PERSONS: ARTICLE 4-35 CASE DIGEST
CORPUZ V. TIROL STO. TOMAS AND THE
SOLICITOR GENERAL
G.R. No. 186571, [11 August 2010]
FACTS:
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz is a naturalized
Canadian citizen who married respondent
Daisylyn Tirol Sto. Tomas but subsequently
left for Canada due to work and other
professional commitments. When he
returned to the Philippines, he discovered
that Sto. Tomas was already romantically
involved with another man. This brought
about the filing of a petition for divorce by
Corpuz in Canada which was eventually
granted by the Court Justice of Windsor,
Ontario, Canada. A month later, the divorce
decree took effect. Two years later, Corpuz
has fallen in love with another Filipina and
wished to marry her. He went to Civil
Registry Office of Pasig City to register the
Canadian divorce decree on his
marriage certificate with Sto. Tomas.
However, despite the registration, an official
of National Statistics Office informed Corpuz
that the former marriage still subsists under
the Philippine law until there has been a
judicial recognition of the Canadian divorce
decree by a competent judicial court in view
of NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.
Consequently, he filed a petition for judicial
recognition of foreign divorce
and/or declaration of dissolution of marriage
with the RTC. However, the RTC denied the
petition reasoning out that Corpuz cannot
institute the action for judicial recognition of
the foreign divorce decree because he is a
naturalized Canadian citizen. It was provided
further that Sto. Tomas was the proper party
who can institute an action under the
principle of Article 26 of the Family Code
which capacitates a Filipino citizen to
remarry in case the alien spouse obtains a
foreign divorce decree. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the second paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code grants aliens like Corpuz
the right to institute a petition for judicial
recognition of a foreign divorce decree?
HELD:
Petition GRANTED. RTC Decision
REVERSED.
The Supreme Court qualifies the
above conclusion – i.e., that the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
bestows no rights in favor of aliens -with the
complementary statement that
this conclusion is not sufficient basis to
dismiss Gerbert’s petition before the RTC. In
other words, the unavailability of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code to aliens does not
necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest
to petition the RTC for the recognition of
his foreign divorce decree.
The foreign divorce decree itself, after its
authenticity and conformity with the alien’s
national law have been duly proven
according to our rules of evidence, serves as
a presumptive evidence of right in favor of
Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court which provides for the
effect of foreign judgments. A remand, at the
same time, will allow other interested parties
to oppose the foreign judgment and
overcome a petitioner’s presumptive
evidence of aright by proving want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to a
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law
or fact. Needless to state, every precaution
must be taken to ensure conformity with our
laws before a recognition is made, as the
foreign judgment, once recognized, shall
have the effect of res judicata between the
parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court.
Fujiki vs. Marinay
GR No. 196049, June 26, 2013
FACTS:
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese
national who married respondent Maria Paz
Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines.
The marriage did not sit well with petitioner’s
parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife
to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they
lost contact with each other.
Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi
Maekara (Maekara). Without the first
marriage being dissolved, Marinay and
Maekara got married in Quezon City.
Maekara brought Marinay to Japan.
However, Marinay allegedly suffered
physical abuse from Maekara. She left
Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they
were able to re-establish their relationship.
Fujiki then helped Marinay obtain a judgment
from a family court in Japan declaring her
marriage in Maekara void on the ground of
bigamy.
Later, back in the Philippines, Fujiki filed a
petition for a Judicial Recognition of Foreign
Judgment before the RTC. However, the trial
court dismissed the petition maintaining that
Fujiki lacks personality file the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a husband or wife of a prior
marriage can file a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent
marriage between his or her spouse and a
foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.
RULING:
Yes, a husband or wife of a prior marriage
can file a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage
between his or her spouse and a foreign
citizen.
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment
only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it
may be made in a special proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entries in the
civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court. Section 1 of the said rule provides for
who may file such petition, to wit:
Sec. 1: Who may file petition. — Any person
interested in any act, event, order or decree
concerning the civil status of persons which
has been recorded in the civil register, may
file a verified petition for the cancellation or
correction of any entry relating thereto, with
the Regional Trial Court of the province
where the corresponding civil registry is
located.
In this case, there is no doubt that the prior
spouse, Fujiki, has a personal and material
interest in maintaining the integrity of the
marriage he contracted and the property
relations arising from it. Thus, he has the
legal personality to file the petition.
PETITION GRANTED.
Bayot v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No.155635, 7 November 2008
FACTS:
On April 20, 1979, Vicente, a Filipino, and
Rebecca, an American, were married in
Muntinlupa. They had a child name Alix, born
in November 27, 1982 in California.
In February 22, 1996, Rebecca initiated
divorce proceedings in Dominican Republic,
which resulted to judgment ordering the
dissolution of the marriage and the
distribution of conjugal properties
After obtaining a Department of Justice
affirmation of her Filipino citizenship, she
then filed a declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage on the ground of Vicente’s alleged
psychological incapacity, seeking for
distribution of conjugal properties and
support.
On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause of
action and that the petition is barred by the
prior judgment of divorce.
RTC denied Vicente’s motion to dismiss but
CA reversed lower court’s decision.
According to the CA, RTC ought to have
granted Vicente’s motion to dismiss, since
the marriage between the spouses is already
dissolved when the divorce decree was
granted since Rebecca was an American
citizen when she applied for the decree.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the divorce decree obtained
by Rebecca in Dominican Republic is valid.
RULING:
Yes, the divorce is valid.
Article 26 (2) of the Civil Code states that:
“Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen
and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise
have the capacity to remarry under Philippine
law.”
Rebecca at that time she applied and
obtained her divorce was an American
citizen and remains to be one, being born to
American parents in Guam, an American
territory which follows the principle of jus soli
granting American citizenship to those who
are born there. She was, and still may be, a
holder of American passport. She had
consistently professed, asserted and
represented herself as an American citizen,
as shown in her marriage certificate, in Alix’s
birth certificate, when she secured divorce in
Dominican Republic.
Being an American citizen, Rebecca was
bound by the national laws of the United
States of America, a country which allows
divorce. The fact that Rebecca may have
been duly recognized as a Filipino citizen by
affirmation of the DOJ Secretary does not
invalidate the foreign divorce secured by
Rebecca as an American citizen in 1996. In
determining whether or not a divorce is
secured abroad would come within the
jurisdiction of the country’s policy against
absolute divorce, the reckoning point is the
citizenship of the parties at the time a valid
divorce is obtained.
Ando vs. Department Of Foreign Affairs
August 27, 2014 G.R. No. 195432
FACTS:
On 16 September 2001, petitioner married
Yuichiro Kobayashi, a Japanese National, in
a civil wedding solemnized at Candaba,
Pampanga.
On 16 September 2004, Yuichiro Kobayashi
sought in Japan, and was validly granted
under Japanese laws, a divorce in respect of
his marriage with petitioner. A copy of the
Divorce Certificate duly issued by the
Consulate-General of Japan and duly
authenticated by the Department of Foreign
Affairs, Manila.
Said Divorce Certificate was duly registered
with the Office of the Civil Registry of Manila.
Believing in good faith that said divorce
capacitated her to remarry and that by such
she reverted to her single status, petitioner
married Masatomi Y. Ando on 13 September
2005 in a civil wedding celebrated in Sta.
Ana, Pampanga.
In the meantime, Yuichiro Kobayashi married
Ryo Miken on 27 December 2005.
Recently, petitioner applied for the renewal of
her Philippine passport to indicate her
surname with her husband Masatomi Y.
Ando but she was told at the Department of
Foreign Affairs that the same cannot be
issued to her until she can prove by
competent court decision that her marriage
with her said husband Masatomi Y. Ando is
valid until otherwise declared.
ISSUE: Whether or not the first marriage is
lawfully annulled by virtue of a divorce
decree making the second marriage valid.
DECISION: No. In Garcia v. Recio, the court
ruled that a divorce obtained abroad by an
alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction,
provided the decree is valid according to the
national law of the foreigner. The
presentation solely of the divorce decree is
insufficient; both the divorce decree and the
governing personal law of the alien spouse
who obtained the divorce must be proven.
Because our courts do not take judicial notice
of foreign laws and judgment, our law on
evidence requires that both the divorce
decree and the national law of the alien must
be alleged and proven and like any other
fact.10
While it has been ruled that a petition for the
authority to remarry filed before a trial court
actually constitutes a petition for declaratory
relief, the court wasstill unable to grant the
prayer of petitioner. As held by the RTC,
there appears to be insufficient proof or
evidence presented on record of both the
national law of her first husband, Kobayashi,
and of the validity of the divorce decree
under that national law. Hence, any
declaration as to the validity of the divorce
can only be made upon her complete
submission of evidence proving the divorce
decree and the national law of her alien
spouse, in an action instituted in the proper
forum.
GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J.
GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, v. REDERICK
A. RECIO, respondent.
G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001
FACTS:
Respondent Rederick Recio, a Filipino, was
married to Editha Samson, an Australian
citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987.
They lived together as husband and wife in
Australia. On May 18, 1989, a decree of
divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage,
was issued by an Australian family court. On
June 26, 1992, respondent became an
Australian citizen and was married again to
petitioner Grace Garcia-Recio, a Filipina on
January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City. In their
application for a marriage license,
respondent was declared as “single” and
“Filipino.”
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and
respondent lived separately without prior
judicial dissolutionof their marriage.
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a
Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage on the ground of bigamy.
Respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting
marriage at the time he married her. On his
Answer, Rederick contended that his first
marriage was validly dissolved; thus, he was
legally capacitated to marry Grace.
On July 7, 1998 or about five years after the
couple’s wedding and while the suit for
the declaration of nullity was pending ,
respondent was able to secure a divorce
decree from a family court in Sydney,
Australia because the “marriage had
irretrievably broken down.”
The Regional Trial Court declared the
marriage of Rederick and Grace
Recio dissolved on the ground that the
Australian divorce had ended the marriage of
the couple thus there was no more marital
union to nullify or annul.
ISSUE:
1.) Whether or not the divorce between
respondent and Editha Samson was proven.
2.) Whether or not respondent was proven to
be legally capacitated to marry petitioner
RULING:
1st issue:
The Supreme Court ruled that the mere
presentation of the divorce decree of
respondent’s marriage to Samson is
insufficient. Before a foreign divorce decree
can be recognized by our courts, the party
pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact
and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign
law allowing it. Furthermore, the divorce
decree between respondent and Editha
Samson appears to be an authentic one
issued by an Australian family court.
However, appearance is not sufficient;
compliance with the aforementioned rules on
evidence must be demonstrated.
2nd issue:
Australian divorce decree contains a
restriction that reads:
“1. A party to a marriage who marries again
before this decree becomes absolute (unless
the other party has died) commits the
offence of bigamy.”
This quotation bolsters our contention that
the divorrecce obtained by respondent may
have been restricted. It did not absolutely
establish his legal capacity to remarry
according to his national law. Hence, the
Court find no basis for the ruling of the trial
court, which erroneously assumed that the
Australian divorce ipso facto restored
respondent’s capacity to remarry despite the
paucity of evidence on this matter.
The Supreme Court remanded the case to
the court a quo for the purpose of receiving
evidence. The Court mentioned that they
cannot grant petitioner’s prayer to declare
her marriage to respondent null and void
because of the question on latter’s legal
capacity to marry.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III
G.R. No.154881, October 5, 2005
Facts:
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III
married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the
United Church of Christ in the Philippines in
Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was
blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer
Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V.
Orbecido.
In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United
States bringing along their son, Kristoffer. A
few years later, Cipriano discovered that his
wife had been naturalized as an American
citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his
son that his wife had obtained a divorce
decree and then married a certain Innocent
Stanley. The respondent thereafter filed with
the trial court a petition for authority to
remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of
the Family Code.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent can remarry
under Article 26 of the Family Code.
Ruling:
The Filipino spouse should likewise be
allowed to remarry as if the other party were
a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of
the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to
sanction absurdity and injustice.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of
the parties at the time of the celebration of
the marriage, but their citizenship at the time
a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating the latter to
remarry.
The Court ruled that Paragraph 2 of Article
26 of the Family Code should be interpreted
to allow a Filipino citizen who has been
divorced by a spouse who had acquired
foreign citizenship and remarried, also to
remarry. However, considering that in the
present petition there is no sufficient
evidence submitted and on record, the Court
is unable to declare, based on respondent’s
bare allegations that his wife, who was
naturalized as an American citizen,
had obtained a divorce decree and had
remarried an American, that respondent is
now capacitated to remarry.
Such declarationcould only be made
properly upon respondent’s submission of
the aforecited evidence in his favor.
ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner, v.
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR. AND
RICHARD UPTON, respondents.
No. L-68470. October 8, 1985.
Facts:
Petitioner Alicia Reyes Van is citizen of the
Philippines while private respondent Richard
Upton is a citizen of the United States, were
married on 1972 at Hongkong. On 1982, they
got divorced in Nevada, United States; and
the petitioner remarried to Theodore Van
Dorn.
On July 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit
against petitioner, asking that the petitioner
be ordered to render an accounting of her
business in Ermita, Manila, and
be declared with right to manage
the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to
dismiss the case on the ground that the
cause of action is barred by
previous judgement in the divorce
proceeding before Nevada Court where
respondent acknowledged that they had no
community property. The lower court denied
the motion to dismiss on the ground that the
property involved is located in the
Philippines, that the Divorce Decree has no
bearing in the case. Respondent avers that
Divorce Decree abroad cannot prevail over
the prohibitive laws of the Philippines.
Issue:
(1) Whether or not the divorce obtained the
spouse valid to each of them.
(2) Whether or not Richard Upton
may assert his right on conjugal properties.
Held:
As to Richard Upton the divorce is binding on
him as an American Citizen. As he is bound
by the Decision of his own country’s Court,
which validly exercised jurisdiction over him,
and whose decision he does not repudiate,
he is estopped by his own representation
before said Court from asserting his right
over the alleged conjugal property. Only
Philippine Nationals are covered by the
policy against absolute divorce the same
being considered contrary to our concept of
public policy and morality. Alicia Reyes under
our National law is still considered married to
private respondent. However, petitioner
should not be obliged to live together with,
observe respect and fidelity, and render
support to private respondent.
The latter should not continue to be one of
her heirs with possible rights
to conjugal property. She should not
be discriminated against her own country if
the ends of justice are to be served.
FE D. QUITA, petitioner, VS. COURT
OF APPEALS and BLANDINA DANDAN,
respondents
December 22, 1998
Facts:
Fe D. Quita and Arturo T. Padlan, both
Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on
May 18, 1941. No children were born out of
their marriage. On July 23, 1954, petitioner
obtained a final judgment of divorce in San
Francisco, California, U.S.A. On April 16,
1972, Arturo died leaving no will. On August
31, 1972, Lino Javier Inciong filed a petition
with the RTC for issuance of letters of
administration concerning
the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine
Trust Company. Respondent Blandina
Dandan, claiming to be the surviving spouse
of Arturo Dandan and the surviving children,
all surnamed Padlan, opposed the petition.
The RTC expressed that the marriage
between Antonio and petitioner subsisted
until the death of Arturo in 1972, that the
marriage existed between private
respondent and Arturo was clearly void since
it was celebrated during the existence of his
previous marriage to petitioner. The Court
of Appeals remanded the case to the trial
court for further proceedings.
Issues:
1. Should the case be remanded to
the lower court?
2. Who between the petitioner and private
respondent is the proper heir of the
decedent?
Held:
If there is a controversy before the court as
to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased
person or as to the distributive shares to
which each person is entitled under the law,
the controversy shall be heard and decided
as in ordinary cases.
No dispute exists as to the right of the six
Padlan children to inherit from the decedent
because there are proofs that they have
been duly acknowledged by him and
petitioner herself even recognizes them
as heirs of Arturo Padlan, nor as to their
respective hereditary shares.
Private respondent is not a surviving spouse
that can inherit from him as this status
presupposes a legitimate relationship. Her
marriage to Arturo being a bigamous
marriage considered void ab inito under
Articles 80 and 83 of the Civil Code renders
her not a surviving spouse.
The decision of the Court
of Appeals ordering the remand of the case
is affirmed.
IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL,
petitioner, v. HON. CORONA IBAY-
SOMERA, HON LUIS C. VICTOR AND
ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING,
respondents.
G.R. No. 80116. June 30, 1989.
Facts:
On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda
Manalaysay Pilapil (Filipino citizen) and
respondent and respondent Erich Ekkehard
Geiling, German national, were married
at Federal Republic of Germany. They lived
together in Malate, Manila and had a child,
Isabella Pilapil Geiling.
The private respondent initiated divorce
proceeding against petitioner in Germany.
The local court in Germany promulgated a
decree of divorce on the ground of failure of
marriage of the spouse.
On the other hand, petitioner filed an action
for legal separation before a trial court in
Manila.
After the issuance of the divorce decree,
private respondent filed the complaint for
adultery before the prosecutor of Manila
alleging that the petitioner had an affair
William Chia and Jesus Chua while they
were still married.
Petitioner filed a petition with the Justice
Secretary asking to set aside the cases filed
against her and be dismissed. Thereafter,
petitioner moved
to defer her arraignment and to suspend
further proceedings. Justice Secretary
Ordoñez issued a resolution directing to
move for the dismissal of the complaints
against petitioner.
Issue:
Is the action tenable?
Ruling:
Yes. The crime of adultery, as well as four
other crimes against chastity, cannot be
prosecuted except upon sworn written filed
by the offended spouse. Article 344 of the
Revised Penal Code presupposes that the
marital relationship is still subsisting at the
time of the institution of the criminal action
for adultery. This is logical consequence
since the raison d’etre of said provision of law
would be absent where the supposed
offended party had ceased to be the spouse
of the alleged offender at the time of the filing
of the criminal case. It is indispensable that
the status and capacity of the complainant to
commence the action be definitely
established and, such status or capacity
must indubitably exist as of the time he
initiates the action. Thus, the divorce decree
is valid not only in his country, may be
recognized in the Philippines insofar as
private respondent is concerned – in view of
the nationality principle under the Civil Code
on the matter of civil status of persons.
Private respondent is no longer the husband
of petitioner and has no legal standing to
commence the adultery case.
The criminal case filed against petitioner is
dismissed.
LORENZO LLORENTE, petitioner vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, respondent
G.R. NO. 124371. November 23, 2000
FACTS:
Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente
(hereinafter referred to as “Paula”) were
married before a parish priest, Roman
Catholic Church, in Nabua, Camarines Sur.
Before the outbreak of the Pacific War,
Lorenzo departed for the United States and
Paula stayed in the conjugal home in barrio
Antipolo, Nabua, Camarines Sur.[5]
On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was
admitted to United States citizenship
and Certificate of Naturalization No.
5579816 was issued in his favor by the
United States District Court, Southern
District of New York. Paula gave birth to a
boy registered in the Office of the Registrar
of Nabua as “Crisologo Llorente,” with
the certificate stating that the child was not
legitimate and the line for the father’s name
was left blank.
Lorenzo returned to the United States and on
November 16, 1951 filed for divorce with the
Superior Court of the State of California in
and for the County of San Diego. Paula was
represented by counsel, John Riley, and
actively participated in the proceedings. On
November 27, 1951, the Superior Court of
the State of California, for the County of San
Diego found all factual allegations to be true
and issued an interlocutory judgment of
divorce.[11]
Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live
with her. On December 4, 1952, the divorce
decree became final. In the meantime,
Lorenzo returned to the Philippines. Lorenzo
married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila.[13]
Apparently, Alicia had no knowledge of the
first marriage even if they resided in the
same town as Paula, who did not oppose the
marriage or cohabitation.
Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament.
The will was notarized by Notary Public
Salvador M. Occiano, duly signed by
Lorenzo with attesting witnesses Francisco
Hugo, Francisco Neibres and Tito Trajano. In
the will, Lorenzo bequeathed all his property
to Alicia and their three children.
Lorenzo filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Iriga, Camarines Sur, a petition for the
probate and allowance of his last will and
testament wherein Lorenzo moved that Alicia
be appointed Special Administratrix of his
estate.
Paula filed with the same court a petition*22+
for letters of administration over Lorenzo’s
estate in her favor.
RTC: considering that this court has so found
that the divorce decree granted to the late
Lorenzo Llorente is void and inapplicable in
the Philippines, therefore the marriage he
contracted with Alicia Fortunato on January
16, 1958 at Manila is likewise void. CA
Affirmed
ISSUE:
Who are entitled to inherit?
RULING:
However, intestate and testamentary
succession, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic
validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is under consideration,
whatever may be the nature of the property
and regardless of the country wherein said
property may be found.”
For failing to apply these doctrines, the
decision of the Court of Appeals must be
reversed.[43] We hold that the divorce
obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first
wife Paula was valid and recognized in this
jurisdiction as a matter of comity. Now, the
effects of this divorce (as to the succession
to the estate of the decedent) are matters
best left to the determination of the trial court.
“Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of
contracts, wills, and other public instruments
shall be governed by the laws of the country
in which they are executed. Will is valid. SC
reversed the decision.
Roehr vs. Rodriguez
WOLFGANG O. ROEHR, petitioner,
vs. MARIA CARMEN D. RODRIGUEZ,
HON. JUDGE JOSEFINA GUEVARA-
SALONGA, Presiding Judge of Makati RTC,
Branch 149, respondents.
G.R. No. 142820, June 20, 2003
QUISUMBING, J.:
Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German
citizen, married private respondent Carmen
Rodriguez, a Filipina, on December 11, 1980
in Germany. Their marriage was
subsequently ratified on February 14, 1981
in Tayasan, Negros Oriental. Out of their
union were born Carolynne and Alexandra
Kristine.
Carmen filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage before the Makati
Regional Trial Court (RTC). Wolfgang filed a
motion to dismiss, but it was denied.
Meanwhile, Wolfgang obtained a decree of
divorce from the Court of First Instance of
Hamburg-Blankenese. Said decree also
provides that the parental custody of the
children should be vested to Wolfgang.
Wolfgang filed another motion to dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction as a divorce decree had
already been promulgated, and said motion
was granted by Public Respondent RTC
Judge Salonga.
Carmen filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration, with a prayer that the case
proceed for the purpose of determining the
issues of custody of children and the
distribution of the properties between her and
Wolfgang. Judge Salonga partially set aside
her previous order for the purpose of tackling
the issues of support and custody of their
children.
1st Issue: W/N Judge Salonga was correct
in granting a partial motion for
reconsideration.
Ruling: Yes.
A judge can order a partial reconsideration of
a case that has not yet attained finality, as in
the case at bar.

The Supreme Court goes further to say that
the court can modify or alter a judgment even
after the same has become executory
whenever circumstances transpire rendering
its decision unjust and inequitable, as where
certain facts and circumstances justifying or
requiring such modification or alteration
transpired after the judgment has become
final and executory and when it becomes
imperative in the higher interest of justice or
when supervening events warrant it.
2nd issue: W/N Judge Salonga's act was
valid when she assumed and retained
jurisdiction as regards child custody and
support.
Ruling: Yes.
As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained
by foreigners in other countries are
recognizable in our jurisdiction. But the legal
effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and
support of the children, must still be
determined by our courts.
Before our courts can give the effect of res
judicata to a foreign judgment, such as the
award of custody to Wolfgang by the German
court, it must be shown that the parties
opposed to the judgment had been given
ample opportunity to do so on grounds
allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the
Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48,
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).
In the present case, it cannot be said that
private respondent was given the opportunity
to challenge the judgment of the German
court so that there is basis for declaring that
judgment as res judicata with regard to the
rights of Wolfgang to have parental custody
of their two children. The proceedings in the
German court were summary. As to what
was the extent of Carmen’s participation in
the proceedings in the German court, the
records remain unclear.
Absent any finding that private respondent is
unfit to obtain custody of the children, the trial
court was correct in setting the issue for
hearing to determine the issue of parental
custody, care, support and education mindful
of the best interests of the children.
GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J.
GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, v. REDERICK
A. RECIO, respondent.
G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001
FACTS:
Respondent Rederick Recio, a Filipino, was
married to Editha Samson, an Australian
citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987.
They lived together as husband and wife in
Australia. On May 18, 1989, a decree of
divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage,
was issued by an Australian family court. On
June 26, 1992, respondent became an
Australian citizen and was married again to
petitioner Grace Garcia-Recio, a Filipina on
January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City. In their
application for a marriage license,
respondent was declared as “single” and
“Filipino.”
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and
respondent lived separately without prior
judicial dissolutionof their marriage.
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a
Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage on the ground of bigamy.
Respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting
marriage at the time he married her. On his
Answer, Rederick contended that his first
marriage was validly dissolved; thus, he was
legally capacitated to marry Grace.
On July 7, 1998 or about five years after the
couple’s wedding and while the suit for
the declaration of nullity was pending ,
respondent was able to secure a divorce
decree from a family court in Sydney,
Australia because the “marriage had
irretrievably broken down.”
The Regional Trial Court declared the
marriage of Rederick and Grace
Recio dissolved on the ground that the
Australian divorce had ended the marriage of
the couple thus there was no more marital
union to nullify or annul.
ISSUE:
1.) Whether or not the divorce between
respondent and Editha Samson was proven.
2.) Whether or not respondent was proven to
be legally capacitated to marry petitioner
RULING:
1st issue:
The Supreme Court ruled that the mere
presentation of the divorce decree of
respondent’s marriage to Samson is
insufficient. Before a foreign divorce decree
can be recognized by our courts, the party
pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact
and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign
law allowing it. Furthermore, the divorce
decree between respondent and Editha
Samson appears to be an authentic one
issued by an Australian family court.
However, appearance is not sufficient;
compliance with the aforementioned rules on
evidence must be demonstrated.
2nd issue:
Australian divorce decree contains a
restriction that reads:
“1. A party to a marriage who marries again
before this decree becomes absolute (unless
the other party has died) commits the
offence of bigamy.”
This quotation bolsters our contention that
the divorrecce obtained by respondent may
have been restricted. It did not absolutely
establish his legal capacity to remarry
according to his national law. Hence, the
Court find no basis for the ruling of the trial
court, which erroneously assumed that the
Australian divorce ipso facto restored
respondent’s capacity to remarry despite the
paucity of evidence on this matter.
The Supreme Court remanded the case to
the court a quo for the purpose of receiving
evidence. The Court mentioned that they
cannot grant petitioner’s prayer to declare
her marriage to respondent null and void
because of the question on latter’s legal
capacity to marry.
VDA. DE CATALAN V. CATALAN-LEE
G. R. No. 183622, [February 08, 2012]
DOCTRINE:
Aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which
maybe recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid ac-cording to their
national law.
FACTS:
Orlando B. Catalan, a naturalized American
citizen,allegedly obtained a divorce in the
United States from his first wife, Felicitas
Amor. He then contracted a second marriage
with petitioner.
When Orlando died intestate in the
Philippines, petitioner filed with the RTC a
Petition for the issuance of letters of
administration for her appointment as
administratrix of the intestate estate. While
the case was pending, respondent Louella
A. Catalan-Lee, one of the children of
Orlando from his first marriage, filed a similar
petition with the RTC. The two cases
were consolidated.
Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the
petition filed by the respondent on the ground
of litis pendentia. Respondent alleged that
petitioner was not considered an interested
person qualified to filethe petition.
Respondent further alleged that a criminal
case for bigamy was filed against petitioner
by Felicitas Amor contending that petitioner
contracted a second marriage to Orlando
despite having been married to one
Eusebio Bristol.
However, the RTC acquitted petitioner of
bigamy and ruled that since the deceased
was a divorced American citizen, and that
divorce was not recognized under Philippine
jurisdiction, the marriage between him and
petitioner was not valid. The RTC took note
of the action for declaration of nullity then
pending filed by Felicitas Amor against the
deceased and petitioner. It considered the
pending action to be a prejudicial question in
determining the guilt of petition-er for the
crime of bigamy. The RTC also found that
petitioner had never been married to Bristol.
The RTC subsequently dismissed the
Petition for the issuance of letters of
administration filed by petitioner and granted
that of private respondent. Contrary to its
findings in Crim. Case No. 2699-A, the RTC
held that the marriage between petitioner
and Eusebio Bristol was valid and subsisting
when she married Orlando. The RTC held
that petitioner was not an interested party
who may file said petition. The CA affirmed
the decision of the lower court.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the acquittal of petitioner in the
crim. case for bigamy meant that the
marriage with Bristol was still valid.
2. Whether the divorce obtained abroad by
Orlando may be recognized under Philippine
jurisdiction.
HELD:
It is imperative for the trial court to first
determine the validity of the divorce to
ascertain the rightful party to be issued the
letters of administration over the estate of
Orlando. Petition is partially granted. Case is
remanded to RTC.
1. No. The RTC in the special proceedings
failed to appreciate the finding of the RTC in
Crim. Case that petitioner was never married
to Eusebio Bristol. It concluded
that, because petitioner was acquitted of
bigamy, it follows that the first marriage
with Bristol still existed and was valid.
2. Yes. Under the principles of comity,
Philippine jurisdiction recognizes a valid
divorce obtained by a spouse of for-eign
nationality. Aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law. Nonetheless,
the fact of divorce must still first be proven by
the divorce decree itself. The best evidence
of a judgment is the judgment itself. Under
Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or
document may be proven as a public or
official record of a foreign country by either
(1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof
attested by the officer having legal custody of
the document. If the record is not kept in the
Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine foreign service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept
and (b) authenticated by the seal of his
office.
Moreover, the burden of proof lies with the
“party who alleges the existence of a fact or
thing necessary in the prosecution or
defense of an action.” In civil cases, plaintiffs
have the burden of proving the material
allegations of the complaint when those are
denied by the answer; and defendants have
the burden of proving the material allegations
in their answer when they introduce new
matters. It is well-settled in our jurisdiction
that our courts cannot take judicial notice of
foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must
be alleged and proved.
It appears that the trial court no longer
required petitioner to prove the validity of
Orlando’s divorce under the laws of the
United States and the marriage between
petitioner and the deceased. Thus, there is a
need to remand the proceedings to the trial
court for further reception of evidence to
establish the fact of divorce.
Barnuevo vs. Fuster
Facts:
Gabriel Fuster and Constanza Yanez
were married in Spain. Fuster came to the
Philippines, settled, and acquire property.
After several years, Yanez also went to the
Philippines to live with his husband.
Subsequently, they made an agreement in a
public instrument by which they resolved to
live apart and Fuster authorizing Yanez to go
back to Spain and reside therein. Fuster also
undertook to gove Yanez a monthly
allowance for support.
Yanez returned to the Philippines and
commenced divorce proceedings against her
husband. She prayed that she be granted a
decree of divorce; that the court order the
separation of the properties of the plaintiff
and the defendant, to date from the date of
the said decree; that the conjugal society be
therefore liquidated, and after the amount of
the conjugal property had been determined,
that one-half thereof be adjudicated to her;
furthermore, as to the amount of pension
owing for her support but not paid to her, that
the defendant be ordered to pay her the sum
of 36,000 Spanish pesetas.
As a special preferred defense,
Fuster alleged that neither the trial court nor
any other court in the Philippine Islands has
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
complaint, because, as to the allowance for
support, since neither the plaintiff nor the
defendant are residents of Manila, or of any
other place in the Philippine Islands In
deciding the case, the Court of First Instance
of the city of Manila held itself to have
jurisdiction, decreed the suspension of life in
common between the plaintiff and defendant.
Both parties appealed from this judgment
Issue:
Whether the courts of the Philippines
are competent or have jurisdiction to decree
the divorce now on appeal
Ruling:
The authority of jurisdictional power
of courts to decree a divorce is not comprised
within the personal status of the husband and
wife, simply because the whole theory of the
statutes and of the rights which belong to
everyone does not go beyond the sphere of
private law, and the authority and jurisdiction
of the courts are not a matter of the private
law of persons, but of the public or political
law of the nation. "The jurisdiction of courts
and other questions relating to procedure are
considered to be of a public nature and
consequently are generally submitted to the
territorial principle.
The provisions of article 80 of the
Civil Law of Spain is only binding within the
dominions of Spain. It does not accompany
the persons of the Spanish subject wherever
he may go. He could not successfully invoke
it if he resided in Japan, in China, in
Hongkong or in any other territory not subject
to the dominion of Spain. Foreign Catholics
domiciled in Spain, subject to the
ecclesiastical courts in actions for divorce
according to the said article 80 of the Civil
Code, could not allege lack of jurisdiction by
invoking, as the law of their personal statute,
a law of their nation which gives jurisdiction
in such a case to territorial courts, or to a
certain court within or without the territory of
their nation. In the present action for divorce
the Court of First Instance of the city of
Manila did not lack jurisdiction over the
persons of the litigants, for, although Spanish
Catholic subjects, they were residents of this
city and had their domicile herein.
LLAVE V. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 169766, [March 30, 2011]
PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
This petition for review on certiorari assails
the Decision dated August 17, 2004 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
61762 and its subsequent Resolution dated
September 13, 2005, which affirmed the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City, Branch 89 declaring
petitioner Estrellita Juliano-Llave s
(Estrellita) marriage to Sen. Mamintal A.J.
Tamano (Sen. Tamano) as void ab initio.
FACTS:
Around 11 months before his death, Sen.
Tamanomarried Estrellita twice – initially
under the Islamic laws and tradition on May
27, 1993 in Cotabato City and, subsequently,
under a civil ceremony officiated by an
RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao del Sur on
June 2, 1993. In their marriage contracts,
Sen. Tamano s civil status was indicated as
“divorced”. Since then, Estrellita has been
representing herself to the whole world as
Sen. Tamano s wife, and upon his death, his
widow.
On November 23, 1994, private respondents
Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) and
her son Adib Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in
their own behalf and in behalf of the rest of
Sen. Tamano s legitimate children with
Zorayda, filed a complaint with the RTC of
Quezon City for the declaration of nullity of
marriage between Estrellita and Sen.
Tamano for being bigamous. The complaint
alleged that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda
on May 31, 1958 under civil rites, and that
this marriage remained subsisting when he
married Estrellita in 1993.
ISSUE:
Whether the marriage between Estrellita and
the late Sen. Tamano was bigamous.
HELD:
Yes. The civil code governs the marriage of
Zoraydaand late Sen. Tamano; their
marriage was never invalidated by PD 1083.
Sen. Tamano s subsequent marriage
to Estrellita is void ab initio.
RATIO:
The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano
and Zorayda was celebrated in 1958,
solemnized under civil and Muslim rites. The
only law in force governing marriage
relationships between Muslims and non-
Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950,
under the provisions of which only one
marriage can exist at any given time. Under
the marriage provisions of the Civil Code,
divorce is not recognized except during the
effectivity of Republic Act No. 394 which was
not availed of during its effectivity.
As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen.
Tamano s prior marriage to Zorayda has
been severed by way of divorce under PD
1083, the law that codified Muslim
personal laws. However, PD 1083 cannot
benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof
provides that the law applies to “marriage
and divorce wherein
both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the
male party is a Muslim and the marriage is
solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or
this Code in any part of the Philippines.” But
Article 13 of PD 1083 does not provide for a
situation where the parties were married
both in civil and Muslim rites.”
HELD:
The petition is DENIED.
IWASAWA VS GANGAN GR 204169
FACTS: Petitioner, a Japanese national, met
private respondent sometime in 2002 in one
of his visits to the Philippines. Private
respondent introduced herself as “single”
and “has never married before.” Since then,
the two became close to each other. Later
that year, petitioner came back to the
Philippines and married private respondent
on November 28, 2002 in Pasay City. After
the wedding, the couple resided in Japan. In
July 2009, petitioner noticed his wife become
depressed. Suspecting that something might
have happened in the Philippines, he
confronted his wife about it. To his shock,
private respondent confessed to him that she
received news that her previous husband
passed away. Petitioner sought to confirm
the truth of his wife’s confession and
discovered that indeed, she was married to
one Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo and that
their marriage took place on June 20, 1994.
This prompted petitioner to file a petition for
the declaration of his marriage to private
respondent as null and void on the ground
that their marriage is a bigamous one.
ISSUE: W/N the marriage of petitioner and
respondent is bigamous
RULING: YES. This Court has consistently
held that a judicial declaration of nullity is
required before a valid subsequent marriage
can be contracted; or else, what transpires is
a bigamous marriage, which is void from the
beginning as provided in Article 35(4) of the
Family Code of the Philippines. And this is
what transpired in the instant case. As
correctly pointed out by the OSG, the
documentary exhibits taken together
concretely establish the nullity of the
marriage of petitioner to private respondent
on the ground that their marriage is
bigamous. The exhibits directly prove the
following facts: ( 1) that private respondent
married Arambulo on June 20, 1994 in the
City of Manila; (2) that private respondent
contracted a second marriage this time with
petitioner on November 28, 2002 in Pasay
City; (3) that there was no judicial declaration
of nullity of the marriage of private
respondent with Arambulo at the time she
married petitioner; (3) that Arambulo died on
July 14, 2009 and that it was only on said
date that private respondent's marriage with
Arambulo was deemed to have been
dissolved; and ( 4) that the second marriage
of private respondent to petitioner is
bigamous, hence null and void, since the first
marriage was still valid and subsisting when
the second marriage was contracted.
Republic v. Manalo
Facts:
Marelyn Tanedo Manalo was married to a
Japanese national, Yoshino Minoro. Manalo
filed a case for divorce in Japan and after due
proceedings, a divorce decree dated
December 6, 2011, was granted. Manalo
now wants to cancel the entry of marriage
between her and Minoro from the Civil
Registry and to be allowed to reuse her
maiden surname, Manalo.
According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the
Family Code,
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen
and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad
by the alien spouse incapacitating him or her
to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise
have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law
Issues:
1. Under Article 26, paragraph 2 of the
Family Code, can the Filipino spouse initiate
the divorce instead of the foreign spouse?
2. Was the divorce obtained by Marelyn
Manalo from Japan valid here in the
Philippines?
Ruling:
1. Yes. The Court ruled that in interpreting
the law, the intent should be taken into
consideration. According to Justice Alicia
Sempio-Dy, a member of the Civil Code
Revision Committee, the aim of the
amendment is to avoid the absurd situation
of having the Filipino deemed still married to
a foreign spouse even though the latter is no
longer married to the former. According to
the Supreme Court, the wording of Article 26,
paragraph 2 of the Family Code requires only
that there be a valid divorce obtained abroad
and does not discriminate as to who should
file the divorce, i.e., whether it is the Filipino
spouse or the foreign spouse. Also, even if
assuming arguendo that the provision should
be interpreted that the divorce proceeding
should be initiated by the foreign spouse, the
Court will not follow such interpretation since
doing so would be contrary to the legislative
intent of the law.
In the issue of the application of Article 15 of
the Civil Code in this case, the Court ruled
that even if Manalo should be bound by the
nationality principle, blind adherence to it
should not be allowed if it will cause unjust
discrimination and oppression to certain
classes of individuals whose rights are
equally protected by the law.
The Court also ruled that Article 26 of the
Family Code is in violation of the equal
protection clause. They said that the
limitation provided by Article 26 is based on
a superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical
classification. The violation of the equal
protection clause in this case is shown by the
discrimination against Filipino spouses who
initiated a foreign divorce proceeding and
Filipinos who obtained a divorce decree
because the foreign spouse had initiated the
divorce proceedings. Their circumstances
are alike, and making a distinction between
them as regards to the validity of the divorce
decree obtained would give one undue favor
and unjustly discriminate against the other.
The Court also said that it is the State’s duty
not only to strengthen the solidarity of the
Filipino family but also to defend, among
others, the right of children to special
protection from all forms of neglect abuse,
cruelty, and other conditions prejudicial to
their development. The State cannot do this
if the application of paragraph 2 of Article 26
of the Family Code is limited to only those
foreign divorces initiated by the foreign
spouse.
2. The Court cannot determine due to
insufficient evidence.
It has been ruled that foreign laws must be
proven. There are two basic types of
divorces: (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo
matrimonii, which terminates the marriage,
and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro,
which suspends it and leaves the bond in full
force.
The presentation solely of the divorce decree
will not suffice to lead the Court to believe
that the decree is valid or constitutes
absolute divorce. The fact of divorce must
still be proven. Therefore, the Japanese law
on divorce must still be proved.
In this case, the Court remanded the case to
the court of origin for further proceedings and
reception of evidence as to the relevant
Japanese law on divorce.
HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO, petitioner,
v. JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ,
respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329. March 8, 2001
Facts:
Complainant Herminia Borja-
Manzano avers that she was the lawful wife
of the late David Manzano, having been
married to him on 21 May 1966 in San
Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue,
Caloocan City. Four children were born out
of that marriage. On 22 March 1993,
however, her husband contracted another
marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before
respondent Judge.
When respondent Judge solemnized said
marriage, he knew or ought to know that the
same was void and bigamous, as the
marriage contract clearly stated that both
contracting parties were “separated.”
Respondent Judge, on the other hand,
claims in his Comment that when he
officiated the marriage between Manzano
and Payao he did not know that Manzano
was legally married. What he knew was that
the two had been living together as husband
and wife for seven years already without the
benefit of marriage, as manifested in their
joint affidavit. According to him, had he
known that the late Manzano was married,
he would have advised the latter not to marry
again; otherwise, Manzano could be charged
with bigamy. He then prayed that the
complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and
for being designed merely to harass him.
The Court Administrator recommended that
respondent Judge be found guilty
of gross ignorance of the law.
Respondent Judge alleges that he agreed to
solemnize the marriage in question in
accordance with Article 34 of the Family
Code.
Issue:
Is the reason of the respondent Judge in
solemnizing the marriage valid?
Ruling:
No. In Article 34 of the Family Code provides
“No license shall be necessary for the
marriage of a man and a woman who have
lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years and without any legal
impediment to marry each other.
Respondent Judge cannot take refuge on
the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and
Luzviminda Payao stating that they had been
cohabiting as husband and wife for seven
years. Just like separation, free and
voluntary cohabitation with another person
for at least five years does not severe the tie
of a subsisting previous marriage.
Marital cohabitation for a long period of time
between two individuals who are legally
capacitated to marry each other is merely a
ground for exemption from marriage license.
It could not serve as a justification for
respondent Judge to solemnize a requirement for a marriage license, cannot
subsequent marriage vitiated by the
impediment of a prior existing marriage.
Republic vs. Dayot
GR No. 175581, March 28, 2008
FACTS:
Jose and Felisa Dayot were married at the
Pasay City Hall on November 24, 1986. In
lieu of a marriage license, they executed a
sworn affidavit that they had lived together
for at least 5years. On August 1990, Jose
contracted marriage with a certain Rufina
Pascual. They were both employees of the
National Statistics and Coordinating
Board. Felisa then filed on June 1993 an
action for bigamy against Jose and an
administrative complaint with the Office of
the Ombudsman. On the other hand, Jose
filed a complaint on July 1993 for annulment
and/or declaration of nullity of marriage
where he contended that his marriage with
Felisa was a sham and his consent was
secured through fraud.
ISSUE: Whether or not Jose’s marriage with
Felisa is valid considering that they executed
a sworn affidavit in lieu of the marriage
license requirement.
HELD:
CA indubitably established that Jose and
Felisa have not lived together for five years
at the time they executed their sworn affidavit
and contracted marriage. Jose and Felisa
started living together only in June 1986, or
barely five months before the celebration of
their marriage on November 1986. Findings
of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding in
the Supreme Court.
The solemnization of a marriage without prior
license is a clear violation of the law and
invalidates a marriage. Furthermore, “the
falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit
relating to the period of Jose and Felisa’s
cohabitation, which would have qualified
their marriage as an exception to the
be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a
quintessential fact that the law precisely
required to be deposed and attested to by the
parties under oath”. Hence, Jose and
Felisa’s marriage is void ab initio. The court
also ruled that an action for nullity of
marriage is imprescriptible. The right to
impugn marriage does not prescribe and
may be raised any time.
Santos vs Santos
Facts of the Case:
On July 27, 2007, the Regional Trial Court of
Tarlac City declared petitioner Celerina J.
Santos (Celerina) presumptively dead after
her husband, respondent Ricardo T. Santos
(Ricardo), had filed a petition for declaration
of absence or presumptive death for the
purpose of remarriage on June 15, 2007.
Ricardo remarried on September 17, 2008.
Ricardo alleged that he exerted efforts to
locate Celerina. He went to Celerina's
parents in Cubao, Quezon City, but they did
not know their daughter's whereabouts. He
also inquired about her from other relatives
and friends, but no one gave him any
information. Ricardo claimed that it was
almost 12 years from the date of his Regional
Trial Court petition since Celerina left. He
believed that she had passed away.
Celerina claimed that she learned about
Ricardo's petition only sometime in October
2008 when she could no longer avail the
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for
relief, or other appropriate remedies.
On November 17, 2008, Celerina filed a
petition for annulment of judgment before the
Court of Appeals on the grounds of extrinsic
fraud and lack of jurisdiction. She argued that
she was deprived her day in court when
Ricardo, despite his knowledge of her true
residence, misrepresented to the court that
she was a resident of Tarlac City. According
to Celerina, her true residence was in
Neptune Extension, Congressional Avenue,
Quezon City. This residence had been her
and Ricardo's conjugal dwelling since 1989
until Ricardo left in May 2008. As a result of
Ricardo's misrepresentation, she was
deprived of any notice of and opportunity to
oppose the petition declaring her
presumptively dead.
Celerina claimed that all the allegations of
Ricardo were fraudulent, that she never
resided in Tarlac and never left to work as a
domestic helper abroad. Further, she also
claimed that it was not true that she had been
absent for 12 years. Ricardo was aware that
she never left their conjugal dwelling in
Quezon City. It was he who left the conjugal
dwelling in May 2008 to cohabit with another
woman. Celerina referred to a joint affidavit
executed by their children to support her
contention that Ricardo made false
allegations in his petition. Celerina also
argued that the court did not acquire
jurisdiction over Ricardo's petition because it
had never been published in a newspaper.
She added that the Office of the Solicitor
General and the Provincial Prosecutor's
Office were not furnished copies of Ricardo's
petition.
The Court of Appeals issued the resolution
dated November 28, 2008, dismissing
Celerina's petition for annulment of judgment
for being a wrong mode of remedy.
According to the Court of Appeals, the proper
remedy was to file a sworn statement before
the civil registry, declaring her reappearance
in accordance with Article 42 of the Family
Code.
Celerina filed a motion for reconsideration
but the same was denied.
Issue:
Whether or not Court of Appelas erred in
dismissing Celerina’s petition on the ground
that the proper remedy is to file a sworn
statement before the civil registry declaring
her reappearance as stated in Article 42 of
the Family Code
Ruling:
Yes. Annulment of judgment is the remedy
when the Regional Trial Court's judgment,
order, or resolution has become final, and the
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for
relief or other appropriate remedies are no
longer available through no fault of the
petitioner. The grounds for annulment of
judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction.
This court defined extrinsic fraud in
Stilianopulos v. City of Legaspi. For fraud to
become a basis for annulment of judgment,
it has to be extrinsic or actual. It is intrinsic
when the fraudulent acts pertain to an issue
involved in the original action or where the
acts constituting the fraud were or could have
been litigated, It is extrinsic or collateral when
a litigant commits acts outside of the trial
which prevents a party from having a real
contest, or from presenting all of his case,
such that there is no fair submission of the
controversy.
The choice of remedy is important because
remedies carry with them certain admissions,
presumptions, and conditions.
Republic vs Cantor
FACTS: The respondent and Jerry were
married on September 20, 1997. They lived
together as husband and wife in their
conjugal dwelling in Agan Homes, Koronadal
City, South Cotabato. Sometime in January
1998, the couple had a violent quarrel
brought about by: (1) the respondent’s
inability to reach "sexual climax" whenever
she and Jerry would have intimate moments;
and (2) Jerry’s expression of animosity
toward the respondent’s father.
After their quarrel, Jerry left their conjugal
dwelling and this was the last time that the
respondent ever saw him. Since then, she
had not seen, communicated nor heard
anything from Jerry or about his
whereabouts.
On May 21, 2002, or more than four (4) years
from the time of Jerry’s disappearance, the
respondent filed before the RTC a
petition4for her husband’s declaration of
presumptive death, docketed as SP Proc.
Case No. 313-25. She claimed that she had
a well-founded belief that Jerry was already
dead. She alleged that she had inquired from
her mother-in-law, her brothers-in-law, her
sisters-in-law, as well as her neighbors and
friends, but to no avail. In the hopes of finding
Jerry, she also allegedly made it a point to
check the patients’ directory whenever she
went to a hospital. All these earnest efforts,
the respondent claimed, proved futile,
prompting her to file the petition in court.
ISSUE: W/N the petition for the declaration of
presumptive death should be granted
RULING: NO. Before a judicial declaration of
presumptive death can be obtained, it must
be shown that the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years and the
present spouse had a well-founded belief
that the prior spouse was already dead.
Under Article 41 of the Family Code, there
are four (4) essential requisites for the
declaration of presumptive death:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing
for four consecutive years, or two
consecutive years if the disappearance
occurred where there is danger of death
under the circumstances laid down in Article
391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to
remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-
founded belief that the absentee is dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary
proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee
Notably, Article 41 of the Family Code,
compared to the old provision of the Civil
Code which it superseded, imposes a stricter
standard. It requires a "well-founded belief "
that the absentee is already dead before a
petition for declaration of presumptive death
can be granted.
In the case at bar, the respondent’s "well-
founded belief" was anchored on her alleged
"earnest efforts" to locate Jerry, which
consisted of the following:
(1) She made inquiries about Jerry’s
whereabouts from her in-laws, neighbors and
friends; and
(2) Whenever she went to a hospital, she
saw to it that she looked through the patients’
directory, hoping to find Jerry.
These efforts, however, fell short of the
"stringent standard" and degree of diligence
required by jurisprudence for the following
reasons:
First, the respondent did not actively look for
her missing husband. It can be inferred from
the records that her hospital visits and her
consequent checking of the patients’
directory therein were unintentional. She did
not purposely undertake a diligent search for
her husband as her hospital visits were not
planned nor primarily directed to look for him.
This Court thus considers these attempts
insufficient to engender a belief that her
husband is dead.
Second, she did not report Jerry’s absence
to the police nor did she seek the aid of the
authorities to look for him. While a finding of
well-founded belief varies with the nature of
the situation in which the present spouse is
placed, under present conditions, we find it
proper and prudent for a present spouse,
whose spouse had been missing, to seek the
aid of the authorities or, at the very least,
report his/her absence to the police.
Third, she did not present as witnesses
Jerry’s relatives or their neighbors and
friends, who can corroborate her efforts to
locate Jerry. Worse, these persons, from
whom she allegedly made inquiries, were not
even named. As held in Nolasco, the present
spouse’s bare assertion that he inquired from
his friends about his absent spouse’s
whereabouts is insufficient as the names of
the friends from whom he made inquiries
were not identified in the testimony nor
presented as witnesses.
Lastly, there was no other corroborative
evidence to support the respondent’s claim
that she conducted a diligent search. Neither
was there supporting evidence proving that
she had a well-founded belief other than her
bare claims that she inquired from her friends
and in-laws about her husband’s
whereabouts. In sum, the Court is of the view
that the respondent merely engaged in a
"passive search" where she relied on
uncorroborated inquiries from her in-laws,
neighbors and friends. She failed to conduct
a diligent search because her alleged efforts
are insufficient to form a well-founded belief
that her husband was already dead.
REPUBLIC V. GRANADA
G.R. No. 187512, [June 13, 2012]
DOCTRINE:
Even if the RTC erred in ruling that
therespondent was able to prove her “well-
founded belief” that her absent spouse
was already dead, such order already final
and can no longer be modified or reversed.
Indeed, “[n]othing is more settled in law than
that when a judgment becomes final and
executory, it becomes immutable and
unalterable. The same may no longer be
modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct what is
perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of
fact or law.”
FACTS:
Cyrus and Yolanda Granada, both
employees of Sumida Electric Company, got
married in 1993.
Sometime in May 1994, when Sumida
Electric Philippines closed down, Cyrus went
to Taiwan to seek employment. Yolanda
claimed that from that time, she did not
receive any communication from her
husband, notwithstanding efforts to locate
him. Her brother testified that he had asked
the relatives of Cyrus regarding the latter’s
whereabouts, to no avail.
After nine (9) years of waiting, Yolanda filed
a Petition to have Cyrus declared
presumptively dead with the RTC Lipa City.
On 7 February 2005, the RTC rendered a HELD:
Decision declaring Cyrus as presumptively
dead. Yes, the declaration of presumptive death is
finaland immediately executory. Even if the
On 10 March 2005, petitioner Republic of the RTC erred in granting the petition, such order
Philippines, represented by the OSG, filed a can no longer be assailed.
Motion for Reconsideration of this Decision.
Petitioner argued that Yolanda had failed to
exert earnest efforts to locate Cyrus and thus
failed to prove her well-founded belief that he
was already dead. The motion was denied.
The OSG then elevated the case on appeal
to the Court of Appeals. Yolanda filed a
Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the CA
had no jurisdiction over the appeal. She
argued that her Petition for Declaration of
Presumptive Death, based on Article 41 of
the Family Code, was a summary judicial
proceeding, in which the judgment is
immediately final and executory and, thus,
not appealable.

The appellate court granted Yolanda’s

Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. Citing Republic v. Bermudez-
Lorino, the CA ruled that a petition for
declaration of presumptive death under Rule
41 of the Family Code is a summary
proceeding. Thus, judgment thereon is
immediately final and executory upon notice
to the parties.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which

was denied. Hence, the present petition
under Rule 45.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the order of the RTC in a

summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death is immediately final and
executory upon notice to the parties and,
hence, is not subject to ordinary appeal.

2. Whether the CA erred in affirming the

RTC’s grant of the petition for declaration of
presumptive death based on evidence that
respondent had presented.