ANG TIBAY

FACTS: 89 Laborers of Ang Tibay were terminatedby Toribio Teodoro's on September 26, 1938,
because there was a shortage of leather soles in ANG TIBAY making it necessary for him to
temporarily lay off the members of the National Labor Union Inc.

Power of Industrial Court Relations:

It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any
question, matter controversy or dispute arising between, and/or affecting employers and
employees or laborers, and regulate the relations between them, subject to, and in accordance
with, the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 103 (section 1)
It shall take cognizance or purposes of prevention, arbitration, decision and settlement, of any
industrial or agricultural dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout, arising from
differences as regards wages, shares or compensation, hours of labor or conditions of tenancy or
employment, between landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, provided that the number of
employees, laborers or tenants of farm-laborers involved exceeds thirty, and such industrial or
agricultural dispute is submitted to the Court by the Secretary of Labor or by any or both of the
parties to the controversy and certified by the Secretary of labor as existing and proper to be by
the Secretary of Labor as existing and proper to be dealth with by the Court for the sake of public
interest
It shall, before hearing the dispute and in the course of such hearing, endeavor to reconcile the
parties and induce them to settle the dispute by amicable agreement. (Paragraph 2, section
4, ibid.) When directed by the President of the Philippines, it shall investigate and study all
industries established in a designated locality, with a view to determinating the necessity and
fairness of fixing and adopting for such industry or locality a minimum wage or share of laborers or
tenants, or a maximum "canon" or rental to be paid by the "inquilinos" or tenants or less to
landowners. (Section 5)

There are primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character:
The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or
affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.
Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence
tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence
presented.
"While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a
necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support it is a nullity,
a place when directly attached." (Edwards vs. McCoy, supra.) This principle emanates from the
more fundamental is contrary to the vesting of unlimited power anywhere. Law is both a grant and
a limitation upon power.

Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, Not only must there be
some evidence to support a finding or conclusion
The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in
the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views
of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.
The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such
a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons
for the decision rendered.

Doctrine: The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the
rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justifiable cases before it,
entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials
and investigations of an administrative character.

By and large, after considerable discussions, we have come to the conclusion that the interest of
justice would be better served if the movant is given opportunity to present at the hearing the
documents referred to in his motion and such other evidence as may be relevant to the main issue
involved. The legislation which created the Court of Industrial Relations and under which it acts is
new. The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties
adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be and the same is
hereby granted, and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the Court of Industrial
Relations, with instruction that it reopen the case, receive all such evidence as may be relevant
and otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth hereinabove.

AIR MANILA

FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari filed by Air Manila, Inc., to determine the validity of
Resolution No. 139 (68) of the Civil Aeronautics Board in CAB Case No. 1414, allegedly issued
without or in excess of jurisdiction. PAL, petitioned the Civil Aeronautics Board, referred to
hereafter as the Board, for approval of a proposed schedule introducing seven nights - F515/516,
F555/556, F561/562, F531/532, F591/338, F527/528, and F211/212 - and the adjustment of the
flight schedule that may thus be affected (CAB Case No. 1414). On 15 April 1968, action on the
petition was deferred for further study. On 22 April 1968, the Board passed Resolution No. 109
(68), referring PAL's petition to a hearing examiner for economic justification. PAL moved for
reconsideration of Resolution No. 109 (68). By resolution of 6 May 1968, the Board deferred action
on this later motion, until PAL shall have resumed its DC-3 services in certain airports named
therein.

On 9 May 1968, PAL filed another motion, this time for reconsideration of the Board resolution of
6 May 1968, on the ground that the new flights which it was proposing to operate in Case No. EP-
1414 will be serviced by jet-prop or pure jet equipment only, thus, the order for resumption of DC-
3 services in said resolution was improper and should be deleted. In its Resolution No. 131 (68) of
20 May 1968, the Board deferred action on this motion for reconsideration.

PAL filed an Urgent Petition for approval of a consolidated schedule of jet and jet prop flights, with
an interim DC-3 schedule to different secondary and feeder points (DTS-35). On 28 May 1968, the
Board issued its Resolution No. 139 (68), approving DTS-35 for a period of 30 days, effective 1
June 1968, subject to the conditions that (a) the flight between Manila and San Fernando, La
Union, F210/211 of the same timetable, be operated daily instead of twice a week as proposed
and (b) that all schedules under DTS-35, for which no previous approval has been granted by the
Board, are to be referred to a hearing examiner for reception of evidence on its economic
justification.
Air Manila, Inc., filed the instant petition claiming that the respondent Board acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction and/or with abuse of discretion in issuing its Resolution No. 139 (68). It is
petitioner's allegation that the proposed new schedule, involving an increase of frequencies, would
not only saturate the routes served also by petitioner, but would also affect its schedule; that the
Board's approval of said Domestic Traffic Schedule without receiving the evidence of the parties
constituted a deprivation of petitioner's right to be heard; and that such authorization to PAL to
operate the proposed schedule without economic justification amounted to a capricious and
whimsical exercise by the Board of its power amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

RULING: There is no merit to the contention of petitioner. It has been correctly said that
administrative proceedings are not exempt from the operation of certain basic and fundamental
procedural principles, such as the due process requirements in investigations and trials.1 And this
administrative due process is recognized to include (a) the right to notice, be it actual or
constructive, of the institution of the proceedings that may affect a person's legal rights; (b)
reasonable opportunity to appear and defend his rights, introduce witnesses and relevant evidence
in his favor, (c) a tribunal so constituted as to give him reasonable assurance of honesty and
impartiality, and one of competent Jurisdiction; and (4) a finding or decision by that tribunal
supported by substantial evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the records or
disclosed to the parties affected.2

In the present case, it can not truthfully be said that the provisional approval by the Board of PAL's
proposed DTS-35 violates the requisites of administrative due process. Admittedly, after PAL's
proposal to introduce new Mercury night flights (in CAB Case No. EP-1414) had been referred to
a hearing examiner for economic justification, PAL submitted a so-called consolidated schedule of
flights, DTS-35, that included the same Mercury night flights involved in Case EP-1414, and this
was allowed by Board Resolution No. 139 (68). According to respondents, however, the Board's
action was impelled by the circumstance that at the time, the authorizations of certain flight
schedules previously allowed but were incorporated in DTS-35 were about to expire; thus, the
consolidated schedule had to be approved temporarily if the operations of the flights referred to
were not to be suspended. In short, the temporary y permit was issued to prevent the stoppage or
cessation of services in the affected areas. This point petitioner has failed to refute.

Neither can the provisional authorization of DTS-35 be said to have done away with the requisite
hearing and investigation of the new flight schedules and, consequently, to have deprived the
petitioner of its right to be heard. Note that in allowing the operation or effectivity of PAL's
consolidated flight schedule, it was precisely prescribed that "all schedules under the DTS-35 for
which no previous approval has been granted by the Board, are hereby referred to a hearing
examiner for reception of evidence on its economic justification."3 It has not been denied that such
hearings were actually conducted by the hearing examiner and a report on the result thereof was
submitted to the Board. And the Board, considering the report of the hearing examiner, passed
Resolution No. 190 (68)4 approving, for a period of 30 days starting 31 July 1968, only three or four
frequencies of the seven proposed new flights (F338, F591, F531/532, F555/556, F527/528,
F561/562, and F515/516). There is no proof, not even allegation, that in all those bearings
petitioner was not notified or given opportunity to adduce evidence in support of its opposition.

CENTURY TEXTILE MILLS

FACTS: According to Rodolfo Marin (a factory co-worker of private respondent Calangi), at around
12:15 a.m. on 4 June 1983 and within company premises, he chanced upon "Gatchie" Torrena (a
machine operator at petitioner's factory) and noticed the latter mixing some substance with the
drinking water contained in a pitcher from which Meliton and Santos regularly drank. Before anyone
could take a drink from the pitcher, Marin reported what he had observed to Meliton who, in turn,
informed Santos of the same. Soon after, Meliton and Santos took possession of the pitcher of
water and filed a formal report of the incident with company management. 2 The contents of the
pitcher were subsequently brought to and analyzed by chemists at the Philippine Constabulary
Crime Laboratory at Camp Crame, Quezon City who found the presence of a toxic chemical
(formaldehyde) therein. 3

In the police investigation that followed, Torrena confessed that private respondent Calangi
personally instructed him, and he agreed, to place formaldehyde in the pitcher of water. Torrena
also admitted that he and private respondent were then motivated by a desire to avenge
themselves upon Meliton and Santos, both of whom had instigated their (i.e., Torrena's and private
respondent's) suspension from work several times in the past. 4 These circumstances moved
petitioner Corporation preventively to suspend Torrena and private respondent Calangi, and
eventually to dismiss them from its employ. Additionally, criminal charges for attempted murder
were filed against these two employees with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal.

On 11 October 1983, private respondent Calangi filed a Complaint 5 for illegal dismissal (docketed
as Case No. NLRC-NCR-10-4518-83) with the Arbitration Branch, National Capital Region, of the
then Ministry of Labor and Employment. Among other things, private respondent alleged in his
complaint that "[p]rior to his preventive suspension neither the company nor any of its officers
furnished him [with] a copy of their charges, if any, nor afforded him the opportunity to answer the
same and defend himself."

RULING: We sustain the ruling of public respondent Commission that private respondent Calangi
had been dismissed without just cause from his employment by petitioner Corporation.

ART. 278. Miscellaneous provisions. —

xxx xxx xxx

However, the employer shall fumish the worker whose employment is sought to be terminated a
written notice containing a statement of the causes for termination and shall afford the latter ample
opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his representative if he so
desires in accordance with company rules and regulations promulgated pursuant to guidelines set
by the [Department] of Labor and Employment. Any decision taken by the employer shall be
without prejudice to the right of the worker to contest the validity and legality of his dismissing by
filing a complaint with the regional branch of the National Labor Relations Commission. The burden
of proving that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause shall rest on the employer. The
[Department] may suspend the effects of the termination pending resolution of the case in the
event of a prima facie finding by the Ministry that the termination may cause a serious labor dispute
or is in implementation of a mass lay-off.

The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute essential elements of due process in cases
of employee dismissal: the requirement of notice is intended to inform the employee concerned of
the employer's intent to dismiss and the reason for the proposed dismissal; upon the other hand,
the requirement of hearing affords the employee an opportunity to answer his employer's charges
against him and accordingly to defend himself therefrom before dismissal is effected. Neither of
these two requirements can be dispensed with without running afoul of the due process
requirement of the 1987 Constitution.

The record of this case is bereft of any indication that a hearing or other gathering was in fact held
where private respondent Calangi was given a reasonable opportunity to confront his accuser(s)
and to defend against the charges made by the latter. Petitioner Corporation's "prior consultation"
with the labor union with which private respondent Calangi was affiliated, was legally insufficient.
So far as the record shows, neither petitioner nor the labor union actually advised Calangi of the
matters at issue. The Memorandum of petitioner's Personnel Manager certainly offered no helpful
particulars. It is important to stress that the rights of an employee whose services are sought to be
terminated to be informed beforehand of his proposed dismissal (or suspension) as well as of the
reasons therefor, and to be afforded an adequate opportunity to defend himself from the charges
levelled against him, are rights personal to the employee. Those rights were not satisfied by
petitioner Corporation's obtaining the consent of or consulting with the labor union; such
consultation or consent was not a substitute for actual observance of those rights of private
respondent Calangi. The employee can waive those rights, if he so chooses, but the union cannot
waive them for him. That the private respondent simply 'kept silent" all the while, is not adequate
to show an effective waiver of his rights. Notice and opportunity to be heard must be accorded by
an employer even though the employee does not affirmatively demand them.
In view of the finding of illegal dismissal in this case, petitioner Corporation is liable to private
respondent Calangi for payment of the latter's backwages for three (3) years, without qualification
and deduction. Considering the circumstances of this case, however, the Court beheves that
reinstatement of private respondent to his former position—or to any other equivalent position in
the company — will not serve the best interests of the parties involved. Petitioner Corporation
should not be compelled to take back in its fold an employee who, at least in the minds of his
employers, poses a significant threat to the lives and safety of company workers. Consequently,
we hold that private respondent should be given his separation pay in lieu of such reinstatement.
The amount of separation pay shall be equal to private respondent's one-half (1/2) month's salary
for every year of service, to be computed from 13 December 1974 (date of first employment) until
10 June 1986 (three years after date of illegal dismissal).