FEDERICO MANSAL, plaintiff, vs. P.P. GO-CHECO LUMBER CO., defendant-appellee.

 Petitioner
o Plaintiff-appellant suffered injuries in the middle finger of his right hand while stacking lumber in
the lumber yard of the defendant.
o he was not employed directly by the company, but worked under a contractor by the name of Pablo
Manansala
 Defendant company
o Federico was a purely casual laborer, employed by what is known in law as an independent
contractor, Pablo Manansala, who had direction and control of plaintiff-appellant without
interference on the part of the defendant.

RULING:

 An independent contractor has been defined as one who is exercise independent employment and contracts
to do a piece of work according to his own methods and without being subject to control of his employer
except as to the result of the work.
 "Laborer" is used as a synonym of "Employee" and means every person who has entered the employment of,
or works under a service or apprenticeship contract for an employer.
o It does not include a person whose employment is purely casual and is not for the purposes of the
occupation or business of the employer.
 to determine whether a person is an independent contractor are:
o whether he has capital or money of his own to pay his laborers;
o whether he filed a bond to answer for the fulfillment of his contract with his employer.
 it is not the continuity of employment that renders the employer responsible, but whether the work of the
laborer is part of the business or occupation of the employer.
 It will be noted that in the order that an employer may not be responsible for an injury to a laborer it is
necessary that the "employment is purely casual and is not for the purposes of the occupation or business of
the employer."
o Casual means occasional, coming without regularity.
o The work is purely casual when it is not a part of the business in which the employer is engaged.
o The clause "is not for the purpose of the occupation or business of the employer" complements and
explains the term "purely casual".
 Under section 14 of Act No. 3428, the plaintiff is entitled to receive 60 per cent of his average weekly wages
for the period he was incapacitated for labor, exclusive of the first seven days.

VICENTE UY CHAO, petitioner, vs. MANUEL AGUILAR and ERNESTO RAMOS, respondents.

 at about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of November 1953, respondent Aguilar suffered physical injury as a
result of the sudden fall of the whole save of a glassware store known as La Boda de Plata and owned by the
petitioner Uy Chao, while he (respondent Aguilar) together with two other laborers was on top of said eave
removing the galvanized iron sheets covering the frame of the eave. In the afternoon of the same day
respondent Ramos engaged respondent Aguilar for the said work.
 Petitioner’s contention:
o Ramos was an independent contractor and the statutory employer of the injured laborer, respondent
Aguilar; that as such respondent Ramos should be held liable for the injuries sustained by the
laborer; and that he (the petitioner) should be exempted from any liability.
o the employment of respondent Aguilar to repair or replace the eave of the glassware store was casual
and not for the purpose of the occupation or business of the petitioner.

RULING:
  It is clear that the repair or dismantlement of the eave was not for the purpose of the petitioner's occupation
or business. The petitioner was a glassware dealer. He bought and sold glassware. It is difficult to see the
connection of the repair or dismantlement with the buying and selling of glassware.
o Repair is restoration to a sound or good state after decay, dilapidation, injury or partial destruction.
It is essentially a process of reconstruction, or of fixing broken or damaged parts of a structural
whole.
o Selling glassware is transferring the ownership over commodities on goods from the seller to the
buyer for a certain valuable consideration.
 Petitioner absolved from liability
 The rule in Caro v. Rilloraza case is not applicable in this case because the petitioner was engaged not in
house-letting business but in buying and selling glassware.
o Ruling in Caro case: the laborer who while constructing a window railing of a building "fell to the
ground and broke his leg, as the wooden platform on which he and another carpenter were working
collapsed," was entitled to receive compensation from the owner of the building.

UNITED CHRISTIAN MISSIONARY SOCIETY vs. SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION and SOCIAL
SECURITY SYSTEM

Subject matter: Condonation of of the assessed penalties for delayed security premium remittances

The petitioners failed for five years to pay the premiums prescribed by law and thus incurred the 3% penalty
thereon per month mandatorily imposed by law for late payment

Petitioner’s contention:

 five petitioners contesting the social security coverage of American missionaries who perform religious
missionary work in the Philippines under specific employment contracts with petitioners
 praying for condonation of assessed penalties against them for delayed social security premium remittances
in the aggregate amount of P69,446.42 for the period from September, 1958 to September, 1963.
 alleged that they had labored under the impression that as international organizations, they were not subject
to coverage under the Philippine Social Security System
 penalties assessed against them appear to be inequitable, citing several resolutions of respondent Commission
which in the past allegedly permitted condonation of such penalties.

Respondent’s contention:

 in the absence of an express provision in the Social Security Act vesting in the Commission the power to
condone penalties, it cannot legally do so

ISSUE:

whether respondent Commission has authority under the Social Security Act to condone the penalty prescribed by law
for late premium remittances.

RULING:

 no
 The prescribed penalty is evidently of a punitive character, provided by the legislature to assure that
employers do not take lightly the State's exercise of the police power in the implementation of the Republic's
declared policy
 good faith or bad faith is rendered irrelevant, since the law makes no distinction between an employer who
professes good reasons for delaying the remittance of premiums and another who deliberately disregards the
legal duty imposed upon him to make such remittance.
 o From the moment the remittance of premiums due is delayed, the penalty immediately attaches to
the delayed premium payments by force of law.
 Section 4 of the Social Security Act precisely enumerates the powers of the Commission.
o Nowhere from said powers of the Commission may it be shown that the Commission is granted
expressly or by implication the authority to condone penalties imposed by the Act.
 funds contributed to the System by compulsion of law have already been held by us to be "funds belonging
to the members which are merely held in trust by the Government."
o Being a mere trustee of the funds of the System which actually belong to the members, respondent
Commission cannot legally perform any acts affecting the same, including condonation of penalties,
that would diminish the property rights of the owners and beneficiaries of such funds without an
express or specific authority therefor.
 Roman Catholic Archbishop vs. Social Security Commission 6 that the legislature had clearly intended to
include charitable and religious institutions and other non-profit institutions, such as petitioners, within the
scope and coverage of the Social Security Act.

HACIENDA CATAYWA/MANUEL VILLANUEVA, owner, JOEMARIE VILLANUEVA, manager,

MANCY AND SONS ENTERPRISES, INC., Petitioners, vs. ROSARIO LOREZO, Respondent.

FACTS:

 Social Security System (SSS) Western Visayas Group informing her that she cannot avail of their retirement
benefits since per their record she has only paid 16 months. Such is 104 months short of the minimum
requirement of 120 months payment to be entitled to the benefit.
 options:
o continue paying contributions as voluntary member;
o request for refund;
o leave her contributions in-trust with the System, or
o file a petition before the Social Security Commission (SSC) so that liabilities, if any, of her
employer may be determined.

Respondent’s contention:

 she was employed as laborer in Hda. Cataywa managed by Jose Marie Villanueva in 1970 but was reported
to the SSS only in 1978.
 SSS contributions were deducted from her wages from 1970 to 1995, but not all were remitted to the SSS
which, subsequently, caused the rejection of her claim

Petitioner’s contention:

 There was no employer-employee relationship

 Petitioners insist that after thirty long years, all the records of the farm were already destroyed by termites
and elements, thus, they relied on the SSS Form R-1A as the only remaining source of information available.
 respondent was a very casual worker because the SSS form revealed that she had 16 months of contributions.
 No legal basis to pierce the veil of corporation entity

RULING:

 three types of employees

o (1) regular employees or those who have been engaged to perform activities that are usually
necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer;
o (2) project employees or those whose employment has been fixed for a specific project or
undertaking, the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of their
engagement, or those whose work or service is seasonal in nature and is performed for the duration
of the season; and
o (3) casual employees or those who are neither regular nor project employees.
  Farm workers generally fall under the definition of seasonal employees. It was also consistently held that
seasonal employees may be considered as regular employees when they are called to work from time to time.
 The primary standard, therefore, of determining a regular employment is the reasonable connection between
the particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual business or trade of the employer.
The test is whether the former is usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer.
 petitioners are liable for delinquent contributions. It being proven by sufficient evidence that respondent
started working for the hacienda in 1970, it follows that petitioners are liable for deficiency in the SSS
contributions.
 The imposition upon and payment by the delinquent employer of the three percent (3%) penalty for the late
remittance of premium contributions is mandatory and cannot be waived by the System.
 The law provides that should the employer misrepresent the true date of the employment of the employee
member, such employer shall pay to the SSS damages equivalent to the difference between the amount of
benefit to which the employee member or his beneficiary is entitled had the proper contributions been
remitted to the SSS and the amount payable on the basis of the contributions actually remitted.
 doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction
o The doctrine applies only when such corporate fiction is used to defeat public convenience, justify
wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime, or when it is made as a shield to confuse the legitimate issues,
or where a corporation is the mere alter ego or business conduit of a person, or where the corporation
is so organized and controlled and its affairs are so conducted as to make it merely an
instrumentality, agency, conduit or adjunct of another corporation.

BEN STA. RITA, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and
THE SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, respondents.

Subject Matter:

Memorandum of Agreement entered into between the Department of Labor and Employment ("DOLE") and the Social
Security System ("SSS") extending the coverage of Social Security, Medical Care and Employment Compensation
laws to Filipino seafarers on board foreign vessels

Petitioner’s contention:

 fails, neglects and refuses to remit to the Social Security System contributions for SSS, Medicare and
Employees Compensation for its covered employees because Filipino seafarers recruited by B. Sta. Rita Co.
and deployed on board foreign vessels outside the Philippines are exempt from the coverage of R.A. No.
1161 under Section 8 (j) (5)
 Memorandum of Agreement entered into by the DOLE and the SSS is null and void as it has the effect of
amending the aforequoted provision of R.A. No. 1161 by expanding its coverage. This allegedly cannot be
done as only Congress may validly amend legislative enactments.

Respondent’s contention:

 Petitioner’s refusal to remit to the Social Security System contributions is a violation of the Social Security
Law
 Memorandum of Agreement entered into by the DOLE and the SSS is valid

ISSUE:

Whether the Memorandum of Agreement entered into by the DOLE and the SSS is valid

RULING:
  Respondent appellate court correctly upheld the validity of the Memorandum of Agreement entered into
between the DOLE and the SSS.
 Section 8 (j) (5) simply defines the term "employment" and does not in any way relate to the scope of
coverage of the Social Security System. That coverage is, upon the other hand, set out in Section 9 of R.A.
No. 1161 as amended, which defines the scope of SSS coverage in the following terms:
o Sec. 9 Compulsory Coverage. — (a) Coverage in the SSS shall be compulsory upon all employees
not over sixty years of age and their employers. (b) Fillpinos recruited in the Philippines by foreign
employers for employment abroad may be covered by the SSS on a voluntary basis.
 Memorandum of Agreement is in line with paragraph 9 (b) of the Social Security statute
 foreign shipowners and manning agencies had generally expressed their conformity to the inclusion of
Filipino seafarers within the coverage of the Social Security Act even prior to the signing of the DOLE-SSS
Memorandum of Agreement

MACHUCA TILE CO., INC., petitioner, vs. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, respondent.

FACTS:

 The deceased, Eduardo Jungay, was a former employee of the petitioner and as such, qualified for compulsory
coverage in December 1961. He died on June 17, 1962, whereupon a claim for death benefits was filed with
the System by Prudencio Jungay, a brother of the deceased, as one of the legal heirs.
 it discovered that the deceased was reported by the petitioner for coverage in the System only on September
5, 1962, when the premiums on this account were remitted to the System

Respondent’s contention:

 Petitioner and System are legally liable for the payment of death benefits to the deceased employee's legal
heirs
 Petitioner’s 2 distinct obligations:
o making a timely remittance of premiums under Section 22 (a)
o making a timely report of its employees' names and other personal data, including the social security
number assigned to each employee, for coverage, under Section 24 (a).

Petitioner’s contention:

 since some months after the death on June 17, 1962 of its employee, Eduardo Jungay, it had submitted on
September 5, 1962 to the System its report on its Employees and remitted the corresponding premiums,
including the sum of P28.80 representing the deceased Jungay's premiums from December, 1961 to June,
1962, it would not be just for respondent-appellee to receive and keep the premiums paid for the deceased
Jungay and still hold petitioner liable for payment of the death benefits.
 since respondent was aware that Jungay's premiums were paid only after his death but did not return nor even
offer to return the same, respondent should be held in estoppel and liable for the payment of the death benefits.

RULING:

 Membership in the SSS is, therefore, in compliance with a lawful exercise of the police power of the State,
to which the principle of non-impairment of the obligation of contract is not a proper defense."

 For failure to make such report in fact excludes the employee from the System's coverage and the Act
therefore shifts to the erring employer the responsibility of paying the social security benefits "to which the
employee or his heirs would have been entitled had his name been reported on time by the employer to the
System." Where the employer has, however, timely and properly reported the employee's name for coverage
but has failed or refused to pay or remit the premiums, such failure or refusal, by express provision of the
 Act in Section 22 (b) "shall not prejudice the right of the covered employee to the benefits of the coverage."
The Act, in such cases as above stated, exacts the lesser liability of payment of the delinquent premiums with
a 3% monthly penalty.

ANTONIO TAN, DANILO DOMINGO and ROBERT LIM, vs. AMELITO BALLENA

Subject Matter: Good faith and absence of criminal intent for the non-remittance of respondent’s contributions

FACTS:

 Petitioners were officers of Footjoy Industrial Corporation (Footjoy), a domestic corporation engaged in the
business of manufacturing shoes and other kinds of footwear
 Respondent filed a Complaint-Affidavit against the petitioners and alleged that the company did not
regularly report the respondent employees for membership at the Social Security System (SSS) and
that it likewise failed to remit their SSS contributions and payment for their SSS loans, which were
already deducted from their wages.

Petitioner’s contention:

 blamed the economic distress that beset their company for their failure to timely pay and update the monthly
SSS contributions of the employees. They alleged that the company's dire situation became even more
aggravated when the buildings and equipment of Footjoy were destroyed by fire
 underlined their good faith and lack of criminal culpability when they acknowledged their fault and
demonstrated their willingness to pay their obligations by executing a memorandum of agreement with the
SSS on 10 April 2001
 DOJ is the highest agency and the ultimate authority to decide the existence or non-existence of probable
cause, and that the Court of Appeals does not have the authority to reverse such findings.

Respondent’s contention:

 these acts violated Sections 9, 10, 22 and 24, paragraph (b) of Republic Act No. 1161, as amended by
Republic Act No. 8282; as well as Section 28, paragraphs (e), (f), and (h) thereof, in relation to Article 315
of the Revised Penal Code
 The petitioners' claim of good faith and the absence of criminal intent should not have been considered, as
these were evidentiary in nature and should thus be more properly proved in a trial. Furthermore, the appellate
court declared that said defenses are unavailing in crimes punishable by a special law, which are characterized
as mala prohibita. In these crimes, it is enough that they were done freely and consciously and that the intent
to commit the same need not be proved.

RULING:

 Probable cause
o is defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable
mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty
of the crime for which he was prosecuted.
o It is a reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is, or may be, well-founded, such a state of
facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to
believe, or entertain an honest or strong suspicion, that a thing is so.
 As held by the Court of Appeals, the claims of good faith and absence of criminal intent for the petitioners'
acknowledged non-remittance of the respondents' contributions deserve scant consideration. The violations
charged in this case pertain to the SSS Law, which is a special law. As such, it belongs to a class of
offenses known as mala prohibita.
 The law has long divided crimes into acts wrong in themselves called acts mala in se; and acts which would
not be wrong but for the fact that positive law forbids them, called acts mala prohibita.
 o The rule on the subject is that in acts mala in se, the intent governs; but in acts mala prohibita,
the only inquiry is, has the law been violated? .When an act is illegal, the intent of the offender
is immaterial

MANUEL H. SANTIAGO, ET AL., petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SOCIAL SECURITY
SYSTEM, respondents.

 petitioners were employees of I-Feng Enamelling Company (Phil.) Inc. for several years, some from 1950
up to the time the company closed its business on May 1, 1965
 their employer failed to remit to the System not only the installment payments to their salary loans in the
amount of P7,940.13 but also the back premiums in the amount of P137,787.90 as of July 1966, excluding
of course the penalties therefor in the amount of P63,734.97 as of August 9,1966
 Petitioners sought to have the amounts credited in their favor but the Commission denied their petition

Petitioner’s contention:

 Petitioners argue that they are entitled to full credit for the unremitted premium contributions and salary
loan installment payments deducted from their wages because, by law, a contract of agency exists between
the SSS and the Employer in the collection of the salary loan installment payments, and therefore, as such
agent, payment to the Employer is payment to the principal, which is the System

ISSUE:

whether the premium contributions and payments of salary loans by petitioners, which were deducted and collected
from their salaries by their Employer, but not remitted to the System, should be credited in their favor by the System.

RULING:

 Clearly, if the employer neglects to pay the premium contributions, the System may proceed with the
collection in the same manner as the Bureau of Internal Revenue in case of unpaid taxes.
o Plainly, too, notwithstanding non-remittance by employers of the premium contributions, covered
employees are entitled to the benefits of the coverage, such as death sickness, retirement, and
permanent disability benefits.
o These benefits continue to be enjoyed by the employees by operation of law and not, as petitioners
allege, because the premium contributions and salary loan installment payments have already
became the money of the System upon payment by the employees to the employer.
o It should be remembered that funds contributed to the System by compulsion of law are funds
belonging to the members, which are merely held in trust by the government.
o The mentioned benefits, however, do not include the salary loan privileges that member-
employees apply for. The System may or may not grant those loans pursuant to its rules and
regulations.
o The salary loans are not covered by law but by contract between the System as lender, and the
private employee, as borrower.

ELENA P. DYCAICO, Petitioner, vs. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and SOCIAL SECURITY
COMMISSION

FACTS:

 Bonifacio S. Dycaico became a member of the SSS on January 24, 1980. In his self-employed data record,
he named the petitioner, Elena P. Dycaico, and their eight children as his beneficiaries.
 o lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage
 A few months prior to his death, however, Bonifacio married the petitioner
o married in 1997 or after his retirement date
 Shortly after Bonifacio’s death, the petitioner filed with the SSS an application for survivor’s pension.
o Denied: on the ground that under Section 12-B(d) of Republic Act (Rep. Act) No. 8282 or the Social
Security Law she could not be considered a primary beneficiary of Bonifacio as of the date of his
retirement
 petitioner filed with the SSC a petition alleging that the denial of her survivor’s pension was unjustified.
o She contended that Bonifacio designated her and their children as primary beneficiaries in his SSS
Form RS-1 and that it was not indicated therein that only legitimate family members could be made
beneficiaries.
o Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 does not, likewise, require that the primary beneficiaries be
legitimate relatives of the member to be entitled to the survivor’s pension.
 SSC
o Paragraph (e) of the same provision, defines "dependents" as the following:
 (1) the legal spouse entitled by law to receive support from the member;
 (2) the legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate child who is unmarried,
not gainfully employed and has not reached twenty-one (21) years of age, or if over twenty-
one (21) years of age, he is congenitally or while still a minor has been permanently
incapacitated and incapable of self-support, physically or mentally; and
 (3) the parent who is receiving regular support from the member.

o she was not the legal spouse of Bonifacio "as of the date of his retirement;" hence, she could not be
considered as his primary beneficiary under Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282.
 CA declared that since the petitioner was merely the common-law wife of Bonifacio at the time of his
retirement in 1989, his designation of the petitioner as one of his beneficiaries in the SSS Form RS-1 in 1980
is void

ISSUE:

whether or not the proviso "as of the date of his retirement" in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 violates the equal
protection and due process clauses of the Constitution.

RULING:

 Yes
 The Court holds that the proviso "as of the date of his retirement" in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282,
which qualifies the term "primary beneficiaries," is unconstitutional for it violates the due process and equal
protection clauses of the Constitution.

The proviso infringes the equal protection clause

 Classification of dependent spouses as primary beneficiaries into two groups:

(1) Those dependent spouses whose respective marriages to SSS members were contracted prior to the
latter’s retirement; and

(2) Those dependent spouses whose respective marriages to SSS members were contracted after the latter’s
retirement.

 classification in Rep. Act No. 8282 with respect to entitlement to benefits, to be valid and reasonable, must
satisfy the following requirements:
o (1) it must rest on substantial distinctions;
 o (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law;
o (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
o (4) it must apply equally to all members of the same class.

 This concern is concededly valid. However, classifying dependent spouses and determining their entitlement
to survivor’s pension based on whether the marriage was contracted before or after the retirement of the other
spouse, regardless of the duration of the said marriage, bears no relation to the achievement of the policy
objective of the law, i.e., "provide meaningful protection to members and their beneficiaries against the
hazard of disability, sickness, maternity, old age, death and other contingencies
resulting in loss of income or financial burden." The nexus of the classification to the policy objective is
vague and flimsy. Put differently, such classification of dependent spouses is not germane to the aforesaid
policy objective.

The proviso infringes the due process clause

 The proviso "as of the date of his retirement" in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 runs afoul of the due
process clause as it outrightly deprives the surviving spouses whose respective marriages to the retired SSS
members were contracted after the latter’s retirement of their survivor’s benefits. There is outright
confiscation of benefits due such surviving spouses without giving them an opportunity to be heard.
 Even as the proviso "as of the date of his retirement" in Section 12-B(d) is nullified, the enumeration of
primary beneficiaries for the purpose of entitlement to survivor’s pension is not substantially affected since
the following persons are considered as such under Section 8(k) of Rep. Act No. 8282:

(1) The dependent spouse until he or she remarries; and

(2) The dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate children.

 In relation thereto, Section 8(e) thereof qualifies the dependent spouse and dependent children as follows:

(1) The legal spouse entitled by law to receive support from the member;

(2) The legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate child who is unmarried, not
gainfully employed and has not reached twenty-one years (21) of age, or if over twenty-one (21)
years of age, he is congenitally or while still a minor has been permanently incapacitated and
incapable of self-support, physically or mentally.

ANICIA V. MERCED, CANDELARIO V. MERCED, CONCEPCION V. MERCED,

ATILANO V. MERCED, JR., and JOSEFINA V. MERCED, petitioners, vs. COLOMBINA VDA. DE
MERCED, BRICCIO MERCED, JR., and the SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, respondents.

FACTS:

 Briccio had designated as his beneficiaries his brothers and sisters, the petitioners herein
 Briccio contracted marriage with Columbina Merced, who bore him a child, Briccio Jr
 Briccio died on February 22, 1961.
 petitioners filed with the Commission their claim for the benefits accruing under Briccio's social security
insurance. However, on April 27, 1961, petitioners were advised by the System that their designation as
beneficiaries of Briccio was null and void and that a claim for the benefits had been filed by Colombina
 Petitioners maintain that the designation made in their favor, as beneficiaries of Briccio remained valid and
effective, despite his subsequent marriage and the birth of Junior, in view of his (Briccio's) failure to
 change said designation, and that the choice of beneficiaries expressly made by Briccio should be
respected.

RULING:

In pursuance of said reserved power, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 2658 (approved on June 18, 1960), which
was in force at the time of Briccio's death, amending Section 8 of Republic Act No. 1161 (as amended by Republic
Act No. 1792) pursuant to subdivision (k) of which the beneficiaries shall be "those designated as such by the covered
employee from among the following:

 (1) The legitimate spouse, the legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children and natural children by
legal fiction and the legitimate descendants; .
 (2) In default of such spouse and children, the legitimate parents of the covered employee;
 (3) In the absence of any. of the foregoing, any other person designated by him.

In other words, the right of choice of the insured is subject to the foregoing limitations, pursuant to which brothers
and sisters may not be designated as beneficiaries except in default, not only of surviving spouse and children, but,
also, of "legitimate parents of the covered employee."

It is, accordingly, clear that the Commission was fully justified in holding that the designation in favor of the brothers
and sisters of the decedent as his beneficiaries was null and void and that Colombina and Junior are, under the law,
the persons entitled to the corresponding benefits.