Doctrine of stare decisis its position in India and US

REASONS AND IMPORTANCE OF THE RULE

The policy of the courts, and the principle upon which rests the authority of judicial
decisions as precedents in subsequent litigations, is embodied in the maxim, Stare
decisis et non quieta mnovere to abide by the precedents and not to 'disturb settled
points. Its meaning is, that when a point of law has been once solemnly and neces-
sarily settled by the decision of a competent court, it will no longer be considered
open to examination, or to a new ruling, by the same tribunal or those which are
bound to follow its adjudications. The reasons which underlie this rule are stated by
Chancellor KENT, in a much quoted passage from the Commentaries, as follows: "A
solemn decision upon a point of law, arising in any given case, becomes an authority
in a like case, because it is the highest evidence which we can have of the law appli-
cable to the subject, and the judges are bound to follow that decision so long as it
stands unreversed, unless it can be shown that the law was misunderstood or misap-
plied in that particular case. If a decision has been made upon solemn argument and
mature deliberation, the presumption is in favour of its correctness; and the commu-
nity have a right to regard it as a just declaration or exposition of the law, and to
regulate their actions and contracts by it. It would, therefore, be extremely inconven-
ient to the public, if precedents were not duly regarded and implicitly followed. It is
by the notoriety and stability of such rules that professional men can give safe advice
to those who consult them; and people in general can venture with confidence to buy
and trust, and to deal with each other. If judicial decisions were to be lightly disre-
garded, we should disturb and unsettle the great landmarks of property. When a rule
has been once deliberately adopted and declared, it ought not to be disturbed, unless
by a court of appeal or review, and never by the same court, except for very cogent
reasons, and upon a clear manifestation of error; and if the practice were otherwise,
it would be leaving us in a state of perplexing uncertainty as to the law.
The principle of stare decisis, therefore, though presenting certain analogies to the
rule which establishes the conclusiveness of an estoppel by judgment, both rests
upon a broader foundation and is more comprehensive in its application. The latter
doctrine springs from the two maxims, that "no one should be twice harassed con-
cerning the same dispute," and that "the interest of the state demands there should
be an end of litigation," and is necessarily limited, in its effect, to the parties to the
particular controversy and, their privies. But the former is predicated upon the neces-
sity of finally settling the rules of the common: law and the interpretation of statutory
enactments in the interest, and for the protection and guidance, of the entire com-
munity; and hence it interposes a barrier to fluctuations of judicial opinion in all sim-
ilar cases.

PROPER LIMITATIONS OF THE DOOTRINE

The principle of stare decisis is subject to certain necessary and proper limitations,
which, on the one hand, secure and enhance its practical utility, and on the other
hand, prevent its abuse. The more important of these limitations will be discussed in
order.

Overruled Cases-If a decision has been expressly overruled, either by the same court
which rendered it, or by a court exercising appellate jurisdiction, it can of course no
longer be cited as a precedent. The latest utterance of the court, on any given point
of law, constitutes the authority which is not to be departed from without cause. And
the same is true of decisions overruled by necessary implication in a subsequent case.
But here it would be necessary to show beyond reasonable cavil, that the two author-
ities were really and necessarily inconsistent rulings on a state of facts substantially
identical. An exception, however, would probably be made in the case of a single de-
cision, probably erroneous, which should overrule a series of previous authorities or
unsettle the established principles of commercial or statutory law. And if a rule of law
has been changed by legislative enactment, the authorities which announced it are of
course stripped of all binding force.

Two Extreme to be avoided-" That doctrine," says Lowris, J., speaking of the rule un-
der consideration, "though incapable of being expressed by any sharp and rigid defi-
nition, and therefore incapable of becoming an institute of positive law, is among the
most important principles of good government. But like all such principles, in its ideal
it presents its medial and its extreme aspects and is approximately defined by the
negation of its extremes.

Decision manifestly Erroneous-Hence, in the third place, if a decision is clearly incor-

rect, whether from a mistaken conception of the law or through a misapplication of
the law to the facts, and no injurious results would be likely to flow from a reversal of
it, and especially if it is injurious and unjust in its operation, it is not only an allowable
departure from precedent, but the imperative duty of the court, to reverse it.

Isolated cases- A single decision upon any given point of law is not regarded as con-
clusive as a precedent in the same degree that a series of decisions upon that point
would be: Duff v. Fisher, THE PRINCIPLE OF STARE DECISIS. 15 Cal. 375; Wells on Res
Adjudicata, sects. 589, 599. And the Supreme Court of California declares that the
doctrine of stare decisis will lead it to conform to a principle of mercantile law estab-
lished all over the world, rather than to follow a decision of its own made a few years
before, which is a very decided and probably injudicious innovation upon that princi-
ple: Aud v. Magru'der, 10 Cal. 282.

Doctrine of stare decisis In India

Like England, doctrine of stare decisis has been accepted in Indian law. Since the law
in India is mostly based on the English law therefore, system of law reporting is fairly
developed in India. The doctrine of stare decisis has essentially tapped as a result of
progress made in a lot reporting. to begin with, there was not Doctrine of stare decisis
as they were no reporting of the decision of in England. The reason of reporting of
decisions in England can be traced back to the 17th century when the decisions of
Exchequer courts came to be reported and were given binding force. Later, with es-
tablishment of High Court of judicature by the acts of 1873 and 1875 the doctrine of
stare decisis was firmly established and now it forms and indispensable part of the
British legal system. Doctrine of stare decisis literary means let the decision stand in
its rightful place. When a decision contains a new principal, it is binding on subordi-
nate courts and has persuasive authority for equivalent courts. The rule is based on
an expediency and public policy. Although this principle is generally followed by the
courts, but it may not be applicable if court is convinced that the earlier wrong is likely
to perpetuate resulting into erroneous decision.

The operation of doctrine of stare decisis presupposes the existence of hierarchy of

courts. For example, in India the lower-most courts or courts of the first instance are
the subordinate courts of the high courts and Supreme courts is that the apex. The
Supreme Court is the highest court in India.

Supreme Court in Supreme Court advocates on record Association v. Union of India

held that doctrine of stare decisis is not an flexible rule it can has a little relevance in
constitutional cases. The court observed that there's no doubt that the rule of stare
decisis brings about consistency and uniformity but at the same time in exercising its
inherent power the Supreme Court should ask itself whether in the interest of public
good or any other reason, it is necessary that its earlier decision should be revised.

In Krishna Swamy v. Union of India Mr. justice Rama Swamy supreme court spell out
the basic philosophy and limits of doctrine of stare decisis.
“The decision of the last word on the interpretation of the constitution and the law
of the land on the article 141. The judge is the living Oracle working in dry bones of
law to articulate the felt necessity of the time.”

In Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab the Supreme Court held, “if the rule of stare decisis
were followed blindly and mechanically, it would dwarf and stultify the growth of law
and affect its capacity to the changing needs of society”.

Absolute authoritative precedent in India - Every court in India is absolutely bound

by the decision of court superior to itself. The sub ordinate court are bound to follow
the decision of the High Court to which they are subordinate. subordinate court should
not presume to set its own opinion against the the authoritative statement of the law
laid down by the court to which it is subordinate .
The judges of the high court sitting alone are bound by the decision of the bench of
two or more judges. A bench of two or more judges are bound by the decision of the
Full bench of same court. A Full bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in
Subbarayudu v. The state following judgement was affirmed by Subbarao, C.J. in
the interest of ensuring the uniformity of law “ A single judge shall not differ from the
judgement of another judge of same court.

Stare Decisis and Precedent

Stare decisis means “ let the decision stand” where the court is bound by its own deci-
sion. It was so with the house of the Lords.
Indian Supreme Court is not bound by its own earlier decision. It can overrule prospec-
tively and retrospectively. The case law is very powerful source of general law of the
land (i.e to say that case laws of two countries differs in its form, points etc). The study
and grasp of case law is very fruitful for the lawyers. It is source of knowledge , pro-
vides basis for argument expound the implication of law and sometimes even supplies
the want of the legislature. It is said to be the second in the source of the general law.
First being the statute which is the formal expression of the legislature will. The pur-
pose of judiciary is to implement in all its intent and implication. Judges introduce
their own philosophies and attitudes which is reflected in the judgements. This take us
to the conclusion that nature of judgement and their recognition and validity differs
from country to country.

Stare Decisis is the Latin phrase which means to stand ny the decided cases.

The doctrine of stare decisis does not mean Imprisonment of the reason or the dog-
matic rule allergic to the logic or reason. It is flexible of law operating in the province
of the precedent providing room to accommodate with the changing needs dictated by
the social needs, state policy and judicial conscience.

Position in US

Janus v. AFSCME is a devastating blow against public sector unions, bar-

ring them from charging “agency fees” to Janus v. AFSCME is a devastating
blow against public sector unions, barring them from charging “agency fees”
to the public employees for whom they negotiate pay increases and benefit
bumps if those employees decline to join the union as full members.

Now, teachers unions, police unions, and more will be

forced to lobby public employees to pay full union dues,
even though those employees will get the same benefits
from the union if they pay nothing at all.Janus is a rare Su-
preme Court decision (though the second in this term) that
overrules a previous judgment of the Court. The Supremes
generally abide by a principle known as stare decisis, Latin
for “to stand by things decided.” That means that even if jus-
tices believe a past decision was wrongly decided, they gen-
erally accept it as precedent and rule in accordance with it
going forward.The previous decision Janus overrules is
known as Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, decided
back in 1977. Detroit teacher D. Louis Abood objected to
being forced to become a member or pay agency fees
(which are generally lower but pay for bargaining services)
to a teachers union. To force him to give money to a group
whose political ideas he disagreed with was, he claimed,
compelled speech.

First, consider the “internet tax” case – South Dakota v. Wayfair.

Here, the justices considered two Supreme Court precedents from
the last 50 years, both of which held that a state cannot require an
out-of-state seller with no physical presence in the state to collect
and remit sales taxes on goods the seller ships to consumers in the
state. Despite those precedents, the Court overruled them – in part
because of the changes in the country wrought by Amazon and
other internet sellers. It held that states are free to collect taxes on
sales made over the internet to consumers in their states, even if
the sales are made by out-of-state sellers.

Next, consider the case of Janus v. AFSCME, an important case

related to government employee unions decided late in this year’s
Supreme Court term. Here, once again the Court was confronted
with a precedent – this time from 1977 – which held a state could
compel a government employee to pay fees to a union that the em-
ployee refused to join. That the employee did not support the un-
ion or what it did with his money did not matter to the justices
when this question was first addressed in a case known as Abood
v. Detroit Board of Education. There, the Court said it did not vio-
late the Constitution to force the employee to pay the union fees
the employee did not want to pay.

But, in the Janus case the Supreme Court held that it got the call
wrong in Abood. Justice Samuel Alito explained for a majority of
the justices that forcing an employee to pay money to a union that
the employee does not support violates that employee’s free
speech rights.

When the Court misapplies the Constitution, as it did in Abood,

those concerns can be overcome by the need to ensure the Consti-
tution is followed and the path of the law corrected- as the Court
did in Janus.

Certainly, stare decisis has its place in our courts. Lower courts
should and must always adhere to the controlling precedents of
higher courts. And even the nation’s highest court should recog-
nize that following precedent in most instances provides stability
and reliability for both the law and the nation. A stable, reliable
system of laws allows Americans to understand what conduct is
lawful and what is not and to govern their behavior accordingly.
A good example of where stare decisis carried the day for these
very reasons arose a decade or so ago. Then, the Supreme Court
was asked to reconsider Miranda v. Arizona – the 1966 decision
that required law enforcement officers to provide arrestees with
their “Miranda warnings” – “you have the right to remain silent,
anything you say can and will be used against you…” All Ameri-
cans know those warnings because they appear on television so
regularly.

Although those warnings are not exactly in the text of the Consti-
tution, the nation came to rely upon them over the years, with little
objection, in the ensuing decades. The Miranda warnings became
widely adopted and accepted by the American people. Therefore,
when the High Court was asked to declare those warnings not con-
stitutionally required in a case called Dickerson v. United States,
based in part on a congressional effort to overrule the warnings,
Chief Justice William Rehnquist upheld the warnings as “constitu-
tionally-based” and worthy of protection specifically because of
stare decisis.

Thus, in that instance, stare decisis carried the day.

But compare the outcome of the Miranda warnings cases to the

outcome of Brown v. Board of Education. In that case, the Su-
preme Court, led by Chief Justice Earl Warren, overruled the infa-
mous Plessy v. Ferguson case—the case that said the government
could offer “separate but equal” accommodations to different
races yet not run afoul of the Constitution. In Brown, the Court
threw out the Plessy decision—and rightly so. The country as a
whole had not come to accept the notion of separate but equal as
equal at all, and legal organizations like the NAACP Legal De-
fense Fund had attacked the decision in the years be-
tween Plessy and Brown to demonstrate that Plessy was wrongly
decided. Their arguments overcame the power and persuasiveness
that stare decisis plays in the courts by demonstrating beyond dis-
pute how wrong Plessy was.

In deciding whether stare decisis should control the Supreme

Court’s decision in reviewing a precedent anew, perhaps some les-
sons can be gleaned from these earlier cases.

First, have the facts and technology changed in the country in a

manner that makes relying upon the precedent less persuasive, as
in the internet tax case—Wayfair?

Second, did the Court just get it wrong when it first considered the
legal issue, as Justice Alito said it did when he and a majority of
the Court overruled Abood in the Janusdecision a few weeks ago?

And third, has the earlier decision come to be accepted by the vast
majority of Americans, like Miranda? Or is the decision more
like Plessy, a decision that rightly came to be reviled by many
Americans in the years after it was decided?
At bottom, as these earlier decisions demonstrate, stare decisis has
an important role to play in our court system. But it is by no
means controlling. The Court has repeatedly rejected stare decisis
when the circumstances—and the text of the Constitution—de-
mand it.