious matters or beliefs of the barrio residents. Any
activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint(such as the acquisition) is not
illegal. Practically, the image was placed in a layman’s custody so that it could easily be made
available to any family desiring to borrow the image in connection with prayers and novena. It
was the council’s funds that were used to buy the image, therefore it is their property. Right of
the determination of custody is their right, and even if they decided to give it to the Church, there
is no violation of the Constitution, since private funds were used. Not every government activity
which involves the expenditure of public funds and which has some religious tint is violative of
the constitutional provisions regarding separation of church and state, freedom of worship and
banning the use of public money or property.
Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Worker’s Union – joining a union is prohibited by the Iglesia ni
Cristo – closed shop agreement – freedom of religion takes precedent over the right against
impairment of contracts

Benjamin victoriano a member of iglesia ni cristo had been in the employ of the Elizalde Rope
factory Inc since 1958. Her was a member of elizalde rope workers union which had with the
company a CBA containing a closed shop provision which reads as follow “Membership union
shall be required as a condition of employment for all permanent employees worker covered by
this agreement.” RA 3350 was enacted introducing an amendment to paragraph (4) subsection
(a) of section 4 of RA 875 as follows “ but such agreement shall not cover members of any
religious sect which prohibit affiliation of their member in any such 0labor organization”
Benjamin victoriano presents his resignation to appellant union thereupon the union wrote a
formal letter to separate the appellee from the service in view of the fact that he was resigning
from the union as member of the company notified the apellee and his counsel that unless the
appellee could achieve a satisfactory arrangement with the union the company would be
constrained to dismiss him from the service . this prompted appellee to file an action for
injunction to enjoin the company and the union from dismissing apallee.

The constitution provision only prohibits legislation for the support of any religious tenets or the
modes of worship of any sect, thus forestalling compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed
or the chosen form of religion within limits of utmost amplitude. RA 3350 does not require as a
qualification on condition in joining any lawful association membership in any particular religion
on in any religious sect neither does the act requires affiliation with a religious sect that prohibits
its member from joining a labor union as a condition on qualification for withdrawing from labor
union RA 3350 only exempts member with such religious affililiation from the required to do a
positive act – to exercise the right to join or to resign from the union. He is exempted from form
the coverage of any closed shop agreement that a labor union may have entered into. Therefore
RA 3350 is never an illegal evasion of constitutional provision or prohibition to accomplish a
desired result which is lawful in itself by vering or following a legal way to do it.

Islamic Dawah v. Executive Secretary – Hala food products – Islamic Dawah v. Office of
Muslim Affairs (OMA) – Classifying a food product as halal is a religious function because the
standards used are drawn from the Qur’an and Islamic beliefs. State cannot classify food as halal.

Petitioner IDCP, a corporation that operates under DSWD, is a non-governmental organization

that extends voluntary services to the Filipino people, especially to Muslim communities. Among
the functions petitioner carries out is to conduct seminars, orient manufacturers on halal food and
issue halal certifications to qualified products and manufacturers. On October 26, 2001,
respondent Office of the Executive Secretary issued EO 46 5 creating the Philippine Halal
Certification Scheme and designating respondent Office on Muslim Affairs (OMA) to oversee its
implementation. Under the EO, respondent OMA has the exclusive authority to issue halal
certificates and perform other related regulatory activities. Petitioner contends that the subject
EO violates the constitutional provision on the separation of Church and State and that it is
unconstitutional for the government to formulate policies and guidelines on the halal certification
scheme because said scheme is a function only religious organizations, entity or scholars can
lawfully and validly perform for the Muslims.

The Court grants the petition. OMA deals with the societal, legal, political and economic
concerns of the Muslim community as a "national cultural community" and not as a religious
group. Thus, bearing in mind the constitutional barrier between the Church and State, the latter
must make sure that OMA does not intrude into purely religious matters lest it violate the non-
establishment clause and the "free exercise of religion" provision found in Article III, Section 5
of the 1987 Constitution. Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of
our fundamental law. And this Court has consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware
that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to
believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live,
consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good." Without doubt, classifying a
food product as halal is a religious function because the standards used are drawn from the
Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving OMA the exclusive power to classify food products as
halal, EO 46 encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim organizations like herein petitioner
to interpret for Filipino Muslims what food products are fit for Muslim consumption. Also, by
arrogating to itself the task of issuing halal certifications, the State has in effect forced Muslims
to accept its own interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunnah on halal food. Only the prevention of
an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community can justify the
infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails to show the seriousness and
immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable. In a society with a
democratic framework like ours, the State must minimize its interference with the affairs of its
citizens and instead allow them to exercise reasonable freedom of personal and religious activity.
There is no compelling justification for the government to deprive Muslim organizations, like
herein petitioner, of their religious right to classify a product as halal, even on the premise that
the health of Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning to OMA the exclusive
power to issue halal certifications. The protection and promotion of the Muslim Filipinos' right to
health are already provided for in existing laws and ministered to by government agencies
charged with ensuring that food products released in the market are fit for human consumption,
properly labeled and safe. Unlike EO 46, these laws do not encroach on the religious freedom of
Muslims. With these regulatory bodies given detailed functions on how to screen and check the
quality and safety of food products, the perceived danger against the health of Muslim and non-
Muslim Filipinos alike is totally avoided. The halal certifications issued by petitioner and similar
organizations come forward as the official religious approval of a food product fit for Muslim
consumption. The petition is GRANTED. Executive Order 46, s. 2000, is hereby declared NULL
AND VOID.

B. Free Exercise of Religion

American Bible Society v. City of Manila – selling bibles; tax - The constitutional guaranty of
the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship carries with it the right to
disseminate religious information. Any restraint of such right could only be justified like other
restraints of freedom of expression on the grounds that there is clear and present danger of any
substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent.
Ebralinag v. Superintendent – saluting the flag; pledge – abandoned the ruling in Gerona. The
2-fold aspect of religious freedom, (1) the absolute freedom to believe as long as such is limited
within the realm of thought, (2) the freedom to act on one’s belief, which may be regulated. It
underscored the rule that the only justification for relief is the existence of clear and present
danger, both grave and imminent, which is of serious evil to public interest. In the case at bar, the
Court held that the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ nonparticipation in the flag ceremony in no way poses
a clear and present danger to society. Thus, restraint on the part of the government would be
unjustified. Moreover, the petitioner’s right to quality education, as granted by the Constitution
was likewise violated by effecting the expulsion.

Iglesia ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals – X rating of a TV show - Mere criticisms of some of the
deeply held dogmas and tenets of other religions do not impose a clear and present danger, which
the State should protect its citizens from. X-rating not justified. The right to religious profession
and worship has a two-fold aspect, viz., freedom to believe and freedom to act on one's beliefs .
The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The second is
subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public
welfare… It is error to think that the mere invocation of religious freedom will stalemate the
State and render it impotent in protecting the general welfare. The inherent police power can be
exercised to prevent religious practices inimical to society. However, prior restraint on speech,
including religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing.

https://batasnatin.com/law-library/political-and-public-international-law/constitutional-law/1704-non-
establishment-clause-case-doctrines.html

NON-STABLISHMENT CLAUSE:

It simply means “that the State cannot set up a church; nor pass laws which aids one religion; aid all
religion, or prefer one religion over another nor force nor influence a person to go to or remain away
from church against his will; or force him to profess a belief or disbelief; that the State cannot openly or
secretly participate in the affairs of any religious organization or group and vice versa” (EVERSON VS.
BOARD OF EDUCATION, 330 US 1)

This clause seeks to protect:

Voluntarism—must come into existence through the voluntary support of its members;

Insulation from political process—growth through voluntary support of its members will not take place
if there is intervention from the State.

There will be no violation of the non-establishment clause if:

1. the statute has a secular legislative purpose;

2. its principal or primary effect is one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and

3. it does not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion. (LEMON VS. KURTZMAN, 403
US 602)

The government is neutral and while protecting all, it prefers none and disparages none. “All” here
applies both to the believer and the non-believer. FREEDOM OF RELIGION INCLUDES FREEDOM FROM
RELIGION; THE RIGHT TO WORHIP INCLUDES THE RIGHT NOT TO WORSHIP

https://lawphilreviewer.wordpress.com/tag/constitutional-law-chapter-vii-the-non-establishment-of-
religion-clause/

Church and State separation

The wall separating the Church and State appears to be in constant motion, either narrowing or
widening the yards of the two "good" neighbors. Its exact location has not been permanently
fixed and definitely established simply because different persons have varying points of view as
to where it has been put up. Or some just cannot see where the wall stands in the country’s
landscape due to a vision blurred by narrow-mindedness. Thus even an innocent and solicitous
admonition from the Roman Catholic Cardinal Jaime Sin encouraging, for the country’s sake,
qualified Filipinos including President GMA to run for President in 2004, has been viewed as a
breach of that wall which obviously has been pushed back to restrict the sphere of the Church
influence.

The doctrine of separation of Church and State however operates more as a restriction on the
powers of the State or the government than on the Church. When the Constitution says that the
"separation of the Church and the State shall be inviolable"(Section 6,Art. II), it basically and
principally means that "no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof" as provided in Section 5, Article III of the "Bill of Rights".
The incorporation of this doctrine in the Bill of Rights is the best argument supporting the view
that it is more of a limitation on State or governmental power. For the main role of the Bill of
Rights is precisely to define the fundamental civil and political rights of the individual and to
impose limitations on the powers of the government as a means of securing those rights.

Section 5 of the Bill of Rights has two essential parts according to noted constitutionalist, writer
and dean of the Ateneo Law School, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J.; the non-establishment of religion
clause and the free exercise of religion clause.

The non-establishment clause prohibits the State from setting up a church, passing laws which
aid one religion, or all religions, or prefer one religion over another, and from participating
openly or directly in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa (Board of
Education vs. Everson 330 U.S. 1,15-16). According to Fr. Bernas again, this clause seeks to
foster the growth of religious sect as a social force by the voluntary support of its members based
on the belief that "both spiritual and secular society will benefit if religions are allowed to
compete on their own intrinsic merit without the benefit of official patronage". This principle is
known as voluntarism which can be achieved only if the political process is insulated from
religion, and religion from politics. Thus, our Constitution also prohibits the registration of
religious sects and denominations as political parties(Sec 2[5] Art. IX-C) and excludes the
religious sector in the allocation of party-list representatives for the lower house( Section 5[2]
Art.VI).

The free exercise of religion on the other hand embraces the absolute freedom to believe and the
limited freedom to act on ones belief. This means that the law cannot restrict the freedom of
conscience and the freedom to adhere to such religious organization or form of worship as the
individual may choose. Primarily therefore this clause protects the inviolability of human
conscience which the non-establishment clause likewise protects. Hence the second sentence of
Art III section 5 provides further that "The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession
and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test
shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights". But the moment "belief flows into
action" it becomes subject to government regulation especially if it is destructive to society or
constitutes an offense which the statute condemns. Thus, for example "crime (polygamy) is not
the less odious because sanctioned by what any particular sect may designate as religion" (Davis
vs. Beason 133 U.S. 333, 345). Or the death of a boy in a prayer healing session of a particular
cult does not exempt members involved from criminal liability simply because of their religious
belief (People of the Philippines vs. Caranca G.R. No. 137268 March 26, 2001).

But behind any viewpoint on the Church-State separation is the unalterable truth that every
human activity is necessarily connected to man’s ultimate end reaching far above his worldly
physical existence and encompassing his spiritual relationship with his Creator, the Supreme
Being. The State itself recognizes this truth in the very preamble of our charter that seeks the
intervention of the "Almighty God" in order to build a just and humane society...and secure for
ourselves and our posterity a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love equality and peace" So even
purely temporal matters that disrupt man’s relation with God and harm the common good as they
transgress the natural law or divine precepts, are within the ambit of Church concerns. The wall
of separation should not be built along this perimeter as to render the Church liable for breach of
Church-State separation. After all, that wall serves to limit the power of the State more than the
Church.

https://www.philstar.com/opinion/2003/07/18/214065/church-and-state-separation

No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the
exercise of civil or political rights.

Religion, defined
“Religion” is derived from the Middle English religioun, from Old French religion, from Latin
religio, vaguely referring to a “bond between man and the gods.” This pre-Christian term for the
cult and rituals of pagan Rome was first Christianized in the Latin translation of the Bible.

While the U.S. Supreme Court has had to take up the challenge of defining the parameters and
contours of “religion” to determine whether a non-theistic belief or act is covered by the religion
clauses, the Philippine Supreme Court has not been confronted with the same issue. In Philippine
jurisprudence, religion, for purposes of the religion clauses, has thus far been interpreted as
theistic. In 1937, the Philippine case of Aglipay v. Ruiz involving the Establishment Clause,
defined “religion” as a “profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his
Creator.”

Twenty years later, the Philippine Supreme Court cited the Aglipay definition in American Bible
Society v. City of Manila, a case involving the Free Exercise clause. The latter also cited the
American case of Davis in defining religion, viz: “(i)t has reference to one’s views of his
relations to His Creator and to the obligations they impose of reverence to His being and
character and obedience to His Will.” The Beason definition, however, has been expanded in
U.S. jurisprudence to include non-theistic beliefs.

Free Exercise Clause

Freedom of choice guarantees the liberty of the religious conscience and prohibits any degree of
compulsion or burden, whether direct or indirect, in the practice of one’s religion. The Free
Exercise Clause principally guarantees voluntarism, although the Establishment Clause also
assures voluntarism by placing the burden of the advancement of religious groups on their
intrinsic merits and not on the support of the state.

In interpreting the Free Exercise Clause, the realm of belief poses no difficulty. The difficulty in
interpretation sets in when belief is externalized into speech and action.

Establishment Clause

In Philippine jurisdiction, there is substantial agreement on the values sought to be protected by

the Establishment Clause, namely, voluntarism and insulation of the political process from
interfaith dissension.

The first, voluntarism, has both a personal and a social dimension. As a personal value, it refers
to the inviolability of the human conscience which, as discussed above, is also protected by the
free exercise clause. From the religious perspective, religion requires voluntarism because
compulsory faith lacks religious efficacy. Compelled religion is a contradiction in terms. As a
social value, it means that the “growth of a religious sect as a social force must come from the
voluntary support of its members because of the belief that both spiritual and secular society will
benefit if religions are allowed to compete on their own intrinsic merit without benefit of official
patronage.
Such voluntarism cannot be achieved unless the political process is insulated from religion and
unless religion is insulated from politics.” Non-establishment thus calls for government
neutrality in religious matters to uphold voluntarism and avoid breeding interfaith dissension.

Free Exercise Clause vis-a -vis Establishment Clause

In both Philippine and U.S. jurisdiction, it is recognized that there is a tension between the Free
Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause in their application. There is a natural antagonism
between a command not to establish religion and a command not to inhibit its practice; this
tension between the religion clauses often leaves the courts with a choice between competing
values in religion cases.

https://pnl-law.com/blog/church-and-state-the-religious-clauses-in-philippine-constitution/