COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS V.

VILLALUZ
G.R. No. L-34038 / JUNE 18, 1976 / 71 SCRA 356
MAKASIAR, J. / CRIMPRO – Return oF property illegally seized/ GRACEGAR
NATURE
PETITIONERS Collector of Customs RESPONDENTS
Hon. Onofre Villaluz et. al.
SUMMARY. Collector of Customs, Salvador T. Mascardo, filed against Cesar T. Makapugay, a letter
complaint with respondent Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court for violation of: (a) Section 174 of the
National Internal Revenue Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4713, (b) Central Bank Circular No. 265,
in relation to Section 34 of Republic Act No. 265, otherwise known as The Central Bank Act, and (c) Section
3601 and 3602 of Republic Act No. 1937, in relation to Sections 2505 and 2530 (m) 1 of the same Act.
Respondent Judge ordered the return of the properties. Petitioner Collector of Customs refused to obey the
order due to the “prior institution of seizure proceedings thereon.” The refusal prompted respondent
Makapugay to file a complaint for “Open Disobedience” under Article 231 of the Revised Penal Code,
before the City Fiscal of Pasay City. SC ruled in favor of the Collector of Customs.

DOCTRINE. A circuit court judge cannot order return to importer of goods seized by the Collector of
Customs even if the criminal complaint against the importer is dismissed by said judge. Jurisdiction to
replevin seized imported articles belongs exclusively to the Bureau of Customs subject to appeal to the
Court of Tax Appeals.

FACTS.
 Petitioner Collector of Customs, Salvador T. Mascardo filed against Cesar T.
Makapugay, a letter complaint with respondent Judge of the Circuit Criminal
Court for violation of NIRC, Central Bank Circular 265 and RA 1937 claiming
that Cesar T. Makapugay "with malicious intention to defraud the government
criminally, willfully and feloniously brought into the country FORTY (40)
cartons of "untaxed blue seal" Salem cigarettes and FIVE (5) bottles of Johny
Walker Scotch Whiskey, also "untaxed", without the necessary permit from the
proper authorities. The respondent submitted a Baggage Declaration Entry
which did not declare the said articles.
 Respondent Judge assumed jurisdiction to conduct and did conduct the
preliminary investigation, and on July 6, 1971, issued the challenged order,
dismissing "the case with prejudice and ordering the return to private
respondent the amount of P2,280.00, his passport No. Ag-2456 FA - No.
B103813, and one (1) box of air-conditioning evaporator only, as well as the
forfeiture of forty (40) cartons of untaxed blue seal Salem cigarettes and five
(5) bottles of Johnny Walker Scotch Whiskey" (p. 13, rec.).
 Armed with said order, private respondent Makapugay demanded that
petitioner release the articles so stated. Petitioner Collector of Customs
refused to obey the order due to the "prior institution of seizure proceedings
thereon." The refusal prompted respondent Makapugay tofile a complaint for
"Open Disobedience" under Article 231 of the Revised Penal Code, before the
City Fiscal of Pasay City.
 Hence, this petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction, seeking to annul
and set aside the order dated July 6, 1971 on the ground that respondent
Judge has no power to conduct a preliminary investigation of criminal
complaints directly filed with him, cannot legally order the dismissal "with
prejudice" of a criminal case after conducting a preliminary investigation
thereon, and is without authority to order the return of articles subject of
seizure proceedings before Customs authorities.
 In these six cases, one common legal issue is whether a Circuit Criminal Court
possesses the power to conduct preliminary investigations which is
significant to determine whether items may be returned or not.
ISSUE & RATIO.
WON the items seized may be returned – NO

The dismissal of a case, even with prejudice, during the stage of preliminary
investigation does not bar subsequent prosecution and conviction if the
evidence warrants the re-filing of the same becomes next to impossible. For the
enforcement of such order would virtually deprive herein petitioner Collector
of Customs of the evidence indispensable to a successful prosecution of the
case against the private respondent. Worse, the order nullified the power of
seizure of the customs official.

Respondent Judge ignored the established principle that from the moment
imported goods are actually in the possession or control of the Customs
authorities, even if no warrant of seizure had previously been issued by
the Collector of Customs in connection with seizure and forfeiture
proceedings, the Bureau of Customs acquires exclusive jurisdiction over
such imported goods for the purpose of enforcing the Customs laws,
subject to an appeal only to the Court of Tax Appeals and to final review by the
Supreme Court.

Such exclusive jurisdiction precludes the Court of First Instance as well as

the Circuit Criminal Court from assuming cognizance of the subject matter
and divests such courts of the prerogative to replevin properties subject
to seizure and forfeiture proceedings for violation of the Tariff and
Customs Code because proceedings for the forfeiture of goods illegally
imported are not criminal in nature since they do not result in the
conviction of wrongdoer nor in the imposition upon him of a penalty.

DECISION.
Petitions dismissed. Writs lifted.
NOTES.
Fernando, J., concurring:
Constitutional law; Preliminary examination; Constitution confers of circuit criminal
judge power to conduct preliminary examination, but said judges should curb any
eagerness to make use of such competence. It is my understanding then that the
decision reached is at most an affirmation that the present Constitution, as did
the 1935 Constitution, confers the power to conduct preliminary examination
preparatory to issuing a warrant of arrest, to a circuit criminal court judge.
Even then, however, he should for sound policy reasons curb any eagerness or
propensity to make use of such competence. x x x As to his competence
regarding a preliminary investigation, it is my understanding that the question
has been left open.

Barredo, J., concurring in result:

Constitutional law; Preliminary examination; Congress did not intend to confer on circuit
criminal courts the power to conduct preliminary investigations. Notwithstanding the
scholarly and extended main opinion, I am not persuaded that the legislature ever
intended to confer upon Circuit Criminal Courts the power to conduct preliminary
investigations. Not only the specific words of the above provision, but the
development of the law on preliminary investigations and circumstances
obtaining at the time R.A. 5179 was enacted point unmistakably, in my considered
opinion, to this conclusion.
 OCCEÑA v. COMELEC
G.R. No. L-56350 / APRIL 2, 1981 / 104 SCRA 1

FACTS.
Upon the call of President-Prime Minister F. Marcos, the Interim Batasang Pambansa convened
as a constituent assembly. Acting as such, it passed 3 resolutions11 proposing amendments to
the Constitution. Occeña et al. challenged the validity of these proposals, attacking the validity
of the 1973 Constitution itself and the validity of the power of the Int. Batasang Pambansa to
propose such amendments.

ISSUE.
1) Is the 1973 Constitution the fundamental law?
2) Does the Int. Batasang Pambansa have the authority to propose amendments to the
Constitution?
3) Did the Interim Batasang Pambansa exceed its authority by allegedly proposing revisions
and not merely amendments?
4) Are the proposals invalid because the allegedly required three-fourths vote was not
complied with?
5) Were the proposals properly submitted to the people for ratification?

DECISION.
(1) Yes. It is much too late in the day to deny the force and applicability of the 1973
Constitution. The ruling in Javellana v. Exec. Secretary is authoritative as to the effectivity
of the 1973 Constitution whose provisions have been applied in several cases already.
(2) Yes. By express provision of the 1976 Constitutional amendments, the Int. Batasang
Pambansa has the same powers as the Int. National Assembly.12 And in Art XVII, Sec 15 of
the 1973 Const., the Int. National Assembly was vested with the power to propose
amendments by special call of the Prime Minister by a vote of a majority of all its members.
When, therefore, the Int. Batasang Pambansa, upon the call of President-Prime Minister F.
Marcos, met as a constituent assembly, it acted by virtue of such competence.
(3) No. A constituent body can propose anything but conclude nothing. Thus, whether [the Int.
Batasang Pambansa acting as a constituent assembly] will only propose amendments to
the Constitution or entirely overhaul the present Constitution xxx is of no moment because
the same will be submitted to the people for ratification.
(4) No. When the Int. Batasang Pambansa is sitting as a constituent assembly, only a majority
vote is needed to propose amendments. A three-fourths vote is not required in a
Constitutional Convention. It is not a requirement either when, in this case, the Int.
Batasang Pambansa exercises its constituent power to propose amendments. Moreover,
even on the presumption that the requirement of three- fourths vote applies, such
extraordinary majority was obtained. Where then is the alleged infirmity?
(5) Yes. Art XVI, Sec 2 of the 1973 Const. provides that the plebiscite called for the ratification
of the amendments shall be held not later than 3 months after the approval of such
amendment or revision. The resolutions were approved on Feb 5 and 27, 1981 and the
plebiscite is set on April 7, 1981. It is thus within the 90-day required period. As for the
people being adequately informed, it cannot be denied that by this time the proposed
amendments have been intensively and extensively discussed at the Int. Batasang
Pambansa, as well as through the mass media, [so that] it cannot be said that our people
are unaware.
 IMBONG v. COMELEC
G.R. No. L-32432 / SEPTEMBER 11, 1970 / 35 SCRA 28

FACTS.
Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly passed resolution No. 2 which, among others, called
for a Constitutional Convention to be composed of two delegates from each representative
district who shall have the same qualifications as those of Congressmen, to be elected on the
second Tuesday of November, 1970 in accordance with the Revised Election Code. Congress
then as a legislative assembly enacted RA 4914 implementing Resolution No. 2. Subsequently,
Congress as a Constitutional Assembly passed Resolution No. 4 which amended Resolution No.
2 and provided more details on the qualifications and apportionment of the delegates but
provided that other details are to be embodied in an implementing legislation. Congress acting
as a legislative assembly thus enacted RA 6132, implementing Resolution Nos. 2 and 4, and
expressly repealing RA 4914. Petitioners now assail the validity of RA 6132.
ISSUE.
May Congress, acting as a legislative assembly, enact RA 6132 to implement a resolution passed
by the same body acting as a Constituent Assembly?

DECISION.
Yes. The grant to Congress as a Constituent Assembly of such plenary authority to call a
constitutional convention includes, by virtue of the doctrine of necessary implication, all other
powers essential to the effective exercise of the principal power granted, such as the power to
fix the qualifications, number, apportionment, and compensation of the delegates as well as
appropriation of funds, and other implementing details indispensable to the convention. While
the authority to call a constitutional convention is vested by the Constitution solely and
exclusively in Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly, the power to enact the implementing
details, does not exclusively pertain to Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly. Such
implementing details are matters within the competence of Congress in the exercise of its
comprehensive legislative power, which power encompasses all matters not expressly or by
necessary implication removed by the Constitution from the ambit of legislative action.
Consequently, when Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly, omits to provide for such
implementing details after calling a
 GONZALES v. COMELEC
G.R. No. L-28196 / NOVEMBER 9, 1967 / 21 SCRA 774

FACTS.
Congress passed three resolutions simultaneously on the same date proposing amendments to
the Constitution:
(1)RBH8 No. 1: to increase the maximum number of seats in the House of Representatives from
120 to 180;
(2)RBH No. 2: calling a Constitutional Convention to be held on Nov 1971; and
(3)RBH No. 3: to authorize members of Congress to run for delegates to the Constitutional
Convention and if elected thereto, to authorize them to be delegates without forfeiting their
seats in Congress.
Upon approval by the President, the bill became RA 4913, which provided that RBH No. 1 and
No. 3 be submitted for the ratification of the people at the general elections on Nov 14, 1967.
ISSUE.
May Constitutional amendments be submitted for ratification in a general election?
DECISION.
Yes. 1935 Constitution, Art XV, Sec 1 provides: “xxx [Constitutional] amendments shall be valid
xxx when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election9 at which the amendments are
submitted to the people for their ratification.” There is nothing in the provision to indicate that
the “election” therein referred to is a “special” election and not a general election. There is no
denying the fact that an adequate appraisal of the merits and demerits of the proposed
amendments is likely to be overshadowed by the great attention usually commanded by the
choice of personalities involved in general elections. But then, these considerations are
addressed to the wisdom of holding a plebiscite simultaneously with the election of public
officers. [Though admirable, we] are unable to subscribe to the contrary view without, in effect,
reading into the Constitution what is not written thereon and what cannot fairly be deduced
from the letter thereof, since the spirit of the law should not be a matter of sheer speculation.
 TOLENTINO v. COMELEC
G.R. No. L-34150 / OCTOBER 16, 1971 / 41 SCRA 702

FACTS.
The first Organic Resolution approved by the 1971 Constitutional Convention proposed to
reduce the voting age from 21 to 18 years of age. It was also provided therein that the plebiscite
to ratify such partial amendment shall coincide with the local elections in November 1971 and
shall be without prejudice to other amendments that will be proposed in the future by the same
Convention. Petitioners now seek to restrain COMELEC on acting on such resolution.
ISSUE.
May amendments to the Constitution be submitted to the electorate for ratification partially
without prejudice to future amendments that may be proposed by the Constitutional
Convention?
DECISION.
No. Art XV, Sec 1 of the 1935 Const. clearly provides that “such amendments shall be valid as
part of the Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which
the amendments are submitted to the people for ratification”, thus leaving no room for doubt as
to how many “elections” or plebiscites may be held to ratify any amendment/s proposed by the
same Convention. The provision unequivocally says “an election” which means only one. In
order that the plebiscite xxx may be validly held, it must provide the voter not only sufficient
time but ample basis for an intelligent appraisal of the nature of the amendment per se as well
as its relation to the other parts with which it has to form a harmonious whole. In the case at
bar, the Convention has hardly started considering the merits of the proposals. To present to
the people any single proposal cannot comply with this requirement. There is here “no proper
submission”.
 MABANAG v. VITO
G.R. No. L-1123 / MARCH 5, 1947 / 78 PHIL 1
TUASON (EN BANC)

3 concur, 1 concur in separate opinion, 2 dissent in separate opinions, 1 filed separate opinion
FACTS.
Three senators and eight representatives had been proclaimed by a majority vote of the
Commission on Elections as having been elected senators and representatives in the elections
held on 23 April 1946. The three senators were suspended by the Senate shortly after the
opening of the first session of Congress following the elections, on account of alleged
irregularities in their election. The eight representatives since their election had not been
allowed to sit in the lower House, except to take part in the election of the Speaker, for the same
reason, although they had not been formally suspended. A resolution for their suspension had
been introduced in the House of Representatives, but that resolution had not been acted upon
definitely by the House when the petition for prohibition was filed. As a consequence these
three senators and eight representatives did not take part in the passage of the congressional
resolution, designated "Resolution of both houses proposing an amendment to the Constitution
of the Philippines to be appended as an ordinance thereto," nor was their membership
reckoned within the computation of the necessary three-fourths vote which is required in
proposing an amendment to the Constitution. If these members of Congress had been counted,
the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have been short of the
necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress. The petition for prohibition sought
to prevent the enforcement of said congressional resolution, as it is allegedly contrary to the
Constitution. The members of the Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of the Philippines,
the Auditor General, and the Director of the Bureau of Printing are made defendants. Eight
senators, 17 representatives, and the presidents of the Democratic Alliance, the Popular Front
and the Philippine Youth Party.
ISSUE.
Whether the Court may inquire upon the irregularities in the approval of the resolution
proposing an amendment to the Constitution.
DECISION.
It is a doctrine too well established to need citation of authorities that political questions are
not within the province of the judiciary, except to the extent that power to deal with such
questions has been conferred upon the courts by express constitutional or statutory provision.
This doctrine is predicated on the principle of the separation of powers, a principle also too
well known to require elucidation or citation of authorities. The difficulty lies in determining
what matters fall within the meaning of political question. The term is not susceptible of exact
definition, and precedents and authorities are not always in full harmony as to the scope of the
restrictions, on this ground, on the courts to meddle with the actions of the political
departments of the government. If a political question conclusively binds the judges out of
respect to the political departments, a duly certified law or resolution also binds the judges
under the "enrolled bill rule" born of that respect. If ratification of an amendment is a political
question, a proposal which leads to ratification has to be a political question. The two steps
complement each other in a scheme intended to achieve a single objective. It is to be noted that
the amendatory process as provided in section I of Article XV of the Philippine Constitution
"consists of (only) two distinct parts: proposal and ratification." There is no logic in attaching
political character to one and withholding that character from the other. Proposal to amend the
Constitution is a highly political function performed by the Congress in its sovereign legislative
capacity and committed to its charge by the Constitution itself. The exercise of this power is
even in dependent of any intervention by the Chief Executive. If on grounds of expediency
scrupulous attention of the judiciary be needed to safeguard public interest, there is less reason
for judicial inquiry into the validity of a proposal then into that of ratification.
 TAÑADA v. CUENCO
G.R. No. L-10520 / FEBRURAY 28, 1957 / 100-103 PHIL 1051-1101

FACTS.
Pending before the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) was an election protest filed by members of
the Citizens Party (CP) who lost to members of the Nacionalista Party (NP). The Senate was at
the time composed of 23 members of the NP and 1 of the CP — petitioner Sen. Tañada. When
the SET was being organized, Sen. Tañada, in behalf of the CP, nominated himself alone. Sen.
Primicias, a member of the NP, then nominated “not on behalf of the [NP] but on behalf of the
Committee on Rules of the Senate” Sens. Delgado and respondent Cuenco “to complete the
membership of the Tribunal”. This he claims is the mandate of the Constitution which reads:
“xxx Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be
Justices of the Supreme Court xxx and the remaining six shall be Members of the [House] who
shall be chosen by each House, three upon nomination of the party having the largest number
of votes and three of the party having the second largest number of votes therein. xxx.”51 Over
the objection of Sen. Tañada, Sens. Delgado and Cuenco were chosen to sit in the SET. Sen.
Tañada now contests them in Court. Respondents aver, among others, that the SC has no
jurisdiction on the matter as the issue is a political question and not judicial.
ISSUE.
Is the issue a political question beyond the ambit of judicial inquiry?
DECISION.
No. The issue at bar is not a political question for the Senate is not clothed with “full
discretionary authority” in the choice of members of the SET.52 The exercise of its power
thereon is subject to constitutional
 SANIDAD v. COMELEC
G.R. No. L-44640 / OCTOBER 12, 1976 / 73 SCRA 333

FACTS.
In 1976, Pres. Marcos submitted to the people in a referendum- plebiscite two questions:
“(1) Do you want martial law to be continued?;
“(2) Whether or not you want martial law to be continued, do you approve the following
amendments to the Constitution? xxx”
Petitioners now seek to declare void the presidential decrees which submitted the
aforementioned issues to the people in a plebiscite- referendum. They aver that the incumbent
President has no constitutional grant of constituent power to propose amendments to the
Constitution; consequently, the referendum-plebiscite has no legal basis. They now seek to
enjoin COMELEC from holding such plebiscite.
ISSUE.
(1) Is the nature of the question on the constitutionality of the assailed presidential decrees
political or justiciable?
(2) Does the President possess the power to propose amendments to the Constitution as well as
set up the required machinery and prescribe the procedure for the ratification of his
proposals by the people?
(3) Is the submission to the people of the proposed amendments sufficient and proper?
DECISION.
(1) The question is justiciable. The constitutional amending in this case is in the form of a
delegated and hence a limited power so that the SC is vested with that authority to
determine whether that power has been discharged within its limits. Political questions
are neatly associated with the wisdom, not the legality of a particular act. [In the case at
bar,] what is in the heels of the Court is not the wisdom but the Constitutional authority of
the President to perform such acts or to assume the power of a constituent assembly. If the
Constitution provides how it may be amended, the Judiciary as the interpreter of that
Constitution, can declare whether the procedure followed or the authority assumed was
valid or not.
(2) Yes. In abnormal times,13 the separation of powers may form an insurmountable barrier to
a decisive emergency action xxx. The power of the State in crisis xxx must be freed from
the normal system of constitutional and legal limitations so that the crisis may be ended
and normal times restored. The presidential exercise of legislative powers in times of
martial law is now a conceded valid act.14 There is, thus, no reason why the President
cannot discharge validly the function of the Int. Assembly to propose amendments to the
Constitution, which is but adjunct to its gross legislative power. For the President to
decline to undertake the amending process, in the absence of the Int. Assembly, would
leave a governmental machinery at a stalemate, thereby impeding the objective of a crisis
govt “to end the crises and restore normal times”.
(3) Yes. Three weeks (period from the issuance of presidential decrees to referendum-
plebiscite) is not too short for free debates and discussions. The questions are not new.
They are issues of the day. All that the 1973 Constitution provides is that the plebiscite
“xxx shall be held not later than 3 months after approval of such amendment.
 ANGARA v. ELECTORAL COMMISSION
G.R. No. 45081 / JULY 15, 1936 / 63 PHIL 139

FACTS.
The Electoral Commission was created pursuant to Art VI sec 4 of the 1935 Constitution (now
sec 17) which conferred to it the power to “be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly.”
The National Assembly (NA) passed a resolution confirming the election of petitioner Angara as
member of the NA on Dec 3, 1935. On Dec 9, 1935, the respondent Electoral Commission
formally organized for the first time and resolved to fix the same date as the final day of filing of
election protests. Ynsua, a candidate vying for the Angara’s position, filed his election protest
before the Electoral Commission on the same date. Angara sought to prohibit the Electoral
Commission from taking further cognizance of the Ynsua’s motion
Angara argues: the Constitution excludes from the Commission’s jurisdiction the power to
regulate the proceedings of such election contests. Morever, the Commission can regulate the
proceedings of election protests only if the NA has not availed of its primary power to so
regulate such proceedings.
ISSUE.
(1) Does the Electoral Commission have the constitutional power to promulgate rules of
procedure (such as fixing a deadline for filing election protests) relating to election protests
notwithstanding the lack of express conferment of such power in the Constitution?
(2) Does it have the power the promulgate such rules notwithstanding the resolution of the NA?
DECISION.
(1) Yes. It is a settled rule of construction that where a general power is conferred or duty
enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of
the other is also conferred. In the absence of any further constitutional provision relating to
the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore,
the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the exclusive power to judge all
contests relating to the election must be deemed by necessary implication to have been
lodged also in the Electoral Commission.
(2) Yes. The purpose of the of the creation of the Electoral Commission was to transfer in its
totality all the powers previously exercised by the Legislature in matters pertaining to
contested elections of its members, to an independent and impartial tribunal. The express
lodging [in the now Art VI, sec 17] of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied
denial of the exercise of that power by the NA. If the NA is permitted to claim the power to
regulate proceedings of election contests, then the grant of power to the Commission would
be ineffective for such power would be xxx subject at all times to the regulation of the NA.
The purpose of the framers of our Constitution would be frustrated.