Veloso v. Martinez, 28 Phil 255 (Repeated)

4.
Administration of exclusive property

(a) By the spouse-owner, FC 110
(b) By the other spouse, FC 110(2); FC 142, 75, 227
Veloso v. Martinez, 28 Phil 255 (Repeated)

13. Manotok Realty v. CA, 149 SCRA 372 (Cerrero)
FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari by way of appeal seeking to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals which
upheld the dismissal of the petitioner's complaint for reinvidicatory action with damages against the private respondent
and ordered the petitioner to accept the payment of the balance of P2,551.85 from said respondent, and thereafter, to
execute the corresponding deed of sale of Lot 227, Block I in favor of the latter.
The private respondent Felipe Madlangawa claims that he has been occupying a parcel of land in the Clara de Tambunting
de Legarda Subdivision since 1949 upon permission being obtained from Andres Ladores, then an overseer of the
subdivision, with the understanding that the respondent would eventually buy the lot.
On April 2, 1950, the owner of the lot, Clara Tambunting, died and her entire estate, including her paraphernal properties
which covered the lot occupied by the private respondent were placed under custodia legis.
On April 22, 1950, the private respondent made a deposit for the said lot in the sum of P1,500.00 which was received by
Vicente Legarda, husband of the late owner. As evidenced by the receipt issued by Vicente Legarda, the lot consisted of an
area of 240 square meters and was sold at P30.00 per square meter. There, thus, remained an unpaid balance of P5,700.00
but the private respondent did not pay or was unable to pay this balance because after the death of the testatrix, Clara
Tambunting de Legarda, her heirs could not settle their differences. Apart from the initial deposit, no further payments
were made from 1950. On April 28, 1950, Don Vicente Legarda was appointed as a special administrator of the estate.
Meanwhile the private respondent remained in possession of the lot in question.
Subsequently, the petitioner became the successful bidder and vendee of the Tambunting de Legarda Subdivision
consisting of 44 parcels of land spread out in the districts of Tondo and Sta. Cruz, Manila, pursuant to the deeds of sale
executed in its favor by the Philippine Trust Company on March 13 and 20, 1959, as administrator of the Testate Estate of
Clara Tambunting de Legarda, in Special Proceeding No. 10809 of the Manila probate court. The lot in dispute was one of
those covered by the sale.
In its effort to clear the Tambunting Subdivision of its squatters and occupants, the petitioner caused the publication of
several notices in the Manila Times issues of January 1, 1966 and the Taliba issues of January 2, and March 16, 1966,
advising the occupants to vacate their respective premises, otherwise, court action with damages would follow. In addition
to these notices by publication, the petitioner sent circulars to the occupants to vacate.
The private respondent was one of the many occupants who refused to vacate the lots they were occupying, so that on
April 26, 1968, the petitioner filed the action below to recover the said lot.
The trial court dismissed the petitioner's action after finding that the Identity of the parcel of land described in the
complaint had not been sufficiently established as the very same piece of land in the material and physical possession of
the private respondent.
On appeal, the respondent Court of Appeals found the Identity of the lot sought to be recovered by the petitioner to be the
same as that in the physical possession of the private respondent and ruled that the only right remaining to the petitioner is
to enforce the collection of the balance because accordingly, it stepped into the shoes of its predecessor; and that since the
area now in possession of the petitioner which is that involved in the present case is only 115 square meters, the balance
after deducting the deposit of P1,500.00 is P2,551.85, and as per order of the Court of First Instance of Manila, the said
balance should be paid in 18 equal monthly installments.
Block 5 | Page 1 of 43
In this petition, the petitioner maintains that the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in holding that the sale by
Don Vicente Legarda in favor of the private respondent is valid, binding, and enforceable against the petitioner.
The petitioner contends that since there is no dispute that the property in question was the paraphernal property of Clara
Tambunting, who died on April 2, 1950, Vicente Legarda had no authority whatsoever to sell the said property to the
private respondent on May 12, 1950 since the former was appointed as administrator of the estate of Clara Tambunting
only on August 28, 1950. Therefore, the questioned sale could not have bound Clara Tambunting's estate because the
vendor Vicente Legarda neither acted as the owner nor the administrator of the subject property when the alleged sale took
place. As regards the provision in the deed of sale which it executed with the Philippine Trust Company wherein it bound
itself to respect the contracts of sale or promises to sell that may have been executed by Vicente Legarda and renounced
the right to warranty in case of eviction, the petitioner argues that this re-required respect only for those valid sales
executed by the deceased Clara Tambunting and by persons with authority to act on behalf of the estate.
On the other hand, the private respondent contends that the aforequoted provisions of the deed of sale are a declaration or
admission against the interest of the petitioner, and shows that the acts of Vicente Legarda had been ratified by the
Philippine Trust Company and approved by the probate court. The petitioner, therefore, is allegedly estopped from
questioning the authority of Vicente Legarda in selling the property in dispute.
Issue: Whether Don Vicente Legarda could validly dispose of the paraphernal property.
Ruling: NO. Decision of CA is reversed and set aside. The record does not show that Don Vicente Legarda was the
administrator of the paraphernal properties of Dona Clara Tambunting during the lifetime of the latter. Thus, it cannot be
said that the sale which was entered into by the private respondent and Don Vicente Legarda had its inception before the
death of Clara Tambunting and was entered into by the Don Vicente on behalf of Clara Tambunting but was only
consummated after her death.
Don Vicente Legarda, therefore, could not have validly disposed of the lot in dispute as a continuing administrator of the
paraphernal properties of Dona Clara Tambunting.
Art. 136 NCC. The wife retains the ownership of the paraphernal property.
Art. 137 NCC. The wife shall have the administration of the paraphernal property, unless she delivers the same to the
husband by means of a public instrument empowering him to administer it.
In this case, the public instrument shall be recorded in the Registry of Property. As for the movables, the husband shall
give adequate security.
The Court concluded that the sale between Don Vicente Legarda and the private respondent is void ab initio, the former
being neither an owner nor administrator of the subject property. Such being the case, the sale cannot be the subject of the
ratification by the Philippine Trust Company or the probate court.
After the appointment of Don Vicente Legarda as administrator of the estate of Dona Clara Tambunting, he should have
applied before the probate court for authority to sell the disputed property in favor of the private respondent. If the probate
court approved the request, then Don Vicente Legarda would have been able to execute a valid deed of sale in favor of the
respondent. But Don Vicente Legarda had no effort to comply with the above-quoted rule of procedure nor on that of the
respondent to protect his interests or to pay the balance of the installments to the court appointed administrator.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The private respondent is ordered to SURRENDER the material and physical possession of Lot No. 277, Block I to the
petitioner and to pay the latter the rentals as stated above from May, 1950 until he surrenders the said lot. The petitioner
shall reimburse the private respondent the amount of P1,500.00 with legal interest from May, 1950 or offset said amount
from the rentals due to it. Costs against the private respondent.
14. Ong vs CA, 204 SCRA 297 (Dimen)
Facts: Teodora B. Ong (wife of the petitioner) conducted her own logging business in Camarines Sur. In furtherance of
her business operation she secured from Francisco Boix (private respondent) a loan in the amount of P2,827.83.
Unfortunately, because of mismanagement, Teodora defaulted in her obligation. This prompted Boix to file a complaint,
based on the promissory notes executed by Teodora, to collect the sum legally due plus interest against Teodora and
Ramon Ong (petitioner), the latter being joined as husband of the former. Defendant-spouses were declared in default and
judgment was rendered in favor of Boix.
CFI Ruling: CFI ruled in favor of plaintiff, ordering the defendant Teodora B. Ong to pay to the plaintiff the sum
P2,827.83, with interest and the title to the property, in favor of the execution-creditor Boix was duly registered in the
Office of the Register of Deeds of Camarines Norte.
After the aforementioned decision became final and executory, Boix moved to execute the judgment. The motion was
granted and a corresponding writ of execution. Accordingly, the Sheriff of Camarines Norte levied and attached a parcel
of land situated at Diego Linan St., Daet, Camarines Norte, declared in the sole name of Teodora B. Ong, subject-parcel of
herein suit. In a notice of levy on Execution and notice of Public Auction sale dated, auction sales was held and defendant
Boix was adjudged highest bidder. A writ of possession was issued to place the execution-creditor in possession of the
property levied upon and sold on execution. Subsequently, thereafter, Ramon C. Ong filed an Omnibus motion with the
same Court of First Instance of Manila asking to quash the writ of possession, which was denied. A motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied.
Consequently, petitioner brought the case to the Court of Appeals to annul the auction sale allegedly irregularly executed
on the following grounds, namely, that the property was conjugal and thus could not be held liable for personal debts
contracted by the wife, and that there was no valid publication thus making the auction sale void. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the trial court, prompting petitioner to file a motion for reconsideration thereof. Said motion was
denied. Hence this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the said parcel of land is exclusive property of the wife (Teodora) or part of conjugal property?
Ruling: The said parcel of land is an exclusive property of Teodora. The mere use of the surname of the husband in the
tax declaration of the subject property is not sufficient proof that said property was acquired during the marriage and is
therefore conjugal. It is undisputed that the subject parcel was declared solely in the wife's name, but the house built
thereon was declared in the name of the spouses. Under such circumstances, coupled with a careful scrutiny of the records
of the present case, the Court held that the lot in question is paraphernal, and is therefore, liable for the personal debts of
the wife.
Thus, it was held in the case of Maramba vs. Lozano, that the presumption that property is conjugal (Art. 160, NCC)
refers to property acquired during the marriage. When there is no showing as to when the property was acquired by a
spouse, the fact that the title is in the spouse's name is an indication it belongs exclusively to said spouse.
As correctly pointed out by the respondent Court, the party who invokes the presumption that all property of the marriage
belongs to the conjugal partnership must first prove that the property was acquired during the marriage. Proof of
acquisition during the marriage is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal
partnership. Thus, when the property is registered in the name of the spouse only and there is no showing as to when the
property was acquired by said spouse, this is an indication that the property belongs exclusively to said spouse. And this
presumption under Art. 160 of the Civil Code cannot prevail when the title is in the name of only one spouse and the
rights of innocent third parties are involved.
Furthermore, even assuming for the sake of argument that the property in dispute is conjugal, the same may still be held
liable for the debts of the wife in this case. Under Art. 117 of the Civil Code, the wife may engage in business although the
husband may object (but subject to certain conditions). It is clear from the records that the wife was engaged in the
logging business with the husband's knowledge and apparently without any objection on his part. The acts of the husband
show that he gave his implied consent to the wife's engagement in business.
Let it be noted that due to the length of time that this case has remained pending, private respondents Francisco Boix and
Arsenio Camino have allegedly already died in the process. No proper substitution of parties have apparently been made.
Nevertheless, despite such supervening events, for failure on the part of petitioner to show any grave abuse of discretion
or reversible error committed by respondent appellate court, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decision.
Besides, the decision of the trial court is in accordance with law and the evidence presented.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit without pronouncement as to costs.
5. Encumbrance/disposition of exclusive property

FC 111-112, of FC 236, amended by RA 6809
15. Wong et al. v. IAC 200 SCRA 792 (Delocario)

Doctrine: Under the Civil Code (before the effectivity of the FC on August 3, 1988), a wife may bind the conjugal
partnership only when she purchases things necessary for the support of the family or when she borrows money for the
purpose of purchasing things necessary for the support of the family if the husband fails to deliver the proper sum; when
the administration of the conjugal partnership is transferred to the wife by the courts or by the husband and when the wife
gives moderate donations for charity. Having failed to establish that any of these circumstances occurred, the Wongs may
not bind the conjugal assets to answer for Katrina's personal obligation to them.
Petitioners: SPOUSES RICKY WONG and ANITA CHAN, LEONARDO JOSON, JUANITO SANTOS, EMERITO
SICAT and CONRADO LAGMAN
Respondents: HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ROMARICO HENSON
Facts: Romarico Henson married Katrina Pineda on January 6, 1964.1 They have three children but even during the early
years of their marriage, Romarico and Katrina had been most of the time living separately. The Romarico stayed in
Angeles City while Katrina lived in Manila. During the marriage or on January 6, 1971, Romarico bought a 1,787 square-
meter parcel of land in Angeles City for P11,492 from his father, Dr. Celestino L. Henson with money borrowed from an
officemate. His father allocated the amount for investments in Angeles City and Palawan.
In Hongkong sometime in June 1972, Katrina entered into an agreement with Anita Chan whereby Anita
consigned to Katrina pieces of jewelry for sale valued at P321,830.95.4 When Katrina failed to return the pieces of
jewelry within the 20-day period agreed upon, Anita Chan demanded payment of their value. Katrina issued in favor of
Anita Chan a check for P55,000 which, however, was dishonored for lack of funds. Hence, Katrina was charged with
estafa before the then Court of First Instance of Pampanga and Angeles City. After trial, the lower court rendered a
decision dismissing the case on the ground that Katrina's liability was not criminal but civil in nature as no estafa was
committed by the issuance of the check in payment of a pre-existing obligation.
The spouses Anita Chan and Ricky Wong filed action for collection of the sum of money against Katrina and her
husband Romarico. The reply with counterclaim filed was only in behalf of Katrina. Trial court ruled in favor of the
Wongs then a writ of execution was thereafter issued upon the 4 lots in Angeles City all in the name of Romarico Henson
married to Katrina Henson. 2 of the lots were sold at public auction to Juanito Santos and the other two with Leonardo
Joson. A month before such redemption, Romarico filed an action for annulment of the decision including the writ and
levy of execution.
The CFI found that there was no basis for holding the conjugal partnership liable for the personal indebtedness of
Katrina, ruled in favor of reconveyance in view of the jurisprudence that the interest of the wife in the conjugal
partnership property being inchoate and therefore merely an expectancy, the same may not be sold or disposed of for value
until after the liquidation and settlement of the community assets.
The IAC ruled the same, that the conjugal property may not be credited for his wife’s debt payment. It noted that
the properties are Romarico' s exclusive capital having been bought by him with his own funds. But granting that
the properties are conjugal, they cannot answer for Katrina's obligations as the latter were exclusively hers because
they were incurred without the consent of her husband, they were not for the daily expenses of the family and they
did not redound to the benefit of the family. The court underscored the fact that no evidence has been submitted that the
administration of the conjugal partnership had been transferred to Katrina either by Romarico or by the court before said
obligations were incurred.
Issue: Whether or not the execution of a decision in an action for collection of a sum of money may be nullified on the
grounds that the real properties levied upon and sold at public auction are the alleged exclusive properties of a husband
who did not participate in his wife's business transaction from which said action stemmed. No, the properties are not
proven to be exclusive, it belongs to their conjugal property. However, an order of payment may not be imposed on
the conjugal property if the debt was contracted without the husband’s consent and if it did not benefit the family.
Ruling: Romarico and Katrina had in fact been separated when Katrina entered into a business deal with Anita Wong. The
husband had nothing to do with the business transactions of Katrina nor authorized her to enter into such. The properties
in Angeles were acquired during the marriage with unclear proof where the husband obtained the money to repay the loan.
Hence, it is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership in the absence of proof that they are exclusive property of the
husband and even though they had been living separately.
The conjugal nature of the properties notwithstanding, Katrina's indebtedness may not be paid for with them her
obligation not having been shown by the petitioners to be one of the charges against the conjugal partnership. In addition
to the fact that her rights over the properties are merely inchoate prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the
consent of her husband and her authority to incur such indebtedness had not been alleged in the complaint and proven at
the trial.
Under the Civil Code (before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988), a wife may bind the conjugal
partnership only when she purchases things necessary for the support of the family or when she borrows money for the
purpose of purchasing things necessary for the support of the family if the husband fails to deliver the proper sum; when
the administration of the conjugal partnership is transferred to the wife by the courts33 or by the husband34 and when the
wife gives moderate donations for charity. Having failed to establish that any of these circumstances occurred, the Wongs
may not bind the conjugal assets to answer for Katrina's personal obligation to them.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the decisions of the appellate court and the lower court in Civil Case No. 28-09 are hereby
AFFIRMED subject to the modifications above stated. No costs.
6. What constitutes CPG

(a) Definition, FC 106
(b) Presumption of CPG, FC 116
Dewara v Lamela, GR 179010, April 11, 2011 (Dacua) (Repeated)
16. De La Pena v Avila, G.R. No. 187490, Feb. 8, 2012 (Evangelista)

Doctrine: Pursuant to Article 160 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, all property of the marriage is presumed to belong
to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Although it is not
necessary to prove that the property was acquired with funds of the partnership, proof of acquisition during the
marriage is an essential condition for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership.
Facts: Antonia Dela Pena (Petitioner) owned a 277 square meter parcel of residential land in Marikina City and the
property was registered under Antonia De La Pena -Married to Antegono dela Pena. On May 7, 1996, Antonia obtained a
loan from A.C. Aguila & Sons for 250k. Antonia also executed in favor of Aguila a notarized Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage over the property, for the purpose of securing the payment of said loan obligation. On Nov 4 1997, Antonia sold
the property to Gemma Avila (respondent) for 600k thus Gemma registered the land to her name. On Nov 26 1997,
Gemma mortgaged the land to Far East Bank and Trust Company (now Bank of the Philippine Islands) - FEBTC-BPI to
secure a loan of 1.2 million. On Mar 3 1998, Antonia filed with the Register of Deeds of Marikina an Affidavit of Adverse
Claim stating that she was the lawful owner of the property under the name of Gemma and that the Deed of Sale to
Gemma was simulated. However, because Gemma had not paid the accumulated interest and penalties on the loans she
took for the land, FEBTC-BPI foreclosed on the property and had a public auction for the highest bidder for ownership.
FEBTC-BPI later consolidated its ownership over the property and registered it under its name.
May 18 1998, Antonia and her son, Alvin Dela Pena, filed against Gemma a complaint for annulment of deed of sale in
the RTC of Marikina. They contended that the land was conjugal property and that Antonia’s husband (deceased) had not
consented to the mortgage for the land in favor of Gemma and that Gemma had shortened the intended maturity date of
the mortgage from 1998 to 1997 because she took advantage of her close relationship with Antonia. They further assert
that they had been misled by Gemma when Antonia executed the sale of the land in favor of Gemma because she had told
them it was necessary to get a loan from FEBTC-BPI thus the Deed of Absolute sale should be nullified because it was
derogatory of Alvin’s successional rights. The Dela Penas sought for reconveyance of the property as well as moral and
exemplary damages with legal fees.
Gemma Avila, asserted that the land was the exclusive property of Antonia and that Antonia had misrepresented that her
husband was still alive. Gemma stated that Antonia had failed to pay the 250k loan she took from Aguila and approached
Gemma for help to prevent the foreclosure of the land thus Gemma settled the loan and gave Antonia a 50k loan with 10%
interest per month. Antonia had allegedly agreed to use the land as collateral for the loan Gemma acquired from FEBTC-
BPI for 1.2 million where Gemma took the money Antonia owed her.
RTC: Property was conjugal in nature and the Deed of Sale in favor to Gemma was void as a disposition without the
liquidation required under Art 130 of the Family Code and ordered FEBTC-BPI to reconvey the land to the Dela Penas.
CA: Reversed decision of RTC for: failure to prove the property was acquired during the marriage and Antonia had
misled Gemma that the property was exclusively hers
Issue: WON the property may be presumed as part of the conjugal property of Antonia and Antegono?
Ruling: Francisco v. Court of Appeals held that:Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that "all property of the
marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband
or to the wife." However, the party who invokes this presumption must first prove that the property in controversy was
acquired during the marriage.
As the parties invoking the presumption of conjugality under Article 160 of the Civil Code, the Dela Peñas did not even
come close to proving that the subject property was acquired during the marriage between Antonia and Antegono. Beyond
Antonia’s bare and uncorroborated assertion that the property was purchased when she was already married, the record is
bereft of any evidence from which the actual date of acquisition of the realty can be ascertained. When queried about the
matter during his cross-examination, even Alvin admitted that his sole basis for saying that the property was owned by his
parents was Antonia’s unilateral pronouncement to the effect. Considering that the presumption of conjugality does not
operate if there is no showing of when the property alleged to be conjugal was acquired, we find that the CA cannot be
faulted for ruling that the realty in litigation was Antonia’s exclusive property. In Ruiz v. CA, the court ruled that the
phrase “married to” is merely descriptive of the civil status of the wife and cannot be interpreted to mean that the husband
is also a registered owner.
Quiao v Quiao, G. R. No. 183622, July 4, 2012 (Repeated)
(c) What are included in CPG, FC 117, 115, 118, 119, 120
17. Villanueva vs CA, 427 SCRA 439 (Escudero)

Doctrine: FC shall apply to conjugal partnerships established before the FC without prejudice to vested rights already
acquired under the Civil Code or other laws. Thus, under the FC, if the properties are acquired during the marriage, the
presumption is that they are conjugal. The burden of proof is on the party claiming that they are not conjugal.
Facts:
1. Eusebia, is the legal wife of defendant Nicolas, having been married on October 7, 1926. Out of lawful wedlock,
they begot five (5) children. Spouses Retuya resided at Mandaue City, Cebu.
2. During their marriage, they acquired real properties and all improvements situated in Mandaue, and Consolacion,
Cebu. Nicolas is the co-owner of a parcel of land situated in Mandaue City which he inherited from his parents as
well as the purchasers of hereditary shares of approximately eight (8) parcels of land in Mandaue City. Some of
the properties earn income from coconuts leased to corporations.
3. In 1945, Nicolas no longer lived with his legitimate family and cohabited with defendant, Pacita Villanueva,
wherein Procopio Villanueva, is their illegitimate son. Nicolas, then, was the only person who received the
income of the properties. Pacita, from the time she started living in concubinage with Nicolas, has no occupation.
She had no properties of her own from which she could derive income. From the time Nicolas suffered stroke
until the present, his illegitimate son is already the one who has been receiving the income of his properties.
4. In October 1988, Eusebia Retuya filed a complaint before the trial court against her husband Nicolas Retuya,
Pacita Villanueva and Procopio Villanueva.
5. Eusebia sought the reconveyance from Nicolas and Pacita of several properties (subject properties), claiming that
such are her conjugal properties with Nicolas.
6. Settlement between parties was asked but not met.
7. Trial court in favor of Eusebia Natuya.
8. Petitioners appealed. Eusebia died, and was then substituted by her heirs.
9. CA upheld trial court’s decision
Issue: Whether or not the subject properties acquired during the marriage between Eusebia and Procopio are conjugal.
Ruling: YES, they are conjugal. Petition denied; decision of CA affirmed.

The FC provisions on conjugal partnerships govern the property relations between Nicolas and Eusebia even if they were
married before the effectivity of the FC. Article 105 of the FC explicitly mandates that the FC shall apply to conjugal
partnerships established before the FC without prejudice to vested rights already acquired under the Civil Code or other
laws. Thus, under the FC, if the properties are acquired during the marriage, the presumption is that they are conjugal. The
burden of proof is on the party claiming that they are not conjugal. This is counterbalanced by the requirement that the
properties must first be proven to have been acquired during the marriage before they are presumed conjugal.
Nicolas and Eusebia were married on 7 October 1926. Nicolas and Pacita started cohabiting in 1936. Eusebia died on 23
November 1996. Pacita and Nicolas were married on 16 December 1996. Petitioners themselves admit that Lot No. 152
was purchased on 4 October 1957. The date of acquisition of Lot No. 152 is clearly during the marriage of Nicolas and
Eusebia. Since the subject properties, including Lot No. 152, were acquired during the marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia,
the presumption under Article 116 of the Family Code is that all these are conjugal properties of Nicolas and Eusebia.
18. Mendoza v. Reyes 124 SCRA 154 (Garcia)

Doctrine: Property acquired during a marriage is presumed to be conjugal and the fact that the land is later registered in
the name of only one of the spouses does not destroy its conjugal nature. If the fact that property acquired during marriage
was registered in the name of the husband alone does not affect its conjugal nature, neither does registration in the name
of the wife.
Facts: Ponciano Reyes and Julia de Reyes were married in 1915. The properties in question consisting of Lots 5 and 6
situated in QC, which were bought on installment basis. Thus, the spouses jointly obtained a loan to pay their balance. The
corresponding deed of absolute sale was executed where the vendee named is 'Julia de Reyes'. Her signatures appear over
the caption vendee and those of Ponciano under the phrase: 'with my marital consent. As a result of these sales, TCTs were
issued in the name of "JULIA REYES married to PONCIANO REYES."
While Ponciano was absent attending his farm in Pampanga, Julia sold absolutely the lots in question to Sps. Efren V.
Mendoza and Inocencia R. De Mendoza, as vendees, without the knowledge and consent of Ponciano. At the same time
the spouses were living separately and were not in speaking terms.
Ponciano filed a complaint for the annulment of a deed of sale of two parcels of land contending that said properties were
conjugal properties of himself and his wife and that she had sold them to petitioners "all by herself" and without his
knowledge or consent.
Petitioner Mendozas alleged that the properties were paraphernal properties of Julia and that they had purchased the same
in good faith and for adequate consideration. Julia testified that she bought the two parcels of land on installment basis
and that the first payment came from her personal funds.
CFI: declared the properties exclusive and paraphernal properties of Julia and ruled that she could validly dispose of the
same without the consent of her husband.
Issue: Are the disputed properties conjugal properties? – Yes.
Ruling: Yes. The deed of sale is declared null and void with respect to one- half share of Ponciano.
Article 153 of the Civil Code provides:

“The following are conjugal partnership property: That which is acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the
expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses;
It is sufficient to prove that the property was acquired during the marriage in order that the same may be deemed conjugal
property. There is no question that the disputed property was acquired by onerous title during the marriage.”
Records show that the funds came from loans obtained by the spouses. Under NCC 161, all debts and obligations
contracted by the husband and the wife for the benefit of the conjugal partnership are liabilities of the partnership.
Julia’s claim of exclusive ownership is belied by the Income Tax Returns which she herself prepared and filed in behalf of
the conjugal partnership wherein she made the statement that the rentals paid to her were income of the conjugal
partnership, and she made to appear the properties in question as capital assets of the conjugal partnership.
Property acquired during a marriage is presumed to be conjugal and the fact that the land is later registered in the name of
only one spouse does not destroy its conjugal nature. If the fact that property acquired during marriage was registered in
the name of the husband alone does not affect its conjugal nature, neither does registration in the name of the wife.
19. Aguete v PNB, GR 170166, April 6, 2011 (Hechanova)

Topic: What constitutes CPG; What are included in CPG
Facts: Ros (husband) obtained a loan (P115k) and executed a real estate mortgage. Upon maturity, the loan remained
outstanding. As a result, PNB instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings. A certificate of sale was issued in favor of
PNB. Said property was then registered in the name of PNB after 1 year had passed without the property being redeemed.
Aguete (wife) then filed a complaint to declare the deed of real estate mortgage and foreclosure proceedings void on the
following grounds: (1) She had no knowledge of the loan. (2) She did not give her consent the mortgage, (3) He
signatures were forged by her husband. (4) The loan did not redound to the benefit of the family.
On the other hand, PNB prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the spouses were barred from
recovering the property because of estoppel, laches, abandonment and prescription.
RTC ruling: The RTC granted the spouses’ petition. It declared the deed of real estate mortgage and foreclosure
proceedings void on the following grounds: (1) The wife did not sign the loan documents nor appeared before the Notary
public to acknowledge the execution of the same. (2) The wife did not receive the loan proceeds and was not aware of the
loan until PNB notified her that she and her family should vacate the mortgaged property. (3) Under the NCC (governing
law), the husband could not encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wife’s consent. The wife
may (a) during the marriage, and (b) within 10 years from the transaction file an action to annul the contract.
CA ruling: The CA reversed the decision of the RTC on the following grounds: (1) The RTC concluded forgery without
adequate proof. (2) The conjugal partnership is still liable because the loan proceeds redounded to the benefit of the
family. The loan was used to expand the family business. Therefore, the loan is chargeable against the conjugal
partnership.
Issue: WON the real estate mortgage executed by the husband is chargeable against the conjugal partnership - YES
Ruling: SC affirmed the decision of CA and ruled in favor of PNB. The following points were raised:
1. The property is considered part of the conjugal partnership of gains because (a) it was acquired during the marriage,
(b) it was mortgaged to PNB during the mortgage, (c) the NCC was the governing law at the time of the mortgage.
NCC 153. Conjugal partnership property includes (either or both the spouses):
(a) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage
(b) Those obtained by industry, work, or as salary
(c) Fruits, rents or interests received or due during marriage (either from common property or exclusive property)
NCC 160. All property of the marriage is presumed conjugal, unless proven to be exclusive property of the spouse.
2. The wife consented to the encumbrance of the property, as evidenced by the certificate of acknowledgement given by
the notary public. The contract is therefore a public document and cannot be disproved by mere denial of the alleged
signer. A notarized document carries with it the presumption of regularity. Also, the spouses did not present a
handwriting expert who could declare that the wife’s signatures were forged. Moreover, they later admitted that the
husband forged the signatures.
NCC 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis (unsound mind), spendthrift, or is under civil
interdiction, or is confined in a leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal
partnership without the wife’s consent. If she unreasonably refuses to give her consent, the court may compel her to
grant the same.
NCC 173. The wife may (a) during the marriage, and (b) within 10 years from the transaction file an action to annul
the contract of the husband entered into without her consent when: (a) consent is required, (b) contract defrauds or
impairs her interest in the conjugal partnership property.
Should the wife fail to exercise this, she or her heirs may demand the value of the property fraudulently alienated by
the husband, after the dissolution of the marriage.
3. The loan application shows that the loan would be used exclusively for “additional working capital of buy & sell of
garlic and virginia tobacco. Debts contracted by the husband for and in the exercise of the industry or profession by
which he contributes to the support of the family cannot be deemed his exclusive debts. The husband’s loan
redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Hence, the debt is chargeable to the conjugal partnership.
NCC 161. Conjugal partnership shall be liable for:
(a) All debts and obligations contracted by the husband/wife for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership.
(b) Arrears or income due from obligations which constitute a charge upon exclusive property or of the
partnership.
(c) Minor repairs or for mere preservation upon the separate property; major repairs upon separate property
not charged to the partnership.
(d) Major or minor repairs upon the conjugal partnership property.
(e) Maintenance of the family, and the education of the (a) children of both spouses, and of (b) legitimate
children of one spouse
(f) Expenses to permit the spouses to complete a professional, vocational or other course
(d) If property bought by installments, FC Art. 118
20. Jovellanos v CA, G.R. No. 100728 June 18, 1992 (Jimenea)
Doctrine: In a contract to sell or a conditional sale, ownership is not transferred upon delivery of property but upon full
payment of the purchase price. This is usually known as pactum reservati dominii (or contractual reservation of title) and
is common in sales on the installment plan. Compliance with the stipulated payments is a suspensive condition, the failure
of which prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey title from acquiring binding force.
Facts: On September 2, 1955, Daniel Jovellanos and Philippine American Life Insurance Company (Philamlife) entered
into a lease and conditional sale agreement over Lot 8, Block 3 of Philamlife’s Quezon City Development Project
including a bungalow located and known as No. 55 South Maya Drive, Philamlife Homes, Quezon City. At this time, he
was still married to Leonor Dizon with whom he had 3 children(petitioners). Unfortunately, Leonor died on January 2,
1959. On May 30, 1967, Daniel was remarried to Annette (respondent).
On December 18, 1971, Mercy (daughter from first marriage; one of the petitioners) and Gil Martinez (her husband), built
an extension at the back of the said property. On January 8, 1975, the lease was paid and Philamlife executed a deed of
absolute sale to Daniel. The following day, he then donated the said property to his children in the first marriage
(petitioners). On September 8, 1985, Daniel died and his death spawned the present controversy(Civil Case Q-52058).
Annette now claims that the said property is the conjugal property belonging to the second marriage due to the fact that
the deed of absolute sale was dated during the celebration of their marriage (Jan. 8, 1975). However, petitioners claim that
the property were acquired by their parents (1st marriage) because of the lease and conditional sale agreement with
Philamlife on September 2, 1955.
RTC ruled that Annette Jovellanos as pro-indiviso owner of the ½ of property.
CA ruled that the full ownership of the subject property was only transferred to Daniel Javellanos upon full payment of
the stipulated price giving rise to the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale on January 8, 1975.
Issue: Whether or not the lot and bungalow covered by the lease and conditional sale agreement is the conjugal property
of the second marriage of the late Daniel Jovellanos with Annette. = YES
Ruling: The basic rule is that a contract which is not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy
has the force of law between the contracting parties should be complied with in good faith. The contract entered into by
Daniel Jovellanos is specified as “Lease and Conditional Sale Agreement” in which the property involved a lease period
of 20 years and a monthly rental of P288.87 by which Daniel as lessee-vendee had only the right of possession over the
property and Philamlife as lessor merely transferred the temporary use and enjoyment of said property. In his capacity as
lessee-vendee, he abided by all rules and regulations of Philamlife with regards to the use and preservation of the property.
In a contract to sell or a conditional sale, ownership is not transferred upon delivery of property but upon full payment of
the purchase price. This is usually known as pactum reservati dominii (or contractual reservation of title) and is common
in sales on the installment plan. Compliance with the stipulated payments is a suspensive condition, the failure of which
prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey title from acquiring binding force.
In this case, his monthly payments were in the form of rentals with the agreement that if he faithfully complied with all
the stipulations in the contract, the same would be in effect be considered as amortization payments to be applied to the
predetermined price of said property. Although he had been in possession of the said property since September 2, 1955, it
was only on January 8, 1975 that Philamlife executed the deed of absolute sale in Jovellanos’ favor. With this, it is evident
that Daniel Jovellanos evidently did not possess or enjoy such rights of ownership.
Article 256 of the Family Code states that: “This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or
impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws”. The right of Daniel Jovellanos is
merely an inchoate and expectant right which would only ripen into a vested right only upon his acquisition of ownership
which was contingent upon his full payment of the rentals and compliance with all his contractual obligations. Thus, for a
property right to be vested, there must be a transition from the potential or contingent to the actual and the proprietary
interest must have attached to a thing, it must have become fixed or established and is no longer open to doubt or
controversy. Thus, upon the execution of said deed of absolute sale on January 8, 1975, full ownership was vested
into Daniel Jovellanos and as early as 1967, he was already married to Annette, this property necessarily belonged
to his conjugal partnership with his second wife. The Court also ordered that reimbursements to the children of his first
wife should be made in line with the pertinent provisions of Article 118 of the Family Code. Depriving the children from
the first will be unfair due to the fact that the lease was contracted during the first marriage, wherein a portion of the
payment came from.
21. Tarrosa vs. De Leon, GR 185063, July 23, 2009 (Labrador)
Doctrine: In a contract to sell, ownership is retained by the seller and is not passed to the buyer until full payment of the
price, unlike in a contract of sale where title passes upon delivery of the thing sold.
Facts: On July 20, 1965, Bonifacio O. De Leon, then single, and the People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation
(PHHC) entered into a Conditional Contract to Sell for the purchase on installment of a 191.30 square-meter lot situated
in Fairview, Quezon City. Subsequently, on April 24, 1968, Bonifacio married Anita de Leon in a civil rite. To this union
were born Danilo and Vilma.
Following the full payment of the cost price for the lot thus purchased, PHHC executed, on June 22, 1970, a Final Deed of
Sale in favor of Bonifacio. Accordingly, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 173677 was issued in the name of
Bonifacio, “single.” Subsequently, Bonifacio, for PhP 19,000, sold the subject lot to her sister, Lita, and husband Felix Rio
Tarrosa (Tarrosas), petitioners herein. The conveying Deed of Sale dated January 12, 1974 (Deed of Sale) did not bear the
written consent and signature of Anita.
Thereafter, or on May 23, 1977, Bonifacio and Anita renewed their vows in a church wedding at St. John the Baptist
Parish in San Juan, Manila. On February 29, 1996, Bonifacio died. Three months later, the Tarrosas registered the Deed of
Sale and had TCT No. 173677 canceled. They secured the issuance in their names of TCT No. N-173911 from the Quezon
City Register of Deeds.
Getting wind of the cancellation of their father’s title and the issuance of TCT No. N-173911, Danilo and Vilma filed on
May 19, 2003 a Notice of Adverse Claim before the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to protect their rights over the
subject property. Very much later, Anita, Danilo, and Vilma filed a reconveyance suit before the RTC in Quezon City. In
their complaint, Anita and her children alleged, among other things, that fraud attended the execution of the Deed of Sale
and that subsequent acts of Bonifacio would show that he was still the owner of the parcel of land. The Tarrosas, in their
Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, averred that the lot Bonifacio sold to them was his exclusive property inasmuch
as he was still single when he acquired it from PHHC. As further alleged, they were not aware of the supposed marriage
between Bonifacio and Anita at the time of the execution of the Deed of Sale.
Issue: WON the lot in question was the conjugal property of Bonifacio and Anita. YES.
RTC Ruling: Rendered judgment in favor of Anita and her children.
CA Ruling: The CA rendered a decision affirmatory of that of the RTC. Just like the RTC, the CA held that the Tarrosas
failed to overthrow the legal presumption that the parcel of land in dispute was conjugal.
SC Ruling: Petitioners assert that, since Bonifacio purchased the lot from PHHC on installment before he married Anita,
the land was Bonifacio’s exclusive property and not conjugal, even though some installments were paid and the title was
issued to Bonifacio during the marriage.
We disagree. Article 160 of the 1950 Civil Code, the governing provision in effect at the time Bonifacio and Anita
contracted marriage, provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership unless it
is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or the wife. Only proof of acquisition during the marriage is needed to
raise the presumption that the property is conjugal. In fact, even when the manner in which the properties were acquired
does not appear, the presumption will still apply, and the properties will still be considered conjugal.
In the case at bar, ownership over what was once a PHHC lot and covered by the PHHC-Bonifacio Conditional Contract
to Sell was only transferred during the marriage of Bonifacio and Anita. It is well settled that a conditional sale is akin, if
not equivalent, to a contract to sell. In both types of contract, the efficacy or obligatory force of the vendor’s obligation to
transfer title is subordinated to the happening of a future and uncertain event, usually the full payment of the purchase
price, so that if the suspensive condition does not take place, the parties would stand as if the conditional obligation had
never existed. In other words, in a contract to sell, ownership is retained by the seller and is not passed to the buyer
until full payment of the price, unlike in a contract of sale where title passes upon delivery of the thing sold.
Such is the situation obtaining in the instant case. The conditional contract to sell executed by and between Bonifacio and
PHHC on July 20, 1965 provided that ownership over and title to the property will vest on Bonifacio only upon execution
of the final deed of sale which, in turn, will be effected upon payment of the full purchase price. Evidently, title to the
property in question only passed to Bonifacio after he had fully paid the purchase price on June 22, 1970. This full
payment, to stress, was made more than two (2) years after his marriage to Anita on April 24, 1968. In net effect, the
property was acquired during the existence of the marriage; as such, ownership to the property is, by law, presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership.
Petitioners’ argument that the disputed lot was Bonifacio’s exclusive property, since it was registered solely in his name, is
untenable. The mere registration of a property in the name of one spouse does not destroy its conjugal nature. What is
material is the time when the property was acquired.
There can be no quibbling that Anita’s conformity to the sale of the disputed lot to petitioners was never obtained or at
least not formally expressed in the conveying deed. It cannot be over-emphasized that the 1950 Civil Code is very explicit
on the consequence of the husband alienating or encumbering any real property of the conjugal partnership without the
wife’s consent. To a specific point, the sale of a conjugal piece of land by the husband, as administrator, must, as a rule, be
with the wife’s consent. Else, the sale is not valid. Accordingly, the Deed of Sale executed on January 12, 1974 between
Bonifacio and the Tarrosas covering the PHHC lot is void.
Even on the supposition that Bonifacio only sold his portion of the conjugal partnership, the sale is still theoretically void,
for, as previously stated, the right of the husband or the wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest until the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership.
(e) Credits due, FC 119
(f) Improvements on CPG property, FC 120
22. Munoz, Jr. v Ramirez, GR 156125, August 25, 2010 (Maligat)

Doctrine: Properties acquired by gratuitous title by either spouse during the marriage, shall be excluded from the
community property and be the exclusive property of each spouse.
Facts: The subject of this case is a 77-square meter residential house and lot located at 170 A. Bonifacio Street,
Mandaluyong City (subject property) covered by TCT No. 7650 of the Registry of Deeds of Mandaluyong City in the
name of petitioner Munoz. Meanwhile, the residential lot in the subject property was previously covered by TCT No.
1427, in the name of Erlinda Ramirez, married to Eliseo Carlos (respondents).
On April 6, 1989, respondent Eliseo, a BIR employee, mortgaged TCT No. 1427, with respondent Erlinda’s consent, to
the GSIS to secure a P136,500.00 housing loan, payable within 20 years, through monthly salary deductions of P1,687.66.
Respondents then constructed a 36-square meter, 2 storey residential house on the lot.
On July 14, 1993, the title to the subject property was transferred to the petitioner Munoz by virtue of a Deed of Absolute
Sale, dated April 30, 1992, executed by Erlinda, for herself and as attorney-in-fact of Eliseo, for a stated consideration of
₱602,000.00.
On September 24, 1993, the respondents filed a complaint with the RTC for the nullification of the deed of absolute sale,
claiming that there was no sale but only a mortgage transaction, and the documents transferring the title to the petitioner
Munoz’s name were falsified.
The respondents alleged that in April 1992, the petitioner Munoz granted them a ₱600,000.00 loan, to be secured by a first
mortgage on TCT No. 1427; the petitioner Munoz gave Erlinda a ₱200,000.00 advance to cancel the GSIS mortgage, and
made her sign a document purporting to be the mortgage contract; the petitioner Munoz promised to give the ₱402,000.00
balance when Erlinda surrenders TCT No. 1427 with the GSIS mortgage cancelled, and submits an affidavit signed by
Eliseo stating that he waives all his rights to the subject property; with the ₱200,000.00 advance, Erlinda paid GSIS
₱176,445.27 to cancel the GSIS mortgage on TCT No. 1427 in May 1992, Erlinda surrendered to the petitioner the clean
TCT No. 1427, but returned Eliseo’s affidavit, unsigned; since Eliseo’s affidavit was unsigned, the petitioner Munoz
refused to give the ₱402,000.00 balance and to cancel the mortgage, and demanded that Erlinda return the ₱200,000.00
advance; since Erlinda could not return the ₱200,000.00 advance because it had been used to pay the GSIS loan, the
petitioner Munoz kept the title; and in 1993, they discovered that TCT No. 7650 had been issued in the petitioner Munoz’s
name, cancelling TCT No.1427 in their name.
The petitioner Munoz countered that there was a valid contract of sale. He alleged that the respondents sold the subject
property to him after he refused their offer to mortgage the subject property because they lacked paying capacity and were
unwilling to pay the incidental charges; the sale was with the implied promise to repurchase within one year, during which
period (from May 1, 1992 to April 30, 1993), the respondents would lease the subject property for a monthly rental of
₱500.00; when the respondents failed to repurchase the subject property within the one-year period despite notice, he
caused the transfer of title in his name on July 14, 1993;when the respondents failed to pay the monthly rentals despite
demand, he filed an ejectment case against them with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 60, Mandaluyong
City, on September 8, 1993, or sixteen days before the filing of the RTC case for annulment of the deed of absolute sale.
RTC: Dismissed the complaint. Claimed that the subject property was Erlinda’s exclusive paraphernal property that was
inherited from her father. Also upheld the sale to petitioner Munoz even without Eliseo’s consent as the deed of absolute
sale bore the genuine signatures of Erlinda and the petitioner as vendor and vendee, respectively. It concluded that the
NBI finding that Eliseo’s signatures in the special power of attorney and in the affidavit were forgeries was immaterial
because Eliseo’s consent to the sale was not necessary.
CA: Applied second paragraph of Art. 158 of the Civil Code. Held that the subject property, originally Erlinda’s exclusive
paraphernal property, became conjugal property when it was used as collateral for a housing loan that was paid through
conjugal funds – Eliseo’s monthly salary deductions; the subject property, therefore, cannot be validly sold or mortgaged
without Eliseo’s consent, pursuant to Article 124 of the FC. Thus, the CA declared void the deed of absolute sale, and set
aside the RTC decision.
Issue: Is the subject property paraphernal or conjugal?
SC Ruling: THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS ERLINDA’S EXCLUSIVE PARAPHERNAL PROPERTY. As a general

rule, all property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or
registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved.
In the present case, clear evidence that Erlinda inherited the residential lot from her father has sufficiently rebutted this
presumption of conjugal ownership. Pursuant to Articles 92 and 109 of the Family Code, properties acquired by gratuitous
title by either spouse, during the marriage, shall be excluded from the community property and be the exclusive property
of each spouse. The residential lot, therefore, is Erlinda’s exclusive paraphernal property.
The CA, however, held that the residential lot became conjugal when the house was built thereon through conjugal funds,
applying the second paragraph of Article 158 of the Civil Code and Calimlim-Canullas. Under the second paragraph of
Article 158 of the Civil Code, a land that originally belonged to one spouse becomes conjugal upon the construction of
improvements thereon at the expense of the partnership. We applied this provision in Calimlim-Canullas, where we held
that when the conjugal house is constructed on land belonging exclusively to the husband, the land ipso facto becomes
conjugal, but the husband is entitled to reimbursement of the value of the land at the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership.
The provisions of this Chapter [on the Conjugal Partnership of Gains] shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains
already established between spouses before the effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to vested rights already
acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws, as provided in Article 256.
Thus, in determining the nature of the subject property, we refer to the provisions of the Family Code, and not the Civil
Code, except with respect to rights then already vested.
Article 120 of the Family Code, which supersedes Article 158 of the Civil Code, provides the solution in determining the
ownership of the improvements that are made on the separate property of the spouses, at the expense of the partnership or
through the acts or efforts of either or both spouses. Under this provision, when the cost of the improvement and any
resulting increase in value are more than the value of the property at the time of the improvement, the entire property of
one of the spouses shall belong to the conjugal partnership, subject to reimbursement of the value of the property of the
owner-spouse at the time of the improvement; otherwise, said property shall be retained in ownership by the owner-
spouse, likewise subject to reimbursement of the cost of the improvement.
In the present case, we find that Eliseo paid a portion only of the GSIS loan through monthly salary deductions. From
April 6, 1989 to April 30, 1992, Eliseo paid about ₱60,755.76, not the entire amount of the GSIS housing loan plus
interest, since the petitioner advanced the ₱176,445.27 paid by Erlinda to cancel the mortgage in 1992. Considering the
₱136,500.00 amount of the GSIS housing loan, it is fairly reasonable to assume that the value of the residential lot is
considerably more than the ₱60,755.76 amount paid by Eliseo through monthly salary deductions.
Thus, the subject property remained the exclusive paraphernal property of Erlinda at the time she contracted with the
petitioner; the written consent of Eliseo to the transaction was not necessary. The NBI finding that Eliseo’s signatures in
the special power of attorney and affidavit were forgeries was immaterial.
Nonetheless, the RTC and the CA apparently failed to consider the real nature of the contract between the parties.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, we hereby DENY the present petition. The assailed decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 57126 are AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
1. The Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 30, 1992 is hereby declared an equitable mortgage; and
2. The petitioner is obligated to RECONVEY to the respondents the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
7650 of the Register of Deeds of Mandaluyong City, UPON THE PAYMENT OF ₱200,000.00, with 12% legal interest
from April 30, 1992, by respondents within NINETY DAYS FROM THE FINALITY OF THIS DECISION.
Costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED.
7. Charges upon and obligations of CPG, FC 121, 122
23. Mariano vs CA, 174 SCRA 59 (Maravillas)
Doctrine: Section 17, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, authorizes a "third person," i.e., "any other person than the judgment
debtor or his agent," to vindicate "his claim to the property by any proper action." The "proper action" referred to in the
section "is and should be an entirely separate and distinct action from that in which execution has issued, if instituted by a
stranger to the latter suit:" and in "such separate action, the court may issue a writ of preliminary injunction against the
sheriff enjoining him from proceeding with the execution sale." "Upon the other hand, if the claim of impropriety on the
part of the sheriff in the execution proceedings is made by a party to the action, not a stranger thereto, any relief therefrom
may be applied for with, and obtained from, only the executing court; and this is true even if a new party has been
impleaded in the suit."
Facts: The proceedings at bar concern (1) an attempt by a married man to prevent execution against conjugal property of
a judgment rendered against his wife, for obligations incurred by the latter while engaged in a business that had
admittedly redounded to the benefit of the family, and (2) the interference by a court with the proceedings on execution of
a co-equal or coordinate court. Both acts being proscribed by law, correction is called for and will hereby be effected.
The proceedings originated from a suit filed by Esther Sanchez against Lourdes Mariano in the Court of First Instance at
Caloocan City, for recovery of the value of ladies’ ready made dresses allegedly purchased by and delivered to the latter.
Daniel Sanchez, Esther’s husband, now made his move. He filed a complaint for annulment of the execution in the Court
of First Instance at Quezon City in his capacity as administrator of the conjugal partnership. He alleged that the conjugal
assets could not validly be made to answer for obligations exclusively contracted by his wife, and that, moreover, some of
the personal property levied on, such as household appliances and utensils necessarily used in the conjugal dwelling, were
exempt from execution.
Issue: Whether the claim that property levied on in execution of a judgment is not property of the judgment debtor, Daniel
Sanchez’s wife, but of the conjugal partnership of the Sanchez Spouses
Ruling: In the case at bar, the husband of the judgment debtor cannot be deemed a “stranger” to the case prosecuted and
adjudged against his wife. In any case, whether by intervention in the court issuing the writ, or by separate action, it is
unavailing for either Esther Sanchez or her husband, Daniel, to seek preclusion of the enforcement of the writ of
possession against their conjugal assets. For it being established, as aforestated, that Esther had engaged in business with
her husband’s consent, and the income derived therefrom had been expended, in part at least, for the support of her family,
the liability of the conjugal assets to respond for the wife’s obligations in the premises cannot be disputed.
24. Ayala vs CA, 286 SCRA 272 (Narag)

FACTS: Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) secured a PHP 50,300,000 loan from Ayala Investment and Development
Corp (AIDC). EVP Alfredo Ching signed an extended security agreement (surety agreement) as an added security for the
credit line offered to PBM. PBM failed to pay the loan. As a result, Alfredo was held jointly and severally held liable for
the debt. Writs of execution were issued and served upon 3 conjugal properties of Spouses Alfredo and Encarnacion
Ching. The said properties were then auctioned off and were acquired by AIDC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the conjugal partnership of Spouses Ching may be held liable for the debt guaranteed by Alfredo
for PBM
RULING: NO, the conjugal partnership of Spouses Ching may not be held liable for the debt guaranteed by Alfredo for
PBM. Article 122, paragraph 1 of the Family Code provides that “the payment of personal debts contracted by the
husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they
have redounded to the benefit of the family.”
In this case, Alfredo was not the principal obligor in the contract of loan. What he signed was merely a surety agreement.
He did not directly receive the money and used it for the exercise of his own profession or industry.
Even if petitioner claims that Alfredo was entitled to certain employment benefits in exchange for the surety agreement he
signed for PBM, there is not evidence which show that these benefits will have a direct benefit to their family and the
conjugal partnership. The money from the loan was used in the operations of PBM.
25.Alfredo & Encarnacion Ching vs CA and Allied Banking Corp., 423 SCRA 356 (Navas) 2004
Doctrine: In Tan v. Court of Appeals, the court held that it is not even necessary to prove that the properties were acquired
with funds of the partnership. As long as the properties were acquired by the parties during the marriage, they are
presumed to be conjugal in nature.
Facts:
1. Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc. (PBMCI) obtained two loans from the Allied Banking Corp. (ABC).
2. (PBMCI) Executive Vice-President Alfredo Ching executed a continuing guaranty with the ABC for the payment
of the said loan. The PBMCI defaulted in the payment of all its loans so ABC filed a complaint for sum of money
against the PBMCI.
3. Trial court issued a writ of preliminary attachment against Alfredo Ching requiring the sheriff of to attach all the
properties of said Alfredo Ching to answer for the payment of the loans.
4. Encarnacion T. Ching, wife of Alfredo Ching, filed a Motion to Set Aside the levy on attachment alleging inter
alia that the 100,000 shares of stocks levied on by the sheriff were acquired by her and her husband during their
marriage out of conjugal funds.
5. Petitioner spouses aver that the source of funds in the acquisition of the levied shares of stocks is not the
controlling factor when invoking the presumption of the conjugal nature of stocks under Art. 21 and that such
presumption subsists even if the property is registered only in the name of one of the spouses, in this case,
petitioner Alfredo Ching.
6. the petitioners argue that the suretyship obligation was not contracted in the pursuit of the petitioner-husband’s
profession or business.
Issue: Should the Conjugal partnership be held liable for the payment of the liability?
Ruling: No.
Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all the properties acquired during the marriage are presumed to belong to
the conjugal partnership; unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband, or to the wife. In Tan v. Court of
Appeals, the court held that it is not even necessary to prove that the properties were acquired with funds of the
partnership. As long as the properties were acquired by the parties during the marriage, they are presumed to be conjugal
in nature. In fact, even when the manner in which the properties were acquired does not appear, the presumption will still
apply, and the properties will still be considered conjugal. The presumption of the conjugal nature of the properties
acquired during the marriage subsists in the absence of clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome the same.
In this case, the evidence adduced by the petitioners in the RTC is that the 100,000 shares of stocks in the Citycorp
Investment Philippines were issued to and registered in its corporate books in the name of the petitioner-husband when the
said corporation was incorporated on May 14, 1979. This was done during the subsistence of the marriage of the
petitioner-spouses. The shares of stocks are, thus, presumed to be the conjugal partnership property of the petitioners. The
private respondent failed to adduce evidence that the petitioner-husband acquired the stocks with his exclusive money.
The barefaced fact that the shares of stocks were registered in the corporate books of Citycorp Investment Philippines
solely in the name of the petitioner-husband does not constitute proof that the petitioner-husband, not the conjugal
partnership, owned the same.
For the conjugal partnership to be liable for a liability that should appertain to the husband alone there must be a showing
that some advantages accrued to the spouses. Certainly, to make a conjugal partnership responsible for a liability that
should appertain alone to one of the spouses is to frustrate the objective of the New Civil Code to show the utmost
concern for the solidarity and well being of the family as a unit. The husband, therefore, is denied the power to assume
unnecessary and unwarranted risks to the financial stability of the conjugal partnership.
In this case, the private respondent failed to prove that the conjugal partnership of the petitioners was benefited by the
petitioner-husband’s act of executing a continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement with the private respondent for and
in behalf of PBMCI. The contract of loan was between the private respondent and the PBMCI, solely for the benefit of the
latter. No presumption can be inferred from the fact that when the petitioner-husband entered into an accommodation
agreement or a contract of surety, the conjugal partnership would thereby be benefited. The private respondent was
burdened to establish that such benefit redounded to the conjugal partnership.
If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., he directly received the money and services to be used
in or for his own business or his own profession, that contract falls within the term “… obligations for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership.” Here, no actual benefit may be proved. It is enough that the benefit to the family is apparent at the
time of the signing of the contract. From the very nature of the contract of loan or services, the family stands to benefit
from the loan facility or services to be rendered to the business or profession of the husband. It is immaterial, if in the end,
his business or profession fails. Simply stated, where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family business,
the law presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. In this case,
the petitioner-husband acted merely as a surety for the loan contracted by the PBMCI from the private respondent.
26. Homeowners vs. Dailo, G.R. No. 153802, Mar.11, 2005 (Odronia)
Doctrine: Under Article 121 of the Family Code, "[T]he conjugal partnership shall be liable for: . . . (3) Debts and
obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have been
bene:ted; . . . ." For the subject property to be held liable, the obligation contracted by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. must
have redounded to the bene:t of the conjugal partnership
Facts: The spouses Miguela and Marcelino Dailo bought a house and lot property situated in San Pablo city however, in
the deed of absolute sale, it was only named to Marcelino excluding Miguela. In 1993, Marcelino through a special power
of attorney, authorized one Lilibeth Gesmundo to secure a loan on behalf of them from the petitioners, the Homeowners
Savings and Loan Bank. Marcelino was able to receive the amount of P300,000 from the loan and as security thereof,
Gesmundo executed a real estate mortgage constituting the subject property. Upon maturity of the loan, the petitioner
instituted an extrajudicial foreclosure of the property and as the highest bidder, a certificate of sale was awarded to them.
After the lapse of one year without the property being redeemed, petitioner, through its vice-president, consolidated the
ownership thereof by executing on June 6, 1996 an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and a Deed of Absolute Sale.
In the year 1995, Marcelino died and while Miguela was having her visit on the said property, she was informed that the
petitioner has already assigned a certain Roldan Brion to clean its premise and that her car was destroyed because he
allowed a kid play with a fire near it. Due to this, she filed for the Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage and Certi:cate of Sale,
Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership, Deed of Sale, Reconveyance with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and
Damages against petitioner. The lower court ruled in favor of miguela and upon appeal, was also affirmed by the CA
stating that the property is indeed part of the conjugal partnership and since the said mortgage was made without her
consent, it should be nullified. Hence this petition.
Issue: Whether the debt accrued by the husband of the respondent be transferred to her because of non-payment thereby
allowing the petitioners to take ownership of the property. - NO
Ruling: No, because according to the provisions of Article 121 of the Family Code, "[T]he conjugal partnership shall be
liable for: . . . (3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the
family may have been benefited; . . . ." Hence, before the Miguela can be made liable for the debt accrued by here
husband, it must first be proved that the loan benefited the family. The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the
bene:t of the conjugal partnership of gains lies with the creditor-party litigant claiming as such. In this case, the petitioners
are claiming that the loan was used to introduce improvements in the subject property however, this was not supported by
any evidence. Further, this claim was not brought up upon their appeal in the lower courts and due to this, this court shall
not allow their alteration of their theory because it contravenes the basic rules of fair play and justice.. Hence, in this case,
the supreme court ruled that the ruling of the lower court and the CA were correct.
27. Ando v Campo, GR 184007, February 16, 2011 (Tagle)
Doctrine: Since he was sued in a representative capacity, and not in his personal capacity, the property could not be made
to answer for the judgment obligation of the corporation. The property was registered not only in the name of petitioner
but also of his wife. She stands to lose the property subject of execution without ever being a party to the case. This will
be tantamount to deprivation of property without due process.
Facts: Paquito Ando (petitioner) was the president of Premier Allied and Contracting Services, Inc. (PACSI), an
independent labor contractor. PACSI hired respondents as pilers or haulers tasked to manually carry bags of sugar from
the warehouse of Victorias Milling Company and load them on trucks. In June 1998, Campo et. al were dismissed from
employment. They filed a case for illegal dismissal and some money claims with the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC)
The Labor Arbiter (LA) issued a decision in respondents' favor. PACSI and Ando were directed to pay a total of
P422,702.28, representing respondents' separation pay. NLRC affirmed the LA decision. Upon finality of the decision,
respondents moved for its execution
Consequently, the NLRC issued a Notice of Sale on Execution of Personal Property over a parcel of land titled in
the name of “Paquito Ando...married to Erlinda S. Ando.” This prompted Ando to file an action for prohibition and
damages with prayer for temporary restraining order before the Regional Trial Court. Ando claimed that the property
belonged to him and his wife, not to the corporation, and, hence, could not be subject of the execution sale. Since it
is the corporation that was the judgment debtor, execution should be made on the latter's properties.
The RTC issued an Order denying the TRO and held that it had no jurisdiction to try and decide the case. The
RTC ruled that, pursuant to the NLRC Manual on the Execution of Judgment, Ando's remedy was to file a third-party
claim with the NLRC Sheriff. Ando filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals which
affirmed the RTC Order in so far as it dismissed the complaint on the ground that it had no jurisdiction over the case.
Ando thus filed the present petition. He argues that he was never sued in his personal capacity, but in his
representative capacity as president of PACSI. Neither was there any indication in the body of the Decision that he was
solidarily liable with the corporation. Petitioner also avers that he can choose between filing a third-party claim with the
sheriff of the NLRC or filing a separate action.
Issue: WON the property owned by the husband and wife could be levied for the debt incurred by the husband (in his
representative capacityand company) - NO.
Ruling: Petitioner Ando claims that the property sought to be levied does not belong to PACSI, the judgment debtor, but
to him and his wife. Since he was sued in a representative capacity, and not in his personal capacity, the property could not
be made to answer for the judgment obligation of the corporation.
The TCT of the property bears out that, indeed, it belongs to petitioner and his wife. Thus, even if we consider petitioner
as an agent of the corporation and, therefore, not a stranger to the case such that the provision on third-party claims will
not apply to him, the property was registered not only in the name of petitioner but also of his wife. She stands to lose the
property subject of execution without ever being a party to the case. This will be tantamount to deprivation of property
without due process.
The power of the NLRC to execute its judgment extends only to properties unquestionably belonging to the judgment
debtor alone. A sheriff has no authority to attach the property of any person except that of the judgment debtor. Likewise,
there is no showing that the sheriff ever tried to execute on the properties of the corporation. Petition granted.
(a) With consent

G-Tractors v. CA, 135 SCRA 192 (Repeated)
Ong v. CA 204 SCRA 297 (Repeated)
Ayala Investment vs. CA (February 12, 1998) (Repeated)
28. Security Bank vs. Mar Tiera Corp., G.R. No. 143382, Nov. 29, 2006 (Tan)
FACTS: On May 7, 1980, respondent Mar Tierra Corporation, through its president, Wilfrido Martinez, applied for a
P12,000,000 credit accommodation with petitioner Security Bank. Petitioner approved the application. It was secured by
an indemnity agreement executed by individual respondents Wilfrido Martinez, Miguel. Lacson and Ricardo Lopa who
bound themselves jointly and severally with respondent corporation for the payment of the loan. On July 2, 1980, the
credit line agreement was amended and increased to P14,000,000.
On September 25, 1981, it was able to pay P4,648,000 for the principal loan and P2,729,195.56 for the interest and other
charges. However, respondent corporation was not able to pay the balance as it suffered business reversals, eventually
ceasing operations in 1984.
Unable to collect the balance of the loan, petitioner filed a complaint for a sum of money with a prayer for preliminary
attachment against respondent corporation and individual respondents in the RTC of Makati, Branch 66. Subsequently,
however, petitioner had the case dismissed with respect to Lacson and Lopa, leaving only Martinez as respondent.
On August 10, 1982, the RTC issued a writ of attachment on all real and personal properties of respondent corporation and
individual respondent Martinez. As a consequence, the conjugal house and lot of the spouses Wilfrido and Josefina
Martinez in Barrio Calaanan, Caloocan City was levied on.
The RTC rendered its decision on June 20, 1994. It held respondent corporation and individual respondent Martinez
jointly and severally liable to petitioner for P5,304,000 plus interest. It, however, found that the obligation contracted by
individual respondent Martinez did not redound to the benefit of his family, hence, it ordered the lifting of the attachment
on the conjugal house and lot of the spouses Martinez.
Petitioner appealed to the CA but the appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision in toto. Petitioner sought
reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, this petition for Review on Certiorari.
ISSUE: May the conjugal partnership be held liable for an indemnity agreement entered into by the husband to
accommodate a third party?
RULING: NO. Under Article 161(1) of the Civil Code, the conjugal partnership is liable for "all debts and obligations
contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." But when are debts and obligations contracted by
the husband alone considered for the benefit of and therefore chargeable against the conjugal partnership? Is a surety
agreement or an accommodation contract entered into by the husband in favor of his employer within the contemplation
of the said provision?
We ruled as early as 1969 in Luzon Surety Co. v. de Garcia that, in acting as a guarantor or surety for another, the husband
does not act for the benefit of the conjugal partnership as the benefit is clearly intended for a third party.
In Ayala Investment and Development Corporation v. CA, we ruled that, if the husband himself is the principal obligor in
the contract, i.e., the direct recipient of the money and services to be used in or for his own business or profession, the
transaction falls within the term "obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." In other words, where the
husband contracts an obligation on behalf of the family business, there is a legal presumption that such obligation
redounds to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
On the other hand, if the money or services are given to another person or entity and the husband acted only as a surety or
guarantor, the transaction cannot by itself be deemed an obligation for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. It is for the
benefit of the principal debtor and not for the surety or his family. No presumption is raised that, when a husband enters
into a contract of surety or accommodation agreement, it is for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Proof must be
presented to establish the benefit redounding to the conjugal partnership. In the absence of any showing of benefit
received by it, the conjugal partnership cannot be held liable on an indemnity agreement executed by the husband to
accommodate a third party.
In this case, the principal contract, the credit line agreement between petitioner and respondent corporation, was solely for
the benefit of the latter. The accessory contract (the indemnity agreement) under which individual respondent Martinez
assumed the obligation of a surety for respondent corporation was similarly for the latter's benefit. Petitioner had the
burden of proving that the conjugal partnership of the spouses Martinez benefited from the transaction. It failed to
discharge that burden.
To hold the conjugal partnership liable for an obligation pertaining to the husband alone defeats the objective of the Civil
Code to protect the solidarity and well being of the family as a unit. The underlying concern of the law is the conservation
of the conjugal partnership. Hence, it limits the liability of the conjugal partnership only to debts and obligations
contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
Aguete v PNB, GR 170166, April 6, 2011 (Repeated)

(b) Without consent
29. Costuna vs. Domondon, 180 SCRA 333 (Ruzol)
Facts: Spouses Amadeo and Estela (petitioner) Costuna during their marriage acquired 3 parcels of land in San Francisco
del Monte, QC under the name of Amadeo Costuna. On November 8, 1975, Amadeo (68 years old at that time) executed
his last will and testament. On April, 1977, relatives of Amadeo requested that he be brought to Samar as there were
documents that needed his signature pertaining to his Samar properties. Since then, Amadeo never returned to Estela and
stayed with his sister. Thus, a feud ensued among Amadeo’s relatives and Estela over his custody prompting Estela to
institute a petition for habeas corpus before the CFI of QC. [became moot and academic as Amadeo died]
5 days later (June 23, 1978), Amadeo filed an action for partition before the Juvenile Domestic Relations Court. Failing to
get Estela’s consent to the desired petition after repeated demands, Amadeo was constrained to execute a deed of sale
over the ½ undetermined portion of the conjugal property without his wife’s consent, in favor of Laureana Domondon
(respondent). Amadeo died on November 5, 1978.
A special proceeding was instituted by Estela with the CFI of Rizal, claiming pro indiviso ½ share over the earlier
mentioned 3 lots by virtue of the deed of sale executed in her favor by Amadeo. For lack of jurisdiction, the probate court
did not rule on her claim but decreed the allowance of the last will and testament and ordered the issuance of Letters of
Administration in favor of Estela.
Consequently, an action to compel Estela to give her conformity to the deed of sale executed by her Amadeo in favor of
Laureana was instituted by Laureana in the RTC. The RTC ruled in favor of Laureana and ordered Estela to affix her
signature in the deed of sale. Estela appealed to the CA, assailing the validity of the sale. The CA affirmed the RTC
decision. Hence this petition.
Issues: 1) WON the deed of sale executed by Amadeo over his share to half of the conjugal partnership without the
consent of Estela is valid? –No it is invalid
2) WON Amadeo’s hospital expenses are chargeable to the conjugal partnership? - YES
Ruling:
1) The court held that the sale executed by Amadeo is invalid.
Firstly, the element of Estela’s consent is wanting. Secondly, the alleged sale was not a voluntary act of Amadeo but was
orchestrated by the persons who were desirous of depriving her of her inheritance which is proved by the ff facts:
1. At the time of the execution of the deed of sale, Amadeo was 81 years of and gravely ill;
2. While the deed of sale was signed by Amadeo, his signature was illegible;
3. The probability that he was unconscious at the time that he signed the document and that somebody may have guided
his hand is not remote;
4. The absence of the signature of both parties in the acknowledgment portion of the deed;
5. The variance between the dates appearing in the deed itself and the acknowledgement.
Thirdly, because of want of consideration. Not only is the supposed buyer financially incapable to pay the purchase price,
there is also the uncertainty of the amount actually paid.
Estela maintains that Amadeo’s hospital and medical bills should not be charged against the conjugal partnership as
Amadeo freely deserted and abandoned her and their conjugal home when he chose to live with his relatives. She asserts
that his relative’s held his “captive”, making it impossible for her to take care of him.
Laureana supports the ruling of the RTC and the CA that the sale was valid, despite the absence of consent since the
disposition of the one-half undivided portion of the conjugal partnership properties was intended to generate funds to
cover Amadeo’s medical bills. There is no denying that Amadeo sought the consent of Estela to the deed of sale as Estela
refused to give it. Her refusal stemmed from her belief that the deed of sale was executed in fraud of her, yet she did not
do anything to impugn the said deed.
What was sold by Amadeo without Estela’s consent was only an undetermined ½ share in the community properties. He
left intact the half share that belongs to Estela. It was therefore Amadeo’s understandable human spirit to live longer that
induced him to execute the deed of sale without the consent of Estela. The court concedes that the consent of Estela was
essential for the validity of the sale but in this case, where consent was unreasonably withheld, the court constrained to
relax the application of the law.
2) The hospital expenses are chargeable to the conjugal partnership pursuant to Art. 161 of the CC
The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:
1. All debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and those contracted by
the wife, also for the same purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the partnership.
The benefit required in the aforementioned article need not be quantified into pesos or square meters of real property. It is
enough that the transaction would result to some discernible
advantage to the conjugal partnership, directly or indirectly. Thus, the health and well-being of both or either of the
spouses would redound to the benefit of their conjugal partnership.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED, and decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto. With costs
against the petitioner. SO ORDERED.
30. Carlos vs. Abelardo, 380 SCRA 361 (Uy)

Doctrine: The loan is the liability of the conjugal partnership pursuant to Article 121 of the Family Code. While
respondent did not and refused to sign the acknowledgment executed and signed by his wife, undoubtedly, the loan
redounded to the benefit of the family because it was used to purchase the house and lot which became the conjugal home
of respondent and his family. Hence, notwithstanding the alleged lack of consent of respondent, under Art. 121 of the
Family Code, he shall be solidarily liable for such loan together with his wife.
Issue: Whether or not the spouses are both liable for the amount loaned from the petitioner. YES
Facts: Honorio Carlos, petitioner, averred that respondent, Manuel Abelardo and his wife Maria Theresa Carlos-Abelardo
approached him and requested him to advance the amount of USD25k for the purchase of a house and lot located in
Parañaque, To enable and assist the spouses conduct their marriage life independently and on their own. Carlos issued a
check in the name of a certain Pura Vallejo, seller of the property, who acknowledged the receipt. The amount was in full
payment of the property.
When Carlos inquired to the spouses the status of the amount he loaned to them, the latter acknowledged their
obligation but pleaded that they were not yet in a position to make a definite settlement of the same. Manuel then
expressed violent resistance to Carlos’ inquiries on the amount to the extent of making various death threats against him.
Carlos then made a formal demand for the payment but the spouses failed to comply with their obligation. Thus,
Carlos filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money of USD25k or PHP625K plus legal interest and moral and
exemplary damages against the spouses in the RTC.
However, they spouses having been separate in fact for more than a year to the filing of the complaint, Manuel
and his wife filed two separate answers. Maria admitted securing a loan together with Manuel; and claimed that the loan
was payable on a staggered basis so she was surprised when Carlos demanded the immediate payment of the full amount.
While the defendant averred due to the assassination of Sen. Benigno Aquino his business, H.L. CARLOS
CONSTRUCTION has suffered tremendous setbacks and stated that the USD25k was never intended as loan but it was
his share of income on contracts obtained by the company. Also, denied the allegations on death threats.
RTC Ruling: Ordered the defendants to pay the USD25k plus legal interests; pay moral and exemplary damages,
PHP500k and PHP50k, respectively; and PHP100k attorney’s fees.
CA Ruling: REVERSED and SET ASIDE of the decision of the RTC, dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of
evidence to show that the subject amount was indeed loaned by the spouses. Also that the amount was the respondent’s
share in the profits of H.L. CARLOS CONSTRUCTION.
SC Ruling: YES. The spouses are both liable for the loan made for the construction of their conjugal residence even
though they have been separated in fact for more than a year prior to the filing of the complaint. Nevertheless, when the
husband did not sign the acknowledgement.
The loan is the liability of the conjugal partnership pursuant to Art. 121 FC:
Art. 121. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:
(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated administrator-spouse for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership of gains, or by both spouses or by one of them with the consent of the other;
(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have
been benefited;
If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid
balance with their separate properties.
While respondent did not and refused to sign the acknowledgement executed and signed by his wife, the loan redounded
to the benefit of the family because it was used to purchase the house and lot which became their conjugal home. Hence,
the alleged lack of consent of respondent, under Art. 21 FC, shall be solidarily liable for such loan together with his wife.
Notes on being a stock holder: All the checks presented by the respondent, which he claims to be his share in the profits
of the petitioner’s company were all in the account of the company. However, the amount of USD25k was drawn from the
personal account of the petitioner. Assuming to be true, then all the more does this prove that the amount of USD25k was
not part of such profits because it was issued by the petitioner from his own account. If such amount was respondent’s
share of the profits, then the same should have been issued under the account of the company.
Also, respondent failed to substantiate his claim that he is entitled to the profits and income of the corporation.
There was no showing that respondent was a stockholder of the company. His name does not appear in the Articles of
Incorporation and the Organizational Profile of the company either as a stockholder or officer.
Notes on the death threats: Randy Rosal, driver of Carlos, declared that around 3PM, he was sent by Maria on an errand
to deliver the acknowledgment letter to Manuel for him to sign. Manuel did not sign the acknowledgment and instead,
wrote a letter addressed to petitioner threatening him. This testimony would be corroborated by an entry in the Police
Blotter of the P.que Police Station narrating the incident.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 54464 is MODIFIED in that respondent is ordered to pay petitioner the amounts of (1) US$25,000 or its equivalent
in Philippine currency at the time of payment, plus legal interest from August 4, 1994, until fully paid; (2) P50,000.00 as
moral damages; (3) P20,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (4) P50,000.00 as attorney's fees.
Villanueva vs Chiong, GR 59889, June 5, 2008 (Wenceslao) (Repeated)
31. Ravina v Villa-Abrille, GR No. 160708, Oct. 16, 2009 (Alejaga)

Facts: Respondent Mary Ann Pasaol Villa Abrille and Pedro Villa Abrille are husband and wife. They have four
children, who are also parties to the instant case and are represented by their mother, Mary Ann.
In 1982, the spouses acquired a 555-square meter parcel of land denominated as Lot 7, located at Kamuning Street, Juna
Subdivision, Matina, Davao City, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-88674 in their names. Said
lot is adjacent to a parcel of land which Pedro acquired when he was still single and which is registered solely in his
name under TCT No. T-26471. Through their joint efforts and the proceeds of a loan from the Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP), the spouses built a house on Lot 7 and Pedro's lot. The house was finished in the early 1980's but the
spouses continuously made improvements, including a poultry house and an annex.
In 1991, Pedro got a mistress and began to neglect his family. Mary Ann was forced to sell or mortgage their movables
to support the family and the studies of her children. By himself, Pedro offered to sell the house and the two lots to
herein petitioners, Patrocinia and Wilfredo Ravina. Mary Ann objected and notified the petitioners of her objections, but
Pedro nonetheless sold the house and the two lots without Mary Ann's consent, as evidenced by a Deed of Sale 5 dated
June 21, 1991. It appears on the said deed that Mary Ann did not sign on top of her name. DcCEHI
On July 5, 1991 while Mary Ann was outside the house and the four children were in school, Pedro together with armed
members of the Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) and acting in connivance with petitioners 6 began
transferring all their belongings from the house to an apartment.
When Mary Ann and her daughter Ingrid Villa Abrille came home, they were stopped from entering it. They waited
outside the gate until evening under the rain. They sought help from the Talomo Police Station, but police authorities
refused to intervene, saying that it was a family matter. Mary Ann alleged that the incident caused stress, tension and
anxiety to her children, so much so that one flunked at school. Thus, respondents Mary Ann and her children filed a
complaint for Annulment of Sale, Specific Performance, Damages and Attorney's Fees with Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction 7 against Pedro and herein petitioners (the Ravinas) in the RTC of Davao City.
During the trial, Pedro declared that the house was built with his own money. Petitioner Patrocinia Ravina testified that
they bought the house and lot from Pedro
Issues:
(1) Whether the property covered by TCT No. T-88674 is an exclusive property of Pedro or conjugal property – No.
(2) Whether its sale by Pedro was valid considering the absence of Mary Ann's consent – No.
Ruling: (1) Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides, "All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife".
There is no issue with regard to the lot covered by TCT No. T-26471, which was an exclusive property of Pedro, having
been acquired by him before his marriage to Mary Ann. However, the lot covered by TCT No. T-88674 was acquired in
1982 during the marriage of Pedro and Mary Ann. No evidence was adduced to show that the subject property was
acquired through exchange or barter. The presumption of the conjugal nature of the property subsists in the absence of
clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome said presumption or to prove that the subject property is
exclusively owned by Pedro. 12 Petitioners' bare assertion would not suffice to overcome the presumption that TCT No.
T-88674, acquired during the marriage of Pedro and Mary Ann, is conjugal. Likewise, the house built thereon is
conjugal property, having been constructed through the joint efforts of the spouses, who had even obtained a loan from
DBP to construct the house.
(2) Significantly, a sale or encumbrance of conjugal property concluded after the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988, is governed by Article 124 of the same Code that now treats such a disposition to be void if done (a)
without the consent of both the husband and the wife, or (b) in case of one spouse's inability, the authority of the court.
Article 124 of the Family Code, the governing law at the time the assailed sale was contracted, is explicit:
ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses
jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for
proper remedy which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal
properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of
disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In
the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the
transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and
may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before
the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (Emphasis supplied.)
The particular provision in the New Civil Code giving the wife ten (10) years to annul the alienation or encumbrance
was not carried over to the Family Code. It is thus clear that alienation or encumbrance of the conjugal partnership
property by the husband without the consent of the wife is null and void.
Hence, just like the rule in absolute community of property, if the husband, without knowledge and consent of the wife,
sells conjugal property, such sale is void. If the sale was with the knowledge but without the approval of the wife,
thereby resulting in a disagreement, such sale is annullable at the instance of the wife who is given five (5) years from
the date the contract implementing the decision of the husband to institute the case.
Here, respondent Mary Ann timely filed the action for annulment of sale within five (5) years from the date of sale and
execution of the deed. However, her action to annul the sale pertains only to the conjugal house and lot and does not
include the lot covered by TCT No. T-26471, a property exclusively belonging to Pedro and which he can dispose of
freely without Mary Ann's consent.
Now, if a voidable contract is annulled, the restoration of what has been given is proper. The relationship between the
parties in any contract even if subsequently annulled must always be characterized and punctuated by good faith and fair
dealing. Hence, in consonance with justice and equity and the salutary principle of non-enrichment at another's expense,
Pedro is ordered to return to petitioner spouses the value of the consideration for the lot covered by TCT No. T-88674 and
the house thereon.
Fuentes v Roca, GR No. 178902, April 21, 2010 (Repeated)
(c) personal debts, FC 122, RPC 108

Art. 122. The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be
charged to the conjugal properties partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family.
Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them be charged to the partnership.
However, the payment of personal debts contracted by either spouse before the marriage, that of fines and indemnities
imposed upon them, as well as the support of illegitimate children of either spouse, may be enforced against the
partnership assets after the responsibilities enumerated in the preceding Article have been covered, if the spouse who is
bound should have no exclusive property or if it should be insufficient; but at the time of the liquidation of the partnership,
such spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for the purpose above-mentioned.
RPC Art. 108. Obligation to make restoration, reparation for damages, or indemnification for consequential damages and
actions to demand the same; Upon whom it devolves. — The obligation to make restoration or reparation for damages and
indemnification for consequential damages devolves upon the heirs of the person liable.
The action to demand restoration, reparation, and indemnification likewise descends to the heirs of the person injured.
32. People v. Lagrimas, 29 SCRA 153 (Barretto)
FACTS: The appellants, heirs of the murdered victim, Pelagio Cagro, filed an information against accused Froilan
Lagrimas for the above murder committed on February 15, 1960 in Pambujan, Samar. Thereafter, appellants as such heirs,
filed on February 27, 1960 a motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment on the property of the accused
Lagrimas, such motion being granted in an order of March 5, 1960. After trial, the lower court found the accused guilty of
the crime charged and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusión perpetua and to indemnify the appellants. An
appeal from the judgment was elevated to this Court by the accused but thereafter withdrawn, the judgment, therefore,
becoming final on October 11, 1962.
A levy was had on eleven parcels of land in the province declared for tax purposes in the name of the accused and the sale
thereof at public auction was scheduled. However, the wife of the accused, Mercedes Aguirre de Lagrimas, filed a motion
to quash the writ of attachment as well as the writ of execution with the allegation that the property levied upon belonged
to the conjugal partnership and, therefore, could not be held liable for the pecuniary indemnity the husband was required
to pay. Her petition was granted and another judge set aside the said order. But upon Mercedes’ filing a motion for
reconsideration, a third judge revived the original order, declaring such attachment and the writ of execution thereafter
issued null and void. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE: May fines and indemnities of a spouse found guilty of a crime be enforced against conjugal partnership assets?
RULING: No, conjugal partnership assets can not be held to answer for civil obligations of a spouse found guilty of a
crime unless the responsibilities of conjugal partnership has been satisfied.
The applicable Civil Code provision is not lacking in explicitness. It states that "Fines and indemnities
imposed upon either husband or wife may be enforced against the partnership assets after the responsibilities
enumerated in article 161 have been covered, if the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive property or if it
should be insufficient."
It is made a condition under this article of the Civil Code that the responsibilities enumerated in Article 161, covering
primarily the maintenance of the family and the education of the children of the spouses or the legitimate children of one
of them as well as other obligations of a preferential character, are first satisfied. It is thus apparent that the legal scheme
cannot be susceptible to the charge that for a transgression of the law by either husband or wife, the rest of the family may
be made to bear burdens of an extremely onerous character.
In the case at bar, there being no evidence presented that the conjugal partnership has satisfied the
obligations under Article 161, the case is remanded to the lower court. The Civil Code provision, as thus worded,
precisely minimizes the possibility that such additional liability of an accused would be rendered nugatory. In doing
justice to the heirs of the murdered victim, no injustice is committed against the family of the offender. It is made a
condition under this article of the Civil Code that the responsibilities enumerated in Article 161, covering primarily the
maintenance of the family and the education of the children of the spouses or the legitimate children of one of them as
well as other obligations of a preferential character, are first satisfied. It is thus apparent that the legal scheme cannot be
susceptible to the charge that for a transgression of the law by either husband or wife, the rest of the family may be made
to bear burdens of an extremely onerous character. Considering that the obligations mentioned in Article 161 are
peculiarly within the knowledge of the husband or of the wife whose conjugal partnership is made liable, the proof
required of the beneficiaries of the indemnity should not be of the most exacting kind, ordinary credibility sufficing.
Otherwise, the husband or the wife, as the case may be, representing the conjugal partnership, may find the temptation to
magnify its obligation irresistible so as to defeat the right of recovery of the family of the offended party. Hence, fines and
liabilities incurred by a spouse found guilty of a crime may only be enforced if the conjugal partnership assets have first
satisfied the responsibilities enumerated under Article 161.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the appealed order is set aside and the case remanded to the court of origin for the
reception of evidence in accordance with this opinion. With costs against appellee Mercedes Aguirre de Lagrimas.
Buado vs Buado, G.R. No. 145222, April 24, 2009 (Repeated)
Pana vs. Heirs of Juanite, Sr., G.R. No. 164201, December 10, 2012 (Cerrero) (Repeated)
(d) winnings from gambling, FC 123
8. Ownership, administration and enjoyment

(a) Joint administration, FC 124 cf. FC 96, 142
33. Guiang vs CA, 291 SCRA 372 (Dimen)

Doctrine: The sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of both the husband and the wife. The absence of the
consent of one renders the sale null and void, while the vitiation thereof makes it merely voidable. Only in the latter case
can ratification cure the defect.
Facts: Private respondent Gilda Corpuz and Judie Corpuz are legally married spouses. They were married on December
24, 1968 in Bacolod City, before a judge. This is admitted by petitioners-spouses Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang in their
answer, and also admitted by defendant Judie Corpuz when he testified in court, although the latter says that they were
married in 1967. The couple have three children, namely: Junie - 18 years old, Harriet - 17 years of age, and Jodie or Joji,
the youngest-15 years of age.
Sometime on February 14, 1983, the couple Gilda (as vendee) and Judie Corpuz, bought a 421 sq. meter lot located in
Barangay Gen. Paulino Santos, Koronadal, South Cotabato, and particularly known as Lot 9, Block 8, (LRC) from
Manuel Callejo who signed as vendor through a conditional deed of sale for a total consideration of P14,735.00. The
consideration was payable in installment, with right of cancellation in favor of vendor should vendee fail to pay three
successive installments.
On April 22, 1988, the couple Gilda and Judie Corpuz sold one-half portion of their Lot No. 9, Block 8, (LRC) to the
petitioners-spouses Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang. The latter have since then occupied the one-half portion and built
their house thereon. They are thus adjoining neighbors of the Corpuzes. When Gilda Corpuz left for Manila sometime in
June 1989. She was trying to look for work abroad, in the Middle East. Unfortunately, she became a victim of an
unscrupulous illegal recruiter. She was not able to go abroad. Her departure for Manila to look for work in the Middle East
was with the consent of her husband Judie Corpuz.
After his wife's departure for Manila, Judie Corpuz seldom went home to the conjugal dwelling. He stayed most of the
time at his place of work at Samahang Nayon Building, a hotel, restaurant, and a cooperative. Their daughter Herriet
Corpuz went to school at King's College, Koronadal, South Cotabato, but she was at the same time working as household
help of, and staying at, the house of Mr. Panes. Her brother Junie was not working. Her younger sister Jodie (Jojie) was
going to school. Her mother sometimes sent them money.
Sometime in January 1990, Harriet Corpuz learned that her father intended to sell the remaining one-half portion
including their house, of their homelot to Guiangs. She wrote a letter to her mother informing her. Her mother replied that
she was objecting to the sale. Harriet, however, did not inform her father about this; but instead gave the letter to Mrs.
Luzviminda Guiang so that she (Luzviminda) would advise her father.
However, in the absence of his wife Gilda Corpuz, defendant Judie Corpuz pushed through the sale of the remaining one-
half portion of the lot. On March 1, 1990, he sold to defendant Luzviminda Guiang thru a document known as Deed of
Transfer of Rights the remaining one-half portion of their lot and the house standing thereon for a total consideration of
P30,000.00 of which P5,000.00 was to be paid in June, 1990. Transferor Judie Corpuz's children Junie and Harriet signed
the document as witnesses.
March 5, 1990, to cure whatever defect in Judie Corpuz's title over the lot transferred, Luzviminda Guiang as vendee
executed another agreement over the lot, now with Manuela Jimenez Callejo, a widow of the original registered owner
whom the couple Judie and Gilda Corpuz bought the lot from, who signed as vendor for a consideration of P9,000.00.
Sometime on March 11, 1990, Gilda returned home. She found her children staying with other households. Only Judie
was staying in their house. Harriet and Joji were with Mr. Panes., Gilda gathered her children together and stayed at their
house.. Her husband was nowhere to be found. She was informed by her children that their father had another wife.
For staying in their house sold by her husband, Gilda was complained against by Luzviminda Guiang and her husband
Antonio Guiang before the Barangay authorities for trespassing. On March 16, 1990, the parties thereat signed a
document for amicable settlement. Spouses Guiang followed thru the amicable settlement with a motion for the execution
of the amicable settlement, filing the same with the Municipal Trial Court of Koronadal, South Cotabato. The proceedings
are still pending before the said court, with the filing of the case at bar.
RTC Ruling: The judgment is rendered in favor of Gilda Corpuz, declaring both the Deed of Transfer of Rights and the
amicable settlement as null void and of no effect. Recognizing as lawful and valid the ownership and possession of Gilda
Corpuz over the remaining one-half portion of the Lot. Ordering Gilda Corpuz to reimburse Luzviminda Guiang the
amount of P9,000.00 corresponding to the payment made by Guiangs to Manuel Callejo for the unpaid balance of the
account of Gilda in favor of Manuel Callejo, and another sum of P379.62 representing one-half of the amount of realty
taxes paid by Guiangs. Dissatisfied, spouses Guiangs filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals.
CA Ruling: CA found no reversible error in the trial court's ruling that any alienation or encumbrance by the husband of
the conjugal property without the consent of his wife is null and void as provided under Article 124 of the FC. It also
rejected petitioners' contention that the amicable settlement ratified said sale, citing Article 1409 of the Code which
expressly bars ratification of the contracts specified therein, particularly those "prohibited or declared void by law."
The Motion for Reconsideration was similarly denied by the same court in its assailed Resolution. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the contract (Deed of Transfer of Rights) executed by Judie without the consent of his wife is null
and void.
Ruling: Yes, the said contract properly falls within the ambit of Article 124 of the Family Code, which was correctly
applied by the lower court:
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership of property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In
case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which
must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.
properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of
disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the
absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be
construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a
binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by
either or both offerors.
The legal provision is clear. The disposition or encumbrance is void. Under Article 166 of the Civil Code, the husband
cannot generally alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wife's consent. The
alienation or encumbrance if so made however is not null and void. It is merely voidable. The offended wife may bring an
action to annul the said alienation or encumbrance. Thus the provision of Article 173 of the NCC, to wit:
Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage and within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the
annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or
contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife
fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of property fraudulently
alienated by the husband.
This particular provision giving the wife ten (10) years during the marriage to annul the alienation or encumbrance was
not carried over to the Family Code. It is thus clear that any alienation or encumbrance made after August 3, 1988 when
the Family Code took effect by the husband of the conjugal partnership property without the consent of the wife is null
and void. Furthermore, it must be noted that the fraud and intimidation referred to by petitioners were perpetrated in the
execution of the document embodying the amicable settlement. Gilda Corpuz alleged during trial that barangay authorities
made her sign said document through misrepresentation and coercion. In any event, its execution does not alter the void
character of the deed of sale between the husband and the petitioners-spouses. The fact remains that such contract was
entered into without the wife's consent.
In sum, the nullity of the contract of sale is premised on the absence of private respondent's consent. To constitute a valid
contract, the Civil Code requires the concurrence of the following elements: (1) cause, (2) object, and (3) consent, the last
element being indubitably absent in the case at bar.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the challenged Decision and Resolution. Costs
against petition.
34. Melania Roxas v. CA and Antonio Cayetano 198 SCRA 541 [1991] (Delocario)
Doctrine: Under the New Civil Code (NCC), "Art. 165. The husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership," in
view of the fact that the husband is principally responsible for the support of the wife and the rest of the family. If the
conjugal partnership does not have enough assets, it is the husband's capital that is responsible for such support, not the
paraphernal property. Responsibility should carry authority with it. The husband is not an ordinary administrator, for while
a mere administrator has no right to dispose of, sell, or otherwise alienate the property being administered, the husband
can do so in certain cases allowed by law. He is not required by law to render an accounting. Acts done under
administration do not need the prior consent of the wife.
Facts: Melania A. Roxas, petitioner, and Antonio M. Cayetano, private respondent, both of them of legal age, were
married to each other, but were living separately. Melania was living in Quezon City and Antonio was living in Parañaque.
Recently, Melania learned that her estranged husband had entered into a contract of lease with defendant Antonio M.
Cayetano sometime on March 30, 1987 covering a portion of their conjugal lot situated at 854 Quirino Highway,
Novaliches, Quezon City, without her knowledge.
On the same lot, Melania had planned to put up her flea market with at least twenty (20) stalls and mini-mart for grocery
and dry goods items for which she had filed an application for the corresponding Mayor's Permit and Municipal License
which had been approved since 1986, but when she attempted to renew it for 1986, the same was disapproved last month
due to the complaint lodged by defendant Antonio M. Cayetano whose application for renewal of Mayor's Permit and
License for the same business of putting up a flea market, had been allegedly earlier approved. The planning and initial
construction of plaintiffs project to put up her own business of flea market and mini-mart grocery and wet and dry stores
which she had intended to operate partly by herself and lease the rest of the twenty (20) stalls thereon, she had spent some
P135,000.00 for the said construction, including materials and labor, where she had expected to earn as daily net income
in the minimum amount of P500.00 daily.
Due to the illegal lease contract entered into between the herein defendants and the resultant unlawful deprivation
of plaintiff from operating her own legitimate business on the same lot of which she is a conjugal owner, plaintiff has been
compelled to seek redress and ventilate her grievance to the court for which she has to engage the services of counsel with
whom she agreed to pay as and for attorney's fees the sum of P10,000.00; plus the amount equivalent to 20% of whatever
damages may be awarded to her in addition to the sum of P500.00 per appearance in court.
The CA dismissed for failure to state a sufficient cause of action.
Issue: Whether or not a husband, as the administrator of the conjugal partnership, may legally enter into a contract of
lease involving conjugal real property without the knowledge and consent of the wife. No.
Ruling: No, the husband may not enter into a contract of lease involving conjugal property without the knowledge and
consent of the wife. Even if the husband is administrator of the conjugal partnership, administration does not include acts
of ownership. For while the husband can administer the conjugal assets unhampered, he cannot alienate or encumber the
conjugal realty.
Under Art. 1643 of the New Civil Code "In the lease of things, one of the parties binds himself to give to another
the enjoyment or use of a thing for a price certain, and for a period which may be definite or indefinite...." Thus, lease is a
grant of use and possession: it is not only a grant of possession. In the contract of lease, the lessor transfers his right of use
in favor of the lessee. The lessor's right of use is impaired, therein. He may even be ejected by the lessee if the lessor uses
the leased realty. Lease is not only an encumbrance but also a qualified alienation, with the lessee becoming, for all legal
intents and purposes, and subject to its terms, the owner of the thing affected by the lease.
Since Melania’s consent to lease their conjugal property in Quezon City was not secured by Antonio, she has the
legal right to file for an action of annulment on the lease contract entered into by Antonio.
NOTE: On “alienation” and “encumbrance” - As stated in Black's Law Dictionary, the word "alienation" means "the
transfer of the property and possession of lands, tenements, or other things from one person to another ... The act by which
the title to real estate is voluntarily assigned by one person to another and accepted by the latter, in the form prescribed by
law." While encumbrance "has been defined to be every right to, or interest in, the land which may subsist in third
persons, to the diminution of the value of the land, but consistent with the passing of the fee by the conveyance; any (act)
that impairs the use or transfer of property or real estate..."
Dispositive: PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE and this case is
hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial court for further proceedings.SO ORDERED.
35. Docena vs. Lapesura, 355 SCRA 658 (Dacua)

DOCTRINE: The husband may reasonably be presumed to have personal knowledge of the filing or non-filing by his
wife of any action or claim similar to the petition for certiorari and prohibition given the notices and legal processes
involved in a legal proceeding involving real property. The Court also sees no justifiable reason why he may not lawfully
undertake together with his wife to inform the court of any similar action or proceeding which may be filed. If anybody
may repudiate the certification or undertaking for having been incorrectly made, it is the wife who may conceivably do so.
FACTS: Private respondent Casiano Hombria file a Complaint for the recovery of a parcel of land against his lessees,
petitioner-spouses Antonio and Alfreda Docena. Petitioners claimed ownership of the land based on occupation since time
immemorial. A certain Guillermo Abuda intervened in the case.
The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioners and the intervenor. The CA reversed the judgment and ordered the
petitioners to vacate the land they have leased. The Motion for Execution filed by Hombria was granted by the public
respondent judge and a Writ of Execution was issued therefor. However, the public respondent sheriff requested to be
clarified in the determination of that particular portion which is sought to be excluded prior to the delivery of the land
adjudged in favour of the plaintiff.
The public respondent judge held that no attempt should be made to alter or modify the decision of the Court of Appeals.
What should be delivered therefore to the plaintiff is that portion leased by the defendants from the plaintiff excluding the
portion that have reclaimed from the sea and forms part of the shore.
Then, the sheriff issued a Writ of Demolition. Petitioners filed a Motion to Set Aside the Writ of Demolition. However, it
was denied. A Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition was filed by the petitioners with the CA alleging grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial court judge in issuing the Orders and of the sheriff in issuing the writ. The CA dismissed
it on grounds that (1) it was filed beyond the 60-day period and that (2) the certification of non-forum shopping was
signed by only one of the petitioners. The petitioners argue that since they are spouses with joint or indivisible interest
over the alleged conjugal property subject of the original action which gave rise to the petition for certiorari and
prohibition, the signing of the certificate of non-forum shopping by only one of them would suffice, especially
considering the long distance they had to travel just to sign the said certificate.
ISSUE: Whether or not it is sufficient that the certification of non-forum shopping was signed by the husband? YES.
RULING: YES. It has been the Court’s previous ruling that the certificate of non-forum shopping should be signed by all
the petitioners or plaintiffs in a case, and that the signing by only one of them is insuficient. However, in the case at bar,
the Court holds that the subject Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping signed by the petitioner Antonio Docena alone
should be deemed to constitute substantial compliance with the rules. There are only two petitioners in this case and
they are husband and wife. Their residence is the subject property alleged to be conjugal in the instant verified petition.
The Verification/Certification on Non-Forum Shopping attached to the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition was signed
only by the husband who certified, inter alia, that he and his wife have not commenced any other action or proceeding
involving the same issues raised in the petition in any court, tribunal or quasi- judicial agency; that to the best of their
knowledge no such action is pending therein; and that he and his wife undertake to inform the Court within (5) days from
notice of any similar action or proceeding which may have been filed.
The property subject of the original action for recovery is conjugal. Whether it is conjugal under the New Civil
Code or the Family Code, a fact that cannot be determined from the records before us, it is believed that the certificate on
non-forum shopping filed in the Court of Appeals constitutes sufficient compliance with the rules on forum-shopping.
Under the New Civil Code, the husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership. In fact, he is the sole
administrator, and the wife is not entitled as a matter of right to join him in this endeavor. The husband as the statutory
administrator of the conjugal property could have filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition alone, without the
concurrence of the wife. If suits to defend an interest in the conjugal properties may be filed by the husband alone, with
more reason, he may sign the certificate of non-forum shopping to be attached to the petition.
Under the Family Code, the administration of the conjugal property belongs to the husband and the wife jointly.
However, unlike an act of alienation or encumbrance where the consent of both spouses is required, joint management or
administration does not require that the husband and wife always act together. Each spouse may validly exercise full
power of management alone, subject to the intervention of the court in proper cases as provided under Article 124 of the
Family Code. It is believed that even under the provisions of the Family Code, the husband alone could have filed the
petition for certiorari and prohibition to contest the writs of demolition issued against the conjugal property with the Court
of Appeals without being joined by his wife. The signing of the attached certificate of non-forum shopping only by the
husband is not a fatal defect.
With this, the signing petitioner here made the certification in his behalf and that of his wife. The husband
may reasonably be presumed to have personal knowledge of the filing or non-filing by his wife of any action or
claim similar to the petition for certiorari and prohibition given the notices and legal processes involved in a legal
proceeding involving real property. The Court also sees no justifiable reason why he may not lawfully undertake
together with his wife to inform the court of any similar action or proceeding which may be filed. If anybody may
repudiate the certification or undertaking for having been incorrectly made, it is the wife who may conceivably do so.
It bears stressing that the rules on forum shopping, which were designed to promote and facilitate the orderly
administration of justice, should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and
legitimate objective.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The CA Resolutions dated June 18, 1999 and
September 9, 1999 are hereby SET ASIDE and the case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
36. Alinas vs Alinas, GR No. 158040, April 14, 2008 (Evangelista)

Doctrine: Article 124 of the FC provides that “The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property
shall belong to both spouses jointly… In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in
the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers
do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent
of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.”
Facts: Spouses Onesiforo and Rosario (Petitioners) separated sometime in 1982, with Rosario moving to Pagadian City
and Onesiforo moving to Manila. They left behind two lots (1st with a bodega standing on it and the 2nd with their
house). Onesiforo and Victor (Respondent) are brothers. Petitioners alleged that they entrusted the properties to Victor and
Elena (respondents) with the agreement that the income of the rental of the properties would be remitted to the SSS and to
the Rural Bank of Oroquieta City, as the rentals were believed to pay off the loans of the petitioners. The lot with the
bodega was mortgaged for a loan obtained from the RBO while the lot with the house was mortgaged to the SSS.
Onesiforo alleges he left blank papers with his signature on them to facilitate the administration of said properties.
In 1993, petitioners discovered that the lots were registered under the respondents. The mortgaged lots had been
foreclosed and reconveyed to the respondents. Onesiforo’s signature also appears in an Absolute Deed of Sale to the
respondents with records of a notarized document where Onesiforo acknowledged that his brother Victor used his own
money to redeem the lots and became the owner of the lot. In the same agreement, petitioner Onesiforo waived whatever
rights, claims, and interests he or his heirs, successors and assigns have or may have over the subject property.
Petitioners filled in the RTC of Ozamis City a complaint for recovery of possession and ownership of their conjugal
properties with damages. However, the RTC ruled that:
1. Victor and Elena were the owners of the land with the Bodega
2. Onesiforo and Rosario were the owners because the sale without the consent of his wife was null and void
The CA modified this and ruled that ½ of the land with the house belongs to Rosario as the wife’s share.
Issue: Whether or not the sale of the land with the house(conjugal property) to the respondents is valid? - NO
Ruling: Article 124 of the FC provides that “The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall
belong to both spouses jointly… In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do
not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of
the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.”
In Homeowners Savings & Loan Bank v. Dailo,19 the Court categorically stated thus: “In Guiang v. Court of Appeals, it
was held that the sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of both the husband and wife. In applying Article 124 of
the Family Code, this Court declared that the absence of the consent of one renders the entire sale null and void,
including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the husband who contracted the sale. x x x By express
provision of Article 124 of the Family Code, in the absence of (court) authority or written consent of the other spouse, any
disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property shall be void.” Thus, pursuant to Article 124 of the Family Code and
jurisprudence, the sale of petitioners' conjugal property made by petitioner Onesiforo alone is void in its entirety. It
should be noted that respondent spouses were well aware that the land with the house is a conjugal property of petitioners.
They also knew that the disposition being made by Onesiforo is without the consent of his wife, as they knew that
petitioners had separated, and, the sale documents do not bear the signature of petitioner Rosario. However the Petitioners
must reimburse the respondents the refunded purchase price at the rate of 12% per annum interest.
37. Aggabao vs. Parulan, G.R. No. 165803, Sept. 1, 2010 (Escudero)
Doctrine: The sale was made on March 18, 1991, or after August 3, 1988, the effectivity of the FC. The proper law to
apply is, therefore, Article 124 of the FC, for it is settled that any alienation or encumbrance of conjugal property made
during the effectivity of the FC is governed by Article 124 of the FC. Article 256 of the FC states that the provisions of the
FC may apply retroactively provided no vested rights are impaired.
In Tumlos v. Fernandez, 330 SCRA 718 (2000), the Court rejected the petitioner’s argument that the FC did not apply
because the acquisition of the contested property had occurred prior to the effectivity of the FC, and pointed out that
Family Code could apply retroactively if the application would not prejudice any vested or acquired rights existing before
the effectivity of the Family Code. In this case, however, the petitioners did not show any vested right in the property
acquired prior to August 3, 1988 that exempted their situation from the retroactive application of the Family Code.
Facts:
1. In January 1991, real estate broker Atanacio offered 2 lots located in Parañaque to Sps. Rex and Concepcion
Aggabao.
2. On February 2, 1991, the Aggabaos met up with Elena Parulan (Elena) at the site of the property and showed
them the following documents:
a. owner’s original copy of the TCT of the 2 lots
b. tax declarations
c. a copy of the SPA dated January 7, 1991 executed by Dionisio authorizing Elena to sell the property.
3. The Aggabaos paid P200,000.00 as earnest money for which Elena executed a handwritten Receipt of Earnest
Money which stipulated that the Aggabaos would pay an additional payment of P130, 000.00 on February 4,
1991; P650,000.00 on or before February 15, 1991 and P700, 000.00 on March 31, 1991 once Elena turned over
the property.
4. On February 4, 1991, the Aggabaos, accompanied by the broker, went to the Office of the Register of Deeds to
verify the TCTs shown by Elena. There, they discovered that one of the lots had been encumbered to Banco
Filipino, but that the encumbrance had been cancelled due to the full payment of the obligation. They noticed that
the loan was effected through an SPA executed by Dionisio Parulan in favor of his wife, Elena. The other lot on
the other hand had an annotation of an existing mortgage in favor of Los Baños Rural Bank, with the same SPA
with a court order authorizing Elena to mortgage the lot to secure the loan.
5. The Aggabaos and Atanacio (the broker) next inquired about the mortgage and the court order at the Los Baños
Rural Bank. There, they met with Atty. Zarate, who revealed that the bank had asked for the court order because
the lot involved was conjugal property.
6. Following their verification, the Aggabaos delivered P130,000.00 as additional down payment on February 4,
1991; and P650,000.00 to the Los Baños Rural Bank on February 12, 1991, which then released the owner’s
duplicate copy of TCT to them.
7. On March 18, 1991, the petitioners delivered the final amount of P700,000.00 to Elena, who executed a deed of
absolute sale in their favor. However, Elena did not turn over the owner’s duplicate copy of the TCT claiming that
said copy was in the possession of a relative who was then in Hongkong. She assured them that the owner’s
duplicate copy of TCT would be turned over after a week.
8. The next day, TCT was cancelled and a new one was issued in the name of the Aggabaos. Elena did not turn over
the duplicate owner’s copy of TCT as promised.
9. In due time, the Aggabaos learned that the duplicate owner’s copy of TCT had been all along in the custody of
Atty. Jeremy Z. Parulan, who appeared to hold a SPA executed by his brother Dionisio authorizing him to sell
both lots.
10. At Atanacio’s instance, the petitioners met on March 25, 1991 with Atty. Parulan at the Manila Peninsula. They
were accompanied by one Atty. Olandesca. They recalled that Atty. Parulan “smugly demanded P800,000.00” in
exchange for the duplicate owner’s copy of TCT, because Atty. Parulan represented the current value of the
property to be P1.5 million. As a counter-offer, however, they tendered P250,000.00, which Atty. Parulan
declined, giving them only until April 5, 1991 to decide.
11. Hearing nothing more from the petitioners, Atty. Parulan decided to call them on April 5, 1991, but they informed
him that they had already fully paid to Elena.
12. Thus, Dionisio, through Atty. Parulan, commenced an action praying for the declaration of the nullity of the deed
of absolute sale executed by Ma. Elena, and the cancellation of the title issued to the petitioners by virtue thereof.
13. In turn, the Aggabaos filed their own action for specific performance with damages against the respondents. Both
cases were consolidated for trial and judgment in the RTC.
RTC Ruling: Annulled the deed of absolute sale executed in favor of the Aggabaos covering two parcels of registered
land the respondents owned for want of the written consent of respondent husband Dionisio Parulan, Jr. The CA affirmed
the RTC decision.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Aggabao acted in good faith in purchasing the property? NO
2. Which between Article 173 of the CC and Article 124 of the FC should apply to the sale of the conjugal property
executed without the consent of Dionisio? Art. 124 of the FC
3. Whether or not Veloso v Ca ruling applies in this case? NO
SC Ruling:
1. This Court defined good faith asa purchaser in good faith is one who buys the property of another, without notice
that some other person has a right to, or interest in, such property, and pays the full and fair price for it at the time
of such purchase or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other persons in the property. Aggabaos
must show that they inquired not only into the title of the seller but also into the seller’s capacity to sell. They
knew fully well that the law demanded the written consent of Dionisio to the sale, but yet they did not present
evidence to show that they had made inquiries into the circumstances behind the execution of the SPA purportedly
executed by Dionisio in favor of Ma. Elena and to check at Notary Republic. As a matter of fact, Atty.
Datingaling, who created the SPA, was not authorized to act as a Notary Public for Manila during the period
1990-1991. Knowing that the property is conjugal at Los Baños Bank, they must withhold the payment. It is clear
that they are in a rush to buy the property.
2. Article 124 of the FC applies and not Article 173 of the CC. The sale was made in 1991after the effectivity of the
FC. The proper law to apply is Article 124 of the FC because it is settled that any alienation or encumbrance of
conjugal property made during the effectivity of the FC is governed by Article 124 of the FC. It is clear that the
consent of Dionisio must be obtained. It must be noted also that Article 254 of the FC repealed entire Title VI in
which the provisions on the property relations between husband and wife. Article of 256 of the FC applies
retroactively provided no vested rights are impaired. In this case, no vested rights are impaired. Dionisio
contention was right that the Aggabaos must withdraw from the agreement after noticing some defects.
3. The Veloso ruling cannot apply because the sale in Veloso ruling happened before the effectivity of the FC while
in this case it is after. In Veloso Ruling, the Court pointed out that mere allegation that the signatures had been
forged could not be sustained without clear and convincing proof to substantiate the allegations. In contrast to this
case, the entries in Dionisio’s passport showed that he was out of the country at the time of the execution of the
questioned SPA.
(b) Sole administration

(1) Incapacity, FC 124, 127, 253
Uy vs. CA, 346 SCRA 246 (Repeated)
(2) Separation in fact, FC 100 (3), 127(3)
(3) Abandonment, FC 101, 128
(4) Pendency of legal separation proceedings, FC 61
Sabalones v. CA 230 SCRA 79 (Repeated)
(c) Disposition and encumbrance, FC 124-125; FC 97, 121
38. Cheeseman v. IAC and Estrelita Padilla 193 SCRA 93 (Garcia)
Facts: Thomas and Criselda Cheesman were married on December 1970 but have been separated since February 1981.
On June 1974, a "Deed of Sale and Transfer of Possessory Rights" was executed by Armando Altares conveying a parcel
of unregistered land and the house thereon in favor of "Criselda P. Cheesman, of legal age, Filipino citizen, married to
Thomas Cheesman. Thomas, although aware of the deed, did not object to the transfer being made only to his wife.
Thereafter—and again with the knowledge of Thomas and also without any protest by him—tax declarations for the
property purchased were issued in the name only of Criselda Cheesman and Criselda assumed exclusive management and
administration of said property, leasing it to tenants. On July 1, 1981, Criselda Cheesman sold the property to Estelita M.
Padilla, without the knowledge or consent of Thomas Cheesman. On July 31, Thomas brought suit in the CFI Olongapo
against his wife, Criselda, and Estelita Padilla, praying for the annulment of the sale on the ground that the transaction had
been executed without his knowledge and consent. An answer was filed in the names of both defendants, alleging that (1)
the property sold was paraphernal, having been purchased by Criselda with funds exclusively belonging to her ("her own
separate money"); (2) Thomas Cheesman, being an American, was disqualified to have any interest or right of ownership
in the land; and (3) Estelita Padilla was a buyer in good faith.
The action resulted in a judgment declaring void ab initio the sale executed by Criselda Cheesman in favor of Estelita M.
Padilla, and ordering the delivery of the property to Thomas Cheesman as administrator of the conjugal partnership
property, and the payment to him of P5,000.00 as attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. Estelita Padilla filed a
supplemental pleading on December 20, 1982 as her own answer to the complaint, and a motion for summary judgment.
TC: the evidence on record satisfactorily overcame the disputable presumption in Article 160 of the Civil Code—that all
property of the marriage belongs to the conjugal partnership "unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband
or to the wife"—and that the immovable in question was in truth Criselda's paraphernal property.
Thomas Cheesman appealed to the IAC, but the IAC dismissed. Hence, this appeal to the SC.
Issue: Whether or not Thomas Cheesman can contest the validity of the contract. - NO
Ruling: The Constitution prohibits the sale to aliens of residential land. Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution
ordains that, "Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private land shall be transferred or conveyed except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain." Petitioner Thomas
was, of course, charged with knowledge of this prohibition. Thus, assuming that it was his intention that the lot in question
be purchased by him and his wife, he acquired no right whatever over the property by virtue of that purchase; and in
attempting to acquire a right or interest in land, vicariously and clandestinely, he knowingly violated the
Constitution; the sale as to him was null and void. In any event, he had and has no capacity or personality to question
the subsequent sale of the same property by his wife on the theory that in so doing he is merely exercising the prerogative
of a husband in respect of conjugal property. To sustain such a theory would permit indirect controversion of the
constitutional prohibition. If the property were to be declared conjugal, this would accord to the alien husband a not
insubstantial interest and right over land, as he would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition.
This is a right that the Constitution does not permit him to have.
As already observed, the finding that his wife had used her own money to purchase the property cannot, and will not, at
this stage of the proceedings be reviewed and overturned. But even if it were a fact that said wife had used conjugal funds
to make the acquisition, the considerations just set out militate, on high constitutional grounds, against his recovering and
holding the property so acquired or any part thereof. And whether in such an event, he may recover from his wife any
share of the money used for the purchase or charge her with unauthorized disposition or expenditure of conjugal funds is
not now inquired into; that would be, in the premises, a purely academic exercise. An equally decisive consideration is
that Estelita Padilla is a purchaser in good faith, both the Trial Court and the IAC having found that Cheesman's own
conduct had led her to believe the property to be exclusive property of the latter's wife, freely disposable by her without
his consent or intervention. An innocent buyer for value, she is entitled to the protection of the law in her purchase,
particularly as against Cheesman, who would assert rights to the property denied him by both the letter and spirit of the
Constitution itself.
39. Frenzel vs. Catito, G.R. No. 143958, July 11, 2003 (Hechanova)
Topic: Disposition and encumbrance

Facts: Frenzel is an Australian citizen who worked as a pilot for the New Guinea Airlines. He married Santos (Filipino) 2
years after he arrived in the Philippines. However, the couple separated without obtaining a divorce. Sometime in 1981,
Frenzel met Catito – a Filipina masseuse, while he was on vacation in Australia. Unknown to him, she previously resided
in Germany and was married to Muller, a German national. The 2 eventually cohabited together in the Philippines. During
their common-law relationship, Frenzel acquired real and personal properties (commercial space for beauty parlor, house
and lot, beach resort, furniture) in the Philippines (valued approx. P724k) with the use of his personal funds. Since Frenzel
knew that as an alien he was disqualified from owning lands in the Philippines, he agreed that only Catito’s name would
appear in the deeds of sale and the titles as the buyer, considering that they planned on getting married.
Eventually, they separated. Frenzel found out about Catito’s subsisting marriage. Catito’s petition for divorce was denied.
Catito’s husband also threated on filing a bigamy case against them. Frenzel then filed a complaint to recover the said
properties and that he be declared as transient owner for the purpose of selling the same at a public auction thereby
recovering the purchase price through the proceeds of the said sale pursuant to NCC 1416, RA 133, NCC 22. He contends
that: (1) He purchased the properties because of his desire to marry Catito and not to violate the Constitution. (2) He was
deceived by Catito when the latter failed to disclose her previous marriage to Muller. (3) Catito managed to transfer funds
from their joint account to her own account with the same bank without his knowledge and consent. Catito, on the other
hand, denied the allegations and insisted that she acquired the said properties with her personal funds as evidenced by the
deeds of sale, receipts, and certificates of title made out in her name.
RTC ruling: The RTC ruled that Frenzel is precluded from recovering the properties from Catito because as an alien he is
disqualified from acquiring and owning lands in the Philippines. The sale of the properties to Frenzel is null and void.
CA ruling: The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. It ruled that Frenzel violated the Constitution and was thus barred
from recovering the money used in purchasing the 3 real properties. To allow Frenzel would embolden aliens to violate
the Constitution and defeat public policy.
Issue: WON Frenzel may recover the 3 real properties to sell the same at public auction and recover the money used in
purchasing such, considering that the deeds of sale and titles stated Catito’s name as the buyer. - NO
Ruling: The SC affirmed the decision of the lower courts. The court raises 4 points:
1. Pursuant to Art 14, Sec 14 of the 1973 Constitution, aliens have been disqualified from acquiring lands of public
domain. Hence, they have also been disqualified from acquiring private lands. Even if he was the real buyer, the said
transactions violate the Constitution and are thus null and void.
Art 14, Sec 14 of the 1973 Constitution. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private land shall be
transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands in the
public domain
2. NCC 1416 does not apply in this case as Frenzel otherwise contends. The provision applies only to merely prohibited
contracts and not to illegal or void ab initio contracts as is the one in this case, which violated the Constitution. Thus,
to allow Frenzel to recover the said properties or the money used would be against public policy.
NCC 1416. When the agreement is not illegal per se but is merely prohibited, and the prohibition by the law is
designed for the protection of the plaintiff, he may, if public policy is thereby enhanced, recover what he has paid
or delivered.
3. RA 133 likewise does not apply in this case as Frenzel otherwise contends. There is no evidence to prove that the said
properties were mortgaged to Frenzel by the owners thereof. The only evidence established is that the said properties
were sold to Catito as buyer, albeit with the use of Frenzel’s personal funds.
Sec 1 RA 133. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, private real property may be mortgaged in
favor of any individual, corporation, or association, but the mortgagee or his successor-in-interest, if disquali ed to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines, shall not take possession of the mortgaged property
during the existence of the mortgage and shall not take possession of mortgaged property except after default and
for the sole purpose of foreclosure, receivership, enforcement or other proceedings and in no case for a period of
more than five years from actual possession and shall not bid or take part in any sale of such real property in case
of foreclosure:
Provided, That said mortgagee or successor-in-interest may take possession of said property after default in
accordance with the prescribed judicial procedures for foreclosure and receivership and in no case exceeding ve
years from actual possession.
4. NCC 22 likewise does not apply in this case as Frenzel otherwise contends. The maxim that “no person should
unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another” (memo cum alterius deter detremento protest) does not apply in this
case. An action for recovery of what has been paid without just cause has been designated as an accion in rem verso.
This does not apply if, as in this case, the action is proscribed by the Constitution or by the application of the pari
delicto doctrine. Said objection to recover is founded in general principles of policy.
NCC 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into
possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.
40. Villaranda vs. Villaranda, G.R. No. 153447, Feb. 23, 2004 (Jimenea)
Doctrine: Without the wife’s consent, the husband’s alienation or encumbrance of conjugal property prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code is not void, but merely voidable.
Facts: This controversy revolves around a Deed of Exchange executed by and between two brothers, Vicente Villaranda
(petitioner) and Honorio Villaranda (respondent). This involves a 471sqm parcel of land located at Divisoria, Cagayan de
Oro (CDO) which was left to the 2 brothers and their 8 other siblings. Bebiano Luminarias, the estate administrator, leased
the 124sqm of the property to Honorio on May 1, 1976 until May 31, 1986. Vicente inherited 64.22sqm of the property
that had not been leased to Honorio.
On July 6, 1976, Honorio and Vicente executed the assailed Deed of Exchange in which Vicente agreed to convey his
64.22 sqm to Honorio in exchange of a 500sqm property in Macasandig, Cagayan De Oro City (covered by TCT No.
2138). After the execution of the deed of exchange, Honorio took possession of the 64.22sqm and constructed a building.
Years later, a subdivision plan for lot 448-B was completed, in pursuit of which TCT No. T-65893 for the 64.22sqm share
of Vicente which was issued in his name while the other heirs were also given their own TCTs for their respective shares.
Honorio and his wife Ana brought an action for specific performance before the RTC of CDO to compel Vicente to
comply with his obligations under the Deed of Exchange because they alleged that they could not fully use or dispose of
their Macasandig property as Vicente has yet to identify and delineate the 500sqm property. During the pendency of this
case, Honorio sold the Divisoria lot to Colorhouse Laboratories, Inc. which intervened in the Civil Case.
RTC ruled in favor of Honorio and his wife Ana.
The CA held that the provisions of the NCC were applicable in this case since the Deed of Exchange had been entered
into prior to the enactment of the FC. Thus, the absence of the wife’s signature on the Deed made it only voidable and not
void. And since Ana brought no action for the annulment of sale within 10 years, points that she assented to the Deed.
Issue: Whether or not the Deed of Exchange which was not signed by the wife of Honorio Villaranda is valid and
enforceable? = YES
Ruling: The Deed was entered into on July 6, 1976, while the Family Code took effect only on August 3, 1998. Laws
should be applied prospectively only, unless a legislative intent to give them retroactive effect is expressly declared or is
necessarily implied from the language used. Hence, the applicable code to the present case is the Civil Code and not the
Family Code.
"Article 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis or a spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction or is
confined in a leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without
the wife's consent. . . .”
"Article 173. The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for
the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such consent is required, or any act
or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should
the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs, after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of the
property fraudulently alienated by the husband."
According to Art 166, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the
wife’s consent. This provision must be read in conjunction with Art 173 because the latter states that an action to annul an
alienation or encumbrance may be instituted by the wife during the marriage and within 10 years from the transaction
questioned. Without the wife’s consent, the husband’s alienation or encumbrance of conjugal property prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code is not void, but merely voidable. In this case, the records show no evidence that any action
was brought by Ana to annul the transfer made by Honorio within 10 years from the transaction question. Therefore, her
right to bring an action to invalidate the contract had prescribed and the deed is valid until and unless annulled.
Ravina v Villa-Abrille, GR No. 160708, Oct. 16, 2009 (Repeated)
41. Siochi v Gozon, G.R. No. 169900, March 18, 2010 (Labrador)
Doctrine: In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the
transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be
perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is
withdrawn by either or both offerors
Facts: This case involves a 30,000 sq.m. parcel of land (property) covered by TCT No. 5357. The property is situated in
Malabon, Metro Manila and is registered in the name of "Alfredo Gozon (Alfredo), married to Elvira Gozon (Elvira)." On
23 December 1991, Elvira filed with the Cavite City RTC a petition for legal separation against her husband Alfredo. On 2
January 1992, Elvira filed a notice of lis pendens, which was then annotated on TCT No. 5357.
On 31 August 1993, while the legal separation case was still pending, Alfredo and Mario Siochi (Mario) entered into an
Agreement to Buy and Sell the property for the price of ₱18 million. Among the stipulations in the Agreement were that
Alfredo would: (1) secure an Affidavit from Elvira that the property is Alfredo’s exclusive property and to annotate the
Agreement at the back of TCT No. 5357; (2) secure the approval of the Cavite RTC to exclude the property from the legal
separation case; and (3) secure the removal of the notice of lis pendens pertaining to the said case and annotated on TCT
No. 5357. However, despite repeated demands from Mario, Alfredo failed to comply with these stipulations. After paying
the ₱5 million earnest money as partial payment of the purchase price, Mario took possession of the property in
September 1993. On 6 September 1993, the Agreement was annotated on TCT No. 5357. RTC granted the legal
separation. As regards the property, the Cavite RTC held that it is deemed conjugal property.
On 22 August 1994, Alfredo executed a Deed of Donation over the property in favor of their daughter, Winifred Gozon
(Winifred). The Register of Deeds of Malabon, Gil Tabije, cancelled TCT No. 5357 and issued TCT No. M-105088 in the
name of Winifred, without annotating the Agreement and the notice of lis pendens on TCT No. M-10508. On 26 October
1994, Alfredo, by virtue of a SPA executed in his favor by Winifred, sold the property to Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc.
(IDRI) for ₱18 million. IDRI paid Alfredo representing full payment for the property. Subsequently, the Register of Deeds
of Malabon cancelled TCT No. M-10508 and issued TCT No. M-10976 to IDRI.
Mario then filed with the Malabon RTC a complaint for Specific Performance and Damages, Annulment of Donation and
Sale, with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order.
Issue: WON the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. YES.
CA Ruling: The sale of the subject land by defendant Alfredo Gozon to plaintiff-appellant Siochi is declared null and
void for the following reasons: a) The conveyance was done without the consent of defendant-appellee Elvira Gozon; b)
Defendant Alfredo Gozon’s one-half (½) undivided share has been forfeited in favor of his daughter, defendant Winifred
Gozon, by virtue of the decision in the legal separation case rendered by the RTC Cavite.
SC Ruling: In his petition, Mario alleges that the Agreement should be treated as a continuing offer which may be
perfected by the acceptance of the other spouse before the offer is withdrawn. Since Elvira’s conduct signified her
acquiescence to the sale, Mario prays for the Court to direct Alfredo and Elvira to execute a Deed of Absolute Sale over
the property upon his payment of ₱9 million to Elvira.
We find the petitions without merit. This case involves the conjugal property of Alfredo and Elvira. Since the disposition
of the property occurred after the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law is the Family Code. Article 124 of the
Family Code. In this case, Alfredo was the sole administrator of the property because Elvira, with whom Alfredo was
separated in fact, was unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal property. However, as sole administrator
of the property, Alfredo still cannot sell the property without the written consent of Elvira or the authority of the court.
Without such consent or authority, the sale is void. As regards Mario’s contention that the Agreement is a continuing
offer which may be perfected by Elvira’s acceptance before the offer is withdrawn, the fact that the property was
subsequently donated by Alfredo to Winifred and then sold to IDRI clearly indicates that the offer was already withdrawn.
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement,
the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within
five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the
other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without
authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting
spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or
authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors
[Other issues] However, we disagree with the finding of the CA that the one-half undivided share of Alfredo in the
property was already forfeited in favor of his daughter Winifred, based on the ruling of the Cavite RTC in the legal
separation case. The CA misconstrued the ruling of the Cavite RTC that Alfredo, being the offending spouse, is deprived
of his share in the net profits and the same is awarded to Winifred.
Among the effects of the decree of legal separation is that the conjugal partnership is dissolved and liquidated and the
offending spouse would have no right to any share of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership. It is only
Alfredo’s share in the net profits which is forfeited in favor of Winifred. Article 102(4) of the FCprovides that "[f]or
purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture in accordance with Article 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2), the said
profits shall be the increase in value between the market value of the community property at the time of the celebration of
the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution." Clearly, what is forfeited in favor of Winifred is not
Alfredo’s share in the conjugal partnership property but merely in the net profits of the conjugal partnership property.
With regard to IDRI, we agree with the Court of Appeals in holding that IDRI is not a buyer in good faith. As found by the
RTC Malabon and the Court of Appeals, IDRI had actual knowledge of facts and circumstances which should impel a
reasonably cautious person to make further inquiries about the vendor’s title to the property.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petitions. We AFFIRM the 7 July 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 74447 with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) We DELETE the portions regarding the forfeiture of Alfredo Gozon’s one-half undivided share in favor of Winifred
Gozon and the grant of option to Winifred Gozon whether or not to dispose of her undivided share in the property; and
(2) We ORDER Alfredo Gozon and Winifred Gozon to pay Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc. jointly and severally the
Eighteen Million Pesos (₱18,000,000) which was the amount paid by Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc. for the property, with
legal interest computed from the finality of this Decision.
Fuentes vs. Roca, G.R. No. 178902, April 21, 2010 (Repeated)
Aguete v PNB, GR 170166, April 6, 2011 (Repeated)
42. Flores v Lindo, GR 183984, April 13, 2011 (Maligat)

Doctrine: The real estate mortgage, absent the authority or consent of the husband, is necessarily void.
Facts: On 31 October 1995, Edna Lindo (Edna) obtained a loan from Arturo Flores (petitioner) amounting to ₱400,000
payable on 1 December 1995 with 3% compounded monthly interest and 3% surcharge in case of late payment. To secure
the loan, Edna executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage (the Deed) covering a property in the name of Edna and her
husband Enrico (Enrico) Lindo, Jr. (collectively, respondents). Edna also signed a Promissory Note and the Deed for
herself and for Enrico as his attorney-in-fact.
Edna issued three checks as partial payments for the loan. All checks were dishonored for insufficiency of funds,
prompting petitioner to file a Complaint for Foreclosure of Mortgage with Damages against respondents.
Branch 33 RTC of Manila: Ruled that petitioner was not entitled to judicial foreclosure of the mortgage. The RTC,
Branch 33 found that the Deed was executed by Edna without the consent and authority of Enrico. The RTC, Branch 33
noted that the Deed was executed on 31 October 1995 while the Special Power of Attorney (SPA) executed by Enrico was
only dated 4 November 1995.
Further ruled that petitioner was not precluded from recovering the loan from Edna as he could file a personal action
against her. However, the RTC, ruled that it had no jurisdiction over the personal action which should be filed in the place
where the plaintiff or the defendant resides in accordance with Section 2, Rule 4 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure.
Branch 42 RTC: On 8 September 2004, petitioner filed a Complaint for Sum of Money with Damages against
respondents. It was raffled to Branch 42 (RTC, Branch 42) of the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
Respondents filed their Answer with Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaims where they admitted the loan but stated that
it only amounted to ₱340,000. Respondents further alleged that Enrico was not a party to the loan because it was
contracted by Edna without Enrico’s signature. Respondents prayed for the dismissal of the case on the grounds of
improper venue, res judicata and forum-shopping, invoking the Decision of the RTC, Branch 33. On 7 March 2005,
respondents also filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of res judicata and lack of cause of action.
Ruled that res judicata will not apply to rights, claims or demands which, although growing out of the same subject matter,
constitute separate or distinct causes of action and were not put in issue in the former action. Respondents filed a motion
for reconsideration.
CA: Set aside the 22 July 2005 and 8 February 2006 Orders of the RTC, Branch 42 for having been issued with grave
abuse of discretion.
Ruled that under Section 3, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may not institute more than one suit for a
single cause of action. If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one on a
judgment upon the merits in any one is available ground for the dismissal of the others. The Court of Appeals ruled that on
a nonpayment of a note secured by a mortgage, the creditor has a single cause of action against the debtor, that is recovery
of the credit with execution of the suit. Thus, the creditor may institute two alternative remedies: either a personal action
for the collection of debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage, but not both. The Court of Appeals ruled that
petitioner had only one cause of action against Edna for her failure to pay her obligation and he could not split the single
cause of action by filing separately a foreclosure proceeding and a collection case. By filing a petition for foreclosure of
the real estate mortgage, the Court of Appeals held that petitioner had already waived his personal action to recover the
amount covered by the promissory note.
Issue: Is the promissory note executed by Edna Lindo valid, even without the consent of her husband?
SC Ruling: NO, THE PROMISSORY NOTE EXECUTED BY EDNA LINDO IS INVALID. The real estate mortgage
executed by petitioner Edna Lindo over their conjugal property is undoubtedly an act of strict dominion and must be
consented to by her husband to be effective. In the instant case, the real estate mortgage, absent the authority or consent of
the husband, is necessarily void. Indeed, the real estate mortgage is this case was executed on October 31, 1995 and the
subsequent special power of attorney dated November 4, 1995 cannot be made to retroact to October 31, 1995 to validate
the mortgage previously made by petitioner.
The liability of Edna Lindo on the principal contract of the loan however subsists notwithstanding the illegality of the
mortgage. Indeed, where a mortgage is not valid, the principal obligation which it guarantees is not thereby rendered null
and void. That obligation matures and becomes demandable in accordance with the stipulation pertaining to it. Under the
foregoing circumstances, what is lost is merely the right to foreclose the mortgage as a special remedy for satisfying or
settling the indebtedness which is the principal obligation. In case of nullity, the mortgage deed remains as evidence or
proof of a personal obligation of the debtor and the amount due to the creditor may be enforced in an ordinary action.
In view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the deed of real estate mortgage as void in the absence of
the authority or consent of petitioner’s spouse therein. The liability of petitioner on the principal contract of loan however
subsists notwithstanding the illegality of the real estate mortgage.
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of
disagreement, the husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be
availed of within five years from the date of contract implementing such decision.
properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or
encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or
consent the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing
offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon
the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both
offerors. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 124 of the Family Code of which applies to conjugal partnership property, is a reproduction of Article 96 of the
Family Code which applies to community property.
Both Article 96 and Article 127 of the Family Code provide that the powers do not include disposition or encumbrance
without the written consent of the other spouse. Any disposition or encumbrance without the written consent shall be void.
However, both provisions also state that "the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the
consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other
spouse x x x before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors."
In this case, the Promissory Note and the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage were executed on 31 October 1995. The Special
Power of Attorney was executed on 4 November 1995. The execution of the SPA is the acceptance by the other spouse
that perfected the continuing offer as a binding contract between the parties, making the Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage a valid contract.
However, as the Court of Appeals noted, petitioner allowed the decisions of the RTC, Branch 33 and the RTC, Branch 93
to become final and executory without asking the courts for an alternative relief. The Court of Appeals stated that
petitioner merely relied on the declarations of these courts that he could file a separate personal action and thus failed to
observe the rules and settled jurisprudence on multiplicity of suits, closing petitioner’s avenue for recovery of the loan.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the 30 May 2008 Decision and the 4 August 2008 Resolution of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No.
94003 are SET ASIDE. The RTC of Manila, Branch 42 is directed to proceed with the trial of Civil Case No. 04-110858.
9. Effect of separation de facto, FC 127, FC 100 cf. FC 239
10. Effect of abandonment, FC 128 cf. FC 101
43. Partosa-Jo v. CA 216 SCRA 693 (Maravillas)

Doctrine: Abandonment implies a departure by one spouse with the avowed intent never to return, followed by prolonged
absence without just cause, and without in the meantime providing in the least for one's family although able to do so.
There must be absolute cessation of marital relations, duties and rights, with the intention of perpetual separation. This
idea is clearly expressed in the above-quoted provision, which states that "a spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other
when he or she has left the conjugal dwelling without any intention of returning."
Facts: The petitioner, Prima Partosa-Jo, is the legal wife of Jose Jo, herein private respondent. Jose Jo admitted to have
cohabited with 3 women and fathered 15 children. Prima filed a complaint against the husband for judicial separation of
conjugal property in addition to an earlier action for support which was consolidated. RTC decision was a definite
disposition of the complaint for support but none of that for the judicial separation of conjugal property. Jose elevated the
decision to CA which affirmed rulings of the trial court. The complaint on the separation of property was dismissed for
lack of cause of action on the ground that separation by agreement was not covered in Art. 178 of the Civil Code. Prima
contested that the agreement between her and Jose was for her to temporarily live with her parents during the initial period
of her pregnancy and for him to visit and support her. They never agreed to be separated permanently. She even returned
to him but the latter refused to accept her.
Issue: Whether there is abandonment on the part of Jose Jo to warrant judicial separation of conjugal property.
Ruling: SC is in the position that respondent court should have made the necessary modification instead of dismissing the
case filed. For abandonment to exist, there must be an absolute cessation of marital relations, duties and rights, with the
intention of perpetual separation. The fact that Jo did not accept her demonstrates that he had no intention of resuming
their conjugal relationship. From 1968 until 1988, Jose refused to provide financial support to Prima. Hence, the physical
separation of the parties, coupled with the refusal by the private respondent to give support to the petitioner, sufficed to
constitute abandonment as a ground for the judicial separation of their conjugal property.
Wherefore, the petition was granted and in favor of the petitioner and that the court ordered the conjugal property of the
spouses be divided between them, share and share alike. The division will be implemented after the determination of all
the properties pertaining to the said conjugal partnership including those that may have been illegally registered in the
name of the persons.
11. Dissolution of CPG, FC 126

(a) Death, FC 126 (1), 130
Heirs of Go v Servacio, GR 157537, Sept. 7, 2011 (Repeated)
(b) Legal separation, FC 63 (2), FC 66
(c) Annulment and declaration of nullity, FC 50 in rel. to FC 43 (2)
(d) Judicial separation of property, FC 134-138
Ugalde v Ysasi, GR 130623, February 29, 2008 (Repeated)
12. Effects of dissolution, FC 129

Tarrosa vs De Leon, GR 185063, July 23, 2009 (Repeated)
44. Cabreza v Cabreza, GR 171260, September 11, 2009 (Unassigned) (Wenceslao){Tan}

Facts: Ceferino Cabreza Jr (respondent) filed a petition of nullity of his marriage (FC36) to Amparo Robles Cabreza
(petitioner) with the RTC. RTC granted this petition and oredered the dissolution and liquidation of conjugal partnership
in accordance with FC 129, without prejudice to creditors. Ceferino then filed for a motion of execution ordering the
Dissolution of conjugal partnership. He sought liquidation of their conjugal home to be sold and for the proceeds to be
divided accordingly. RTC issued an order granting this petition and another one allowing prospective buyers to inspect the
property. Amparo filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied.
RTC issued an order granting writ of possesion to the buyer of the property, BJD Holdings corporation. A notice to vacate
was given to Amparo.
Amparo filed a motion to hold in abeyance the writ of possession and notice to vacate arguing that FC129(9) states that
the conjugal dwelling shall be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority of the children choose to remain. She
asserted that the family home should be given to her. This was dismissed because the decision had long become final and
executory. RTC said that FC 129(9) presupposes a situation where there are properties aside from the conjugal dwelling.
Again, Amparo was denied.
(To salvage her case, she filed new ones questioning the validity of sale) When this case was filed with the SC, there were
3 more filed with the CA questioning the validity of the deed of sale between Ceferino and BJD HIldings Corporation
because she did not give consent. The CA granted these and remanded them to RTC. But the RTC had already rendered
judgment as final and executory (to sell the family dwelling)
Issue: W/N the sale of the property is varies the previous RTC decision should no longer be litigated anew (to allow so
would permit Amparo to indirectly reopen her failed petition), (so, in short, W/N she can still go after their dwelling
despite an executory decision)
Ruling: No, she cannot raise these new questions about the sale. It would be unfair for her to raise her argument in this
petition in the guise of questioning the subsequent implementation orders of the RTC.
She cannot question the validity of sale because she herself said that this was again a pending case in the CA and therefore
cannot be subject to the petition herein.
Note: The SC decision became very procedural because she filed so many cases. but re: the property, FC 129
presupposes the couple has more than 1 property (ie. the conjugal dwelling). In case you have more properties, you
liquidate and divide those, then give the dwelling to the spouse with the children. If you only have that one property, you
have to sell and liquidate that. To make a long story short, she lost the house during the liquidation stage so she made new
petitions questioning the validity of sale, etc, hoping she could insert FC 129 again to get her house.
Cabreza v Cabreza, GR 181962, January 16, 2012 (Repeated)
(a) Liquidation procedure, FC 129

Quiao v Quiao, G. R. No. 183622, July 4, 2012 (Repeated)
(b) Cause other than death, FC 43(2), 63(2)
(c) termination due to death; FC 130, cf. FC 104
13. For marriages before FC, FC 131
14. Applicability of Rules of Court, FC 132
15. Support during CPG liquidation, FC 133
45. Santero v. CFI, 153 SCRA 728 (Cerrero)

Facts: Princesita Santos-Morales, Frederico Santero and Willie Santero (Petitioners) are children of the late Pablo Santero
with Felixberta Pacursa while Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina and Miguel Santero (Respondents) are 4 of the 7 children by
Pablo Santero with Anselma Diaz. Both sets of children are the natural children of the late Pablo since neither of their
mothers was married to their father. Pablo was the only legitimate son of Pascual Santero and Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero.The issue in this case springs from the Motion for Allowance filed by Respondents through their guardian,
Anselma in 1981 wherein the ground cited was for support which included educational expenses, clothing and medical
necessities, which was granted. Again, Respondents filed a Motion for Allowance in 1982, citing the same grounds.
Petitioners opposed and contended that the wards for whom allowance is sought are no longer schooling and have attained
majority age so that they are no longer under guardianship. They likewise allege that the administrator does not have
sufficient funds to cover the said allowance because whatever funds are in the hands of the administrator, they constitute
funds held in trust for the benefit of whoever will be adjudged as owners of the Kawit property from which said
administrator derives the only income of the intestate estate of Pablo.
In the Reply to the Opposition filed by Anselma, she admitted that some of her children are of age and not enrolled for the
first semester due to lack of funds but will be enrolled as soon as they are given the requested allowances. She cited Art.
290 of the Civil Code and Sec. 3 of Rule 83 of the Rules of Court.
CFI granted the allowance to the Respondents (2k each).While the case was pending in the SC, Respondents filed another
Motion for Allowance to include Juanita, Estelita and Pedro Santero as children of Pablo with Anselma praying that an
order be granted directing the administrator to deliver 6k to each of the 7 children as their allowance. CFI granted again
but Petitioners asked the CFI to reconsider. An Amended Order was issued directing Anselma to submit her clarification
or explanation as to the additional 3 children included. Anselma stated that in her previous motions, only the last 4 minor
children were included and her first 3 who were then of age should have been included since all her children have the
right to receive allowance as advance payment of their shares in the inheritance of Pablo under Art. 188 of the NCC.CFI
issued another Order directing the administrator to get back the allowance of the 3 additional recipients or children of
Anselma.Petitioners argue that Respondents are not entitled to any allowance since they have already attained majority, 2
are gainfully employed and 1 is married as provided for under Sec. 3 Rule 83, of the ROC. Petitioners also allege that
there was misrepresentation on the part of the guardian in asking for allowance for tuition fees, book and other school
materials and other miscellaneous expenses for school term 1982-83 because these wards have already attained majority
age so that they are no longer under guardianship
Issue:W/N CFI acted with abuse of discretion in granting the allowance to Respondents despite the fact that all of them
are not minors and all are gainfully employed with the exception of Miguel? No
Ruling: The fact that private respondents are of age, gainfully employed, or married is of no moment and should not be
regarded as the determining factor of their right to allowance under Art. 188. While the Rules of Court limit allowances to
the widow and minor or incapacitated children of the deceased, the New Civil Code gives the surviving spouse and his/her
children without distinction. Hence, the private respondents Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina and Miguel all surnamed Santero
are entitled to allowances as advances from their shares in the inheritance from their father Pablo Santero.
Since the provision of the Civil Code, a substantive law, gives the surviving spouse and to the children the right to receive
support during the liquidation of the estate of the deceased, such right cannot be impaired by Rule 83 Sec. 3 of the Rules
of Court which is a procedural rule. Be it noted however that with respect to "spouse," the same must be the "legitimate
spouse" (not common-law spouses who are the mothers of the children here).
It is not true that the Motion for Allowance was granted by respondent Court without hearing. The record shows that the
"Motion for Allowance" dated June 30, 1982 contains a Notice of Hearing addressed to the lawyers for the petitioners and
setting the hearing thereof on July 8, 1982 at 9:00 in the morning. Apparently a copy of said motion was duly received by
the lawyer, Atty. Beltran as he filed an opposition thereto on the same date of hearing of the motion. Furthermore even the
instant petition admits that the wards, (petitioners and private respondents as represented by their respective guardians)
"have been granted allowances for school expenses for about 8 years now." The respondent court in granting the motion
for allowance merely "followed the precedent of the court which granted a similar motion last year." However in previous
years (1979-1981) the "wards" (petitioners and private respondents) only received P1,500.00 each depending upon the
availability of funds as granted by the court in several orders.
WHEREFORE, in the light of the aforementioned circumstances, the instant Petition is hereby DISMISSED and the
assailed judgment is AFFIRMED.

Veloso v. Martinez, 28 Phil 255 (Repeated)

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4.

Administration of exclusive property

Veloso v. Martinez, 28 Phil 255 (Repeated)

5. Encumbrance/disposition of exclusive property

15. Wong et al. v. IAC 200 SCRA 792 (Delocario)

6. What constitutes CPG

Dewara v Lamela, GR 179010, April 11, 2011 (Dacua) (Repeated)

16. De La Pena v Avila, G.R. No. 187490, Feb. 8, 2012 (Evangelista)

17. Villanueva vs CA, 427 SCRA 439 (Escudero)

Ruling: YES, they are conjugal. Petition denied; decision of CA affirmed.

18. Mendoza v. Reyes 124 SCRA 154 (Garcia)

Issue: Are the disputed properties conjugal properties? – Yes.

Article 153 of the Civil Code provides:

19. Aguete v PNB, GR 170166, April 6, 2011 (Hechanova)

(d) If property bought by installments, FC Art. 118

22. Munoz, Jr. v Ramirez, GR 156125, August 25, 2010 (Maligat)

Issue: Is the subject property paraphernal or conjugal?

SC Ruling: THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS ERLINDA’S EXCLUSIVE PARAPHERNAL PROPERTY. As a general

7. Charges upon and obligations of CPG, FC 121, 122

24. Ayala vs CA, 286 SCRA 272 (Narag)

(a) With consent

Aguete v PNB, GR 170166, April 6, 2011 (Repeated)

30. Carlos vs. Abelardo, 380 SCRA 361 (Uy)

Villanueva vs Chiong, GR 59889, June 5, 2008 (Wenceslao) (Repeated)

31. Ravina v Villa-Abrille, GR No. 160708, Oct. 16, 2009 (Alejaga)

Fuentes v Roca, GR No. 178902, April 21, 2010 (Repeated)

(c) personal debts, FC 122, RPC 108

(d) winnings from gambling, FC 123

8. Ownership, administration and enjoyment

33. Guiang vs CA, 291 SCRA 372 (Dimen)

35. Docena vs. Lapesura, 355 SCRA 658 (Dacua)

36. Alinas vs Alinas, GR No. 158040, April 14, 2008 (Evangelista)

(b) Sole administration

Uy vs. CA, 346 SCRA 246 (Repeated)

(2) Separation in fact, FC 100 (3), 127(3)

(3) Abandonment, FC 101, 128

(4) Pendency of legal separation proceedings, FC 61

Sabalones v. CA 230 SCRA 79 (Repeated)

(c) Disposition and encumbrance, FC 124-125; FC 97, 121

Topic: Disposition and encumbrance

Ravina v Villa-Abrille, GR No. 160708, Oct. 16, 2009 (Repeated)

Issue: WON the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. YES.

42. Flores v Lindo, GR 183984, April 13, 2011 (Maligat)

43. Partosa-Jo v. CA 216 SCRA 693 (Maravillas)

11. Dissolution of CPG, FC 126

12. Effects of dissolution, FC 129

44. Cabreza v Cabreza, GR 171260, September 11, 2009 (Unassigned) (Wenceslao){Tan}

Cabreza v Cabreza, GR 181962, January 16, 2012 (Repeated)

(a) Liquidation procedure, FC 129

45. Santero v. CFI, 153 SCRA 728 (Cerrero)

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