RENATO A.

CASTILLO, Petitioner,
vs.
LEA P. DE LEON CASTILLO, Respondent. Issue​: W/N judicial declaration is necessary in order to establish the nullity 
of a marriage. 
Facts: 

On 25 May 1972, respondent Lea P. De Leon Castillo (Lea) married  Ruling​: NO, under the Civil Code. Petition is DENIED. 
Benjamin Bautista (Bautista). On 6 January 1979, respondent married   
herein petitioner Renato A. Castillo (Renato).  The Court held that the subsequent marriage of Lea to Renato is valid in 
view of the invalidity of her first marriage to Bautista because of the 
On 28 May 2001, Renato filed before the RTC a Petition for Declaration of  absence of a marriage license. That there was no judicial declaration that 
Nullity of Marriage, praying that his marriage to Lea be declared void due  the first marriage was void ab initio before the second marriage was 
to her subsisting marriage to Bautista. Respondent opposed the Petition,  contracted is immaterial as this is not a requirement under the Civil Code. 
and contended that her marriage to Bautista was null and void as they had  Nonetheless, the subsequent Decision of the RTC declaring the nullity of 
not secured any license therefor, and neither of them was a member of the  Lea's first marriage only serves to strengthen the conclusion that her 
denomination to which the solemnizing officer belonged.  subsequent marriage to Renato is valid. 
 
RTC declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and   
void ab initio on the ground that it was a bigamous marriage under Article  Ratio​: 
41 of the Family Code. The RTC said that the fact that Lea's marriage to   
Bautista was subsisting when she married Renato on 6 January 1979, makes  The validity of a marriage and all its incidents must be determined in 
her marriage to Renato bigamous, thus rendering it void ab initio. The  accordance with the law in effect at the time of its celebration. In this 
lower court dismissed Lea's argument that she need not obtain a judicial  case, the law in force at the time Lea contracted both marriages was the 
decree of nullity and could presume the nullity of a prior subsisting  Civil Code. The children of the parties were also born while the Civil Code 
marriage. The RTC stressed that so long as no judicial declaration exists,  was in effect i.e. in 1979, 1981, and 1985. Hence, the Court must resolve 
the prior marriage is valid and existing. Lastly, RTC also said that even if  this case using the provisions under the Civil Code on void marriages, in 
respondent eventually had her first marriage judicially declared void, the  particular, Articles 80, 81, 82, and 83 (first paragraph); and those on 
fact remains that the first and second marriage were subsisting before the  voidable marriages are Articles 83 (second paragraph), 85 and 86. 
first marriage was annulled, since Lea failed to obtain a judicial decree of   
nullity for her first marriage to Bautista before contracting her second  Under the Civil Code, a void marriage differs from a voidable marriage in 
marriage with Renato.  the following ways: 
1) a void marriage is nonexistent - i.e., there was no marriage from the 
CA reversed and set aside the RTC's Decision and Order and upheld the  beginning - while in a voidable marriage, the marriage is valid until 
validity of the parties' marriage. In reversing the RTC, the CA said that  annulled by a competent court; 
since Lea's marriages were solemnized in 1972 and in 1979, or prior to the  2) a void marriage cannot be ratified, while a voidable marriage can be 
effectivity of the Family Code on 3 August 1988, the Civil Code is the  ratified by cohabitation; 
applicable law since it is the law in effect at the time the marriages were  3) being nonexistent, a void marriage can be collaterally attacked, while a 
celebrated, and not the Family Code. Furthermore, the CA ruled that the  voidable marriage cannot be collaterally attacked; 
Civil Code does not state that a judicial decree is necessary in order to  4) in a void marriage, there is no conjugal partnership and the offspring are 
establish the nullity of a marriage.  natural children by legal fiction, while in voidable marriage there is 
conjugal partnership and the children conceived before the decree of  respondents raised the additional ground of lack of marriage ceremony due
annulment are considered legitimate; and  to Eulogios serious illness which made its performance impossible.
5) "in a void marriage no judicial decree to establish the invalidity is 
necessary," while in a voidable marriage there must be a judicial decree.  In the Answer, petitioner maintained that she and Eulogio lived together as
  husband and wife under one roof for 21 years openly and publicly; hence,
Emphasizing the fifth difference, this Court has held in the cases of People  they were exempted from the requirement of a marriage license. She further
v. Mendoza, People v. Aragon, and Odayat v. Amante, that the Civil Code  contended that the marriage ceremony was performed in the Municipal Hall
contains no express provision on the necessity of a judicial declaration of  of Lal-lo, Cagayan, and solemnized by the Municipal Mayor. As an
nullity of a void marriage.  affirmative defense, she sought the dismissal of the action on the ground that
  it is only the contracting parties while living who can file an action for
It must be emphasized that the enactment of the Family Code rendered the  declaration of nullity of marriage.
rulings in Odayat, Mendoza, and Aragon inapplicable to marriages 
celebrated after 3 August 1988. A judicial declaration of absolute nullity of  ISSUES:
marriage is now expressly required where the nullity of a previous marriage 
is invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage. A second  Whether of or not the heirs may validly file the declaration of nullity of
marriage contracted prior to the issuance of this declaration of nullity is  marriage between Eulogio and Lolita
thus considered bigamous and void. 
RULING:

Enrico vs. Heirs
G.R. No. 173614, September 28, 2007
FACTS:
The heirs of Spouses Eulogio and Trinidad Medinaceli filed with the RTC, an
action for declaration of nullity of marriage of Eulogio and petitioner Lolita
D. Enrico, alleging that Eulogio and Trinidad were married in June 1962 and
begot seven children, herein respondents. On May 1, 2004, Trinidad died. On
August 26, 2004, Eulogio married petitioner before the Municipal Mayor of
Lal-lo, Cagayan without the requisite of a marriage license. Eulogio passed
away six months later. They argued that Article 34 of the Family Code, which
exempts a man and a woman who have been living together for at least five
years without any legal impediment from securing a marriage license, was
not applicable to petitioner and Eulogio. Respondents posited that the
marriage of Eulogio to Trinidad was dissolved only upon the latters death, or
on 1 May 2004, which was barely three months from the date of marriage of
Eulogio to petitioner. Therefore, petitioner and Eulogio could not have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years. To further their cause,
No. Administrative Order No. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, effective March 14,
2003, covers marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines does not
allow it. The marriage of petitioner to Eulogio was celebrated on August 26,
2004 which falls within the ambit of the order. The order declares that a
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed
solely by the husband or the wife. But it does not mean that the compulsory
or intestate heirs are already without any recourse under the law. They can
still protect their successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the
Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders,
compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of
the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity, but upon the death
of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased
spouse filed in the regular courts.
De castro vs De Castro G.R. No. 160172
FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991. They
planned to get married, thus they applied for a marriage license with the
Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City in September 1994. They had their
first sexual relation sometime in October 1994, and had regularly engaged in
sex thereafter. When the couple went back to the Office of the Civil Registrar,
the marriage license had already expired. Thus, in order to push through with
the plan, in lieu of a marriage license, they executed an affidavit dated 13
March 1995 stating that they had been living together as husband and wife
for at least five years. The couple got married on the same date, with Judge
Jose C. Bernabe, presiding judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig
City, administering the civil rites. Nevertheless, after the ceremony, petitioner
and respondent went back to their respective homes and did not live together
as husband and wife.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and respondent is valid.
HELD:
Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal
requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, whereas a defect in any of
the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable. In the instant
case, it is clear from the evidence presented that petitioner and respondent
did not have a marriage license when they contracted their marriage.
Instead, they presented an affidavit stating that they had been living together
for more than five years. However, respondent herself in effect admitted the
falsity of the affidavit when she was asked during cross-examination. The
falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the
formal requisites of marriage. The law dispenses with the marriage license
requirement for a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively
with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of
at least five years before the marriage. The aim of this provision is to avoid
exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant
with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to
the publication of every applicant’s name for a marriage license. In the
instant case, there was no "scandalous cohabitation" to protect; in fact, there
was no cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which petitioner and respondent
executed so they could push through with the marriage has no value
whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt from the
marriage license requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a marriage
license renders their marriage void ab initio.
Mercado vs. Tan
337 SCRA 122
FACTS:
Dr. Vicent Mercado was previously married with Thelma Oliva in 1976 before
he contracted marriage with Consuelo Tan in 1991 which the latter claims
she did not know. Tan filed bigamy against Mercado and after a month the
latter filed an action for declaration of nullity of marriage against Oliva. The
decision in 1993 declared marriage between Mercado and Oliva null and
void.
ISSUE: ​Whether Mercado committed bigamy in spite of filing the declaration
of nullity of the former marriage.
HELD:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a
subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a
subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty
of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by
statute as “void.”
In the case at bar, Mercado only filed the declaration of nullity of his marriage
with Oliva right after Tan filed bigamy case. Hence, by then, the crime had
already been consummated. He contracted second marriage without the
judicial declaration of the nullity. The fact that the first marriage is void from
the beginning is not a defense in a bigamy charge.
ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the
minors BABYLINE NIÑAL, INGRID NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL &
PEPITO NIÑAL, JR., petitioners, v. NORMA BAYADOG,
respondent.
G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000
Facts:
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. She
was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8
months thereafter, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married
without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an
affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a
marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident
After their father’s death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity
of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void
for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that
the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner’s
successional rights.
Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause
of action since they are not among the persons who could file an action for
annulment of marriage under Article 47 of the Family Code.
Issues:
(a) Whether or not Pepito and Norma’ living together as husband and wife
for at least five years exempts them from obtaining a marriage license under
Article 34 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
(b) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in
asking for the declaration of the nullity of marriage of their deceased father,
Pepito G. Niñal, with her specially so when at the time of the filing of this
instant suit, their father Pepito G. Niñal is already dead
Ruling:
(a) On the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband
and wife for five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period
should be computed on the basis of cohabitation as “husband and wife”
where the only missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate
the union. In other words, the five-year common law cohabitation period,
which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a
period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. The
five-year period should be the years immediately before the day the marriage
and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by
exclusivity—meaning no third party was involved at any time within the five
years, and continuity—that is, unbroken. Otherwise, if that five-year
cohabitation period is computed without any distinction as to whether the
parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then
the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have
common law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those
who lived faithfully with their spouse.
(b) The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a
marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not identical. Consequently, void
marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable
marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after
death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if
the marriage had been perfectly valid.
Republic v. Nolasco
G.R. No. 94053, 17 March 1993
FACTS:
Gregorio Nolasco is a seaman. He met Janet Parker, a British, in bar in
England. After that, Janet started living with Nolasco in his ship for six
months. It lasted until the contract of Nolasco expired then he brought her to
his hometown in Antique. They got married in January 1982. Due to another
contract, Nolasco left the province. In 1983, Nolasco received a letter from
his mother informing him that his son had been born but 15 days after, Janet
left. Nolasco went home and cut short his contract to find Janet’s
whereabouts. He did so by securing another seaman’s contract going to
London. He wrote several letters to the bar where they first met but it was all
returned. Gregorio petitioned in 1988 for a declaration of presumptive death
of Janet.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Nolasco had a well-founded belief that his wife, Janet, is
already dead?
RULING:
There are 4 requisites for the declaration of presumptive death under Article
41 of the Family Code:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or
two consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger
of death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is
dead;
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee;
The Supreme Court ruled that Nolasco’s efforts to locate Janet were not
persistent to show that he has a well-founded belief that his wife was already
dead because instead of seeking assistance of local authorities and the
British Embassy, he even secured another contract. More so, while he was in
London, he did not even try to solicit help of the authorities to find his wife.
LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA, complainant, vs. JUDGE FRANCISCO
F. BRILLANTES, JR., respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-92-706 March 29, 1995
Facts:
Lupo Almodiel Atienza filed an administrative case against Judge Brillantes
for Gross Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety. Complainant alleges
that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro, who are living together at a
subdivision in Makati, which he purchased in 1987. One day, he caught the
respondent asleep in his bedroom. He asked the houseboy about him and the
latter said that the judge had been cohabiting with De Castro. Atienza did not
bother to wake up the respondent instead asked the houseboy to take care of
his two children.
After that, the respondent prevented him from visiting his child and has
alienated the affection of his children. The Complainant also claims that the
respondent is married to Zenaida Ongkiko.
The judge denies having been married to Ongkiko because their marriage was
celebrated twice without marriage license, therefore, his marriage to De
Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles, California was because he believed in good
faith and for all legal purposes, that his first marriage was solemnized
without marriage license.
He further argues that Article 40 of the Family Code is not applicable in his
case because his first marriage in 1965 was governed by the Civil Code and
the 2nd relationship was 1991 under the Family Code. No retroactive Effect.
Issue:
Whether or not the absence of marriage license of his previous marriage
justifi3es his act to cohabit with De Castro
Held:
Respondent passed the Bar examinations in 1962 and was admitted to the
practice of law in 1963. At the time he went through the two marriage
ceremonies with Ongkiko, he was already a lawyer. Yet, he never secured any
marriage license. Any law student would know that a marriage license is
necessary before one can get married. Respondent was given an opportunity
to correct the flaw in his first marriage when he and Ongkiko were married
for the second time. His failure to secure a marriage license on these two
occasions betrays his sinister motives and bad faith.
Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage.
Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code, said Article is given
“retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.” This is
particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent
has not shown any vested right that was impaired by the application of
Article 40 to his case.
Republic v. Court of Appeals Molina
G.R. No. 108763, 13 February 1997
FACTS:
Spouses Roridel and Reynaldo Molina were married on April 14, 1985 at the
San Agustin Church in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born.After a
year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of immaturity and irresponsibility
as a husband and a father since he preferred to spend more time with his
peers and friends on whom he squandered his money; that he depended on
his parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in
regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them.
Sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and
since then Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the family; that in
October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of which their
relationship was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job
in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City; that a few weeks
later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned
them.
Reynaldo had shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying
with essential marital obligations and was a highly immature and habitually
quarrelsome individual who thought of himself as a king to be served; and
that it would be to the couples best interest to have their marriage declared
null and void in order to free them from what appeared to be an incompatible
marriage from the start.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
RULING:
No, the marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo subsists and remains valid.
In the case at bar, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were
constitutive of psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage
celebration. While some effort was made to prove that there was a failure to
fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of thoughtfulness and gentleness on Reynaldo’s
part and of being conservative, homely and intelligent on the part of Roridel,
such failure of expectation is not indicative of antecedent psychological
incapacity.
Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, “A marriage contracted by
any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with his obligations of marriage, shall likewise be
void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.”
The following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of
the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and
the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity;
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision;
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the
celebration” of the marriage;
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative
only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex;
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage;
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68
up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision;
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should
be given great respect by our courts;
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be
quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or
opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along
with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for
resolution of the court.
In Leouel Santos v Court of Appeals, this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice
Jose C. Vitug, ruled that “psychological incapacity should refer to no less
than a mental (not physical) incapacity . . . and that (t)here is hardly any
doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
‘psychological incapacity’ to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the
time the marriage is celebrated.” Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former
presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic
Archdiocese of Manila, Justice Vitug wrote that “the psychological incapacity
must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability.”
MARCOS V. MARCOS
Facts
Plaintiff Brenda B. Marcos married Wilson Marcos in 1982 and they had five
children. Alleging that the husband failed to provide material support to the
family and have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, Brenda filed a
case for the nullity of the marriage for psychological incapacity. The RTC
declared the marriage null and void under Art. 36 which was however
reversed by CA.
Issues
Whether personal medical or psychological examination of the respondent by
a physician is a requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity.
Whether the totality of evidence presented in this case show psychological
incapacity.
Held
Psychological incapacity as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage,
may be established by the totality of evidence presented. There is no
requirement, however that the respondent be examined by a physician or a
psychologist as a condition sine qua non for such declaration. Although this
Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to provide material
support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and
abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of
psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his
“defects” were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they
are incurable. Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact
that he had lost his job and was not gainfully employed for a period of more
than six years. It was during this period that he became intermittently drunk,
failed to give material and moral support, and even left the family home.
Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not
to the inception of the marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence
showing that his condition is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully
employed as a taxi driver. In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of
the marriage for failure of the petitioner to show that the alleged
psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence
and incurabilty and for her failure to observe the guidelines as outline in
Republic v. CA and Molina.
Suazo v. Suazo
G.R. No. 164493, 10 March 2010
FACTS:
Angelito Suazo and Jocelyn Suazo were married when they were 16 years
old only. Without any means to support them, they lived with Angelito’s
parents while Jocelyn took odd jobs and Angelito refused to work and were
most of the time drunk. Petitioner urged him to find work but this often
resulted to violent quarrels. A year after their marriage, Jocelyn left Angelito.
Angelito thereafter found another woman with whom he has since lived. 10
years later, she filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under Art.
36 Psychological incapacity. Jocelyn testified on the alleged physical beating
she received. The expert witness corroborated parts of Jocelyn’s testimony.
Both her psychological report and testimony concluded that Angelito was
psychologically incapacitated. However, B was not personally examined by
the expert witness.
The RTC annulled the marriage on the ground that Angelito is unfit to comply
with his marital obligation, such as “immaturity, i.e., lack of an effective sense
of rational judgment and responsibility, otherwise peculiar to infants (like
refusal of the husband to support the family or excessive dependence on
parents or peer group approval) and habitual alcoholism, or the condition by
which a person lives for the next drink and the next drinks” but the CA
reversed it and held that the respondent may have failed to provide material
support to the family and has resorted to physical abuse, but it is still
necessary to show that they were manifestations of a deeper psychological
malaise that was clinically or medically identified.
The theory of the psychologist that the respondent was suffering from an
anti-social personality syndrome at the time of the marriage was not the
product of any adequate medical or clinical investigation. The evidence that
she got from the petitioner, anecdotal at best, could equally show that the
behavior of the respondent was due simply to causes like immaturity or
irresponsibility which are not equivalent to psychological incapacity, or the
failure or refusal to work could have been the result of rebelliousness on the
part of one who felt that he had been forced into a loveless marriage.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is basis to nullify Jocelyn’s marriage with Angelito under
Article 36 of the Family Code.
RULING:
The Court fined the petition devoid of merit. The CA committed no reversible
error of law in setting aside the RTC decision, as no basis exists to declare
Jocelyn’s marriage with Angelito a nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code
and its related jurisprudence.
Jocelyn’s evidence is insufficient to establish Angelito’s psychological
incapacity. The psychologist evaluated Angelito’s psychological condition
only in an indirect manner – she derived all her conclusions from information
coming from Jocelyn whose bias for her cause cannot of course be doubted.
The psychlologist, using meager information coming from a directly
interested party, could not have secured a complete personality profile and
could not have conclusively formed an objective opinion or diagnosis of
Angelito’s psychological condition. While the report or evaluation may be
conclusive with respect to Jocelyn’s psychological condition, this is not true
for Angelito’s. The methodology employed simply cannot satisfy the required
depth and comprehensiveness of examination required to evaluate a party
alleged to be suffering from a psychological disorder. Both the psychologist’s
report and testimony simply provided a general description of Angelito’s
purported anti-social personality disorder, supported by the characterization
of this disorder as chronic, grave and incurable. The psychologist was
conspicuously silent, however, on the bases for her conclusion or the
particulars that gave rise to the characterization she gave. Jurisprudence
holds that there must be evidence showing a link, medical or the like,
between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the
psychological disorder itself. A’s testimony regarding the habitual
drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job, while indicative of
psychological incapacity, do not, by themselves, show psychological
incapacity. All these simply indicate difficulty, neglect or mere refusal to
perform marital obligations.
It is not enough that the respondent, alleged to be psychologically
incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with his marital obligations, or was
unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening
disabling factor – an adverse integral element in the respondent’s personality
structure that effectively incapacitated him from complying with his essential
marital obligations – must be shown. Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the
performance of marital obligations or ill will on the part of the spouse is
different from incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition
or illness; irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves warrant a
finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be
due to a person’s refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations
of marriage.
Psychological Incapacity Case: Lucita Estrella Hernandez, petitioner, v. 
Court of Appeals, and Mario C. Hernandez, respondents, GR No. 126010, 
Dec. 08, 1999 (Second Division) 
Subject: Legal Research 
Topic: Psychological Incapacity  Ruling 
Title: Lucita Estrella Hernandez, petitioner,  (answer to the issue, supported by the court’s reasoning explaining and 
v.  supporting the decision) 
Court of Appeals, and Mario C. Hernandez, respondents,  The petitioner failed to provide evidence proving that the respondent was 
GR No. 126010, Dec. 08, 1999 (Second Division)  psychologically incapacitated. The respondent’s habitual alcoholism, 
Facts  womanizing and cohabitation with those he’s had extra-marital affairs with 
(describe events bet. the parties leading to the litigation, how the case  do not constitute psychological incapacity. Art. 36 of the Family Code 
came before the court that’s now deciding it, who the plaintiff and  requires that incapacity must be psychological, not physical, although the 
defendant are, basis for plaintiff’s suit, ruling whether the court affirmed  manifestations or symptoms are physical. 
or reversed the case)   
Lucita Estrella Hernandez and Mario C. Hernandez were married and had  As for the other claims prayed for by the petitioner, the Court believed 
three children. Lucita, petitioner, filed before the RTC of Tagaytay City a  that those should be litigated in a separate proceeding for legal separation, 
petition for annulment on the ground of psychological incapacity of the  dissolution of property regime, and/or custody of children. 
respondent, Mario. The petitioner claimed that the respondent failed to   
perform his obligation to support the family and contribute to the  Judgment affirmed.  
management of the household. Respondent engaged in drinking sprees,   
gambled and womanized at which came a point that he had an illegitimate  G.R. No. 163209 October 30, 2009
child. 
Spouses Prudencio and Filomena Lim ​vs. ​Ma. Cheryl S. Lim, et. al.
 
Petitioner also added in her petition full custody of her three children, Php  Facts: ​In 1979, Cheryl married Edward, son of petitioners. Cheryl bore Edward three
9,000 monthly financial support for the children, sole ownership of the  children, respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III. Cheryl,
Edward and their children resided at the house of petitioners in Forbes Park, Makati
parcel of land purchased during their marriage as well as of the jeep which 
City, together with Edward’s ailing grandmother, Chua Giak and her husband
private respondent took when he left his family.  Mariano Lim (Mariano). Edward’s family business, which provided him with a
  monthly salary of ​P​6,000, shouldered the family expenses. Cheryl had no steady
source of income.
RTC dismissed the petition. This decision was affirmed by the CA. 
  On October 14, 1990, Cheryl abandoned the Forbes Park residence, bringing the
Issue  children with her (then all minors), after a violent confrontation with Edward whom
she caught with the in-house midwife of Chua Giak in what the trial court described
(WoN, question that the court must decide to resolve, rule of law that 
"a very compromising situation."
governs the dispute) 
Whether or not the respondent was psychologically incapacitated at the  Cheryl, for herself and her children, sued petitioners, Edward, Chua Giak and
Mariano (defendants) in RTC for support. RTC ordered Edward to provide monthly
time of his marriage to the petitioner 
support of ​P​6,000 pendente lite.
 
On January 31, 1996, RTC rendered judgment ordering Edward and petitioners to
"jointly" provide ​P​40,000 monthly support to respondents, with Edward
shouldering ​P​6,000 and petitioners the balance of ​P​34,000 subject to Chua Giak’s
subsidiary liability. The defendants sought reconsideration, questioning their
liability. RTC, while denying reconsideration, clarified that petitioners and Chua
Giak were held jointly liable with Edward because of the latter’s “inability to give
sufficient support”.
Petitioners appealed to the CA assailing, among others, their liability to support
respondents. Petitioners argued that while Edward’s income is insufficient, the law
itself sanctions its effects by providing that legal support should be "in keeping with
the financial capacity of the family" under Article 194 of the Civil Code, as amended
by Executive Order No. 209 (The Family Code of the Philippines).
On April 28, 2003, CA affirmed RTC. Parents and their legitimate children are
obliged to mutually support one another and this obligation extends down to the
legitimate grandchildren and great grandchildren. Should the person obliged to give
support does not have sufficient means to satisfy all claims, the other persons
enumerated in Article 199 in its order shall provide the necessary support. This is
because the closer the relationship of the relatives, the stronger the tie that binds
them. Thus, the obligation to support is imposed first upon the shoulders of the
closer relatives and only in their default is the obligation moved to the next nearer
relatives and so on. CA denied motion for reconsideration.
Issue: ​WON petitioners are concurrently liable with Edward to provide support to
respondents.
Held: ​Yes. Petitioners are liable to provide support but only to their grandchildren.
By statutory and jurisprudential mandate, the liability of ascendants to provide legal
support to their descendants is beyond cavil. Petitioners themselves admit as much –
they limit their petition to the narrow question of when their liability is triggered, not
if they are liable. Relying on provisions found in Title IX of the Civil Code, as
amended, on Parental Authority, petitioners theorize that their liability is activated
only upon ​default​ of parental authority, conceivably either by its termination or
suspension during the children’s minority. Because at the time respondents sued for
support, Cheryl and Edward exercised parental authority over their
children, petitioners submit that the obligation to support the latter’s offspring ends
with them.
Grandchildren cannot demand support directly from their grandparents if they have
parents (ascendants of nearest degree) who are capable of supporting them. This is so
because we have to follow the order of support under Art. 199. There is no showing
that private respondent is without means to support his son; neither is there any
evidence to prove that petitioner, as the paternal grandmother, was willing to
voluntarily provide for her grandson's legal support.
There is no question that Cheryl is unable to discharge her obligation to provide
sufficient legal support to her children, then all school-bound. It is also undisputed
that the amount of support Edward is able to give to respondents, ​P​6,000 a month, is
insufficient to meet respondents’ basic needs. This inability of Edward and Cheryl to
sufficiently provide for their children shifts a portion of their obligation to the
ascendants in the nearest degree, both in the paternal (petitioners) and maternal lines,
following the ordering in Article 199.​1avvphi1
Petitioners’ partial concurrent obligation extends only to their ​desc​ endants as this
word is commonly understood to refer to relatives, by blood of lower degree. As
petitioners’ grandchildren by blood, only respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace
and Mariano III belong to this category. Indeed, Cheryl’s right to receive support
from the Lim family extends only to her husband Edward, arising from their marital
bond. Cheryl’s share from the amount of monthly support RTC awarded cannot be
determined from the records. Thus, we are constrained to remand the case to the trial
court for this limited purpose.
As an alternative proposition, petitioners wish to avail of the option in Article 204 of
the Civil Code, as amended, and pray that they be allowed to fulfill their obligation
by maintaining respondents at petitioners’ Makati residence. The option is
unavailable to petitioners. The application of Article 204 which provides that the
person obliged to give support shall have the option to fulfill the obligation either by
paying the allowance fixed, or by receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling
the person who has a right to receive support. The latter alternative cannot be availed
of in case there is a moral or legal obstacle thereto.
The persons entitled to receive support are petitioners’ grandchildren and
daughter-in-law. Granting petitioners the option in Article 204 will secure to the
grandchildren a well-provided future; however, it will also force Cheryl to return to
the house which, for her, is the scene of her husband’s infidelity.
[CASE DIGEST] Rowena Padilla-Rumbaua vs. Edward Rumbaua 
(G.R. No. 166738, August 14, 2009) 
Date: ​February 13, 2019​Author: ​staredecisis​0 Comments
FACTS: likewise failed to send her greeting cards on special occasions. Edward

Rowena and Edward were childhood neighbors in Dupax del Norte, Nueva indicated as well in his visa application that he was single.

Vizcaya. Sometime in 1987, they met again and became sweethearts but In April 1995, Edward’s mother died. Edward blamed Rowena, associating

Edward’s family did not approve of their relationship. After graduation from his mother’s death to the pain that the discovery of his secret marriage

college in 1991, Edward promised to marry Rowena as soon as he found a brought. Pained by Edward’s action, Rowena severed her relationship with

job. The job came in 1993, when the Philippine Air Lines (​PAL​) accepted Edward. They eventually reconciled through the help of Rowena’s father,

Edward as a computer engineer. Edward proposed to Rowena that they first although they still lived separately.

have a “secret marriage” in order not to antagonize his parents. Rowena In 1997, Edward informed Rowena that he had found a job in Davao. A year

agreed; they were married in Manila on February 23, 1993. Rowena and later, Rowena and her mother went to Edward’s house in Novaliches and

Edward, however, never lived together; Rowena stayed with her sister in found him cohabiting with one Cynthia Villanueva (​Cynthia​). When she

Fairview, Quezon City, while Edward lived with his parents in Novaliches. confronted Edward about it, he denied having an affair with Cynthia. Rowena

Rowena and respondent saw each other every day during the first six apparently did not believe Edwards and moved to to Nueva Vizcaya to

months of their marriage. At that point, Edward refused to live with Rowena recover from the pain and anguish that her discovery brought.

for fear that public knowledge of their marriage would affect his application Rowena filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Edward.

for a PAL scholarship. Seven months into their marriage, the couple’s daily Aside from her oral testimony, the petitioner also presented a certified true

meetings became occasional visits to Rowena’s house in Fairview; they copy of their marriage contract; and the testimony, ​curriculum vitae,​ and

would have sexual trysts in motels. Later that year, Edward enrolled at FEATI psychological report of clinical psychologist Dr. Nedy Lorenzo Tayag (​Dr.

University after he lost his employment with PAL. Tayag)​ .

In 1994, the parties’ respective families discovered their secret marriage. Dr. Tayag declared on the witness stand that she administered the following

Edward’s mother tried to convince him to go to the United States, but he tests on Rowena: a Revised Beta Examination; a Bender Visual Motor

refused. To appease his mother, he continued living separately from Gestalt Test; a Rorschach Psychodiagnostic Test; a Draw a Person Test; a

Rowena. Edward forgot to greet Rowena during her birthday in 1992 and Sach’s Sentence Completion Test; and MMPI. She thereafter prepared a

psychological report with his findings. According to his evaluation, the

character traits of Edward reveal him to suffer Narcissistic Personality her former counsel, Atty. Richard Tabago, and asserts that remanding the

Disorder – declared to be grave, severe and incurable. However, at the end case to the RTC would allow her to cure the evidentiary insufficiencies.

of his findings, Dr. Tayag incorporated his personal idea about love. Love, ISSUES:

according to him, means: a) Whether a remand of the Case to the RTC is improper.

“Love happens to everyone. It is dubbed to be boundless as it goes beyond b) Whether Dr. Tayag’s Report is sufficient to justify the nullification of their

the expectations people tagged with it. In love, “age does matter.” People marriage.

love in order to be secure that one will share his/her life with another and that RULING

he/she will not die alone. Individuals who are in love had the power to let love When the case reached the Supreme Court, it ruled that Rowena failed to

grow or let love die – it is a choice one had to face when love is not the love establish the Edward’s psychological incapacity.

he/she expected.” First, as to the remand of the case to the RTC, the Court said:

The Regional Trial Court nullified the marriage of Rowena and Edward. A remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings amounts to the

The Republic, through the OSG, appealed the RTC decision to the CA. The grant of a new trial that is not procedurally proper at this stage. Section 1 of

CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision, and denied the nullification of Rule 37 provides that an aggrieved party may move the trial court to set

the parties’ marriage. aside a judgment or final order already rendered and to grant a new trial

In its ruling, the CA observed that Dr. Tayag’s psychiatric report did not within the period for taking an appeal. In addition, a motion for new trial may

mention the cause of the Edward’s so-called “narcissistic personality be filed only on the grounds of (1) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable

disorder;” it did not discuss the Edward’s childhood and thus failed to give the negligence that could not have been guarded against by ordinary prudence,

court an insight into the Edward’s developmental years. Dr. Tayag likewise and by reason of which the aggrieved party’s rights have probably been

failed to explain why she came to the conclusion that the Edward’s incapacity impaired; or (2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence,

was “deep-seated” and “incurable.” the aggrieved party could not have discovered and produced at the trial, and

Rowena then went up to the Supreme Court. Among her prayer is the that would probably alter the result if presented.

remanding of the case to the RTC for further reception of evidence. She In the present case, the Rowena cites the inadequacy of the evidence

argues that the inadequacy of her evidence during the trial was the fault of presented by her former counsel as basis for a remand. She did not,
however, specify the inadequacy. That the RTC granted the petition for
declaration of nullity prima facie shows that the Rowena’s counsel had not
been negligent in handling the case. Granting arguendo that the Rowena’s
counsel had been negligent, the negligence that would justify a new trial
must be excusable, i.e. one that ordinary diligence and prudence could not
have guarded against.
As to the findings of Dr. Tayag, the Supreme Court notes that said findings
was based mainly on her assessment of Rowena. The Court states:
We cannot help but note that Dr. Tayag’s conclusions about Edward’s
psychological incapacity were based on the information fed to her by only
one side – Rowena – whose bias in favor of her cause cannot be doubted.
While this circumstance alone does not disqualify the psychologist for
reasons of bias, her report, testimony and conclusions deserve the
application of a more rigid and stringent set of standards in the manner we
discussed above. For, effectively, Dr. Tayag only diagnosed Edward from the
prism of a third party account; she did not actually hear, see and evaluate
Edward and how he would have reacted and responded to the doctor’s
probes.
The Court therefore ruled that:
“We find these observations and conclusions insufficiently in-depth and
comprehensive to warrant the conclusion that a psychological incapacity
existed that prevented Edward from complying with the essential obligations
of marriage. It failed to identify the root cause of Edward’s narcissistic
personality disorder and to prove that it existed at the inception of the
marriage. Neither did it explain the incapacitating nature of the alleged
disorder, nor show that Edward was really incapable of fulfilling his duties
due to some incapacity of a psychological, not physical, nature.
Najera v. Najera
G.R. No. 164817, 3 July 2009
FACTS:
Petitioner filed with the RTC a verified Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage with Alternative Prayer for Legal separation, with Appliction for
Designation as Administrator Pendente Lite of the Conjugal Partnership of
Gains. Petitioner alleged that she and respondent are residents of Bugallon,
Pangasinan, but respondent is presently living in the (United States of
America). They were married but are childless.
Petitioner claimed that at the time of the celebration of marriage, respondent
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of the marriage, and such incapacity became manifest only after
marriage; (1) that respondent was jobless and was not exerting effort to find
a job at the time of marriage; only with the help of petitioner’s elder brother,
who was a seaman, was respondent able to land a job as a seaman; (2) that
while employed as a seaman, respondent did not give petitioner sufficient
financial support); (3) that respondent would quarrel with petitioner and
falsely accuse her of having an affair with another man whenever he came
home, and took to smoking marijuana and drinking; (4) that on July 1, 1994,
while he was quarreling with petitioner, without provocation, he inflicted
physical violence upon her and attempted to kill her with a bolo; and (6) after
the said incident respondent left the family home, taking along all their
personal belongings, and abandoned the petitioner. Petitioner reported the
incident at the police station of Bugallon, Pangasinan.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the totality of petitioner’s evidence was able to prove that
respondent is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage warranting the annulment of their marriage under
Article 1: of the Family Code.
RULING:
No. The evidence presented by petitioner in regard to the physical violence
or grossly abusive conduct toward petitioner and respondent’s abandonment
of petitioner justifiable cause for more than one year are grounds for legal
separation only and not for annulment of marriage under Article 1: of the
Family Code.
Chi Ming Tsoi vs. CA
GR No. 119190, January 16, 1997
FACTS:
Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao Tsoi was married in 1988. After the celebration
of their wedding, they proceed to the house of defendant’s mother. There
was no sexual intercourse between them during their first night and same
thing happened until their fourth night. In an effort to have their honeymoon
in a private place, they went to Baguio but Gina’s relatives went with them.
Again, there was no sexual intercourse since the defendant avoided by
taking a long walk during siesta or sleeping on a rocking chair at the living
room. Since May 1988 until March 1989 they slept together in the same bed
but no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. Because of this, they
submitted themselves for medical examination to a urologist in Chinese
General Hospital in 1989. The result of the physical examination of Gina was
disclosed, while that of the husband was kept confidential even the medicine
prescribed. There were allegations that the reason why Chi Ming Tsoi
married her is to maintain his residency status here in the country. Gina
does not want to reconcile with Chi Ming Tsoi and want their marriage
declared void on the ground of psychological incapacity. On the other hand,
the latter does not want to have their marriage annulled because he loves
her very much, he has no defect on his part and is physically and
psychologically capable and since their relationship is still young, they can
still overcome their differences. Chi Ming Tsoi submitted himself to another
physical examination and the result was there is not evidence of impotency
and he is capable of erection.
ISSUE: ​Whether Chi Ming Tsoi’s refusal to have sexual intercourse with his
wife constitutes psychological incapacity.
HELD:
The abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is
strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder which to the mind of the
Supreme Court clearly demonstrates an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance tot the marriage within the meaning of Article 36 of
the Family Code.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or
her essential marital obligations and the refusal is senseless and constant,
Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity
than to stubborn refusal. Furthermore, one of the essential marital
obligations under the Family Code is to procreate children thus constant
non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity and wholeness
of the marriage
Antonio vs. Reyes
GR No. 155800, March 10, 2006
FACTS:
Leonilo Antonio, 26 years of age, and Marie Ivonne Reyes, 36 years of age
met in 1989. Barely a year after their first meeting, they got married at
Manila City Hall and then a subsequent church wedding at Pasig in
December 1990. A child was born but died 5 months later. Reyes
persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation,
income, educational attainment and other events or things. She even did not
conceal bearing an illegitimate child, which she represented to her husband
as adopted child of their family. They were separated in August 1991 and
after attempt for reconciliation, he finally left her for good in November 1991.
Petitioner then filed in 1993 a petition to have his marriage with Reyes
declared null and void anchored in Article 36 of the Family Code.
ISSUE: ​Whether Antonio can impose Article 36 of the Family Code as basis
for declaring their marriage null and void.
HELD:
Psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations
of marriage as opposed to a mere inability to comply with them. The
petitioner, aside from his own testimony presented a psychiatrist and clinical
psychologist who attested that constant lying and extreme jealousy of Reyes
is abnormal and pathological and corroborated his allegations on his wife’s 1) Delia and Domingo married on November 29, 1976; 
behavior, which amounts to psychological incapacity. Respondent’s fantastic
ability to invent, fabricate stories and letters of fictitious characters enabled
2)  Later  on  found  out,  without  the  knowledge  of Delia, Domingo had 
her to live in a world of make-believe that made her psychologically
a  previous  marriage  with  Emerina  dela  Paz  on  April  25,  1969  which 
incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and significance
marriage is valid and still existing; 
to her marriage. The root causes of Reyes’ psychological incapacity have
been medically or clinically identified that was sufficiently proven by experts.
The gravity of respondent’s psychological incapacity was considered so 3)  She  came  to  know  of  the  prior  marriage  only  sometime  in  1983 
grave that a restrictive clause was appended to the sentence of nullity when Emerina sued them for bigamy; 
prohibited by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal from contracting
marriage without their consent. It would be difficult for an inveterate
pathological liar to commit the basic tenets of relationship between spouses 4) Since 1979, respondent Delia has been working in Saudi Arabia and 
based on love, trust and respect. Furthermore, Reyes’ case is incurable is  only  able  to  stay  in  the  Philippines  when  she  would  avail  of  the 
considering that petitioner tried to reconcile with her but her behavior remain one-month annual vacation leave granted by her employer; 
unchanged.
Hence, the court conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action 5)  Roberto has been unemployed and completely dependent upon her 
for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code. for support and subsistence; 

DOMINGO VS. COURT OF APPEALS  6)Her  personal  properties  amounting  to  P350,000.00  are  under  the 
possession  of  Roberto,  who  disposed  some  of  the  said  properties 
without her knowledge and consent; 
226 SCRA 572 

7)  While  Delia  was  on  her  vacation,  she  discovered  that  he  was 
Petitioner: Roberto Domingo  cohabiting with another woman. 

Respondents: Court of Appeals and Delia Soledad Avera  Petitioner  filed  a  Motion  to  Dismiss  on  the  ground  that  the 
declaration  of  their  marriage,  which  is  void  ab  initio,  is  superfluous 
Ponente: J. Romero  and  unnecessary.  He  further  suggested  that  private  respondent 
should  have  filed  an  ordinary  civil  action  for  the  recovery  of  the 
properties alleged to have been acquired by their union. 
FACTS: 

RTC and CA dismissed the petitioner’s motion for lack of merit. 

Private  respondent  Delia  Soledad  A.  Domingo  filed  the  petition  On 
May  29,  1991,  entitled  “Declaration  of  Nullity  of  Marriage  and 
Separation  of  Property”  against  Roberto  Domingo.  The  petition,  ISSUES: 
which was filed before Pasig RTC, alleged the following: 
1) Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage  marriage to Leni. Afterwards, he filed an amended complaint for the
is  necessary.  (If  in  the  affirmative,  whether  the  same  should  be  filed  declaration of nullity of their marriage based on psychological incapacity.
only for purpose of remarriage.)  The case went to trial and the trial court further held that Alfonso presented
quantum evidence that Leni needs to controvert for the dismissal of the case.
Alfonso claimed that Leni charged him with perjury, concubinage and
2)  Whether  or  not  the  petition  entitled  “Declaration  of  Nullity  of 
deportation which shows latter’s psychological incapacity because according
Marriage  and Separation of Property” is the proper remedy of private 
to him it clearly showed that his wife not only wanted him behind bars but
respondent  to  recover  certain  real  and  personal  properties  allegedly 
also to banish outside the country.
belonging to her exclusively. 
ISSUE: ​Whether or not Alfonso Chua presented quantum evidence for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage with Leni on the ground of psychological
HELD:  incapacity.
HELD:
The court held that documents presented by Alfonso during the trial of the
1)  Yes.  The  nullification  of  a  marriage  for  the  purpose  of  contracting  case do not in any way show the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife.
another  cannot  be  accomplished  merely  on  the  basis  of  the  The evidence was insufficient and shows grave abuse of discretion bordering
perception  of  both  parties  or  of  one  that  their  union  is  defective.  on absurdity. Alfonso testified and complained about three aspects of Leni’s
Were  this  so,  this  inviolable  social  institution  would  be  reduced  to  a  personality namely lack of attention to children, immaturity, and lack of an
mockery and would rest on a very shaky foundation.  intention of procreative sexuality and none of these three, singly or
collectively, constitutes psychological incapacity.
On  the  other  hand,  the clause “on the basis solely of a final judgment  Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical
declaring  such  marriage  void”  in  Article  40  of  the  Code  denotes  that  antecedence, and incurability. It must be more than just a difficulty, a refusal
such  final  judgment  declaring  the  previous  marriage  void is not only  or a neglect in the performance of marital obligations. A mere showing of
for purpose of remarriage.  irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities does not constitute
psychological incapacity.
Furthermore, the testimonial evidence from other witnesses failed to identify
2)  Yes.  The  prayer  for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may  and prove root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity. It just
be  raised  together  with  the  other  incident  of  their  marriage  such  as  established that the spouses had an incompatibility or a defect that could
the  separation  of  their  properties.  The  Family  Code  has  clearly  possibly be treated or alleviated through psychotherapy. The totality of
provided  the  effects  of  the  declaration  of  nullity  of  marriage,  one  of  evidence presented was completely insufficient to sustain a finding of
which  is  the  separation  of  property  according  to  the  regime  of  psychological incapacity more so without any medical, psychiatric or
property relations governing them.  psychological examination.

Hence, SC denied the instant petition. CA’s decision is affirmed  Bobis v. Bobis

G.R. No. 138509, 31 July 2000

Choa vs. Choa
GR No. 1473376, November 26, 2002
FACTS: FACTS:
Leni Choa and Alfonso Choa got married in 1981. They have 2 children
namely Cheryl Lynne and Albryan. In 1993, Alfonso filed an annulment of his
On October 21, 1985, respondent contracted a first marriage with one Maria
Dulce B. Javier. Without the said marriage been annulled, nullified or
terminated, the same respondent contracted a second marriage with
petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis on January 25, 1996 and allegedly a third
marriage with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez. Based on petitioner’s
complaint- affidavit, information for bigamy was filed against respondent.
Sometime thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for the judicial
declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage on the ground that it was
celebrated without a marriage license.
would not erase the fact that respondent entered into a second marriage
during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is
not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a
prejudicial question.
Tenebro v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 150758, 18 February 2004

FACTS:
ISSUE:

Veronico Tenebro contracted marriage with Leticia Ancajas in 1990. The two
Whether the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a
lived together continuously and without interruption until the later part of
previous marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal case for
1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married
bigamy
to a certain Hilda Villareyes in 1986. Petitioner thereafter left the conjugal
dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit
RULING:
with Villareyes. In 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage with a
certain Nilda Villegas. Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against
No. The subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a
petitioner. Villegas countered that his marriage with Villareyes cannot be
previous marriage does not constitute a prejudicial question to a criminal
proven as a fact there being no record of such. He further argued that his
case for bigamy.
second marriage, with Ancajas, has been declared void ab initio due to
psychological incapacity. Hence he cannot be charged for bigamy.
A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of which is
a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein. It is a question based on a
ISSUE:
fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it
that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. Its two essential
Whether or not Tenebro can use psychological incapacity as ground for
elements are: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related
absolution of bigamy case against him.
to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
RULING:

In Article 40 of the Family Code, respondent, without first having obtained the
No. In invoking Article 36 of the Family Code, petitioner failed to realize that a
judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage, cannot be said to have
declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
validly entered into the second marriage. In the current jurisprudence, a
psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the State’s
marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration of such fact before any
penal laws are concerned
party can marry again; otherwise the second marriage will also be void. The
reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is
presumed to be subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent was for all legal The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of
intents and purposes regarded as a married man at the time he contracted psychological incapacity does not retroact to the date of the celebration of
his second marriage with petitioner. Any decision in the civil action for nullity the marriage insofar as the Philippines’ penal laws are concerned. As such,
an individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of a valid marriage is criminally liable for bigamy,
notwithstanding the subsequent declaration that the second marriage is void
ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.

The prosecution was able to establish the validity of the first marriage. As a
second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of
petitioner’s valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas
would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of petitioner’s
psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage contracted during the
subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this
second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal
liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code
criminalizes “any person who shall contract a second or subsequent
marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before
the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment rendered in the proper proceedings”. A plain reading of the law,
therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of
contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a
valid marriage.