ISSUE: W/N either House of Congress has the power to punish a person not a

Arnault v Nazareno G.R. No. L-3820 Digest member for contempt

Arnault v Nazareno digest YES.

G.R. No. L-3820 July 18, 1950
Ozaeta, J.:
Topic: Legislative inquiry
Facts:
1. The controversy arose out of the Governments purchase of 2 estates. Petitioner was the
attorney in-fact of Ernest H. Burt in the negotiations for the purchase of the Buenavista and
Tambobong Estates by the Government of the Philippines. The purchase was effected and
the price paid for both estates was P5,000,000. The Senate adopted Resolution No. 8
creating a Special Committee to determine the validity of the purchase and whether the
price paid was fair and just. During the said Senate investigation, petitioner was asked to
whom a part of the purchase price, or P440,000, was delivered. Petitioner refused to
answer this question, hence the Committee cited him in contempt for contumacious acts
and ordered his commitment to the custody of the Sergeant at-arms of the Philippines
Senate and imprisoned in the new Bilibid Prison he reveals to the Senate or to the Special
Committee the name of the person who received the P440,000 and to answer questions
pertinent thereto.
2. It turned out that the Government did not have to pay a single centavo for the
Tambobong Estate as it was already practically owned by virtue of a deed of sale from the
Philippine Trust Company and by virtue of the recession of the contract through which
Ernest H. Burt had an interest in the estate. An intriguing question which the committee
sought to resolve was that involved in the apparent irregularity of the Government's paying
to Burt the total sum of P1,500,000 for his alleged interest of only P20,000 in the two
estates, which he seemed to have forfeited anyway long before October, 1949. The
committee sought to determine who were responsible for and who benefited from the
transaction at the expense of the Government.
Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of a legislative body
to make, the investigating committee has the power to require a witness to answer any
question pertinent to that inquiry, subject of course to his constitutional right against self-
incrimination. The inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative body to make, must
be material or necessary to the exercise of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such
as to legislate, or to expel a Member; and every question which the investigator is
empowered to coerce a witness to answer must be material or pertinent to the subject of
the inquiry or investigation. So a witness may not be coerced to answer a question that
obviously has no relation to the subject of the inquiry. Note that, the fact that the legislative
body has jurisdiction or the power to make the inquiry would not preclude judicial
intervention to correct a clear abuse of discretion in the exercise of that power.
It is not necessary for the legislative body to show that every question propounded to a
witness is material to any proposed or possible legislation; what is required is that is that it
be pertinent to the matter under inquiry.
As to the self-incrimination issue, as against witness's inconsistent and unjustified claim to
a constitutional right, is his clear duty as a citizen to give frank, sincere, and truthful
testimony before a competent authority. The state has the right to exact fulfillment of a
citizen's obligation, consistent of course with his right under the Constitution.
The resolution of commitment here in question was adopted by the Senate, which is a
continuing body and which does not cease exist upon the periodical dissolution of the
Congress or of the House of Representatives. There is no limit as to time to the Senate's
power to punish for contempt in cases where that power may constitutionally be exerted as
in the present case. That power subsists as long as the Senate, which is a continuing
body, persists in performing the particular legislative function involved.

3. Arnault testified that two checks payable to Burt aggregating P1,500,000 were delivered
to him; and that on the same occasion he draw on said account two checks; one for
P500,000, which he transferred to the account of the Associated Agencies, Inc., with PNB,
and another for P440,000 payable to cash, which he himself cashed.

4. Hence, this petition on following grounds:

a) Petitioner contends that the Senate has no power to punish him for contempt for refusing
to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000, because such
information is immaterial to, and will not serve, any intended or purported legislation and
his refusal to answer the question has not embarrassed, obstructed, or impeded the
legislative process.
b) Petitioner contended that the Senate lacks authority to commit him for contempt for a
term beyond its period of legislative session, which ended on May 18, 1950.
c) Also contended that he would incriminate himself if he should reveal the name of the
person
 Senate v Ermita
Senate v. Executive Secretary Digest
Senate of the Phils. v Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 169777 April 20, 2006
Facts:
1. Assailed in this petition was the constitutionality of Executive Order 464 issued by
the President. Petitioners contend that the President abused its power and prayed
that said law be declared null and void. EO 464 requires that heads of departments
obtain the consent of the President before they can validly appear before
investigations including the one conducted in the Senate. It also grants executive
privilege on all classified or confidential information between the President and the
public officers covered by the EO.
2. The Senate conducted an investigation and issued invitations to various officials of
the Executive department as resource speakers in a public hearing on the North Rail
project. Said public hearing was sparked by a privilege speech of Sen. Enrile urging
the Senate to investigate the alleged overpricing and other unlawful provisions of
the contract covering the said project. The Senate Committee on National Defense
and Security likewise issued invitations to officials of the AFP.
3. Executive Ermita sent a letter to the Senate requesting postponement of the
hearing. On the same day (Sept 28, 2005) the President issued EO 464.
Despite this development, the investigation pushed through, with only Col.
Balutan and Brig. Gen. Gudani among all the AFP officials invited attending.
Both were subsequently relieved for defying the President’s order.
4. Hence, three petitions (Bayan Muna, Sen. Chavez, Alt.. Law Group),
for certiorari and prohibition and TRO, were filed before the Supreme Court
challenging the constitutionality of E.O. 464.
ISSUE 1: Whether or not E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in
Congress
YES. EO 464 bars the appearance of executive officials before the Congress, hence it
deprives it of the information in possession of these officials.
1. The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Sec. 21 Article VI of the
Constitution. This power is incidental to the legislative function. The power of
inquiry – with process to enforce it -- is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the
legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the
absence of information respecting conditions which the legislation is intended to
affect or change; and when it does not possess the required information, recourse
must be had on others who possess it. This power is broad enough to cover officials
of the executive branch. The operation of the government is a proper subject for
investigation, as held in Arnault case.
2. Although the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to
the power of inquiry, which fall under the rubric of ‘executive privilege’. It is
defined by Schwartz as “the power of the government to withhold information from
the public, the courts and the Congress.” (e.g. state secret privilege, informer’s
privilege, generic privilege)
3. The power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under
Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of
separation of powers. While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the
legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to
comply with its demands for information. The oversight function of Congress may
be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in
pursuit of legislation. This is consistent with the intent discerned from the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
4. Congress undoubtedly, has a right to information from the executive branch
whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such
information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the
reason therefor and why it must be respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade
congressional requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to
do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said
provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is
frustrated. That is impermissible.
5. Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the public, is
recognized only in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive character.
While executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a claim thereof may be valid or
not depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is
made. Noticeably absent is any recognition that executive officials are exempt from
the duty to disclose information by the mere fact of being executive officials.
Indeed, the extraordinary character of the exemptions indicates that the
presumption inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure.
Sec. 21 (Inquiry in Aid of Legislation) vs Sec. 22 (Question Hour)
6. A distinction was made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question
hour. While attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was
compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. These are two distinct functions of the
legislature. Sec. 21 and 22 while closely related does not pertain to the same power
 of the Congress. One specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation with the aim of eliciting information that may be used in legislation while
the other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which
is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight function. Hence, the
oversight function of Congress may only be facilitated by compulsory process only
to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation.
7. When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for the department
heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege, and not by
the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive official may be
exempted from this power – the president on whom the executive power is vested,
hence beyond the reach of the Congress except by the power of impeachment.
Members of SC are likewise exempt from this power of inquiry. This is on the basis
of separation of powers and fiscal autonomy, as well as the constitutional
independence of the judiciary.
information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the
reason therefor and why it must be respected. The infirm provisions of E.O. 464,
however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests for
information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its
reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of
Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated. That is
impermissible. Resort to any means then by which officials of the executive branch
could refuse to divulge information cannot be presumed valid. Otherwise, we shall
not have merely nullified the power of our legislature to inquire into the operations
of government, but we shall have given up something of much greater value – our
right as a people to take part in government.

On the constitutionality of EO 464

8. Section 1, in view of its specific reference to Section 22 of Article VI of the

Constitution and the absence of any reference to inquiries in aid of legislation, must
be construed as limited in its application to appearances of department heads in
the question hour contemplated in the provision of said Section 22 of Article VI. The
reading is dictated by the basic rule of construction that issuances must be
interpreted, as much as possible, in a way that will render it constitutional. Section
1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in
aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of
the department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is
subsequently made, either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary.

9. Section 3 and Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 must be invalidated. Section 3 of E.O. 464,
therefore, cannot be dismissed outright as invalid by the mere fact that it sanctions
claims of executive privilege. This Court must look further and assess the claim of
privilege authorized by the Order to determine whether it is valid. The claim of
privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is thus invalid per se.
It is not asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of providing precise and certain
reasons for the claim, it merely invokes E.O. 464, coupled with an announcement
that the President has not given her consent. It is woefully insufficient for Congress
to determine whether the withholding of information is justified under the
circumstances of each case. It severely frustrates the power of inquiry of Congress.

10. The impairment of the right of the people to information as a consequence of E.O.
464 is, just as direct as its violation of the legislature’s power of inquiry.

11. Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch
whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such