Gualberto De La Llana vs Manuel Alba

In 1981, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled “An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor
and for Other Purposes”, was passed. Gualberto De la Llana, a judge in Olongapo, was assailing its validity
because, first of all, he would be one of the judges that would be removed because of the reorganization and
second, he said such law would contravene the constitutional provision which provides the security of tenure of
judges of the courts. He averred that only the Supreme Court can remove judges NOT the Congress.

ISSUE: Whether or not a judge like Judge De La Llana can be validly removed by the legislature by such
statute (BP 129).

HELD: Yes. The SC ruled the following way: “Moreover, this Court is empowered “to discipline judges of
inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their dismissal.” Thus it possesses the
competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President who was vested with such power.
Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can
be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal,
there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the
standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for
the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists
between removal and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a
member of the judiciary. In the implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance
with accepted principles of constitutional construction that as far as incumbent justices and judges are
concerned, this Court be consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest consideration. No fear need be
entertained that there is a failure to accord respect to the basic principle that this Court does not render
advisory opinions. No question of law is involved. If such were the case, certainly this Court could not have its
say prior to the action taken by either of the two departments. Even then, it could do so but only by way of
deciding a case where the matter has been put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be
appointed to the vacant positions created by the reorganization. That remains in the hands of the Executive to
whom it properly belongs. There is no departure therefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial power.
Rather what is sought to be achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the charge
that in the exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing the inferior courts, the power of removal of the
present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free
from any unconstitutional taint, even one not readily discernible except to those predisposed to view it with
distrust. Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with the basic principle that in the choice of
alternatives between one which would save and another which would invalidate a statute, the former is to be
preferred.”