RULE 120
the parties nor reference to any legal
PEOPLE V. FERRER
Facts: Apellant was tried under an information
for rape that on or sometime in October 1995 and
in the Municipality of Wao, Province of Lanao
del Sur, the said accused with lewd design, did
then and there willfully and feloniously and by
means of force, violence and intimidation and
taking advantage of his ascendancy as stepfather
of an eleven (11) years [sic] old by pointing [to]
her a scythe (garab) and ordering her to remove
her clothes and then to lay down, remove her
panty and successfully have sexual intercourse
with her against her will and consent and
continuously repeated the same thereafter when
she is alone at home and while her mother is out.
Appellant’s counsel filed for an Urgent Motion
for Medical Treatment which was granted. Upon
pre trial, appellant and his counsel failed to
appear. Trial in absentia followed.
Judgment was rendered convicting the accused
of the crime of rape and sentencing him to death
penalty.
Issue: WON the judgment should be nullified for
failing to express clearly the facts and the law on
which it was based
Held:
Violating the Constitutional requirements, the
five-page decision failed to express therein
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which it is based. After a summation of the
evidence presented, which consisted only of the
prosecution's considering that the defense failed
to adduce evidence in its behalf, the trial court
immediately declared, in a most sweeping
manner, the guilt of appellant.
Thus, we nullified or deemed to have
failed to comply with Section 14,
Article VIII of the Constitution, a
decision, resolution or order which:
contained no analysis of the evidence of
basis in reaching its conclusions;
contained nothing more than a summary
of the testimonies of the witnesses of
both parties; convicted the accused of
libel but failed to cite any legal
authority or principle to support
conclusions that the letter in question
was libelous; consisted merely of one
(1) paragraph with mostly sweeping
generalizations and failed to support its
conclusion of parricide; consisted of
five (5) pages, three (3) pages of which
were quotations from the labor arbiter's
decision including the dispositive
portion and barely a page (two [2] short
paragraphs of two [2] sentences each) of
its own discussion or reasoning; was
merely based on the findings of another
court sans transcript of stenographic
notes; or failed to explain the factual
and legal bases for the award of moral
damages.
Tested against these standards, we withhold
approbation on the trial court's decision at bar for
its palpable failure to comply with the
constitutional and legal mandates. Except for the
narration of the prosecution's evidence, there is
nothing to indicate the reason for the decision.
There is no evaluation of the evidence and no
reason given why it concluded that said evidence
proved the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. The trial court's decision is
brief, starkly hallow, vacuous in its content and
trite in its form. It achieved nothing and
attempted at nothing. Its inadequacy speaks for
itself.
PEOPLE V. LIZADA
Facts: In August 1998, the petitioner did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
by means of force, violence and intimidation
Analia Orillosa, his stepdaughter, by embracing,
kissing, and touching her private parts. He then
proceeded with carnal knowedge to remove her
skirt and panty and placed himself on top of her
and tried to insert his penis into her vagina. This
allegation was repeated four times in different
occasions. However, medical examination
revealed that Analia’s hymen was intact, and the
other parts of her vagina was not injured due to
an insertion of average-sized adult Filipino male
organ in full erection. The testimony of Rossel,
Analia’s sister, also proved that no insertion of
penis happened because the petitioner stopped
after he saw her.
Hence, petitioner was charged for four counts of
qualified rape under four separate information.
RTC accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime charged against him and sentenced to
Death Penalty in each and every case as provided
for in the seventh paragraph, no. 1, Article 335 of
the Revised Penal Code.
However, petitioner averred in his brief that the
prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt and that the testimony of
Rossel was not taken into consideration in the
decision.
Issue: WON Lizada is guilty of acts of
lasciviousness only.
Ruling: NO. Accused-appellant is guilty of
attempted rape and not of acts of lasciviousness.
There is an attempt when the offender
commences the commission of a felony directly
by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of
execution which should produce the felony by
reason of some cause or accident other than his
own spontaneous desistance. The essential
elements of an attempted felony are as follows:
1. The offender commencesthe
commission of the felony directly by
overt acts;
2. He does not performall the acts of
execution which should producethe
felony;
3. The offenders act be not stopped by his
own spontaneousdesistance;
4. The non-performance of all acts of
executionwas due
to causeor accident other than his
spontaneous desistance.
The first requisite of an attempted felony consists
of two elements, namely:
(1) That there be external acts;
(2) Such external acts have direct connection
with the crime intended to be committed.
If the malefactor does not perform all the acts of
execution by reason of his spontaneous
desistance, he is not guilty of an attempted
felony.The law does not punish him for his
attempt to commit a felony.
Applying the foregoing jurisprudence and taking
into account Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code,
the appellant can only be convicted of attempted
rape. He commenced the commission of rape by
removing his clothes, undressing and kissing his
victim and lying on top of her. However, he
failed to perform all the acts of execution which
should produce the crime of rape by reason of a
cause other than his own spontaneous
desistance, i.e., by the timely arrival of the
victims brother. Thus, his penis merely touched
Mary Joys private organ. Accordingly, as the
crime committed by the appellant is attempted
rape, the penalty to be imposed on him should be
an indeterminate prison term of six (6) years
of prision correccional as minimum to twelve
(12) years of prision mayor as maximum.
On the issue of the trial court not making a
finding of fact in its decision, accused-appellant
contends that the decision of the trial court is null
and void as it failed to comply with the
requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution and Section 1, Rule 36 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. He
avers that the court a quo made no findings of
facts in its decision. The trial court merely
summarized the testimonies of the witnesses of
the prosecution and those of accused-appellant
and his witnesses, and forthwith set forth the
decretal portion of said decision. The trial court
even failed to state in said decision the factual
and legal basis for the imposition of the supreme
penalty of death on him.
The trial court is mandated to set out in its
decision the facts which had been proved and its
conclusions culled therefrom, as well as its
resolution on the issues and the factual and legal
basis for its resolution.17 Trial courts should not
merely reproduce the respective testimonies of
witnesses of both parties and come out with its
decretal conclusion.
In this case, the trial court failed to comply with
the requirements under the Constitution and the
Rules on Criminal Procedure. It merely
summarized the testimonies of the witnesses of
the prosecution and of accused-appellant on
direct and cross examinations and merely made
referral to the documentary evidence of the
parties then concluded that, on the basis of the
evidence of the prosecution, accused-appellant is
guilty of four (4) counts of rape and sentenced
him to death, on each count.
BEJARASCO, JR. V. BUENCONSEJO
[Administrative complaint: Dereliction of duty,
ignorance of the law, grave misconduct and
serious irregularity relative to a criminal case]
Facts: The complainants alleged that they were
charged by a certain Dr. Edwin Fonghe with
grave threats and grave oral defamation before
the Municipal Trial Court of Dalaguete, Cebu.
According to the complainants, the respondent
judge inhibited himself from the said cases on
the ground of delicadeza and that Executive
Judge Epifanio Llanos of the Regional Trial
Court of Argao, Cebu, Branch 26, designated
Judge Palmacio Calderon of the MTC of Argao,
Cebu, to hear and try the said cases.2 Judge
Calderon conducted continuous and
simultaneous trials, and the cases were submitted
for decision on June 29, 1999. Unfortunately,
Judge Calderon died on December 31, 1999
without having rendered judgment on the said
cases.
The complainants alleged that they were
surprised to receive a notice from the MTC of
Argao, Cebu, that Criminal Cases Nos. R-4171
and R-4172 had been set for promulgation on
May 15, 2000 by the respondent judge, who was
then designated as presiding judge of the said
court.
The complainants, thereafter, received another
notice of promulgation at 10:00 a.m. of May 29,
2000. On the said date, the complainants counsel
argued that the respondent judge could not
promulgate the decision since he had earlier
inhibited himself from trying the said cases, and
that the judge who actually heard the case had
already died. The respondent judge, however,
ignored these arguments and proceeded with the
promulgation of the Decision4 dated November
19, 1999, convicting both complainants.
Thereafter, the complainants counsel filed a
motion to nullify the decision. The respondent
judge denied the motion, and ordered the arrest
of the complainants. The latters counsel filed a
petition for certiorari with the Regional Trial
Court of Argao, Cebu, Branch 26, questioning
the validity of the decision in Criminal Cases
Nos. R-4171 and R-4172 and its promulgation.
Issue: WON judge is administratively liable
Held: YES. Thus, a judgment, to be valid, must
have been personally and directly prepared by
the judge, and duly signed by him. If at the time
of the promulgation, a judge or member of a
collegiate court has already vacated his office,
his vote is automatically withdrawn.
It is clear then, that a judge who takes over
the sala of another judge who died during office
cannot validly promulgate a decision penned by
the latter. In fact, decisions promulgated after the
judge who penned the same had been appointed
to and qualified in another office are null and
void. To be binding, a judgment must be duly
signed and promulgated during the incumbency
of the judge whose signature appears thereon. In
single courts like the regional trial courts and the
municipal trial courts, a decision may no longer
be promulgated after the ponente has vacated his
office
The respondent judge cannot, likewise, claim
that his only participation in the promulgation of
the questioned decision was merely an exercise
of a ministerial duty to enforce the said decision
which was already long rendered by the judge
who actually and completely heard the above-
mentioned criminal cases on the merits. It must
be stressed that the respondent judge had earlier
inhibited himself from the cases in question, and
that Judge Calderon was designated to hear and
try the cases in his stead. The mere fact that the
respondent judge was designated as Presiding
Judge of Branch 26 following the death of Judge
Calderon does not necessarily mean that his
previous inhibition in relation to the criminal
cases in question has been lifted. That would be
an absurdity, as a valid designation presupposes
that the judge so designated has not inhibited
himself from the cases assigned/raffled to the
said branch.
PEOPLE V. GLENN DE LOS SANTOS
Facts: The evidence for the prosecution disclose
that the Special Counter Insurgency Operation
Unit Training held at Camp Damilag, Manolo
Fortich, Bukidnon, started on 1 September 1995
and was to end on 15 October 1995. The last
phase of the training was the endurance run from
said Camp to Camp Alagar, Cagayan de Oro
City. The run on 5 October 1995 started at 2:20
a.m. The PNP trainees were divided into three
columns: the first and second of which had 22
trainees each, and the third had 21. The trainees
were wearing black T-shirts, black short pants,
and green and black combat shoes. At the start of
the run, a Hummer vehicle tailed the jogging
trainees. When they reached Alae, the driver of
the Hummer vehicle was instructed to dispatch
advanced security at strategic locations in
Carmen Hill. Since the jogging trainees were
occupying the right lane of the highway, two rear
security guards were assigned to each rear
column.
While they were negotiating Maitum Highway,
they saw an Isuzu Elf truck coming at high speed
towards them. The vehicle lights were in the high
beam. At a distance of 100 meters, the rear
security guards started waving their hands for the
vehicle to take the other side of the road, but the
vehicle just kept its speed, apparently ignoring
their signals and coming closer and closer to
them. Realizing that the vehicle would hit them,
the rear guards told their co-trainees to retract.
The guards forthwith jumped in different
directions. Lemuel and Weldon saw their co-
trainees being hit by the said vehicle, falling like
dominoes one after the other. Some were thrown,
and others were overrun by the vehicle. The
driver did not reduce his speed even after hitting
the first and second columns. The guards then
stopped oncoming vehicles to prevent their
comrades from being hit again.
In its decision of 26 August 1997, the trial court
convicted Glenn of the complex crime of
multiple murder, multiple frustrated murder and
multiple attempted murder, with the use of motor
vehicle as the qualifying circumstance. It
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death and
ordered him to indemnify each group of the heirs
of the deceased in the amount of P75,000; each
of the victims of frustrated murder in the amount
of P30,000; and each of the victims of attempted
murder in the amount of P10,000.
Issue: WON GLENN should be held guilty of
multiple murder, multiple frustrated murder and
multiple attempted murder
Held: NO.
The accused-appellant GLENN DE LOS
SANTOS is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
(1) the complex crime of reckless imprudence
resulting in multiple homicide with serious
physical injuries and less serious physical
injuries
We are convinced that the incident, tragic though
it was in light of the number of persons killed
and seriously injured, was an accident and not an
intentional felony. It is significant to note that
there is no shred of evidence that Glenn had an
axe to grind against the police trainees that
would drive him into deliberately hitting them
with intent to kill.
Considering that the incident was not a product
of a malicious intent but rather the result of a
single act of reckless driving, GLENN should be
held guilty of the complex crime of reckless
imprudence resulting in multiple homicide with
serious physical injuries and less serious physical
injuries.
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides
that when the single act constitutes two or more
grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense
is a necessary means for committing the other,
the penalty for the most serious crime shall be
imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum
period. Since Article 48 speaks of felonies, it is
applicable to crimes through negligence in view
of the definition of felonies in Article 3 as acts or
omissions punishable by law committed either
by means of deceit (dolo) or fault
(culpa). 26 In Reodica v. Court of Appeals, 27 we
ruled that if a reckless, imprudent, or negligent
act results in two or more grave or less grave
felonies, a complex crime is committed. Thus,
in Lapuz v. Court of Appeals, 28 the accused was
convicted, in conformity with Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code, of the complex crime of
homicide with serious physical injuries and
damage to property through reckless imprudence,
and was sentenced to a single penalty of
imprisonment, instead of the two penalties
imposed by the trial court. Also, in Soriao v.
Court of Appeals, 29 the accused was convicted
of the complex crime of multiple homicide with
damage to property through reckless imprudence
for causing a motor boat to capsize, thereby
drowning to death its twenty-eight passengers.
The slight physical injuries caused by GLENN to
the ten other victims through reckless
imprudence, would, had they been intentional,
have constituted light felonies. Being light
felonies, which are not covered by Article 48,
they should be treated and punished as separate
offenses. Separate informations should have,
therefore, been filed.
It must be noted that only one information (for
multiple murder, multiple frustrated murder and
multiple attempted murder) was filed with the
trial court. However, nothing appears in the
record that GLENN objected to the multiplicity
of the information in a motion to quash before
his arraignment. Hence, he is deemed to have
waived such defect. 30 Under Section 3, Rule 120
of the Rules of Court, when two or more offenses
are charged in a single complaint or information
and the accused fails to object to it before trial,
the court may convict the accused of as many
offenses as are charged and proved, and impose
on him the penalty for each of them.
PEOPLE V. JIMMY AQUINO
Facts: Analyn was 10 years and 11 months old
on the day of the alleged rape, having been born
on 23 June 1985. She filed the complaint with
the assistance of her mother, Lolita, who is
Jimmy’s first cousin. Prior to the filing of this
case and the assumption of custody by the
Department of Social Welfare and Development,
Analyn lived with her grandmother in Sta. Ines,
San Miguel, Bulacan; while her mother lived
with her second husband in another house within
the same barangay.
At around 9:00 a.m. of 24 May 1996, while
Analyn was playing with her friend near the
house of Jimmy’s sister Nini in Sta. Ines, San
Miguel, Bulacan, Jimmy, who was staying in
Nini’s house during the day, called out Analyn to
buy cooking oil for him from the store nearby.
He gave her P5.00 and a glass for the cooking
oil. When she returned to Nini’s house, Jimmy
asked her to get the feeding bottle of his niece
near the bed, which was in a slightly elevated
portion of the house. She then went to get the
bottle. Jimmy followed her and, producing a
knife, ordered Analyn to remove her shorts and
underwear. Fearing for her safety, Analyn
acceded. Jimmy then proceeded to remove his
clothes and force himself on top of her. With a
knife in his right hand pressed against her left
palm, he began to have sexual intercourse with
her. Once during the ordeal, he applied to her
genitals the cooking oil she bought. Jimmy
stopped his assault only after two hours, or at
around 11:00 a.m., when he heard the voice of
his brother-in-law outside the house. He
forthwith ordered Analyn to get dressed and get
out of the house. Analyn went home and reported
the rape to her grandmother.
Later in the afternoon, Analyn went to the
poultry farm where her mother worked and told
her that "Tio Imi" had raped her. Lolita went to
the Barangay Council of Sta. Ines and reported
the rape. Councilman Ismael Julian asked
Barangay Tanod Rolando Viola to fetch Jimmy.
Under interrogation by Ismael, Jimmy admitted
to having asked Analyn to undress. The
councilman prepared a statement, which was
signed by him, Jimmy and Lolita, wherein it was
stated that the nature of the complaint was that
Jimmy had asked Analyn to remove her clothes
because he wanted to see what her vagina looked
like. Even if the statement did not mention rape,
Lolita signed it thinking it would merely be used
as evidence that she had made a complaint.
Issue: WON appellant should be held guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of rape
Held: The main issue in this case is whether on
the day of 24 May 1996, Jimmy Aquino had
carnal knowledge of Analyn de la Cruz. Because
Analyn was under 12 years old, her age takes the
place of force and intimidation in vitiating her
consent, and only an evidence of carnal
knowledge is necessary.
In view of the consistency and credibility of the
witnesses presented by the defense, who equally
withstood strict scrutiny during trial, we must
give weight to the evidence for the defense and
make room for the uncertainty that arises out of
it. At most is what has been admitted by the
appellant that he asked Analyn to undress on 24
May 1996. Whether it was a prelude to sexual
intercourse or to truly satisfy his curiosity is
debatable. Whether this event continued into the
consummation of the sexual act remains
uncertain.
However, while the appellant cannot be held
guilty of the charge of rape on the ground of
reasonable doubt, we find that his act of directing
Analyn to remove her lower apparel constitutes
an act of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the
Revised Penal Code. Section 4, Rule 120 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure authorizes,
in cases of variance between the offense charged
and that proved, the conviction of an accused of
the offense proved which is included in the
offense charged, or of the offense charged which
is included in that which is proved. In People v.
Caralipio, 45 we ruled that although an accused
is charged in the information with the crime of
rape, he can be convicted of acts of
lasciviousness, which is included in
rape.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
From the environmental circumstance under
which the act was done, lewd design can be
imputed to Jimmy. He was alone with Analyn
when he ordered her to remove her drawers. He
claimed that his purpose was to see her private
organ because of the alleged rumors that it
(Analyn’s genitalia) was "beautiful and big."
Such act was not out of sheer curiosity but rather
out of lascivious curiosity. Notably, on cross-
examination, he testified that he never tried "to
peep to see the private organs" of his sisters to
confirm whether they were big and beautiful. He
also acknowledged that it is "very immoral for a
man to look and stare at the private organ of a
lady."
PEOPLE V PEDRO FLORES
Facts: The complaints against accused-appellant
filed on February 3, 1997 read as follows:
Criminal Case No. U-9184:
CRIMINAL COMPLAINT1
The undersigned, FILIPINA FLORES Y LAZO,
11 years old, grade three pupil and a resident of
Sitio Buenlag, Brgy Nancamaliran West,
Urdaneta, Pangasinan, under oath, hereby
accuses PEDRO FLORES, JR., Y FLORES for
the crime of "RAPE", committed as follows:
That on the 9th day of December 1996, in the
morning at Sitio Buenlag, Brgy. Nancamaliran
West, Municipality of Urdaneta, Province of
Pangasinan, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully, criminally and feloniously sexually
abuse the herein complaining witness FILIPINA
FLORES Y LAZO, 11 years old, all against her
will.
Criminal Case No. U-9185:
CRIMINAL COMPLAINT2
The undersigned, FILIPINA FLORES Y LAZO,
11 years old, grade three pupil and a resident of
Sitio Buenlag, Brgy. Nancamaliran West,
Urdaneta, Pangasinan, under oath, hereby
accuses PEDRO FLORES, JR., Y FLORES,
ALIAS "PESYONG", committed as follows:
That on the 28th day of December 1996, in the
evening at Sitio Buenlag, Brgy Nancamaliran
West, Municipality of Urdaneta, Province of
Pangasinan, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, with deliberate intent and by
means of force and intimidation, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully, criminally and
feloniously sexually abuse the herein
complaining witness FILIPINA FLORES, an 11
years old and daughter of the herein accused with
the use of sharp pointed bladed weapon and all
against her will.
Issue: WON the information should be held null
and void for being violative of the constitutional
right of the accused to be informed of the nature
and case of accusation against him
Held: YES
The allegation that accused-appellant did
"sexually abuse" Filipina does not suffice. In the
recent case of People v. Lito Egan alias Akiao32,
this Court ruled that "although the prosecution
has proved that [the therein private complainant]
Lenie was sexually abused, the evidence
proffered is inadequate to establish carnal
knowledge."33Hence, sexual abuse cannot be
equated with carnal knowledge or sexual
intercourse.34 The allegation in the instant
criminal complaints that accused-appellant
"sexually abuse[d]" the private complainant
cannot thus be read to mean that accused-
appellant had carnal knowledge or sexual
intercourse with the private complainant.
This Court is not unaware of the rule in case
there is a variance between allegation and proof
as etched in Section 4 of Rule 120 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure which reads:
SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between
allegation and proof.—When there is variance
between the offense charged in the complaint or
information and that proved, and the offense as
charged is included in or necessarily includes the
offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of
the offense proved which is included in the
offense charged, or of the offense charged which
is included in the offense proved.
The case at bar, however, is not one of variance
between allegation and proof. The recital of facts
in the criminal complaints simply does not
properly charge rape, "sexual abuse" not being
an essential element or ingredient thereof.
Neither can accused-appellant be convicted of
acts of lasciviousness or of any offense for that
matter under our penal laws. It is settled that
what characterizes the charge is the actual recital
of facts 36 in the complaint or information. For
every crime is made up of certain acts and intent
which must be set forth in the complaint or
information with reasonable particularity of time,
place, names (plaintiff and defendant), and
circumstances. In other words, the complaint
must contain a specific allegation of every fact
and circumstance necessary to constitute the
crime charged37, the accused being presumed to
have no independent knowledge of the facts that
constitute the offense.38
The Court also finds that accused-appellant
cannot be convicted of rape or acts of
lasciviousness under the information in Criminal
Case No. 15368-R, which charges accused-
appellant of a violation of R.A. No. 7610 (The
Special Protection of Children Against Child
Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act),
"either by raping her or committing acts of
lasciviousness."
It is readily apparent that the facts charged in
said information do not constitute an offense.
The information does not cite which among the
numerous sections or subsections of R.A. No.
7610 has been violated by accused-appellant.
Moreover, it does not state the acts and
omissions constituting the offense, or any special
or aggravating circumstances attending the same,
as required under the rules of criminal
procedure.
The allegation in the information that accused-
appellant "willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
commit sexual abuse on his daughter [Jeannie
Ann] either by raping her or committing acts of
lasciviousness on her" is not a sufficient
averment of the acts constituting the offense as
required under Section 8, for these are
conclusions of law, not facts. The information in
Criminal Case No. 15368-R is therefore void for
being violative of the accused-appellant’s
constitutionally-guaranteed right to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him. (Emphasis & underscoring supplied)
As held by this Court in the above-case of Cruz,
the allegation in the information that the therein
accused-appellant sexually abused the therein
private complainant by either raping or
committing acts of lasciviousness on her "is not a
sufficient averment of the acts constituting the
offense as required under Section 8 [of Rule
110], for these are conclusions of law, not facts."
Nothing less can be said of the criminal
complaints in the cases at bar. They are void for
being violative of the accused-appellant’s
constitutional right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him.
TEVES V. SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts:
That on or about February 4, 1992, and sometime
subsequent thereto, in Valencia, Negros Oriental,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused Edgar Y. Teves, a
public officer, being then the Municipal Mayor
of Valencia, Negros Oriental, committing the
crime-herein charged in relation to, while in the
performance and taking advantage of his official
functions, and conspiring and confederating with
his wife, herein accused Teresita Teves, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally
cause the issuance of the appropriate business
permit/license to operate the Valencia Cockpit
and Recreation Center in favor of one Daniel
Teves, said accused Edgar Y. Teves having a
direct financial or pecuniary interest therein
considering the fact that said cockpit arena is
actually owned and operated by him and
accused Teresita Teves.
Issue: WON the variance doctrine is applicable
Held: YES
The elements of the offense charged in this case,
which is unlawful intervention in the issuance of
a cockpit license in violation of Section 3(h) of
the Anti-Graft Law, are
1. The accused is a public officer;
2. He has a direct or indirect financial or
pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or
transaction, whether or not prohibited by law;
andcralawlibrary
3. He intervenes or takes part in his official
capacity in connection with such interest.
On the other hand, the essential ingredients of
the offense proved, which is possession of
prohibited interest in violation of Section 3(h) of
the Anti-Graft Law, are as follows:
1. The accused is a public officer;
2. He has a direct or indirect financial or
pecuniary interest in any business, contract or
transaction; andcralawlibrary
3. He is prohibited from having such interest by
the Constitution or any law.
It is clear that the essential ingredients of the
offense proved constitute or form part of those
constituting the offense charged. Put differently,
the first and second elements of the offense
charged, as alleged in the information, constitute
the offense proved. Hence, the offense proved is
necessarily included in the offense charged, or
the offense charged necessarily includes the
offense proved. The variance doctrine thus finds
application to this case, thereby warranting the
conviction of petitioner Edgar Teves for the
offense proved.
PEOPLE V. NOQUE
Facts: Accused Joselito Noque was caught in a
buy-bust operation conducted by SPO4 Norberto
Murillo on January 30, 2001. SPO4 Murillo
frisked the appellant and recovered the buy-bust
money. He also confiscated the pranela bag that
contained a large quantity of crystalline granules
suspected to be shabu. Two Informations were
filed before the RTC of Manila docketed as
Criminal Case Nos. 01-189458 and 01-189459
charging of the crimes of illegal sale and illegal
possession of a regulated drug.
The trial court convicted the accused on
both charges. The trial court held that while the
Informations alleged methamphetamine
hydrochloride as the drug seized from the
appellant, the drug actually confiscated which
was ephedrine, which by means of chemical
reaction could change into methamphetamine.
The trial court further held that under Section 4,
Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, a variance in the
offense charged in the complaint or information
and that proved shall result in the conviction for
the offense charged which is included in the
offense proved.
The CA affirmed the trial court’s
decision. The CA held that the designations and
allegations in the informations are for the crimes
of illegal sale and illegal possession of regulated
drugs.
Hence, the accused appealed the case
before the Supreme Court.
Issues:
1. Whether or not appellant is guilty of illegal sale
of dangerous drugs.
2. Whether or not appellant is guilty of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs.
3. Whether or not appellant’s right to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusations was not
violated.
Held:
1. The prosecution successfully
proved that appellant violated Section 15, Article
III of RA 6425. The prosecution’s evidence
established the concurrence of the elements of an
illegal sale of a dangerous drug, to wit: (1) the
identity of the buyer and seller, object, and
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing
sold and the payment therefor.
In the instant case, the police officers
conducted a buy-bust operation after receiving
confirmed surveillance reports that the appellant
was engaged in the illicit sale of dangerous drugs
at No. 630 San Andres Street, Malate, Manila.
PO1 Balais, the designated poseur-buyer of the
buy-bust team, personally identified the appellant
as the person who volunteered to sell to him
P1,000.00 worth of white crystalline substance
alleged to be shabu. The police officer received
this illegal merchandise after giving the appellant
the marked money as payment. Undoubtedly, the
appellant is guilty of selling a dangerous drug.
2. The prosecution was also
successful in proving that appellant violated
Section 16, Article III of RA 6425. It adduced
evidence that established the presence of the
elements of illegal possession of a dangerous
drug. It showed that (1) the appellant was in
possession of an item or an object identified to
be a prohibited or regulated drug, (2) such
possession is not authorized by law, and (3) the
appellant was freely and consciously aware of
being in possession of the drug.
The police buy-bust team apprehended
the appellant for the sale of a white crystalline
substance then proceeded to search the premises.
They found a large quantity of the same
substance inside the bag that contained the two
sachets of the regulated drug sold to PO1 Balais.
Appellant did not offer any explanation why he
is in custody of the said substance. Neither did
the appellant present any authorization to possess
the same. Mere possession of a regulated drug
per se constitutes prima facie evidence of
knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to
convict an accused absent a satisfactory
explanation of such possession the onus probandi
is shifted to the accused, to explain the absence
of knowledge or animus possidendi. With the
burden of evidence shifted to the appellant, it
was his duty to explain his innocence on the
regulated drug seized from his person. However,
as already mentioned, he did not offer any
excuse or explanation regarding his possession
thereof.
3. Appellants right to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusations was not
violated. The Supreme Court agrees with the
findings of the CA and the trial court, as well as
the testimony of the forensic chemical officer,
that the drug known as ephedrine has a central
nervous stimulating effect similar to that of
methamphetamine. In fact, ephedrine is an
important precursor used in the clandestine
synthesis of methamphetamine, which in
crystallized form is methamphetamine
hydrochloride.
The CA correctly ruled that Sections 4
and 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, can be
applied by analogy in convicting the appellant of
the offenses charged, which are included in the
crimes proved. Under these provisions, an
offense charged is necessarily included in the
offense proved when the essential ingredients of
the former constitute or form part of those
constituting the latter.At any rate, a minor
variance between the information and the
evidence does not alter the nature of the offense,
nor does it determine or qualify the crime or
penalty, so that even if a discrepancy exists, this
cannot be pleaded as a ground for acquittal. In
other words, his right to be informed of the
charges against him has not been violated
because where an accused is charged with a
specific crime, he is duly informed not only of
such specific crime but also of lesser crimes or
offenses included therein.
PAYUMO V. SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts: A composite team of Philippine
Constabulary and Integrated National Police
units allegedly fired at a group of civilians
instantly killing one civilian and wounding seven
others, including Edgar Payumo. The accused
pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. During
the trial, the accused interposed the defenses of
lawful performance of duty, self-defense,
mistake of fact, and alibi. They insisted that the
incident was a result of a military operation, and
not an ambush as claimed by the prosecution.
The Fifth Division promulgated its judgment
dated November 27, 1998, convicting the
accused of the crime of Murder with Multiple
Attempted Murder. The accused filed their
Supplemental Omnibus Motion to Set Aside
Judgment and for New Trial because there was
serious irregularity during the trial due to the
erroneous admission of the testimonies of the
witnesses of the petitioners, such should be taken
anew and to afford the accused the opportunity to
present in evidence the records of the Judge
Advocate General Office (JAGO) relative to the
shooting as to whether it was an ambush or the
result of a military operation. The omnibus
motion was granted.
Ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the
Sandiganbayan amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction for nullifying the order of conviction
and granting new trial, Edgar Payumo and et. al,
filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and/or injunction to enjoin the
Sandiganbayan from proceeding with the
scheduled hearings for a second new trial.
Issue: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan acted
in excess of its jurisdiction when it granted a new
trial in favor of the accused.
Held: Yes. It must be emphasized that an
erroneous admission or rejection of evidence by
the trial court is not a ground for a new trial or
reversal of the decision if there are other
independent evidence to sustain the decision, or
if the rejected evidence, if it had been admitted;
would not have changed the decision.
The records of the JAGO relative to shooting
incident do not meet the criteria for newly
discovered evidence that would merit a new trial.
A motion for new trial based on newly-
discovered evidence may be granted only if the
following requisites are met:
1. that the evidence was discovered after trial;
2. that said evidence could not have been
discovered and produced at the trial even with
the exercise of
reasonable diligence;
3. that it is material, not merely cumulative,
corroborative or impeaching; and
4. that the evidence is of such weight that, if
admitted, would probably change the judgment.
It is essential that the offering party exercised
reasonable diligence in seeking to locate the
evidence before or during trial but nonetheless
failed to secure it. In this case, however, such
records could have been easily obtained by the
accused and could have been presented during
the trial with the exercise of reasonable
diligence.
Issue: WON the Sandiganbayan Special Fifth
Division erred in the promulgation of the
November 27, 1998 Decision considering that at
the time of its promulgation, the ponente, Justice
Legaspi, was no longer a member of the Fifth
Division as he already transferred to the Second
Division as its Senior Member.
Held: NO.
A judgment of a division of the Sandiganbayan
shall be promulgated by reading the judgment or
sentence in the presence of the accused and any
Justice of the division which rendered the same.
Promulgation of the decision is an important part
of the decision-making process. Promulgation
signifies that on the date it was made, the judge
or justices who signed the decision continued to
support it which could be inferred from his
silence or failure to withdraw his vote despite
being able to do so. A decision or resolution of
the court becomes such, only from the moment
of its promulgation.
A final decision or resolution becomes binding
only after it is promulgated and not before. It is
an elementary doctrine that for a judgment to be
binding, it must be duly signed and promulgated
during the incumbency of the judge who penned
it. In this connection, the Court En-Banc issued
the Resolution dated February 10, 1983
implementing B.P. 129 which merely requires
that the judge who pens the decision is still an
incumbent judge, that is, a judge of the same
court, albeit now assigned to a different branch,
at the time the decision is promulgated.
In People v. CFI of Quezon, Branch X, it was
clarified that a judge who died, resigned, retired,
had been dismissed, promoted to a higher court
or appointed to another office with inconsistent
functions, would no longer be considered an
incumbent member of the court and his decision
written thereafter would be invalid. Indeed, one
who is no longer a member of the court at the
time the final decision or resolution is signed and
promulgated cannot validly take part in that
decision or resolution. Much less could he be
the ponente of the decision or resolution. Also,
when a judge or a member of the collegiate
court, who had earlier signed or registered his
vote, has vacated his office at the time of the
promulgation of the decision or resolution, his
vote is automatically withdrawn or cancelled
Guided by the foregoing principles, the judgment
of conviction dated November 27, 1998 penned
by Justice Legaspi must be declared valid.
Apparently, it was not necessary that he be a
member of the Fifth Division at the time the
decision was promulgated since he remained an
incumbent justice of the Sandiganbayan. What is
important is that the ponente in a collegiate court
remains a member of said court at the time
his ponencia is promulgated because, at any time
before that, he has the privilege of changing his
opinion or making some last minute changes
therein for the consideration and approval of his
colleagues. After all, each division is not
separate and distinct from the other divisions as
they all constitute one Sandiganbayan.
Jurisdiction is vested in the court, not in the
judges or justices. Thus, when a case is filed in
the Sandiganbayan, jurisdiction over the case
does not attach to the division or justice alone, to
the exclusion of the other divisions.
PEOPLE V CA
Facts: Sometime in 1989, Rufina Chua met
respondent Wilfred Chiok. He represented
himself as a licensed stockbroker and an expert
in the stock market. He then encouraged Rufina
to invest her money in stocks, requesting her to
designate him as her stockbroker. On
respondent's prodding, she agreed.
For several years, respondent acted as Rufina's
stockbroker. She made a profit out of their
transactions, prompting her to trust respondent in
handling her stock investments.
In 1995, respondent encouraged Rufina to
purchase shares in bulk as this will increase her
earning. Hence, in June 1995, she entrusted to
him the amount of P9,563,900.00 for the purpose
of buying shares of stocks in bulk. She deposited
the amount of P7,100,000.00 in respondent's
account. With respect to the
remaining P2,463,900.00, she personally gave it
to him. Thereupon, he told her to wait for one
week. A week elapsed, but she did not hear from
him. Upon her inquiry, he advised her to wait for
another week, but still there was no news from
him. Finally, when she was able to contact him,
he admitted that he spent the money. At any rate,
he issued two checks as payment but when she
deposited them in the drawee bank, they were
dishonored for insufficient funds.
In a letter dated October 25, 1995, Rufina
demanded payment from respondent, but this
remained unheeded.
Upon inquiry, Rufina came to know that
respondent was not a licensed stockbroker but
only a telephone clerk at Bernard Securities, Inc.
Immediately, she caused the filing of an
information for estafa against him with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 165, Pasig City,
docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 109927.
On February 1, 1999, the trial court rendered a
Decision convicting respondent of estafa and
sentencing him to suffer twelve (12) years
of prision mayor, as minimum, to twenty (20)
years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum. During the promulgation of the
judgment, respondent and his counsel failed
to appear despite notice. Consequently, the
prosecution filed a Motion for Cancellation of
Bail on the ground that there is an indication that
respondent might flee or commit another crime.
Meanwhile, or on June 25, 1999, the trial court
issued a warrant of arrest against respondent
for the reason that "he has not surrendered
despite the lapse of the given period (five
days) as provided in the Omnibus Order
dated May 28, 1999." The said warrant was
returned unserved because he could not be
found at his given address.
Issue: WON trial court erred in cancelling bail
because of failure to appear during promulgation
despite notice
Held: NO.
The trial court correctly cancelled respondent's
bail because of his failure to appear during the
promulgation of judgment despite notice. He
violated the condition of his bail that he must
appear before the proper court whenever so
required by that court or the Rules.2 Simply
stated, he jumped bail. As such, his arrest, as
ordered by the trial court, is proper.3 This is in
accordance with Section 6, Rule 120 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure which
provides in part, thus:
SEC. 6. Promulgation of judgment. –
The judgment is promulgated by
reading it in the presence of the accused
and any judge of the court in which it
was rendered. x x x
The proper clerk of court shall give
notice to the accused personally or
through his bondsman or warden and
counsel, requiring him to be present at
the promulgation of the decision. x x x
If the judgment is for conviction and
the failure of the accused to appear
was without justifiable cause, he shall
lose the remedies available in these
rules against the judgment and the
court shall order his arrest. Within
fifteen (15) days from promulgation of
judgment, however, the accused may
surrender and file a motion for leave of
court to avail of these remedies. He
shall state the reasons for his absence at
the scheduled promulgation and if he
proves that his absence was for a
justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to
avail of said remedies within fifteen
(15) days from notice.
The last paragraph of Section 6 quoted above
authorizes the promulgation of judgment in
absentia in view of respondent's failure to appear
despite notice. It bears stressing that the rule
authorizing promulgation in absentia is intended
to obviate the situation where the judicial process
could be subverted by the accused jumping bail
to frustrate the promulgation of judgment.4
Here, respondent tried in vain to subvert the
judicial process by not appearing during the
promulgation of judgment. Thus, he lost his
remedies against the judgment. In fact, he cannot
challenge successfully the cancellation of his bail
by the trial court.
SALVADOR V. CHUA
Facts: The petitioner and his wife Marinel
Salvador were charged in the RTC
with estafa penalized under Article 315 (a) of
the Revised Penal Code docketed as Criminal
Case No. R-PSY-08-04689-CR.3 On March 30,
2011, the date scheduled for the promulgation of
the judgment, their counsel moved for the
deferment of the promulgation inasmuch as the
petitioner was then suffering from
hype1iension.4 Unconvinced of the reason, the
RTC proceeded to promulgate its decision
holding petitioner guilty of estafa.
The RTC then issued a warrant for the
petitioner's arrest. He was apprehended on April
7, 2011, or eight days from the promulgation of
the judgment finding him guilty.7redarclaw
The petitioner filed his Motion for Leave to file
Notice of Appeal dated April 13, 2011,8 and
attached thereto the medical certificate dated
March 30, 2011 purportedly issued by Dr. Paulo
Miguel A. David,9certifying that the petitioner
had submitted himself to a medical consultation
at the Rizal Medical Center on March 30, 2011
and had been found to be suffering from
hypertension.
Issue: WON petitioner has lost right to appeal
against his conviction
Held: As the rule expressly indicates, the
promulgation of the judgment of conviction may
be done in absentia. The accused in such case is
allowed a period of 15 days from notice of the
judgment to him or his counsel within which to
appeal; otherwise, the decision becomes
final.29 The accused who fails to appear at the
promulgation of the judgment of conviction loses
the remedies available under the Rules of Court
against the judgment, specifically: (a) the filing
of a motion for new trial or for reconsideration
(Rule 121 ), and (b) an appeal from the judgment
of conviction (Rule 122). However, the Rules of
Court permits him to regain his standing in court
in order to avail himself of these remedies within
15 days from the date of promulgation of the
judgment conditioned upon: (a) his
surrender; and (b) his filing of a motion for leave
of court to avail himself of the remedies, stating
therein the reason for his absence. Should the
trial court find that his absence was for a
justifiable cause, he should be allowed to avail
himself of the remedies within 15 days from
notice of the order finding his absence justified
and allowing him the available remedies from
the judgment of conviction.
Under Section 6, supra, the personal presence of
the petitioner at the promulgation of the
judgment in Criminal Case No. R-PSY-08-
04689-CR was mandatory because the offense of
which he was found guilty was not a light felony
or offense.31 He was charged with and actually
found guilty of estafa, and meted the
indeterminate sentence of four years and two
months of prision correccional, as minimum, to
20 years of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
Based on the records, the promulgation of the
judgment was on March 30, 2011; hence, the
petitioner had only until April 14, 2011 within
which to meet the mandatory requirements under
Section 6, supra.
In the attempt to regain his right to avail himself
of the remedies under the Rules of Court, the
petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to File a
Notice of Appeal, and attached thereto the
medical certificate issued by Dr. Paulo Miguel
David. Yet, he did not thereby establish that his
absence had been for a justifiable cause because
the purported issuer himself, Dr. Paolo Miguel
A. David, directly impugned the credibility of
this certificate by denying to have issued the
certificate, and to have examined the petitioner
on March 30, 2011, or to have signed the
certificate, or that the Rizal Medical Center
issued the certificate. The petitioner later
submitted another medicate certificate, which,
aside from being belatedly issued, went
unsupported and unauthenticated by the
testimony of the alleged issuing physician, who
turned out to be an OB-Gynecologist. The CA
justly discredited the certificates.32redarclaw
Even assuming that he had suffered
hypertension, which could have validly excused
his absence from the promulgation, the petitioner
did not fulfill the other requirement of Section
6, supra, to surrender himself to the trial court.
The term surrender used in the rule visibly
necessitated his physical and voluntary
submission to the jurisdiction of the court to
suffer any consequences of the verdict against
him.33redarclaw
In its assailed decision, therefore, the CA
unavoidably declared the petitioner to have lost
his standing in court because of his non-
compliance with Section 6, supra. His failure to
fulfill the requirements rendered the conviction
final and immutable.34 He ought to be reminded
that the right to appeal, being neither a natural
right nor a part of due process, is a merely
statutory privilege that should be exercised in the
manner and in accordance with the provisions of
the law establishing the right; otherwise, it is
lost.
VILLENA V. PEOPLE
Facts: Petitioners Police Inspector (P/Insp.)
Edward Garrick Villena and Police Officer 1
(PO1) Percival Doroja, together with PO2
Nicomedes Lambas (PO2 Lambas), PO3 Dan
Fermalino (PO3 Fermalino),4 Police Chief
Inspector Jovem C. Bocalbos, PO3 Reynaldo
Macalinao (PO3 Macalinao), PO1 Alvaro
Yumang (PO1 Yumang), and Imelda Borcelis,
were indicted for the crime of robbery
(extortion)5 before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 202, Las Piñas City. The case
was docketed as Criminal Case No. 05-0025.
After arraignment, where the accused all pled
"not guilty," and pre-trial, trial on the merits
ensued. Petitioners failed to appear before the
trial court to adduce evidence in their defense. It
was only PO3 Macalinao who appeared before
the court to present his evidence.
On August 29, 2007, the RTC rendered its
decision6 convicting petitioners, together with
PO2 Lambas, PO3 Fermalino, PO3 Macalinao,
and PO1 Yumang, of the crime charged.
During the promulgation of judgment on
September 3, 2007, petitioners again failed to
appear despite proper notices to them at their
addresses of record. In the absence of petitioners,
the promulgation was made pursuant to
paragraphs 4 and 5, Section 6, Rule 120 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Consequently, the RTC issued warrants of arrest
against them.
On October 11, 2007, petitioners, through their
new counsel, Atty. William F. delos Santos, filed
their separate notices of appeal before the RTC.
In the said notices, they explained that they
failed to attend the promulgation of judgment
because they did not receive any notice thereof
because they were transferred to another police
station.
Issue: WON petitioners’ notice of appeal should
be granted
Held: NO
The accused who failed to appear at the
promulgation of the judgment of conviction shall
lose the remedies available under the Rules of
Court against the judgment—(a) the filing of a
motion for new trial or reconsideration (Rule
121), and (b) an appeal from the judgment of
conviction (Rule 122). However, the Rules allow
the accused to regain his standing in court in
order to avail of these remedies by: (a) his
surrender, and (b) his filing of a motion for leave
of court to avail of these remedies, stating therein
the reasons for his absence, within 15 days from
the date of promulgation of judgment. If the trial
court finds that his absence was for a justifiable
cause, the accused shall be allowed to avail of
the said remedies within 15 days from notice or
order finding his absence justified and allowing
him the available remedies against the judgment
of conviction.
Thus, petitioners’ mere filing of notices of appeal
through their new counsel, therein only
explaining their absence during the promulgation
of judgment, cannot be considered an act of
surrender, despite the fact that said notices were
filed within 15 days from September 28, 2007,
the purported date when their new counsel
personally secured a copy of the judgment of
conviction from the RTC. The term "surrender"
under Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court
contemplates an act whereby a convicted accused
physically and voluntarily submits himself to the
jurisdiction of the court to suffer the
consequences of the verdict against him. The
filing of notices of appeal cannot suffice as a
physical and voluntary submission of petitioners
to the RTC’s jurisdiction. It is only upon
petitioners’ valid surrender, and only after proper
motion, that they can avail of the remedy of
appeal. Absent compliance with these
requirements, their notices of appeal, the
initiatory step to appeal from their conviction,
were properly denied due course.
What is more, the judgment of conviction against
petitioners had already acquired finality. Under
Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, they
had only 15 days from the date of promulgation
of judgment within which to surrender and to file
the required motion for leave of court to avail of
the remedies against the judgment. As the
judgment was promulgated on September 3,
2007, petitioners had only until September 18,
2007 to comply with the mandatory requirements
of the said rule.
This Court has invariably ruled that the right to
appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due
process. It is merely a statutory privilege, and, as
such, may be exercised only in the manner and in
accordance with the provisions of the law. The
party who seeks to avail of the same must
comply with the requirements of the Rules.
Failing to do so, the right to appeal is lost.
TEOPE V. PEOPLE
Facts: Petitioner alleged that on January 19,
1994, she was charged with 2 counts of violation
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B. P. 22) before
the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City
(RTC). 3 After the prosecution rested its case,
petitioner filed a Demurrer to the Evidence on
December 9, 1995. The RTC denied said
demurrer on January 9, 1995 and a Notice of
Appeal from the denial was filed on January 21,
1999. The RTC denied due course to the Notice
of Appeal on February 5, 1999. Petitioner timely
filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was
denied by the RTC on March 16, 1999.
Petitioner then filed a petition
for mandamus with the Court of Appeals on May
24, 1999. On October 19, 2000 and August 6,
2001, respectively, the Court of Appeals
promulgated the assailed Decision and
Resolution dismissing the petition and denying
the subsequent motion for reconsideration. Thus,
the present petition was instituted.
Issue: Where the court erred in denying the
motion for reconsideration
Held: NO
If the judgment is for conviction and the failure
of the accused to appear was without justifiable
cause, he shall lose the remedies available in
these Rules against the judgment and the court
shall order his arrest. Within fifteen (15) days
from promulgation of judgment, however, the
accused may surrender and file a motion for
leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall
state the reasons for his absence at the scheduled
promulgation and if he proves that his absence
was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to
avail of said remedies within fifteen (15) days
from notice.
There is no question that petitioner escaped after
her arraignment. Subsequently, the trial was
ordered to continue but after the accused failed to
appear, the RTC terminated the trial and,
thereafter, promulgated the Joint Judgment of
conviction. During that time petitioner was at
large. She remains at large even while her
counsel continues to file various pleadings on her
behalf before the RTC, the Court of Appeals and
this Court.
Under the Rules of Court, petitioner is barred
from availing of the remedies allowed by the
rules against the judgment of the RTC, one of
which is the right to file an appeal with the Court
of Appeals. The reason for this rule is because
once an accused escapes from prison or
confinement, or jumps bail or flees to a foreign
country, he loses his standing in court and unless
he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the
court, he is deemed to have waived any right to
seek relief from the court.
REYES V. MANGINO (Ruling)
However, the Court finds that the respondent
Judge is liable for gross ignorance of the law in
not requiring the presence of the accused during
the promulgation of the decision in Criminal
Case No. 200-97, as admitted by him in his
Comment on the complaint.
There are two instances when judgment may be
promulgated even without the personal presence
of the accused: (1) when the judgment is for a
light offense, in which case, the counsel for the
accused or a representative may stand for him;
and (2) in cases where despite due notice to the
accused or his bondsman or warden and counsel,
the accused failed to appear at the promulgation
of the decision. The evident purpose of this latter
exception is to afford the offended party the
opportunity to enforce the award of civil
indemnity which could not otherwise be effected
if the decision cannot be pronounced on account
of the absence of the accused. Criminal Case No.
200-97 does not fall under any of the exceptions,
since the accused therein were charged and
convicted of other deceits under Article 318 of
the Revised Penal Code, which is a less grave
felony, the imposable penalty being arresto
mayor.
It bears stressing the importance of the
promulgation of decisions in criminal cases,
considering that a judgment or sentence does not
become a judgment or sentence in law until the
same has been read or announced to the
defendant or has become part of the record of the
court. Parenthetically, when there is no valid
promulgation of judgment, no right to appeal
accrues
Under Canon 1.01 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, a judge is expected to be "the
embodiment of competence, integrity, and
independence" to maintain public confidence in
the legal system. He should so behave at all
times as to promote confidence in the integrity
and impartiality of the judiciary. When
questionable orders are issued by a magistrate of
law, casting doubt as to his integrity and
impartiality, the erring judge must be sanctioned
therefor, keeping in mind that the irresponsible
or improper conduct of judges erodes public
confidence in the judiciary, and, as such, must
avoid all impropriety and the appearance thereof,
in accordance with Canon 2 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct.
DE VERA V. DE VERA
Facts: Petitioner Rosario T. de Vera accused her
spouse Geren A. de Vera (Geren) and Josephine
F. Juliano (Josephine) of Bigamy. They were
thus indicted in an Information, the accusatory
portion of which reads:
That on or about the 31st day of July, 2003, in
the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused Geren A. De
Vera being previously united in lawful marriage
with Rosario Carvajal Tobias-De Vera, and
without said marriage having been legally
dissolved, did, then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously contract a second
marriage with accused Josephine Juliano y
Francisco, who likewise has previous knowledge
that accused Geren A. De Vera's previous
marriage with Rosario T. De Vera is still valid
and subsisting, said second marriage having all
the essential requisites for its validity.
WHEREFORE, the court finds accused Geren A.
de Vera guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of bigamy as charged in the Information
and there being two (2) mitigating circumstances
(Plea of guilty and voluntary surrender), and no
aggravating circumstance and applying the
provision of Article 349 in relation to paragraph
5, Article 64, Revised Penal Code, as amended,
and the Indeterminate Sentence Law, accused is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of 6
MONTHS of ARRESTO MAYOR, as minimum
to FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS
of PRISION CORRECCIONAL, as maximum.
Unsatisfied, petitioner moved for reconsideration
seeking the modification of the court's judgment
of conviction against Geren, because of the
allegedly mistaken application of the mitigating
circumstance of "voluntary surrender." The
eventual relief prayed for is the increase in the
penalty imposed on Geren.
Issue: WON the action of the petitioner is tenable
Held: NO
Section 7, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 7. Modification of judgment. - A judgment
of conviction may, upon motion of the accused,
be modified or set aside before it becomes final
or before appeal is perfected. Except where the
death penalty is imposed, a judgment becomes
final after the lapse of the period for perfecting
an appeal, or when the sentence has been
partially or totally satisfied or served, or when
the accused has waived in writing his right to
appeal, or has applied for probation.
Simply stated, in judgments of conviction, errors
in the decision cannot be corrected unless the
accused consents thereto; or he, himself, moves
for reconsideration of, or appeals from, the
decision
Records show that after the promulgation of the
judgment convicting Geren of bigamy, it was
petitioner (as private complainant) who moved
for the reconsideration of the RTC decision. This
was timely opposed by Geren, invoking his right
against double jeopardy. Although the trial court
correctly denied the motion for lack of merit, we
would like to add that the same should have been
likewise denied pursuant to the above-quoted
provision of the Rules.
As explained in People v. Viernes the rule on the
modification of judgments of conviction had
undergone significant changes before and after
the 1964 and 1985 amendments to the Rules.
Prior to the 1964 Rules of Court, we held in
various cases17 that the prosecution (or private
complainant) cannot move to increase the
penalty imposed in a promulgated judgment, for
to do so would place the accused in double
jeopardy. The 1964 amendment, however,
allowed the prosecutor to move for the
modification or the setting aside of the judgment
before it became final or an appeal was
perfected. In 1985, the Rules was amended to
include the phrase "upon motion of the accused,"
effectively resurrecting our earlier ruling
prohibiting the prosecution from seeking a
modification of a judgment of conviction.
Significantly, the present Rules retained the
phrase "upon motion of the accused." Obviously,
the requisite consent of the accused is intended to
protect him from having to defend himself anew
from more serious offenses or penalties which
the prosecution or the court may have
overlooked.
BACLAYON V. MUTIA
Facts: Petitioner, a school teacher, was convicted
of the crime of Serious Oral Defamation by the
then Municipal Court of Plaridel, Misamis
Occidental, then presided by respondent Pacito
G. Mutia for having quarrelled with and uttered
insulting and defamatory words against
Remedios Estillore, principal of the Plaridel
Central School.
Petitioner’s conviction was affirmed by the Court
of Appeals (now Intermediate Appellate Court)
and the appellate court, taking into account the
aggravating circumstance of disregard of the
respect due the offended party on account of her
rank and age and the fact that the crime was
committed in the office of the complainant in the
public school building of Plaridel, Misamis
Occidental where public authorities are engaged
in the discharge of their duties during office
hours, increased the penalty imposed by
respondent judge and sentenced petitioner to one
year, 8 months, 21 days of arresto mayor in its
maximum period to 2 years and 4 months of
prision correccional in its minimum period.
On the same date petitioner applied for probation
with respondent judge who referred the
application to a Probation Officer. The Post-
Sentence Investigation Report favorably
recommended the granting of petitioner's
probation for a period of three (3) years.
On December 21, 1981, respondent Judge issued
an order granting petitioner's probation and
imposing certain conditions
Petitioner plead for deletion of the condition
which seeks to refrain her from continuing her
teaching profession
Issue: WON a teacher who applied for probation
may be prohibited from continuing her teaching
profession as a condition for the said probation.
Held: NO
The conditions which trial courts may impose on
a probationer may be classified into general or
mandatory and special or discretionary. The
mandatory conditions, enumerated in Section 10
of the Probation Law, require that the
probationer should (a) present himself to the
probation officer designated to undertake his
supervision at such place as may be specified in
the order within 72 hours from receipt of said
order, and (b) report to the probation officer at
least once a month at such time and place as
specified by said officer. Special or discretionary
conditions are those additional conditions, listed
in the same Section 10 of the Probation Law,
which the courts may additionally impose on the
probationer towards his correction and
rehabilitation outside of prison. The
enumeration, however, is not inclusive.
Probation statutes are liberal in character 2 and
enable courts to designate practically any term it
chooses as long as the probationer's
constitutional rights are not jeopardized. 3 There
are innumerable conditions which may be
relevant to the rehabilitation of the probationer
when viewed in their specific individual context.
It should, however, be borne in mind that the
special or discretionary conditions of probation
should be realistic, purposive and geared to help
the probationer develop into a law-abiding and
self-respecting individual Conditions should be
interpreted with flexibility in their application
and each case should be judged on its own merits
— on the basis of the problems, needs and
capacity of the probationer. 4 The very liberality
of the probation should not be made a tool by
trial courts to stipulate instead unrealistic terms.
Petitioner is a teacher and teaching is the only
profession she knows and as such she possesses
special skills and qualifications. Thus, she was
designated as District Guidance Coordinator and
always designated as District-in-Charge
whenever the District Supervisor is out of town.
She is usually selected to represent her district in
seminars, meetings and conferences. She also
excelled in her study of Child Study and
Development. It also appears that she is an
outstanding member of the Misamis Occidental
Girl Scout Council, having served as Physical
Education & Girl Scout Field Advisor of the
District, Adviser of the District Girl Scout
Leaders Association, Adviser of the Distinct
Federated Girl Scout Barangay Troop
Committee, acts as resource person in District
and Division Level Girl Scout encampments and
re-elected Board Member of the Misamis
Occidental Girl Scout Council. To order the
petitioner to refrain from teaching would deprive
the students and the school in general the
benefits that may be derived from her training
and expertise. While it is true that probation is a
mere privilege and its grant rests solely upon the
discretion of the court, this discretion is to be
exercised primarily for the benefit of organized
society and only incidentally for the benefit of
the accused. 5 Equal regard to the demands of
justice and public interest must be observed. 6 In
this case, teaching has been the lifetime and only
calling and profession of petitioner. The law
requires that she devote herself to a lawful
calling and occupation during probation. Yet, to
prohibit her from engaging in teaching would
practically prevent her from complying with the
terms of the probation.
HERNAN V. SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts:Petitioner Hernan worked as a Supervising
Fiscal Clerk at DOTC-CAR in Baguio City. By
virtue of his position, she was designated
as cashier, disbursement and collection officer.
As such, petitioner received cash and other
collections from customers and clients for the
payment of telegraphic transfers, toll fees, and
special message fees. The collections she
received were deposited at the bank account of
the DOTC at the Land Bank of the Philippines
(LBP), Baguio City Branch.
On December 17, 1996, a cash examination of
accounts handled by Hernan was conducted. It
was found out that the deposit slips dated
September 19, 1996 and November 29, 1996
bearing the amounts of P11,300.00 and
P81,348.20, respectively, did not bear a stamp
receipt by LBP nor was it machine validated.
Petitioner was then informed that the two
aforesaid remittances were not acknowledged by
the bank. The auditors then found that petitioner
duly accounted for the P81,348.20 remittance but
not for the P11,300.00.
Accused-petitioner was charged with
malversation of public funds with the amount of
P11,300.00. RTC found the accused guilty.
Petitioner appealed to CA which affirmed
her conviction but modified the penalty imposed.
Upon motion, however, the CA set aside its
decision on the finding that it has
no appellate jurisdiction over the case.
Petitioner appealed the case to Sandiganbayan
which affirmed RTC’s decision but modified the
penalty imposed. Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was denied in a
Resolution dated August 31, 2010. On June 26,
2013, the Resolution denying petitioner’s
MR became final and executory.
On July 26, 2013, accused filed an Urgent
Motion to Reopen the Case with Leave of Court
and with Prayer to Stay the Execution.
Sandiganbayan denied the same and directed the
execution of the judgment of conviction.
Thereafter, petitioner filed her Petition for
Reconsideration with Prayer for Recall of Entry
of Judgment in lieu of the Prayer for the Stay of
Execution of Judgement on January 9, 2014
which was likewise denied.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not accused is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for the crime of malversation of
public funds.
2. Whether or not the case may be reopened for
further reception of evidence.
HELD:
FIRST ISSUE: YES.
The Court affirmed the finding of guilt of
accused for the crime of malversation of public
funds.
The elements of malversation of public funds
under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC) are: (1) that the offender is a public
officer; (2) that he had the custody or control of
funds or property by reason of the duties of his
office; (3) that those funds or property were
public funds or property for which he was
accountable; and (4) that he appropriated, took,
misappropriated or consented or, through
abandonment or negligence, permitted another
person to take them. This article establishes a
presumption that when a public officer fails to
have duly forthcoming any public funds with
which he is chargeable, upon demand by any
duly authorized officer, it shall be prima facie
evidence that he has put such missing funds to
personal uses.
As duly found by the trial court, and affirmed by
the Sandiganbayan, petitioner’s defense that she,
together with her supervisor Cecilia Paraiso,
went to the LBP and handed the subject
P11,300.00 deposit to the teller Ngaosi and,
thereafter, had no idea as to where the money
went failed to overcome the presumption of law.
For one, Paraiso was never presented to
corroborate her version. For another, when
questioned about the subject deposit, not only
did petitioner fail to make the same readily
available, she also could not satisfactorily
explain its whereabouts. Indeed, in the crime of
 malversation, all that is necessary
for conviction is sufficient proof that the
accountable officer had received public funds,
that she did not have them in her possession
when demand therefor was made, and that she
could not satisfactorily explain her failure to do
so. Thus, even if it is assumed that it was
somebody else who misappropriated the said
amount, petitioner may still be held liable for
malversation.
SECOND ISSUE: NO, but the instant case was
nevertheless reopened ONLY to modify the
penalty imposed in view of the enactment of an
amendatory law favorable to the accused.
The Court upheld Sandiganbayan’s ruling
that the absence of the first requisite that the
reopening must be before the finality of a
judgment of conviction already cripples the
Motion to Reopen the Case. The records of the
case clearly reveal that the August 31, 2010
Resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration had
already become final and executory and, in fact,
was already recorded in the Entry Book of
Judgments on June 26, 2013.
Requirements for reopening of the case
(Section 24, Rule 119 of Rules of Court)
1. The reopening must be before the finality of a
judgment of conviction;
2. The order is issued by the judge on his own
initiative or upon motion;
3. The order is issued only after a hearing is
conducted;
4. The order intends to prevent a miscarriage of
justice; and
5. The presentation of additional and/or further
evidence should be terminated within thirty days
from the issuance of the order
However, the Court held that it is still
necessary to reopen the instant case and recall
the Entry of Judgment dated June 26, 2013 of
the Sandiganbayan, not for further reception
of evidence, however, as petitioner prays for,
but in order to modify the penalty imposed by
said court.
The general rule is that a judgment that
has acquired finality becomes immutable and
unalterable, and may no longer be modified in
any respect even if the modification is meant to
correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and
whether it will be made by the court that
rendered it or by the highest court of the land.
When, however, circumstances transpire after the
finality of the decision rendering its execution
unjust and inequitable, the Court may sit
en banc and give due regard to such exceptional
circumstance warranting the relaxation of the
doctrine of immutability.
To the Court, the recent passage of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 10951 which accordingly reduced the
penalty applicable to the crime charged herein is
an example of such exceptional circumstance.
Pursuant to the aforequoted provision, therefore,
we have here a novel situation wherein the
judgment convicting the accused, petitioner
herein, has already become final and executory
and yet the penalty imposed thereon has been
reduced by virtue of the passage of said law.
Because of this, not only must petitioner’s
sentence be modified respecting the settled rule
on the retroactive effectivity of laws, the
sentencing being favorable to the accused, she
may even apply for probation, as long as she
does not possess any ground for disqualification,
in view of recent legislation on probation, or
R.A. No. 10707.
Thus, in order to effectively avoid any injustice
that petitioner may suffer as well as a possible
multiplicity of suits arising therefrom, the Court
deems it proper to reopen the instant case and
recall the Entry of Judgment dated June 26, 2013
of the Sandiganbayan, which imposed the
penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to eleven (11) years, six (6)
months, and twenty-one (21) days of prision
mayor, as maximum. Instead, since the amount
involved herein is P11,300.00, which does not
exceed P40,000.00, the new penalty that should
be imposed is prision correccional in
its medium and maximum periods, which has a
prison term of two (2) years, four (4) months,
and one (1) day, to six (6) years.

The Court also held that when exceptional

circumstances exist, such as the passage of the
instant amendatory law imposing penalties
more lenient and favorable to the accused, the
Court shall not hesitate to direct the
reopening of a final and immutable judgment,
the objective of which is to correct not so
much the findings of guilt but the applicable
penalties to be imposed.