Legal Separation

Article 55
Laperal v Republic
GR No. L-18008
Oct. 30, 1962
FACTS: The petitioner, a bona fide resident of Baguio City, was married to Mr. Enrique R.
Santamaria on March 1939. However, a decree of legal separation was later on issued to
the spouses. Aside from that, she ceased to live with Enrique. During their marriage, she
naturally uses Elisea L. Santamaria. She filed this petition to be permitted to resume in
using her maiden name Elisea Laperal. This was opposed by the City Attorney of Baguio on
the ground that it violates Art. 372 of the Civil Code. She was claiming that continuing to use
her married name would give rise to confusion in her finances and the eventual liquidation of
the conjugal assets.

ISSUE: Whether Rule 103 which refers to change of name in general will prevail over the
specific provision of Art. 372 of the Civil Code with regard to married woman legally
separated from his husband.

HELD: In legal separation, the married status is unaffected by the separation, there being no
severance of the vinculum. The finding that petitioner’s continued use of her husband’s
surname may cause undue confusion in her finances was without basis. It must be
considered that the issuance of the decree of legal separation in 1958, necessitate that the
conjugal partnership between her and Enrique had automatically been dissolved and
liquidated. Hence, there could be no more occasion for an eventual liquidation of the
conjugal assets.

Furthermore, applying Rule 103 is not a sufficient ground to justify a change of the name of
Elisea for to hold otherwise would be to provide for an easy circumvention of the mandatory
provision of Art. 372.

Petition was dismissed.

Article 56-57
Bugayong v Ginez
GR No. L-10033
Dec. 28, 1956
FACTS: Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the US Navy was married with Leonila Ginez
on August 1949 at Pangasinan while on furlough leave. Immediately after the marriage, they
lived with the sisters of Bugayong in said municipality before he went back to duty. The
couple came to an agreement that Ginez would stay with his sisters who later moved in
Manila. On or about July 1951, she left the dwelling of the sisters-in-law and informed her
husband by letter that she had gone to Pangasinan to reside with her mother and later on
moved to Dagupan to study in a local college.

Petitioner then began receiving letters from Valeriana Polangco, (plaintiff’s sister-in-law) and
some from anonymous writers, which were not produced at the hearing, informing him of
alleged acts of infidelity of his wife. He admitted that his wife informed him by letter that a
certain Eliong kissed her. All these communications, prompted him in October 1951 to seek
the advice of the Navy Chaplain who asked him to consult with the navy legal department.
In August 1952, Bugayong went to Pangasinan and looked for his wife. They met in the
house of the defendant’s godmother. They proceeded to the house of Pedro, cousin of the
plaintiff where they stayed for 1 day and 1 night as husband and wife. The next day, they
slept together in their own house. He tried to verify with Leonila the truth on the information
he received but instead of answering, she merely packed up and left, which he took as a
confirmation of the acts of infidelity. He then filed a complaint for legal separation.

ISSUE: Whether there was condonation between Bugayong and Ginez that may serve as a
ground for dismissal of the action.

HELD: Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for legal
separation. A single voluntary act of marital intercourse between the parties ordinarily is
sufficient to constitute condonation and where the parties live in the same house, it is
presumed that they live on terms of matrimonial cohabitation.

Furthermore, Art. 100 of the Civil Code states that the legal separation may be claimed only
by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the
adultery or concubinage.

Article 58-62
Rule on Legal Separation
A.M. No. 02-11-11-SC
Mar. 4, 2003

Section 1. Scope.​ - This Rule shall govern petitions for legal separation under the Family
Code of the Philippines.

The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.

Section 2. Petition​. - (a) Who may and when to file. - (1) A petition for legal separation may
be filed only by the husband or the wife, as the case may be within five years from the time
of the occurrence of any of the following causes:

(a) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a
common child, or a child of the petitioner;

(b) Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or
political affiliation;

(c) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a child of
the petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement;

(d) Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six years, even
if pardoned;

(e) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;

(f) Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent;

(g) Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in or outside
the Philippines;

(h) Sexual infidelity or perversion of the respondent;

(i) Attempt on the life of petitioner by the respondent; or

(j) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one year.

Sec. 19 RA 9262 (VAWC)

SECTION 19. Legal Separation Cases.​ – In cases of legal separation, where violence as
specified in this Act is alleged, Article 58 of the Family Code shall not apply. The court shall
proceed on the main case and other incidents of the case as soon as possible. The hearing
on any application for a protection order filed by the petitioner must be conducted within the
mandatory period specified in this Act.

Lapuz v Eufemio
GR No. L-30977
Jan. 31, 1972
FACTS: Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio Eufemio on
August 1953. They were married civilly on September 21, 1934 and canonically after nine
days. They had lived together as husband and wife continuously without any children until
1943 when her husband abandoned her. They acquired properties during their marriage.
Petitioner then discovered that her husband cohabited with a Chinese woman named Go
Hiok on or about 1949. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal separation, which
among others, would order that the defendant Eufemio should be deprived of his share of
the conjugal partnership profits.

Eufemio counterclaimed for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lapuz-Sy on the
ground of his prior and subsisting marriage with Go Hiok. Trial proceeded and the parties
adduced their respective evidence. However, before the trial could be completed,
respondent already scheduled to present surrebuttal evidence, petitioner died in a vehicular
accident on May 1969. Her counsel duly notified the court of her death. Eufemio moved to
dismiss the petition for legal separation on June 1969 on the grounds that the said petition
was filed beyond the one-year period provided in Article 102 of the Civil Code and that the
death of Carmen abated the action for legal separation. Petitioner’s counsel moved to
substitute the deceased Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz.

ISSUE: Whether the death of the plaintiff, before final decree in an action for legal
separation, abate the action and will it also apply if the action involved property rights.

HELD: An action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property
rights are involved. These rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source being
the decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before
the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes
during the pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing a more
radical and definitive separation; and the expected consequential rights and claims would
necessarily remain unborn.
The petition of Eufemio for declaration of nullity is moot and academic and there could be
no further interest in continuing the same after her demise, that automatically dissolved the
questioned union. Any property rights acquired by either party as a result of Article 144 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines 6 could be resolved and determined in a proper action for
partition by either the appellee or by the heirs of the appellant.

Gadionco v Penaranda
GR No. 79284
Nov. 27, 1987
FACTS: Private respondent, Teresita Gandionco, filed a complaint against herein petitioner,
Froilan Gandionco for legal separation on the ground of concubinage as a civil case.
Teresita also filed a criminal complaint of concubinage against her husband. She likewise
filed an application for the provisional remedy of support pendente lite which was approved
and ordered by the respondent judge. Petitioner moved to suspend the action for legal
separation and the incidents consequent thereto such as the support for pendent elite, in
view of the criminal case for concubinage filed against him. He contends that the civil action
for legal separation is inextricably tied with the criminal action thus, all proceedings related to
legal separation will have to be suspended and await the conviction or acquittal of the
criminal case.

ISSUE: Whether or not a civil case for legal separation can proceed pending the resolution
of the criminal case for concubinage.

HELD: Supreme Court ruled that the contentions of the petitioner were incorrect. A civil
action for legal separation on the ground of concubinage may proceed ahead of, or
simultaneously with, a criminal action for concubinage, because said civil action is not one to
enforce the civil liability arising from the offense, even if both the civil and criminal actions
arise from or are related to the same offense. Such civil action is one intended to obtain the
right to live separately, with the legal consequences thereof including the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership of gains, custody of the children, support and disqualifications from
inheriting from the innocent spouse. Decree of legal separation may be issued upon proof
by a preponderance of evidence, where no criminal proceeding or conviction is necessary.

Furthermore, the support pendente lite, as a remedy, can be availed of in an action for legal
separation, and granted at the discretion of the judge. If in case, the petitioner finds the
amount of support pendente lite ordered as too onerous, he can always file a motion to
modify or reduce the same.

Rights and Obligations bet. H&W

Article 68
Article 266-A RPC
Art. 266-A. Rape​: When and How Committed. ― Rape is committed:1. By a man who shall
have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:a. Through
force, threat, or intimidation;b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious;c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; andd. When
the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of
the circumstances mentioned above be present.

Sec. 3 RA 9262 (VAWC)

SECTION 3. Definition of Terms.- As used in this Act,
(a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a series of acts
committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman
with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a
common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the
family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or
suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion,
harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the following
acts:

A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm;

B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed against a woman
or her child. It includes, but is not limited to:

a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a woman or her child as a sex
object, making demeaning and sexually suggestive remarks, physically attacking the sexual
parts of the victim's body, forcing her/him to watch obscene publications and indecent shows
or forcing the woman or her child to do indecent acts and/or make films thereof, forcing the
wife and mistress/lover to live in the conjugal home or sleep together in the same room with
the abuser;

b) acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to engage in any sexual activity by force,
threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm or coercion;

c) Prostituting the woman or child.

C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or

emotional suffering of the victim such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking,
damage to property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and mental
infidelity. It includes causing or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual or
psychological abuse of a member of the family to which the victim belongs, or to witness
pornography in any form or to witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted
deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of common children.

D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially
dependent which includes, but is not limited to the following:

1. withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging in any legitimate
profession, occupation, business or activity, except in cases wherein the other
spouse/partner objects on valid, serious and moral grounds as defined in Article 73 of the
Family Code;

2. deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right to the use and
enjoyment of the conjugal, community or property owned in common;
3. destroying household property;

4. controlling the victims' own money or properties or solely controlling the conjugal money
or properties.

(b) "Battery" refers to an act of inflicting physical harm upon the woman or her child resulting
to the physical and psychological or emotional distress.

(c) "Battered Woman Syndrome" refers to a scientifically defined pattern of psychological

and behavioral symptoms found in women living in battering relationships as a result of
cumulative abuse.

(d) "Stalking" refers to an intentional act committed by a person who, knowingly and without
lawful justification follows the woman or her child or places the woman or her child under
surveillance directly or indirectly or a combination thereof.

(e) "Dating relationship" refers to a situation wherein the parties live as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage or are romantically involved over time and on a continuing
basis during the course of the relationship. A casual acquaintance or ordinary socialization
between two individuals in a business or social context is not a dating relationship.

(f) "Sexual relations" refers to a single sexual act which may or may not result in the bearing
of a common child.

(g) "Safe place or shelter" refers to any home or institution maintained or managed by the
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) or by any other agency or
voluntary organization accredited by the DSWD for the purposes of this Act or any other
suitable place the resident of which is willing temporarily to receive the victim.

(h) "Children" refers to those below eighteen (18) years of age or older but are incapable of
taking care of themselves as defined under Republic Act No. 7610. As used in this Act, it
includes the biological children of the victim and other children under her care.

Lacson v San Jose-Lacson

GR No. L-23482
Aug. 30, 1968
Facts: On Feb 14, 1953, when they got married, Jan 9, 1963 is when Carmen (respondent)
left home in Bacolod to go to Manila, on March 12, 1963 Carmen filed a complaint for
custody of children as well as support in Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila,
Before it pushed through though they reached a settlement where the two eldest kids would
go to
petitioner Alfonso and the youngest would stay with Carmen, This was affirmed by the CFI.
and on May 7, 1963 respondent filed a motion for the custody of all children be given to her
in JDRC since, she said she only entered into agreement to gain custody of her younger
children and thus should be given custody of the older ones as well who are all below 7
years old. CA ruled that compromise agreement as relating to custody of children should be
declared null and void and as such the execution of said judgment is void too.

ISSUE: Whether or Not support should be awarded to the wife

HELD: Yes, should have but was filed out of time, Older children at that time were 5 and 6
so agreement should have been declared null and void since no compelling reasons were
stated otherwise, However the children are now 11 and 10 and thus The 11 year old may
choose which parent they want to live with and Court may also award custody to who they
deem more fit through evidence

Ilusorio (Potenciano) v CA
GR No. 139789
Jul. 19, 2001
FACTS: In March 1999, Erlinda Illusorio, the wife of herein petitioner, Potenciano, petitioned
for habeas corpus which was dismissed on May 2000 for lack of merit and granted the
petition to nullify the CA ruling giving visitation rights to Erlinda. This case before SC is
Erlinda’s motion to reconsider the decision made. A conference was set on September 2000
to determine the propriety and relevance of a physical and medical examination of
Potenciano and how it will be conducted. Erlinda’s motion to have Potenciano be medically
examined by a team of medical experts appointed by the Court was denied with finality in
March 2001.

ISSUE: Whether a court can validly issue an order compelling the husband to live together
and observe mutual love, respect and fidelity.

HELD: Erlinda claimed that she was not compelling Potenciano to live with her in consortium
but clearly she wanted the latter to live with her and is the root cause of her petition. What
the law provides is that “husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love,
respect and fidelity”. The sanction thereof is the “spontaneous, mutual affection between
husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order to enforce consortium.

Evidently, there was absence of empathy between Erlinda and Potenciano having separated
from bed and board since 1972. Empathy as defined by SC is a “shared feeling between
husband and wife experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep
sense of spiritual communion”. Marital union is a two-way process. It is for two loving adults
who view the relationship with respect, sacrifice and a continuing commitment to
togetherness, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.