G.R. No.
L-30736 April 14, 1975 jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff the
LIRAG TEXTILE MILLS, INC. and FELIX
K. LIRAG, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and CRISTAN
ALCANTARA, respondents.
A. O. Benitez for petitioners.
Rosauro Alvarez for private respondent.
FACTS
Petitioners Lirag Textile Mills, Inc. and Felix
K. Lirag seek a review by certiorari of the
decision of the respondent Court of Appeals
in its C. A. G.R. No. 33116-R, entitled
"Cristan Alcantara, plaintiff-appellee vs.
Lirag Textile Mills, Inc. and Felix Lirag,
defendants-appellants", which affirmed
with costs against the appellants the
decision dated September 19, 1963, of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal (Branch VI)
in its Civil Case No. 6884, in favor of
respondent Cristan Alcantara (plaintiff in
Civil Case No. 6884 and appellee in C. A.
G.R. No. 33116-R), which provides as
follows:
However, as he (respondent Cristan
Alcantara) was dismissed without cause in
violation of the contract of employment,
and as he was at the time earning P500.00
monthly, the Court finds, and so adjudges,
that he is entitled to recover from
defendants as actual damages the sum of
P12,500.00 representing his salaries for 25
months ending September 22, 1963, plus
the sum of P500.00 monthly thereafter
until the whole amounts due him are fully
paid and settled by defendants. As to moral
damages claimed, the Court finds that,
considering the circumstances of the case
and there being no justification and/or
cause for his removal or dismissal, he is
entitled to recover from defendants moral
damages in the sum of P5,000.00 plus
attorney's fees in the sum of P3,000.00.
In view of the foregoing, judgment is
hereby rendered sentencing defendants,
amounts above set forth, plus the costs of
this suit. It is so ordered.
ISSUE
The main thrust of petitioners' contention
is that an employer's liability for
terminating without just cause the
employment of an employee is governed by
the provisions of Republic Act 1787,
amending Republic Act 1052, which limits
said liability as follows:
Sec. 1. In case of employment without a
definite period, in a commercial, industrial,
or agricultural establishment or enterprise,
the employer ... may terminate at any time
the employment with just cause, or without
just cause ... or in the case of an employer,
by serving such notice to the employee at
least one month in advance or one half
month for every year of service of the
employee, whichever is longer, ....
The emloyee, upon whom no such notice
was served in case of termination of
employment without just cause shall be
entitled to compensation from the date of
termination of his employment in an
amount equivalent to his salaries or wages
corresponding to the required period of
notice. (Republic Act 1787) (Emphasis
supplied) .
The fatal defect of petitioner's argument is
that the above quoted provision of the law
does not and cannot apply to an employer-
employee relationship with an express
contract for a period of employment.
HELD
The foregoing finding shows without the
slightest doubt that it was petitioner Felix
Lirag who induced private respondent
Alcantara to resign from his permanent
position in the Philippine Chamber of
Industries and accept, the job offered to
him by the petitioner Felix Lirag in the
petitioner Lirag Textile Mills, Inc. The
respondent Appellate Court was also
convinced that private respondent
Alcantara did his best to contact petitioner
Felix Lirag so he could remonstrate against
his unjust separation from the service, but
he was not able to do so; hence the
conclusion of the respondent Court that
petitioner Felix Lirag should also be held
liable for moral damages.
It is clear that petitioner Lirag Textile Mills,
Inc. violated the contract of employment
with private respondent Alcantara when
the former terminated his services without
a valid cause. The act was attended with
bad faith and deceit because said petitioner
made false allegations of a supposed valid
cause knowing them to be false, thus
making itself liable for payment of actual,
moral and exemplary damages, plus
attorneys fees to private respondent
Alcantara. Petitioner Lirag Textile Mills, Inc.
cannot with impunity be allowed the
absolute and unilateral power to terminate
without valid cause a contract of
employment with a definite period it
voluntarily entered into merely on the basis
of its whim or caprice and under the false
pretense of financial distress. To
countenance its wrongful act would be to
place its employees in the disadvantageous
position of not being able to protect
themselves from the arbitrary, oppressive
and wrongful acts of an economically
powerful employer. The laudable ends of
social justice would not be served in that
manner, especially in the era of a
compassionate society. Petitioner Felix
Lirag should also be held liable to private
respondent Alcantara for having induced
the latter to leave a permanent position in
the Philippine Chamber of Industries to
accept a job in the Lirag Textile Mills, Inc.,
and when private respondent Alcantara
was dismissed without any valid cause,
petitioner Felix Lirag did not do anything to
help him although he was in a position to
do so by reason of his eminent position in
the petitioner corporation. His
responsibility is not only moral but also
legal as under Art. 21 of the Civil Code:
"Any person who willfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good custom or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage." .
WHEREFORE, the decision of the
respondent Court of Appeals is affirmed
with costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
MARILOU T. GONZALES, respondents.
Public Attorney's Office for petitioner.
Corleto R. Castro for private respondent.
FACTS:
Petitioner was a medicine student at
Lyceum Northwestern Colleges at Dagupan
City. He was
an Iranian exchange student and was 29
years old. Respondent was a former
waitress on a luncheonette, and was 22
years old. Petitioner was allegedly the lover
of the respondent, and was said to promise
marriage to the latter, which convinced her
to live with him in his apartment. It was
even alleged that the petitioner went to the
house of the respondent to inform her
family about the marriage on the end of the
semester. However, the marriage did not
materialize, with several beatings and
maltreatment experienced by the
respondent from the petitioner.
The case was filed in the RTC of
Pangasinan, and the decision was held in
favor of the respondent. However, the
petitioner claimed that the judgment of the
RTC was an error, for the claims of the
respondent are not true, and that he did
not know about the custom of the Filipinos;
his acts were in accordance of his custom.
The decision of the RTC was affirmed in
toto by the Court of Appeals. Hence, the
petitioner filed an appeal to the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent could claim
payment for the damages incurred by the
petitioner.
RULING:
Mere breach of marriage is not punishable
by law. However, since the respondent was
proved to have a good moral character, and
that she had just let her virginity be taken
away by the petitioner since
the latter offered a promise of marriage,
then she could ask for payment for
damages. Furthermore, since she let her
lover, the petitioner, “deflowered” her since
she believed that his promise to marry was
true, and not due to her carnal desire, then
she could have her claims against the
petitioner. Moreover, the father of the
respondent had already looked for pigs and
chicken for the marriage reception and the
sponsors for the marriage, and then
damages were caused by the petitioner
against the respondents, which qualified
the claims of the respondent against the
petitioner.
G.R. No. 140420 February 15, 2001
SERGIO AMONOY, petitioner,
vs.
Spouses JOSE GUTIERREZ and
ANGELA FORNIDA, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Damnum absque injuria. Under this
principle, the legitimate exercise of a
person's rights, even if it causes loss to
another, does not automatically result in
an actionable injury. The law does not
prescribe a remedy for the loss. This
principle does not, however, apply when
there is an abuse of a person's right, or
when the exercise of this right is
suspended or extinguished pursuant to a
court order. Indeed, in the availment of
one's rights, one must act with justice,
give their due, and observe honesty and
good faith
FACTS
The appellate court narrated the factual
antecedents of this case as follows:
"This case had its roots in Special
Proceedings No. 3103 of Branch I of the CFI
of Pasig, Rizal, for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased Julio Cantolos,
involving six(6) parcels of land situated in
Tanay Rizal. Amonoy was the counsel of
therein Francisca Catolos, Agnes Catolos,
Asuncion Pasamba and Alfonso Formida.
On 12 January 1965, the Project of
Partition submitted was approved and xxx
two (2) of the said lots were adjudicated to
Asuncion Pasamba and Alfonso Formilda.
The Attorney's fees charged by Amonoy
was P27,600.00 and on 20 January 1965
Asuncion Pasamba and Alfonso Formida
executed a deed of real estate mortgage on
the said two (2) lots adjudicated to them,
in favor of Amonoy to secure the payment
of his attorney's fees. But it was only on 6
August 1969 after the taxes had been paid,
the claims settled and the properties
adjudicated, that the estate was declared
closed and terminated.
"Asuncion Pasamba died on 24 February
1969 while Alfonso Fornilda passsed away
on 2 July 1969. Among the heirs of the
latter was his daughter, plaintiff-appellant
Angela Gutierrez.
"Because his Attorney's fess thus secured
by the two lots were not paid, on 21
January 1970 Amonoy filed for their
foreclosure in Civil Code4 No. 12726
entitled Sergio Amonoy vs. Heirs of
Asuncion Pasamba and Heirs of Alfonso
Fornilda before the CFI of Pasig, Rizal, and
this was assigned to Branch VIII. The heirs
opposed, contending that the attorney's
fees charged [were] unconscionable and
that the attorney's fees charged [were]
unconscionable and that the agreed sum
was only P11,695.92. But on 28 September
1972 judgment was rendered in favor of
Amonoy requiring the heirs to pay within
90 days the P27,600.00 secured by the
mortgage, P11,880.00 as value of the
harvests, and P9,645.00 as another round
of attorney's fees. Failing in that, the two
(2) lots would be sold at public auction.
"They failed to pay. On 6 February 1973,
the said lots were foreclosed and on 23
March 1973 the auction sale was held
where Amonoy was the highest bidder at
P23,760.00. On 2 May 1973 his bid was
judicially confirmed. A deficiency was
claimed and to satisfy it another execution
sale was conducted, and again the highest
bidder was Amonoy at P12,137.50.
"Included in those sold was the lot on which
the Gutierrez spouses had their house.
"More than a year after the Decision in Civil
Code No. 12726 was rendered, the said
decedent's heirs filed on 19 December
1973 before the CFI of Pasig, Rixal[,] Civil
case No. 18731 entitled Maria Penano, et al
vs. Sergio Amonoy, et al, a suit for the
annulment thereof. The case was dismissed
by the CFI on 7 November 1977, and this
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on 22
July 1981.
"Thereafter, the CFI on 25 July 1985 issued
a Writ of Possession and pursuant to which
a notice to vacate was made on 26 August
1985. On Amonoy's motion of 24 April
1986, the Orders of 25 April 1986 and 6
May 1986 were issued for the demolition of
structures in the said lots, including the
house of the Gutierrez spouses.
"On 27 September 1985 the petition
entitled David Fornilda, et al vs Branch 164
RTC Ivth Pasig, Deputy Sheriff Joaquin
Antonil and Atty. Sergio Amonoy, G.R. No.
L-72306, was filed before the Supreme
Court. Among the petitioners was the
plaintiff-appellant Angela Gutierrez. On a
twin musiyun (Mahigpit na Musiyon Para
Papanagutin Kaugnay ng
Paglalapastangan) with full titles as fanciful
and elongated as
their Petisyung (Petisyung Makapagsuri
Taglay and Pagpigil ng Utos), a temporary
restraining order was granted on 2 June
1986 enjoining the demolition of the
petitioners' houses.
"Then on 5 October 1988 a Decision was
rendered in the said G.R. No. L-72306
disposing that:
"WHEREFORE, Certiorari is granted; the
Order of respondent Trial Court, dated 25
July 1985, granting a Writ of Possession, as
well as its Orderd, dated 25 April 1986 and
16 May 1986, directing and authorizing
respondent Sheriff to demolish the houses
of petitioners Angela and Leocadia Fornilda
are hereby ordered returned to petitioners
unless some of them have been conveyed
to innocent third persons."5
But by the time the Supreme Court
promulgated the abovementioned
Decision, respondents' house had already
been destroyed, supposedly in accordance
with a Writ of Demolition ordered by the
lower court.
Thus, a Complaint for damages in
connection with the destruction of their
house was filed by respondents against
petitioner before the RTC on December 15,
1989.
In its January 27, 1993 Decision, the RTC
dismissed respondents' suit. On appeal, the
CA set aside the lower court's ruling and
ordered petitioner to pay respondents
P250,000 as actual damages. Petitioner
then filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
which was also denied.
ISSUE
In his Memorandum,7 petitioner submits
this lone issue for our consideration:
"Whether or not the Court of Appeals was
correct was correct in deciding that the
petition [was] liable to the respondents for
damages."8
RULING
The Petition has no merit.
Well-settled is the maxim that damage
resulting from the legitimate exercise of a
person's rights is a loss without
injury- damnum absque injuria - for which
the law gives no remedy.9 In other words,
one who merely exercises one's rights does
no actionable injury and cannot be held
liable for damages.
Petitioner invokes this legal precept in
arguing that he is not liable for the
demolition of respondents' house. He
maintains that he was merely acting in
accordance with the Writ of Demolition
ordered by the RTC.
We reject this submission. Damnum
absque injuria finds no application to this
case.
True, petitioner commenced the demolition
of respondents' house on May 30, 1986
under the authority of a Writ of Demolition
issued by the RTC. But the records show
that a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO),
enjoining the demolition of respondents'
house, was issued by the Supreme Court
on June 2, 1986. The CA also found, based
on the Certificate of Service of the Supreme
Court process server, that a copy of the
TRO was served on petitioner himself on
June 4, 1986.
Petitioner, howeverm, did not heed the
TRO of this Court. We agree with the CA
that he unlawfully pursued the demolition
of respondents' house well until the middle
of 1987. This is clear from Respondent
Angela Gutierrez's testimony.
The foregoing disproves the claim of
petitioner that the demolition, which
allegedly commenced only on May 30,
1986, was completed the following day. It
likewise belies his allegation that the
demolitions had already ceased when he
received notice of the TRO.
Although the acts of petitioner may have
been legally justified at the outsset, their
continuation after the issuance of the TRO
amounted to an insidious abuse of his right.
Indubitably, his actions were tainted with
bad faith. Had he not insisted on
completing the demolition, respondents
would not have suffered the loss that
engendered the suit before the RTC. Verily,
his acts constituted not only an abuse of a
right, but an invalid exercise of a right that
had been suspended when he received
thae TRO from this Court on June 4, 1986.
By then he was no longer entitled to
proceed with the demolition.
A commentator on this topic explains:
"The exercise of a right ends when the right
disappears, and it disappears when it is
abused, especially to the prejudice of
others. The mask of a right without the
spirit of justcie which gives it life, is
repugnant to the modern concept of social
law. It cannot be said that a person
exercises a right when he unnecessarily
prejudices another xxx. Over and above
the specific precepts of postive law are the
supreme norms of justice xxx; and he who
violates them violates the law. For this
reason it is not permissible to abuse our
rights to prejudice others."12
Likewise, in Albenson Enterprises Corp. v.
CA,13 the Court discussed the concept of
abuse of rights as follows:
"Artilce 19, known to contain what is
commonly referred to as the principle of
abuse of rights, sets certain standards
which may be observed not only in the
exercise of one's rights but also in the
performance of one's duties.These
standards are the following: to act with
justice; to give everyone his due;
recognizes the primordial limitation on all
rights: that in their exercise, the norms of
human conduct set forth in Article 19 and
results in damage to another, a legal wrong
is thereby committed for which the
wrongdoer must be held responsible xxx."
Clearly then, the demolition of
respondents' house by petitioner, despite
his receipt of the TRO, was not only an
abuse but also an unlawful exercise of such
right. In insisting on his alleged right, he
wantonly violated this Court's Order and
wittingly caused the destruction of
respondents; house.1âwphi1.nêt
Obviously, petitioner cannot
invoke damnum absque injuria, a principle
premised on the valid exercise of a
right.14Anything less or beyond such
exercise will not give rise to the legal
protection that the principle accords. And
when damage or prejudice to another is
occasioned thereby, liability cannot be
obscured, much less abated.
In the ultimate analysis, petitioner's
liability is premised on the obligation to
repair or to make whole the damage
caused to another by reason of one's act or
omission, whether done intentionally or
negligently and whether or not punishable
by law.15
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and
the appealed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
ROGELIO BAYOTAS y
CORDOVA, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-
appellant.
FACTS
Rogelio Bayotas, accused and charged with
Rape, died on February 4, 1992 due
to cardio respiratory arrest. The Solicitor
General then submitted a comment stating
that the death of the accused does not
excuse him from his
civil liability (supported by the Supreme
Court’s decision in People vs
Sendaydiego). On the other hand,
the counsel of the accused claimed that in
the Supreme Court’s decision in People vs
Castillo, civil liability is extinguished if
accused should die before the
final judgement is rendered.
ISSUE
Whether or not the death of the accused
pending appeal of his conviction extinguish
his civil liability.
RULING
The Court decided on this case through
stating the cases of Castillo and
Sendaydiego. In the Castillo case, the
Court said that civil liability is extinguished
only when death of the
accused occurred before the
final judgement. Judge Kapunan further
stated that civil liability is extinguished
because there will be “no party defendant”
in the case. There will be no civil liability if
criminal liability does not exist. Further,
the Court stated “it is, thus, evident that…
the rule established was that the survival
of the civil liability depends on whether the
same can be predicated on the sources
of obligations other than delict.
In the Sendaydiego case, the Court issued
Resolution of July 8, 1977 where it states
that civil liabilitywill only survive if death
came after the final judgement of the CFI
of Pangasinan. However, Article 30 of the
Civil Code could not possibly lend support
to the ruling in Sendaydiego.
Civil liability ex delicto is extinguished by
the death of the accused while his
conviction is on appeal. The Court also
gave a summary on which cases should
civil liability be extinguished, to wit:
Death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction extinguishes his
criminal liability as well as the
civil liability based solely thereon.
Therefore, Bayotas’s death extinguished
his criminal and civil liability based solely
on the act complained of.
G.R. No. 96740 March 25, 1999
VIRGINIA P. SARMIENTO and
APOLONIA P. CATIBAYAN, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SIMON
ARGUELLES, respondents.
FACTS
Virginia P. Sarmiento and Apolonia P.
Catibayan, the petitioners herein, filed a
complain for partition of a piece of land,
more particularly described as Lot No. 926
of the Naic Estate, G.L.R.O., Record No.
8340, in Naic, Cavite, with an area of 1,779
square meters, covered by TCT No. 21877
issued on September 1, 1941 to co-owners,
Francisco Arguelles and Petrona Reyes.
Petitioners are sisters, their parents being
Tiburcio Pangilinan and Leogarda
Arguelles, who died in 1946. Leogarda was
the daughter of Francisco Arguelles who
died on February 18, 1949 and Emilia
Pineli, who died on May 2, 1950. Private
respondent Simon Arguelles is a half
brother of Leogarda, with Francisco
Arguelles as their common father.
Petitioners claim that as granddaughters of
Francisco Arguelles, they and private
respondent Simon Arguelles are co-owners
of the 1/2 portion of Lot No. 926, as the
only heirs of the late Francisco Arguelles.
But according to private respondent,
petitioners are not the legal heirs of
Francisco Arguelles because their
(petitioners') mother, Leogarda Arguelles,
was allegedly an illegitimate child of his
father, Francisco Arguelles, and Emilia
Pineli who were not married. Under the old
Civil Code, which should be applied since
Francisco Arguelles died in 1949, before
the effectivity of the New Civil Code, an
illegitimate child did not have successional
rights.
ISSUE
whether or not the petitioners offered
sufficient evidence to substantiate their
submission that Francisco Arguelles and
Emilia Pineli were legally married.
RULING
Guided by the aforecited provision of law,
the trial court ratiocinated:
The fact that no marriage certificate of
Francisco Arguelles and Emilia Pineli was
submitted in evidence does not lead to the
conclusion that the said parties were not
legally married and that Leogarda was their
illegitimate child. The defendant admitted
that his father and Emilia Pineli lived and
cohabited together as husband and wife,
even staying in the same house were he
was also residing. The presumption is that
'A man and woman deporting themselves
as husband and wife have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage (sic) (Sec.
5(bb), Rule 131, Rules of Court). 10 Every
intendment of law or facts leans toward the
validity of marriage and the legitimacy of
children (Art. 220, Civil Code). In this case,
no evidence was adduced by defendant
Arguelles to rebut this presumption.
Neither did he attempt to show that
Francisco and Emilia could not validity
marry each other because of some legal
impediments to their marriage.11
While it is true that Francisco Arguelles and
Emilia Pineli cohabited as husband and
wife, private respondent Simon Arguelles
testified that the said cohabitation was
without the benefit of marriage. In People
vs. Borromeo 12, this Court held that
persons living together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, absent any
counter presumption or evidence special to
the case, to be in fact married. 13
In the case under consideration, the
presumption of marriage, on which the trial
court premised its decision, has been
sufficiently offset. 14 Records reveal that
petitioners tried to justify the non-
presentation of the marriage certificate of
Francisco and Emilia by submitting a
certification issued by Assistant Treasurer
Lucila Lucero of Naic, Cavite, to the effect
that:
the Marriage Certificate of Francisco
Arguelles married to Emilia Pineli on the
18th day of August, 1918 at Naic, Cavite,
is no longer available due to destruction of
the records during the Japanese
occupation, and as such no certified copy
of Marriage could be issued to the parties
concerned.15
Consequently, with the presumption of
marriage sufficiently overcome, the onus
probandi of the private respondent shifted
to the petitioners. It then became the
burden of the petitioners, Virginia P.
Sarmiento and Apolonia P. Catibayan, to
prove that their deceased grandparents,
Francisco Arguelles and Emilia Pineli, were
legally married.
In Trinidad vs. Court of Appeals, et a1. 20,
this Court ruled that as proof of marriage
may be presented: a) testimony of a
witness to the matrimony; b) the couple's
public and open cohabitation as husband
and wife after the alleged wedlock; c) the
birth and baptismal certificate of children
born during such union; and d) the mention
of such nuptial in subsequent documents.
Pertinent records show that the petitioners
failed to substantiate their theory that
Francisco Arguelles and Emilia Pineli were
married. What is more, the available
records of marriage contradict the
allegation that Francisco Arguelles and
Emilia Pineli were legally married. But
petitioners, to whom the burden of proving
the fact of marriage shifted, did not present
anybody who witnessed the marriage
ceremony of Francisco Arguelles and Emilia
Pineli.
Evidently, petitioners relied mainly on the
legal presumption that Francisco Arguelles
and Emilia Pineli were married, without
introducing any evidence to prove the
marriage theorized upon.
In a belated attempt to establish the
legitimacy of Leogarda Arguelles,
petitioners have theorized for the first time,
in the present Petition, that the birth
certificate 22 of Leogarda Arguelles which
they allegedly presented during the trial
below, shows the legitimate status of
Leogarda Arguelles. 23 Concededly, such
birth certificate may be used to show the
alleged marriage. But be that as it may, the
totality of evidence for the private
respondent preponderates over
petitioners'. Preponderant evidence means
that, as a whole, the evidence adduced by
one side outweighs that of the adverse
party. 24 Compared with the evidence
introduced by the private respondent,
petitioners rely heavily on the legal
presumption of marriage which, as earlier
pointed out, has been effectively rebutted.
We are concluded by the factual findings of
the Court of Appeals.
Premises studiedly considered, we are of
the ineluctable conclusion, and so hold,
that the Court of Appeals erred not in
reversing the decision of the Regional Trial
Court a quo.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and
the assailed Decision, dated October 26,
1989, and Resolution, dated January 4,
1991, of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 72964 January 7, 1988
FILOMENO URBANO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FACTS
On October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno
Urbano was on his way to his ricefield. He
found the place where he stored palay
flooded with water coming from the
irrigation canal. Urbano went to the
elevated portion to see what happened,
and there he saw Marcelino Javier and
Emilio Efre cutting grass. Javier admitted
that he was the one who opened the canal.
A quarrel ensued, and Urbano hit Javier on
the right palm with his bolo, and again on
the leg with the back of the bolo. On
October 27, 1980, Urbano and Javier had
an amicable settlement. Urbano paid P700
for the medical expenses of Javier. On
November 14, 1980, Urbano was rushed to
the hospital where he had lockjaw and
convulsions. The doctor found the condition
to be caused by tetanus toxin which
infected the healing wound in his palm. He
died the following day. Urbano was charged
with homicide and was found guilty both by
the trial court and on appeal by the Court
of Appeals. Urbano filed a motion for new
trial based on the affidavit of the Barangay
Captain who stated that he saw the
deceased catching fish in the shallow
irrigation canals on November 5. The
motion was denied; hence, this petition.
ISSUE
Whether the wound inflicted by Urbano to
Javier was the proximate cause of the
latter’s death
HELD
A satisfactory definition of proximate cause
is... "that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury, and without which the result would
not have occurred."And more
comprehensively, "the proximate legal
cause is that acting first and producing the
injury, either immediately or by setting
other events in motion, all constituting a
natural and continuous chain of events,
each having a close causal connection with
its immediate predecessor, the final event
in the chain immediately effecting the
injury as a natural and probable result of
the cause which first acted, under such
circumstances that the person responsible
for the first event should, as an ordinarily
prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the
moment of his act or default that an injury
to some person might probably result
therefrom."
If the wound of Javier inflicted by the
appellant was already infected by tetanus
germs at the time, it is more medically
probable that Javier should have been
infected with only a mild cause of tetanus
because the symptoms of tetanus
appeared on the 22nd dayafter the hacking
incident or more than 14 days after the
infliction of the wound. Therefore,
the onset time should have been more than
six days. Javier, however, died on the
second day from theonset time. The more
credible conclusion is that at the time
Javier's wound was inflicted by the
appellant, the severe form of tetanus that
killed him was not yet present.
Consequently, Javier's wound could have
been infected with tetanus after the
hacking incident. Considering the
circumstance surrounding Javier's death,
his wound could have been infected by
tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22
days before he died.
The rule is that the death of the victim must
be the direct, natural, and logical
consequence of the wounds inflicted upon
him by the accused. And since we are
dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof
that the accused caused the victim's death
must convince a rational mind beyond
reasonable doubt. The medical findings,
however, lead us to a distinct possibility
that the infection of the wound by tetanus
was an efficient intervening cause later or
between the time Javier was wounded to
the time of his death. The infection was,
therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.
There is a likelihood that the wound was
but the remote cause and its subsequent
infection, for failure to take necessary
precautions, with tetanus may have been
the proximate cause of Javier's death with
which the petitioner had nothing to do. "A
prior and remote cause cannot be made the
be of an action if such remote cause did
nothing more than furnish the condition or
give rise to the occasion by which the injury
was made possible, if there intervened
between such prior or remote cause and
the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated,
and efficient cause of the injury, even
though such injury would not have
happened but for such condition or
occasion. If no danger existed in the
condition except because of the
independent cause, such condition was not
the proximate cause. And if an independent
negligent act or defective condition sets
into operation the instances which result in
injury because of the prior defective
condition, such subsequent act or condition
is the proximate cause.”
G.R. No. L-18193 February 27,
1963
NICASIO BERNALDES, SR., PERPETUA
BESAS DE BERNALDES and JOVITO
BERNALDES, aided by NICASIO
BERNALDES, SR., as Guardian-ad-
litem, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
BOHOL LAND TRANSPORTATION,
INC., defendant-appellee.
Lilio L. Amora and Peter L. Amora for
plaintiffs-appellants.
Filemon B. Barria for defendant-appellee.
FACTS
In a complaint for damages filed in the
Court of First Instance of Bohol by
appellants, the spouses Nicasio Bernaldes,
Sr. and Perpetua Besas and their minor
son, Jovito, against appellee, the Bohol
Land Transportation Co., a domestic
corporation engaged in business as a
common carrier in said province, they
alleged, in substance, that, in the afternoon
of November 27, 1958, Jovito Bernaldes
and his brother, Nicasio, boarded one of
appellee's passenger trucks (B.L.T. Co. No.
322 with plate No. 1470) in the town of
Guindulman, Bohol, bound for Tagbilaran
of the same province; that on the way the
bus fell off a deep precipice in barrio
Balitbiton, municipality of Garcia-
Hernandez, of the said province, resulting
in the death of Nicasio and in serious
physical injuries to Jovito.
Defendant moved for the dismissal of the
complaint on two grounds, namely, that
the cause of action alleged therein was
barred by a prior judgment, and that it did
not state a cause of action.
At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, it
was established that in Criminal Case No.
2775 of the same court, Leonardo Balabag,
driver of the bus involved in the accident,
was charged with double homicide thru
reckless imprudence but was acquitted on
the ground that his guilt had not been
established beyond reasonable doubt, and
that appellees, through Attys. Amora and
Tirol, intervened in the prosecution of said
case and did not reserve the right to file a
separate action for damages.
Relying on the case of Maria C. Roa vs.
Segunda de la Cruz, et al., G.R. No. L-
13134, promulgated February 13, 1960,
the lower court sustained the motion on the
ground of bar by prior judgment, and
dismissed the case. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE
The issues in this appeal are first, whether
a civil action for damages against the
owner of a public vehicle, based on breach
of contract of carriage, may be filed after
the criminal action instituted against the
driver has been disposed of, if the
aggrieved party did not reserve his right to
enforce civil liability in a separate action,
and second, whether the intervention of
the aggrieved party, through private
prosecutors, in the prosecution of the
criminal case against the driver — who was
acquitted on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence — will bar him from suing the
latter's employer for damages for breach of
contract, in an independent and separate
action.
The civil action instituted against appellee
in this case is based on alleged culpa
contractual incurred by it due to its failure
to carry safely the late Nicasio Bernaldes
and his brother Jovito to their place of
destination, whereas the criminal action
instituted against appellee's driver involved
exclusively the criminal and civil liability of
the latter arising from his criminal
negligence. In other words, appellant's
action concerned the civil liability of
appellee as a common carrier, regardless
of the liabilities of its driver who was
charged in the criminal case. Therefore, as
held in Parker, et al. vs. Panlilio, et al.,
(G.R. No. L-4961, March 5, 1952), the
failure, on the part of the appellants, to
reserve their right to recover civil
indemnity against the carrier can not in any
way be deemed as a waiver, on their part,
to institute a separate action against the
latter based on its contractual liability, or
on culpa aquiliana, under Articles 1902-
1910 of the Civil Code. As a matter of fact,
such reservation is already implied in the
law which declares such action to be
independent and separate from the
criminal action. Moreover, it has been held
that the duty of the offended party to make
such reservation applies only to defendant
in the criminal action, not to persons
secondarily liable (Chaves, et al. vs. Manila
Electric, 31 Phil. 47).
RULING
True, appellants, through private
prosecutors, were allowed to intervene —
whether properly or improperly we do not
here decide — in the criminal action against
appellee's driver, but if that amounted
inferentially to submitting in said case their
claim for civil indemnity, the claim could
have been only against the driver but not
against appellee who was not a party
therein. As a matter of fact, however,
inspite of appellee's statements to the
contrary in its brief, there is no showing in
the record before Us that appellants made
of record their claim for damages against
the driver or his employer; much less does
it appear that they had attempted to prove
such damages. The failure of the court to
make any pronouncement in its decision
concerning the civil liability of the driver
and/or of his employer must therefore be
due to the fact that the criminal action did
not involve at all any claim for civil
indemnity.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray
that the foregoing stipulation of facts be
admitted and approved by this Honorable
Court, without prejudice to the parties
adducing other evidence to prove their case
not covered by this stipulation of
facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
Lastly, as appellee's driver was acquitted
only on reasonable doubt, a civil action for
damages against him may be instituted for
the same act or omission (Rule 107, par.
[d]; Art. 29, New Civil Code). If such is the
rule as against him, a fortiori, it must in the
case of his employer.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, we find
the appeal interposed by appellants to be
meritorious. As a result, the order of
dismissal appealed from is hereby set aside
and the case is remanded to the lower court
for further proceedings.
G.R. No. L-69866 April 15, 1988
ABERCA V. VER
FACTS
Task Force Makabansa (TFM) was ordered
by General Fabian Ver to conduct pre-
emptive strikes against Communist-
Terrorist underground houses. TFM raided
several houses, employing in most cases
defectively judicial search
warrants, arrested people without warrant
of arrest, denied visitation rights, and
interrogated them with the use of threats
and tortures. A motion to dismiss was filed
by defendants, stating that 1) plaintiffs
may not cause a judicial inquiry about
their detention because the writ of
habeas corpus was suspended;
2) defendants are immune from liability for
acts done in their official duties; 3) there
was no cause of action. On Nov 8, 1983,
Judge Fortun granted the motion to
dismiss, which prompted plaintiffs to file a
MR on Nov 18, 1983. He later inhibited
himself and was replaced Judge Lising, who
denied the MR for being filed out of time.
Another MR was filed, and was only
modified to include Maj. Aguinaldo and
MSgt. Balaba for officers accountable in the
said complaint.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not immunity from suit may
be invoked?
2. Whether petitioners have the right to
question the alleged violation of their rights
in the constitution?
3. Whether the superior officers who gave
the orders are liable?
HELD
1. NO, Article 32 of the Civil Code provides
a sanction to rights and freedom enshrined
in the constitution. These rights cannot be
violated just because of an order given by
a superior. The rule of law must prevail, or
else liberty will perish. Even though they
just followed the orders of their superior,
these do not authorize them
to disregard the rights of the petitioners,
and therefore cannot be considered “acts
done in their official duties”. Article 32
speaks of any public officer or private
individual, and violation of
these constitutional rights does not exempt
them from responsibility.
2. YES, the suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus does not prevent petitioners
from claiming damages for the illegal arrest
and detention in violation of
their constitutional rights by seeking
judicial authority. What the writ suspends
is merely the right of an individual to seek
release from detention as a speedy means
of obtaining liberty. It cannot suspend their
rights and cause of action for injuries
suffered due to violation of their rights.
3. YES, Article 32 speaks of the liabilities
of people who are in direct violation of the
rights stated, as well as people who are
indirectly responsible for such acts. In the
case at hand, the superior officers are the
ones who gave the order, and can be
considered indirectly responsible. It was
also stated in the complaint who were the
ones who directly and indirectly
participated in those acts. By filing a
motion to dismiss, they admitted all
the facts stated in the complaint.
DYOGI V. YATCO, GR NO. L-9623
JANUARY 22, 1957 (wala sa net
huhu)
G.R. No. 91856 October 5, 1990
YAKULT PHILIPPINES AND LARRY
SALVADO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, WENCESLAO M.
POLO, in his capacity as Presiding
Judge of Br. 19 of the RTC of Manila,
and ROY CAMASO, respondents.
Tomas R. Leonidas for petitioners.
David B. Agoncillo for private respondent.
FACTS
Petitioner was charged with the crime of
reckless imprudence resulting in slight
physical injuries. Later, a complaint for
damages was filed by respondent
represented by his father, against
petitioners in the Regional Trial Court. Trial
court rendered decision awarding damages
to respondents. Petitioners’ appealed on
the thesis that the civil action for damages
for injuries arising from alleged criminal
negligence of Salvado, being without
malice, cannot be filed independently of the
criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil
Code. Further, it is contended that under
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure such a separate civil
action may not be filed unless reservation
thereof is expressly made. The appeal was
dismissed.
Although the separate civil action filed in
this case was without previous reservation
in the criminal case, nevertheless since it
was instituted before the prosecution
presented evidence in the criminal action,
and the judge handling the criminal case
was informed thereof, then the actual filing
of the civil action is even far better than a
compliance with the requirement of an
express reservation that should be made
by the offended party before the
prosecution presents its evidence.
Procedural laws have retroactive
application.

ISSUE

Whether or not a civil action instituted after

the criminal action was filed, before
presentation of evidence by the
prosecution, would prosper even if there
was no reservation to file a separate civil
action.

HELD

YES. Petition was denied. Decision of the

Court of Appeals was affirmed.

RATIO:

The civil action for the recovery of civil

liability is impliedly instituted with the
criminal action unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves his right to
institute it separately or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action. Such
civil action includes recovery of indemnity
under the Revised Penal Code, and
damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
arising from the same act or omission of
the accused. The purpose of this rule
requiring reservation is to prevent the
offended party from recovering damages
twice for the same act or omission.