MANILA PRINCE HOTEL V GSIS

FACTS: GSIS decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel
Corporation (MHC) which owns the historic Manila Hotel. Only 2 bidders participated: petitioner
Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or
15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, which bid for the
same number of share at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder, petitioner matched the bid price of
P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad, petitioner sent a check for 33 million pesos which
respondent GSIS refused to accept.
Petitioner came to this Court on prohibition and mandamus. In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10,
second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has been identified
with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument which reflects the vibrancy
of Philippine heritage and culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier generation of Filipinos who
believed in the nobility and sacredness of independence and its power and capacity to release the full
potential of the Filipino people. To all intents and purposes, it has become a part of the national
patrimony.

The MHC is clearly covered by the term national economy, to which Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII,
1987 Constitution, applies.7

It is also the thesis of petitioner that since Manila Hotel is part of the national patrimony and its
business also unquestionably part of the national economy petitioner should be preferred after it has
matched the bid offer of the Malaysian firm.
Respondents contend that Article 12 sec 10 par 2 of the 1987 constitution is not a self-executing
provision and requires implementing legislation.
Second, granting that this provision is self-executing, Manila Hotel does not fall under the term
national patrimony which only refers to lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum
and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and
fauna and all marine wealth in its territorial sea, and exclusive marine zone as cited in the first and
second paragraphs of Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution. According to respondents, while petitioner
speaks of the guests who have slept in the hotel and the events that have transpired therein which
make the hotel historic, these alone do not make the hotel fall under the patrimony of the nation.
What is more, the mandate of the Constitution is addressed to the State, not to respondent GSIS
which possesses a personality of its own separate and distinct from the Philippines as a State.
Issue: is Art. 12 sec 10 a self-executing provision?

Held: the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing If the
constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature
would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. 14 This can
be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that —

. . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-
executing . . . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be
considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when,
or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the
lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed
implementing statute.
Artcile 12 Section 10 : In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national
economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.

SATURNINO OCAMPO V ENRIQUEZ

FACTS: Secretary of National Defense Delfin N. Lorenzana issued a memorandum to the Chief of
Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), General Ricardo R. Visaya, regarding the
interment of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos at the Libingan ng Mga Bayani (LNMB), in
compliance with the verbal order of President Duterte to fulfill his election campaign promise to that
effect. On August 9, 2016, AFP Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez issued the corresponding
directives to the Philippine Army Commanding General. Dissatisfied with the foregoing issuance,
various parties filed several petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, essentially arguing that
the decision to have the remains of former President Marcos interred at the LNMB violated various
laws; that Marcos is not entitled to be interred at the LNMB; and that the Marcos family has already
waived such burial.
Issue: Did the issuance of the assailed memorandum and directive violate the Constitution, domestic
and international laws?

RULINGS: 1. NO, the assailed memorandum and directive, being the President’s decision, to bury
Marcos at the LNMB is in accordance with the Constitution, domestic and international laws.
1987 Constitution Ocampo, et al. invoked Sections 2, 11, 13, 23, 26, 27 and 28 of Article II; Sec. 17 of
Art. VII, Sec. 3(2) of Art. XIV; Sec. 1 of Art. XI; and Sec. 26 of Art. XVIII of the Constitution.
While the Constitution is a product of our collective history as a people, its entirety should not be
interpreted as providing guiding principles to just about anything remotely related to the Martial Law
period such as the proposed Marcos burial at the LNMB.
Tañada v. Angara already ruled that the provisions in Article II of the Constitution are not
selfexecuting. The reasons for denying a cause of action to an alleged infringement of broad
constitutional principles are sourced from basic considerations of due process and the lack of judicial
authority to wade “into the uncharted ocean of social and economic policy making.”
In the same vein, Sec. 1 of Art. XI of the Constitution is not a self-executing provision.
The Court also found the reliance on Sec. 3(2) of Art. XIV and Sec. 26 of Art. XVIII of the Constitution
to be misplaced, with such provisions bearing no direct or indirect prohibition to Marcos’ interment at
the LNMB.
The Court also found no violation of President Duterte’s mandate under Sec. 17, Art. VII of the
Constitution to take necessary and proper steps to carry into execution the law.
RA No. 289 (An Act Providing For the Construction of A National Pantheon for Presidents of the
Philippines, National Heroes and Patriots of the Country)
Even if the Court treats R.A. No. 289 as relevant to the issue, still, Ocampo, et al.'s allegations must
fail. To apply the standard that the LNMB is reserved only for the "decent and the brave" or "hero"
would be violative of public policy as it will put into question the validity of the burial of each and every
mortal remains resting therein, and infringe upon the principle of separation of powers since the
allocation of plots at the LNMB is based on the grant of authority to the President under existing laws
and regulations.
Under AFP Regulations G-161-375, the following are eligible for interment at the LNMB:
(a) Medal of Valor Awardees;
(b) Presidents or Commanders-in-Chief, AFP;
(c) Secretaries of National Defense;
(d) Chiefs of Staff, AFP;
(e) General/Flag Officers of the AFP;
(f) Active and retired military personnel of the AFP to include active draftees and trainees who died in
line of duty, active reservists and CAFGU Active Auxiliary (CAA) who died in combat operations or
combat related activities;
(g) Former members of the AFP who laterally entered or joined the PCG and the PNP;
(h) Veterans of Philippine Revolution of 1890, WWI, WWII and recognized guerillas;
(i) Government Dignitaries, Statesmen, National Artists and other deceased persons whose interment
or reinternment has been approved by the Commander-in-Chief, Congress or the Secretary of
National Defense;
and g) Former Presidents, Secretaries of Defense, Dignitaries, Statesmen, National Artists, widows of
Former Presidents, Secretaries of National Defense and Chief of Staff.
Similar to AFP Regulations G-161-374, the following are not qualified to be interred in the LNMB:
(a) Personnel who were dishonorably separated/reverted/discharged from the service;
(b) and (b) Authorized personnel who were convicted by final judgment of an offense involving
moral turpitude.

In the absence of any executive issuance or law to the contrary, the AFP Regulations G-161-375
remains to be the sole authority in determining who are entitled and disqualified to be interred at the
LNMB. Whether or not the extension of burial privilege to civilians is unwarranted and should be
restricted in order to be consistent with the original purpose of the LNMB is immaterial and irrelevant
to the issue at bar since it is indubitable that Marcos had rendered significant active military service
and military-related activities. Ocampo, et al. did not dispute that Marcos was a former President and
Commander-in-Chief, a legislator, a Secretary of National Defense, a military personnel, a veteran,
and a Medal of Valor awardee.
For his alleged human rights abuses and corrupt practices, the Court may disregard Marcos
as a President and Commander-in-Chief, but the Court cannot deny him the right to be
acknowledged based on the other positions he held or the awards he received. In this sense,
the Court agreed with the proposition that Marcos should be viewed and judged in his totality
as a person. While he was not all good, he was not pure evil either. Certainly, just a human
who erred like us. Aside from being eligible for burial at the LNMB, Marcos possessed none of
the disqualifications stated in AFP Regulations G-161-375. He was neither convicted by final
judgment of the offense involving moral turpitude nor dishonorably
separated/reverted/discharged from active military service.

OPOSA V FACTORAN
FACTS: The petitioners filed a complaint ordering the defendant, his agent, representatives and other
ersons acting in his behalf to – 1. Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country, and 2.
Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license
agreements.
The plaintiffs argue that they as well as their successors have a clear and constitutional right to a
balanced and healthful ecology. And that the further issuance of timber license agreements to various
logging corporations would result to deforestation and thus irreparable injury to our ecology.
The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) filed a motion to dismiss the complaint
based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2) the
issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or
executive branches of Government.

Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains
sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of
the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR,
Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16,
Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology, the concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man's inalienable
right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on
the respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right
to a healthful environment.

Facts
This case is unique in that it is a class suit brought by 44children, through their parents, claiming that
they bring the case in the name of “their generation as well as those generations yet unborn.” Aiming
to stop deforestation, it was filed against the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, seeking to have him cancel all the timber license agreements (TLAs) in the country and to
cease and desist from accepting and approving more timber license agreements. The children
invoked their right to a balanced and healthful ecology and to protection by the State in its capacity as
parens patriae
. The petitioners claimed that the DENR Secretary's refusal to cancel the TLAs and to stop issuing
them was "contrary to the highest law of humankind-- the natural law—and violative of plaintiffs' right
to self-preservation and perpetuation." The case was dismissed in the lower court, invoking the law
on non-impairment of contracts, so it was brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari.
Issue
Did the children have the legal standing to file the case?
Yes. The Supreme Court in granting the petition ruled that the children had the legal standing to file
the case based on the concept of “intergenerational responsibility”. Their right to a healthy
environment carried with it an obligation to preserve that environment for the succeeding generations.

The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the
fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:

Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of
the same article:

Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill
health consciousness among them

it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful
ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting
their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and
protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for
the present generation, but also for those to come — generations which stand to inherit nothing but
parched earth incapable of sustaining life.

The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from
impairing the environment. During the debates on this right in one of the plenary sessions of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, the following exchange transpired between Commissioner Wilfrido
Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the section in question:

MR. AZCUNA:

Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic) environment

necessarily carries with it the correlative duty of not impairing the same
and, therefore, sanctions may be provided for impairment of
environmental balance. 12

The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the
country's forests.

FRANCISCO V HOR
FACTS: on july 22, 2002, the hor adopted a resolution which directed the committee on justice to
conduct an investigation on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the CJ of the SC of
the Judiciary development fund (JDF). Then on june 2, 2003, former pres joseph Estrada filed an
impeachment complaint against CJ Hilario Davide Jt. And 7 associate justices. The complaint was
endorsed and was referred to the house committee in accordance with section 3(2) of article 6 of the
consti.
The house committee on justice ruled on oct. 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was
sufficient in form, but voted to dismiss it for being insufficient in substance. On October 23, 2003, a
second impeachment complaint was filed against CJ davide founded on the alleged results of the
legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned house resolution. This second impeachment
complaint was accompanied by a resolution of endorsement/ impeachment signed by at least 1/3 of
the members of the house of reps.
Issues: 1 w/n sections 15 and 16 of rule 5 of the rules on impeachment adopted by the 12th congress
are unconstitutional?
2. w/n the second impeachment complaint is barred under section 3(5) of article 6 of the constitution?

Held: The Supreme Court employed three principles in deciding the case:

1) Whenever possible, the words in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning (verbal
egis);

2) If there is ambiguity, the Constitution must be interpreted according to the intent of the framers;
and

3) The Constitution must be interpreted as a whole.

Applying these principles, to “initiate” in its ordinary acceptation means simply to begin. The records
of the debates by the framers affirm this textual interpretation. From the records of the Constitutional
Convention and the amicus curiae briefs of its two members (Maambong and Regalado), the term “to
initiate” in Sec 3(5), Art. XI of the Constitution refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint
coupled with taking initial action by Congress on the complaint.

By contrast, Secs. 16 and 17 state that impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if House
Committee on Justice deems the complaint sufficient in substance, or (2) if the House itself affirms or
overturns the findings of the House Committee on Justice on the substance of the complaint, or (3) by
filing or endorsement before the HOR Secretary General by one-thirds of the members of the House.

In this light, Secs. 16 and 17 of the House Rules of Procedure for Impeachment are unconstitutional
because the rules clearly contravene Sec. 3 (5), Art. XI since the rules give the term “initiate” a
different meaning from filing and referral.

Hence, the second impeachment complaint by Teodoro and Fuentebella violates the constitutional
one-year ban.

J.M. Tuason v the land tenure administration

FACTS: on august 3, 1959, RA 2616 took effect. The act states that the Tatalon Estate jointly owned
by JM Tuason and Co. Inc, Gregorio Araneta and Co. Inc., and Florencio Deudor et al was authorized
to be expropriated. More than a year later Land Tenure Administration was directed by the executive
secretary to institute the expropriation of the aforesaid property. Appellee then filed a prohibition with
a preliminary injunction to prevent respondents from instituting the expropriation. The lower court
decided that the said act was unconstitutional and a writ of prohibition was granted to the appellee.
Respondent appealed to CA.
Issue: W/N the RA 2616 as amended by 3454 is constitutional?
Held: Yes, the decision of the lower court of Jan. 10, 1963, holding that RA 2616 is unconstitutional
as amended by RA 3454 is reversed.
The question is one of constitutional construction (of interpreting the constitution). The task is to
ascertain the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in adopting the Constitution.
It is assumed that the words in the constitutional provisions express the objectivity sought to be
attained. They are to be given their ordinary meaning except when technical terms are employed in
which case the significance attached to them prevails. This case is such a case and is therefore one
of minimal construction. The congress has the legislative will to expropriate and subdivide lands it
deems to be fit for sale. Moreover, it cannot be denied that congress has the capacity to exercise
such authority. The language employed is not swathed in obscurity (because congress has the
legislative power as stated in the constitution). It is presumed that the constitution suffices to govern
the life of the people not only at the present time but also in the indefinite future. The constitution
though does not give rigid answers but is flexible and accommodates the problems the future may
pose.

Civil Liberties Union V Exec Sec

Facts:
FACTS:

Peititioners sought to declare the Executive Order No. 284 as unconstitutuinal. In July 1987, then
President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 284 which allowed members of the Cabinet,
their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in
addition to their primary positions subject to limitations set therein. The Civil Liberties Union (CLU)
assailed this EO averring that such law is unconstitutional.

The petitioners are challenging EO 284’s constitutionality because it adds exceptions to Section 13 of
Article VII other than those provided in the constitution. According to the petitioners, the only
exceptions against holding any other office or employment in government are those provided in the
Constitution namely: 1. The Vice President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under
Section 3 par.2 of Article VII. 2. The secretary of justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and
Bar Council by virtue of Sec. 8 of article VIII.

CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase “unless otherwise provided in this Constitution“, the only
exceptions against holding any other office or employment in Government are those provided in the
Constitution.

It is clear that the 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the President, Vice-President, members of the
Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from holding during their tenure multiple offices or employment in
the government, except in those cases specified in the Constitution itself and as above clarified with
respect to posts held without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and
as required by the primary functions of their office, the citation of Cabinet members (then called
Ministers) as examples during the debate and deliberation on the general rule laid down for all
appointive officials should be considered as mere personal opinions which cannot override the
constitution’s manifest intent and the people’s understanding thereof. The court said, by allowing
Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries to hold at least two positions in the
government and government corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or
employment which is a direct contravention of the express mandate of Article VII, Section 13 of the
1987 Constitution which prohibits them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987
Constitution itself.

The explained that the phrase “unless otherwise provided in this constitution” must be given a literal
interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited in the constitution itself which are
Section 3 of Article VII (for VP) and Section 8 of Article VIII (for Secretary of Justice).

NITAFAN V CIR

FACTS:

Petitioners are qualified judges of the Regional Trial Court. They sought to prohibit the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court from making deductions of
withholding taxes from their salaries.

According to the petitioners, the tax withheld from their compensation as judicial officers is a violation
of Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which states that:

“The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and of judges of
lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be
decreased”.

In other words, by deducting withholding taxes, the judges asserted that their salaries are being
decreased, citing Perfecto vs. Meer and Dencia vs. David as their legal basis.

In particular, since the 1987 Constitution does not contain a provision similar to Section 6, Article XV
of the 1973 Constitution, petitioners claimed that the intent of the framers was to revert to the original
concept of “non-diminution” of salaries.

The Chief Justice had actually dealt with this matter previously in response to representations that the
Court direct its Finance Officer to discontinue the withholding of taxes from salaries of members of
the Bench. While the question has been resolved, the Court decided to settle the legal issues through
a judicial pronouncement.

ISSUE/HELD:

Whether members of the judiciary are subject to payment of income tax – YES

RATIO:

Members of the judiciary are subject to payment of income tax

This payment of income tax does not fall within the constitutional protection against decrease of their
salaries during their continuance in office. Further, the deletion of the grant of exemption from
payment of income tax to members of the Judiciary was a way of ensuring the equality of the three
branches of government.

Based on jurisprudence, it was concluded that the true intent of the framers was to make the salaries
of members of the Judiciary taxable, as is applicable to all income earners.

The course of deliberations, debates, and amendments on the draft proposal of Section 10, Article
VIII further clarified the issue:

Commissioner Cirilo Rigos’s proposal, that the term “diminished” be changed to “decreased” and that
the word “nor subjected to income tax” be deleted, was accepted.

Commissioner Joaquin G. Bernas announced that by putting a period after “decreased”, it is with the
understanding that the salaries of justices are subject to tax. He cited that this is based on the
understanding that there will be a provision in the Constitution similar to Section 6 of Article XV, the
General Provisions of the 1973 Constitution, which states that no salary of any public officer shall be
exempt from payment of income tax.

Due to these issues, Fr. Bernas stated that the ruling in Perfecto vs Meer and Dencia vs David were
not applicable anymore.