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A) Afghanistan stalemate limits Obama’s ability to reorient foreign policy towards effective diplomacy
Fernholz, 10 – writing fellow at the American Prospect and Research Fellow at the New America Foundation (Tim, The American Prospect, “The Ultimate Test
Case,” March, 2010, lexis) Katulis = security policy analyst at the Center for American Progress

Obama's final decision in December offered something for everyone, or tried to: The U.S. would deploy an additional 30,000 soldiers to Afghanistan, fewer than
McChrystal requested but still a tripling of the troop commitment to the conflict since Obama's inauguration. The strategy was virtually unchanged from what Obama had
offered in the spring. The goal also remained the same: "to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan and to prevent their return to either country
in the future." Obama's plan echoed the surge he opposed in Iraq: An escalation to protect civilians in population centers and train Afghan security forces that will, in
theory, reverse the momentum of the insurgents and even co-opt those who are willing to lay down their arms. Along with aid from a "civilian surge" of U.S. officials and
contractors with expertise in engineering, agriculture, justice, and local politics, the hope is that this will give the Afghan government time to recover from corruption and
incompetence (the euphemism is "capacity building"). The one new development was a timeline: In July of 2011, the U.S. will start handing over responsibilities to the
Afghans so that coalition forces can begin to withdraw. The president insisted on this timeline, and it remains the single most progressive aspect of the plan -- a
recognition that, in the greater scheme of things, the U.S. has better things to do for its national security than muck about in Afghanistan. "Any American president has to
think about the political sustainability of his policies, and an American president that launches into policies that he can't sustain politically isn't doing his job," Hurlburt
says. "That's true of Obama, that's true of Bush, it's true of everybody. You look at some of the things that Bush started and couldn't sustain -- that's the worst of all
possible worlds." Obama's tinkering around the edges -- the timeline, the counterinsurgency strategy, the emphasis on development, the whole-of-government approach --
marks a real departure from the previous administration's efforts. His rhetoric still holds the promise of the overhaul he campaigned on. But the president's failure
to fundamentally reorient the Afghan conflict has broad ramifications for his promised foreign-policy reforms. Perhaps the most significant
loss is the big picture. Nearly 100,000 troops are committed to pursuing Obama's "narrow goal" of defeating al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. But is this extensive involvement in
an Afghan civil war the best way to fight al-Qaeda and like-minded groups? After all, one of al-Qaeda leaders' stated goals is drawing the United States into expensive and
intractable long-term conflicts. Even as we're leaving Iraq, doubling-down on Afghanistan plays into their hands. "We did not ask for this fight," the
president said in a major speech on Afghanistan in December. "On September 11, 2001, 19 men hijacked four airplanes and used them to murder nearly 3,000
people." It was an explanation straight out of the Bush era. Much of the 9-11 operation was carried out not in Afghanistan or Pakistan (or Iraq, for that
matter) but in places like Germany and Florida. And terrorism experts warn that officials should not take for granted that al-Qaeda could re-establish a safe
haven in Afghanistan, or that such safe havens are threats to the United States. The administration admits that fewer than 100 al-Qaeda terrorists
remain in Afghanistan -- and that many insurgents aren't ideological opponents of the United States. Some are petty criminals, some are simply armed local groups tired of
being pushed around by the central government, and others fight merely for pay. (The U.S. was embarrassed to find out in December that the Taliban paid its fighters more
than the Afghan National Army paid its soldiers.) Many of these insurgents are angry at the U.S. simply because we're there. "The importance
of a people not wanting to be occupied cannot be underestimated," says Matthew Hoh, a former Foreign Service officer who was the first person to
resign a government post in protest of U.S. strategy in Afghanistan. "National will or ethnic will cannot be downplayed or misunderstood or denied." Meanwhile, the
transnational terrorists we're supposedly fighting don't need bases in Afghanistan and Pakistan to attack us. Officials concede that safe havens in
other failed or failing states must be pressed as well. Just weeks after Obama announced his strategy, a Nigerian man obtained explosives from an al-Qaeda affiliate in
Yemen -- which, along with places like Pakistan, Algeria, and Somalia, provides a "safe haven" for the group -- and attempted to destroy an
international flight as it landed in Detroit. U.S. intelligence agencies, despite having some relevant information, didn't act in time to prevent the bomber from getting on the
flight. Perhaps the billions of dollars dedicated to the new troops in Afghanistan would be better served fixing structural failures in
intelligence-gathering. Instead, we're seeing the considerable militarization of intelligence-gathering. After a suicide bomber killed seven Central Intelligence
Agency employees in Afghanistan, CIA Director Leon Panetta wrote that "like our military, CIA officers are on the front lines against al-Qaeda and its violent allies." The
officers were stationed there to manage a drone program that hunts terrorists in the mountains of Afghanistan and Pakistan. While fighting terrorists requires both
intelligence-gathering and the kind of targeted strikes the CIA performs, there is a clear imbalance when a camp in Afghanistan has dozens of CIA employees but the
National Counterterrorism Center has only eight or nine Middle East analysts. The focus on troops has also hampered Obama's goal of placing
equal emphasis on civilian and military aspects of our foreign policy. The military, which has increasingly become America's primary presence
abroad, is resisting the attempt to narrow the focus of the war. Despite the White House's goal of training just over 200,000 Afghan soldiers and police, Pentagon officials
plan to train 400,000. And Holbrooke, intended to be the civilian counterpart to Petraeus, has seen his influence diminish commensurate with his lack of resources. Though
his office is still an important center of coordination, he plays a smaller-than-expected role in the White House-driven decision-making process. Obama's foreign-policy
vision professed a need to address the root causes of conflict by building up local infrastructure and actively fostering better lives for people in places like Afghanistan.
Despite a consensus -- which even includes Defense Secretary Robert Gates -- that civilian development, medical access, and agricultural expertise are critical to
counterinsurgency, the administration's budget request in March reflected a heavy emphasis on defense over development. Ambassador Eikenberry protested in a cable to
Washington, asking for an additional $2.5 billion -- 60 percent more than he had been given. The military was receiving $68 billion. Even if civilian efforts were given
more resources, overhauling the State Department and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to make them more effective remains a challenge
-- despite the fact that the State Department created a position to do just that. Although the administration expects to have 974 civilians on the ground by early 2010,
beating a goal it set in March, this is a drop in the bucket: Afghanistan has a population of 28 million. Reports show a deep frustration from U.S. officials
working on development projects, because they are almost entirely dependent on the military. Indeed, despite the growing acceptance of the
need for civilian expertise, the military often finds itself trying to do the work of civilian agencies that aren't set up to operate in a war zone. "We're in a 'build the airplane
while you're flying it' kind of situation," Hurlburt says. "If the effort to produce a better, much more energetic and smartly focused civilian effort in Afghanistan succeeds,
it will become the template for broader reform of the institutions." That template could be useful, Hurlburt adds, or it could be detrimental, since the lessons U.S.
development officers learn in Afghanistan may not apply so well to countries that need U.S. help but aren't in the middle of a war. This narrow focus on the
military conflict also distracts from Pakistan, Afghanistan's nuclear neighbor, where an unstable government and the proliferation of extreme Islamist
groups are of much more interest to the United States. "I am not sure what 40,000 additional troops in Afghanistan can do about the greater global security threat,
instability in Pakistan," Katulis told me last fall. "You have nearly daily -- and sometimes twice-a-day -- attacks targeted inside of Pakistan, which is five times more
populous and has nuclear weapons." Just consider the numbers: Obama is spending $1.5 billion a year on aid to Pakistan and over $68 billion fighting a war in
Afghanistan. With Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visiting Pakistan, the administration has had some success in navigating the nation's complex politics. Clinton is
trying to broaden the U.S.-Pakistan relationship from working with the government on national-security issues toward a holistic engagement with the entire country. It's
exactly the kind of approach that Obama promised, but it is undermined by the use of drone strikes on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, which have increased anti-
American sentiment. The Obama team has set aside the Bush administration's end goal of installing a democracy and instead made a limited version of that aim the means
to their central end: Everything comes down to eliminating the terrorist presence in Afghanistan. Vikram Singh, Holbrooke's defense adviser, says the region is the
"epicenter" of al-Qaeda's action, which is why the administration has made preventing the group's re-establishment there a more pressing goal than dealing with al-Qaeda
globally. With even John Kerry, now the chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, using the distinctly Bush-administration phrase "global counterinsurgency" in
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his speeches on Afghanistan, progressive attempts to change the way we think about terrorism threats have taken a step back. The president seems to have settled into the
Washington consensus that he criticized as an up-and-coming senator. His Afghanistan strategy buys into the idea that American troops can defeat tenacious insurgencies,
that our officials have the ability to build even the most basic state from the ground up, and that terrorists represent a monolithic enemy around the world. The cocky
senator of last spring has been replaced by a cautious and tightly controlled president. There was a time when Obama could flout conventional wisdom, but now he must
accommodate it. It's true that Obama did not start this war, did not under-resource it for eight years, and did not fail to pursue Osama bin Laden at Tora Bora. The credit
for those dubious achievements goes to George W. Bush. But the new president has missed opportunities to shift how our government approaches these problems. Many
of the campaign aides who helped craft Obama's forward-thinking foreign-policy vision remain in his inner circle, but are superseded by a group of veteran officials
(Clinton, Gates, Petraeus, Holbrooke, National Security Adviser James Jones) whose commitment to new ideas varies. It remains to be seen how much they -- and the
responsibilities of being president -- have shifted Obama's personal foreign-policy vision. The stakes are high in Afghanistan not only on the merits
but because success buys him the credibility to advance other foreign-policy initiatives that don't tend to go over well with
domestic audiences: closing Guantánamo Bay, engaging Iran, pressuring Israel toward peace, reaching out to the Muslim community,
and reducing nuclear weapons in America and the world. Even given the daunting odds, it is still possible that a new mode of
foreign policy -- one that is executed by civilians and soldiers equally -- could spring from the crucible of Afghanistan. The other
scenario, though, is that using the military in Afghanistan as the central means of fighting terrorism leaves reform of law enforcement and intelligence out in the cold,
hinders the transformation of the civilian agencies, and prevents Obama from spending resources on other projects. A failure in Afghanistan is a failure to
change the way this country approaches foreign policy. Worse, if the next two years don't show an Afghan government that can
handle basic governing and security, then all of Obama's ideas will be wrapped in that failure, hindering his ability to execute
any of his other initiatives.
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B) COIN is a vortex for US diplomacy – kills leverage Haddick 2010
Robert Haddick , Managing Editor of Small Wars Journal, former Marine Corps Officer, holds a B.A. and M.B.A. from the University of Illinois,2010 (“This Week at
War: The Afghanistan Vortex,” Foreign Policy, June 25th, Available Online
athttp://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/25/this_week_at_war_the_afghanistan_vortex , Accessed 08-31-2010)

Afghanistan is becoming a deepening vortex for both the United States military and for the country's national security policies. In addition to
the financial and human toll (80 ISAF soldiers have died so far this month), Afghanistan is imposing other costs on the U.S. military, on U.S. defense planning,
and on America's diplomatic leverage around the world. When assessing the benefits to be achieved by the Afghan campaign, these costs also merit
consideration. The administration and its military advisers have chosen a manpower-intensive counterinsurgency strategy for Afghanistan. Defense Secretary Robert Gates
and a long list of officials have expressed their concerns about the implications of repeated deployments for the all-volunteer
force. Afghanistan also seems to chew up generals. Gen. David McKiernan was replaced out of frustration with a lack of progress. The same frustration, expressing itself
in behind-the-scenes contempt and bickering, brought down Gen. Stanley McChrystal. Now Petraeus has been recalled from a depleted bench. This move has its price.
After jumping into the Afghan vortex, Petraeus will leave behind his critical duties at Central Command, which include diplomacy across the Middle East and Central
Asia, the containment of Iran, and supervising the endgame in Iraq. The administration has yet to announce who, if anyone, will replace Petraeus at Centcom. The
Afghan vortex has implications for defense planning elsewhere in the world. In a speech he delivered to the Navy League in May, Gates said that
the costs of rehabilitating the Army and Marine Corps, combined with the ground force's long term manpower and family support costs, will mean that the Navy will see
no increases in its budget. The secretary general of Japan's ruling party recently argued that U.S. naval power is in decline and that
Japan needs to adjust its maritime security policy accordingly. When that view spreads throughout Asia, an arms race will be
inevitable. The deepening commitment has forced the U.S. government into the position of pleading for favors from Pakistan
and Russia in order to open new supply lines to the growing army in Afghanistan. The price has been to forfeit diplomatic leverage with
implications for U.S. relations in Europe, India, and China. Are the campaign objectives in Afghanistan worth all of these costs? Evidently, Obama has
decided that they are. A smaller commitment to Afghanistan would presumably reduce or eliminate the costs described above. But such
a course would have its own risks, which Obama has presumably considered and rejected..

C) COIN shreds our foreign policy priorities—includes resources for diplomacy and climate change.
Cohen 11/30/09 - Michael, senior research fellow at the New America Foundation, New York Daily News, " Mother of all decisions: If Obama escalates in
Afghanistan, he'll set back ... "
Sending from 30,000 to 40,000 troops to that tumultuous nation will likely wreak havoc on Obama's broader first-term foreign policy agenda -
consuming resources, sucking up time and attention, and ultimately subverting his larger foreign policy goals. In August, National
Intelligence Council Chairman John Brennan declared that under Obama, "the fight against terrorists and violent extremists has been returned to its right and proper place:
no longer defining - indeed, distorting - our entire national security and foreign policy, but rather serving as a vital part of those larger policies." But the military
commitment endorsed by President Obama would have the reverse effect - officially making stabilization in Afghanistan and the war against Al Qaeda and the Taliban the
President's top priority. For example, one of the most serious challenges facing the country's national security bureaucracy - one Obama and Secretary of State Clinton
have expressed serious concern about in the past - is the skewed balance between resources for our military and civilian agencies. Nearly everyone in the foreign
policy community agrees that both State and the U.S. Agency for International Development are badly under-resourced. But with
Obama's likely troop increase in Afghanistan, agencies like the State Department and USAID will see their dwindling capacity
devoted to assisting the military as opposed to the long-term diplomacy and development work that can further U.S. interests in
places not named Afghanistan or Pakistan. The civilian-military balance will only become further skewed. And if the administration requests $100 billion a
year for the war in Afghanistan, in the face of looming budget deficits, what are the chances Congress will loosen its purse strings further for two underappreciated foreign
policy agencies? Finally, Obama and his advisers will be pressed in devoting their attention and political capital to other foreign policy
matters, whether it's pushing for a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, organizing an international coalition to confront the
Iranian nuclear program or hammering out international agreements on climate change and trade. It's never easy for Presidents
and their advisers to proverbially "walk and chew gum at the same time," and having 100,000 troops in Afghanistan will make it
that much harder. But above all, Obama's goal of changing America's mind-set from the belief that there is a military solution to every national security challenge
will be dealt a defining and perhaps fatal blow - and in the end, that is probably the most important reason why troop levels in Afghanistan matter and why the President
should think twice. The opportunity costs will be profound, and Obama will risk becoming the one thing he likely did not want to be: a war
President. As he prepares to announce a decision that will define his presidency, Obama would be wise to consider the words of
one of his predecessors in the Oval Office, Lyndon Johnson, who after leaving office told a biographer, "History provided too
many cases where the sound of the bugle put an immediate end to the hopes and dreams of the best reformers." No doubt
Obama knows what ultimately happened to Johnson's policy agenda - and his presidency
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D) The ability to effectively deploy diplomatic assets is key to stop warming Hague 9/27 (William Hague, Secretary of
State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and Member of Parliament for Richmond, United Kingdom, “The Diplomacy of Climate Change,” 9/27/10)

But I particularly wanted to make the point to this audience and to circulate to a wider audience certain points about climate change this morning, which is perhaps the 21st
century's biggest foreign- policy challenge, along with preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. I believe those two threats over the longer term are the biggest threats to
the peace and security of the world. A world that is failing to respond to climate change is one in which the values embodied in the United Nations will not be met, and it's
a world in which competition and conflict would win out over collaboration. We're at a very crucial point in the global debate on this subject. Many people are
questioning, in the wake of Copenhagen, whether we should continue to seek a response to climate change through the U.N. and whether we can ever hope to deal with
this enormous challenge. And I will first argue today that an effective response to climate change underpins our security and prosperity; second,
that our response should be to strive for a binding global deal, whatever the setbacks; and third, I will set out why effective deployment of foreign policy
assets is crucial to mobilizing the political will needed if we're going to shape an effective response. Now, Ban Ki-moon is right to have
made climate change his top priority. Two weeks ago, I was talking about Britain's values in a networked world. I said then that a successful response to climate change
must be a central objective of British foreign policy. And I said this not only because I believe action against climate change is in line with a values-based foreign policy,
but because it underpins our prosperity and security. You can't have food, water or energy security without climate security; they are
interconnected and inseparable. They form four resource pillars on which global security, prosperity and equity stand. Each depends on
the other. Plentiful, affordable food requires reliable and affordable access to water and energy. Increasing dependence on coal, oil and gas threatens climate security,
increasing the severity of floods and droughts, damaging food production, exacerbating the loss of biodiversity, and in countries that rely on hydropower, undermining
energy security through the impact on the availability of water. As the world becomes more networked, the impact of climate change in one country or
region will affect the prosperity and security of others around the world. No one can have failed to be appalled by the devastating floods in
Pakistan. They overwhelmed the capacity of government to respond and opened political space for extremists. While Pakistan has borne the brunt of the human impact,
China too has been hit on a vast scale by a seemingly endless sequence of droughts, floods and deadly mudslides. The Russian drought last month damaged the wheat
harvest, leading to an export ban. World prices surged, hitting the poorest hardest, and sparking riots over bread prices in far away Mozambique. While no one weather
event can ever be linked with certainty to climate change, the broad patterns of abnormality seen this year are consistent with climate-change models. They provide an
illustration of the events we will be encountering increasingly in the future. So the clock is ticking, and the time to act is now. We must all take
responsibility for this threat and take robust action. But we must also be clear-headed about the difficulties of reaching agreement and not lose heart when the going gets
tough. The post-war leaders set up the United Nations in the aftermath of conflagration. They saw the pressing need for global solutions to global problems: cooperation
not conflict, through frameworks and institutions embedded in the rule of law, and an international system that is fair and offers everyone a realistic prospect of security
and prosperity. Failure to respond to climate change is inimical to all these values, undermining trust between nations, intensifying
competition for resources, and shrinking the political space available for cooperation. It is an affront to fairness, since it puts the greatest
burden on those who have done least to cause the problem and are least able to deal with its consequences. It is incompatible with the values and aspirations that the U.N.
embodies. And it's incompatible with the values and aspirations of British foreign policy. For more than 20 years, we've been striving to build an effective international
response to climate change. But we have lacked the collective ambition required. We need to shift investment urgently from high-carbon "business as usual" to the low-
carbon economy. This means building an essentially decarbonized global economy by mid- century. At the same time, we must ensure development is climate resilient;
otherwise, the changes in climate that are already unavoidable will block the path for hundreds of millions of people from poverty to prosperity. These changes also
threaten to sweep away the investments in development we have made, and just as the bridges and schools in Pakistan were swept away. To drive that shift in investment
from low to high carbon, we need a global climate change deal under the United Nations. Now, some have argued that we should abandon hope of doing so. They say
Copenhagen proved it's all too difficult; we should focus instead on less inclusive and less demanding responses, such as coalitions of the willing. But we believe this
would be a strategic error. It mistakes the nature of the task, which is to expand the realm of the possible, not to lower our ambition by accepting its current limits. And we
must recognize this at Cancun. One thing Copenhagen did give us was a set of political commitments, captured in the Copenhagen Accord, on which we can build. More
than 120 countries have now associated themselves with that accord, and that represents a broad and growing consensus. We now need to ensure that we live up to the
commitments we made to each other in the accord, and reach out even more widely. Copenhagen, despite those accords, was a strategic setback, but it was not by any
means the end of the road. We need to be clear why it failed to live up to high expectations and why it did not deliver a legally binding deal. Many people say that it failed
because of process: The diplomats and the politicians had created a negotiation that was too difficult and too complex. But this misses the point. International treaties are
an outcome, not an input, of political bargains. If you've made the political commitment to deliver, you can make the process work to deliver. The real reason Copenhagen
did not deliver on high expectations was a lack of political will. Many in developing countries saw a gap between the words and the deeds of the industrialized economies.
They questioned whether we really believed our own rhetoric. And to answer those questions, we each need to start at home. That is why the coalition government to
which I belong has committed itself to being the greenest government ever in the United Kingdom, and why, with others in Europe, we are calling on the European Union
to commit to a 30-percent cut in emissions by 2020 without waiting for the rest of the world to act. The UK is already the world leader in offshore wind, with more
projects installed, in planning and in construction than any other country in the world. We're undertaking the most radical transformation of our electricity sector ever. We
aim to provide over 30 percent of our domestic electricity from renewables by 2020. We have committed to build no new coal-fired power stations without carbon capture
and storage technology, and we've announced our intention to continue the demonstration projects of that. And because it's imperative that foreign and
domestic policies are mutually reinforcing, we must ensure that our approach is coherent. Now, that's one reason we have established the
new British National Security Council: to ensure this happens across the full range of issues, including climate change. And that's why I work hand in glove with Chris
Huhne, the British Energy and Climate Change secretary, and Andrew Mitchell, the International Development secretary, to ensure that our domestic action
reflects our level of international ambition. But we won't succeed, of course, if we act alone. We must aim for a framework that is global and
binding. It needs to be global because climate change affects everyone. Only a response that allows everyone a voice will generate a
sense of common purpose and legitimacy. Only a response that is binding will convince investors that we intend to keep the promises we make to each other.
Businesses need clear political signals, so let's show them an unequivocal green light. We are now a few weeks away from the 16th Conference of Parties on Climate
Change in Cancun. And I commend the consultative and collaborative approach Mexico has taken ahead of this meeting. Thanks to their
determination and foresight, we have a chance in Cancun to regain momentum and make progress on key issues such as forests, technology, finance and transparency of
commitments. Cancun will -- may not get us all the way to a full agreement, but it can put us back on track to one. That said, the negotiations can't succeed inside a bubble.
The negotiators in the U.N. process can't themselves build political will. They have to operate on the basis of current political realities in the countries they represent. And
it's those realities that limit the ambition that we can set in the -- in such negotiations, and it's those realities that we now need to shift. There is no global consensus on
what climate change puts at risk, geopolitically and for the global economy, and thus on the scale and urgency of the response we need. We must build a global
consensus if we are to guarantee our citizens security and prosperity. That is a job for foreign policy. A fundamental purpose here for foreign policy
is to shift the political debate, to create the political space for leaders and negotiators to reach agreement. We didn't get that right before Copenhagen, and we must get it
 WaRu 2010-2011 Diplomacy Adv Cummings!!! 5
right now. So we urgently need to mobilize foreign ministers and the diplomats they lead, as well as institutions such as the Council on Foreign Relations, to put
climate change at the heart of foreign- policy thinking. When I became foreign secretary in May, I said the core goals of our foreign policy were to
guarantee Britain's security and prosperity. Robust global action on climate change is essential to that agenda. That is why the British Foreign and
Commonwealth Office, under my leadership, is a vocal advocate for climate diplomacy. All British ambassadors carry the argument for a global low-carbon transition in
their breast pocket or in their handbag. Climate change is part of their daily vocabulary, alongside the traditional themes of foreign policy. And they're supported by our
unique network of climate attaches throughout the world. The core assets of foreign policy are its networks and its convening power. Foreign policy can build political
impulses to overcome barriers between sectors and cultures. In a networked world, diplomacy builds partnerships beyond government. And
nowhere are those partnerships more vital than on climate. So we must mobilize all our networks, not just across government but between
governments, using organizations such as the Commonwealth as well. We must reach out, beyond, to NGOs, faith groups and businesses. And of all these, perhaps
business engagement is the key to making a difference. It's business that will lead low-carbon transition. It's business that best understands the incentives needed to help us
all prosper. We must also harness scientific expertise in cutting-edge low- carbon technologies. The scientific community will develop the goods which will power the
low-carbon economy and drive global ambition on climate change. And that's why the British government has a science and innovation network, which fosters
collaborative research in the U.K. and other countries. Now, what can the U.K. and the European Union do to make that fundamental shift and shape a global consensus on
climate change? The most serious problem at Copenhagen, and the strongest brake on political will, was and is a lack of confidence in the low-carbon economy. Too few
people in too few countries are yet convinced that a rapid move to low carbon is compatible with economic recovery and growth. They see the short-term economic and
domestic stability risks before the opportunities and the longer-term risks of inaction. There should be only one European response to that confidence gap. The EU, in
my view, must accelerate its own progress and demonstrate that a low-carbon growth path makes us more competitive. I am
convinced this is in the long-term interests of Europe's economy. We have learned painful lessons from the oil price shocks. We must modernize our
infrastructure. The opportunities are out there. The global industry in low-carbon and environmental goods and services is already estimated to be worth
up to 3.2 trillion pounds a year. Nearly a million British people are now employed in this sector, and that's why we are creating a green investment bank to ensure that we
can properly support and develop low-carbon industry. But we need to redouble our efforts, both in the EU (itself ?) and in our engagement with partners. Each of us
as member states will be better able to accelerate if we're doing so together as the world's largest single market. And by opening up
this effort through partnership with others, we can make it easier for them to accelerate, too. So we'll be at the forefront of pushing for low-carbon modernization of
Europe's infrastructure and energy policy. The European Union's budget until 2013 is set out in the current "financial perspective". We will argue -- we will need to agree
the financial perspective for the seven years after that, the period including our 2020 climate goals. And it's -- as ever, it's right that the EU budget should reflect the
prevailing economic circumstances. It's also right that we direct the budget to today's challenges, not those of yesterday. And that means one that supports the transition to
a low-carbon economy. Action in Europe alone will not be enough. We need both the developed and developing world to take action. And this
week Guido Westerwelle, the German foreign minister, and I have tasked our teams to come together to shape a coordinated,
diplomacy-led effort on climate change, combining the strengths of our respective foreign services. I've just put the case for bringing a new
urgency for low-carbon transition within the EU. But together we should carry that urgency in external dialogues, whether they are with the United States, China or India.
The transition to low carbon will happen faster and maximize the benefit for all if the United States -- historically the world's
largest emitter -- is at the leading edge. I recognize the political challenges that the U.S. administration faces and welcome President Obama's commitment to
combat climate change. As he said in his State of the Union speech, "the nation that leads the clean-energy economy will be the nation that leads
the global economy." Whatever the outcome of the upcoming midterm elections in the U.S., there is scope for political unity around an economic agenda that targets
new energy opportunities and new jobs. American business understands this new market and should want to lead it. But to make these new clean-energy investments at the
required pace and on a sufficient scale, they need the right incentives. On climate, as in so many areas, the world looks to the US for leadership, because it has the
economic clout and diplomatic leverage to shift the global debate. And I look forward to working with the U.S. administration and indeed with the Council on Foreign
Relations to raise global ambitions and put us back on the path to sustainable growth. A key challenge for Europe is to build an economic partnership with China that
reinforces the steps China is taking towards a low- carbon economy. These steps include its recent announcement of the five provinces and eight cities that have been
designated as China's low-carbon pilots. Together these pilots cover 350 million people, so an ambitious approach to these schemes, tenaciously implemented, could
provide a critical boost to global confidence in the concept of low- carbon development and help put China on the path to sustainable prosperity. It could also produce
huge two-way investment and partnership opportunities. Europe should place itself at the heart of these, working with China to maximize the ambition and the
opportunities and to build the shared technology standards that will shape a global low- carbon market. In China's case, low-carbon opportunity is matched by urgent low-
carbon need. The pace of growth in China means average Chinese per- capita emissions could soon eclipse those of Europe. So while China has taken some very welcome
steps, without a commitment from China to further decisive action, the efforts of others will be in vain. The emerging economies face a dilemma. Often they are the most
vulnerable to the direct effects of climate change. But they are concerned that action against climate change will adversely affect their development. The challenge to all
countries is to have a high- growth, low-carbon economy. Some, like Brazil, which derives nearly half its energy from clean and renewable resources, are rising to that
challenge. India is another, embodying in microcosm the challenge that climate change poses to us all. Threatened by food, water and energy insecurity, India has
responded with ambitious plans to generate 20 gigawatts of solar power by 2022. South Africa, a coal-dependent economy, the success of which is so important to growth
and prosperity within the continent, has made a significant offer to deviate their emissions from the business-as- usual pathway. The opportunity is for the emerging
economies -- for the emerging economies is to make a direct leap to low carbon, avoiding the high- carbon lock-in that we see in the developed world: a new, sustainable
pathway for prosperity and security. A global low-carbon economy is not an idealist's pipe dream but a 21st-century realist's imperative.
Countries that adapt quickly to a carbon-constrained world will be better able to deliver lasting prosperity for their citizens. As a Permanent Security Council member, I'm
determined that the U.K. will play its full part in that, not least by supporting climate finance for the poorest. Collectively, we share a responsibility to those most
vulnerable to the impact of climate change. Bangladesh, with its densely populated coastal region, is particularly susceptible to rising sea levels. Glacial melt, sea-level
rises and El Nino-type events threaten the lives of millions across South America. And the very existence of many small island states is under threat. We have a shared
vision to meet the Millennium Development Goals. But in a world without action on climate change, that vision will remain a dream, and the efforts of the last 10 years
would So climate change is one of the gravest threats to our security and prosperity. Unless we take robust and timely action to deal with it, no country will be immune to
its effects. However difficult it might seem now, a global deal under the U.N. is the only response to this threat which will create the
necessary confidence to drive a low- carbon transition. We must be undaunted by the scale of the challenge. We must continue to strive for agreement.
We must not accept that because there is no consensus on a way forward now, that there never will be one. And to change the debate, we must imaginatively deploy
all of the foreign policy assets in our armory until we've shaped that global consensus. A successful response to climate change will not only
stabilize the climate, but open the way to a future in which we can meet our needs through cooperation, in accordance with the ideals of the United Nations. Failure to do
so will enhance competitive tendencies and make the world more dangerous, so this is not actually a hard choice. We have to get this right. If we do, we can still shape our
world. And if we don't, the world will determine our destiny for us
 WaRu 2010-2011 Diplomacy Adv Cummings!!! 6

E) Warming impact
 WaRu 2010-2011 Diplomacy Adv Cummings!!! 7
F) Second is prolif and global stability—cooperation ensures new weapons states and rising powers are
stable—the impact is nuke war Dyer, 04 - worked as a freelance journalist, columnist, broadcaster and lecturer on international affairs for more
than 20 years, but he was originally trained as an historian. Born in Newfoundland, he received degrees from Canadian, American and British universities, finishing with a
Ph.D. in Military and Middle Eastern History from the University of London. [Gwynne, "The end of war," Toronto Star, 12/30, l/n]

War is deeply embedded in our history and our culture, probably since before we were even fully human, but weaning ourselves away from it should not be a bigger
mountain to climb than some of the other changes we have already made in the way we live, given the right incentives. And we have certainly been given the right
incentives: The holiday from history that we have enjoyed since the early '90s may be drawing to an end, and another great-power
war, fought next time with nuclear weapons, may be lurking in our future.. The "firebreak" against nuclear weapons use that we began building
after Hiroshima and Nagasaki has held for well over half a century now. But the proliferation of nuclear weapons to new powers is a major
challenge to the stability of the system. So are the coming crises, mostly environmental in origin, which will hit some countries much harder than others, and
may drive some to desperation. Add in the huge impending shifts in the great-power system as China and India grow to rival the United States in GDP over the next 30 or
40 years and it will be hard to keep things from spinning out of control. With good luck and good management, we may be able to ride out the
next half-century without the first-magnitude catastrophe of a global nuclear war, but the potential certainly exists for a major
die-back of human population. We cannot command the good luck, but good management is something we can choose to provide. It depends, above all, on
preserving and extending the multilateral system that we have been building since the end of World War II. The rising powers must be absorbed into a system that
emphasizes co-operation and makes room for them, rather than one that deals in confrontation and raw military power. If they are obliged to play the traditional great-
power game of winners and losers, then history will repeat itself and everybody loses. Our hopes for mitigating the severity of the coming environmental crises also
depend on early and concerted global action of a sort that can only happen in a basically co-operative international system. When the great powers are locked
into a military confrontation, there is simply not enough spare attention, let alone enough trust, to make deals on those issues, so
the highest priority at the moment is to keep the multilateral approach alive and avoid a drift back into alliance systems and
arms races. And there is no point in dreaming that we can leap straight into some never-land of universal brotherhood; we will
have to confront these challenges and solve the problem of war within the context of the existing state system.
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Turn – current war will force Dems to inevitably abandon Obama
Donnelly 09- staff writer for CQ weekly (John M. Donnelly, Nov. 23, 2009 “The Costs of Buying
Time”http://library.cqpress.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/cqweekly/document.php?id=weeklyreport111-
000003253119&type=hitlist&num=0&)
Even as President Obama contemplates … the 4,434 wounded throughout the war.

Abandoning COIN is popular with Democrats and Republicans

Washington Times 09 (Kim R. Holmes SPECIAL TO THE WASHINGTON TIMES, 8/20/09, "What's the Big Idea: Obama facing the
tests of war in Afghanistan amid elections", lexis)
All this is true. But … … his own party, he may not find them eager allies.

No link – CT isn’t full withdrawal – obama can spin

IISS 10 – International Institute for Strategic Studies, (April, “Obama's presidency bolstered by political
success”http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/past-issues/volume-16-2010/april/obamas-presidency-
bolstered-by-political-success/ )
As a consequence, the US has … until then to take stock.

A/T SO2 Disad

SO2’s cool factor is small and just a model fudge factor---AND it increases warming
World Climate Report 5, Change of Direction: Do SO2 Emissions Lead to Warming?, April 22,
2005,http://www.worldclimatereport.com/index.php/2005/04/22/change-of-direction-do-so2-emissions-lead-to-
warming/)

Many scientists believe that sulfur … modest global warming to date.

SO2 no longer effectively cools the earth

Wild et al. 2007 (Wild, M., A. Ohmura, and K. Makowski (2007), Impact of global dimming and brightening on global
warming, Geophys. Res. Let http://www.agu.org/pubs/crossref/2007/2006GL028031.shtml)

Speculations on the impact of … solar dimming within this period.

Warming causes massive sea level rise, destroys civilization

Hansen 6 (James, Director @ NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies and Adjunct Prof. Earth and Env. Sci. @
Columbia U. Earth Institute, New York Review of Books, “THE THREAT TO THE
PLANET”,http://pubs.giss.nasa.gov/docs/2006/2006_Hansen.pdf)
 WaRu 2010-2011 Diplomacy Adv Cummings!!! 9

Important cards to have

2010 is the key year for Russia to expand and consolidate power – pulling out of afghan allows the US to contain Russian expansion
Steff 10 — Intern, Centre for Strategic Studies. Dissertation on ballistic missiles and deterrence. MA, IR (Reuben,
The Russian Resurgence, America and the Great Crisis of 2010, 7 January
2010, http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/HL1001/S00022.htm)

Well 2010 will be a period of … and the US remains impossible.

Turn - U.S. focus on the Islamic world prevents any possible prevention of Russian expansionism
Kabalan 6/25 (Marwan Al, Professor of Political Science and Media at Damascus University, “Russia is reasserting its
influence”,http://gulfnews.com/opinions/columnists/russia-is-reasserting-its-influence-1.645812)

The US has always been … them adopt a more pragmatic approach.

Russian adventurism causes global nuclear conflicts

Cohen, 1996 - Heritage Foundation (Ariel, “The New "Great Game": Oil Politics in the Caucasus and Central Asia”,
1/25,http://www.heritage.org/Research/RussiaandEurasia/BG1065.cfm)

Much is at stake in … off Islamic militancy more difficult.

Anti Americanism from occupation is the greatest link to global terrorism – Afghanistan is irrelevant
Pena 09 - Senior Fellow, The Independent Institute (December 9, Charles, “Can the U.S. Withdraw from Afghanistan
and Iraq?”http://www.independent.org/events/transcript.asp?eventID=145 )
Here are the issues. Number one, both Peter and Ivan have talked about this ... not necessarily that they want to
come after the United States in the U.S.

A large military footprint bolsters radical nationalism throughout central asia

Innocent and Carpenter, 9 - *foreign policy analyst at Cato who focuses on Afghanistan and Pakistan AND vice
president for defense and foreign policy studies at Cato (Malou and Ted, “Escaping the Graveyard of Empires: A
Strategy to Exit Afghanistan,”http://www.cato.org/pubs/wtpapers/escaping-graveyard-empires-strategy-exit-
afghanistan.pdf)

Contrary to the claims that we should use the U.S. military to stabilize the region and reduce the threat of
terrorism ... let alone one who is hell-bent on launching a terrorist attack against the American homeland.