Case Digests - Consti Law II

ALONZO 1. PBM Employees Org. vs. PBM Co., Inc.
, 51 SCRA 189 (1973)
Full Title of the Case: PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION, NICANOR
TOLENTINO, FLORENCIO, PADRIGANO RUFINO, ROXAS MARIANO DE LEON, ASENCION PACIENTE,
BONIFACIO VACUNA, BENJAMIN PAGCU and RODULFO MUNSOD, petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE
BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC. and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.
G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE: G.R. No. L-31195 / 51 SCRA 189 / June 5, 1973
Ponente: MAKASIAR, J.
Petition Filed:
FACTS: The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (hereinafter referred to as
PBMEO) is a legitimate labor union composed of the employees of the respondent Philippine Blooming
Mills Co., Inc., and petitioners Nicanor Tolentino, Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon,
Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are officers and members
of the petitioner Union.
Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass demonstration at Malacañang
on March 4, 1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police, to be participated in by the
workers in the first shift (from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M.) as well as those in the regular second and third shifts
(from 7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and from 8 A.M. to 5 P.M., respectively); and that they informed the respondent
Company of their proposed demonstration.
Petitioner’s Allegation: Herein petitioners claim that they did not violate the existing CBA because they
gave the respondent Company prior notice of the mass demonstration on March 4, 1969; that the said
mass demonstration was a valid exercise of their constitutional freedom of speech against the alleged
abuses of some Pasig policemen; and that their mass demonstration was not a declaration of strike
because it was not directed against the respondent firm.
Respondent’s Allegation: Because the petitioners and their members numbering about 400 proceeded
with the demonstration despite the pleas of the respondent Company that the first shift workers
should not be required to participate in the demonstration and that the workers in the second and
third shifts should be utilized for the demonstration from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. on March 4, 1969,
respondent Company prior notice of the mass demonstration on March 4, 1969, with the respondent
Court, a charge against petitioners and other employees who composed the first shift, charging them
with a "violation of Section 4(a)-6 in relation to Sections 13 and 14, as well as Section 15, all of Republic
Act No. 875, and of the CBA providing for 'No Strike and No Lockout.'
Court a Quo (RTC) Ruling: Found herein petitioner PBMEO guilty of bargaining in bad faith and herein
petitioners Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna,
Benjamin Pagcu, Nicanor Tolentino and Rodulfo Munsod as directly responsible for perpetrating the
said unfair labor practice and were, as a consequence, considered to have lost their status as
employees of the respondent Company.
ISSUE/S: Whether the respondents’ act of concluding that the petitioners acted in bad faith for
proceeding with the demonstration and expelling them from the company is unconstitutional.
HELD/RATIO - SC RULING (DOCTRINE/S): No. The pretension of their employer that it would suffer
loss or damage by reason of the absence of its employees is a plea for the preservation merely of their
property rights. Such apprehended loss or damage would not spell the difference between life and
death of the firm or its owners or its management.
While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over property rights
is recognized. Because these freedoms are “delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in
our society” and the “threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual
application of sanctions,” they “need breathing space to survive,” permitting government regulation
only “with narrow specificity.”
The primacy of human rights — freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress
of grievances — over property rights has to be sustained.
The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of liberty, equality and security "against the assaults
of opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of small encroachments, and the scorn
and derision of those who have no patience with general principles."
ALVARO 2. MMDA v Viron Transportation G.R. 170656 (2007)
Full Title of the Case: THE METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, et al . v . VIRON
TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., et al
G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE:530 SCRA 341 (2007)
Ponente:
FACTS:
To solve the worsening traffic congestions problem in Metro Manila the President issued
Executive Order (E.O.) 179, ―Providing for the Establishment of Greater Manila Mass
Transportation System. As determined in E.O. 179, the primary cause of traffic congestion in
Metro Manila has been the numerous buses plying the streets that impede the flow of vehicles
and commuters and the inefficient connectivity of the different transport modes. To decongest
traffic, petitioner Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) came up with a
recommendation, proposing the elimination of bus terminals located along major Metro Manila
thoroughfares, and the construction of mass transport terminal facilties to provide a more
convenient access to mass transport system to the commuting public. The project provided for
under this E.O. was called ―Greater Manila Transport System‖ (Project) wherein the MMDA was
designated as the implementing agency. Accordingly, the Metro Manila Council the governing
board of the MMDA issued a resolution, expressing full support of the project. The respondents,
which are engaged in the business of public transportation with a provincial bus operation, Viron
Transport Co., Inc. and Mencorp Transportation System, Inc., assailed the constitutionality of
E.O. 179 before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. They alleged that the E.O., insofar as it
permitted the closure of existing bus terminal, constituted a deprivation of property without due
process; that it contravened the Public Service Act which mandates public utilities to provide
and maintain their own terminals as a requisite for the privilege of operating as common carriers;
and that Republic Act 7924, which created MMDA, did not authorize the latter to order the closure
of bus terminals. The trial court declared the E.O. unconstitutional. The MMDA argued before the
Court that there was no justiciable controversy in the case for declaratory relief filed by the
respondents; that E.O. 179 was only an administrative directive to government agencies to
coordinate with the MMDA, and as such did not bind third persons; that the President has the
authority to implement the Project pursuant to E.O. 125; and that E.O. 179 was a valid exercise
of police power.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not E.O, 179 is constitutional.
HELD/RATIO - SC RULING (DOCTRINE/S):
By designating the MMDA as implementing agency of the “Greater Manila Transport System,”
the President clearly overstepped the limits of the authority conferred by law, rendering E.O. 179
ultra vires. Executive Order 125, invoked by the MMDA, was issued by former President Aquino
in her exercise of legislative powers. This executive order reorganized the Ministry (now
Department) of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), and defined its powers and
functions. It mandated the DOTC to be the primary policy, planning, programming, coordinating,
implementing, regulating and administrative entity to promote, develop and regulate networks
of transportation and communications. The grant of authority to the DOTC includes the power to
establish and administer comprehensive and integrated programs for transportation and
communications. Accordingly, it is the DOTC Secretary who is authorized to issue such orders,
rules, regulations and other issuances as may be necessary to ensure the effective
implementation of the law. The President may also exercise the same power and authority to
order the implementation of the mass transport system project, which admittedly is one for
transportation. Such authority springs from the President‘s power of control over all executive
departments as well as for the faithful execution of the laws under the Constitution. Thus, the
President, although authorized to establish or cause the implementation of the Project, must
exercise the authority through the instrumentality of the DOTC, which, by law, is the primary
implementing and administrative entity in the promotion, development and regulation of
networks of transportation. It is the DOTC, and not the MMDA, which is authorized to establish
and implement a project such as the mass transport system. By designating the MMDA as
implementing agency of the Project, the President clearly overstepped the limits of the authority
conferred by law, rendering E.O. 179 ultra vires. In the absence of a specific grant of authority to
it under R.A. 7924, MMDA cannot issue order for the closure of existing bus terminals Republic
Act (R.A.) 7924 authorizes the MMDA to perform planning, monitoring and coordinative
functions, and in the process exercises regulatory and supervisory authority over the delivery
of metro-wide services, including transport and traffic management. While traffic decongestion
has been recognized as a valid ground in the exercise of police power, MMDA is not granted
police power, let alone legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government
units, there is no provision in R.A. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or the Metro Manila Council to
enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the
inhabitants of Metro Manila. In light of the administrative nature of its powers and functions, the
MMDA is devoid of authority to implement the Greater Manila Transport System as envisioned
by E.O. 179; hence, it could not have been validly designated by the President to undertake the
project. It follows that the MMDA cannot validly order the elimination of respondents‘ terminals.
Even assuming arguendo that police power was delegated to the MMDA, its exercise of such
power does not satisfy the two sets of a valid police power measure: (1) the interest of the public
generally, as distinguished from that of a particular class, requires its exercise; and (2) the means
employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals. In various cases, the Court has recognized that traffic congestion
is a public, not merely a private concern. Indeed, the E.O. was issued due to the felt need to
address the worsening traffic congestion in Metro Manila which, the MMDA so determined, is
caused by the increasing volume of buses plying the major thoroughfares and the inefficient
connectivity of existing transport system. With the avowed objective of decongesting traffic in
Metro Manila the E.O. seeks to eliminate the bus terminals now located along major Metro Manila
thoroughfares and provide more convenient access to the mass transport system to the
commuting public through the provision of mass transport terminal facilities. Common carriers
with terminals along the major thoroughfares of Metro Manila would thus be compelled to close
down their existing bus terminals and use the MMDA-designated common parking areas. The
Court fails to see how the prohibition against respondents‘ terminals can be considered a
reasonable necessity to ease traffic congestion in the metropolis. On the contrary, the
elimination of respondents‘ bus terminals brings forth the distinct possibility and the equally
harrowing reality of traffic congestion in the common parking areas, a case of transference from
one site to another. Moreover, an order for the closure of bus terminals is not in line with the
provisions of the Public Service Act. The establishment, as well as the maintenance of vehicle
parking areas or passenger terminals, is generally considered a necessary service by provincial
bus operators, hence, the investments they have poured into the acquisition or lease of suitable
terminal sites.
BALISI 3. Gancayco vs City Gov't of QC and MMDA G.R. 177807 (2011)
Full Title of the Case:

G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE:
Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
Petitioner’s Allegation:
Respondent’s Allegation:
Court a Quo (RTC) Ruling:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
CANAS 4. Tano v. Socrates, G.R. 110249, August 27, 1997

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
CARADA 5. City of Manila v. Judge Laguio, G. R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
CONCEPCION 6. Fernando vs. St. Scholastica. G.R. 161107

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
DE GUZMAN 7. Southern Luzon Drug Corp. v DSWD, GR 199669, Apr 25, 2017
Full Title of the Case: SOUTHERN LUZON DRUG CORPORATION, Petitioner vs. THE DEPARTMENT OF
SOCIAL WELFARE AND DEVELOPMENT, THE NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR THE WELFARE OF DISABLED
PERSONS, THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, and THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE
G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE: G.R. No. 199669 / April 25, 2017
Ponente: REYES, J.
Petition Filed: PETITION FOR REVIEW OF CERTIORARI
FACTS:
The petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of: drugstore operation in the
Philippines while the respondents are government' agencies, office and bureau tasked to monitor
compliance with R.A. Nos. 9257 and 9442, promulgate implementing rules and regulations for their
effective implementation, as well as prosecute and revoke licenses of erring establishments.
Petitioners challenges the constitutionality and implementation of Section 4(a) of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 9257, otherwise known as the "Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003" and Section 32 of R.A. No.
9442, which amends the "Magna Carta for Disabled Persons," particularly the granting of 20% discount
on the purchase of medicines by senior citizens and persons with disability (PWD),: respectively, and
treating them as tax deduction.
Petitioner alleged that their company suffered business losses due to the implementation of the said
laws. The losses were backed up by financial statements.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Prohibition with Application for TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction
with the CA, seeking to declare as unconstitutional (a) Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 9257, and (b) Section 32
of R.A. No. 9442 and Section 5.1 of its IRR, insofar as these provisions only allow tax deduction on the
gross income based on the net cost of goods sold or services rendered as compensation to private
establishments for the 20% discount that they are required to grant to senior citizens and PWDs.
Further, the petitioner prayed that the respondents be permanently enjoined from implementing the
assailed provisions.
CA Ruling:
CA dismissed the petition, reiterating the ruling of the Court in Carlos Superdrug particularly that
Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 9257 was a valid exercise of police power.
ISSUE/S: WON Sec. 4(a) of RA No. 9257 and Sec. 32 of RA No. 9442 are constitutional and valid
exercise of police power.
YES. The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of eminent domain,
has general welfare for its object. Police power is not capable of an exact definition, but has been
purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and
provide enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances, thus
assuring the greatest benefits. Accordingly, it has been described as "the most essential, insistent and
the least limitable of powers, extending as it does to all the great public needs." It is "the power vested
in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and
reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the
constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the
subjects of the same.
For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature, property rights must
bow to the primacy of police power because proper rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield
to general welfare.
Verily, it is the bounden duty of the State to care for the elderly as they reach the point in their lives
when the vigor of their youth has diminished and resources have become scarce. Not much because
of choice, they become needing of support from the society for whom they presumably spent their
productive days and for whose betterment they' exhausted their energy, know-how and experience to
make our days better to live.
In the same way, providing aid for the disabled persons is an equally important State responsibility.
Thus, the State is obliged to give full support to the improvement of the total well-being of disabled
persons and their integration into the mainstream of society. 32This entails the creation of
opportunities for them and according them privileges if only to balance the playing field which had
been unduly tilted against them because of their limitations.
Section 4(a) of Republic Act No. 9257 and Section 32 of Republic Act No. 9442 are hereby declared
CONSTITUTIONAL.
DE JESUS 8. Social Justice Society v Atienza, Jr., 517 SCRA 657 (2007)
Full Title of the Case:SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), VLADIMIR ALARIQUE T. CABIGAO, and
BONIFACIO S. TUMBOKON, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., in his capacity as Mayor of the City of Manila, Respondent.
G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE: G.R. 156052
Ponente: Corona, J.
Petition Filed: Petition for Mandamus
FACTS: Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted pursuant to the police power delegated to local government
units, a principle described as the power inherent in a government to enact laws, within
constitutional limits, to promote the order, safety, health, morals and general welfare of the
society.Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein from industrial to commercial and
directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed under Section 1 to cease and desist from
operating their businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among the
businesses situated in the area are the so-called "Pandacan Terminals" of the oil companies Caltex
(Philippines), Inc., Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation.
However, on June 26, 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a
memorandum of understanding (MOU)6 with the oil companies in which they agreed that "the
scaling down of the Pandacan Terminals [was] the most viable and practicable option."
Petitioner’s Allegation: Petitioners filed this original action for mandamus on December 4, 2002
praying that Mayor Atienza be compelled to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the immediate
removal of the terminals of the oil companies
Respondent’s Allegation: Respondent’s defense is that Ordinance No. 8027 has been superseded by
the MOU and the resolutions.14 However, he also confusingly argues that the ordinance and MOU
are not inconsistent with each other and that the latter has not amended the former. He insists that
the ordinance remains valid and in full force and effect and that the MOU did not in any way prevent
him from enforcing and implementing it. He maintains that the MOU should be considered as a mere
guideline for its full implementation.
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:1. whether respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and
order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals, and
2. whether the June 26, 2002 MOU and the resolutions ratifying it can amend or repeal Ordinance
No. 8027.12
HELD/RATIO - SC RULING (DOCTRINE/S): Yes. The mayor has the mandatory legal duty to enforce
Ordinance No. 8027 because the Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as city
mayor, to “enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city.” One of these is
Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No.
8027 as long as it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. He has no
other choice. It is his ministerial duty to do so.
In Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr., it provides that officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground
of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. It might seriously hinder the transaction of
public business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of
statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been declared
unconstitutional.
DE VERA 9. Carlos Superdrug Corp. v DSWD, GR 16694, Jun 29, 2007

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:

DELOS REYES 10. Manila Memorial Park v DSWD, GR 175356, Dec. 3, 2013

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:

11. Drugstore Asso. of the Phil. v National Council on Disability Affairs, GR
DICANG 194561, Sep 14, 2016
Full Title of the Case: DRUGSTORES ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. AND NORTHERN LUZON
DRUG CORPORATION, Petitioners, v. NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY AFFAIRS; DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH; DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE; BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE; DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT; AND DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND DEVELOPMENT, Respondent.
G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE: GR 194561, Sep 14, 2016
Ponente: PERALTA, J
Petition Filed: Review on Certiorari with a Prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction which seeks to annul and set aside the Decision
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:

FLORES, GEM 12. Meralco v Sps. Ramos, GR 195145, Feb. 10, 2016

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:

13. Asso. of Medical Clinic for Overseas Workers, Inc. v GCC Approved
FLORES, HANNA Medical Center Asso., GR 207132, Dec 6, 2016

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:

GALVEZ 14. St. Luke’s Medical Center Employees Asso. v NLRC, 514 SCRA 677 (2007)

ST. LUKES MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEES ASSOC. vs. NLRC
G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE: 514 SCRA 677 (2007)
Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
In 1984, petitioner Maribel Santos was hired as X-Ray Technician in the Radiology department of
private respondent St. Luke’s Medical Center, Inc. (SLMC). Congress passed and enacted Republic Act
No. 7431 known as the “Radiologic Technology Act of 1992.” Said law requires that no person shall
practice or offer to practice as a radiology and/or x-ray technologist in the Philippines without having
obtained the proper certificate of registration from the Board of Radiologic Technology.
Pursuant to RA 7431 the assistant Executive Director-Ancillary Services and HR Director of SLMC issued
a final notice to all practitioners of Radiologic Technology to comply with the requirement otherwise,
the unlicensed employee will be transferred to an area which does not require a license to practice if
a slot is available.
The Director of the Institute of Radiology issued another memorandum to Maribel advising her that
only a license can assure her of her continued employment at the Institute of Radiology of SLMC and
that the latter is giving her the last chance to take and pass the forthcoming board examination
scheduled in June 1998; otherwise, SLMC shall be constrained to take action which may include her
separation from employment. On November 23, 1998, the Director of the Institute of Radiology issued
a notice to Maribel informing the latter that the management of SLMC has approved her retirement in
lieu of separation pay. SLMC issued a “Notice of Separation from the Company” to petitioner Maribel
effective December 30, 1998 in view of the latter’s refusal to accept private respondent SLMC’s offer
for early retirement.
Maribel files a complaint against private respondent illegal dismissal and non-payment of salaries,
allowances and other monetary benefits. She further contends that her failure to pass the board
licensure exam for exam for X-ray technicians did not constitute just cause for termination as it violated
her constitutional right to security of tenure. The appellate court finds this contention untenable,
hence this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the petitioner is legally dismissed pursuant to R.A. 7431 exercising police power
of the State?
HELD
Yes, the petitioner dismissal is valid due to her inability to secure a certificate of registration
from Board of Radiologic Technology.
While the right of workers to security of tenure is guaranteed by the Constitution, its exercise
may be reasonably regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health,
morals, peace, education, order, safety, and the general welfare of the people. Consequently,
persons who desire to engage in the learned professions requiring scientific or technical
knowledge may be required to take an examination as a prerequisite to engaging in their
chosen careers. The state is justified in prescribing the specific requirements for x-ray
technicians and/or any other professions connected with the health and safety of its citizens.
Respondent being engaged in the hospital and health care business, is a proper subject of the
cited law; thus, having in mind the legal requirements of these laws, the latter cannot close its
eyes and complainant private interest override public interest. The law is clear that the
Certificate of Registration cannot be substituted by any other requirement to allow a person to
practice as a Radiologic Technologist and/or X-ray Technologist.
LIBO-ON 15. Moday v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 368 (1997)

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
MENDZ 16. Sps. Yasay v CA, G.R. 156684

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
MERIDA 17. RP. v. PLDT, 26 SCRA 620 (1969)

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
MONTEADORA 18. NIA v Rural Bank, G.R. No. 185124

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
MURDOCK 19. Republic vs. Castelvi, 58 SCRA 336 (1974)
Full Title of the Case: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CARMEN M. VDA. DE CASTELLVI, ET AL.
G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE: G.R. No. L-20620 August 15, 1974
Ponente: ZALDIVAR, J.
Petition Filed: Complaint for eminent domain
FACTS: The Republic of the Philippines occupied the land of Carmen M. vda. de Castellvi, the judicial
administratrix of the estate of the late Alfonso de Castellvi, from 1 July 1947, by virtue of a contract
of lease,on a year to year basis (from July 1 of each year to June 30 of the succeeding year). Before
the expiration of the contract of lease on 30 June 1956, the Republic sought to renew the same but
Castellvi refused. When the AFP refused to vacate the leased premises after the termination of the
contract, Castellvi wrote to the Chief of Staff of the AFP on 11 July 1956, informing the latter that the
heirs of the property had decided not to continue leasing the property in question because they had
decided to subdivide the land for sale to the general public, demanding that the property be vacated
within 30 days from receipt of the letter, and that the premises be returned in substantially the same
condition as before occupancy.
Petitioner’s Allegation: The Chief of Staff refused, saying that it was difficult for the army to vacate
the premises in view of the permanent installations and other facilities worth almost P500,000.00
that were erected and already established on the property, and that, there being no other recourse,
the acquisition of the property by means of expropriation proceedings would be recommended to
the President.
While this ejectment case was pending, the Republic filed on 26 June 1959 complaints for eminent
domain against Castellvi, and Maria Nieves Toledo Gozun over 3 parcels of land situated in the barrio
of San Jose, Floridablanca, Pampanga. In its complaint, the Republic alleged, among other things, that
the fair market value of the above-mentioned lands, according to the Committee on Appraisal for the
Province of Pampanga, was not more than P2,000 per hectare, or a total market value of
P259,669.10; and prayed, that the provisional value of the lands be fixed at P259,669.10, that the
court authorizes the Republic to take immediate possession of the lands upon deposit of that amount
with the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga; that the court appoints 3 commissioners to ascertain and
report to the court the just compensation for the property sought to be expropriated, and that the
court issues thereafter a final order of condemnation. The Republic was placed in possession of the
lands on 10 August 1959.
Court a Quo (RTC) Ruling: November 21, 1959, the CFI of Pampanga, dismissed the case, upon
petition of the parties. After the parties filed their respective memoranda, the trial court, on 26 May
1961, rendered its decision, finding that the unanimous recommendation of the commissioners of
P10.00 per square meter forthe 3 lots subject of the action is fair and just; and required the Republic
to pay interests. On 21 June 1961 the Republic filed a motion for a new trial and/or reconsideration,
against which motion Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun filed their respective oppositions, and which the
trial court denied on 12 July 1961.
Appeal: On 11 January 1962 the Republic filed a "motion to strike out the order of 27 December 1961
and for reconsideration", and subsequently an amended record on appeal, against which motion
Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun filed their opposition.
On 26 July 1962 the trial court issued an order, stating that "in the interest of expediency, the questions
raised may be properly and finally determined by the Supreme Court," and at the same time it ordered
the Solicitor General to submit a record on appeal containing copies of orders and pleadings specified
therein. In an order dated November 19, 1962, the trial court approved the Republic's record on appeal
as amended. Castellvi did not insist on her appeal. Toledo-Gozun did not appeal.
ISSUE/S: WON the taking of Castellvi’s property occurred in 1947 or in 1959.
HELD/RATIO - SC RULING (DOCTRINE/S): A number of circumstances must be present in the "taking"

of property for purposes of eminent domain. First, the expropriator must enter a private property.
Second, the entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary period. Third, the
entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal authority. Fourth, the property
must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected. Fifth,
the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive
him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.
The "taking" of Castellvi's property for purposes of eminent domain cannot be considered to have
taken place in 1947 when the Republic commenced to occupy the property as lessee thereof. Two
essential elements in the "taking" of property under the power of eminent domain, namely: (1) that
the entrance and occupation by the condemnor must be for a permanent, or indefinite period, and (2)
that in devoting the property to public use the owner was ousted from the property and deprived of
its beneficial use, were not present when the Republic entered and occupied the Castellvi property in
1947.
The "taking' of the Castellvi property should not be reckoned as of the year 1947 when the Republic
first occupied the same pursuant to the contract of lease, and that the just compensation to be paid
for the Castellvi property should not be determined on the basis of the value of the property as of that
year.
Under Section 4 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the "just compensation" is to be determined as of the
date of the filing of the complaint.
This Court has ruled that when the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with the
commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of the
complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing
of the complaint. Herein, it is undisputed that the Republic was placed in possession of the Castellvi
property, by authority of the court, on 10 August 1959. The "taking" of the Castellvi property for the
purposes of determining the just compensation to be paid must, therefore, be reckoned as of 26 June
1959 when the complaint for eminent domain was filed.
SAY, ALEX 20. City Govt. of Quezon City vs. Ericta, 122 SCRA 759 (1983)

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
SECRETO 21. City of Manila v Laguio, GR 118127, Apr 12, 2005
Full Title of the Case: CITY OF MANILA, HON. ALFREDO S. LIM as the Mayor of the City of
Manila, HON. JOSELITO L. ATIENZA, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila and
Presiding Officer of the City Council of Manila, HON. ERNESTO A. NIEVA, HON. GONZALO
P. GONZALES, HON. AVELINO S. CAILIAN, HON. ROBERTO C. OCAMPO, HON. ALBERTO
DOMINGO, HON. HONORIO U. LOPEZ, HON. FRANCISCO G. VARONA, JR., HON.
ROMUALDO S. MARANAN, HON. NESTOR C. PONCE, JR., HON. HUMBERTO B. BASCO,
HON. FLAVIANO F. CONCEPCION, JR., HON. ROMEO G. RIVERA, HON. MANUEL M.
ZARCAL, HON. PEDRO S. DE JESUS, HON. BERNARDITO C. ANG, HON. MANUEL L. QUIN,
HON. JHOSEP Y. LOPEZ, HON. CHIKA G. GO, HON. VICTORIANO A. MELENDEZ, HON.
ERNESTO V.P. MACEDA, JR., HON. ROLANDO P. NIETO, HON. DANILO V. ROLEDA, HON.
GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR., HON. MA. PAZ E. HERRERA, HON. JOEY D. HIZON, HON.
FELIXBERTO D. ESPIRITU, HON. KARLO Q. BUTIONG, HON. ROGELIO P. DELA PAZ, HON.
BERNARDO D. RAGAZA, HON. MA. CORAZON R. CABALLES, HON. CASIMIRO C. SISON,
HON. BIENVINIDO M. ABANTE, JR., HON. MA. LOURDES M. ISIP, HON. ALEXANDER S.
RICAFORT, HON. ERNESTO F. RIVERA, HON. LEONARDO L. ANGAT, and HON. JOCELYN
B. DAWIS, in their capacity as councilors of the City of Manila, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR., as Presiding Judge, RTC, Manila and MALATE TOURIST
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondents.
G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE: G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005
Ponente: Tinga, J.
Petition Filed: Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
and/or Temporary Restraining Order
FACTS:
On 30 On 30 March 1993, then Mayor of the City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim, signed into law
Ordinance 7783 entitled “AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR
OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT,
ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA,
PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES”.
The Ordinance prohibited establishments such as bars, karaoke bars, motels and hotels from
operating in the Malate District, which at that time, was notoriously viewed as a red-light district
harboring thrill seekers. The Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) claims that the
ordinance is invalid for it included hotels and motels among its list of places offering amusement
or entertainment. MTDC claims that neither do they market nor do the use women astool for
entertainment.
MTDC further reiterates that under the Local Government Code, Local Government Units can
only regulate motels but cannot prohibit its operations.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the Ordinance promulgated by the City of Manila constitutional?

The modality employed by the City of Manila in promoting its advocacy of strengthening morality
constitutes unlawful taking and is thus unconstitutional.
The Ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive as it substantially divests the respondent of the
beneficial use of its property.An ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that it
cannot be used for any reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and must be recognized as a
taking of the property without just compensation.It is intrusive and violative of the private
property rights of individuals.
The Constitution expressly provides in Article III, Section 9, that "private property shall not be
taken for public use without just compensation." The provision is the most important protection
of property rights in the Constitution. This is a restriction on the general power of the government
to take property. The constitutional provision is about ensuring that the government does not
confiscate the property of some to give it to others. In part too, it is about loss spreading. If the
government takes away a person's property to benefit society, then society should pay. The
principal purpose of the guarantee is "to bar the Government from forcing some people alone to
bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.
All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property rights and impairs
personal privileges. It is constitutionally infirm. The Ordinance contravenes statutes; it is
discriminatory and unreasonable in its operation; it is not sufficiently detailed and explicit that
abuses may attend the enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be forgotten, the City Council
under the Code had no power to enact the Ordinance and is therefore ultravires, null and void.
Concededly, the challenged Ordinance was enacted with the best of motives and shares the concern
of the public for the cleansing of the Ermita-Malate area of its social sins. Police power legislation
of such character deserves the full endorsement of the judiciary we reiterate our support for it.
But in spite of its virtuous aims, the enactment of the Ordinance has no statutory or constitutional
authority to stand on. Local legislative bodies, in this case, the City Council, cannot prohibit the
operation of the enumerated establishments under Section 1 thereof or order their transfer or
conversion without infringing the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection
of laws not even under the guise of police power.
SERVANEZ 22. RP (Napocor) v Heirs of Borbon, CA, GR 165354, Jan 12, 2015
Full Title of the Case: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION,
Petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF SATURNINO Q. BORBON, AND COURT OF APPEALS,
G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE: G.R. No. 165354 January 12, 2015
Ponente: BERSAMIN, J.
Petition Filed: Expropriation
FACTS: In February 1993, NAPOCOR entered a property located in Barangay San Isidro, Batangas City in order to
construct and maintain transmission lines for the 230 KV Mahabang Parang-Pinamucan Power Transmission
Project. Respondents heirs of Saturnino Q. Borbon owned the property, with a total area of 14,257 square
meters, which was registered under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-9696 of the Registry of Deeds of Batangas.
On May 26, 1995, NAPOCOR filed a complaint for expropriation in the Regional Trial Court in Batangas City (RTC),
seeking the acquisition of an easement of right of way over a portion of the property involving an area of only
6,326 square meters.
Petitioner alleged that it had negotiated with the respondents for the acquisition of the easement but they had
failed to reach any agreement; and that, nonetheless, it was willing to deposit the amount of ₱9,790.00
representing the assessed value of the portion sought to be expropriated. It prayed for the issuance of a writ of
possession upon deposit to enable it to enter and take possession and control of the affected portion of the
property; to demolish all improvements existing thereon; and to commence construction of the transmission line
project. It likewise prayed for the appointment of three commissioners to determine the just compensation to
be paid.
In their answer with motion to dismiss, the respondents staunchly maintained that the entry by NAPOCOR was
done without their consent in the process, destroying some fruit trees without payment, and installing five
transmission line posts and five woodpoles for its project; that the area being expropriated only covered the
portion directly affected by the transmission lines; that the remaining portion of the property was also affected
because the transmission line passed through the center of the land, thereby dividing the land into three lots;
that the presence of the high tension transmission line had rendered the entire property inutile for any future
use and capabilities; that, nonetheless, they tendered no objection to NAPOCOR’s entry provided it would pay
just compensation not only for the portion sought to be expropriated but for the entire property whose potential
was greatly diminished, if not totally lost, due to the project; and that their property was classified as industrial
land.
RTC ordered NAPOCOR to pay the respondent for the 14,257 square meters parcel of land at the rate of
₱550.00/square meter.
CA Ruling: Affirmed the decision of the court a quo.
On January 3, 2014, NAPOCOR filed a Manifestation and Motion to Discontinue Expropriation Proceedings,
informing that the parties failed to reach an amicable agreement; that the property sought to be expropriated
was no longer necessary for public purpose because of the intervening retirement of the transmission lines
installed on the respondents’ property; that because the public purpose for which such property would be used
thereby ceased to exist, the proceedings for expropriation should no longer continue, and the State was now
duty-bound to return the property to its owners; and that the dismissal or discontinuance of the expropriation
proceedings was in accordance with Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the expropriation proceedings should be discontinued or dismissed pending appeal?
Ruling
Yes. Public use is the fundamental basis for the action for expropriation. However, the concept has expanded to
include utility, advantage or productivity for the benefit of the public. The expropriator should commit to use the
property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation filed, failing which, it should file another
petition for the new purpose. If not, it is then incumbent upon the expropriator to return the said property to its
private owner, if the latter desires to reacquire the same. Otherwise, the judgment of expropriation suffers an
intrinsic flaw, as it would lack one indispensable element for the proper exercise of the power of eminent domain,
namely, the particular public purpose for which the property will be devoted. Accordingly, the private property
owner would be denied due process of law, and the judgment would violate the property owner's right to justice,
fairness and equity.
In the present case the petitioner admits that the expropriation of the land in question is no longer necessary for
public use. Had that admission been made in the trial court the case should have been dismissed there. It now
appearing positively, by resolution of the plaintiff, that the expropriation is not necessary for public use, the
action should be dismissed even without a motion on the part of the plaintiff. The moment it appears in whatever
stage of the proceedings that the expropriation is not for a public use the complaint should be dismissed and all
the parties thereto should be relieved from further annoyance or litigation
SULIT 23. Napocor vs. Gutierrez, 193 SCRA 1 (1991)
Full Title of the Case: NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner,vs.SPS. MISERICORDIA

GUTIERREZ and RICARDO MALIT and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
respondents.
G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE: G.R. No. L-60077 / January 18, 1991
Ponente: BIDIN, J., SC THIRD DIVISION
Petition Filed: petition for review on certiorari filed by the National Power Corporation (NPC)
seeking the reversal or modification of the March 9, 1986 Decision of the Court of Appeals
FACTS:
Plaintiff National Power Corporation (Napocor), for the construction of its 230 KV Mexico-Limay
transmission lines, its lines have to pass the lands belonging to respondents Matias Cruz, heirs of
Natalie Paule and spouses Misericordia Gutierrez and Recardo Malit. Unsuccessful with its negotiations
for the acquisition of the right of way easements, Napocor was constrained to file eminent domain
proceedings. Trial courts ordered that the defendant spouses were authorized to withdraw the fixed
provisional value of their land in the sum of P973.00 deposited by the plaintiff to cover the provisional
value of the land to proceed their construction and for the purpose of determining the fair and just
compensation due the defendants, the court appointed three commissioners, comprised of one
representative of the plaintiff, one for the defendants and the other from the court, who then were
empowered to receive evidence, conduct ocular inspection of the premises, and thereafter, prepare
their appraisals as to the fair and just compensation to be paid to the owners of the lots.
Napocor filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the Court of Appeals committed gross error
by adjudging the petitioner liable for the payment of the full market value of the land traversed by its
transmission lines, and that it overlooks the undeniable fact that a simple right-of-way easemen
transmits no rights, except that of the easement
The lower court rendered judgement ordered Napocor to pay defendant spouses the sum of P10.00
per square meter as the fair and reasonable compensation for the right-of-way easement of the
affected area and P800.00 as attorney's fees'.
CA Ruling:
Finding no reversible error committed by the court a quo, the appealed judgment is hereby affirmed
with costs against the plaintiff-appellant
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not petitioner should be made to pay simple easement fee or full compensation for the
land traversed by its transmission lines.
In RP v. PLDT, the SC ruled that "Normally, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or
appropriation of the title to, and possession of, the expropriated property, but no cogent reason
appears why said power may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of the
condemned property, without loss of title or possession. It is unquestionable that real property may,
through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right of way." In this case, the easement is
definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain. Considering the nature and effect of the
installation of the transmission lines, the limitations imposed by the NPC against the use of the land
(that no plant higher than 3 meters is allowed below the lines) for an indefinite period deprives private
respondents of its ordinary use. For these reasons, the owner of the property expropriated is entitled
to a just compensation which should neither be more nor less, whenever it is possible to make the
assessment, than the money equivalent of said property. Just equivalent has always been understood
to be the just and complete equivalent of the loss which the owner of the thing expropriated has to
suffer by reason of the expropriation. The price or value of the land and its character at the time of
taking by the Govt. are the criteria for determining just compensation.
VARGAS 24. Napocor v. San Pedro, G.R. No. 170945, September 26, 2006

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
VICENTE 25. U.S. v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946)

G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE: 328 US 256, 27 May 1946
Ponente:Douglas, J.
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
Thomas Lee Causby owned a dwelling and a chicken farm near a municipal airport. The safe path of glide
to one of the runways of the airport passed directly over his property at 83 feet, which was 67 feet above
the house, 63 feet above the barn and 18 feet above the highest tree.
The Government leased the use of the airport for a term of one month commencing, with a provision for
renewal of six months after the end of the national emergency, whichever was earlier.
Various military aircraft of the United States used the airport. They frequently came so close to Causby’s
property that they barely missed the tops of trees, the noise was startling, and the glare from their landing
lights lighted the place up brightly at night. This destroyed the use of the property as a chicken farm and
caused loss of sleep, nervousness, and fright on the part of Causby.
Thus, Causby sued in the Court of Claims to recover for an alleged taking of their property and for damages
to their poultry business.
The Court of Claims found that the Government had taken an easement over Causby's property.
In defense, the US referenced the 1926 Air Commerce Act in which the US government claimed to 'possess'
all airspace.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the US can possess all airspace.
No. The United States Supreme Court rejected the government's claim to 'possess' the space down to
ground level. The Court held low altitude flights to be "a direct invasion of [the landowner's] domain", and
that a "servitude has been imposed upon the land" by the occupancy of the private space.
The Court also recognized that a claim of property ownership indefinitely upward "has no place in the
modern world." Thereby rejecting "ad coelum" or "for whoever owns the soil, it is theirs up to Heaven (and
down to Hell)."
The court held the public's right of flight does not extend downward to the earth's surface. Finding "if the
landowner is to have full enjoyment of the land, he must have exclusive control of the immediate reaches
of the enveloping atmosphere. Otherwise, buildings could not be erected, trees could not be planted, and
even fences could not be run" …“The fact that he does not occupy [space] in a physical sense -- by the
erection of buildings and the like – is not material. As we have said, the flight of airplanes, which skim the
surface but do not touch it, is as much an appropriation of the use of the land as a more conventional
entry upon it."
Here, the Court of Claims was tasked with defining the value of the "property interests" that had
been taken from Causby by flyovers. Because the lowest plane flew at 83 feet (25 m), and because flights
above 365 feet (111 m) were considered within the public easement declared by congress, the Court
needed to determine the value owed the Farmer for public use of his airspace between 83 and 365 feet (25
and 111 m). The Court did not need to compensate the farmer for use below 83 feet (25 m), because the
planes did not fly below that height. Compensation was owed based on the occupancy of the property
and not damage to chickens.
ALONZO 26. PPI v. Comelec, 244 SCRA 272 (1995)
Full Title of the Case: PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE, INC., for and in behalf of 139 members, represented
by its President, Amado P. Macasaet and its Executive Director Ermin F. Garcia, Jr., petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE: G.R. No. L-119694 / 244 SCRA 272 / May 22, 1995
Ponente: Feliciano, J.
Petition Filed: The Philippine Press Institute, Inc. ("PPI") is before this Court assailing the constitutional
validity of Resolution No. 2772 issued by respondent Commission on Elections ("Comelec") and its
corresponding Comelec directive dated 22 March 1995, through a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition. Petitioner PPI is a non-stock, non-profit organization of newspaper and magazine
publishers.
FACTS: COMELEC issued resolution 2772 directing newspapers to provide provide free print space of
not less than one half (1/2) page for use as “Comelec Space” which shall be allocated by the
Commission, free of charge, among all candidates within the area in which the newspaper, magazine
or periodical is circulated to enable the candidates to make known their qualifications, their stand on
public issues and their platforms and programs of government.
Petitioner’s Allegation: PPI asks us to declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void
on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government, and
any of its agencies, against the taking of private property for public use without just compensation.
Petitioner also contends that the 22 March 1995 letter directives of Comelec requiring publishers to
give free "Comelec Space" and at the same time process raw data to make it camera-ready, constitute
impositions of involuntary servitude, contrary to the provisions of Section 18 (2), Article III of the 1987
Constitution. Finally, PPI argues that Section 8 of Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is violative of the
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech, of the press and of expression.
Respondent’s Allegation: Comelec Resolution No. 2772 does not impose upon the publishers any
obligation to provide free print space in the newspapers as it does not provide any criminal or
administrative sanctions for non-compliance with that Resolution as it merely established guidelines
to be followed in connection with the procurement of "Comelec space," the procedure for and mode
of allocation of such space to candidates and the conditions or requirements for the candidate's
utilization of the "Comelec space" procured. At the same time, however, the Solicitor General argues
that even if the questioned Resolution and its implementing letter directives are viewed as mandatory,
the same would nevertheless be valid as an exercise of the police power of the State. The Solicitor
General also maintains that Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772 is a permissible exercise of the power of
supervision or regulation of the Comelec over the communication and information operations of print
media enterprises during the election period to safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and credible
election.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the resolution was a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain.
HELD/RATIO - SC RULING (DOCTRINE/S): No. To compel print media companies to donate "Comelec-
space" of the dimensions specified in Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 (not less than one-half page),
amounts to "taking" of private personal property for public use or purposes. Section 2 failed to specify
the intended frequency of such compulsory "donation:" only once during the period from 6 March
1995 (or 21 March 1995) until 12 May 1995? or everyday or once a week? or as often as Comelec may
direct during the same period? The extent of the taking or deprivation is not insubstantial; this is not a
case of a de minimis temporary limitation or restraint upon the use of private property. The monetary
value of the compulsory "donation," measured by the advertising rates ordinarily charged by
newspaper publishers whether in cities or in non-urban areas, may be very substantial indeed.
The taking of print space here sought to be effected may first be appraised under the rubric of
expropriation of private personal property for public use. The threshold requisites for a lawful taking
of private property for public use need to be examined here: one is the necessity for the taking; another
is the legal authority to effect the taking. The element of necessity for the taking has not been shown
by respondent Comelec. It has not been suggested that the members of PPI are unwilling to sell print
space at their normal rates to Comelec for election purposes. Indeed, the unwillingness or reluctance
of Comelec to buy print space lies at the heart of the problem. Similarly, it has not been suggested, let
alone demonstrated, that Comelec has been granted the power of eminent domain either by the
Constitution or by the legislative authority. A reasonable relationship between that power and the
enforcement and administration of election laws by Comelec must be shown; it is not casually to be
assumed.
The taking of private property for public use is, of course, authorized by the Constitution, but not
without payment of "just compensation" (Article III, Section 9). And apparently the necessity of paying
compensation for "Comelec space" is precisely what is sought to be avoided by respondent
Commission, whether Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is read as petitioner PPI reads it, as an assertion
of authority to require newspaper publishers to "donate" free print space for Comelec purposes, or as
an exhortation, or perhaps an appeal, to publishers to donate free print space, as Section 1 of
Resolution No. 2772-A attempts to suggest. There is nothing at all to prevent newspaper and magazine
publishers from voluntarily giving free print space to Comelec for the purposes contemplated in
Resolution No. 2772. Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 does not, however, provide a constitutional
basis for compelling publishers, against their will, in the kind of factual context here present, to provide
free print space for Comelec purposes. Section 2 does not constitute a valid exercise of the power of
eminent domain.
27. Republic v Sps. Llamas (Illegal Taking of Subdivision Roads), GR 194190,

Jan 25, 2017
Full Title of the Case: Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Department of Public
Works and Highways (DPWH) Vs. Sps. Francisco R. Llamas and Carmelita C. Llamas
G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE: G.R. No. 194190 (2017)
FACTS:
On April 23, 1990, the Department of Public Works and Highways initiated an action for
expropriation for the widening of Dr. A. Santos Ave, which also known as Sucat Road. This action
was brought against 26 defendants, none of whom are respondents in this case.
On November 2, 1993, the Commissioners appointed by the Regional Trial Court in the
expropriation case submitted a resolution recommending that just compensation for the
expropriated areas be set to P12, 000.00 per square meter.
Llamas spouses filed "Most Urgent and Respectful Motion for Leave to be Allowed Intervention
as Defendants-Intervenors-Oppositors" on January 27, 1994. They also filed their Answer-in-
Intervention on March 21, 1994. After which, on August 2, 1994, they filed a "Most Urgent Motion
for the Issuance of an Order Directing the Immediate Payment of 40% of Zonal Value of
Expropriated Land and Improvements."
After years of not obtaining a favorable ruling, the Llamas Spouses filed a "Motion for Issuance
of an Order to Pay and/or Writ of Execution dated May 14, 2002. In this Motion, the Llamas
Spouses faulted the Department of Public Works and Highways for what was supposedly its
deliberate failure to comply with the Regional Trial Court's previous Orders and even with its
own undertaking to facilitate the payment of just compensation to the Llamas Spouses.
Department of Public Works and Highways and the Llamas Spouses had an understanding that
the resolution of the latter's claims required the submission of: (1) certified true copies of the
TCTs covering the lots; and (2) certified true copies of the tax declarations, tax clearances, and
tax receipts over the lots. But, due to their continued failure to comply with their undertaking,
the Department of Public Works and Highways did not pay them.
On October 8, 2007, the Regional Trial Court issued the Order directing the payment to the
Llamas Spouses of just compensation at P12,000.00 per square meter for 41 square meters for
the lot covered by TCT No. 217267. It denied payment for areas covered by TCT No. 179165 and
noted that these were subdivision road lots, which the Llamas Spouses "no longer owned" and
which "belonged to the community for whom they were made." In the Order dated May 19, 2008,
the Regional Trial Court denied the Llamas Spouses' Motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUE/S:
Whether just compensation must be paid to respondents Francisco and Carmelita Llamas for
the subdivision road lots covered by TCT No. 179165.
The Department of Public Works and Highways insists that the road lots are not compensable since
they have "already been withdrawn from the commerce of man." It relies chiefly on this Court's
1991 Decision in White Plains Association, Inc. v. Legaspi, which pertained to "the widening of the
Katipunan Road in the White Plains Subdivision in Quezon City.”More specifically, in the 1991
White Plains Decision that shows a compulsion for subdivision owners to set aside open spaces for
public use, such as roads, and for which they need not be compensated by Subdivision owners are
mandated to set aside such open spaces before their proposed subdivision plans may be approved
by the government authorities, and that such open spaces shall be devoted exclusively for the use
of the general public and the subdivision owner need not be compensated for the same. A
subdivision owner must comply with such requirement before the subdivision plan is approved and
the authority to sell is issued.
On the other hand, in its assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals set aside the Regional Trial Court's
Orders and required the Department of Public Works and Highways to similarly compensate the
Llamas Spouses for the two (2) road lots at P12, 000.00 per square meter.
The Court of Appeals correctly stated that a "positive act" must first be made by the "owner-
developer before the city or municipality can acquire dominion over the subdivision roads." As
there is no such thing as an automatic cession to government of subdivision road lots, an actual
transfer must first be effected by the subdivision owner: "subdivision streets belonged to the
owner until donated to the government or until expropriated upon payment of just
compensation." Stated otherwise, "the local government should first acquire them by donation,
purchase, or expropriation, if they are to be utilized as a public road."
Delineated roads and streets, whether part of a subdivision or segregated for public use, remain
private and will remain as such until conveyed to the government by donation or through
expropriation proceedings. An owner may not be forced to donate his or her property even if it has
been delineated as road lots because that would partake of an illegal taking. He or she may even
choose to retain said properties.
Respondents have not made any positive act enabling the City Government of Parañaque to
acquire dominion over the disputed road lots. Therefore, they retain their private character.
Accordingly, just compensation must be paid to respondents as the government takes the road lots
in the course of a road widening project.
28. Bartolata v Republic, GR 223334, Jun 7, 2017

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
29. Mosqueda, et al. v. Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters Association, Inc.,
et al. (G.R. No. 189185, August 16, 2016
Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
30. Heirs of Juancho Ardona vs. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220 (1983)

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
CASTILLO, DONALD 31. Manosca v. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 412 (1996)

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS: Petitioners inherited a piece of land located at P. Burgos Street, Calzada,

Taguig. Metro Manila, with an area of about four hundred ninety-two (492) square
meters. When the parcel was ascertained by the NHI to have been the birthsite of Felix
Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed Resolution No. 1, Series of 1986,
pursuant to Section 42 of Presidential Decree No. 260, declaring the land to be a national
historical landmark.
PETITIONER’S SIDE: Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the main thesis that
the intended expropriation was not for a public purpose and, incidentally, that the act
would constitute an application of public funds, directly or indirectly, for the use,
benefit, or support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity, contrary to the provision of
Section 29(2), Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution
RESPONDENT’S SIDE : Republic filed an urgent motion for the issuance of an order to
permit it to take immediate possession of the property.
ISSUE: whether or not the "public use" requirement of Eminent Domain is extant in the
attempted expropriation by the Republic of a 492-square-meter parcel of land so
declared by the National Historical Institute ("NHI") as a national historical landmark.
RULING: NO. Petitioners ask: But "(w)hat is the so-called unusual interest that the
expropriation of (Felix Manalo's) birthplace become so vital as to be a public use
appropriate for the exercise of the power of eminent domain" when only members of the
Iglesia ni Cristo would benefit? This attempt to give some religious perspective to the
case deserves little consideration, for what should be significant is the principal
objective of, not the casual consequences that might follow from, the exercise of the
power. The purpose in setting up the marker is essentially to recognize the distinctive
contribution of the late Felix Manalo to the culture of the Philippines, rather than to
commemorate his founding and leadership of the Iglesia ni Cristo.
The practical reality that greater benefit may be derived by members of the Iglesia ni
Cristo than by most others could well be true but such a peculiar advantage still remains
to be merely incidental and secondary in nature. Indeed, that only a few would actually
benefit from the expropriation of property does not necessarily diminish the essence
and character of public use.
32. Estate of Jimenez v. PEZA, G.R. No. 137285, January 16, 2001

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:

DE GUZMAN 33. NHA v. Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo, G.R. No. 154411, June 19, 2003
Full Title of the Case: NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, Petitioner vs. HEIRS OF ISIDRO GUIVELONDO,
Court of Appeals, HON. ISAIAS DICDICAN, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Cebu City,
and PASCUAL Y. ABORDO, Sheriff, Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Cebu City, Respondents
G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE: G.R. No. 154411 / June 19, 2003
Ponente: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Petition Filed: PETITION FOR REVIEW OF CERTIORARI
FACTS:
NHA called the alleged claimants of the land they intend to develop as a socialized housing project,
namely the Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo. The Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo (respondents) filed a
Manifestation stating that they were waiving their objections to petitioner’s power to expropriate their
properties. The plaintiff has a lawful right to expropriate the properties of the defendants who are
heirs of Isidro Guivelondo and the court appointed three Commissioners to ascertain the just
compensation.
Commisioners submitted their reports amounting to P11,200.00 per square meter. Both parties filed a
motion for reconsideration about the compensation but was denied by court.
Subsequently, a Motion of Execution was filed by the Respondent Heirs.
Petitioner filed with the RTC a Motion to Dismiss complaint for eminent domain, alleging that the
implementation of its socialized housing project was rendered impossible by the unconscionable value
of the land sought to be expropriated, which the intended beneficiaries can not afford.
Partial Judgment had already become final and executory and there was no just and equitable reason
to warrant the dismissal of the case. Furthermore, the funds and assets of the petitioner are exempt
from levy and garnishment.
RTC Ruling:
RTC granted the Motion of Execution by the Respondent Heirs.
RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss and MR of the Petitioner. Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari
with the CA, praying for the annulment of the Order of the RTC denying its Motion to Dismiss and its
MR.
CA Ruling:
CA summarily dismissed the petition. Immediately thereafter, Respondent Sheriff Abordo of RTC Cebu
served on petitioner a Notice of Levy pursuant to the Writ of Execution issued by the RTC.
On February 18, 2002, the CA set aside the dismissal of the petition and reinstated the same.
Thereafter, TRO was issued enjoining respondent sheriff to preserve the status quo.
On May 27, 2002, respondent sheriff served on the LBP a Notice of Third Garnishment against the
deposits, moneys and interests of petitioner therein. Subsequently, respondent sheriff levied on funds
and personal properties of petitioner.
On July 16, 2002, the CA rendered the assailed decision dismissing the petition for certiorari.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON the State can be compelled and coerced by the courts to exercise or continue with the
exercise of its inherent power of eminent domain;
2. WON judgment has become final and executory and if estoppel or laches applies to
government;
3. WON writs of execution and garnishment may be issued against the State in an expropriation
wherein the exercise of the power of eminent domain will not serve public use or purpose.
1. YES. The right of the plaintiff to dismiss an action with the consent of the court is universally
recognized with certain well-defined exceptions. If the plaintiff discovers that the action which
he commenced was brought for the purpose of enforcing a right or a benefit, the advisability
or necessity of which he later discovers no longer exists, or that the result of the action would
be different from what he had intended, then he should be permitted to withdraw his action,
subject to the approval of the court.
2. YES. Expropriation proceedings consists of two stages: first, condemnation of the property
after it is determined that its acquisition will be for a public purpose or public use and, second,
the determination of just compensation to be paid for the taking of private property to be
made by the court with the assistance of not more than three commissioners. Both of the
stages are final yet still appealable. An order of condemnation or dismissal is final, resolving
the question of whether or not the plaintiff has properly and legally exercised its power of
eminent domain. Once the first order becomes final and no appeal thereto is taken, the
authority to expropriate and its public use can no longer be questioned. In the case at bar,
petitioner did not appeal the Order of the trial court, which declared that it has a lawful right
to expropriate the properties of respondent Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo. Hence, the Order
became final and may no longer be subject to review or reversal in any court. A final and
executory decision or order can no longer be disturbed or reopened no matter how erroneous
it may be. Although judicial determinations are not infallible, judicial error should be corrected
through appeals, not through repeated suits on the same claim.
3. Yes. Court is satisfied that "socialized housing" falls with the confines of "public use". The public
purpose of the socialized housing project is not in any way diminished by the amount of just
compensation that the court has fixed. It was also stated that the funds of such government-
owned and controlled corporations and non-corporate agency, although considered public in
character, are not exempt from garnishment. This is so because when the Government enters
into commercial business, it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other
corporation.
The instant petition for review is DENIED. CA decision affirming the trial court’s Order denying
petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss the expropriation proceedings is AFFIRMED. Petitioner’s prayer for
injunctive relief against the levy and garnishment of its funds and personal properties is DENIED. The
TRO is LIFTED.
DE JESUS 34. NPC & Pobre v. CA. G.R. No. 106804, August 12, 2004
Full Title of the Case: NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ANTONINO POBRE, respondents.
Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS: Antonio Pobre owns a land which he developed into a resort subdivision, beneath which is
thermal mineral water and steam. For one year, Pobre leased to NPC eleven lots from the
approved subdivision plan. To own the land for industrial purposes, NPC filed an expropriation case
against Pobre, during the pendency of which the former dumped waste materials beyond the site
agreed upon by the parties. Then NPC filed its second expropriation case against Pobre to acquire
an additional area of the property.
Petitioner’s Allegation: NPC filed a motion to dismiss the second expropriation case on the ground
that NPC had found an alternative site and that NPC had already abandoned in 1981 the project
within the Property due to Pobre’s opposition.
Respondent’s Allegation: In his motion to dismiss the complaint, Pobre prayed for just
compensation of all the lots affected by NPC’s actions and for the payment of damages.
Court a Quo (RTC) Ruling:The trial court ruled that because of the pollution generated by NPC’s
geothermal plants NPC had rendered Pobre’s entire Property useless as a resort-subdivision. The
Property has become useful only to NPC. NPC must therefore take Pobre’s entire Property and pay
for it. But NPC insists that it has the right to move for the automatic dismissal of its complaint,
relying on Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Court (the Rules in effect at that time).
CA Ruling:ISSUE: Whether or not NPC has the right to automatically dismiss complaint for eminent
domain
ISSUE/S:Whether or not NPC has the right to automatically dismiss complaint for eminent domain
HELD/RATIO - SC RULING (DOCTRINE/S): In expropriation cases, there is no such thing as the

plaintiff’s matter of right to automatically dismiss the complaint precisely because the landowner
may have already suffered damages at the start of the taking. If the propriety of the taking of
private property through eminent domain is subject to judicial scrutiny, the dismissal of the
complaint must also pass judicial inquiry because private rights may have suffered in the
meantime. The dismissal, withdrawal or abandonment of the expropriation case cannot be made
arbitrarily. Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure no longer makes the dismissal of
the complaint automatic. The right of the plaintiff to dismiss his action before the defendant has
filed his answer or asked for summary judgment must be first confirmed by the court in an order
issued by it
35. Mactan Cebu Airport Authority v Lozada GR No. 176625

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
36. Republic v. Lim, G.R. 161656, June 29, 2005

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
CASTILLO, DONALD 37. Mactan-Cebu Int’l Airport Authority v CA, GR 139495, Nov 27, 2000

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS: adjoining the then Lahug Airport and covered by TCT No. 120366 of the Registry
of Deeds of Cebu City, in the name of MCIAA.
During the liberation, the Lahug Airport was occupied by the United States Army. Then,
in 1947, it was turned over to the Philippine Government through the Surplus Property
Commission. Subsequently, it was transferred to the Bureau of Aeronautics which was
succeeded by the National Airports Corporation. When the latter was dissolved, it was
replaced by the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA).
In June 1953, appellee Virginia Chiongbian purchased Lot 941 from its original owner,
Antonina Faborada, the original defendant in the expropriation case, for ₱8,000.00.
Subsequently, TCT No. 9919 was issued in her name (Exh. D).
Then, in 1990, Republic Act No. 6958 was passed by Congress creating the Mactan-Cebu
International Airport Authority to which the assets of the Lahug Airport was transferred.
Lot 941 was then transferred in the name of MCIAA under TCT No. 120366 on May 8,
1992.
Petitioner’s allegation: MCIAA contends that the Republic of the Philippines

appropriated Lot No. 941 through expropriation proceedings in Civil Case No. R-1881.
The judgment rendered therein was unconditional and did not contain a stipulation that
ownership thereof would revert to CHIONGBIAN nor did it give CHIONGBIAN the right
to repurchase the same in the event the lot was no longer used for the purpose it was
expropriated
Respondent’s allegation: Virginia Chiongbian filed a complaint for reconveyance of Lot

941 with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 9, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-
17650 alleging, that sometime in 1949, the National Airport Corporation (NAC) ventured
to expand the Cebu Lahug Airport. As a consequence, it sought to acquire by
expropriation or negotiated sale several parcels of lands adjoining the Lahug Airport,
one of which was Lot 941 owned by Virginia Chiongbian
RTC ruling: the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the respondent Virginia Chiongbian
(CHIONGBIAN) the dispositive portion of the decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor
of the plaintiff, Virginia Chiongbian and against the defendant, Mactan Cebu
International Authority (MCIAA), ordering the latter to restore to plaintiff the possession
and ownership of the property denominated as Lot No. 941 upon reimbursement of the
expropriation price paid to plaintiff.
CA ruling: Aggrieved by the holding of the trial court, the petitioner Mactan Cebu
International Airport Authority (MCIAA) appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals,
which affirmed the RTC decision.
ISSUE: Whether the abandonment of the public use for which Lot No. 941 was
expropriated entitles CHIONGBIAN to reacquire it.
HELD: NO.
RULING: : The answer to that question depends upon the character of the title acquired
by the expropriator, whether it be the State, a province, a municipality, or a corporation
which has the right to acquire property under the power of eminent domain. If, for
example, land is expropriated for a particular purpose, with the condition that when that
purpose is ended or abandoned the property shall return to its former owner, then, of
course, when the purpose is terminated or abandoned the former owner reacquires the
property so expropriated. If, for example, land is expropriated for a public street and the
expropriation is granted upon condition that the city can only use it for a public street,
then, of course, when the city abandons its use as a public street, it returns to the former
owner, unless there is some statutory provision to the contrary. Many other similar
examples might be given. If, upon the contrary, however, the decree of expropriation
gives to the entity a fee simple title, then, of course, the land becomes the absolute
property of the expropriator, whether it be the State, a province, or municipality, and in
that case the non-user does not have the effect of defeating the title acquired by the
expropriation proceedings.
When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple, unconditionally, either by the
exercise of eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no rights in the
land, and the public use may be abandoned, or the land may be devoted to a different
use, without any impairment of the estate or title acquired, or any reversion to the former
owner."12
There was no condition imposed to the effect that the lot would return to CHIONGBIAN
or that CHIONGBIAN had a right to repurchase the same if the purpose for which it was
expropriated is ended or abandoned or if the property was to be used other than as the
Lahug airport.
DICANG 38. Mun. of Meycayauan vs. IAC, 157 SCRA 640 (1988)
Full Title of the Case: MUNICIPALITY OF MEYCAUAYAN, BULACAN, HON. ADRIANO D. DAEZ,
MUNICIPAL MAYOR, MEYCAUAYAN, BULACAN, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and PHILIPPINE PIPES & MERCHANDIZING
CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE: SCRA 640 (1988)
Ponente: GUTIERREZ, JR., J

Petition Filed: Review on certiorari of the resolution dated April 24,1985
FACTS: In 1975, private respondent Philippine Pipes and Merchandising Corporation filed with the Office of the
Municipal Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan, an application for a permit to fence a parcel of land which will
enable the storage of the respondent’s heavy equipment and various finished products such as large diameter
steel pipes, pontoon pipes for ports, wharves, and harbors, bridge components, pre-stressed girders and piles,
large diameter concrete pipes, and parts for low cost housing. In the same year, the Municipal Council of
Meycauayan, headed by then Mayor Celso R. Legaspi, passed Resolution manifesting the intention to
expropriate the respondent’s parcel of land. On 1976, the Special Committee recommended that the Provincial
Board of Bulacan disapprove the resolution in question because there was no genuine necessity for the
Municipality to expropriate the respondent’s property for use as a public road. The respondent, then, reiterated to
the Office of the Mayor its petition for the approval of the permit to fence the aforesaid parcels of land. On 1983,
however, the Municipal Council of Meycauayan, now headed by Mayor Adriano D. Daez, passed Resolution for
the purpose of expropriating anew the respondent’s land. The Provincial Board of Bulacan approved the
aforesaid resolution and filed with the RTC a special civil action for expropriation. Upon deposit of the amount
of value of the land, the RTC issued a writ of possession in favor of the petitioner. In 1984, the RTC issued an
order the taking of the property and ascertain the just compensation for the property. The respondent went to the
IAC on petition for review. In 1985, the IAC affirmed the RTC’s decision. However, it was subsquently reversed
after the court found no genuine necessity to expropriate the land for use as a public road as there were several
other roads for the same purpose and another more appropriate lot for the proposed public road .
Petitioner’s Allegation: The Municipal Council of Meycauayan, headed by then Mayor Celso R. Legaspi,
passed Resolution manifesting the intention to expropriate the respondent’s parcel of land. After failing to
expropriate the said land, On 1983, the Municipal Council of Meycauayan, now headed by Mayor
Adriano D. Daez, passed another resolution for the purpose of expropriating anew the
respondent’s land for public use.
Respondent’s Allegation: On 1976, the Special Committee recommended that the Provincial
Board of Bulacan disapprove the the petition to expropriate the said land because there
was no genuine necessity for the Municipality to use the respondent’s property as a
public road. The respondent, then, reiterated to the Office of the Mayor its petition for the
approval of the permit to fence the aforesaid parcels of land.
Court a Quo (RTC) Ruling: Upon deposit of the amount of value of the land, the RTC issued a
writ of possession in favor of the petitioner. In 1984, the RTC issued an order the taking
of the property and ascertain the just compensation for the property
CA Ruling: Dismissed the special civil action for expropriation filed by the petitioner.
ISSUE/S: Whether the expropriation of the Respondents Lot is of Public Necessity?
HELD/RATIO - SC RULING (DOCTRINE/S): No, the Court held that the foundation of the right to exercise the
power of eminent domain is genuine necessity and that necessity must be of a public character. Condemnation of
private property is justified only if it is for the public good and there is a genuine necessity of a public character.
Consequently, the courts have the power to inquire into the legality of the exercise of the right of eminent
domain and to determine whether there is a genuine necessity therefor. here is no genuine necessity for the
Municipality of’ Meycauayan to expropriate the aforesaid property of the Philippine Pipes and Merchandising
Corporation for use as a public road. Considering that in the vicinity there are other available road and vacant lot
offered for sale situated similarly as the lot in question and lying Idle, unlike the lot sought to be expropriated
which was found by the Committee to be badly needed by the company as a site for its heavy equipment after it
is fenced together with the adjoining vacant lot, the justification to condemn the same does not appear to be very
imperative and necessary and would only cause unjustified damage to the firm. The desire of the Municipality of
Meycauayan to build a public road to decongest the volume of traffic can be fully and better attained by
acquiring the other available roads in the vicinity maybe at lesser costs without causing harm to an establishment
doing legitimate business therein.
39. De Knecht vs. Bautista, 100 SCRA 660 (1980)

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
40. Republic vs. De Knecht, G.R. 87351, February 12, 1990

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
GALVEZ 41. De la Paz Masikip v. Judge Legaspi, G.R. No. 136349, January 23, 2006

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS
Petitioner Lourdes Masikip is the registered owner of a parcel of land located at Pag-Asa,
Caniogan, Pasig City, Metro Manila. In 1994, respondent City of Pasig, notified Masikip of its
intention to expropriate a portion of her property to be used for the “sports development and
recreational activities” of the residents of Barangay Caniogan. This was pursuant to Ordinance
enacted by the then Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig. Masikip refused. Respondent wrote another
letter to petitioner, but this time the purpose was allegedly “in line with the program of the
Municipal Government to provide land opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our
community.”
Masikip replied that the intended expropriation of her property is unconstitutional, invalid, and
oppressive, as the area of her lot is neither sufficient nor suitable to “provide land opportunities
to deserving poor sectors of our community.” Respondent reiterated in a letter that the purpose
of the expropriation of petitioner’s property is “to provide sports and recreational facilities to its
poor residents.”
Subsequently, respondent filed with the trial court a complaint for expropriation and prayed that
the trial court, after due notice and hearing, issue an order for the condemnation of the property.
The petitioner filed a Motion to dismiss the complaint. The trial court dismissed the motion on
the ground that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate the property. The motion for
reconsideration of the petitioner was denied by the trial court which prompted petitioner to file
with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari who dismissed the petition for lack
of merit. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was also denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE
WON there was genuine necessity to expropriate the subject property.
RULING
No. The right to take private property for public purposes necessarily originates from “the
necessity” and the taking must be limited to such necessity. The Court held that the very
foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity and that necessity
must be of a public character. Moreover, the ascertainment of the necessity must precede or
accompany and not follow, the taking of the land. That “necessity within the rule that the
particular property to be expropriated must be necessary, does not mean an absolute but only
a reasonable or practical necessity, such as would combine the greatest benefit to the public
with the least inconvenience and expense to the condemning party and the property owner
consistent with such benefit.”
Respondent City of Pasig has failed to establish that there is a genuine necessity to
expropriate petitioner’s property. There is already an established sports development and
recreational activity center at Rainforest Park in Pasig City. Evidently, there is no “genuine
necessity” to justify the expropriation. The records show that the Certification issued by the
Caniogan Barangay Council which became the basis for the passage of Ordinance No. 4,
authorizing the expropriation, indicates that the intended beneficiary is the Melendres
Compound Homeowner’s Association, a private, non-profit organization, not the residents of
Caniogan.
42. JIL v Municipality of Pasig G.R. 152230, August 9, 2005
Full Title of the Case: 42. JIL vs CITY of PASIG (Genuine necessity)
G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE: 152230 / 09 Aug 2005
Ponente: Callejo, Sr., J.
Petition Filed: Petition for Review of Decision of the CA
FACTS: The Municipality of Pasig needed an access road from E. R. Santos Street, a municipal road
near the Pasig Public Market, to Barangay Sto. Tomas Bukid, Pasig, where 60 to 70 houses, mostly
made of light materials, were located. the Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig approved an Ordinance
authorizing the municipal mayor to initiate expropriation proceedings to acquire the said property
and appropriate the fund therefor. The ordinance stated that the property owners were noti􀁈ed of
the municipality's intent to purchase the property for public use as an access road but they rejected
the offer. On July 21, 1993, the municipality filed a complaint, amended on August 6, 1993, against
the Ching Cuancos for the expropriation of the property under Section 19 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7160
Petitioner’s Allegation: JILCSFI answered that the exercise of eminent domain was only for a
particular class and not for the benefit of the poor and landless. It alleged that the property is not
the best portion for the road. It also averred that it had been denied the use and enjoyment of its
property. Eduardo Villanueva, Chairman of the Board of Trustees and President of JILCSFI, testified
that the parcel of land was purchased for purposes of constructing a school building and a church as
worship center. He averred that the realization of these projects was delayed due to the passing of
the ordinance for expropriation. During trial, Rolando Togonon, the plaintiffs messenger, testified
that on February 23, 1993, he served a letter of Engr. Jose Reyes, the Technical Assistant to the Mayor
on Infrastructure, to Lorenzo Ching Cuanco. A lady received the same and brought it inside the store.
When she returned the letter to him, it already bore the signature of Luz Bernarte. He identified a
photocopy of the letter as similar to the one he served at the store. On cross-examination, he
admitted that he never met Luz Bernarte.
Respondent’s Allegation: The plaintiff alleged therein that it notified the defendants, by letter, of
its intention to construct an access road on a portion of the property but they refused to sell the
same portion. The plaintiff appended to the complaint a photocopy of the letter addressed to
defendant. On plaintiff's motion, the RTC issued a writ of possession over the property sought to
be expropriated. On November 26, 1993, the plaintiff caused the annotation of a notice of lis
pendens at the dorsal portion of TCT No. PT-92579 under the name of the Jesus Is Lord Christian
School Foundation, Incorporated (JILCSFI) which had purchased the property. Thereafter, the
plaintiff constructed therein a cemented road with a width of three meters; the road was called
Damayan Street.
Court a Quo (RTC) Ruling: the RTC issued an Order in favor of the plaintiff. The RTC held that, as
gleaned from the declaration in Ordinance No. 21, there was substantial compliance with the
definite and valid offer requirement of Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160, and that the expropriated
portion is the most convenient access to the interior of Sto. Tomas Bukid
CA Ruling: the CA affirmed the order of the RTC
ISSUE/S: whether the respondent complied with the requirement, under Section 19 of the Local
Government Code, of a valid and definite offer to acquire the property prior to the filing of the
complaint
HELD/RATIO - SC RULING (DOCTRINE/S): The petition is meritorious.
The grant of the power of eminent domain to local government units is grounded on
Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160. The Court declared that the following requisites for the valid
exercise of the power of eminent domain by a local government unit must be complied
with: 1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief
executive, in behalf of the local government unit, to exercise the power of eminent domain
or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property. 2. The power of
eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the
poor and the landless. 3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section
9, Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws. 4. A valid and definite offer has
been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said
offer was not accepted.
The expropriating authority is burdened to make known its definite and valid offer to all
the owners of the property. However, it has a right to rely on what appears in the
certificate of title covering the land to be expropriated. Hence, it is required to make its
offer only to the registered owners of the property. After all, it is well-settled that persons
dealing with property covered by a Torrens certificate of title are not required to go
beyond what appears on its face.
In the present case, the respondent failed to prove that before it filed its complaint, it
made a written definite and valid offer to acquire the property for public use as an access
road.
Public Necessity
We reject the contention of the petitioner that its property can no longer be expropriated
by the respondent because it is intended for the construction of a place for religious
worship and a school for its members. Nonetheless, the respondent failed to show the
necessity for constructing the road particularly in the petitioner's property and not
elsewhere. We note that the whereas clause of the ordinance states that the 51-square
meter lot is the shortest and most suitable access road to connect Sto. Tomas Bukid to E. R.
Santos Street. The respondent's complaint also alleged that the said portion of the
petitioner's lot has been surveyed as the best possible ingress and egress. However, the
respondent failed to adduce a preponderance of evidence to prove its claims
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of
the Court of Appeals are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The RTC is ordered to dismiss the
complaint of the respondent without prejudice to the refiling thereof
43. Filstream International v CA, 284 SCRA 716 (1998)

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
CASTILLO, MARIA 44. Heirs of Feliciano, Jr. v Land Bank, (DAR formula) GR 215290, Jan 11, 2017

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
45. Eslaban v. De Onorio, G.R. No. 146062, June 28, 2001

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
46. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Yatco Agricultural Enterprises, G.R. No.
172551, January 15, 2014
Full Title of the Case: NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. AURELLANO S. TIANGCO,
LOURDES S. TIANGCO and NESTOR S. TIANGCO, Respondents.
G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE: G.R. No. 172551, January 15, 2014
Ponente: GARCIA, J.
Petition Filed: petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
FACTS: Herein respondents are the owners of a parcel of land in Barangay Sampaloc, Tanay, Rizal and
registered in their names. petitioner NPC requires the respondents’ aforementioned property, across
which its 500Kv Kalayaan-San Jose Transmission Line Project will traverse. NPC’s Segregation Plan for
the purpose shows that the desired right-of-way will cut through the respondents’ land. After
repeated unsuccessful negotiations with the respondents, NPC filed with the RTC a complaint for
expropriation against them which the RTC issued Condemnation Order, granting NPC the right to take
possession of the area sought to be expropriated. Which RTC subsequently ordered directing NPC to
pay and deposit with the Rizal Provincial Treasurer an amount representing the temporary
provisional value of the area subject of the expropriation prior to the possession. The RTC rendered
judgment expropriating in favor of [NPC] a parcel of land covering a total area and ordered the
amount of P40,594.07 as just compensation for the 19,423 square meters of land affected by the
expropriations; and the amount of P324,750.00 as reasonable compensation for the improvements
on the land expropriated. The respondents moved for reconsideration, presenting for the first time a
document entitled “BIR Circular of Appraisal,” which shows that for the year 1985, 1992, 1994 that
the lands valued at ₱30.00, ₱80.00, ₱100.00 per square meter respectively. NPC and the respondents
went on appeal to the CA whereat the separate appeals who modified the decision of the RTC that
the compensation awarded for the 19,423 square meters of land affected is increased to
₱116,538.00, and the reasonable compensation for the improvements thereon is likewise increased
to P325,025.00.
Petitioner’s Allegation: Argued that the respondents should not profit from an assessment made
years after the taking.
Respondent’s Allegation: Expropriation would result in the substantial impairment of the use of the
area needed, even though what is sought is a mere aerial right-of-way.
Court a Quo (RTC) Ruling: 1. Expropriating in favor of [NPC] a parcel of land covering a total area of
19,423 sq.m. covered by TCT No. M-17860 owned by the [respondents];
2. Ordering the amount of P40,594.07 as just compensation for the 19,423 square meters of land
affected by the expropriations; and the amount of P324,750.00 as reasonable compensation for the
improvements on the land expropriated with legal interest from the time of possession by the plaintiff.
No pronouncement as to costs.
CA Ruling: The appellate court found merit in the respondents’ appeal, and disregarded the ₱2.09
per square meter valuation of the trial court, which was based on a 1984 tax declaration. Instead, the
CA placed reliance upon a 1993 tax declaration, "being only two years removed from the time of
taking.” The appellate court determined the time of taking to be in 1991. Thus, the greater value of
₱913,122.00 as declared in Tax Declaration No. 011-2667 dated July 23, 1993 should be the basis for
determining just compensation. With regard to the value of improvements, the appellate court found
NPC’s valuation more favorable, being based on the current (1991) schedule of values for trees in the
provinces of Rizal and Laguna.
ISSUE/S: Whether the Just Compensation Is it to be based on the 1984 or the 1993 valuation?
HELD/RATIO - SC RULING (DOCTRINE/S): Neither of the two determinations made by the the CA and
RTC is therefore correct. A new one must be arrived at, taking into consideration the foregoing
pronouncements.
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by
the expropriator. In this case, this simply means the property’s fair market value at the time of the
filing of the complaint, or “that sum of money which a person desirous but not compelled to buy, and
an owner willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received
therefor.” The measure is not the taker’s gain, but the owner’s loss.
In the determination of such value, the court is not limited to the assessed value of the property or to
the schedule of market values determined by the provincial or city appraisal committee; these values
consist but one factor in the judicial valuation of the property. The nature and character of the land
at the time of its taking is the principal criterion for determining how much just compensation should
be given to the landowner All the facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings, as
well as its improvements and capabilities, should be considered.
As correctly observed by the CA, considering the nature and the effect of the installation power lines,
the limitations on the use of the land for an indefinite period would deprive respondent of normal
use of the property. For this reason, the latter is entitled to payment of a just compensation, which
must be neither more nor less than the monetary equivalent of the land.
The evidence suggests that NPC’s transmission line project that traverses the respondents’ property
is perpetual, or at least indefinite, in nature. Moreover, not to be discounted is the fact that the high-
tension current to be conveyed through said transmission lines evidently poses a danger to life and
limb; injury, death or destruction to life and property within the vicinity.
47. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Yatco Agricultural Enterprises, G.R. No.
ONDEVILLA 172551, January 15, 2014
Full Title of the Case: LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, v. YATCO AGRICULTURAL ENTERPRISES
Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS: Respondent Yatco Agricultural Enterprises (Yatco) was the registered of owner of a 27-
hectare parcel of agricultural land (property) in Calamba, Laguna. On April 30, 1999, the
government placed the property under the coverage if its Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP).
Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) valued the property at P1,126,132.89. Yatco did not find the
valuation acceptable and thus elevated the matter to the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD), which then conducted summary administrative
proceedings for the determination of just compensation.
The PARAD valued the property at P16,543,800.00, using the property current market value. LBP
did not move to reconsider the PARAD ruling. Instead it filed with the RTC-SAC a petition for the
judicial determination of just compensation.
RTC-SAC fixed the just compensation for the property at P200 per square meter based on the RTC
branch 35 and 36. RTC-SAC did not give weight to the LBP evidence in justifying its valuation,
pointing out that the LBP failed to prove that it complied with the prescribed procedure and failed
to consider the valuation in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL).
The CA dismissed LBP appeal.
Petitioner’s Allegation: The LBP argues in the present petition that the CA erred when it affirmed the
RTC-SAC’s ruling that fixed the just compensation for the property based on the valuation set by
Branches and The LBP pointed out that the property in the present case was expropriated pursuant to its
agrarian reform program; in contrast, the land subject of the civil cases was expropriated by the National
Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) for industrial purposes.
The LBP added that in adopting the valuation fixed by Branches 35 and 36, the RTC-SAC completely
disregarded the factors enumerated in Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 and the guidelines and procedure laid
out in DAR AO 5-98.
Finally, the LBP maintains that it did not encroach on the RTC-SAC’s prerogative when it fixed the
valuation for the property as it only followed Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 and DAR AO 5-98, and merely
discharged its mandate under E.O. No. 405.
Respondent’s Allegation: Yatco argues that the RTC-SAC correctly fixed the just compensation for its
property at P200.00 per square meter. It points to several reasons for its position. First, the RTC-SAC’s
valuation was not only based on the valuation fixed by Branch 36 (as adopted by Branch 35); it was also
based on the property’s market value as stated in the current tax declaration that it presented in evidence
before the RTC-SAC. Second, the RTC-SAC considered the evidence of both parties; unfortunately for the
LBP, the RTC-SAC found its evidence wanting and in total disregard of the factors enumerated in Section
17 of R.A. No. 6657. And third, the RTC-SAC considered all of the factors enumerated in Section 17 when
it set the property’s value at P200.00 per square meter. Procedurally, Yatco claims that the present
petition’s issues and arguments are purely factual and they are not allowed in a petition for review on
certiorari and the LBP did not point to any specific error that the CA committed when it affirmed the RTC-
SAC’s decision.
Court a Quo (RTC) Ruling: The RTC-SAC fixed the just compensation for the property at P200.00 per
square meter. The RTC-SAC arrived at this valuation by adopting the valuation set by the RTC of Calamba
City,
Branch 35 (Branch 35) in Civil Case No. 2326-96-C, which, in turn, adopted the valuation that the RTC of
Calamba City, Branch 36 (Branch 36) arrived at in Civil Case No. 2259-95-C (collectively, civil cases). The
RTC-SAC did not give weight to the LBP’s evidence in justifying its valuation, pointing out that the LBP
failed to prove that it complied with the prescribed procedure and likewise failed to consider the valuation
factors provided in Section 17 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (CARL). The RTC-SAC
subsequently denied the LBP’s motion for reconsideration. The LBP appealed to the CA.
CA Ruling: The CA dismissed the LBP’s appeal. Significantly, it did not find the LBP’s assigned
errors–the RTC-SAC’s reliance on the valuation made by Branches 35 and 36 in the civil cases–to be
persuasive. First, according to the CA, the parcels of land in the civil cases were the very same
properties in the appealed agrarian case. Second, Branch 36’s valuation was based on the report of
the duly appointed commissioners and was arrived at after proper land inspection. As the
determination of just compensation is essentially a judicial function, the CA thus affirmed the RTC-
SAC’s valuation which was founded on factual and legal bases. The LBP filed the present petition
after the CA denied its motion for reconsideration in the CA’s May 3, 2006 resolution.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the RTC-SAC’s determination of just compensation for the property was proper.
HELD/RATIO - SC RULING (DOCTRINE/S): The RTC-SAC determination of just compensation for the
property was not proper.
"For purposes of determining just compensation, the fair market value of an expropriated property
is determined by its character and its price at the time of taking,"or the time when the landowner
was deprived of the use and benefit of his property. RTC is hereby directed to observe the
following guidelines in the remand of the case:
1. Just compensation must be valued at the time of taking
2. Courts should consider the factors in Section 17 of RA 6657, as amended, prior to its amendment
by RA 9700, as translated into the applicable DAR formula.
3. Interest may be awarded as may be warranted by the circumstances of the case and based on
prevailing jurisprudence.
RIVERA 48. Republic v Macabagdal, GR 227215, Jan 30, 2018
Full Title of the Case: Republic v Macabagdal,

G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE: GR 227215, Jan 30, 2018
Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS: Petitioner the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Department of Public
Works and Highways, filed before the RTC a complaint against an unknown owner for the
expropriation of a 200-square meter (sq. m.) lot located in Barangay Ugong, Valenzuela City for
the construction of the C-5 Northern Link Road Project, otherwise known as North Luzon
Expressway (NLEX). Petitioner thereafter applied for, and was granted a writ of possession
over the subject lot on May 5, 2008, and was required to deposit with the court the amount of
₱550,000.00 representing the zonal value thereof.
Respondent Leonor Macabagdal was substituted as party defendant upon sufficient showing
that the subject lot is registered in her name. Respondent did not oppose the expropriation,
and received the provisional deposit.
The RTC appointed a board of commissioners to determine the just compensation for the
subject lot, which thereafter submitted its Commissioners' Report dated May 23, 2014,
recommending a fair market value of ₱9,000.00/sq. m. as the just compensation for the subject
lot, taking into consideration its location, neighbourhood and land classification, utilities,
amenities, physical characteristics, occupancy and usage, highest and best usage, current
market value offerings, as well as previously decided expropriation cases of the same RTC
involving properties similarly situated in the same barangay.
Court a Quo (RTC) Ruling: The RTC found the recommendation of the commissioners to be
reasonable and just, and accordingly: (a) fixed the just compensation for the subject lot at
₱9,000.00/ sq. m.; (b) directed petitioner to pay the same, less the provisional deposit of
₱550,000.00; and (c) imposed legal interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) p.a. on the
unpaid balance, computed from the time of the taking of the subject lot until full payment.
Dissatisfied, petitioner appealed before the CA, questioning the just compensation of
₱9,000.00/sq. m. and the award of twelve percent (12%) interest rate p.a., instead of six percent
(6%) p.a. as provided under Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary Board (BSP-MB) Circular No.
799, Series of 2013.
CA Ruling
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the CA committed reversible error in affirming the RTC's imposition of
interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) p.a. on the unpaid balance, computed from the time
of the taking of the subject lot until full payment.
HELD/RATIO - SC RULING (DOCTRINE/S): PARTLY GRANTED
The Court recognizes that the owner's loss is not only his property, but also its income-
generating potential. Thus, when property is taken, full compensation of its value must be
immediately paid to achieve a fair exchange for the property and the potential income lost. The
value of the landholdings should be equivalent to the principal sum of the just compensation
due, and interest is due and should be paid to compensate for the unpaid balance of this
principal sum after taking has been completed. This shall comprise the real, substantial, full,
and ample value of the expropriated property, and constitutes due compliance with the
constitutional mandate of just compensation in eminent domain.
In this case, from the date of the taking of the subject lot on May 5, 2008 when the RTC issued a
writ of possession in favor of petitioner, until the just compensation therefore was finally fixed
at ₱9,000.00/sq. m., petitioner had only paid a provisional deposit in the amount of ₱550,000.00
(i.e., at ₱2,750.00/sq. m.). Thus, this left an unpaid balance of the "principal sum of the just
compensation," warranting the imposition of interest. It is settled that the delay in the payment
of just compensation amounts to an effective forbearance of money, entitling the landowner to
interest on the difference in the amount between the final amount as adjudged by the court and
the initial payment made by the government.
However, as aptly pointed out by petitioner, the twelve percent (12%) p.a. rate of legal interest
is only applicable until June 30, 2013. Thereafter, legal interest shall be at six percent (6%) p.a.
in line with BSP-MB Circular No. 799, Series of 2013, effective July 1, 2013.
Nonetheless, it bears to clarify that legal interest shall run not from the date of the filing of the
complaint but from the date of the issuance of the Writ of Possession on May 5, 2008, since it
is from this date that the fact of the deprivation of property can be established. As such, it is
only proper that accrual of legal interest should begin from this date. Accordingly, the Court
deems it proper to correct the award of legal interest to be imposed on the unpaid balance of
the just compensation for the subject lot, which shall be computed at the rate of twelve percent
(12%) p.a. from the date of the taking on May 5, 2008 until June 30, 2013. Thereafter, or
beginning July 1, 2013, until fully paid, the just compensation due respondent shall earn legal
interest at the rate of six percent (6%) p.a.
SABLAN 49. Napocor v Sps. Chiong, GR 152436, Jun 20, 2003

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
50. Ansaldo vs. Tantuico, G.R. 50147, August 3, 1990

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
51. NAPOCOR v. Tiangco, G.R. No. 170846, February 6, 2007

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
52. City of Cebu v. Spouses Dedamo, G.R. No. 142 971, May 07, 2002

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
RIVERA 53. Assoc. of Small Landowners v. DAR, 175 SCRA 343 (1988)
Full Title of the Case: Assoc. of Small Landowners v. DAR

G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE: 175 SCRA 343 (1988)
Ponente: J. Cruz
Petition Filed:
FACTS: One of the issues raised in this petition is the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6657. This
refers to Section 18 of the CARP Law providing in full as follows: SEC. 18. Valuation and Mode
of Compensation. — The LBP shall compensate the landowner in such amount as may be
agreed upon by the landowner and the DAR and the LBP, in accordance with the criteria
provided for in Sections 16 and 17, and other pertinent provisions hereof, or as may be finally
determined by the court, as the just compensation for the land. The compensation shall be paid
in one of the following modes, at the option of the landowner: (1) Cash payment, under the
following terms and conditions: XXX; (2) Shares of stock in government-owned or controlled
corporations, LBP preferred shares, physical assets or other qualified investments in
accordance with guidelines set by the PARC; (3) Tax credits which can be used against any tax
liability; (4) LBP bonds, which shall have the following features: XXX; The contention of the
petitioners is that the above provision is unconstitutional insofar as it requires the owners of
the expropriated properties to accept just compensation therefor in less than money, which is
the only medium of payment allowed. In support of this contention, they cite jurisprudence
holding that In the United States the weight of authority is also to the effect that just
compensation for property expropriated is payable only in money and not otherwise. Part cash
and deferred payments are not and cannot, in the nature of things, be regarded as a reliable
and constant standard of compensation.
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S: WON the content and manner of the just compensation provided for in Section 18 of
the CARP Law is violative of the Constitution.
HELD/RATIO - SC RULING (DOCTRINE/S): SUSTAINED against the constitutional objections
No. It cannot be denied that the traditional medium for the payment of just compensation is
money and no other. And so, conformably, has just compensation been paid in the past solely
in that medium. However, we do not deal here with the traditional excercise of the power of
eminent domain. This is not an ordinary expropriation where only a specific property of
relatively limited area is sought to be taken by the State from its owner for a specific and
perhaps local purpose. What we deal with here is a revolutionary kind of expropriation.
We assume that the framers of the Constitution were aware of this difficulty when they called
for agrarian reform as a top priority project of the government. It is a part of this assumption
that when they envisioned the expropriation that would be needed, they also intended that the
just compensation would have to be paid not in the orthodox way but a less conventional if
more practical method. The Court has not found in the records of the Constitutional
Commission any categorical agreement among the members regarding the meaning to be
given the concept of just compensation as applied to the comprehensive agrarian reform
program being contemplated. There was the suggestion to "fine tune" the requirement to suit
the demands of the project even as it was also felt that they should "leave it to Congress" to
determine how payment should be made to the landowner and reimbursement required from
the farmer-beneficiaries. Such innovations as "progressive compensation" and "State-
subsidized compensation" were also proposed. In the end, however, no special definition of
the just compensation for the lands to be expropriated was reached by the Commission.
On the other hand, there is nothing in the records either that militates against the assumptions
we are making of the general sentiments and intention of the members on the content and
manner of the payment to be made to the landowner in the light of the magnitude of the
expenditure and the limitations of the expropriator.
With these assumptions, the Court hereby declares that the content and manner of the just
compensation provided for in the afore- quoted Section 18 of the CARP Law is not violative of
the Constitution.
54. DAR v. CA, 249 SCRA 149 (1995)

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
SECRETO 55. Sec. of DPWH and Engr. Contreras v Sps Tecson, GR 179334, Apr 21, 2015
Full Title of the Case: SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND
HIGHWAYS and DISTRICT ENGINEER CELESTINO R. CONTRERAS, Petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES HERACLEO and RAMONA TECSON, Respondents.
G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE: G.R. No. 179334, April 21, 2015
Ponente: Peralta, J.
Petition Filed: Motion for Reconsideration
FACTS:
Respondent spouses Heracleo and Ramona Tecson are co-owners of a parcel of land with an area
of 7,268 square meters located in San Pablo, Malolos, Bulacan and covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. T-43006 of the Register of Deeds of Bulacan. Said parcel of land was among the
properties taken by the government sometime in 1940 without the owners’ consent and without
the necessary expropriation proceedings and used for the construction of the MacArthur
Highway.
In a letter dated December 15, 1994, respondents demanded the payment of the fair market value
of the subject parcel of land. Petitioner Celestino R. Contreras, then District Engineer of the First
Bulacan Engineering District of DPWH, offered to pay the subject land at the rate of P0.70 per
square meter per Resolution of the Provincial Appraisal Committee (PAC) of Bulacan. Unsatisfied
with the offer, respondents demanded for the return of their property or the payment of
compensation at the current fair market value.
As their demand remained unheeded, respondents filed a Complaint for recovery of possession
with damages against petitioners, praying that they be restored to the possession of the subject
parcel of land and that they be paid attorney’s fees.
Instead of filing their Answer, petitioners moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the following
grounds: (1) that the suit is against the State which may not be sued without its consent; (2) that
the case has already prescribed; (3) that respondents have no cause of action for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies; and (4) if respondents are entitled to compensation, they should be paid
only the value of the property in 1940 or 1941.
On June 28, 1995, the RTC issued an Order granting the motion to dismiss based on the doctrine
of state immunity from suit.
The CA reversed and set aside the dismissal of the complaint and consequently remanded the case
to the trial court for the purpose of determining the just compensation because the doctrine of
state immunity from suit is not applicable and the recovery of compensation is the only relief
available. To deny such relief would undeniably cause injustice to the landowner.
The trial proceeded in the RTC with the Branch Clerk of Court appointed as the Commissioner
and designated as the Chairman of the Committee that would determine just compensation.
Later the case was referred to the PAC for the submission of a recommendation report on the
value of the subject property. The PAC recommended the amount of P1,500.00 per square meter
as the just compensation for the subject property per PAC Resolution No. 99- 007 dated December
19, 2001.
On March 22, 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision directing DPWH to pay the amount of One
Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P1,500.00) per square meter for the subject lot in accordance with
PAC Resolution.
The CA affirmed the above decision with the modification that the just compensation stated above
should earn interest of six percent (6%) per annum computed from the filing of the action on
March 17, 1995 until full payment.
ISSUE/S:
When is the reckoning date for property valuation in determining the amount of just
compensation?
The Court ruled that the fair market value of the property at the time of taking is controlling for
purposes of computing just compensation. As in the aforementioned cases, just compensation due
respondents-movants in this case should, therefore, be fixed not as of the time of payment but at
the time of taking in 1940 which is Seventy Centavos (P0.70) per square meter, and not One
Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (₱1,500.00) per square meter, as valued by the RTC and CA.
While disparity in the above amounts is obvious and may appear inequitable to respondents-
movants as they would be receiving such outdated valuation after a very long period, it should be
noted that the purpose of just compensation is not to reward the owner for the property taken but
to compensate him for the loss thereof. As such, the true measure of the property, as upheld by a
plethora of cases, is the market value at the time of the taking, when the loss resulted.
Constitutionally, "just compensation" is the sum equivalent to the market value of the property,
broadly described as the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course
of legal action and competition, or the fair value of the property as between the one who receives
and the one who desires to sell, it being fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government.
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner
by the expropriator. It has been repeatedly stressed by the Court that the true measure is not the
taker's gain but the owner's loss. The word "just" is used to modify the meaning of the word
"compensation" to convey the idea that the equivalent to be given for the property to be taken
shall be real, substantial, full and ample.
Indeed, the State is not obliged to pay premium to the property owner for appropriating the
latter's property; it is only bound to make good the loss sustained by the landowner, with due
consideration of the circumstances availing at the time the property was taken. More, the concept
of just compensation does not imply fairness to the property owner alone. Compensation must also
be just to the public, which ultimately bears the cost of expropriation.
Servañez 56. Republic v Lim, GR 161656, Jun 29, 2005
Full Title of the Case: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, GENERAL ROMEO ZULUETA, COMMODORE
EDGARDO GALEOS, ANTONIO CABALUNA, DOROTEO MANTOS & FLORENCIO BELOTINDOS,
petitioners,vs. VICENTE G. LIM,
G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE: GR 161656, June 29, 2005
Ponente:SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Petition Filed: quieting of title
FACTS: In 1938, the Republic instituted a special civil action for expropriation of a land in Lahug, Cebu
City for the purpose of establishing a military reservation for the Philippine Army. The said lots were
registered in the name of Gervasia and Eulalia Denzon. The Republic deposited P9,500 in the PNB then
took possession of the lots. Thereafter, on May 1940, the CFI rendered its Decision ordering the
Republic to pay the Denzons the sum of P4,062.10 as just compensation. The Denzons appealed to the
CA but it was dismissed on March 11, 1948. An entry of judgment was made on April 5, 1948.
For failure of the Republic to pay for the lots, on September 20, 1961, the Denzons· successors-in-
interest,Valdehueza and Panerio, filed with the same CFI an action for recovery of possession with
damages against the Republic and AFP officers in possession of the property. The CFI promulgated its
Decision in favor of Valdehueza and Panerio, holding that they are the owners and have retained their
right as such over lots because of the Republic’s failure to pay the amount of P4,062.10, adjudged in
the expropriation proceedings. However, in view of the annotation on their land titles, they were
ordered to execute a deed of sale in favor of the Republic. They appealed the CFI’s decision to the SC.
The latter held that Valdehueza and Panerio are still the registered owners of Lots 932 and 939, there
having been no payment of just compensation by the Republic. SC still ruled that they are not entitled
to recover possession of the lots but may only demand the payment of their fair market value.
Meanwhile, in 1964, Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged Lot 932 to Vicente Lim, herein respondent,
as security for their loans. For their failure to pay Lim despite demand, he had the mortgage foreclosed
in 1976. The lot title was issued in his name.
On 1992, respondent Lim filed a complaint for quieting of title with the RTC against the petitioners
herein.
Petitioner:
The Republic alleged that they remain as the owner of Lot 932 as held by this Court in Valdehueza vs.
Republic.
Respondent’s argument: He contends that Valdehueza and Panerio are still the registered owners of
Lots 932 and 939, there having been no payment of just compensation by the Republic and
consequently, the ownership is transferred to him by virtue of the foreclosure.
The RTC ruled declaring plaintiff Vicente Lim the absolute and exclusive owner of Lot No. 932 with
all the rights of an absolute owner including the right to possession
CA Ruling: CA Affirmed the assailed decision.
Issue: Whether the Republic has retained ownership of Lot 932 despite its failure to pay respondent’s
predecessors-in-interest the just compensation therefor pursuant to the judgment of the CFI rendered
as early as May 14, 1940?
Ruling:
No. The prevailing doctrine is that "the non-payment of just compensation does not entitle the private
landowner to recover possession of the expropriated lots, however, in cases where the government
failed to pay just compensation within five (5) years from the finality of the judgment in the
expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned shall have the right to recover possession of their
property. After all, it is the duty of the government, whenever it takes property from private persons
against their will, to facilitate the payment of just compensation. In Cosculluela v. Court of Appeals, we
defined just compensation as not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the
property owner but also the payment of the property within a reasonable time. Without prompt
payment, compensation cannot be considered "just."
57. Napocor v Heirs of Sangkay, GR 165828, Aug 24, 2011
Full Title of the Case: NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. HEIRS OF MACABANGKIT
SANGKAY, NAMELY: CEBU, BATOWA-AN, ET AL., ALL SURNAMED MACABANGKIT, Respondents.
G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE: G.R. No. 165828 : August 24, 2011
Ponente: BERSAMIN, J.
Petition Filed: Petitioner National Power Corporation (NPC) seeks the review on certiorari of the
decision promulgated on October 5, 2004,whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision
dated August 13, 1999 and the supplemental decision dated August 18, 1999, ordering NPC to pay just
compensation to the respondents, both rendered by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, in Iligan City
(RTC).
FACTS:
Pursuant to its legal mandate under Republic Act No. 6395 (An Act Revising the Charter of the National
Power Corporation), NPC undertook the Agus River Hydroelectric Power Plant Project in the 1970s to
generate electricity for Mindanao. The project included the construction of several underground
tunnels to be used in diverting the water flow from the Agus River to the hydroelectric plants.
On November 21, 1997, the respondents as the owners of land with an area of 221,573 square meters
situated in Ditucalan, Iligan City, sued NPC in the RTC for the recovery of damages and of the property,
with the alternative prayer for the payment of just compensation. They alleged that they had belatedly
discovered that one of the underground tunnels of NPC that diverted the water flow of the Agus River
for the operation of the Hydroelectric Project in Agus V, Agus VI and Agus VII traversed their land; that
their discovery had occurred in 1995 after Atty. Saidali C. Gandamra, President of the Federation of
Arabic Madaris School, had rejected their offer to sell the land because of the danger the underground
tunnel might pose to the proposed Arabic Language Training Center and Muslims Skills Development
Center; that such rejection had been followed by the withdrawal by Global Asia Management and
Resource Corporation from developing the land into a housing project for the same reason; that Al-
Amanah Islamic Investment Bank of the Philippines had also refused to accept their land as collateral
because of the presence of the underground tunnel.
NPC countered that the Heirs of Macabangkit had no right to compensation under section 3(f) of
Republic Act No. 6395, under which a mere legal easement on their land was established; that their
cause of action, should they be entitled to compensation, already prescribed due to the tunnel
having been constructed in 1979; and that by reason of the tunnel being an apparent and continuous
easement, any action arising from such easement prescribed in five years.
Respondents sued NPC in the RTC for the recovery of damages and of the property, with the alternative
prayer for the payment of just compensation. The allegations are that 1) one of the underground
tunnels of NPC that diverted the water flow of the Agus River for the operation of the Hydroelectric
Project in Agus V, Agus VI and Agus VII traversed their land and 2) that the underground tunnel had
been constructed without their knowledge and consent; that the presence of the tunnel deprived them
of the agricultural, commercial, industrial and residential value of their land
The RTC ruled in favor of the plaintiffs (Heirs of Macabangkit). Earlier, on August 18, 1999, the Heirs
of Macabangkit filed an urgent motion for execution of judgment pending appeal. The RTC granted
the motion and issued a writ of execution.
CA Ruling:
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE/S:
W/N NPC is liable for payment of just compensation?
Yes. five-year prescriptive period under Section 3(i) of Republic Act No. 6395 does not apply to claims
for just compensation. The action to recover just compensation from the State or its expropriating
agency differs from the action for damages. The former, also known as inverse condemnation, has the
objective to recover the value of property taken in fact by the governmental defendant, even though
no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain has been attempted by the taking agency.Just
compensation is the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator.
The measure is not the takers gain, but the owner's loss. The word just is used to intensify the meaning
of the word compensation in order to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the
property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full, and ample. On the other hand, the latter action
seeks to vindicate a legal wrong through damages, which may be actual, moral, nominal, temperate,
liquidated, or exemplary. When a right is exercised in a manner not conformable with the norms
enshrined in Article 19 and like provisions on human relations in the Civil Code,and the exercise results
to the damage of another, a legal wrong is committed and the wrongdoer is held responsible.
The two actions are radically different in nature and purpose. The action to recover just compensation
is based on the Constitution while the action for damages is predicated on statutory enactments.
Indeed, the former arises from the exercise by the State of its power of eminent domain against private
property for public use, but the latter emanates from the transgression of a right. The fact that the
owner rather than the expropriator brings the former does not change the essential nature of the suit
as an inverse condemnation, for the suit is not based on tort, but on the constitutional prohibition
against the taking of property without just compensation. It would very well be contrary to the clear
language of the Constitution to bar the recovery of just compensation for private property taken for a
public use solely on the basis of statutory prescription.
Due to the need to construct the underground tunnel, NPC should have first moved to acquire the land
from the Heirs of Macabangkit either by voluntary tender to purchase or through formal expropriation
proceedings. In either case, NPC would have been liable to pay to the owners the fair market value of
the land, for Section 3(h) of Republic Act No. 6395 expressly requires NPC to pay the fair market value
of such property at the time of the taking, thusly:
(h)To acquire, promote, hold, transfer, sell, lease, rent, mortgage, encumber and otherwise dispose of
property incident to, or necessary, convenient or proper to carry out the purposes for which the
Corporation was created:Provided, That in case a right of way is necessary for its transmission lines,
easement of right of way shall only be sought:Provided, however,That in case the property itself shall
be acquired by purchase, the cost thereof shall be the fair market value at the time of the taking of
such property.
NPCs construction of the tunnel constituted taking of the land, and entitled owners to just
compensation.
58. Meralco v. Pineda, 206 SCRA 196 (1992)

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
VICENTE 59. NPC v. Henson, G.R. No. 129998, December 29, 1998
Full Title of the Case: NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.
LOURDES HENSON, married to Eugenio Galvez; JOSEFINA HENSON, married to Petronio Katigbak,
JESUSA HENSON; CORAZON HENSON, married to Jose Ricafort; ALFREDO TANCHIATCO;
BIENVENIDO DAVID; MARIA BONDOC CAPILI, married to Romeo Capili; and MIGUEL MANOLOTO,
respondents.
G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE: G.R. No. 129998, December 29, 1998
Ponente: PARDO, J.
Petition Filed:
FACTS: On March 21, 1990, the National Power Corporation (NPC) originally instituted with the
Regional Trial Court, Third Judicial District, Branch 46, San Fernando, Pampanga, a complaint1 for
eminent domain, later amended on October 11, 1990, for the taking for public use of five (5)
parcels of land, owned or claimed by respondents, with a total aggregate area of 58,311 square
meters, for the expansion of the NPC Mexico Sub-Station.
Respondents are the registered owners/claimants of the five (5) parcels of land sought to be
expropriated, situated in San Jose Matulid, Mexico, Pampanga,
Petitioner needed the entire area of the five (5) parcels of land, comprising an aggregate area of
58,311 square meters, for the expansion of its Mexico Subdivision.
On March 28, 1990, petitioner filed an urgent motion to fix the provisional value of the subject
parcels of land.
On April 20, 1990, respondents filed a motion to dismiss. They did not challenge petitioners right to
condemn their property, but declared that the fair market value of their property was from
P180.00 to P250.00 per square meter.
Court a Quo (RTC) Ruling: On July 10, 1990, the trial court denied respondents motion to dismiss.
The court did not declare that petitioner had a lawful right to take the property sought to be
expropriated.6 However, the court fixed the provisional value of the land at P100.00 per square
meter, for a total area of 63,2207 square meters of respondents property, to be deposited with the
Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga. Petitioner deposited the amount on August 29, 1990.
On September 5, 1990, the trial court issued a writ of possession in favor of petitioner, and, on
September 11, 1990, the courts deputy sheriff placed petitioner in possession of the subject land.
On November 22, 1990, and December 20, 1990, the trial court granted the motions of respondents
to withdraw the deposit made by petitioner of the provisional value of their property amounting to
P5,831,100.00, with a balance of P690,900.00, remaining with the Provincial Treasurer of
Pampanga.
On April 5, 1991, the trial court issued an order appointing three (3) commissioners to aid the court
in the reception of evidence to determine just compensation for the taking of the subject property.
After receiving the evidence and conducting an ocular inspection, the commissioners submitted to
the court their individual reports.
Commisioner Mariano C. Tiglao, in his report dated September 10, 1992, recommended that the
fair market value of the entire 63,220 square meters property be fixed at P350.00 per square
meter. Commissioner Arnold P. Atienza, in his report dated February 24, 1993, recommended that
the fair market value be fixed at P375.00 per square meter. Commissioner Victorino Orocio, in his
report dated April 28, 1993, recommended that the fair market value be fixed at P170.00 per
square meter.
However, the trial court did not conduct a hearing on any of the reports.
On May 19, 1993, the trial court rendered judgment fixing the amount of just compensation to be
paid by petitioner for the taking of the entire area of 63,220 square meters at P400.00 per square
meter, with legal interest thereon computed from September 11, 1990, when petitioner was
placed in possession of the land, plus attorneys fees of P20,000.00, and costs of the proceedings.
CA Ruling: On July 23, 1997, the Court of Appeals rendered decision affirming that of the Regional
Trial Court, except that the award of P20,000.00, as attorney's fees was deleted.
ISSUE/S: What is the just compensation for the taking of respondents property for the expansion of
the NPCs Mexico Sub-station, situated in San Jose Matulid, Mexico, Pampanga.
HELD/RATIO – SC RULING (DOCTRINE):

The parcels of land sought to be expropriated are undeniably idle, undeveloped, raw agricultural
land, bereft of any improvement. Except for the Henson family, all the other respondents were
admittedly farmer beneficiaries under operation land transfer of the Department of Agrarian
Reform. However, the land has been re-classified as residential. The nature and character of the
land at the time of its taking is the principal criterion to determine just compensation to the
landowner.
In this case, the trial court and the Court of Appeals fixed the value of the land at P400.00 per
square meter, which was the selling price of lots in the adjacent fully developed subdivision, the
Santo Domingo Village Subdivision. The land in question, however, was an undeveloped, idle land,
principally agricultural in character, though re-classified as residential. Unfortunately, the trial
court, after creating a board of commissioners to help it determine the market value of the land
did not conduct a hearing on the report of the commissioners. The trial court fixed the fair market
value of subject land in an amount equal to the value of lots in the adjacent fully developed
subdivision. This finds no support in the evidence. The valuation was even higher than the
recommendation of anyone of the commissioners.
On the other hand, Commissioner Atienza recommended a fair market value at P375.00 per square
meter. This appears to be the closest valuation to the market value of lots in the adjoining fully
developed subdivision. Considering that the subject parcels of land are undeveloped raw land, the
price of P375.00 per square meter would appear to the Court as the just compensation for the
taking of such raw land.
Consequently, we agree with Commissioner Atienzas report that the fair market value of subject
parcels of land be fixed at P375.00 per square meter.
ALONZO 60. Napocor v. Sps. De la Cruz, G.R. No. 156093, February 2, 2007
Full Title of the Case: NATIONAL POWER CORP., Petitioner, vs. SPOUSES NORBERTO AND JOSEFINA
DELA CRUZ, METROBANK, Dasmariñas, Cavite Branch, REYNALDO FERRER, and S.K. DYNAMICS
MANUFACTURER CORP., Respondents.
G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE: G.R. No. 156093 / February 2, 2007
Ponente: VELASCO, JR., J.
Petition Filed: Petitioner National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) seeks to annul and set aside the
November 18, 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 67446, which affirmed the
December 28, 1999 Order of the Imus, Cavite Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch XX in Civil Case No.
1816-98, which fixed the fair market value of the expropriated lots at PhP 10,000.00 per square meter.
FACTS: On November 27, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for eminent domain and expropriation of
an easement of right-of-way against respondents as registered owners of the parcels of land sought to
be expropriated.
After respondents filed their respective answers to petitioner’s Complaint, petitioner deposited PhP
5,788.50 to cover the provisional value of the land in accordance with Section 2, Rule 67 of the Rules
of Court. Then, on February 25, 1999, petitioner filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of a
Writ of Possession, which the trial court granted in its March 9, 1999 Order. The trial court issued a
Writ of Possession over the lots owned by respondents spouses de la Cruz and respondent Ferrer on
March 10, 1999 and April 12, 1999, respectively.
Later, the trial court terminated the pre-trial in so far as respondent Ferrer was concerned, considering
that the sole issue was the amount of just compensation, and issued an Order directing the constitution
of a Board of Commissioners with respect to the property of respondent S.K. Dynamics.
The commissioners conducted an ocular inspection of S.K. Dynamics’ property, and on October 8, 1999,
they submitted a report to the trial court. Based on the analysis of data gathered and making the proper
adjustments with respect to the location, area, shape, accessibility, and the highest and best use of the
subject properties, it is the opinion of the herein commissioners that the fair market value of the
subject real properties is P10,000.00 per square meter. The records show that the commissioners did
not afford the parties the opportunity to introduce evidence in their favor, nor did they conduct
hearings before them. In fact, the commissioners did not issue notices to the parties to attend hearings
nor provide the concerned parties the opportunity to argue their respective causes.
On December 1, 1999, respondent Ferrer filed a motion adopting in toto the commissioners’ report
with respect to the valuation of his property. On December 28, 1999, the trial court consequently
issued the Order approving the commissioners’ report, and granted respondent Ferrer’s motion to
adopt the subject report. Subsequently, the just compensation for the disparate properties to be
expropriated by petitioner for its project was uniformly pegged at PhP 10,000.00 per square meter.
Court a Quo (RTC) Ruling: The trial court fixed the just compensation to be paid by petitioner at PhP
10,000.00 per square meter.
CA Ruling: Affirmed RTC Ruling.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not petitioner was denied due process when it was not allowed to present
evidence on the reasonable value of the expropriated property before the Board of Commissioners.
Whether or not the valuation of just compensation was not based from the evidence on record and
other authentic documents.
HELD/RATIO - SC RULING (DOCTRINE/S): 1st Issue: It is undisputed that the commissioners failed to
afford the parties the opportunity to introduce evidence in their favor, conduct hearings before them,
issue notices to the parties to attend hearings, and provide the opportunity for the parties to argue
their respective causes. It is also undisputed that petitioner was not notified of the completion or filing
of the commissioners’ report, and that petitioner was also not given any opportunity to file its
objections to the said report.
The appointment of commissioners to ascertain just compensation for the property sought to be taken
is a mandatory requirement in expropriation cases. In the instant expropriation case, where the
principal issue is the determination of just compensation, a hearing before the commissioners is
indispensable to allow the parties to present evidence on the issue of just compensation. While it is
true that the findings of commissioners may be disregarded and the trial court may substitute its own
estimate of the value, the latter may only do so for valid reasons, that is, where the commissioners
have applied illegal principles to the evidence submitted to them, where they have disregarded a clear
preponderance of evidence, or where the amount allowed is either grossly inadequate or excessive.
Thus, "trial with the aid of the commissioners is a substantial right that may not be done away with
capriciously or for no reason at all."
In this case, the fact that no trial or hearing was conducted to afford the parties the opportunity to
present their own evidence should have impelled the trial court to disregard the commissioners’
findings. The absence of such trial or hearing constitutes reversible error on the part of the trial court
because the parties’ (in particular, petitioner’s) right to due process was violated.
2nd Issue: In this case, it is not disputed that the commissioners recommended that the just
compensation be pegged at PhP 10,000.00 per square meter. The commissioners arrived at the figure
in question after their ocular inspection of the property, wherein they considered the surrounding
structures, the property’s location and, allegedly, the prices of the other, contiguous real properties in
the area. Furthermore, based on the commissioners’ report, the recommended just compensation was
determined as of the time of the preparation of said report on October 5, 1999.
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property sought to be expropriated.
The measure is not the taker’s gain but the owner’s loss. The compensation, to be just, must be fair
not only to the owner but also to the taker. Even as undervaluation would deprive the owner of his
property without due process, so too would its overvaluation unduly favor him to the prejudice of the
public.
It is clear that in this case, the sole basis for the determination of just compensation was the
commissioners’ ocular inspection of the properties in question, as gleaned from the commissioners’
October 5, 1999 report. The trial court’s reliance on the said report is a serious error considering that
the recommended compensation was highly speculative and had no strong factual moorings. For one,
the report did not indicate the fair market value of the lots occupied by the Orchard Golf and Country
Club, Golden City Subdivision, Arcontica Sports Complex, and other business establishments cited.
Also, the report did not show how convenience facilities, public transportation, and the residential and
commercial zoning could have added value to the lots being expropriated.
61. Leca Realty v. Republic, G.R. No. 155605, September 27, 2006

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:

62. NPC v. Angas, 208 SCRA 196 (1992)

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:

63. Wycoco v. Judge Caspillo, G.R. No. 146733, January 13, 2004

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:

64. City of Manila v. Oscar Serrano, G.R. No. 142304, June 20, 2001

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:

CASTILLO,DONAL 65. Republic v. Gingoyon, G.R. No. 166429, December
D 19, 2005

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
TITLE
FACTS: NAIA 3, a project between the Government and the Philippine International Air
Terminals Co., Inc (PIATCO) was nullified.
The present controversy has its roots with the promulgation of the Court’s decision in
Agan v. PIATCO,promulgated in 2003 (2003 Decision). This decision nullified the
“Concession Agreement for the Build-Operate-and-Transfer Arrangement of the Ninoy
Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminal III” entered into between the Philippine
Government (Government) and the Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc.
(PIATCO), as well as the amendments and supplements thereto. The agreement had
authorized PIATCO to build a new international airport terminal (NAIA 3), as well as a
franchise to operate and maintain the said terminal during the concession period of 25
years. The contracts were nullified, among others, that Paircargo Consortium,
predecessor of PIATCO, did not possess the requisite financial capacity when it was
awarded the NAIA 3 contract and that the agreement was contrary to public policy. At
the time of the promulgation of the 2003 Decision, the NAIA 3 facilities had already been
built by PIATCO and were nearing completion. However, the ponencia was silent as to
the legal status of the NAIA 3 facilities following the nullification of the contracts, as well
as whatever rights of PIATCO for reimbursement for its expenses in the construction of
the facilities.
The Government and PIATCO conducted several rounds of negotiation regarding

the NAIA 3 facilities. It also appears that arbitral proceedings were commenced before
the International Chamber of Commerce International Court of Arbitration and the
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, although the
Government has raised jurisdictional questions before those two bodies. Then, on 21
December 2004, the Government11 filed a Complaint for expropriation with the Pasay
City Regional Trial Court (RTC), together with an Application for Special Raffle seeking
the immediate holding of a special raffle. The Government sought upon the filing of the
complaint the issuance of a writ of possession authorizing it to take immediate
possession and control over the NAIA 3 facilities. The Government also declared that it
had deposited the amount of P3,002,125,000.0012 (3 Billion) in Cash with the Land Bank
of the Philippines, representing the NAIA 3 terminal’s assessed value for taxation
purposes.
In the 4 January 2005 Order, now assailed in the present petition, the RTC noted
that its earlier issuance of its writ of possession was pursuant to Section 2, Rule 67 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. However, it was observed that Republic Act No. 8974
(Rep. Act No. 8974), otherwise known as “An Act to Facilitate the Acquisition of Right-
of-Way, Site or Location for National Government Infrastructure Projects and For Other
Purposes” and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules) had
amended Rule 67 in many respects.
PETITIONER’S SIDE: the Government, through expropriation filed a petition to be

entitled of a writ of possession contending that a mere deposit of the assessed value
of the property with an authorized government depository is enough for the entitlement
to said writ (Rule 67 of the Rules of Court).
RESPONDENT’S SIDE: Avers that before an entitlement of the writ of possession is

issued, direct payment of just compensation must be made to the builders of the
facilities, citing RA No. 8974 and a related jurisprudence (2004 Resolution).
RTC: Issued an Order directing the issuance of a writ of possession to the Government,
authorizing it to “take or enter upon the possession” of the NAIA 3 facilitie
CA:
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 8794 should be applied in the instant expropriation case and
not Rule 67
RULING: Yes. At the very least, Rule 67 cannot apply in this case without violating the
2004 Resolution. Even assuming that Rep. Act No. 8974 does not govern in this case, it
does not necessarily follow that Rule 67 should then apply. After all, adherence to the
letter of Section 2, Rule 67 would in turn violate the Court’s requirement in the 2004
Resolution that there must first be payment of just compensation to PIATCO before the
Government may take over the property.
It is the plain intent of Rep. Act No. 8974 to supersede the system of deposit under Rule
67 with the scheme of “immediate payment” in cases involving national government
infrastructure projects.
65. CIR vs. Algue, Inc., 158 SCRA 9 (1988)

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
66. Commissioner vs. Makasiar, 177 SCRA 27 (1989)

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
DE GUZMAN 67. City of Pasig & Crispina Salumbre v Meralco, GR 181710, Mar 7, 2018
Full Title of the Case: CITY OF PASIG AND CRISPINA V. SALUMBRE, IN HER CAPACITY AS OIC-CITY
TREASURER OF PASIG CITY, Petitioners, vs. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, Respondent.
G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE: G.R. No. 181710 / March 07, 2018
Ponente: MARTITES, J.
Petition Filed: Appeal for petition for review of certiorari
Under the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991, a municipality is bereft of authority to levy and impose
franchise tax on franchise holders within its territorial jurisdiction. That authority belongs to provinces
and cities only.1 A franchise tax levied by a municipality is, thus, null and void. The nullity is not cured
by the subsequent conversion of the municipality into a city. 
FACTS/Petitioner’s Allegation:
On 26 December 1992, the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Pasig enacted Ordinance No. 25
which, under its Article 3, Section 32, imposed a franchise tax on all business venture operations carried
out through a franchise within the municipality.
By virtue of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7829, which took effect on 25 January 1995, the Municipality of
Pasig was converted into a highly urbanized city to be known as the City of Pasig. 
On 24 August 2001, the Treasurer's Office of the City Government of Pasig informed the Manila Electric
Company (MERALCO), a grantee of a legislative franchise, that it is liable to pay taxes for the period
1996 to 1999, pursuant to Municipal Ordinance No. 25. The city, thereafter, on two separate occasions,
demanded payment of the said tax, exclusive of penalties. 
MERALCO protested the validity of the demand and subsequently instituted an action before the RTC
for the annulment of the said demand with prayer for a temporary restraining order and a writ of
preliminary injunction.
RTC Ruling:
RTC ruled in favor of the City of Pasig declaring as valid its demand for payment of franchise tax upon
[MERALCO] for the years 1996 to 1999.
CA Ruling:
CA reversed and set aside the decision appealed from. The demand for payment of franchise tax from
MERALCO as invalid for being devoid of legal basis.
ISSUE/s: WON the Municipality of Pasig can impose franchise taxes.
Unlike a city, a municipality is bereft of authority to levy franchise tax, thus, the ordinance enacted for
that purpose is void. The conversion of the municipality into a city does not lend validity to the void
ordinance. Neither does it authorize the collection of the tax under said ordinance.
The LGC further provides that the power to impose a tax, fee, or charge or to generate revenue shall
be exercised by the Sanggunian of the local government unit concerned through an appropriate
ordinance. This simply means that the local government unit cannot solely rely on the statutory
provision (LGC) granting specific taxing powers, such as the authority to levy franchise tax. The
enactment of an ordinance is indispensable for it is the legal basis of the imposition and collection of
taxes upon covered taxpayers. Without the ordinance, there is nothing to enforce by way of
assessment and collection.
  However, an ordinance must pass muster the test of constitutionality and the test of consistency
with the prevailing laws. Otherwise, it shall be void.
 It is not disputed that at the time the ordinance in question was enacted in 1992, the local government
of Pasig, then a municipality, had no authority to levy franchise tax. Article 5 of the Civil Code explicitly
provides, "acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except
when the law itself authorizes their validity." Section 32 of Municipal Ordinance No. 25 is, thus, void
for being in direct contravention with Section 142 of the LGC. Being void, it cannot be given any legal
effect. An assessment and collection pursuant to the said ordinance is, perforce, legally infirm.
  Consequently, the CA was correct when it declared that the demand of the City of Pasig upon
MERALCO for the payment of the disputed tax was devoid of legal basis. It bears emphasizing that the
DOJ and the RTC of Pasig City had previously declared Section 32 of Municipal Ordinance No. 25 as void
ab initio. Even the City of Pasig, it seems, does not contest the invalidity of said ordinance.
In fine, the City of Pasig cannot legally make a demand for the payment of taxes under the challenged
ordinance, which is void, even after its conversion into a city. The CA, thus, committed no reversible
error. 
Petition DENIED for lack of merit. CA decision AFFIRMED.
DE JESUS 68. YMCA vs. CIR, 33 Phil. 217 (1916)
Full Title of the Case:THE YOUNG MEN'S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION OF MANILA, plaintiff-
appellant,
vs.
THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE, defendant-appellee.
G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE: 33 Phil 217
Ponente: MORELAND, J.
Petition Filed:
FACTS:The Young Men’s Christian Association came to the Philippine with the army of
occupation in 1898. When the large body of troops in Manila was removed to permanent
quarters at Fort William McKinley in February, 1905, an independent association for Manila
was organized under the direction of the Army and navy departments. Shortly after the
organization of the association the directors made a formal request to the international
committee of the Young Men’s Christian Association in New York City for the assistance
and cooperation of its foreign department. A site for the new building was selected on
Calle Concepcion, Ermita, and the building contract was let on the 8th of January
following. The cornerstone was laid with appropriate ceremonies on July 10, 1908, and the
building was formally dedicated on October 20, 1909.
The purposes of the association, as set forth in its charter and constitution, are:
To develop the Christian character and usefulness of its members, to improve the
spiritual, intellectual, social and physical condition of young men, and to acquire, hold,
mortgage, and dispose of the necessary lands, buildings and personal property for the use
of said corporation exclusively for religious, charitable and educational purposes, and not
for investment or profit.
The purposes of this association shall be exclusively religious, charitable and educational,
in developing the Christian character and usefulness of its members and in improving the
spiritual, mental, social and physical condition of young men.

CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:Whether the building and grounds of the Young Men’s Christian Association of
Manila are subject to taxation Exemption?
HELD/RATIO - SC RULING (DOCTRINE/S): Yes, There is no doubt about the correctness of
the contention that an institution must devote itself exclusively to one or the other of the
purpose mentioned in the statute before it can be exempt from taxation; but the statute
does not say that it must be devoted exclusively to any one of the purposes therein
mentioned. It may be a combination of two or three or more of those purposes and still be
entitled to exempt. The Young Men’s Christian Association of Manila cannot be said to be
an institution used exclusively for religious purposes, or an institution used exclusively
for charitable purposes, or an institution devoted exclusively to educational purposes; but
we believe it can be truthfully said that it is an institution used exclusively for all three
purposes, and that, as such, it is entitled to be exempted from taxation.
MALIT 69. Province of Abra vs. Hernando, 107 SCRA 104 (1981)

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
70. Abra Valley College vs. Aquino, 162 SCRA 106 (1988)

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
LUCERO 71. CIR v DLSU, GR 196596, Nov 9, 2016
Full Title of the Case: CIR v DLSU
G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE: GR 196596, Nov 9, 2016

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS: In 2004, the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) issued a letter authorizing it’s revenue officers
to examine the book of accounts of and records for the year 2003 De La Salle University (DLSU) and
later on issued a demand letter to demand payment of tax deficiencies for Income tax on rental
earnings from restaurants/canteens and bookstores operating within the campus; Value-added tax
(VAT) on business income; and Documentary stamp tax (DST) on loans and lease contracts for the
years 2001,2002, and 2003, amounting to P17,303,001.12. DLSU protested the assessment that was
however not acted upon, and later on filed a petition for review with the Court of Tax Appeals(CTA).
Petitioner’s Allegation: CIR argued that the rental income is taxable regardless of how such income is
derived, used or disposed of. DLSU’s operations of canteens and bookstores within its campus even
though exclusively serving the university community do not negate income tax liability. Article XIV,
Section 4 (3) of the Constitution must be harmonized with Section 30 (H) of the Tax Code, which
states among others, that the income of whatever kind and character of [a non-stock and non-profit
educational institution] from any of [its] properties, real or personal, or from any of (its] activities
conducted for profit regardless of the disposition made of such income, shall be subject to tax
imposed by this Code. that a tax-exempt organization like DLSU is exempt only from property tax but
not from income tax on the rentals earned from property. Thus, DLSU’s income from the leases of its
real properties is not exempt from taxation even if the income would be used for educational
purposes.
Respondent’s Allegation: DLSU argued that Article XIV, Section 4 (3) of the Constitution is clear that
all assets and revenues of non-stock, non-profit educational institutions used actually, directly and
exclusively for educational purposes are exempt from taxes and duties. Under the doctrine of
constitutional supremacy, which renders any subsequent law that is contrary to the Constitution void
and without any force and effect. Section 30 (H) of the 1997 Tax Code insofar as it subjects to tax the
income of whatever kind and character of a non--stock and non-profit educational institution from
any of its properties, real or personal, or from any of its activities conducted for profit regardless of
the disposition made of such income, should be declared without force and effect in view of the
constitutionally granted tax exemption on “all revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit
educational institutions used actually, directly, and exclusively for educational purposes.“that it
complied with the requirements for the application of Article XIV, Section 4 (3) of the Constitution.
CA Ruling: CTA En Banc found that DLSU was able to prove that a portion of the assessed rental
income was used actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes; hence, exempt from tax.
The CTA En Banc was satisfied with DLSU's supporting evidence confirming that part of its rental
income had indeed been used to pay the loan it obtained to build the university's Physical Education -
Sports Complex. Parenthetically, DLSU's unsubstantiated claim for exemption, i.e., the part of its
income that was not shown by supporting documents to have been actually, directly and exclusively
used for educational purposes, must be subjected to income tax and VAT.
ISSUE/S: Whether DLSU's income and revenues proved to have been used actually, directly and
exclusively for educational purposes are exempt from duties and taxes
HELD/RATIO - SC RULING (DOCTRINE/S): YES. The income, revenues and assets of non-stock, non-
profit educational institutions proved to have been used actually, directly and exclusively for
educational purposes are exempt from duties and taxes.
A plain reading of the Constitution would show that Article XIV, Section 4 (3) does not require that the
revenues and income must have also been sourced from educational activities or activities related to
the purposes of an educational institution. The phrase all revenues is unqualified by any reference to
the source of revenues. Thus, so long as the revenues and income are used actually, directly and
exclusively for educational purposes, then said revenues and income shall be exempt from taxes and
duties.
Revenues consist of the amounts earned by a person or entity from the conduct of business operations.
It may refer to the sale of goods, rendition of services, or the return of an investment. Revenue is a
component of the tax base in income tax, VAT, and local business tax (LBT). Assets, on the other hand,
are the tangible and intangible properties owned by a person or entity. It may refer to real estate, cash
deposit in a bank, investment in the stocks of a corporation, inventory of goods, or any property from
which the person or entity may derive income or use to generate the same. In Philippine taxation, the
fair market value of real property is a component of the tax base in real property tax (RPT). Also, the
landed cost of imported goods is a component of the tax base in VAT on importation and tariff duties.
Thus, when a non-stock, non-profit educational institution proves that it uses its revenues actually,
directly, and exclusively for educational purposes, it shall be exempted from income tax, VAT, and LBT.
On the other hand, when it also shows that it uses its assets in the form of real property for educational
purposes, it shall be exempted from RPT.
The last paragraph of Section 30 of the Tax Code without force and effect for being contrary to the
Constitution insofar as it subjects to tax the income and revenues of non-stock, non-profit educational
institutions used actually, directly and exclusively for educational purpose. We make this declaration
in the exercise of and consistent with our duty to uphold the primacy of the Constitution.
72. Punzalan vs. Municipal Board of Manila, 95 Phil. 46 (1954)

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
73. City of Manila v Cosmos Bottling Company Corp. v GR 196681, Jun 27,
LUCERO 2018
Full Title of the Case: CITY OF MANILA V COSMOS BOTTLIN COMPANY CORP. V
G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE: GR 196681, JUN 27, 2018

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS: For the first quarter of 2007, the City of Manila assessed [Cosmos] local business taxes and
regulatory fees in the total amount of P1,226,781.05, as contained in the Statement of Account dated
January 15, 2007.
Petitioner’s Allegation: Cosmos also argued that the collection of local business tax under Section 21
of the RCM in addition to Section 14 of the same code constitutes double taxation.
Respondent’s Allegation: Petitioners argue that double taxation is wanting for the reason that the
tax imposed under Section 21 is imposed on a different object and of a different nature as that in
Section 14.
Court a Quo (RTC) Ruling: The RTC in its decision ruled in favor of [Cosmos]. WHEREFORE, premises
considered, judgment is hereby rendered enjoining the respondent Treasurer of the City of Manila to
refrain henceforth from imposing tax under Section 21 of the Revenue Code of Manila if it had
already imposed tax on manufacturers under Section 14 of the same Code.
CA Ruling: The CTA Division essentially ruled that the collection by the City Treasurer of Manila of
local business tax under both Section 21 and Section 14 of the Revenue Code of Manila constituted
double taxation.
ISSUE/S: Whether the collection of taxes under both Sections 14 and 21 of the Revenue Code of
Manila constitutes double taxation.
HELD/RATIO - SC RULING (DOCTRINE/S): YES. While the City of Manila could impose against Cosmos
a manufacturer's tax under Section 14 of Ordinance No. 7794, or the Revenue Code of Manila, it
cannot at the same time impose the tax under Section 21 of the same code; otherwise, an obnoxious
double taxation would set in. The petitioners erroneously argue that double taxation is wanting for
the reason that the tax imposed under Section 21 is imposed on a different object and of a different
nature as that in Section 14. The argument is not novel. In The City of Manila v. Coca-Cola Bottlers,
Inc. (2009), the Court explained – There is indeed double taxation if respondent is subjected to the
taxes under both Sections 14 and 21 of Tax Ordinance No. 7794, since these are being imposed: (1)
on the same subject matter — the privilege of doing business in the City of Manila; (2) for the same
purpose — to make persons conducting business within the City of Manila contribute to city
revenues; '(3) by the same taxing authority — petitioner City of Manila; (4) within the same taxing
jurisdiction — within the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Manila; (5) for the same taxing periods
per calendar year; and (6) of the same kind or character — a local business tax imposed on gross
sales or receipts of the business.
74. Physical Therapy Org. vs. Municipal Board, G.R. 10448, August 30, 1957

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
75. Corona v. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Phils., 283 SCRA 31,
LUCERO Dec. 12, 1997
Full Title of the Case: Corona v. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Phils.
G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE: 283 SCRA 31, Dec. 12, 1997
Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS: Administrative Order No. 04-92 (PPA-AO No. 04-92), PPA, pursuant to its power of control,
regulation, and supervision of pilots and the pilotage profession, the promulgated PPA-AO-03-852 on
March 21, 1985, which embodied the "Rules and Regulations Governing Pilotage Services, the
Conduct of Pilots and Pilotage Fees in Philippine Ports." These rules mandate, inter alia, that aspiring
pilots must be holders of pilot licenses3 and must train as probationary pilots in outports for three
months and in the Port of Manila for four months. It is only after they have achieved satisfactory
performance4 that they are given permanent and regular appointments by the PPA itself5to exercise
harbor pilotage until they reach the age of 70, unless sooner removed by reason of mental or
physical unfitness by the PPA General Manager.6
However, PPA General Manager Rogelio A. Dayan issued limiting the term of appointment of harbor
pilots to one year subject to yearly renewal or cancellatio. “All appointments to harbor pilot positions
in all pilotage districts shall, henceforth, be only for a term of one (1) year from date of effectivity
subject to yearly renewal or cancellation by the Authority after conduct of a rigid evaluation of
performance."
Respondents United Harbor Pilots Association and the Manila Pilots Association, through Capt.
Alberto C. Compas, questioned PPA-AO No. 04-92 that "the matter of reviewing, recalling or
annulling PPA's administrative issuances lies exclusively with its Board of Directors as its governing
body. Then PPA issued Memorandum Order No. 08-928 which laid down the criteria or factors to be
considered in the reappointment of harbor pilot, viz.: (1) Qualifying Factors:9 safety record and
physical/mental medical exam report and (2) Criteria for Evaluation: promptness in servicing vessels,
compliance with PPA Pilotage Guidelines, number of years as a harbor pilot, awards/commendations
as harbor pilot, and age.
Respondents reiterated their request for the suspension of the implementation of PPA-AO No. 04-92,
but Secretary Garcia insisted on his position that the matter was within the jurisdiction of the Board
of Directors of the PPA. Assistant Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs Renato C. Corona, dismissed
the appeal/petition and lifted the restraining order issued earlier.
Alleged unconstitutionality and illegality of PPA-AO No. 04-92 and its implementing memoranda and
circulars, Secretary Corona opined that: “The exercise of one's profession falls within the
constitutional guarantee against wrongful deprivation of, or interference with, property rights
without due process. In the limited context of this case. PPA-AO 04-92 does not constitute a wrongful
interference with, let alone a wrongful deprivation of, the property rights of those affected thereby.
As may be noted, the issuance aims no more than to improve pilotage services by limiting the
appointment to harbor pilot positions to one year, subject to renewal or cancellation after a rigid
evaluation of the appointee's performance. declared null and void.”
ISSUE/S: Whether or not violate respondents' right to exercise their profession and their right to due
process of law
HELD/RATIO - SC RULING (DOCTRINE/S): No. There is no dispute that pilotage as a profession has
taken on the nature of a property right. Even petitioner Corona recognized this when he stated in his
March 17, 1993, decision that "(t)he exercise of one's profession falls within the constitutional
guarantee against wrongful deprivation of, or interference with, property rights without due
process."20 He merely expressed the opinion the "(i)n the limited context of this case, PPA-AO 04-92
does not constitute a wrongful interference with, let alone a wrongful deprivation of, the property
rights of those affected thereby, and that "PPA-AO 04-95 does not forbid, but merely regulates, the
exercise by harbor pilots of their profession." As will be presently demonstrated, such supposition is
gravely erroneous and tends to perpetuate an administrative order which is not only unreasonable
but also superfluous. Pilotage, just like other professions, may be practiced only by duly licensed
individuals. Licensure is "the granting of license especially to practice a profession." It is also "the
system of granting licenses (as for professional practice) in accordance with establishment
standards.” A license is a right or permission granted by some competent authority to carry on a
business or do an act which, without such license, would be illegal. WHEREFORE, the instant petition
is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed decision of the court a quo dated September 6, 1993, in Civil
Case No. 93-65673 is AFFIRMED.
DICANG 76. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884)
Full Title of the Case: Hurtado v. California

G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE: 110 U.S. 516 (1884)
Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS: Joseph Hurtado was charged with killing Jose Antonio Stuardo. He was ultimately tried
by a jury and convicted of first-degree murder. The court sentenced Hurtado to the death
penalty.
The law in California allowed for an accusation by information, rather than an indictment by a
grand jury. An information is a document filed by the district attorney that lists the charges
against a defendant and is reviewed and approved by a magistrate before it becomes effective.
In Hurtado’s case, the district attorney charged him by filing an information. Following his
conviction, Hurtado contended that not presenting his case to a grand jury for indictment
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Petitioner’s Allegation: Hurtado contended that not presenting his case to a grand jury for
indictment violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Court a Quo (RTC) Ruling: The trial court denied Hurtado’s motion to set aside the verdict based
upon a due process violation.
CA Ruling: The California Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision.
ISSUE/S: Is an indictment by grand jury necessary to satisfy the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment in state felony prosecutions?
HELD/RATIO - SC RULING (DOCTRINE/S): The Constitution is a document written for an expanding

and undefined future. The broad concept of “due process of law” should not be held static by
requiring a certain legal process over another. Accordingly, indictment by grand jury is not
mandated by the term “due process.”
Indeed, the Fifth Amendment mentions both indictment by a grand jury and due process. Because
there is no surplus language in the Constitution, the Fifth Amendment must be read to mean that
due process does not necessarily include the right to indictment by grand jury. That is supported by
the fact that the Fourteenth Amendment mentions due process, but not the grand jury. Moreover,
the accusation by information in this case was reviewed by a magistrate. Thus, liberty and justice
are still protected in that procedure such that Hurtado received due process.
77. Villegas vs. Hu Chong Tsai Pao Ho, 86 SCRA 275 (1978)

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:

78. Rubi vs. Prov. Board of Mindanao, 39 Phil. 660 (1919)

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:

GALVEZ 79. Tanada v Tuvera, 292 SCRA 141 (1998)

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS
Petitioners Lorenzo M. Tanada, et. al. invoked due process in demanding the disclosure of a
number of Presidential Decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by
Law. The government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so
when it was otherwise provided, as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to
become effective immediately upon approval.
ISSUE
WON the publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute becomes valid
and enforceable.
RULING
Publication is a must. Article 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of
publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity.
The clear object of this provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various
laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and
publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignoratia legis nominem
excusat. It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the
transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. The
publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement
of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be
officially and specifically informed of its contents.
80. GMA v MTRCB, 514 SCRA 191 (2007)

GMA VS MTRCB-Substantive Due Process
Full Title of the Case: GMA NETWORK, INC., petitioner, vs . MOVIE AND TELEVISION REVIEW AND
CLASSIFICATION BOARD, respondent.
G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE: 148579, 05 Feb 2007
Ponente: Corona, J.
Petition Filed: petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
FACTS: Petitioner GMA Network, Inc. operates and manages the UHF television station, EMC Channel
27. On January 7, 2000, respondent MTRCB issued an order of suspension against petitioner for airing
"Muro Ami: The Making" without first securing a permit from it as provided in Section 7... of PD
1986.The penalty of suspension was based on Memorandum Circular 98-17 dated December 15,
1998[4] which provided for the penalties for exhibiting a program without a valid permit from the
MTRCB.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the suspension order and, at the same time, informed
MTRCB that Channel 27 had complied with the suspension order by going off the air since midnight
of January 11, 2000. It also filed a letter-protest which was merely "noted" by the MTRCB... thereby,
in effect, denying both the motion for reconsideration and letter-protest.
Petitioner then filed with the CA a petition for certiorari which was dismissed in the now assailed
June 18, 2001 decision. The January 7, 2000 suspension order issued by MTRCB was affirmed in toto.
Petitioner’s Allegation: petitioner claims that "Muro Ami: The Making" was a public affairs program.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the suspension order and, at the same time, informed
MTRCB that Channel 27 had complied with the suspension order by going off the air since midnight
of January 11, 2000. It also filed a letter-protest which was merely "noted" by the MTRCB thereby,
in effect, denying both the motion for reconsideration and letter-protest
Respondent’s Allegation: Section 3 of PD 1986 5 empowers the MTRCB to screen, review and
examine all motion pictures, television programs including publicity materials
ISSUE/S: (1) whether the MTRCB has the power or authority to review the show "Muro Ami: The
Making" prior to its broadcast by television and (2) whether Memorandum Circular No. 98-17 was
enforceable and binding on petitioner.
HELD/RATIO - SC RULING (DOCTRINE/S): the instant petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED
First, Section 3 of PD 1986[5] empowers the MTRCB to screen, review and examine all motion
pictures, television programs including publicity materials. This power of prior review is highlighted
in its Rules and Regulations, particularly Section 7... thereof, which reads:
SECTION 7. REQUIREMENT OF PRIOR REVIEW. -- No motion picture, television program or
related publicity material shall be imported, exported, produced, copied, distributed, sold,
leased, exhibited or broadcasted by television without prior permit issued by the BOARD
after review of the motion picture, television program or publicity material.
The only exemptions from the MTRCB's power of review are those expressly mentioned in Section
7,[6] such as (1) television programs imprinted or exhibited by the Philippine Government and/or
departments and agencies, and (2) newsreels.
According to the CA, the subject program was a publicity for the movie, "Muro Ami." In adopting
this finding, we hold that "Muro Ami: The Making," did not fall under any of the exemptions and
was therefore within the power of review of MTRCB.
On the other hand, petitioner claims that "Muro Ami: The Making" was a public affairs program.[7]
Even if that were so, our resolution of this issue would not change. This Court has already ruled
that a public affairs program -- described as a... variety of news treatment; a cross between pure
television news and news-related commentaries, analysis and/or exchange of opinions -- is within
the MTRCB's power of review.[8]
However, while MTRCB had jurisdiction over the subject program, Memorandum Circular 98-17,
which was the basis of the suspension order, was not binding on petitioner. The Administrative
Code of 1987, particularly Section 3 thereof, expressly requires each agency to file with the Office
of the National Administrative Register (ONAR) of the University of the Philippines Law Center
three certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Administrative issuances which are not published
or filed with the ONAR are ineffective and may not be enforced.
Memorandum Circular No. 98-17, which provides for the penalties for the first, second and third
offenses for exhibiting programs without valid permit to exhibit, has not been registered with the
ONAR as of January 27, 2000.[10] Hence, the same is yet to be... effective.
Consequently, petitioner was not bound by said circular and should not have been meted the
sanction provided thereunder.
81. Knights of Rizal v DMCI Homes, Inc., GR 213948, Apr 25, 2017
Full Title of the Case:Knights of Rizal v DMCI Homes, Inc.

G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE:GR 213948, Apr 25, 2017
FACTS: On 1 September 2011, DMCI Project Developers, Inc. (DMCI-PDI) acquired a 7,716.60-square
meter lot in the City of Manila, located near Taft Avenue, Ermita, beside the former Manila Jai-Alai
Building and Adamson University. The lot was earmarked for the construction of DMCI-PDI's Torre de
Manila condominium project. On 2 April 2012, DMCI-PDI secured its Barangay Clearance to start the
construction of its project. It then obtained a Zoning Permit from the City of Manila's City Planning and
Development Office (CPDO) on 19 June 2012 allowing it to build a "Forty-Nine (49) Storey w/ Basement
& 2 penthouse Level Res'l./Condominium" on the property. On 24 July 2012, the City Council of Manila
issued Resolution No. 121 enjoining the Office of the Building Official to temporarily suspend the
Building Permit of DMCI-PDI, citing among others, that "the Torre de Manila Condominium, based on
their development plans, upon completion, will rise up high above the back of the national monument,
to clearly dwarf the statue of our hero, and with such towering heights, would certainly ruin the line of
sight of the Rizal Shrine from the frontal Roxas Boulevard vantage point[.]" Building Official Melvin Q.
Balagot then sought the opinion of the City of Manila's City Legal Officer on whether he is bound to
comply with Resolution No. 121. In his letter dated 12 September 2012, City Legal Officer Renato G.
Dela Cruz stated that there is "no legal justification for the temporary suspension of the Building Permit
issued in favor of [DMCI-PDI]" since the construction "lies outside the Luneta Park" and is "simply too
far to be a repulsive distraction or have an objectionable effect on the artistic and historical
significance" of the Rizal Monument. On 26 November 2013, following an online petition against the
Torre de Manila project that garnered about 7,800 signatures, the City Council of Manila issued
Resolution No. 146, reiterating its directive in Resolution No. 121 enjoining the City of Manila's building
officials to temporarily suspend DMCI-PDI's Building Permit. On 12 September 2014, the Knights of
Rizal (KOR), a "civic, patriotic, cultural, non-partisan, non-sectarian and non-profit organization"
created under Republic Act No. 646, 19 filed a Petition for Injunction seeking a temporary restraining
order, and later a permanent injunction, against the construction of DMCI-PDI's Torre de Manila
condominium project. KOR Contends The KOR asserts that the completed Torre de Manila structure
will "[stick] out like a sore thumb, [dwarf] all surrounding buildings within a radius of two kilometer/s"
and "forever ruin the sightline of the Rizal Monument in Luneta Park: Torre de Manila building would
loom at the back and overshadow the entire monument, whether up close or viewed from a distance.
''
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the construction of Torre De Manila should be prohibited
HELD/RATIO - SC RULING (DOCTRINE/S): NO There is no law prohibiting the construction of the Torre
de Manila. In Manila Electric Company v. Public Service Commission, the Court held that "what is not
expressly or impliedly prohibited by law may be done, except when the act is contrary to morals,
customs and public order." In essence, this principle, which is the foundation of a civilized society under
the rule of law, prescribes that the freedom to act can be curtailed only through law. Without this
principle, the rights, freedoms, and civil liberties of citizens can be arbitrarily jand whimsically trampled
upon by the shifting passions of those who can spout the loudest, or those who can gather the biggest
crowd or the most number of Internet trolls. In other instances, the Court has allowed or upheld actions
that were not expressly prohibited by statutes when it determines that these acts were not contrary
to morals, customs, and public order, or that upholding the same would lead to a more equitable
solution to the controversy. However, it is the law itself - Articles 1306 and 1409(1) of the Civil Code -
which prescribes that acts not contrary to morals, good customs, public order, or public policy are
allowed if also not contrary to law. In this case, there is no allegation or proof that the Torre de Manila
project is "contrary to morals, customs, and public order" or that it brings harm, danger, or hazard to
the community. On the contrary, the City of Manila has determined that DMCI-PDI complied with the
standards set under the pertinent laws and local ordinances to construct its Torre de Manila Project.
There is one fact that is crystal clear in this case. There is no law prohibiting the construction of the
Torre de Manila due to its effect on the background "view, vista, sightline, or setting" of the Rizal
Monument.
82. Evasco v Montanez, GR 199172, Feb 21, 2018

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
83. Mayor Fernando v St. Scholastica’s College, GR 16107, May 12, 2013

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
84. Mosqueda v Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters Asso., Inc., GR

189185, Aug 16, 2016

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
85. Ople v. Torres, 292 SCRA 141. (1998)

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
86. Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001
Full Title of the Case: JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division)
and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE: G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001
Ponente: BELLOSILLO, J.
Petition Filed:
FACTS: Former President Estrada and co-accused were charged for Plunder under RA 7080 (An Act
Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), as amended by RA 7659.
On the information, it was alleged that Estrada have received billions of pesos through any or a
combination or a series of overt or criminal acts, or similar schemes or means thereby unjustly
enriching himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage of the Filipino people and the
Republic of the Philippines.
Estrada filed an Omnibus Motion on the grounds of lack of preliminary investigation,

reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses and opportunity to prove lack of probable cause but was
denied.
Later on, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution in Crim. Case No. 26558 finding that a probable cause
for the offense of plunder exists to justify the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused.
Estrada moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 26558 on the ground that the facts
alleged therein did NOT constitute an indictable offense since the law on which it was based was
unconstitutional for vagueness and that the Amended Information for Plunder charged more than one
offense. Same was denied.
Petitioner’s Allegation: that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but
distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. He therefore makes a stringent
call for this Court to subject the Plunder Law to the crucible of constitutionality mainly because,
according to him, (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the "reasonable
doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes
already punishable under The Revised Penal Code, all of which are purportedly clear violations of the
fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.
Respondent’s Allegation: denied, law is constitutional
Court a Quo (RTC) Ruling: n/a
CA Ruling: n/a
ISSUE/S: Whether the crime of plunder is unconstitutional for being vague?
HELD/RATIO - SC RULING (DOCTRINE/S): NO. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide
or rule that would inform those who are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its
penalties, its validity will be sustained. The amended information itself closely tracks the language of
the law, indicating w/ reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense w/c the petitioner is
alleged to have committed.
We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in his
defense.
Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the terms
“combination” and “series” in the key phrase “a combination or series of overt or criminal acts. These
omissions, according to the petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being
impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him, hence violative of his fundamental right to due process.
A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used herein, or because
of the employment of terms without defining them.
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence most necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the
statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects – it violates due process for failure to accord
persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law
enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle.
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of
possible “chilling effect” upon protected speech. The possible harm to society in permitting some
unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of
others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects
of overly broad statutes. But in criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.
ONDEVILLA 87. David v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 171390, May 3, 2006
Full Title of the Case: David v. Arroyo,

G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE: G.R. No. 171390, May 3, 2006
Ponente: Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.
Petition Filed: Petitions for certiorari and prohibition allege that in issuing Presidential
Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017) and General Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5)
FACTS: On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People
Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency and call upon the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), to prevent and
suppress acts of terrorism and lawless violence in the country. The Office of the President announced
the cancellation of all programs and activities related to the 20th anniversary celebration of Edsa
People Power I; and revoked the permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the local governments and
dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA. The police arrested (without warrant) petitioner Randolf S.
David, a professor at the University of the Philippines and newspaper columnist. Also arrested was
his companion, Ronald Llamas, president of party-list Akbayan.
In the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of the Criminal Investigation and Detection
Group (CIDG) of the PNP, on the basis of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, raided the Daily Tribune offices in
Manila and attempt to arrest was made against representatives of ANAKPAWIS, GABRIELA and
BAYAN MUNA whom suspected of inciting to sedition and rebellion. On March 3, 2006, President
Arroyo issued PP 1021 declaring that the state of national emergency has ceased to exist. Petitioners
filed seven (7) certiorari with the Supreme Court and three (3) of those petitions impleaded President
Arroyo as respondent questioning the legality of the proclamation, alleging that it encroaches the
emergency powers of Congress and it violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press,
of speech and assembly
Petitioner’s Allegation: PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are "unconstitutional for being violative of
the freedom of expression, including its cognate rights such as freedom of the press and
the right to access to information on matters of public concern, all guaranteed under
Article III, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution."
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
1.) Whether or not Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 is unconstitutional?
2.) Whether or not the warantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas and the dispersal
of KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during rallies were valid?
3.) Whether or not proper to implead President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as respondent in the
petitions?
4.) Whether or not the petitioners have a legal standing in questioning the constitutionality of the
proclamation?
5.) Whether or not the concurrence of Congress is necessary whenever the alarming powers incident
to Martial Law are used?

1. The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the
President for the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence whenever becomes necessary as
prescribed under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. However, there were extraneous provisions
giving the President express or implied power
(A) To issue decrees; (" Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature.
Section 1, Article VI categorically states that "[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of
the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.")
(B) To direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not related to lawless violence
as well as decrees promulgated by the President[The absence of a law defining "acts of terrorism" may
result in abuse and oppression on the part of the police or military]; and
(C) To impose standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, are ultra vires and
unconstitutional. The Court also rules that under Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution, the President,
in the absence of legislative legislation, cannot take over privately-owned public utility and private
business affected with public interest. Therefore, the PP No. 1017 is only partly unconstitutional.
2.) The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal and warrantless arrest
of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during their rallies are illegal, in the absence of proof that these
petitioners were committing acts constituting lawless violence, invasion or rebellion and violating BP
880; the imposition of standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, as well as the
warrantless search of the Tribune offices and whimsical seizure of its articles for publication and other
materials, are declared unconstitutional because there was no clear and present danger of a substantive
evil that the state has a right to prevent.
3.) It is not proper to implead President Arroyo as respondent. Settled is the doctrine that the President,
during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there
is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law.
4.) This Court adopted the “direct injury” test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held that the person
who impugns the validity of a statute must have “a personal and substantial interest in the case such
that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.” Therefore, the court ruled that the
petitioners have a locus standi, for they suffered “direct injury” resulting from “illegal arrest” and “unlawful
search” committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017.
5.) Under Article XII Section 17 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, in times of national emergency,
when the public interest so requires, the President may temporarily take over a privately owned public
utility or business affected with public interest only if there is congressional authority or approval.
There must enactment of appropriate legislation prescribing the terms and conditions under which the
President may exercise the powers that will serve as the best assurance that due process of law would
be observed.
88. Ong v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 126858, September 16, 2005

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
89. Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v Anti-Terrorism

SABLAN Council. 632 SCRA 146 (2010)

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
SAY, ALEX 90. Nestle Philippines, Inc., v Puedan, GR 220617, Jan. 30, 2017

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
SECRETO 91. Turks Shawarma Company v Pajaton, GR 207156, Jan 16, 2017
Full Title of the Case: TURKS SHAWARMA COMPANY/GEM ZEÑAROSA, Petitioners,

vs.
FELICIANO Z. PAJARON and LARRY A. CARBONILLA, Respondents.
Ponente: Del Castillo, J.
Petition Filed: Petition for Review on Certiorari
FACTS:
Petitioner hired Feliciano Z. Pajaron (Pajaron) in May 2007 as service crew. On April 15, 2010,
Pajaron filed his Complaint for constructive and actual illegal dismissal, non-payment of overtime
pay, holiday pay, holiday premium, rest day premium, service incentive leave pay and 13th month
pay against petitioners. Pajaron alleged that on April 9, 2010, Zeñarosa (President of Turks)
asked him to sign a piece of paper stating that he was receiving the correct amount of wages and
that he had no claims whatsoever from petitioners. Disagreeing to the truthfulness of the
statements, Pajaron refused to sign the paper prompting Zeñarosa to fire him from work.
Pajaron claimed that there was no just or authorized cause for his dismissal and that petitioners
also failed to comply with the requirements of due process. As such, he prayed for separation pay
in lieu of reinstatement due to strained relations with petitioners and backwages as well as
nominal, moral and exemplary damages. Pajaron also claimed for nonpayment of just wages,
overtime pay, holiday pay, holiday premium, service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay.
Petitioners denied having dismissed Pajaron; they averred that he actually abandoned his work.
They alleged that Pajaron would habitually absent himself from work for an unreasonable length
of time without notice; and while they rehired him several times whenever he returned, they
refused to rehire him this time after he abandoned work in April 2009.
Further, criminal complaint for slander was filed against Pajaron for uttering defamatory words that
allegedly compromised Zeñarosa's reputation as a businessman. Petitioners, thus, insisted that their
refusal to rehire Pajaron was for valid causes and did not amount to dismissal from employment.
Finally, petitioners claimed that Pajaron failed to substantiate his claim that he was not paid labor
standards benefits.
Proceedings before the Labor Arbiter
In a Decision dated December 10, 2010, the Labor Arbiter found credible Pajaron’s version and held
that he was constructively and illegally dismissed by petitioners. The Labor Arbiter found it
suspicious for petitioners to file a criminal case against Pajaron only after the complaint for illegal
dismissal have been filed. Pajaron was thus awarded the sum of ₱148,753.61, representing
backwages, separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, holiday pay, service incentive leave pay and
13th month pay.
Proceedings before the NLRC
Due to alleged non-availability of counsel, Zeñarosa himself filed a Notice of Appeal with
Memorandum and Motion to Reduce Bond with the NLRC. Along with this, Zeñarosa posted a partial
cash bond in the amount of ₱15,000.00, maintaining that he cannot afford to post the full amount
of the award since he is a mere backyard micro-entrepreneur. He begged the NLRC to reduce the
bond.
The NLRC, in an Order dated March 18, 2011, denied the motion to reduce bond. It ruled that
financial difficulties may not be invoked as a valid ground to reduce bond; at any rate, it was not
even substantiated by proof. Moreover, the partial bond in the amount of ₱15,000.00 is not
reasonable in relation to the award which totalled to ₱197,936.27. Petitioners' appeal was thus
dismissed by the NLRC for non-perfection.
On April 7, 2011, petitioners, through a new counsel, filed a Motion for Reconsideration (with plea
to give due course to the appeal) averring that the outright dismissal of their appeal was harsh and
oppressive considering that they had substantially complied with the Rules through the posting of a
partial bond and their willingness to post additional bond if necessary. Moreover, their motion to
reduce bond was meritorious since payment of the full amount of the award will greatly affect the
company's operations; besides the appeal was filed by Zeñarosa without the assistance of a counsel.
Petitioners thus implored for a more liberal application of the Rules and prayed that their appeal be
given due course. Along with this motion for reconsideration, petitioners tendered the sum of
₱207,435.53 representing the deficiency of the appeal bond.
In an Order dated September 29, 2011, the NLRC denied the Motion for Reconsideration, reiterating
that the grounds for the reduction of the appeal bond are not meritorious and that the partial bond
posted is not reasonable. The NLRC further held that the posting of the remaining balance on April
7, 2011 or three months and eight days from receipt of the Labor Arbiter's Decision on December 30,
2010 cannot be allowed, otherwise, it will be tantamount to extending the period to appeal which is
limited only to 10 days from receipt of the assailed Decision.
Proceedings before the CA

Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari with application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and
Temporary Restraining Order with the CA. They insisted that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion
in dismissing the appeal for failure to post the required appeal bond.
On May 8, 2013, the CA rendered a Decision dismissing the Petition for Certiorari. It held that the
NLRC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners' appeal for non-
perfection because petitioners failed to comply with the requisites in filing a motion to reduce bond,
namely, the presence of a meritorious ground and the posting of a reasonable amount of bond. The
CA stated that financial difficulties is not enough justification to dispense with the mandatory
posting of a bond inasmuch as there is an option of posting a surety bond from a reputable bonding
company duly accredited by the NLRC, which, unfortunately, petitioners failed to do. The CA noted
that the lack of assistance of a counsel is not an excuse because petitioners ought to know the Rules
in filing an appeal; moreover, ignorance of the law does not excuse them from compliance therewith.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the dismissal of the appeal filed by Zeñarosa tantamount denial of due process.
The Court has time and again held that "[t]he right to appeal is neither a natural right nor is it a
component of due process. It is a mere statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the
manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law. The party who seeks to avail of the same
must comply with the requirements of the rules. Failing to do so, the right to appeal is lost."
It is clear from both the Labor Code (Article 223) and the NLRC Rules of Procedure (Sections 4
and 6 of Rule VI) that there is legislative and administrative intent to strictly apply the appeal
bond requirement, and the Court should give utmost regard to this intention."
The posting of cash or surety bond is therefore mandatory and jurisdictional; failure to comply
with this requirement renders the decision of the Labor Arbiter final and executory. This
indispensable requisite for the perfection of an appeal ''is to assure the workers that if they finally
prevail in the case[,] the monetary award will be given to them upon the dismissal of the employer's
appeal [and] is further meant to discourage employers from using the appeal to delay or evade
payment of their obligations to the employees.
Stated otherwise, petitioners' case will still fail on its merits even if the Court is to allow their
appeal to be given due course. After scrupulously examining the contracting positions and
arguments of the parties, it was found that the Labor Arbiter's decision declaring Pajaron illegally
dismissed was supported by substantial evidence. All told, the Court found no error on the part of
the CA in ruling that the NLRC did not gravely abused its discretion in dismissing petitioners'
appeal for no perfection due to noncompliance with the requisites of filing a motion to reduce
bond.
SERVAÑEZ 92. Estate of F.E. Marcos v Republic, GR 213027, Jan 18, 2017
Full Title of the Case:ESTATE OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS, vs.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

and IMELDA ROMUALDEZ MARCOS and IRENE MARCOS ARANETA, vs. REPUBLIC
Ponente: SERENO, CJ.:
Petition Filed: Petitions for Review on Certiorari// Forfeiture case
Facts:
The present consolidated Petition emanated from Civil Case no. 0141 , when the Republic filed a
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment dated 24 June 2009 with respect to the another property listed
in the 1991 Petition asking the Sandiganbayan to render judgment declaring the pieces of jewelry
known as Malacañang collection and specifically mentioned under paragraph 9 (6) of the 1991 Petition
as ill-gotten wealth and to subsequently cause the collection of jewelry to be declared forfeited in favor
of the government.
In support of its Motion, the Republic cited the letter of Imelda Marcos dated 25 May 2009 demanding
“the immediate return of all her pieces of jewelry taken by the PCG from Malañang Palace and (ii) those
turned over to PCGG by the US Government.” The Republic argued that the letter proved the claim of
the Marcoses that they owned the Malacañang Collection, including the Hawaii Collection. It further
argued that in the 1991 Petition, they were deemed to have admitted the allegations regarding the
pieces of jewelry. The Republic said that the words or stock phrases they used in their Answer dated
18 October 1993 had been declared by this Court in the Swiss deposits case as a "negative pregnant"
and, as such, amounted to an admission if not squarely denied. Finally, it contended that "the lawful
income of the Marcoses during their incumbencies as public officials was grossly disproportionate to
the value of the pieces of jewelry."
Consequently, the Republic also filed a Request for Admission. Thereafter, The Republic also submitted
a Supplement to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment dated 14 July 2009 restating that the object of
the motion covered only the Malacañang Collection, as the ownership of the two other collections had
been settled by the Sandiganbayan in a Resolution dated 25 October 1996.
Petitioner’s Argument
● Imelda Marcos and Irene Marcos Araneta filed their Manifestation and Preliminary
Comments manifesting that the Motion for Partial Judgment was filed to justify the
unlawful possession of PCGG of her jewelry for failure to initiate the proper proceeding or to
issue a sequestration or freeze order. They based their allegations on the pronouncements of
the Sandiganbayan and on the Republic's omission of the collection in the prayer of the
1991 Petition. Further, they averred that the Request for Admission was inconsistent with the
Motion for Partial Summary of Judgment.
● Subsequently, Imelda Marcos filed a Manifestation and Motion to Expunge and claimed that
the filing of the Request for Admission was tantamount to an abdication of the earlier position
of the Republic that the case was ripe for summary judgment. They argued that the Request
for Admission entertained a possibly genuine issue as to a material fact, which was needed for
the grant of the motion for summary judgment.
Republic’s Argument
●
The Republic filed its Opposition dated 24 August 2009, in which it said that the
Manifestation and Motion to Expunge of Imelda Marcos and Irene Marcos Araneta argued
on trivial matters, raised puerile arguments, and failed to refute the contention that
the collection was ill-gotten and subject to forfeiture. It further stated that the Request for
Admission merely sought to elicit details regarding the acquisition of the jewelry in order to
expedite the resolution of the motion. The Republic therefore claimed that by operation of
law, the failure of the Marcoses to respond resulted in their admission of the matters
contained in the request.
● The Republic likewise filed its Reply on Marcoses' Manifestation and Preliminary Comments
insisting that while the Decision dated 2 April 2009 focused on the Arelma assets, it
had reservations regarding "other reliefs and remedies as may be just and equitable
under the premises" which includes the prayer for the forfeiture of the Malacañang
Collection as part of the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses. Also, the filing of request was
not prohibited under the Rule of Court and that instead of making an admission or a denial as
a timely response to the request within 15 days, the Marcoses filed a Manifestation and
Motion to Expunge. Thus, the Republic insisted that all the matters that were the
subject of the request be deemed admitted by the Marcoses
Sandiganbayan Ruling:
In a Resolution dated 2 August 2010, the Sandiganbayan denied the Marcoses' Manifestation and
Preliminary Comments and Manifestation and Motion to Expunge. It ruled that (1) the proceedings
in this case had not been terminated; (2) in filing their objection, respondents were not deemed to
have admitted the matters in the Request for Admission; and (3) the Republic's Request for
Admission was not inconsistent with the Motion for Summary Judgment. The Sandiganbayan
further directed the Marcoses to file and serve within 15 days their sworn answer to the Request
for Admission, but they failed to comply with the directive.
After the submission of the parties of their respective memoranda, the Sandiganbayan issued a
Partial Summary Judgment dated 13 January 2014 ruling that (1) the Malacañang Collection was
part and subject of the forfeiture petition; (2) the Motion for Summary Judgment was proper; and
(3) the forfeiture of the Malacañang Collection was justified pursuant to R.A. 1379.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the forfeiture is justified, and the forfeiture of the Malacañang Collection is lawful
under R.A. 1379?
2. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan correctly declared that the forfeiture was not a deprivation of
petitioner’s right to due process of law?
SC RULING
The Court upheld the decision of the Sandiganbayan.
1. The Court held that "whenever any public officer or employee has acquired during his
incumbency an amount of property which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as
such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from
legitimately acquired property, said property shall be presumed prima facie to have been
unlawfully acquired." Petitioners failed to satisfactorily show that the properties were lawfully
acquired; hence, the prima facie presumption that they were unlawfully acquired prevails.
Likewise, the court held that a request for admission can be the basis for the grant of summary
judgment. The request can be the basis therefor when its subject is deemed to have been
admitted by the party and is requested as a result of that party's failure to respond to the
court's directive to state what specifically happened in the case. The resort to such a request
as a mode of discovery rendered all the matters contained therein as matters that have been
deemed admitted pursuant to Rule 26, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
2. The Court found the Petitioner’s claim that they were denied due process by not being given
any opportunity to prove their lawful acquisition of the Malacañang Collection for and that
"there has been no trial or hearing"; and that "petitioners were shamefully never given an
opportunity to show that the questioned properties may have been lawfully acquired
through other means" to be baseless considering the various pleadings petitioners have filed
in this case and in other cases involving the Marcos properties were countless occasions when
they could have proven that the Malacañang Collection had indeed been lawfully acquired as
claimed.
SULIT 93. Lagon v Velasco, GR 208424, Feb 14, 2018

ARMANDO LAGON, Petitioner, v. HON. DENNIS A. VELASCO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING
JUDGE OF MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN CITIES OF KORONADAL, SOUTH COTABATO, AND
GABRIEL DIZON, Respondents.
G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE: G.R. No. 208424, February 14, 2018
Ponente: REYES, JR., J.
Petition Filed: Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court seeking the
annulment of the Order dated June 6, 2013, issued by public respondent Judge Velasco, directing
petitioner Lagon to file the judicial affidavits of his witnesses within five (5) days prior to the
commencement of the trial dates.
FACTS:
Sometime in December 2000, Lagon obtained a cash loan from private respondent Dizon, in the
amount of Php 300,000.00. In payment thereof, Lagon issued PCIBank Check postdated January 12,
2001, in an equal amount. However, when Dizon presented the check for payment, it was dishonored
for being Drawn Against Insufficient Funds. Consequently, Dizon sent a Letter dated May 6, 2011 to
Lagon, demanding the payment Php 300,000.00. However, Lagon refused to pay. On June 6, 2011,
Dizon field a Complaint for Sum of Money, Damages and Attorney's Fees against Lagon. At the initial
trial on June 6, 2013, neither of the parties submitted their judicial affidavits or those of their
witnesses. Hence, Judge Velasco issued the assailed Order requiring the parties to submit their
respective judicial affidavits five (5) days before the trial. On June 27, 2013, Lagon filed a Motion for
Partial Reconsideration. On July 10, 2013, Judge Velasco issued the assailed Order denying Lagon's
Motion for Partial Reconsideration. Dissatisfied with the ruling, Lagon sought direct recourse to the
Supreme Court.
: In this regard, Lagon asserts that Judge Velasco committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, by compelling him to submit his evidence by judicial affidavits, even
before the plaintiff could have adduced his own evidence and rested his case. According to Lagon,
under the Judicial Affidavit Rule, the defendant is forced to adduce evidence simultaneously with
the plaintiff. This conflicts with the rule on Demurrer to Evidence, which grants a defendant the right
to opt out of presenting evidence, and instead move for the dismissal of the complaint upon the
failure of the plaintiff to show a right to relief. The defendant is thus stripped of his "due process
right” not to be compelled to adduce evidence.
On the other hand, Dizon counters that no grave abuse of discretion may be ascribed against Judge
Velasco for merely enforcing the rules promulgated by this Court. Dizon avers that contrary to
Lagon's claim, the Judicial Affidavit Rule actually preserves and respects litigants' procedural rights.
Due process of law contemplates notice to the party, and an opportunity to be heard before
judgment is rendered. Lagon was accorded notice and an opportunity to be heard when Judge
Velasco ordered the submission of judicial affidavits prior to the pretrial conference. It was Lagon,
who blatantly refused to comply with the order. Dizon points out that the Judicial Affidavit Rule does
not in any way prevent Lagon from filing a demurrer to evidence if he feels that the same is truly
warranted.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the Judicial Affidavit Rule violates the right of the defendant not to be compelled
to adduce evidence.
HELD/RATIO - SC RULING (DOCTRINE/S): No.
The Judicial Affidavit Rule was particularly created to solve the following ills brought about by
protracted litigations, such as, the dismissal of criminal cases due to the frustration of complainants
in shuttling back and forth to court after repeated postponements. The success of the judicial
affidavit rule was unprecedented, and its implementation led to a reduction of about two-thirds of
the time used for presenting the testimonies of witnesses. Indeed, the use of judicial affidavits
greatly hastened the hearing and adjudication of cases. Thus, in all proceedings before the
aforementioned tribunals, the parties are required to file the Judicial Affidavits of their witnesses, in
lieu of their direct testimonies.
Incidentally, the failure to comply with Section 2 of the Judicial Affidavit Rule shall result to a waiver
of the submission of the required judicial affidavits and exhibits (but the court may allow late
submission subject to their discretion).
Both the Judicial Affidavit Rule and Demurrer to Evidence can co-exist harmoniously as tools for a
more efficient and speedy administration of trial procedures. On the one hand, the Judicial Affidavit
Rule simply dispenses with the direct testimony, thereby reducing the time at which a case stands
for trial, in the same way that the Demurrer to Evidence abbreviates proceedings by allowing the
defendant to seek for an early resolution of the case should the plaintiff be unable to sufficiently
prove his complaint. These rules do not conflict, and when used hand in hand will lead to an efficient
administration of the trial.
Moreover, by no stretch of the imagination may it be concluded that Lagon was deprived of due
process of law. There is nothing in the provisions of the Judicial Affidavit Rule, which prohibits a
defendant from filing a demurrer to evidence, if he truly believes that the evidence adduced by the
plaintiff is insufficient. There is nothing too tedious or burdensome in requiring the submission of
the judicial affidavit. In fact, this would even help the defendant in preparing his opposing arguments
against the plaintiff. All told, the Court has always emphasized that "procedural rules should be
treated with utmost respect and due regard, since they are designed to facilitate the adjudication of
cases to remedy the worsening problem of delay in the resolution of rival claims and in the
administration of justice. Judge Velasco cannot be deemed to have acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by strictly enforcing the Court's rules. Hence,
the Petition for Certiorari must be dismissed.
VARGAS 94. Republic v CJ Sereno, GR 237428, Resolution for M.R., Jun 19, 2018

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
VICENTE 95. Borlongan v BDO, GR 217617; GR 218590, Apr 5, 2017
Full Title of the Case: CARMELITA T. BORLONGAN, Petitioner, vs.

BANCO DE ORO (formerly EQUITABLE PCI BANK), Respondent.
G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE: G.R. No. 217617; G.R. No. 218590, April 5, 2017
Ponente: VELASCO, JR, J
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
Eliseo Borlongan, Jr. and his wife Carmelita, acquired a real property. Then, they went to the
Registry of Deeds of Pasig City to obtain a copy of the TCT in preparation for a prospective sale of
the subject property. To their surprise, the title contained an annotation that the property covered
thereby was the subject of an execution sale pending before the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City.
Carmelita immediately procured a copy of the records of the case and found out that Banco de
Oro, formerly Equitable PCI Bank, filed a complaint for sum of money against Tancho Corporation,
the principal debtor of loan obligations obtained from the bank. Likewise impleaded were several
persons, including Carmelita, who supposedly signed four (4) security agreements totaling
₱13,500,000 to guarantee the obligations of Tancho Corporation.
It appears from the records of the case that the Makati RTC issued an Order directing the service of
summons to all the defendants at the business address of Tancho Corporation, provided by BDO,
Fumakilla Compound, Amang Rodriguez Avenue, Brgy. Dela Paz, Pasig City.
Parenthetically, the records of the case show that BDO already foreclosed the Fumakilla
Compound, following Tancho Corporation's failure to pay its obligation, and BDO already
consolidated its ownership of the property.
Understandably, the process server filed an Officer's Return stating that summons remained
unserved as the "defendants are no longer holding office at [Fumakilla Compound]."
After the single attempt at personal service on Carmelita and her co-defendants, BDO moved for
leave to serve the summons by publication. The RTC granted the motion.
BDO filed an ex-parte Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Attachment against the defendants,
including Carmelita. During the hearing on the motion, BDO submitted a copy of the title of the
subject property. The Makati RTC thereafter granted BDO's motion and a Writ of Attachment was
issued against Carmelita, effectively attaching the subject property on behalf of BDO.
BDO filed an ex-parte motion praying that the summons and the complaint be served against
Carmelita at the subject property. The Makati RTC granted the motion. The Sheriff filed a return
stating that no actual personal service was made as Carmelita "is no longer residing at the given
address and the said address is for 'rent,' as per information gathered from the security guard on
duty."
However, BDO filed a manifestation stating that it had complied with the Order of the Makati RTC
having caused the publication of the alias summons and the complaint in People's Taliba.
Thereafter, upon BDO's motion, the Makati RTC declared the defendants, including Carmelita, in
default. BDO soon after proceeded to present its evidence ex-parte.
The Makati RTC rendered a Decision holding the defendants liable to pay BDO ₱32,543,856.33 plus
12% interest per annum from the time of the filing of the complaint until fully paid and attorney's
fees. The Makati RTC decision was published.
The Makati RTC issued a Writ of Execution upon BDO's motion. The Order states that in the event
that the judgment obligors cannot pay all or part of the obligation, the sheriff shall levy upon the
properties of the defendants to satisfy the award.
The Makati RTC's sheriff filed a Report stating that he tried to serve the Writ of Execution upon the
defendants at Fumakilla Compound but he was not able to do so since the defendants were no
longer holding office thereat. The Sheriff also reported that, on the same day, he went to the
subject property to serve the execution but likewise failed in his attempt since Carmelita was no
longer residing at the said address.
BDO filed a Motion to Conduct Auction of the subject property. The motion was granted by the
Makati RTC so that the subject property was sold to BDO, as the highest bidder.
An ex-parte omnibus motion filed by BDO, the Makati RTC ordered the issuance of a Writ of
Possession and the issuance of a new TCT covering the subject property in favor of BDO.
Arguing that the Makati RTC had not acquired jurisdiction over her person as the service of the
summons and the other processes of the court was defective, Carmelita filed a Petition for
Annulment of Judgment (With Urgent Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Writ of Preliminary Injunction) with the CA.
In its Resolution,5 the appellate court denied Carmelita's prayer for the issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
Aggrieved, Carmelita interposed a motion for the reconsideration of the CA's Resolution. However,
the appellate court denied her motion for reconsideration, holding that "upon the expiration of the
redemption period, the right of the purchaser to the possession of the foreclosed property
becomes absolute."
Thus, Carmelita filed a Petition for Review, before this Court, ascribing to the appellate court the
commission of serious reversible errors. The Court denied the petition. Hence, Carmelita
interposed a Motion for Reconsideration urging the Court to take a second hard look at the facts of
the case and reconsider its stance.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not Carmelita’s prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/or WPI, stopping the
consolidation of BDO's ownership over the subject property, should be granted.
HELD/RATIO – SC RULING (DOCTRINE):
Yes. Carmelita has a clear and unmistakable right that must be protected. This right is not just her
proprietary rights over the subject property but her constitutionally protected right to due process
before she can be deprived of her property.
In its classic formulation, due process means that any person with interest to the thing in litigation
must be notified and given an opportunity to defend that interest. Thus, as the essence of due
process lies in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence the defendant
may have in support of her defense, she must be properly served the summons of the court. In
other words, the service of summons is a vital and indispensable ingredient of due process and
compliance with the rules regarding the service of the summons is as much an issue of due process
as it is of jurisdiction. 1 Unfortunately, it would seem that the Constitutional right of Carmelita to
be properly served the summons and be notified has been disregarded by the officers of the trial
court.
At this very juncture, the existence of the second ground for the issuance of a TRO and/or WPI is
self-evident. Without a TRO and/or WPI enjoining BDO from continuing in the possession and
consolidating the ownership of the subject property, Carmelita's right to be afforded due process
will unceasingly be violated.
96. Allowance for the Family Foundation Phil., Inc., v Garin, Resolution on
ALONZO Partial M.R., GR 217872; Gr 221866, Apr26, 2017
Full Title of the Case: G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE:

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:

CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
ALVARO 97. Tanada v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446 (1986)
Full Title of the Case: Lorenzo M. Tañada, Abraham F. Sarmiento, and Movement of Attorneys for
Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI), petitioners, versus Hon. Juan C. Tuvera,
in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, Hon. Joaquin Venus, in his capacity as
Deputy Executive Assistant to the President, Melquiades P. de la Cruz, etc., et al., respondents
G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE:GR No. L-63915 December 29, 1986
FACTS:
Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number of
presidential decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by law. The
government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was
“otherwise provided,” as when the decrees themselves declared that they we to become effective
and immediately upon their approval.
The petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of general applicability
and those which are not, that publication means complete publication; and that the publication
must be made forthwith the Official Gazette.
Issue:
Whether or not the Presidential decrees are covered by the provisions of Article 2 of the New
Civil Code, on the necessity of publication for its effectivity.
The clause “unless otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself. Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature
may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen day period shall be shortened or extended.
The term “laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly
speaking all laws related to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them
directly.
All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different
effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and
executive orders promulgated by the President. Administrative rules and regulations must also
be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid
delegation.
There is much to be said of the view that the publication need not be
BALISI 98. PITC v. Angeles, 263 SCRA 421 (1996)

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:

CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
CANAS 99. Republic v. Extelcom, G.R. 147096, January 15, 2002

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:

CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
CARADA 100. Tanada vs. PAEC, 141 SCRA 307 (1986)

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:

CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
CASTILLO,DONAL 101. Anzaldo vs. Clave, 119 SCRA 353 (1982)

D
Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS: The contested position became vacant in 1974 when its incumbent, Doctor
Quintin Kintanar, became Director of the Biological Research Center. Doctor Kintanar
recommended that Doctor Venzon be appointed to that position. Doctor Anzaldo
protested against that recommendation.
At the time the vacancy occurred, or on June 30, 1974, both Doctors Anzaldo and
Venzon were holding similar positions in the Medical Research Department:
Later, Doctor Pedro G. Afable, Vice-Chairman, became the Officer-in-Charge of the NIST.
Effective January 5, 1978, he appointed Doctor Anzaldo to the contested position with
compensation at P18,384 per annum. The appointment was approved by the Civil
Service Commission.
Doctor Venzon in a letter dated January 23, 1978, addressed to Jacobo C. Clave,
appealed to the Office of the President of the Philippines (pp. 139-40). The appeal was
forwarded to the NIST Anzaldo to the contested position (p. 63, Rollo). The appeal-
protest was later sent to the Civil Service Commission.
PETITIONER’S SIDE: Doctor Felicidad Estores-Anzaldo 55, seeks to annul the decision
of Presidential Executive Assistant Jacobo C. Clave dated March 20, 1980, revoking her
appointment dated January 5, 1978 as Science Research Supervisor II and directing the
appointment to that position of Doctor Eulalia L. Venzon,
RESPONDENT’S SIDE Chairman Clave of the Civil Service Commission and

Commissioner Jose A. R. Melo recommended in Resolution No. 1178 dated August 23,
1979 that Doctor Venzon be appointed to the contested position, a recommendation
which is in conflict with the 1978 appointment of Doctor Anzaldo which was duly
attested and approved by the Civil Service Commission (pp. 30 and 48, Rollo).
ISSUE: Whether or Dr. Anzaldo was denied of due process.
RULING: YES. When Presidential Executive Assistant Clave said in his decision that he
was "inclined to concur in the recommendation of the Civil Service Commission", what
he meant was that he was concurring with Chairman Clave's recommendation: he was
concurring with himself
Due process of law means fundamental fairness. It is not fair to Doctor Anzaldo that
Presidential Executive Assistant Clave should decide whether his own recommendation
as Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, as to who between Doctor Anzaldo and
Doctor Venzon should be appointed Science Research Supervisor II, should be adopted
by the President of the Philippines.
Common sense and propriety dictate that the commissioner in the Civil Service
Commission, who should be consulted by the Office of the President, should be a
person different from the person in the Office of the President who would decide the
appeal of the protestant in a contested appointment.
In this case, the person who acted for the Office of the President is the same person in
the Civil Service Commission who was consulted by the Office of the President: Jacobo
C. Clave. The Civil Service Decree could not have contemplated that absurd situation
for, as held in the Zambales Chromite case, that would not be fair to the appellant
CASTILLO, MARIA 101. Tejano v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 159190, June 30, 2005

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
CONCEPCION 102. People v. Court of Appeals, 262 SCRA 452 (1996)

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
DE GUZMAN 103. Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 332 (1997)
Full Title of the Case: LUIS A. TABUENA, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, and THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents;
ADOLFO M. PERALTA, petitioner, vs. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division), and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, represented by the OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, respondents.
G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE: G.R. Nos. 103501-03 / February 17, 1997; G.R. No. 103507 / February 17,
1997
Ponente: FRANCISCO, J.
Petition Filed: Appeal for petition for review of certiorari . They appeal the Sandiganbayan decision
convicting them of malversation of MIAA funds in the amount of P55M.
FACTS:
Then Pres. Ferdinand Marcos instructed Luis Tabuena, General Manager of the Manila International
Airport Authority (MIAA), over the phone to pay directly to the president’s office and in cash what the
MIAA owes the Phil. National Construction Corp. The verbal instruction was reiterated in a Presidential
memorandum.
In obedience to Pres. Marcos’ instruction, Tabuena, with the help of Gerardo Dabao and Adolfo Peralta,
the Asst. Gen. Mgr. and the Acting Finance Services Mgr. of MIAA, respectively, caused the release of
P55M of MIAA funds of three (3) withdrawals and delivered the money to Mrs. Fe Roa-Gimenez, private
secretary of Marcos. Gimenez issued a receipt for all the amounts she received from Tabuena. Later, it
turned out that PNCC never received the money.
The case involves two (2) separate petitions for review by Luis Tabuena and Adolfo Peralta.
Petitioners were accused and convicted of the crime of malversation by Sandiganbayan for defrauding
the government, taking and misappropriating money when there is no outstanding obligation between
MIAA and PNCC.
Petitioners’ Allegation:
Petitioner contended that they were acting in good faith when the office of the president directed him
to deliver the said amount to his office — “person who acts in obedience to an order issued by a
superior for some lawful purpose.”
ISSUE/S: WON Sandiganbayan violated due process on the ground of departing from that common
standard of fairness and impartiality.
YES. The majority believes that the interference by the Sandiganbayan Justices was just too excessive
that it cannot be justified under the norm applied to a jury trial, or even under the standard employed
in a non-jury trial where the judge is admittedly given more leeway in propounding questions to clarify
points and to elicit additional relevant evidence.
The "cold neutrality of an impartial judge" requirement of due process was certainly denied Tabuena
and Peralta when the court, with its overzealousness, assumed the dual role of magistrate and
advocate. Time and again the Court has declared that due process requires no less than the cold
neutrality of an impartial judge. That the judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be
impartial, to give added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. The parties are entitled
to no less than this, as a minimum guaranty of due process.
It is never proper for a judge to discharge the duties of a prosecuting attorney. However anxious a
judge may be for the enforcement of the law, he should always remember that he is as much judge in
behalf of the defendant accused of crime, and whose liberty is in jeopardy, as he is judge in behalf of
the state, for the purpose of safeguarding the interests of society.
Petitioners Tabuena and Peralta are ACQUITTED of the crime of malversation. The Sandiganbayan
Decision and the Resolution are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
DE JESUS 104. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966)
Full Title of the Case: Sheppard v. Maxwell

G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE: 384 U.S. 333
Ponente:
Petition Filed: Habeas Corpus
FACTS: On July 4, 1954, Cleveland-area physician Sam Sheppard’s wife was bludgeoned to death he
was arrested for the murder of his wife, Marilyn. His trial began October 18 and terminated with his
conviction December 21, 1954. During the pretrial period, virulent and incriminating publicity about
petitioner and the murder made the case notorious, and the news media frequently aired charges
and countercharges besides those for which petitioner was tried. He was examined for more than
five hours without counsel in a televised three-day inquest conducted before an audience of several
hundred spectators in a gymnasium.
Over three weeks before trial the newspapers published the names and addresses of prospective
jurors causing them to receive letters and telephone calls about the case. The trial began two weeks
before a hotly contested election at which the chief prosecutor and the trial judge were candidates
for judgeships. Newsmen were allowed to take over almost the entire small courtroom, hounding
petitioner, and most of the participants. The movement of the reporters in the courtroom caused
frequent confusion and disrupted the trial; and in the corridors and elsewhere in and around the
courthouse they were allowed free rein by the trial judge. Pervasive publicity was given to the case
throughout the trial, much of it involving incriminating matter not introduced at the trial, and the
jurors were thrust into the role of celebrities.
At the very inception of the proceedings and later, the trial judge announced that neither he nor
anyone else could restrict the prejudicial news accounts. Despite his awareness of the excessive
pretrial publicity, the trial judge failed to take effective measures against the massive publicity which
continued throughout the trial or to take adequate steps to control the conduct of the trial.
Petitioner’s Allegation:The petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition contending that he did not
receive a fair trial.
ISSUE/S: Can massive, pervasive, and prejudicial publicity, and a carnival-like atmosphere in the
courtroom, deprive a defendant of a fair trial?
US District Court Ruling: The US District Court held that he was not afforded a fair trial and granted
the writ subject to the State's right to put Sheppard to trial again.
Court of Appeals Ruling: The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed by a divided vote the
conviction of Sheppard. The massive, pervasive, and prejudicial publicity attending petitioner's
prosecution prevented him from receiving a fair trial consistent with the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
(a) Though freedom of discussion should be given the widest range compatible with the fair and
orderly administration of justice, it must not be allowed to divert a trial from its purpose of
adjudicating controversies according to legal procedures based on evidence received only in open
court.
(b) Identifiable prejudice to the accused need not be shown if, as in Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 , and
even more so in this case, the totality of the circumstances raises the probability of prejudice.
(c) The trial court failed to invoke procedures which would have guaranteed petitioner a fair trial,
such as adopting stricter rules for use of the courtroom by newsmen as petitioner's counsel
requested, limiting their number, and more closely supervising their courtroom conduct. The court
should also have insulated the witnesses; controlled the release of leads, information, and gossip to
the press by police officers, witnesses, and counsel; proscribed extrajudicial statements by any
lawyer, witness, party, or court official divulging prejudicial matters; and requested the appropriate
city and county officials to regulate release of information by their employees.
Since the state trial judge did not fulfill his duty to protect Sheppard from the inherently prejudicial
publicity which saturated the community and to control disruptive influences in the courtroom, we
must reverse the denial of the habeas petition.
We have concluded that Sheppard did not receive a fair trial consistent with the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment and, therefore, reverse the judgment.
The case is remanded to the District Court with instructions to release petitioner from custody unless
he is tried again within a reasonable time.
GALVEZ 11112. LIM vs. COURT OF APPEALS, GR 111397 (2002)

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS
In 1993, Bistro Pigalle Inc. filed before the trial court a petition for mandamus and prohibition,
with prayer for temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction, against Alfredo Lim
in his capacity as Mayor of the City of Manila. The Bistro filed the case because policemen
under Lim’s instructions inspected and investigated the Bistro’s license as well as the work
permits and health certificates of its staff. This caused the stoppage of work in the Bistro’s night
club and restaurant operations (i.e. the New Bangkok Club and the Exotic Garden Restaurant).
Lim also refused to accept the Bistro’s application for a business license, as well as the work
permit applications of the Bistro’s staff, for the year 1993. The court granted preliminary
injunction. However, Lim issued closure of Bistro operations and filed motion to dissolve the
injunction order.
ISSUE
WON Lim violated due process on the ground of failing to give Bistro the opportunity to be
heard?
RULING
Petition denied. From the language of Section 11 (l), Article II of the Revised Charter of the
City of Manila and Section 455 (3) (iv) of the Local Government Code, it is clear that the power
of the mayor to issue business licenses and permits necessarily includes the corollary power
to suspend, revoke or even refuse to issue the same. However, the power to suspend or revoke
these licenses and permits is expressly premised on the violation of the conditions of these
permits and licenses. The laws specifically refer to the "violation of the condition(s)" on which
the licenses and permits were issued. Similarly, the power to refuse to issue such licenses and
permits is premised on non-compliance with the prerequisites for the issuance of such licenses
and permits.
The mayor must observe due process in exercising these powers, which means that the mayor
must give the applicant or licensee notice and opportunity to be heard. True, the mayor has
the power to inspect and investigate private commercial establishments for any violation of the
conditions of their licenses and permits. However, the mayor has no power to order a police
raid on these establishments in the guise of inspecting or investigating these commercial
establishments.
Lim has no authority to close down Bistro’s business or any business establishment in Manila
without due process of law. Lim cannot take refuge under the Revised Charter of the City of
Manila and the Local Government Code. There is no provision in these laws expressly or
impliedly granting the mayor authority to close down private commercial establishments without
notice and hearing, and even if there is, such provision would be void. The due process clause
of the Constitution requires that Lim should have given the Bistro an opportunity to rebut the
allegations that it violated the conditions of its licenses and permits.
GALVEZ 114. UNIDO vs. COMELEC, 104 SCRA 17 (1981)

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS
A plebiscite will be held for the amendments to the 1973 Philippine Constitution. United
Democratic Opposition (UNIDO) is a political organization campaigning for “No” votes. On the
other hand, President-PM Marcos will lead the campaign for “Yes” votes in his nationwide
“Pulong-Pulong sa Pangulo” radio-television program. Due to this UNIDO requested
COMELEC to direct the tv/radio facilities to give them the same prime time all over the country
which were utilized by Marcos pursuant to equal opportunity clause. COMELEC denied the
said request and the succeeding appeals.
ISSUE
WON UNIDO was deprived of equal opportunity?
RULING
Petition denied.
The President holds the sacred responsibility to protect and defend the security of all the
people, the stability of the government and the integrity of the national territory, not only for the
tenure to which he has been elected but for all times. He deems it warranted by the
circumstances to present to them a plan of government which includes the modification of the
existing structure of government together with its concomitant allocation of governmental
powers, it is not only his right but his duty to take the people directly into his confidence and
impart to them to the fullest measure of his capacity and by all available adequate means the
reasons therefore and the corollary advantages thereof to their welfare. The opposition has
naturally the indisputable right to make every effort to thwart his objective. But, surely, this is
far from saying that it is the duty of the administration to generously grant to them the means
to wage their campaign against it. There are other political parties similarly situated as
petitioner. To grant to petitioner what it wants, it must necessarily follow that such other parties
should also be granted.
The provisions of all election laws regulating propaganda through the mass media, for
example, Section 41 of the Election Code of 1978, must be deemed applicable to plebiscites.
Therefore, it is the duty of the Comelec to see to it that the sale of air time by TV and radio
stations insures that time equal as to duration and quality is available to all candidates for the
same office or political parties, groups or aggrupations at the same rates or given free of
charge.
Comelec has been contemplated to precisely constitute an exception to freedom of speech

and press clause, on account of considerations more paramount for the general welfare and
public interest, which exceptions after all would operate only during limited periods, that is,
during the duration of the election Campaign fixed in the charter itself and/or by law.
THE SUMMARY DISMISSAL BOARD AND THE REGIONAL APPELLATE BOARD,

DICANG V V. C/INSP. LAZARO TORCITA
Full Title of the Case: THE SUMMARY DISMISSAL BOARD AND THE REGIONAL APPELLATE
BOARD, PNP, REGION VI, ILOILO CITY, Petitioners, v. C/INSP. LAZARO TORCITA
G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE: G.R. No. 130442. April 6, 2000
Ponente: GONZAGA-REYES, J
Petition Filed: Petition for Review by way of Certiorari
FACTS: On 26 April 1994, a red Cortina Ford, driven by C/Insp. Lazaro Torcita, with his aide, PO2 Java, in the
front seat and his wife with two ladies at the backseat, were overtaken by a Mazda pick-up owned
byCongressman Manuel Puey and driven by one Reynaldo Consejo with four (4) passengers in the persons of
Alex Edwin del Rosario, Rosita Bistal, Carmen Braganza and Cristina Dawa.
After the Mazda pick-up has overtaken the red Cortina Ford, and after a vehicular collision almost took place,
it accelerated speed and proceeded to Hacienda Aimee, a sugarcane plantation owned by the congressman.
The red Cortina Ford followed also at high speed until it reached the hacienda where Torcita and Java alighted
and the confrontation with del Rosario and Jesus Puey occurred. Torcita identified himself but the same had
no effect.
PO2 Java whispered to him that there are armed men around them and that it is dangerous for them to
continue. That at this point, they radioed for back-up.
Torcita, upon the arrival of the back-up force of PNP Cadiz City, proceeded to the place where Capt. Jesus Puey
and Alex Edwin del Rosario were.
On 6 July 1994, 12 verified administrative complaints were filed against Torcita for Conduct Unbecoming of a
Police Officer, Illegal Search, Grave Abuse of Authority and Violation of Domicile, and Abuse of Authority and
Violation of COMELEC Gun Ban.The 12 administrative complaints were consolidated into 1 major complaint
for conduct unbecoming of a police officer.
The Summary Dismissal Board, however, did not find sufficient evidence to establish that Torcita threatened
anybody with a gun, nor that a serious confrontation took place between the parties, nor that the urinating
incident took place, and held that the charges of violation of domicile and illegal search were not proven. Still,
while the Board found that Torcita was "in the performance of his official duties" when the incident happened,
he allegedly committed a simple irregularity in performance of duty (for being in the influence of alcohol while
in performance of duty) and was suspended for 20 days and salary suspended for the same period of time.
Torcita appealed his conviction to the Regional Appellate Board of the Philippine National Police (PNP, Region
VI, Iloilo City), but the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Whereupon, Torcita filed a petition for certiorari in the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City (Branch 31),
questioning the legality of the conviction of an offense for which he was not charged (lack of procedural due
process of law). The Board filed a motion to dismiss, which was denied.
The RTC granted the petition for certiorari and annulled the dispositive portion of the questioned decision
insofar as it found Torcita guilty of simple irregularity in the performance of duty. The Board appealed from
the RTC decision, by petition of review to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the same for the reason that
the respondent could not have been guilty of irregularity considering that the 12 cases were eventually
dismissed.
Petitioner’s Allegation: Whereupon, Torcita filed a petition for certiorari in the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo
City (Branch 31), questioning the legality of the conviction of an offense for which he was not charged (lack of
procedural due process of law). The Board filed a motion to dismiss, which was denied.
Respondent’s Allegation: Torcita filed a petition for certiorari in the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City
(Branch 31), questioning the legality of the conviction of an offense for which he was not charged (lack of
procedural due process of law). The Board filed a motion to dismiss, which was denied.
Court a Quo (RTC) Ruling: The RTC granted the petition for certiorari and annulled the dispositive portion
of the questioned decision insofar as it found Torcita guilty of simple irregularity in the performance of duty
CA Ruling: The Board appealed from the RTC decision, by petition of review to the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed the same for the reason that the respondent could not have been guilty of irregularity considering
that the 12 cases were eventually dismissed.
ISSUE/S: Whether Torcita may be proceeded against or suspended for breach of internal discipline, when
the original charges against him were for Conduct Unbecoming of a Police Officer, Illegal Search, Grave Abuse
of Authority and Violation of Domicile, and Abuse of Authority and Violation of COMELEC Gun Ban.
HELD/RATIO - SC RULING (DOCTRINE/S): NO. Notification of the charges contemplates that the
respondent be informed of the specific charges against him. The absence of specification of the offense for
which he was eventually found guilty is not a proper observance of due process. There can be no short-cut to
the legal process. While the definition of the more serious offense is broad, and almost all-encompassing a
finding of guilt for an offense, no matter how light, for which one is not properly charged and tried cannot be
countenanced without violating the rudimentary requirements of due process.
Herein, the 12 administrative cases filed against Torcita did not include charges or offenses mentioned or made
reference to the specific act of being drunk while in the performance of official duty.
There is no indication or warning at all in the summary dismissal proceedings that Torcita was also being
charged with breach of internal discipline consisting of taking alcoholic drinks while in the performance of his
duties.
The omission is fatal to the validity of the judgment finding him guilty of the offense for which he was not
notified nor charged.Further, the cursory conclusion of the Dismissal Board that Torcita "committed breach of
internal discipline by taking drinks while in the performance of same" should have been substantiated by
factual findings referring to this particular offense. Even if he was prosecuted for irregular performance of
duty, he could not have been found to have the odor or smell of alcohol while in the performance of duty
because he was not on duty at the time that he had a taste of liquor because he was on a private trip fetching
his wife.
Hence , the decision of the petitioners Board was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction. Petition
dismissed.
113. AQUINO VS MUNICIPALITY OF MALAY AKLAN-NOTICE AND HEARING
Full Title of the Case: CRISOSTOMO B. AQUINO v. MUNICIPALITY OF MALAY, AKLAN

G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE: G.R. No. 211356/ September 29, 2014
Ponente: VELASCO JR., J.
Petition Filed: Petition for Review on Certiorari
FACTS: Boracay Island West Cove Management Philippines, Inc. applied for a building permit
covering the construction of a three-storey hotel over a parcel of land in Malay, Aklan, which is
covered by a Forest Land Use Agreement for Tourism Purposes (FLAgT) issued by the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). The Municipal Zoning Administrator denied
petitioner’s application on the ground that the proposed construction site was within the “no build
zone” demarcated in Municipal Ordinance 2000-131.
Petitioner appealed the denial action to the Office of the Mayor but despite follow up, no action was
ever taken by the respondent mayor.
A Cease and Desist Order was issued by the municipal government, enjoining the expansion of the
resort, and on June 7, 2011, the Office of the Mayor of Malay, Aklan issued the assailed EO 10,
ordering the closure and demolition of Boracay West Cove’s hotel.
EO 10 was partially implemented on June 10, 2011. Thereafter, two more instances followed wherein
respondents demolished the improvements introduced by Boracay West Cove.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for injunctive relief with the CA Alleging that the
order was issued and executed with grave abuse of discretion
Petitioner’s Allegation: 1) The hotel cannot summarily be abated because it is not a nuisance per
se, given the hundred million peso-worth of capital infused in the venture.2) Municipality of Malay,
Aklan should have first secured a court order before proceeding with the demolition
Respondent’s Allegation: The demolition needed no court order because the municipal mayor has
the express power under the Local Government Code (LGC) to order the removal of illegally
constructed buildings. respondents contended that the FLAgT does not excuse the company from
complying with the Ordinance and Presidential Decree No. 1096 (PD 1096), otherwise known as the
National Building Code of the Philippines. Respondents also argued that the demolition needed no
court order because the municipal mayor has the express power under the Local Government Code
(LGC) to order the removal of illegally constructed buildings.
CA Ruling: The CA dismissed the petition solely on procedural ground, i.e., the special writ of
certiorari can only be directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions and since the issuance of EO 10 was done in the exercise of executive functions, and not of
judicial or quasi-judicial functions, certiorari will not lie
ISSUE/S: Whether the judicial proceedings should first be conducted before the LGU can order the
closure and demolition of the property in question.
HELD/RATIO - SC RULING (DOCTRINE/S): HELD: The Court ruled that the property involved cannot
be classified as a nuisance per se which can therefore be summarily abated. Here, it is merely the
hotel’s particular incident, its location and not its inherent qualities that rendered it a nuisance.
Otherwise stated, had it not been constructed in the no build zone, Boracay West Cove could have
secured the necessary permits without issue. As such, even if the hotel is not a nuisance per se, it is
still a nuisance per accidens
Generally, LGUs have no power to declare a particular thing as a nuisance unless such a thing is a
nuisance per se. Despite the hotel’s classification as a nuisance per accidens, however, the LGU may
nevertheless properly order the hotel’s demolition. This is because, in the exercise of police power
and the general welfare clause, property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and
burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the government. Moreover, the Local Government Code
authorizes city and municipal governments, acting through their local chief executives, to issue
demolition orders. The office of the mayor has quasi-judicial powers to order the closing and
demolition of establishments.
PETITION IS DENIED
114

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
115

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
116

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
117

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
118

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
119 Philcomsat vs Alcuaz
Full Title of the Case: PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. JOSE
LUIS A. ALCUAZ, as NTC Commissioner, and NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,
respondents.
G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE: G.R. No. 84818 December 18, 1989
Ponente: REGALADO, J.
Petition Filed: petition seeks to annul and set aside an Order issued by respondent Commissioner
Jose Luis Alcuaz of the National Telecommunications Commission (hereafter, NTC)
FACTS: Herein petitioner is engaged in providing for services involving telecommunications. Charging
rates for certain specified lines that were reduced by order of herein respondent Jose
AlcuazCommissioner of the National Telecommunications Commission. The rates were ordered to be
reduced by fifteen percent (15%) due to Executive Order No. 546 which granted the NTC the power
to fix rates. Said order was issued without prior notice and hearing.
Under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5514, petitioner was exempt from the jurisdiction of the then
Public Service Commission, now respondent NTC. However, pursuant to Executive Order No. 196
issued on June 17, 1987, petitioner was placed under the jurisdiction, control and regulation of
respondent NTC
Petitioner’s Allegation: Questions the constitutionality of Executive Orders Nos. 546 and 196 on the
ground that the same do not fix a standard for the exercise of the power therein conferred.
Respondent’s Allegation: Assert that since petitioner is operating its communications satellite
facilities through a legislative franchise, as such grantee it has no vested right therein. What it has is
merely a privilege or license which may be revoked at will by the State at any time without
necessarily violating any vested property right of herein petitioner.
CA Ruling: n/a
ISSUE/S: Whether or Not E.O. 546 is unconstitutional.
HELD/RATIO - SC RULING (DOCTRINE/S): In Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Public Service
Commission the Supreme Court said that although the rule-making power and even the power to fix
rates- when such rules and/or rates are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout
the Philippines-may partake of a legislative character. Respondent Alcuaz no doubt contains all the
attributes of a quasi-judicial adjudication. Foremost is the fact that said order pertains exclusively to
petitioner and to no other
The respondent admits that the questioned order was issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions.
It, however, insists that notice and hearing are not necessary since the assailed order is merely
incidental to the entire proceedings and, therefore, temporary in nature but the supreme court said
that While respondents may fix a temporary rate pending final determination of the application of
petitioner, such rate-fixing order, temporary though it may be, is not exempt from the statutory
procedural requirements of notice and hearing
The Supreme Court Said that it is clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no authority to
make such order without first giving petitioner a hearing, whether the order be temporary or
permanent. In the Case at bar the NTC didn’t scheduled hearing nor it did give any notice to the
petitioner
120) Suntay vs People, 101 Phil 833
Suntay vs People
101 Phil 833
Facts: Emilio Suntay is facing criminal charges and flee the country. Private prosecutor
filed a motion praying the Court to issue an order “directing such government agencies as
may be concerned, particularly the NBI and DFA, for the purpose of having the accused
brought back to the Philippines so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law.
Court granted the motion and DFA Secretary and asked the Ambassador to USA to cancel
the passport issued to the petitioner and to compel him to return to the Philippines to
answer the criminal charges against him. Suntay wrote to the Secretary to reconsider the
action taken against him and and filed in the criminal case a motion praying that the
respondent Court reconsider its order. Both were denied hence the present petition.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner should be accorded notice and hearing prior the
cancellation of his passport?
Decision: Petition denied. Hearing would have been proper and necessary if the reason
for the withdrawal or cancellation of the passport were not clear but doubtful. But where
the holder of a passport is facing a criminal a charge in our courts and left the country to
evade criminal prosecution, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in the exercise of his
discretion to revoke a passport already issued, cannot be held to have acted whimsically
or capriciously in withdrawing and cancelling such passport. Due process does not
necessarily mean or require a hearing. When discretion is exercised by an officer vested
with it upon an undisputed fact, such as the filing of a serious criminal charge against the
passport holder, hearing maybe dispensed with by such officer as a prerequisite to the
cancellation of his passport; lack of such hearing does not violate the due process of law
clause of the Constitution
145. PJA VS PRADO- PUBLIC POLICY
Full Title of the Case: THE PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION vs. HON. PETE PRADO
G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE: 105371./ 11 Nov 1993
Ponente: Cruz, J.
FACTS: Petitioners assailed the validity of Sec 35 R.A. No. 7354 which withdraw the franking privilege
from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds,
along with certain other government offices.
Petitioner’s Allegation: The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on the grounds
that: (1) its title embraces more than one subject and does not express its purposes; (2) it did not
pass the required readings in both Houses of Congress and printed copies of the bill in its final form
were not distributed among the members before its passage; and (3) it is discriminatory and
encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary.
ISSUE/S: ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 35 of RA 7354 is constitutional.
HELD/RATIO - SC RULING (DOCTRINE/S): RULING:
No. SC held that Sec 35 R.A. No. 7354 is unconstitutional.
1. Article VI, Sec. 26(l), of the Constitution providing that "Every bill passed by the Congress shall
embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof."
The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as comprehensive
as to cover every single detail of the measure. It has been held that if the title fairly indicates the
general subject, and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead
the legislature or the people, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement.
We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies is germane to
the accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which is the creation of a more
efficient and effective postal service system. Our ruling is that, by virtue of its nature as a repealing
clause, Section 35 did not have to be expressly included in the title of the said law.
2. The petitioners maintain that the second paragraph of Sec. 35 covering the repeal of the franking
privilege from the petitioners and this Court under E.O. 207, PD 1882 and PD 26 was not included in
the original version of Senate Bill No. 720 or House Bill No. 4200. As this paragraph appeared only in
the Conference Committee Report, its addition, violates Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. The
petitioners also invoke Sec. 74 of the Rules of the House of Representatives, requiring that
amendment to any bill when the House and the Senate shall have differences thereon may be settled
by a conference committee of both chambers.
Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez laid down the rule that the enrolled bill, is conclusive upon
the Judiciary (except in matters that have to be entered in the journals like the yeas and nays on the
final reading of the bill). The journals are themselves also binding on the Supreme Court.
Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners' charges that an amendment
was made upon the last reading of the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and that copies
thereof in its final form were not distributed among the members of each House. Both the enrolled
bill and the legislative journals certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with
Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such official assurances from a coordinate
department of the government, to which we owe, at the very least, a becoming courtesy.
3. SC annuls Section 35 of the law as violative of Article 3, Sec. 1, of the Constitution providing that
no person shall "be deprived of the equal protection of laws."
It is worth observing that the Philippine Postal Corporation, as a government-controlled corporation,

was created and is expected to operate for the purpose of promoting the public service. While it may
have been established primarily for private gain, it cannot excuse itself from performing certain
functions for the benefit of the public in exchange for the franchise extended to it by the government
and the many advantages it enjoys under its charter. 14 Among the services it should be prepared to
extend is free carriage of mail for certain offices of the government that need the franking privilege
in the discharge of their own public functions.

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:

CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:

CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
SECRETO JNAng Tibay v CIR, 69 Phil 635 (1940)
Full Title of the Case: ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager and
proprietor, abd NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD,petitioners
vs.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC,
respondents.
Office of the Solicitor-General Ozaeta and Assistant Attorney Barcelona for the Court of
Industrial Relations.
Antonio D. Paguia for National Labor Union.
Claro M. Recto for petitioner “Ang Tibay”.
Jose M. Casal for National Workers’ Brotherhood.
G Tibay for National Worker’s Brotherhood
G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE: G.R. No. L-46496, February 27, 1940
Ponente: Laurel, J.
Petition Filed: Motion for Reconsideration
FACTS:
TeodoroToribio owns and operates AngTibay, a leather company which supplies the Philippine
Army. Due to alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the lay-off of a number of his employees.
However, the National Labor Union, Inc. (NLU) questioned the validity of said lay off as it averred
that employees laid off were members of NLU while no members of the rival labor union National
Workers Brotherhood (NWB) were laid off. NLU claims that NWB is a company dominated union
and Toribio was merely busting NLU.
The case reached the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) where Toribio and NWB won.
Eventually, NLU went to the Supreme Court invoking its right for a new trial on the ground of
newly discovered evidence. The Supreme Court agreed with NLU. The Solicitor General, arguing
for the CIR, filed a motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the National Labor Union, Inc. is entitled to a new trial.
Yes. The records show that the newly discovered evidence or documents obtained by
NLU, which they attached to their petition with the SC, were evidence so inaccessible to
them at the time of the trial that even with the exercise of due diligence they could not
be expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial
Relations. Further, the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching
importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and
reversal of the judgment rendered (said newly obtained records include books of
business/inventory accounts by AngTibay which were not previously accessible but
already existing).
The SC also outlined that administrative bodies, like the CIR, although not strictly bound
by the Rules of Court must also make sure that they comply to the requirements of due
process. For administrative bodies, due process can be complied with by observing the
following:
● The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected
to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.
● Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to
adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal
must consider the evidence presented.
● While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it
does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having
something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support
it is a nullity, a place when directly attached.
● Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the
evidence must be “substantial.” Substantial evidence is more than a mere
scintilla It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.
● The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at
least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
● The administrative body or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not
simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.
● The administrative body should, in all controversial questions, render its
decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the
various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The
performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
SERVAÑEZ 125. Montemayor v Araneta Univ. Foundation
Full Title of the Case:FELIX MONTEMAYOR, petitioner, vs. ARANETA UNIVERSITY FOUNDATION, JUAN
SALCEDO, JR., TOMAS DAVID, MARTIN CELINO, MARCELO AMIANA, as Members of the Panel of
Investigators, Members of the Board of Trustees, FR. ROMEO PELAYO and the HONORABLE
SECRETARY OF LABOR,
G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE: G.R. No. L-44251 May 31, 1977
Ponente: FERNANDO, J.:
Petition Filed: Petition for Certiorari
FACTS:
The Chaplain of Araneta University Foundation filed a complaint against Felix Montemayor, a fulltime
professor of AUF for immorality. Thus, the President of AUF created a committee to investigate such
charge. The first hearing was attended by Montemayor as well the Chaplain with his two witnesses.
The accusation centered on conversations on sex and immoral advances committed against Leonardo
de Lara. Montemayor was found morally responsible for the act complained of. The recommendation
was for his demotion in rank by one degree. The President adopted such recommendation and
thereafter referred the same to the Board of Trustees of AUF for appropriate action. Subsequently,
Professor Luis R. Almazan, Jaime Castaneda, and Jesus Martinez filed a new charges against
Montemayor for conduct unbecoming of a faculty member. Another investigation committee was
established. Then came his preventive suspension, ordered to last until the administrative investigation
was concluded. Montemayor filed a motion for the postponement of the hearing, but the same was
denied. The hearing proceeded in his absence. There was testimony by Professor Almazan and
Castaneda. Thereafter, the Committee submitted its report finding the charges against Montemayor
to have been sufficiently established and recommending to the President and the Board of Trustees of
the AUF his separation from the University, in accordance with Sections 116 and 351 of the Manual of
Policies of the University. AUF filed with the National Labor Relations Commission a report of his
suspension and application for clearance to terminate Montemayor’s employment. Meanwhile,
Montemayor filed a complaint with the NLRC against AUF for reinstatement and payment of back
wages and salaries, with all the privileges, benefits and increments attendant thereto; and for unfair
labor practice.
Labor Arbiter and NLRC Ruling:

The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC found in favor of Montemayor. He was ordered reinstated to his former
position with back wages and without loss of seniority and other privileges. However, his complaint for
unfair labor practice was, however, dismissed.
Secretary of Labor Ruling:

AUF appealed to Secretary of Labor, who, set aside the Commission's order for his reinstatement,
founding Montemayor’s dismissal justified, nor was he persuaded by the plea that there was denial of
due process. He was satisfied with the procedure followed by AUF. Moreover, he could not have
ignored the fact that the controversy between the parties was passed upon and the parties heard on
their respective contentions in the proceedings before the labor agencies. AUF was, however, required
to pay complainant the amount of P14,480.00 representing the latter's accrued back wages which the
former voluntarily offered to extend him.
Dissatisfied with the Secretary's decision, Montemayor filed a petition for certiorari, alleging that there
was a failure to comply with the procedural due process.
Issue:
Whether or not Montemayor was accorded with due process of law.
Ruling:
Montemayor was accorded with due process of law.
The procedure followed in the first investigation of petitioner, conducted in June of 1974, did satisfy
the procedural due process requisite. The same cannot be said of the November, 1974 inquiry when
the petitioner had to face anew a similar charge of making homosexual advances. As admitted in the
exhaustive comment of the Solicitor General: "On November 16, 1974, Montemayor, through counsel,
moved for the postponement of the hearing set for November 18 and 19, 1974 but the same was
rejected by the committee. The hearing proceeded as scheduled in the absence of Professor
Montemayor and his counsel. In said hearing, Prof. Luis Almazan and Jaime Castaneda testified. On
December 5, 1974, the Committee submitted its report finding the charges against Montemayor to
have been sufficiently established and recommending to the President and the Board of Trustees of
the Araneta University Foundation his separation from the University, in accordance with Sections 116
and 351 of the Manual of Policies of the University.
The legal aspect as to the procedural due process having been satisfied was then summarized by the
Solicitor General thus: "All the foregoing clearly shows that Montemayor was afforded his day in court.
Finally, and more significant, is the fact that Montemayor claims denial of due process in the
proceeding had before the investigating committees and not in the proceedings before the NLRC
wherein, as shown heretofore, he was given the fullest opportunity to present his case."
126 Meralco vs. PSC, 11 SCRA 317 (1964)
Full Title of the Case: MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner, vs. PUBLIC SERVICE
COMMISSION ETC., ET AL., respondents.
G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE: GR L-13638-40, 30 June 1964
Ponente: Paredes, J.
Petition Filed: Petition for review with preliminary injunction
FACTS: On 10 March 1955, the Manila Electric Company (Meralco) filed two applications with the Public
Service Commission (PSC), one, for revision and reduction of its rates for commercial and other
nonresidential customers for general lighting, heating and/or power purposes (PSC Case 85889) and
the other for revision and reduction of its residential meter rate, schedule RM-3 (PSC Case 85890).
These applications were approved by the PSC in a decision rendered on 24 September 1955. On 24
August 1955, the Meralco filed another application for revision and reduction of its general power rate,
Schedule GP-2 (PSC Case 89293), which was provisionally approved on 31 August 1955. Previous to
these applications, Meralco filed 7 other applications for revision and reduction rates. On 9 June 1954,
upon petition of Dr. Pedro Gil, the Commission requested the Auditor General to cause an audit and
examination of Meralco's books of accounts. The General Auditing Office (GAO) examined and audited
the books and under date of 11 May 1956, it presented a report which was submitted to the
Commission on 28 May 1956. On 30 May 1956, the PSC, thru Commissioner Feliciano Ocampo, reset
the hearing of the cases for 22 June 1956 "for the purpose of considering such further revision of
applicant's rates as may be found reasonable." On said date, the parties appeared and Atty. Venancio
L. de Peralta, Technical Assistant and Chief of the Finance and Rate Division of the PSC, who was duly
authorized to receive the evidence of the parties, announced that the hearing was an "informal
hearing", and its purpose was to hear any remarks or statements of the parties and to define the issues
"so that at the hearing we know exactly what are disputed at this informal hearing". Dr. Pedro Gil
submitted the 3 cases on the report of the GAO dated 11 May 1956 and on a letter dated 7 June 1956
he sent to the Commission, in which he asked the Commission, inter alia, to allow the Meralco "a rate
of return of only 8% on its invested capital.". The Solicitor General submitted the case on the same
report and letter of Dr. Gil and on a letter-report addressed by the Deputy Auditor General to the
Commission on 21 November 1955. Other parties made common cause with Dr. Gil. Meralco was given
by the Commission a period of 30 days within which to file an answer, specifying its objections to the
report of the GAO. On 31 July 1956, the Meralco filed its answer to the GAO's report, specifying its
objection, and prayed that the cases be reset for hearing to enable the parties to present their proofs.
On 27 December 1957, the PSC handed down a decision, granting the petition for the reduction of
rates. The motion for reconsideration and to set aside decision, filed on 14 January 1958 by Meralco,
was denied by the Commission on a 2 to 1 vote, on 3 March 1958. Meralco filed the petition for review
with preliminary injunction before the Supreme Court.
Petitioner’s Allegation: Without having (1) first reset the said 3 cases for hearing; (2) Without having
given the Meralco an opportunity, as requested by it, to cross-examine the officers of the GAO who
prepared the report dated May 11, 1956, on which report the Commission based its decision; and (3)
Without having given the Meralco an opportunity, as requested by it, to present evidence in support
of its answer to refute the facts alleged in said report and controverted by Meralco.
Court a Quo (PSC) Ruling: Granted the petition for the reduction of rates
ISSUE/S: Whether the informal hearing held 22 June 1956 serves the purpose of “proper notice and
hearing” in administrative cases.
HELD/RATIO - SC RULING (DOCTRINE/S): The record shows that no hearing was held. On 22 June 1956,
parties appeared before "Attorney Vivencio L. Peralta, Technical Assistant, and Chief, Finance and Rate
Division, Public Service Commission, who was duly authorized to receive the evidence of the parties",
and the record shows that the hearing held before the said Commissioner was merely an informal
hearing because, using his own words, "I said at the beginning that this is only preliminary because I
want that the parties could come to some kind of understanding." Meralco has not been given its day
in court. The decision of 27 December 1957 was not promulgated "upon proper notice and hearing",
as required by law, and that therefore it can not serve as a legal basis for requiring the Meralco to put
in effect the reductions ordered in the decision. It is the cardinal right of a party in trials and
administrative proceedings to be heard, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to
present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof and to have such evidence presented
considered by the tribunal. Even if the Commission is not bound by the rules of judicial proceedings, it
must how its head to the constitutional mandate that no person shall be deprived of right without due
process of law, which binds not only the government of the Republic, but also each and everyone of
its branches, agencies, etc. Due process of law guarantees notice and opportunities to be heard to
persons who would be affected by the order or act contemplated.
127

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
VICENTE ALCUAZ

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
129

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
152.) De la Cruz vs People
FACTS:
Complainants alleged that a certain Ariel Escobedo was picked up by several unknown
male persons believed to be police officers for allegedly selling drugs. Complainants
were instructed to proceed to the Gorordo Police Station. They met “James” at the
Police Station, who demanded from them P100,000.00 which was later lowered to
P40,000.00, in exchange for the release of Ariel.
The accused was nabbed after an entrapment operation was conducted. The accused
was later brought to the forensic laboratory where he was required to submit his urine
for drug testing. The test yielded a positive result for presence of dangerous drugs.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the drug test conducted upon the petitioner is legal. (NO)
HELD:
The drug test in Section 15 does not cover persons apprehended or arrested for any
unlawful act, but only for unlawful acts listed under Article II of the law.
The drug test was in violation of the petitioner’s right to privacy and right against self-
incrimination. It is incontrovertible that petitioner refused to have his urine extracted
and tested for drugs.
184.) People vs Omaweng
People vs Omaweng
213 SCRA 462
Facts:
In the morning of September 12, 1988, Joseph Layong, a PC constable with the Mt. Province PC
Command at Bontoc, Mt. Province proceeded with other PC soldiers to Barrio Dantay, Bontoc
and, per instruction of their officer, Capt. Eugene Martin, put up a checkpoint at the junction of
the roads, one going to Sagada and the other to. They stopped and checked all vehicles that
went through the checkpoint. At about 9:15 A.M., Layong and his teammate, Constable David
Osborne Famocod (sic), saw and flagged down a cream-colored Ford Fiera bearing Plate No.
ABT-634 coming from the Bontoc Poblacion and headed towards Baguio. The vehicle was driven
by appellant and had no passengers. Layong and his companions asked permission to inspect
the vehicle and appellant acceded to the request. When they peered into the rear of the vehicle,
they saw a travelling bag which was partially covered by the rim of a spare tire under the
passenger seat on the right side of the vehicle. Layong and his companions asked permission
to see the contents of the bag. Appellant consented to the request but told them that it only
contained some clothes. When Layong opened the bag, he found that it contained forty-one (41)
plastic packets of different sizes containing pulverized substances. Layong gave a packet to his
team leader, constable David Osborne Fomocod, who, after sniffing the stuff concluded that it
was marijuana. The PC constables, together with appellant, boarded the latter’s Ford Fiera and
proceeded to the Bontoc poblacion to report the incident to the PC The prohibited drugs were
surrendered to the evidence custodian, Sgt. Angel Pokling. Major Carlos Figueroa, a PC Forensic
Chemist at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet, who has conducted more than 2500
professional examinations of marijuana, shabu and cocaine samples, conducted two chemistry
examinations of the substance contained in the plastic packets taken from appellant and found
them to be positive for hashish or marijuana. A criminal complaint was filed against the accused
where the judge convicting the accused of the crime of transporting prohibited drugs penalized
under Section 4, Article II of R.A. No. 6425, as amended. Hence the appeal.
Issue: Whether the constitutional rights of the accused against unreasonable search was
violated even if he consented the opening of the said bag.
Held: He willingly gave prior consent to the search and voluntarily agreed to have it conducted
on his vehicle and travelling bag. Thus, the accused waived his right against unreasonable
searches and seizures. When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made of
(sic) his person or premises, he is precluded from later complaining thereof, he right to be secure
from unreasonable search may, like every right, be waived and such waiver may be made either
expressly or impliedly. “Since in the course of the valid search forty-one (41) packages of drugs
were found, it behooved the officers to seize the same; no warrant was necessary for such
seizure. Besides, when said packages were identified by the prosecution witnesses and later on
formally offered in evidence, the accused did not raise any objection whatsoever.
216. Malacat vs CA
Malacat vs Court of Appeals
Facts:
Petitioner was arrested for having in his possession a hand grenade after he was searched by a
group of policemen when he was said to be acting suspiciously when he was hanging around
Plaza Miranda with his eyes moving fast together with other Muslim-looking men. When the
policemen approached the group of men, they scattered in all directions which prompted the
police to give chase and petitioner was then apprehended and a search was made on his
person.
He was then convicted under PD 1866 in the lower court. Hence, the present petition wherein
petitioner contended that the lower court erred in holding that the search made on him and the
seizure of the hand grenade from him was an appropriate incident to his arrest and that it erred
in admitting the hand grenade as evidence since it was admissible because it was a product of
an unreasonable and illegal search.
Issue: WON the search and seizure conducted by the police was valid.
Held:
The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is that a warrant is needed in order to
validly effect the same. 31 The Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable arrests,
searches and seizures refers to those effected without a validly issued warrant, 32 subject to
certain exceptions. As regards valid warrantless arrests, these are found in Section 5, Rule 113
of the Rules of Court, which reads, in part:
Sec. 5. — Arrest, without warrant; when lawful — A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped . . .
A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) has been
denominated as one "in flagrante delicto," while that under Section 5(b) has been described as
a "hot pursuit" arrest.
Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the following: (1) customs searches;
(2) search of moving vehicles; (3) seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) consent searches; 33
(5) a search incidental to a lawful arrest;34 and (6) a "stop and frisk.’
At the outset, we note that the trial court confused the concepts of a "stop-and-frisk" and of a
search incidental to a lawful arrest. These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of
the requisite quantum of proof before they may be validly effected and in their allowable
scope.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the
incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g.,
whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. 36 In this instance, the
law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made — the process
cannot be reversed. 37 At bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer may search the
person of the arrestee and the area within which the latter may reach for a weapon or for
evidence to destroy, and seize any money or property found which was used in the
commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that which may be used as evidence, or
which might furnish the arrestee with the means of escaping or committing violence.
We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a "stop-and-frisk" as a "limited
protective search of outer clothing for weapons," as laid down in Terry, thus:
We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him
reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that
the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the
course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes
reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel
his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and
others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in
an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a
reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment . .
Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop
and frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and
frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer's experience and surrounding
conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him.
Finally, a "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime
prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under
appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of
investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more
pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to
assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that
could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.
248.) Social Justice Society vs Dangerous Drug Board
FACTS: In 2002, Republic Act No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 was
implemented. Section 36 thereof requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office,
students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and
persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with certain offenses.
In December 2003, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6486, prescribing the rules and regulations on the
mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office in connection with the May 10, 2004 synchronized
national and local elections. Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., a senator and a candidate for re-election in the May
elections, filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he seeks (1) to nullify Sec.
36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 dated December 23, 2003 for being
unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification for candidates for senators in addition to those already
provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to enjoin the COMELEC from implementing Resolution No.
6486.
According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five (5) qualifications for one to
be a candidate for, elected to, and be a member of the Senate. He says that both the Congress and
COMELEC, by requiring, via RA 9165 and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant, among other
candidates, to undergo a mandatory drug test, create an additional qualification that all candidates for
senator must first be certified as drug free. He adds that there is no provision in the Constitution
authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to expand the qualification requirements of candidates for
senator.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 36 of RA 9165 and Resolution 6486 are constitutional.
HELD: No. Pimentel’s contention is valid. Accordingly, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional. It is basic
that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void
and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid
if it conflicts with the Constitution. In the discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of
government have no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits
it imposes must be observed.
The provision “[n]o person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he
has undergone mandatory drug test” is not tenable as it enlarges the qualifications. COMELEC cannot,
in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or promulgating rules and regulations to
implement Sec. 36, validly impose qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what the
Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such additional
qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The right of a citizen in the
democratic process of election should not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not
otherwise specified in the Constitution.

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
ALONZO 11129. Non vs. Hon. Dames, G.R. No. 89317, May 30, 1990
Full Title of the Case: ARIEL NON, REX MAGANA, ALVIN AGURA, NORMANDY OCCIANO, JORGE
DAYAON, LOURDES BANARES, BARTOLOME IBASCO, EMMANUEL BARBA, SONNY MORENO, GIOVANI
PALMA, JOSELITO VILLALON, LUIS SANTOS, and DANIEL TORRES, petitioners, vs. HON. SANCHO DANES
II, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of 5th Regional Trial Court, Br. 38, Daet, Camarines Norte; and
MABINI COLLEGES, INC., represented by its president ROMULO ADEVA and by the chairman of the
Board of Trustees, JUSTO LUKBAN, respondents.
G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE: G.R. No. 89317 / May 20, 1990
Ponente: CORTES, J.
Petition Filed:
FACTS: Petitioners, students in private respondent Mabini Colleges, Inc. were not allowed to re-enroll
by the school for the academic year 1988-1989 for leading or participating in student mass actions
against the school in the preceding semester. The subject of the protests is not, however, made clear
in the pleadings.
The trial court dismissed the petition referring to the ruling in Alcuaz vs. PSBA stating, that being a
mere privilege and not a legal right for a student to be enrolled or re-enrolled, respondent Mabini
College is free to admit or not admit the petitioners for re-enrollment in view of the academic freedom
enjoyed by the school.
The respondents, in justifying their action, stated that 8 of the petitioners have incurred failing grades.
In response, the petitioners stated that: (a) three of them were graduating. (b) Their academic
deficiencies do not warrant non-readmission. (c) The improper conduct attributed to them was during
the exercise of the cognate rights of free speech and peaceable assembly. (d) There was no due
investigation that could serve as basis for disciplinary action. (e) Respondent school is their choice
institution near their places of residence, which they can afford to pay for tertiary education.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the school has the right not to re-admit the petitioners.
HELD/RATIO - SC RULING (DOCTRINE/S): The Supreme Court ruled that the trial court cannot anchor
the “Termination of Contract” theory the contract between the school and the student is not an
ordinary contract. It is imbued with public interest, considering the high priority given by the
Constitution to education and the grant to the State of supervisory and regulatory powers over all
educational institutions. It is intended merely to protect schools wherein tuition fees are collected and
paid on installment basis. It cannot be construed to mean that a student shall be enrolled for only one
semester.
The right of an institution of higher learning to set academic standards cannot be utilized to
discriminate against students who exercise their constitutional rights to speech and assembly, for
otherwise there will be a violation of their right to equal protection. It provides that every student has
the right to enroll in any school college or university upon meeting its specific requirements and
reasonable regulations; . . . and that “the student is presumed to be qualified for enrollment for the
entire period he is expected to complete the course, without prejudice to his right to transfer.”
The Student Does Not Shed His Constitutionally Protected Rights at the Schoolgate.
130

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
131

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
132

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
133

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
134

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
135

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
136

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
DE GUZMAN 137. Gallardo v. People, G.R. 142030, April 21, 2005
Full Title of the Case: ARTURO GALLARDO, PETER MELCHOR J. ARCHES, ALLAN B. AMPOLOQUIO,
CIRILO N. BACQUIANO, JOSUE M. RODAJE, BENJAMIN R. MACASAET, JR., VICTORINA DELOS
CIENTOS-MIRAL, RODOLFO M. CARTIN, QUIRINA T. SARTE, NORBERTO E. GOMEZ, GENEFREDO P.
ESPINA, NOEL GUINITA, AND OFELIA NACIONAL, Petitioners,  vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
SANDIGANBAYAN, HONORABLE ANIANO DESIERTO in his official capacity as OMBUDSMAN, AND
OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, Respondents.
G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE: G.R. No. 142030 / April 21, 2005
Ponente: CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Petition Filed: Appeal for petition for review of certiorari assailing the Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan denying petitioners’ Motion To Quash.
FACTS:
Public Health Workers of Davao del Sur filed letter-complaint in the Ombudsman against herein
Petitioners charging them with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 for their alleged
refusal to appropriate in the municipal budget the amount representing payment of the mandatory
statutory obligations of the Municipality of Bansalan (headed by Mayor Arturo Gallardo) accruing to
the complaining PHWs in the nature of unpaid salary differential and magna carta benefits.
Probable cause was found and information was filed stating that Gallardo caused undue injury to PHW
workers. Gallardo requested for reinvestigation. This was granted by Sandiganbayan, however
Ombudsman Desierto recommended his disapproval.
Petitioner filed a motion to quash on the ground that they were not accorded equal protection of the
law. They contend that similar cases were dismissed by Desierto previously and should be accorded
the same to the case at bar.
Sandiganbayan’s Ruling:
The Sandiganbayan denied petitioners’ motion. It ruled that the averments in the Information
sufficiently charged the offense, and that the mere fact that cases similar to this case were dismissed
by the Ombudsman does not mean due process or equal protection of the law clause was denied the
petitioners.
ISSUE/s: WON Ombudsman Desierto violated equal protection right of the petitioners on the ground
of not uniformly deciding similar cases.
No. The contention that petitioners’ right to equal protection of the law has been transgressed is
equally untenable. The equal protection clause requires that the law operates uniformly on all persons
under similar circumstances or that all persons are treated in the same manner, the conditions not
being different, both in privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. It allows reasonable
classification. If the classification is characterized by real and substantial differences, one class may be
treated differently from another. Simply because the respondent Ombudsman dismissed some cases
allegedly similar to the case at bar is not sufficient to impute arbitrariness or caprice on his part, absent
a clear showing that he gravely abused his discretion in pursuing the instant case. The Ombudsman
dismissed those cases because he believed there were no sufficient grounds for the accused therein to
undergo trial. On the other hand, he recommended the filing of appropriate information against
petitioners because there are ample grounds to hold them for trial. He was only exercising his power
and discharging his duty based upon the constitutional mandate of his office. Stated otherwise, the
circumstances obtaining in the numerous cases previously dismissed by the Ombudsman are entirely
divergent from those here existing.
Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
138

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:

CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
139

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:

CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
177. DIMAL VS PEOPLE-Particularity of description
Full Title of the Case: JAYLORD DIMAL and ALLAN CASTILLO, petitioners, vs . PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE: G.R. No. 216922/April 18, 2018.
Ponente: PERALTA, J
Petition Filed: petition for review on certiorari
FACTS: At around 6:00 p.m. of September 6, 2010, Lucio Pua, Rosemarie Pua and Gemma Eugenio
were scheduled to visit the compound of petitioner Jaylord A. Dimal in Echague, Isabela, to
negotiate for the sale of palay. At around 7:30 p.m., Lucio's nephew, Edison Pua, went to Dimal's
compound, asking for information as to the whereabouts of Lucio, Rosemarie and Gemma. Dimal
informed Edison that they had left an hour ago. Unable to locate his relatives, Edison went to the
police station in Alicia, Isabela, to report that they were missing, then proceeded to seek assistance
from the police station in Echague. Thereafter, Edison was escorted by two policemen to Dimal's
compound, where they allegedly stayed and observed the premises in the absence of Dimal until
September 7, 2010. On even date at around 5:30 a.m., Edison and the two policemen supposedly
searched without a warrant Dimal's compound, but found no evidence linking him to the
disappearances. On September 24, 2010, petitioner Allan Castillo was accosted by the Echague
Police, and allegedly tortured to implicate Dimal in the killing of Lucio, Rosemarie and Gemma. On
September 25, 2010, a certain Eduardo Sapipi was arrested due to the supposed statement made
by Castillo. Sapipi purportedly made an uncounseled confession that Dimal shot the three victims,
and ordered him, Castillo and one Michael Miranda to cover up the crime by throwing the bodies in
a river. On September 26, 2010, Dimal was arrested by the Echague Police. On September 27, 2010,
the Echague Police 􀁈led with the O􀁈ce of the Provincial Prosecutor of Ilagan, Isabela. October 8,
2010, Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Roy Michael S. Malixi, a commissioned officer of the Philippine
National Police assigned with the Police Anti- Crime and Emergency Response in Camp Crame
Quezon City, filed an Application for the Issuance of a Search Warrant 4before the RTC Ilagan,
Isabela, Branch 17, in connection with the kidnapping and multiple murder of Lucio, Rosemarie and
Gemma
Petitioner’s Allegation: They argued that the search warrant is invalid because it was issued in
connection with, not just one single offense, but two crimes, i.e., kidnapping and multiple murder.
They also contended that except for witness Ernesto Villador, applicant P/Insp. Malixi and witnesses
Edison and Shaira Mae have no personal knowledge surrounding the two crimes committed; hence,
their statements did not provide basis for a finding of probable cause, much less for the issuance of
a search warrant. Petitioners further posit that the search warrant was invalidly implemented
because the raiding team failed to comply with Section 8, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court on the
requisite presence of two witnesses during a search of premises, and with Section 10, Rule 126 on
the issuance of a receipt of seized properties. Finally, petitioners sought that the items seized which
are not covered by the search warrant, should be declared inadmissible in evidence and be ordered
returned to the accused
Respondent’s Allegation: P/Insp. Malixi stressed that he has personally verified and ascertained
the veracity of the information and found the same to be true and correct, as narrated and sworn
to by Ernesto Villador, a long-time employee of Dimal, Edison Uy Pua, the nephew of the victims
Lucio and Rosemarie Pua, and Shaira Mae Eugenio, daughter of the victim Gemma Eugenio. P/Insp.
Malixi claimed that the application was founded on his personal knowledge and that of his
witnesses, acquired after conducting surveillance and investigation.
Court a Quo (RTC) Ruling: the RTC of Quezon City denied the Motion to Quash Search Warrant No.
10-11 for lack of merit. The RTC ruled that a perusal of the application for search warrant reveals
that it was issued by the RTC of Ilagan, Isabela, after conducting searching and probing questions
upon the persons of the applicant P/Insp. Malixi, and his witnesses Edison, Shaira Mae and more
particularly Villador, and finding probable cause based on their personal knowledge
CA Ruling: perusal of the records show that Judge Ong, through searching and probing questions,
personally examined the (sic) P/Insp. Malixi and the witnesses, Edison Uy, Ernesto Villador and
Shaira Mae Eugenio, on 8 October 2010. The questions that Judge Ong propounded were sufficiently
probing, not at all superficial and perfunctory. The facts narrated by the witnesses while under oath,
when they were asked by the examining judge, were sufficient justification for the issuance of the
subject search warrant.
ISSUE/S: 1. that the search warrant is void and its quashal imperative; and 2. that the items seized
on the basis of the void search warrant are inadmissible in evidence
HELD/RATIO - SC RULING (DOCTRINE/S): The petition is partly meritorious. Search Warrant No. 10-
11 was validly issued, but most of the items seized pursuant thereto are inadmissible in evidence, as
they were neither particularly described in the warrant nor seized under the "plain view doctrine."
At the outset, there is no merit to petitioners' contention that the search warrant was applied for in
connection with two unrelated offenses, i.e., kidnapping and murder, in violation of Section 4, Rule
126 of the Rules of Court which requires that such warrant must be issued in relation to one offense.
Suffice it to state that where a person kidnapped is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention,
there is only one special complex crime for which the last paragraph of Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code provides the maximum penalty that shall be imposed, i.e., death. There is no dispute
that Search Warrant No. 10-11 was applied for and issued in connection with the crime of kidnapping
with murder. Records clearly show that Judge Ong personally examined under oath applicant P/Insp.
Malixi and his witnesses, Edwin, Shaira Mae and Villador, whose collective testimonies would
prompt a reasonably discreet person to believe that the crime of kidnapping with murder was
committed at the Felix Gumpal Compound on September 6, 2010, and that specific personal
properties sought in connection with the crime could be found in the said place sought to be
searched.
They assert that Felix Gumpal Compound consists of a very large area, consisting of two houses, one
nipa hut, two external bathrooms, one garage, one warehouse utilized as a palay depot, and one
warehouse utilized to store a palay drying machinery. They likewise claim that all the items actually
seized were either not among those listed in the warrant or were seized in violation of the "plain
view doctrine." Insisting that the search warrant was procured in violation of the Constitution and
the Rules of Court, petitioners posit that all the items seized in Dimal's compound are "fruits of the
poisonous tree" and inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding
Meanwhile, a search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized (1) when
the description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow; or (2) when the
description expresses a conclusion of fact — not of law by which the warrant officer may be guided
in making the search and seizure; (3) and when the things to be described are limited to those
which bear direct relation to the offenses for which the warrant is being issued sought to be seized
in connection with the special complex crime of kidnapping with murder, namely: (1) blood-stained
clothes of Gemma Eugenio consisting of a faded pink long sleeves jacket and a black t-shirt, and (2)
a 0.9mm caliber pistol. Having no direct relation to the said crime, the 1,600 sacks of palay that
were supposedly sold by the victims to Dimal and found in his warehouse, cannot be a proper
subject of a search warrant because they do not fall under the personal properties stated under
Section 3 of Rule 126, to wit: (a) subject of the offense; (b) stolen or embezzled and other proceeds
or fruits of the offense; or (c) those used or intended to be used as the means of committing an
offense, can be the proper subject of a search warrant.
141

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
142

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
143

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
144

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
145

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
146

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
147

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
148

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
149

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
150

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
151 Alvero vs. Dizon
Full Title of the Case: AURELIO S. ALVERO, petitioner, vs. ARSENIO P. DIZON, ET AL., respondent.
G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE: G.R. No. L-342 May 4, 1946
Ponente: DE JOYA, J.
Petition Filed: petition for certiorari with injunction
FACTS: On 12 February 1945, while the battle for Manila was raging, soldiers of the United States
Army, accompanied by men of Filipino Guerrilla Forces, placed Aurelio S. Alvero under arrest, having
been suspected of collaboration with the enemy, and seized and took certain papers from his house
in Pasay, Rizal.
On or about 4 October 1945, Alvero was accused of treason, in criminal case 3 of the People’s Court;
after which, on 1 December 1945, he filed a petition, demanding the return of the papers allegedly
seized and taken from his house. Alvero also filed a petition for bail, at the hearing of which the
prosecution presented certain papers and documents, which were admitted as part of its evidence,
and said petition was denied.
At the trial of the case on the merits, the prosecution again presented said papers and documents,
which were admitted as part of its evidence, and were marked as exhibits.
On 26 February 1946, the judges issued an order denying the petition for the return of the
documents, and admitted as competent evidence the documents presented by the prosecution. On
the same date that said order was issued, denying the petition for the return of said documents,
Alvero asked for the reconsideration of said order, which was also denied. Alvero filed a petition for
certiorari with injunction with the Supreme Court.
Petitioner’s Allegation: Objected to the presentation of said documents, and called the attention of
the respondent judges to the fact that he had filed a petition, in which he protested against the
procedure of the government in the seizure of said documents, and asked for their return to the
petitioner, alleging that their seizure was illegal and that their presentation would be tantamount to
compelling him to testify against himself
Respondent’s Allegation: Allege
(1) that petitioner himself has admitted the legality of the seizure of the documents in question in his
motion for reconsideration, dated February 26, 1946;
(2) that petitioner has not proven that said documents had been illegally seized for him;
(3) that the seizure of the documents in question took place, on February 12, 1945, in Pasay, Rizal,
which was then still a combat zone, and that the seizure of certain papers in the house of the
petitioner was made by soldiers of the United States Army of Liberation or its instrumentalities;
(4) that said seizure was effected lawfully under the terms of the proclamation of the Commander in
Chief of the United States Liberation Forces, dated December 29, 1944, in which he declared his
purpose to remove alleged collaborators, when apprehended, from any position of political and
economic influence in the Philippines and to hold them in restraint for the duration of the war;
(5) that the documents in question had been properly admitted as evidence for the prosecution in
criminal case No. 3, as herein petitioner, as accused in said case, had expressly waived his right to
object to their admissibility, particularly Exhibits A, FF, HH and P;
(6) that petitioner's evidence of alleged ownership, relative to Exhibits C, G, H, K, I, P, R, R-1 and R-2,
is altogether insufficient, and petitioner himself has expressly admitted that said documents are not
his personal papers but part of the files of the New Leaders' Association, which was proven to be an
organization created, for the purpose of collaborating with the enemy;
(7) and that none of the exhibits referred to in the petition has been satisfactorily identified by the
petitioner as included among the papers allegedly wrongfully seized from his house and belonging to
him.
CA Ruling: n/a
ISSUE/S: Whether the documents seized by United States Army personnel at Alvero’s home can be
used as evidence against the latter.
HELD/RATIO - SC RULING (DOCTRINE/S): The right of officers and men of the United States Army to
arrest Alvero, as a collaborationist suspect, and to seize his personal papers, without any search
warrant, in the zone of military operations, is unquestionable, under the provisions of article 4,
Chapter II, Section I, of the Regulations relative to the Laws and Customs of War on Land of the
Hague Conventions of 1907, authorizing the seizure of military papers in the possession of prisoners
of war; and also under the proclamation, dated 29 December 1944, issued by Gen. Douglas
MacArthur, as Commander in Chief of the United States Army, declaring his purpose to remove
certain citizens of the Philippines, who had voluntarily given aid and comfort to the enemy, in
violation of the allegiance due the Governments of the United States and the Commonwealth of the
Philippines, when apprehended, from any position of political and economic influence in the
Philippines and to hold them in restraint for the duration of the war.
The purpose of the constitutional provisions against unlawful searches and seizures is to prevent
violations of private security in person and property, and unlawful invasions of the sanctity of the
home, by officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction, and to give remedy against
such usurpations when attempted. But it does not prohibit the Government from taking advantage of
unlawful searches made by a private person or under authority of state law.
Herein, as the soldiers of the United States Army, that took and seized certain papers and documents
from the residence of Alvero, were not acting as agents or on behalf of the Government of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines; and that those papers and documents came into the possession of
the authorities of the Commonwealth Government, through the Office of the CIC of the United States
Army in Manila, the use and presentation of said papers and documents, as evidence for the
prosecution against Alvero, at the trial of his case for treason, before the People’s Court, cannot now
be legally attacked, on the ground of unlawful or unreasonable searches and seizures, or on any
other constitutional ground, as declared by the Supreme Court of the United States in similar cases.

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
SECRETO b Burgos v Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA 800 (1984)
Full Title of the Case: JOSE BURGOS, SR., JOSE BURGOS, JR., BAYANI SORIANO and J.
BURGOS MEDIA SERVICES, INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE CHIEF, PHILIPPINE
CONSTABULARY, THE CHIEF LEGAL OFFICER, PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY COMMAND,
THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, ET AL., respondents.
Lorenzo M. Tañada, Wigberto E. Tañada, Martiniano Vivo, Augusto Sanchez, Joker P.

Arroyo, Jejomar Binay and Rene Saguisag for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE: G.R. No. L-64261, December 26, 1984
Ponente: Escolin, J.
Petition Filed: Petition for certiorari prohibition and mandamus with preliminary
mandatory and prohibitory injunction
FACTS:
Respondent Judge issued two search warrants under which the business addresses of
the “Metropolitan Mail” and “We Forum” newspapers were searched, and office and
printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in
printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous
papers, documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in the possession
and control of petitioner, publisher-editor of the “We Forum” newspaper, were seized.
The issuance was upon application of an intelligence officer and the joint affidavit of
two members of the team which conducted a surveillance of the premises prior to the
filling of the application for the search warrant.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not there was sufficient basis for the finding of a probable cause
upon which a warrant may validly issue.
No. Mere generalization will not suffice. The broad statement in Col. Abadilla’s
application is a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirements of
probable cause. Bereft of such particulars as would justify a finding of the existence of
probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search
warrant and it was grave error for respondent judge to have done so. Equally insufficient
as basis for the determination of probable cause is the statement contained in the joint
affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango. The Constitution requires no
less than knowledge by the complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the
issuance of a search warrant may be justified.
SERVAÑEZ 157. Chandler v. Miller, April 25, 1997, D-96-126
Full Title of the Case:Walker L. Chandler et. al. vs. Zell Miller, Governor of Georgia, et. al.
G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE:April 25, 1997, D-96-126
Ponente:Justice Ginsburg
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
A Georgia statute requires candidates for designated state offices to certify that they have
taken a urinalysis drug test within 30 days prior to qualifying for nomination or election and that the
test result was negative.
Petitioner’s Argument:
Libertarian Party nominees for state offices subject to the statute's requirements, filed an
action against the Governor and two officials involved in the statute's administration, asserting that
the drug tests violated their rights under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution.
Respondent’s argument:
Georgia contend that unlawful drug use is incompatible with holding high state office because
such drug use draws into question an official's judgment and integrity; jeopardizes the discharge of
public functions, including antidrug law enforcement efforts; and undermines public confidence and
trust in elected officials.
Issue:
Whether or not the statutory requirement, which effects a search, is reasonable.
Ruling:
The statutory requirement does not fit within the closely guarded category of constitutionally
permissible suspicionless searches.
To be reasonable under [Section 2 of the Bill of Rights], a search ordinarily must be based on
individualized suspicion of wrongdoing. (Vernonia, 515 US, at 652-653) But particularized exceptions
to the main rule are sometimes warranted based on "special needs, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement." (Skinner, 489 US,at 619) When such "special needs" are alleged, courts must undertake
a context-specific inquiry, examining closely the competing private and public interests advanced by
the parties. (Von Raab, 489 US, at 665-666)
Here, the statutory requirement of testing method is relatively noninvasive; therefore, if the
"special need" showing had been made, the State could not be faulted for excessive intrusion.
However, Georgia has failed to show a special need that is substantial-important enough to override
the individual's acknowledged privacy interest, sufficiently vital to suppress [Section 2 of the Bill of
Rights’] normal requirement of individualized suspicion.
158 11People v. Chua Ho San, 308 SCRA 432 (1999)
Full Title of the Case: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CHUA HO SAN @ TSAY HO
SAN, accused-appellant.
G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE: G.R. No. 128222 June 17, 1999
Ponente: DAVIDE, JR., C.J.
Petition Filed: Chua Ho San @ Tsay Ho San (hereafter CHUA) prays for his acquitttal and the reversal
of the judgment of 10 February 1997 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando, La Union,
Branch 66, finding him guilty of transporting, without appropriate legal authority, the regulated
substance methamphetamine hydrochloride
FACTS: In response to reports of rampant smuggling of firearms and other contraband, Chief of Police
Jim Lagasca Cid of Bacnotan Police Station, La Union began patrolling the Bacnotan coastline with his
officers. While monitoring the coastal area of Barangay Bulala, he intercepted a radio call at around
12:45 p.m. from Barangay Captain Juan Almoite of Barangay Tammocalao requesting for police
assistance regarding an unfamiliar speedboat the latter had spotted. According to Almoite, the vessel
looked different from the boats ordinarily used by fisherfolk of the area and was poised to dock at
Tammocalao shores. Cid and six of his men led by SPO1 Reynoso Badua, proceeded immediately to
Tammocalao beach and there conferred with Almoite. Cid then observed that the speedboat ferried a
lone male passenger, who was later identified as Chua Ho San. When the speed boat landed, the male
passenger alighted, carrying a multicolored strawbag, and walked towards the road. Upon seeing the
police officers, the man changed direction. Badua held Chua’s right arm to prevent him from fleeing.
They then introduced themselves as police officers; however, Chua did not understand what they’re
saying. And by resorting of “sign language”, Cid motioned with his hands for the man to open his bag.
The man acceded to the request. The said bag was found to contain several transparent plastics
containing yellowish crystalline substances, which was later identified to be methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu. Chua was then brought to Bacnotan Police Station, where he was provided
with an interpreter to inform him of his constitutional rights.
Petitioner’s Allegation: The Solicitor General traverses CHUA's contentions by asserting that: (1) the
search was licitly conducted despite the absence of search and seizure warrants as circumstances
immediately preceding to and comtemporaneous with the search necessitated and validated the police
action; and (2) that there was an effective and valid waiver of CHUA's right against unreasonable
searches and seizures since he consented to the search.
Respondent’s Allegation: CHUA posits that the RTC erred in (1) admitting as competent evidence the
29 plastic packets of methamphetamine hydrochloride since they were indubitably "forbidden fruits;"
(2) granting weight and credence to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses despite glaring
inconsistencies on material points; and in (3) appreciating conspiracy between him and an organized
syndicate in the illicit commerce of prohibited drugs since this was not alleged in the information.
Court a Quo (RTC) Ruling: The RTC found that the prosecution successfully discharged its burden of
proving that CHUA transported 28.7 kilos of methamphetamine hydrochloride without legal authority
to do so. The RTC also believed that CHUA conspired not only with his alleged employer RONG and
the Captain of the 35-tonner vessel in the illegal trade of prohibited drugs on Philippine shores, but
with several other members of an organized syndicate bent on perpetrating said illicit traffic.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the warrantless arrest, search and seizure conducted by the Police Officers
constitute a valid exemption from the warrant requirement.
HELD/RATIO - SC RULING (DOCTRINE/S): NO
The Court explains that the Constitution bars State intrusions to a person's body, personal effects or
residence except if conducted by virtue of a valid of a valid search warrant issued in accordance with
the Rules. However, warrantless searches may be permitted in the following cases, to wit:
(1) search of moving vehicles,

(2) seizure in plain view,
(3) customs searches,
(4) waiver or consent searches,
(5) stop and frisk situations (Terry search), and
(6) search incidental to a lawful arrest.
It is required in cases of in flagrante delicto that the arresting officer must have personal knowledge of
such facts or circumstances convincingly indicative or constitutive of probable cause. Probable cause
means a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves
to warrant a cautious man's belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is
charged. In the case at bar, there are no facts on record reasonably suggestive or demonstrative of
CHUA's participation in on going criminal enterprise that could have spurred police officers from
conducting the obtrusive search. CHUA was not identified as a drug courier by a police informer or
agent. The fact that the vessel that ferried him to shore bore no resemblance to the fishing boats of
the area did not automatically mark him as in the process of perpetrating an offense. With these, the
Court held that there was no probable cause to justify a search incidental to a lawful arrest.
The Court likewise did not appreciate the contention of the Prosecution that there was a waiver or
consented search. If CHUA could not understand what was orally articulated to him, how could he
understand the police's "sign language?" More importantly, it cannot logically be inferred from his
alleged cognizance of the "sign language" that he deliberately, intelligently, and consciously waived
his right against such an intrusive search.
Finally, being a forbidden fruit, the subject regulated substance was held to be inadmissible in
evidence.
Hence, the accused was acquitted as the evidence was not sufficient to establish guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
ALONZO 16161. AAA v Carbonell
Full Title of the Case: AAA *, petitioner, vs. HON. ANTONIO A. CARBONELL, in his capacity as Presiding
Judge, Branch 27, Regional Trial Court, San Fernando City, La Union and ENGR. JAIME O. ARZADON,
respondents.
G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE: G.R. No. 171465 / 524 SCRA 496 / June 8, 2007
Ponente: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Petition Filed: This petition for certiorari1 assails the December 16, 20052 Order of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 27, San Fernando, La Union in Criminal Case No. 6983, dismissing the rape case filed
against private respondent Jaime O. Arzadon for lack of probable cause; and its February 3, 20063
Order denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
FACTS: Petitioner worked as a secretary at the Arzadon Automotive and Car Service Center. On May
27, 2001 at about 6:30 p.m., Arzadon asked her to deliver a book to an office located at another
building but when she returned to their office, the lights had been turned off and the gate was closed.
Nevertheless, she went inside to get her handbag.
On her way out, she saw Arzadon standing beside a parked van holding a pipe. He told her to go near
him and upon reaching his side, he threatened her with the pipe and forced her to lie on the pavement.
He removed her pants and underwear, and inserted his penis into her vagina. She wept and cried out
for help but to no avail because there was nobody else in the premises.
Petitioner did not report the incident because Arzadon threatened to kill her and her family. But when
she discovered that she was pregnant as a consequence of the rape, she narrated the incident to her
parents. On July 24, 2002, petitioner filed a complaint for rape against Arzadon.
private complainant failed to appear 4 consecutive orders to take the witness stand in order to satisfy
the judge for the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
Judge Carbonell dismissed Criminal Case No. 6983 for lack of probable cause on the ground that the
complainant and her witnesses failed to take the witness stand. He claims that under Section 2, Article
III of the 1987 Constitution, no warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause “to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce.”
ISSUE/S: Whether or not Judge Carbonell acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
criminal case for lack of probable cause.
It is clear therefore that respondent Judge Carbonell gravely abused his discretion in dismissing
Criminal Case No. 6983 for lack of probable cause on the ground that petitioner and her witnesses
failed to take the witness stand. Considering there is ample evidence and sufficient basis on record to
support a finding of probable cause, it was unnecessary for him to take the further step of examining
the petitioner and her witnesses. Moreover, he erred in holding that petitioner’s absences in the
scheduled hearings were indicative of a lack of interest in prosecuting the case. In fact, the records
show that she has relentlessly pursued the same.

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
DE GUZMAN 169. People v. Mamaril, G.R. 147607, January 22, 2004
Full Title of the Case: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,  vs.  BENHUR MAMARIL, appellant
G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE: G.R. No. 147607 / January 22, 2004
Ponente: AZUNA, J.
Petition Filed: Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the RTC finding appellant Benhur
Mamaril guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 81 of Republic Act (RA) No. 6425, as
amended by RA No. 7659.
SPO2 Chito Esmenda applied before the RTC for a search warrant authorizing the search for marijuana
at the family residence of appellant Mamaril. During the search operation, the searching team
confiscated sachets of suspected marijuana leaves. Police officers took pictures of the confiscated
items and prepared a receipt of the property seized and certified that the house was properly searched,
which was signed by the appellant and the barangay officials who witnessed the search.
The PNP Crime Laboratory issued a report finding the seized specimens positive for the presence of
marijuana. Moreover, the examination on the urine sample of appellant affirmed that it was positive
for the same.
Appellant denied that he was residing at his parent’s house, and that he was at his parent’s house when
the search was conducted only because he visited his mother. He also said that he saw the Receipt of
Property Seized for the first time during the trial, although he admitted that the signature on the
certification that the house was properly search was his.
RTC Ruling:
The prosecution having established beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused of the crime of
possession of marijuana defined and penalized under Section 8 of RA 6425, as amended, this Court in
the absence of any modifying circumstances, hereby sentences said accused to suffer the penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay a fine of P500K, plus costs of this suit.
ISSUE/s: WON the trial court erred in issuing a search warrant.
YES. Appellant’s contention is meritorious.
The issuance of a search warrant is justified only upon a finding of probable cause.
Probable cause for a search has been defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the
objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.
In determining the existence of probable cause, it is required that:
● The judge must examine the complaint and his witnesses personally
● The examination must be under oath
● The examination must be reduced in writing in the form of searching questions and answers
The prosecution failed to prove that Executive Judge Eugenio G. Ramos put into writing his examination
of the applicant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers before issuance of
the search warrant.
When the Branch Clerk of Court was required to testify on the available records kept in their office, he
was only able to present before the court the application for search warrant and supporting affidavits.
Neither transcript of the proceedings of a searching question and answer nor the sworn statements of
the complainant and his witnesses showing that the judge examined them in the form of searching
questions and answers in writing was presented. Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses
are not sufficient. Such written examination is necessary in order that the judge may be able to properly
determine the existence and non-existence of probable cause.
The search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of the Judge to conform with the essential
requisites of taking the depositions in writing and attaching them to the record, rendering the search
warrant invalid.
No matter how incriminating the articles taken from the appellant may be, their seizure cannot validate
an invalid warrant. Consequently, the evidence seized pursuant to an illegal search warrant cannot be
used in evidence against appellant.
The decision of the RTC is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Search Warrant is NULL and VOID and the search
and seizure made at appellant’s residence is illegal. For lack of evidence to establish appellant’s guilt
beyond reasonable doubt, appellant BENHUR MAMARIL is hereby ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED
from confinement unless he is being held for some other legal grounds.
170. Pita v CA, GR 80806, Oct 5, 1989
Full Title of the Case: LEO PITA doing business under the name and style of PINOY PLAYBOY,
petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, RAMON BAGATSING, and NARCISO CABRERA, respondents.
G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE: GR 80806 October 5, 1989
Ponente: Sarmiento, J.
Petition Filed:
FACTS:On December 1 and 3, 1983, pursuing an Anti-Smut Campaign initiated by the Mayor of
the City of Manila, Ramon D. Bagatsing, elements of the Special Anti-Narcotics Group,
Auxilliary Services Bureau, Western Police District, INP of the Metropolitan Police Force of
Manila, seized and confiscated from dealers, distributors, newsstand owners and peddlers
along Manila sidewalks, magazines, publications and other reading materials believed to be
obscene, pornographic and indecent and later burned the seized materials in public at the
University belt along C.M. Recto Avenue, Manila, in the presence of Mayor Bagatsing and
several officers and members of various student organizations.
Among the publications seized, and later burned, was "Pinoy Playboy" magazines published
and co-edited by plaintiff Leo Pita.
Plaintiff filed a case for injunction with prayer for issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction
against Mayor Bagatsing and Narcisco Cabrera, as superintendent of Western Police District of
the City of Manila, seeking to enjoin said defendants and their agents from confiscating
plaintiff’s magazines or from preventing the sale or circulation thereof claiming that the
magazine is a decent, artistic and educational magazine which is not per se obscene, and that
the publication is protected by the Constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the
press. Plaintiff also filed an Urgent Motion for issuance of a temporary restraining order
against indiscriminate seizure, confiscation and burning of plaintiff's "Pinoy Playboy"
Magazines, pending hearing on the petition for preliminary injunction.
Court a Quo (RTC) Ruling:The Court granted the temporary restraining order. The case was set
for trial upon the lapse of the TRO. RTC ruled that the seizure was valid.
CA Ruling:This was affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE/S:Whether or Not the seizure violative of the freedom of expression of the petitioner.
HELD/RATIO - SC RULING (DOCTRINE/S): Freedom of the press is not without restraint as the
state has the right to protect society from pornographic literature that is offensive to public
morals, as indeed we have laws punishing the author, publishers and sellers of obscene
publications. However, It is easier said than done to say, that if the pictures here in question
were used not exactly for art's sake but rather for commercial purposes, the pictures are not
entitled to any constitutional protection. Using the Kottinger rule: the test of obscenity is
"whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose
minds are open to such immoral influences and into whose hands a publication or other article
charged as being obscene may fall." Another is whether it shocks the ordinary andcommon
sense of men as an indecency. Ultimately "whether a picture is obscene or indecent must
depend upon the circumstances of the case and that the question is to be decided by the
"judgment of the aggregate sense of the community reached by it." The government authorities
in the instant case have not shown the required proof to justify a ban and to warrant
confiscation of the literature First of all, they were not possessed of a lawful court order: (1)
finding the said materials to be pornography, and (2) authorizing them to carry out a search
and seizure, by way of asearch warrant. The court provides that the authorities must apply for
the issuance of a search warrant from a judge, if in their opinion an obscenity seizure is in
order and that;
1. The authorities must convince the court that the materials sought to be seized are obscene
and pose a clear and present danger of an evil substantive enough to warrant State
interference and action;
2. The judge must determine whether or not the same are indeed obscene. The question is to
be resolved on a case-to-case basis and on the judge’s sound discretion;
171

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:

172

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:

173

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
174

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
175

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
176

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
177

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
178 178 Prudente vs. Judge Dayrit, 180 SCRA 69 (1989)
Full Title of the Case: DR. NEMESIO E. PRUDENTE, PETITIONER, VS. THE HON. EXECUTIVE JUDGE
ABELARDO M. DAYRIT, RTC MANILA, BRANCH 33 AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
On 1 November 1987, a Sunday and All Saints Day, the search warrant was enforced by some 200
WPD operatives led by P/Col. Edgar Dulla Torre, Deputy Superintendent, WPD, and P/Major Romeo
Maganto, Precinct 8 Commander.
In his affidavit,[4] dated 2 November 1987, Ricardo Abando y Yusay, a member of the searching
team, alleged that he found in the drawer of a cabinet inside the wash room of Dr. Prudente's office a
bulging brown envelope with three (3) live fragmentation hand grenades separately wrapped with
old newspapers, classified by P/Sgt. J.L. Cruz as follows: (a) one (1) pc. - M33 Fragmentation hand
grenade (live); (b) one (1) pc. - M26 Fragmentation hand grenade (live); and (c) one (1) pc. - PRB-423
Fragmentation hand grenade (live).
On 6 November 1987, petitioner moved to quash the search warrant. He claimed that (1) the
complainant's lone witness, Lt. Florenio C. Angeles, had no personal knowledge of the facts which
formed the basis for the issuance of the search warrant; (2) the examination of the said witness was
not in the form of searching questions and answers; (3) the search warrant was a general warrant, for
the reason that it did not particularly describe the place to be searched and that it failed to charge
one specific offense; and (4) the search warrant was issued in violation of Circular No. 19 of the
Supreme Court in that the complainant failed to allege under oath that the issuance of the search
warrant on a Saturday was urgent.[5]
ISSUE/S: WON warrantless arrest valid? No
For a valid search warrant to issue, there must be probable cause, which is to be determined
personally by the judge, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.[12] The probable cause must be in connection with one specific offense,[13] and
the judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions
and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and any witness he may produce, on facts
personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements together with any
affidavits submitted.[14]
The "probable cause" for a valid search warrant, has been defined "as such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed, and that objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be
searched."[15] This probable cause must be shown to be within the personal knowledge of the
complainant or the witnesses he may produce and not based on mere hearsay.[16]
Petitioner assails the validity of Search Warrant No. 87-14 on the ground that it was issued on the
basis of facts and circumstances which were not within the personal knowledge of the applicant and
his witness but based on hearsay evidence.
In his application for search warrant, P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw stated that "he has been
informed" that Nemesio Prudente "has in his control and possession" the firearms and explosives
described therein, and that he "has verified the report and found it to be a fact." On the other hand,
in his supporting deposition, P/Lt. Florenio C. Angeles declared that, as a result of their continuous
surveilance for several days, they "gathered informations from verified sources" that the holders of
the said fire arms and explosives are not licensed to possess them. In other words, the applicant and
his witness had no personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances which became the basis for
issuing the questioned search warrant, but acquired knowledge thereof only through information
from other sources or persons.
Petitioner also assails the validity of the search warrant on the ground that it failed to particularly
describe the place to be searched, contending that there were several rooms at the ground floor and
the second floor of the PUP.
The rule is, that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can,
with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended.[22] In the case at bar, the
application for search warrant and the search warrant itself described the place to be searched as the
premises of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines, located at Anonas St., Sta Mesa, Sampaloc,
Manila, more particularly, the offices of the Department of Military Science and Tactics at the ground
floor, and the Office of the President, Dr. Nemesio Prudente, at PUP, Second Floor and other rooms
at the second floor. The designation of the places to be searched sufficiently complied with the
constitutional injunction that a search warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched,
even if there were several rooms at the ground floor and second floor of the PUP.
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned orders dated 9
March 1988 and 20 April 1988 as well as Search Warrant No. 87-14 are hereby ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE.
179

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
180

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
181

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
182

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
183 Unilab vs Isip
UNITED LABORATORIES, INC., petitioner, vs. ERNESTO ISIP and/or SHALIMAR PHILIPPINES and/or
OCCUPANTS, Shalimar Building, No. 1571, Aragon Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, respondents.
G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE: G.R. No. 163858 June 28, 2005
Ponente: CALLEJO, SR., J.
FACTS: UNILAB hired a private investigator to investigate a place purported to be manufacturing fake
UNILAB products, especially Revicon multivitamins. The agent took some photographs where the
clandestine manufacturing operation was taking place. UNILAB then sought the help of the NBI,
which thereafter filed an application for the issuance of search warrant in the RTC of Manila. After
finding probable cause, the court issued a search warrant directing the police to seize “finished or
unfinished products of UNILAB, particularly REVICON multivitamins.” No fake Revicon was however
found; instead, sealed boxes where seized, which, when opened contained 60 ml bottles of Disudrin
and 200mg tablets of Inoflox, both were brands used by UNILAB. NBI prayed that some of the sized
items be turned over to the custody of the Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD) for examination. The
court granted the motion. The respondents then filed a motion to quash the search warrant or to
suppress evidence, alleging that the seized items are considered to be fruit of a poisonous tree, and
therefore inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding, which the petitioners opposed alleging
that the boxes of Disudrin and Inoflox were seized under the plain view doctrine. The court, however,
granted the motion of the respondents.
Petitioner’s Allegation: The petitioner asserts that the description in the search warrant of the
products to be seized – "finished or unfinished products of UNILAB" – is sufficient to include
counterfeit drugs within the premises of the respondents not covered by any license to operate from
the BFAD, and/or not authorized or licensed to manufacture, or repackage drugs produced or
manufactured by UNILAB. The petitioner asserts that the products seized were in plain view of the
officers; hence, may be seized by them. The petitioner posits that the respondents themselves
admitted that the seized articles were in open display; hence, the said articles were in plain view of
the implementing officers.
Respondent’s Allegation: The respondents, likewise, maintain that the raiding team slashed the
sealed boxes so fast even before respondent Isip could object. They argue that the seizure took place
at No. 1524-A, Lacson Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
220778, and not at No. 1571, Aragon Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila covered by TCT No. 174412 as stated in
the search warrant. They conclude that the petitioner failed to prove the factual basis for the
application of the plain view doctrine.
Court a Quo (RTC) Ruling: On May 28, 2004, the trial court issued an Order denying the motion for
reconsideration filed by UNILAB. The court declared that: The Search Warrant is crystal clear: The
seizing officers were only authorized to take possession of "finished or unfinished products of United
Laboratories (UNILAB), particularly REVICON Multivitamins, and documents evidencing the
counterfeit nature of said products. The Receipt/Inventory of Property Seized pursuant to the
warrant does not, however, include REVICON but other products. And whether or not these seized
products are imitations of UNILAB items is beside the point. No evidence was shown nor any was
given during the proceedings on the application for search warrant relative to the seized products.
CA Ruling: n/a
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the seizure of the sealed boxes which, when opened, contained Disudrin
syrup and Inoflox, were valid under the plain view doctrine.
HELD/RATIO - SC RULING (DOCTRINE/S): No. It is true that things not described in the warrant may
be seized under the plain view doctrine. However, seized things not described in the warrant cannot
be presumed as plain view. The State must adduce evidence to prove that the elements for the
doctrine to apply are present, namely: (a) the executing law enforcement officer has a prior
justification for an initial intrusion or otherwise properly in a position from which he can view a
particular order; (b) the officer must discover incriminating evidence inadvertently; and (c) it must be
immediately apparent to the police that the items they observe may be evidence of a crime,
contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure
It was thus incumbent on the NBI and the petitioner to prove that the items were seized on plain
view. It is not enough that the sealed boxes were in the plain view of the NBI agents. However, the
NBI failed to present any of officers who were present when the warrant was enforced to prove that
the the sealed boxes was discovered inadvertently, and that such boxes and their contents were
incriminating and immediately apparent. It must be stressed that only the enforcing officers had
personal knowledge whether the sealed boxes and their contents thereof were incriminating and
that they were immediately apparent. There is even no showing that the NBI agents knew the
contents of the sealed boxes before they were opened. In sum then, the petitioner and the NBI failed
to prove that the plain view doctrine applies to the seized items.
184

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:

185

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:

186

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:

187

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:

SECRETO Veroy v Layague, 210 SCRA 97 (1992)
Full Title of the Case: SPOUSES LEOPOLDO and MA. LUISA VEROY, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. WILLIAM L. LAYAGUE, Presiding Judge, Branch XIV, Regional Trial Court at
Davao City; and BRIG. GEN. PANTALEON DUMLAO, Commanding General, PC-
Criminal Investigation Service, respondents.
Ponente: Paras, J.
Petition Filed: petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court
FACTS:
Spouses Veroy of Davao City moved in to Quezon City. Their house in Davao was left to
the custody of a caretaker who only had keys to the kitchen. The Veroys had the keys
to the interior house. Capt. Obrero raided the house based on information that rebel
soldiers were allegedly hiding therein. With the help of the caretaker, the team of Capt.
Obrero was only able to enter until the yard since the owners were not around and they
do not have with them a search warrant. Mrs. Veroy was contacted and was informed
that the house was reportedly being used as a hideout and recruitment center of rebel
soldiers Mrs. Veroy then gave permission to search the house with the condition that
Major Macasaet, long-time family friend, must be there during the search.
Despite the qualified consent, the officers entered various rooms, including their
children’s room, and confiscated a .45 caliber gun and other effects, which were the
basis of the charge of illegal possession of firearms against them. Despite the fact that
the warrants for their arrest have not yet been served on them, petitioners voluntarily
surrender themselves to Brig. Gen. Pantaleon Dumlao, PC-CIS Chief, since it was the
CIS that initiated the complaint. However, the latter refused to receive them on the
ground that his office has not yet received copies of their warrants of arrest.
The spouses assailed the admissibility of the evidence for being obtained in violation
of their constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the evidence obtained is admissible in view of the qualified consent
given by Mrs. Veroy.

The evidence obtained is not valid and is thus inadmissible. The permission to enter a
house and search for persons and effects may be qualified, and the searching officer
may not act in excess of the authority granted to him.
Petitioners alleged that while Capt. Obrero had permission to enter their house, it was
merely for the purpose of ascertaining the presence of the alleged "rebel" soldiers. The
permission did not include the authority to conduct a room to room search inside the
house. The items taken were, therefore, products of an illegal search, violative of their
constitutional rights. As such, they are inadmissible in evidence against them.
The Court ruled that the case at bar does not fall on the exceptions for a warrantless
search. The reason for searching the house is that it was reportedly being used as a
hideout and recruitment center for rebel soldiers. While Capt. Obrero was able to enter
the yard, he did not enter the house because he did not have a search warrant and the
owners were not present. This shows that he himself recognized the need for a search
warrant, hence, he did not persist in entering the house but rather contacted the Veroys
to seek permission to enter the same. Permission was granted by Mrs. Veroy to enter
the house but only to ascertain the presence of rebel soldiers.
Under the circumstances the police officers had time to procure a search warrant but
they did not.
The Court also ruled that although the offense of illegal possession of firearms is a
malumprohibitum, it does not follow that the subjects may be seized simply because
they are prohibited. A search warrant is still necessary.
The rule having been violated and no exception being applicable, the articles seized
were confiscated illegally and are therefore protected by the exclusionary principle.
They cannot be used as evidence against the petitioners in the criminal action against
them for illegal possession of firearms.
189 Lopez and Velasco v. Commissioner of Customs
Full Title of the Case: JOSE G. LOPEZ and TOMAS VELASCO, vs.COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS,
COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS OF DAVAO, CHAIRMAN OF THE ASAC, ACTING DIRECTOR, NATIONAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION, CITY FISCAL OF DAVAO, SENIOR NBI AGENT OF DAVAO, EARL REYNOLDS, AND/OR
ANY OF THEIR AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.
G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE: 68 SCRA 320 (1975
Ponente: FERNANDO, J.:
Petition Filed: petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
FACTS:
At bar, petitioner questions the legality of the seizure made by the Collector of Customs of Davao of
the 1,408 sacks of copra and 86 sacks of coffee allegedly owned by the petitioners." Then came this
portion: "Petitioners claim that the 1,408 sacks of copra and 86 sacks of coffee in question were
purchased in Kiamba, Lumatin, and Lumasal, all in the province of Cotabato, from a certain Osmeña
Juanday. Petitioners contend that, inasmuch as the said goods were not imported and of foreign origin,
they are not legally subject to seizure and forfeiture. They likewise contend that the forfeiture made
by the Collector of Customs of Davao was invalid because the said forfeiture was based on documents
and papers which were illegally seized by agents of the Government through violence and intimidation.
Petitioner’s argument:
On the question of the search of the hotel room, the petition alleged that when the vessel was
searched, a combined team of Constabulary and Regional Anti-Smuggling Center operatives headed by
NBI agent Earl Reynolds raided the hotel room then being rented by Tomas Velasco without any search
warrant and in the absence at the time of such Tomas Velasco or the presence of any other person,
except one Teofila Ibañez, a mere manicurist of Davao City by occupation and "forcibly opened
luggages and boxes from which only several documents and papers were found, then seized,
confiscated and took away the same."
Respondent’s argument:
Responded denied the claim and contends that the evidence is sufficient to hold that the goods in
question came from Indonesia and subsequently brought to the Philippines in violation of our laws
and, therefore, subject to forfeiture; and that the Indonesian documents and papers allegedly secured
illegally by the combined team of NBI, PC and RASAC agents stationed in Davao, were in fact lawfully
and validly secured by them.
Issue:
WON the consent given by Teofila Ibañez is sufficient for a warrantless search and seizure?
Ruling:
Yes, the consent given by Teofila Ibañez, is valid.
The court held that there is this succinct restatement of what is embraced in the guarantee in the latest
case of Lim v. Ponce de Leon, with Justice Martin as ponente: "There can be no question that without
the proper search warrant, no public official has the right to enter the premises of another without his
consent for the purpose of search and seizure." It does not admit of doubt therefore that a search or
seizure cannot be stigmatized as unreasonable and thus offensive to the Constitution, if consent be
shown.
Here, there was an attempt on the part of petitioners to counteract the force of the above recital by
an affidavit of one Corazon Y. Velasco, who stated that she is the legal wife of Tomas Velasco, and
another by such petitioner himself reiterating such a fact and that the person who was present at his
hotel room was one Teofila Ibañez, "a manicurist by occupation ." Their effort appurtenant thereto is
doomed to failure. If such indeed were the case, then it is much more easily understandable why that
person, Teofila Ibañez, who could be aptly described as the wrong person at the wrong place and at
the wrong time, would have signified her consent readily and immediately. Under the circumstances,
that was the most prudent course of action. It would save her and even Velasco himself from any gossip
or innuendo. Nor could the officers of the law be blamed if they would act on the appearances. There
was a person inside who from all indications was ready to accede to their request. Even common
courtesy alone would have precluded them from inquiring too closely as to why she was there. Under
all the circumstances, therefore, it can readily be concluded that there was consent sufficient in law to
dispense with the need for a search warrant. The petition cannot, therefore, prevail.
190 Caballes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 136292, January 5, 2002
Full Title of the Case: RUDY CABALLES y TAIÑO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents
G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE: G.R. No. 136292 January 15, 2002
Ponente: PUNO, J.
Petition Filed: This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of respondent Court of Appeals dated
September 15, 1998 which affirmed the judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Santa Cruz,
Laguna, finding herein petitioner, Rudy Caballes y Taiño, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of theft, and the resolution dated November 9, 1998 which denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
FACTS: About 9:15 p.m. of 28 June 1989, Sgt. Victorino Noceja and Pat. Alex de Castro, while on a
routine patrol in Barangay Sampalucan, Pagsanjan, Laguna, spotted a passenger jeep unusually
covered with "kakawati" leaves. Suspecting that the jeep was loaded with smuggled goods, the two
police officers flagged down the vehicle. The jeep was driven by Rudy Caballes y Taiño. When asked
what was loaded on the jeep, he did not answer, but he appeared pale and nervous. With Caballes'
consent, the police officers checked the cargo and they discovered bundles of 3.08 mm
aluminum/galvanized conductor wires exclusively owned by National Power Corporation (NAOCOR).
The conductor wires weighed 700 kilos and valued at P55,244.45. Noceja asked Caballes where the
wires came from and Caballes answered that they came from Cavinti, a town approximately 8
kilometers away from Sampalucan. Thereafter, Caballes and the vehicle with the highvoltage wires
were brought to the Pagsanjan Police Station. Danilo Cabale took pictures of Caballes and the jeep
loaded with the wires which were turned over to the Police Station Commander of Pagsanjan, Laguna.
Caballes was incarcerated for 7 days in the Municipal jail. Caballes was charged with the crime of theft
in an information dated 16 October 1989. During the arraignment, Caballes pleaded not guilty and
hence, trial on the merits ensued.
Petitioner now comes to the Court contending that the flagging down of his vehicle by police officers
who were on routine patrol, merely on “suspicion” that “it might contain smuggled goods,” does not
constitute probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure.
Court a Quo (RTC) Ruling: On 27 April 1993, Regional Trial Court of Santa Cruz, Laguna rendered
judgment, finding Caballes, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of theft. In a resolution dated
9 November 1998, the trial court denied Caballes' motion for reconsideration.
CA Ruling: Affirmed the trial court decision
ISSUE/S: Whether Caballes’ passive submission to the statement of Sgt. Noceja that the latter "will
look at the contents of his vehicle and he answered in the positive" be considered as waiver on
Caballes’ part on warrantless search and seizure.
HELD/RATIO - SC RULING (DOCTRINE/S): Enshrined in our Constitution is the inviolable right of the
people to be secure in their persons and properties against unreasonable searches and seizures, as
defined under Section 2, Article III thereof. The exclusionary rule under Section 3(2), Article III of the
Constitution bars the admission of evidence obtained in violation of such right. The constitutional
proscription against warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute but admits of certain exceptions,
namely: (1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of
the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence; (2) seizure of evidence in plain view; (3) search of
moving vehicles; (4) consented warrantless search; (5) customs search; (6) stop and frisk situations
(Terry search); and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances. In cases where warrant is necessary, the
steps prescribed by the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court must be complied with. In the
exceptional events where warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, or when the latter
cannot be performed except without a warrant, what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search
or seizure is purely a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances
involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause,
the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched and the character
of the articles procured. It is not controverted that the search and seizure conducted by the police
officers was not authorized by a search warrant. The mere mobility of these vehicles, however, does
not give the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct indiscriminate searches without warrants if
made within the interior of the territory and in the absence of probable cause. Herein, the police
officers did not merely conduct a visual search or visual inspection of Caballes' vehicle. They had to
reach inside the vehicle, lift the kakawati leaves and look inside the sacks before they were able to see
the cable wires. It thus cannot be considered a simple routine check. Also, Caballes' vehicle was flagged
down because the police officers who were on routine patrol became suspicious when they saw that
the back of the vehicle was covered with kakawati leaves which, according to them, was unusual and
uncommon. The fact that the vehicle looked suspicious simply because it is not common for such to be
covered with kakawati leaves does not constitute "probable cause" as would justify the conduct of a
search without a warrant. In addition, the police authorities do not claim to have received any
confidential report or tipped information that petitioner was carrying stolen cable wires in his vehicle
which could otherwise have sustained their suspicion. Philippine jurisprudence is replete with cases
where tipped information has become a sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless search and
seizure. Unfortunately, none exists in the present case. Further, the evidence is lacking that Caballes
intentionally surrendered his right against unreasonable searches. The manner by which the two police
officers allegedly obtained the consent of Caballes for them to conduct the search leaves much to be
desired. When Caballes' vehicle was flagged down, Sgt. Noceja approached Caballes and "told him I
will look at the contents of his vehicle and he answered in the positive." By uttering those words, it
cannot be said the police officers were asking or requesting for permission that they be allowed to
search the vehicle of Caballes. For all intents and purposes, they were informing, nay, imposing upon
Caballes that they will search his vehicle. The "consent" given under intimidating or coercive
circumstances is no consent within the purview of the constitutional guaranty. In addition, in cases
where the Court upheld the validity of consented search, it will be noted that the police authorities
expressly asked, in no uncertain terms, for the consent of the accused to be searched. And the consent
of the accused was established by clear and positive proof. Neither can Caballes' passive submission
be construed as an implied acquiescence to the warrantless search. Casting aside the cable wires as
evidence, the remaining evidence on record are insufficient to sustain Caballes' conviction. His guilt
can only be established without violating the constitutional right of the accused against unreasonable
search and seizure
191

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
192

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
AONZO 19193. Pollo vs Constantino-David, 659 SCRA 198
Full Title of the Case: BRICCIO "Ricky" A. POLLO, Petitioner, vs. CHAIRPERSON KARINA CONSTANTINO-
DAVID, DIRECTOR IV RACQUEL DE GUZMAN BUENSALIDA, DIRECTOR IV LYDIA A. CASTILLO, DIRECTOR
III ENGELBERT ANTHONY D. UNITE AND THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Respondents.
G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE: G.R. No. 181881, October 18, 2011
Ponente:
Petition Filed: This case involves a search of office computer assigned to a government employee who
was charged administratively and eventually dismissed from the service. The employee’s personal files
stored in the computer were used by the government employer as evidence of misconduct.
FACTS: On January 3, 2007 at around 2:30 p.m., an unsigned letter-complaint addressed to respondent
CSC Chairperson Karina Constantino-David which was marked "Confidential" and sent through a
courier service (LBC) from a certain "Alan San Pascual" of Bagong Silang, Caloocan City, was received
by the Integrated Records Management Office (IRMO) at the CSC Central Office. Following office
practice in which documents marked "Confidential" are left unopened and instead sent to the
addressee, the aforesaid letter was given directly to Chairperson David.
The letter alleged that an officer of the CSC has been lawyering for public officials with pending cases
in the CSC. Chairperson David immediately formed a team with a background in information
technology and issued a memorandum directing them “to back up all the files in the computers found
in the [CSC-ROIV] Mamamayan Muna (PALD) and Legal divisions.”
Several diskettes containing the back-up files sourced from the hard disk of PALD and LSD computers
were turned over to Chairperson David. The contents of the diskettes were examined by the CSC’s
Office for Legal Affairs (OLA). It was found that most of the files in the 17 diskettes containing files
copied from the computer assigned to and being used by the petitioner, numbering about 40 to 42
documents, were draft pleadings or letters in connection with administrative cases in the CSC and other
tribunals. On the basis of this finding, Chairperson David issued the Show-Cause Order, requiring the
petitioner, who had gone on extended leave, to submit his explanation or counter-affidavit within five
days from notice.
Petitioner’s Allegation: Petitioner filed his Comment, denying that he is the person referred to in the
anonymous letter-complaint which had no attachments to it, because he is not a lawyer and neither is
he "lawyering" for people with cases in the CSC. He accused CSC officials of conducting a "fishing
expedition" when they unlawfully copied and printed personal files in his computer, and subsequently
asking him to submit his comment which violated his right against self-incrimination. He asserted that
he had protested the unlawful taking of his computer done while he was on leave, citing the letter
dated January 8, 2007 in which he informed Director Castillo that the files in his computer were his
personal files and those of his sister, relatives, friends and some associates and that he is not
authorizing their sealing, copying, duplicating and printing as these would violate his constitutional
right to privacy and protection against self-incrimination and warrantless search and seizure. He
pointed out that though government property, the temporary use and ownership of the computer
issued under a Memorandum of Receipt (MR) is ceded to the employee who may exercise all attributes
of ownership, including its use for personal purposes. As to the anonymous letter, petitioner argued
that it is not actionable as it failed to comply with the requirements of a formal complaint under the
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (URACC). In view of the illegal search, the
files/documents copied from his computer without his consent is thus inadmissible as evidence, being
"fruits of a poisonous tree."
Respondent’s Allegation: On February 26, 2007, the CSC issued Resolution No. 07038211 finding prima
facie case against the petitioner and charging him with Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and Violation of R.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees).
CA Ruling: The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari after finding no grave abuse of discretion
committed by respondents CSC officials. The CA held that: (1) petitioner was not charged on the basis
of the anonymous letter but from the initiative of the CSC after a fact-finding investigation was
conducted and the results thereof yielded a prima facie case against him; (2) it could not be said that
in ordering the back-up of files in petitioner’s computer and later confiscating the same, Chairperson
David had encroached on the authority of a judge in view of the CSC computer policy declaring the
computers as government property and that employee-users thereof have no reasonable expectation
of privacy in anything they create, store, send, or receive on the computer system; and (3) there is
nothing contemptuous in CSC’s act of proceeding with the formal investigation as there was no
restraining order or injunction issued by the CA.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the search conducted and the copying of petitioner’s files without his
knowledge and consent lawful.
HELD/RATIO - SC RULING (DOCTRINE/S): Yes. The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in
this jurisdiction as a facet of the right protected by the guarantee against unreasonable search and
seizure under Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
The constitutional guarantee is not a prohibition of all searches and seizures but only of "unreasonable"
searches and seizures.
On the matter of government employees’ reasonable expectations of privacy in their workplace,

O’Connor teaches:
x x x Public employees’ expectations of privacy in their offices, desks, and file cabinets, like similar
expectations of employees in the private sector, may be reduced by virtue of actual office practices
and procedures, or by legitimate regulation. x x x The employee’s expectation of privacy must be
assessed in the context of the employment relation. An office is seldom a private enclave free from
entry by supervisors, other employees, and business and personal invitees. Instead, in many cases
offices are continually entered by fellow employees and other visitors during the workday for
conferences, consultations, and other work-related visits. Simply put, it is the nature of government
offices that others – such as fellow employees, supervisors, consensual visitors, and the general public
– may have frequent access to an individual’s office. We agree with JUSTICE SCALIA that
"[c]onstitutional protection against unreasonable searches by the government does not disappear
merely because the government has the right to make reasonable intrusions in its capacity as
employer," x x x but some government offices may be so open to fellow employees or the public that
no expectation of privacy is reasonable. x x x Given the great variety of work environments in the public
sector, the question of whether an employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy must be
addressed on a case-by-case basis.
194

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
195

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
196

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
197

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
198

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
198

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
199

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
200

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
DE GUZMAN 201. People vs. Libnao, et. al., G.R. No. 136860, January 20, 2003
Full Title of the Case: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,  vs.  AGPANGA LIBNAO y
KITTEN and ROSITA NUNGA y VALENCIA, accused.
G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE: G.R. No. 136860 / January 20, 2003
Ponente: PUNO, J.
Petition Filed: Appeal from the Decision of the RTC, finding appellant Agpanga Libnao and her co-
accused Rosita Nunga guilty of violating Article II, Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
The intelligence operatives of the PNP stationed in Tarlac, Tarlac began conducting surveillance
operation on suspected drug dealers in the area. They learned from their asset that a certain woman
from Tajiri, Tarlac and a companion from Baguio City were transporting illegal drugs once a month in
big bulks.
On October 20, 1996, at about 1AM, SPO1 Gamotea and PO3 Ferrer flagged down a passing tricycle. It
had two female passengers seated inside, who were later identified as the herein appellant and her
co-accused. In front of them was a black bag. Suspicious of the black bag and the two’s uneasy behavior
when asked about its ownership and content, the officers invited them to Kabayan Center No. 2. Upon
reaching the center, PO3 Ferrer fetched Brgy. Captain Pascual to witness the opening of the black bag.
As soon as the Brgy. Captain arrived, the black bag was opened in the presence of the appellant, her
co-accused and personnel of the center. Found inside were eight bricks of leaves sealed in plastic bags
and covered with newspaper.
The seized articles were later brought to the PNP Crime Lab in Pampanga. Forensic Chemist Babu
conducted a laboratory examination and concluded that the articles were Marijuana. For their part,
both accused denied the accusation against them.
Libnao argued that her arrest was unlawful, capitalizes on the absence of a warrant for her arrest.
RTC Ruling:
Both accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of violation of Article II, Section 4 of RA
6425 in relation to RA 7659, they are sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and
to pay a fine of P2M.
ISSUE/s: WON the warrantless arrest is valid and lawful.
YES. The Court is not persuaded by petitioners’ contentions.
It is clear that at the time she was apprehended, she was committing a criminal offense. She was
making a delivery or transporting prohibited drugs in violation of Article II, Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425.
Under the Rules of Court, one of the instances a police officer is permitted to carry out a warrantless
arrest is when the person to be arrested is caught committing a crime in flagrante delicto, thus:
Section 5. Arrest without Warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.
The instant appeal is DENIED. RTC decision is AFFIRMED.
202 People vs. Musa G.R. No. 96177. January 27,1993 (Vol 217 SCRA 597)
Full Title of the Case: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOJO
MUSA y SANTOS, ROBERT CARIÑO y FERRERAS, AUGUST DAYRIT y
HERNANDEZ, CESAR DOMONDON, JR. y SACRIZ, and MICHAEL GARCIA y
DELA CRUZ, Accused-Appellants.
G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE:G.R. NO. 170472 : July 3, 2009
Ponente: Brion, J.
Petition Filed:
FACTS: Mari Musa was accused and convicted guilty beyond reasonable doubt of selling marijuana
which is an illegal substance and trade. Musa appealed the trial court’s decision. He was arrested
after a buy bust operation conducted by Narcom agents Sgt. Jesus Belarga and Sgt. Amado Ani. Sgt.
Belarga instructed Sgt. Ani to conduct a surveillance and test-buy operation on the appellant at
Suterville, Zamboanga City on December 13, 1989, later that same day, Sgt. Ani went back to their
office and reported a successful operation and turned over to Sgt. Belarga one wrapper of
marijuana. Sgt. Belarga then organized a team to conduct a buy-bust operation the following day.
On December 14, 1989, Sgt. Belarga led a team of Narcom agents who went to Suterville,
Zamboanga City. Sgt. Belarga gave a P20.00 marked bill to Sgt. Ani which was to be used in the buy-
bust operation. Upon arrival of the Narcom agents in Suterville, Zamboanga City, Sgt. Ani
proceeded to the house of the appellant while some agents stayed in the vehicles and others
positioned themselves in strategic places. The appellant met Sgt. Ani and an exchange of articles
took place (the P20.00 bill for two parcels of newspaper wrapped marijuana). After the exchange,
Sgt. Ani approached the other Narcom agents and made the pre-arranged signal of raising his right
hand. The Narcom agents, accompanied by Sgt. Ani, went inside the house and made the arrest.
The agents searched the appellant and unable to find the marked money; they asked him where it
was. The appellant said that he gave it to his wife who was nowhere to be found. The Narcom
agents then conducted a search of the whole house in pursuit of the marked P20.00 bill. During
their search they seized a plastic bag in the kitchen, when they asked Musa about the contents of
the bag appellant replied he did not know. The Narcom agents then proceeded to examine the
contents of the bag which evidently contained marijuana. The Narcom agents confiscated the bag
of marijuana and arrested Mari Musa.
Court a Quo (RTC) Ruling: Mari Musa was convicted guilty by the trial courts.
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:Was Mari Musa’s right against unreasonable searches and seizures violated? Hence this
appeal
HELD/RATIO - SC RULING (DOCTRINE/S): No, Rule 126 Sec 12 of the Rules of court expressly
authorizes a warrantless search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest, thus: Sec. 12 Search incident
to lawful arrest – A person Lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything
which may be used as proof of the commission of an offence, without a search warrant. In a buy-
bust operation conducted to entrap a drug-pusher, the law enforcement agents may seize the
marked money found on the person of the pusher immediately after the arrest even without arrest
and search warrants. In the case at bar, the Narcom agents searched the person of the appellant
after arresting him in his house but found nothing. They then searched the entire house and, in the
kitchen found and seized a plastic bag hanging in the corner. The warrantless search and seizure, as
an incident to a suspect’s lawful arrest, may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to
include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. Objects in the “PLAIN VIEW” of
an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may
be presented as evidence. The “plain view” doctrine, may not, however be used to launch
unbridled searched and indiscriminate seizures nor to extend a general exploratory search made
solely to find evidence of defendant’s guilt. In the instant case, the appellant was arrested and his
person searched in the living room. Failing to retrieve the marked money which they hoped to find,
the Narcom agents searched the whole house and found the plastic bag in the kitchen which was
not withing their “plain view” when they arrested the appellant. Therefore, under the
circumstances of this case, the “plain view” doctrine does not apply and the marijuana contained in
the plastic bag was seized illegally and cannot be presented in evidence pursuant to Article III,
Section 3(2) of the Constitution. The exclusion of this particular evidence does not however
diminish, in any way the damaging effect of the other pieces of evidence presented by the
prosecution to prove that the appellant sold marijuana, in violation of Article II, Section 4 of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. It is held that by virtue of the testimony of Sgt. Ani and Sgt. Belarga
and the two wrappings of marijuana sold by the appellant to Sgt. Ani, among other pieces of
evidence, the guilt of the appellant of the crime charged had been proved beyond a reasonable
doubt. Wherefore, the appeal is DIMISSED and the judgment of the Regional Trial Court AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED
203

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
204

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
205

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
206

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
207

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
208

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
209. PEOPLE VS GATWARD- Enforcement of fishing, customs and immigration

209
laws
Full Title of the Case: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs . NIGEL RICHARD
GATWARD, and U AUNG WIN, accused, NIGEL RICHARD GATWARD , accused-appellant.
G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE: G.R. Nos. 119772-73/ 07 Feb 1997
Ponente: Regalado, J.
Petition Filed:
FACTS: The trial court handed down its verdict on March 3, 1995 finding both accused guilty as
charged, thus: In Criminal Case No. 94-6268, accused Nigel Richard Gatward is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of transporting, without legal authority therefor, 5,237.70 grams of heroin, a
prohibited drug, in violation of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659; and there being no
aggravating or mitigating circumstance shown to have attended the commission of the crime, he is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for thirty-five (35) years of reclusion perpetua and
to pay a fine of Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00).
In Criminal Case No. 94-6269, accused U Aung Win is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
importing or bringing into the Philippines 5,579.80 grams of heroin, a prohibited drug, without
being authorized by law to do so, contrary to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 6425, the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659; and in view of the presence of one (1)
mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty, without any aggravating circumstance to offset
it, he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for twenty-five (25) years of reclusion
perpetua and to pay a fine of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00).
Court a Quo (RTC) Ruling: WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 94-6268, accused Nigel Richard Gatward
is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of transporting, without legal authority therefor, 5,237.70
grams of heroin, a prohibited drug, in violation of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the decision and penalty imposed by the trial court violated the accused
constitutional or legal right?
HELD/RATIO - SC RULING (DOCTRINE/S): Finally, no constitutional or legal right of this accused is

violated by the imposition upon him of the corrected duration, inherent in the essence and concept,
of the penalty. Otherwise, he would be serving a void sentence with an illegitimate penalty born out
of a figurative liaison between judicial legislation and unequal protection of the law. He would thus
be the victim of an inadvertence which could result in the nullification, not only of the judgment and
the penalty meted therein, but also of the sentence he may actually have served. Far from violating
any right of U Aung Win, therefore, the remedial and corrective measures interposed by this opinion
protect him against the risk of another trial and review aimed at determining the correct period of
imprisonment. The trial court was also correct in rejecting the challenge to the admissibility in
evidence of the heroin retrieved from the bag of appellant. While no search warrant had been
obtained for that purpose, when appellant checked in his bag as his personal luggage as a passenger
of KLM Flight No. 806 he thereby agreed to the inspection thereof in accordance with customs rules
and regulations, an international practice of strict observance, and waived any objection to a
warrantless search. His subsequent arrest, although likewise without a warrant, was justified since
it was effected upon the discovery and recovery of the heroin in his bag, or in flagrante delicto.
The judgment of the court a quo, specifically with regard to the penalty imposed on accused-
appellant Nigel Richard Gatward in Criminal Case No. 94-6268 and that of accused U Aung Win in
Criminal Case No. 94-6269, is MODIFIED in the sense that both accused are sentenced to serve the
penalty of reclusion perpetua in its entire duration and full extent
210 People v. Johnson, G.R. No. 138881, December 18, 2000

210
FACTS:First. Accused-appellant claims that she was arrested and detained in gross violation of her
constitutional rights. She argues that the "shabu" confiscated from her is inadmissible against her
because she was forced to affix her signature on the plastic bags while she was detained at the 1st
RASO office, without the assistance of counsel and without having been informed of her
constitutional rights. Hence, she argues, the methamphetamine hydrochloride, or "shabu," should
have been excluded from the evidence.[17]
ISSUE/S: won warrantless arrest valid? Yes
HELD/RATIO - SC RULING (DOCTRINE/S): The contention has no merit. No statement, if any, was
taken from accused-appellant during her detention and used in evidence against her. There is,
therefore, no basis for accused-appellant's invocation of Art. III, §12(1) and (3). On the other hand,
what is involved in this case is an arrest in flagrante delicto pursuant to a valid search made on her
person.
The constitutional right of the accused was not violated as she was never placed under custodial
investigation but was validly arrested without warrant pursuant to the provisions of Section 5, Rule
113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) when in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
(b) when an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
The methamphetamine hydrochloride seized from her during the routine frisk at the airport was
acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures.
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or
property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which
expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.[19] Such recognition is implicit in airport
security procedures. With increased concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come
increased security at the nation's airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass
through metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely subjected
to x-ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious objects, physical searches
are conducted to determine what the objects are. There is little question that such searches are
reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests involved, and the
reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel.[20] Indeed, travelers are often notified
through airport public address systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets that they are subject
to search and, if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be subject to seizure.
These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional protections against
warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures.
The packs of methamphetamine hydrochloride having thus been obtained through a valid
warrantless search, they are admissible in evidence against the accused-appellant herein. Corollarily,
her subsequent arrest, although likewise without warrant, was justified since it was effected upon
the discovery and recovery of "shabu" in her person in flagrante delicto.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 110, finding accused-
appellant guilty of violation of §16 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, and imposing upon her the penalty
of reclusion perpetua is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the fine imposed on accused-
appellant is reduced to P50,000.00. Costs against appellant.
211
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Murdock 21215. Manalili vs. CA G.R. No. 113447 October 9, 1997

Full Title of the Case: ALAIN MANALILI y DIZON, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE: G.R. No. 113447 October 9, 1997
Ponente: Panganiban, J.
FACTS: At about 2:10 p.m. of 11 April 1988, policemen from the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Kalookan
City Police Station were conducting a surveillance along A. Mabini street, Kalookan City, in front of
the Kalookan City Cemetery. The policemen were Pat. Romeo Espiritu and Pat. Anger Lumabas and a
driver named Arnold Enriquez was driving a Tamaraw vehicle which was the official car of the Police
Station of Kalookan City. The surveillance was being made because of information that drug addicts
were roaming the area in front of the Kalookan City Cemetery. Upon reaching the Kalookan City
Cemetery, the policemen alighted from their vehicle. They then chanced upon a male person in front
of the cemetery who appeared high on drugs.
The male person was observed to have reddish eyes and to be walking in a swaying manner. When this
male person tried to avoid the policemen, the latter approached him and introduced themselves as
police officers. The policemen then asked the male person what he was holding in his hands. The male
person tried to resist. Pat. Romeo Espiritu asked the male person if he could see what said male person
had in his hands. The latter showed the wallet and allowed Pat. Romeo Espiritu to examine the same.
Pat. Espiritu took the wallet and examined it. He found suspected crushed marijuana residue inside.
He kept the wallet and its marijuana contents. The male person was then brought to the Anti-Narcotics
Unit of the Kalookan City Police Headquarters and was turned over to Cpl. Wilfredo Tamondong for
investigation. Pat. Espiritu also turned over to Cpl. Tamondong the confiscated wallet and its suspected
marijuana contents. The man turned out to be Alain Manalili y Dizon. On 11 April 1988, Manalili was
charged by Assistant Caloocan City Fiscal E. Juan R.Bautista with violation of Section 8, Article II of
Republic Act 6425. Upon his arraignment on 21 April 1988, Manalili pleaded "not guilty" to the charge.
With the agreement of the public prosecutor, Manalili was released after filing a P10,000.00 bail bond.
Petitioner’s Allegation: Petitioner protests the admission of the marijuana leaves found in his
possession, contending that they were products of an illegal search.
Respondent’s Allegation: The Solicitor General, in his Comment dated July 5, 1994, which was
adopted as memorandum for respondent, counters that the inadmissibility of the marijuana leaves
was waived because petitioner never raised this issue in the proceedings below nor did he object to
their admissibility in evidence. He adds that, even assuming arguendo that there was no waiver, the
search was legal because it was incidental to a warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court.
Court a Quo (RTC) Ruling: After trial in due course, the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch
124, acting as a Special Criminal Court, rendered on 19 May 1989 a decision convicting appellant of
illegal possession of marijuana residue. Manalili remained on provisional liberty. Atty. Benjamin
Razon, counsel for the defense, filed a Notice of Appeal dated 31 May 1989.
CA Ruling: On 19 April 1993, the Court of Appeals denied the appeal and affirmed the trial court. The
appellate court denied reconsideration via its Resolution dated 20 January 1994. Manalili filed a
petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE/S: Whether a search and seizure could be effected without necessarily being preceded by an
arrest.
HELD/RATIO - SC RULING (DOCTRINE/S): In the landmark case of Terry vs. Ohio, a stop-and-frisk was
defined as the vernacular designation of the right of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street,
interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s).
In allowing such a search, the interest of effective crime prevention and detection allows a police
officer to approach a person, in appropriate circumstances and manner, for purposes of investigating
possible criminal behavior even though there is insufficient probable cause to make an actual arrest.
What justified the limited search was the more immediate interest of the police officer in taking steps
to assure himself that the person with whom he was dealing was not armed with a weapon that
could unexpectedly and fatally be used against him.
It did not, however, abandon the rule that the police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance
judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure, excused only by exigent
circumstances. In Philippine jurisprudence, the general rule is that a search and seizure must be
validated by a previously secured judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure is
unconstitutional and subject to challenge.
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, gives this guarantee. This right, however, is not
absolute. The recent case of People vs. Lacerna enumerated five recognized exceptions to the rule
against warrantless search and seizure, viz.: "
(1) search incidental to a lawful arrest,
(2) search of moving vehicles,
(3) seizure in plain view,
(4) customs search, and
(5) waiver by the accused themselves of their right against unreasonable search and seizure."
In People vs. Encinada, the Court further explained that in these cases, the search and seizure may be
made only with probable cause as the essential requirement. Stop-and-frisk has already been
adopted as another exception to the general rule against a search without a warrant.
In Posadas vs. Court of Appeals, the Court held that there were many instances where a search and
seizure could be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest, one of which was stop-
and-frisk. To require the police officers to search the bag only after they had obtained a search
warrant might prove to be useless, futile and much too late under the circumstances.
In such a situation, it was reasonable for a police officer to stop a suspicious individual briefly in order
to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo while obtaining more information, rather than
to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur.
Herein, Patrolman Espiritu and his companions observed during their surveillance that Manalili had
red eyes and was wobbling like a drunk along the Caloocan City Cemetery, which according to police
information was a popular hangout of drug addicts. From his experience as a member of the Anti-
Narcotics Unit of the Caloocan City Police, such suspicious behavior was characteristic of drug addicts
who were "high."
The policemen therefore had sufficient reason to stop Manalili to investigate if he was actually high
on drugs. During such investigation, they found marijuana in his possession. The search was valid,
being akin to a stop-and-frisk.
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SERVAÑEZ 221. Salvador v. People
Full Title of the Case: TOMAS SALVADOR,vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE: GR No. 146706, July 15, 2005
Ponente: Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.,
Petition Filed: Petition for Review
Facts:
A Special Mission Group from the PAF Special Operations Squadron conducted routine surveillance
operations at the Manila Domestic Airport to check on reports of alleged drug trafficking and smuggling
being facilitated by certain PAL personnel. Major Pagcaliuangan ordered Sgts. Teves and Ople to keep
close watch on the second airplane parked inside the Domestic Airport terminal. Thereafter, Sgt. Teves
reported that the three (3) persons who earlier boarded the Airbus 300 had disembarked with their
abdominal areas bulging. They then boarded an airplane tow truck with its lights off. The PAF
surveillance team promptly boarded their vehicles and followed the aircraft tow truck. At the Lima
Gate of the Domestic Airport, the team blocked and stopped the tow truck. Sgt. Teves then got off,
identified himself and asked the four (4) persons on board to alight. They were later identified as Tomas
Salvador, petitioner, Aurelio Mandin, Danilo Santos and Napoleon Clamor, the driver of the tow truck.
Sgt. Teves approached Aurelio Mandin. He noticed that Mandins uniform was partly open, showing a
girdle. While Sgt. Teves was reaching for the girdle, a package wrapped in brown packaging tape fell.
Suspecting that the package contained smuggled items, Sgt. Teves yelled to his teammates, Positive!
Thereupon, the rest of the team surrounded petitioner and his two co-accused who surrendered
without a fight. The team searched their bodies and found that the three were wearing girdles beneath
their uniforms, all containing packets wrapped in packaging tape. Mandin yielded five (5) packets, while
petitioner and Santos had four (4) each. The team confiscated the 13 packets containing assorted
smuggled watches and jewelries valued at more than half a million pesos and brought all the accused
to the PAFSECOM Office.
Consequently, they were charged with violation of Section 3601 of the Tariff and Customs Code.
All the accused denied committing the offense charged, claiming they were framed-up by the military.
Petitioner’s allegation:
Among four accused, only Salvador assailed the decision and contends that the warrantless search and
seizure conducted by the PAF operatives is illegal. Citing People v. Burgos,[9] he maintains that at the
time he and his co-accused were stopped by the PAF law enforces, they were unaware that a crime
was being committed. Accordingly, the law enforcers were actually engaged in a fishing expedition in
violation of his Constitutional right against unlawful search and seizure. Thus, the seized items should
not have been admitted in evidence against him.
Respondent’s argument
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that under the factual circumstances of the case at
bar, there was sufficient probable cause for the PAF surveillance team to stop and search petitioner
and his companions. They boarded the parked Air Bus 300 PAL plane at the time when there were no
other PAL personnel working therein. They stayed inside the plane for sometime and surprisingly, came
out with bulging waists. They then stopped and looked around and made apparent signals. All these
acts were sufficient to engender a reasonable suspicion that petitioner and his colleagues were up to
something illegal. Moreover, the search and seizure was conducted in connection with the
enforcement of customs law when the petitioner and his co-accused were riding a motor vehicle. In
addition, the search was conducted at the vicinity of Lima Gate of the Manila Domestic Airport which,
like every gate in the airport perimeter, has a checkpoint. Finally, the petitioner and his companions
agreed to the search after one of them was caught with a suspicious-looking packet. Under these
circumstances, the search and seizure is legal and the seized items are admissible in evidence.
RTC Ruling:
The trial court found the 4 accused guilty for the crime charged.
CA: Affirmed.
Issue
whether the search and seizure is valid? Whether the seized items are admissible in evidence?
Ruling:
Yes.
Sections 2 and 3(2), Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution provisions do not prohibit searches and seizures,
but only such as are unreasonable. Our jurisprudence provides for privileged areas where searches and
seizures may lawfully be effected sans a search warrant. These recognized exceptions include: (1)
search of moving vehicles; (2) search in plain view; (3) customs searches; (4) waiver or consented
searches; (5) stop-and-frisk situations; and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest. Here, it should be
noted that during the incident in question, the special mission of the PAF operatives was to conduct a
surveillance operation to verify reports of drug trafficking and smuggling by certain PAL personnel in
the vicinity of the airport. In other words, the search made by the PAF team on petitioner and his co-
accused was in the nature of a customs search. As such, the team properly effected the search and
seizure without a search warrant since it exercised police authority under the customs law.
Moreover, we recall that at the time of the search, petitioner and his co-accused were on board a
moving PAL aircraft tow truck. As stated earlier, the search of a moving vehicle is recognized in this
jurisdiction as a valid exception to the requirement for a search warrant. Such exception is easy to
understand. A search warrant may readily be obtained when the search is made in a store, dwelling
house or other immobile structure. But it is impracticable to obtain a warrant when the search is
conducted in a mobile ship, aircraft or other motor vehicle since they can quickly be moved out of the
locality or jurisdiction where the warrant must be sought.
222 People vs. De Gracia, 233 SCRA 716 (1994)
Full Title of the Case: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROLANDO DE GRACIA, CHITO
HENSON and JOHN DOES, accused. ROLANDO DE GRACIA, accused-appellant.
G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE: G. R. Nos. 102009-10 July 6, 1994
Ponente: REGALADO, J.
Petition Filed: Accused-appellant Rolando de Gracia was charged in two separate informations for
illegal possession of ammunition and explosives in furtherance of rebellion, and for attempted
homicide, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. Q-90-11755 and Q-90-11756, respectively, which were tried
jointly by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 103.
FACTS: In the early morning of December 1, 1989, Maj. Efren Soria of the Intelligence Division, National
Capital Region Defense Command, was conducting a surveillance of the Eurocar Sales Office located at
Epifanio de los Santos Avenue in Quezon City, together with his team. The surveillance, which actually
started on the night of November 30, 1989 at around 10:00 P.M., was conducted pursuant to an
intelligence report received by the division that said establishment was being occupied by elements of
the RAM-SFP as a communication command post. Sgt. Crispin Sagario, the driver of the car, parked the
vehicle around ten to fifteen meters away from the Eurocar building, had earlier alighted from the car
to conduct his surveillance on foot.
A crowd was then gathered near the Eurocar office watching the on-going bombardment near Camp
Aguinaldo. After a while, a group of five men disengaged themselves from the crowd and walked
towards the car of the surveillance team. At that moment, Maj. Soria, who was then seated in front,
saw the approaching group and immediately ordered Sgt. Sagario to start the car and leave the area.
As they passed by the group, then only six meters away, the latter pointed to them, drew their guns
and fired at the team, which attack resulted in the wounding of Sgt. Sagario on the right thigh. Nobody
in the surveillance team was able to retaliate because they sought cover inside the car and they were
afraid that civilians or bystanders might be caught in the cross-fire.
As a consequence, at around 6:30 A.M. of December 5, 1989, a searching team raided the Eurocar Sales
Office. They were able to find and confiscate the ff;
· Five (5) bundles of C-4 or dynamites
· Six (6) cartoons of M-16 ammunition at 20 each
· One hundred (100) bottles of MOLOTOV bombs
These were located and confiscated from the inside of one of the rooms belonging to a certain Col.
Matillano which is located at the right portion of the building. Sgt. Oscar Obenia, the first one to enter
the Eurocar building, saw appellant De Gracia inside the office of Col. Matillano, holding a C-4 and
suspiciously peeping through a door. De Gracia was the only person then present inside the room.
As a result of the raid, the team arrested appellant, as well as Soprieso Verbo and Roberto Jimena who
were janitors at the Eurocar building. They were then made to sign an inventory, written in Tagalog, of
the explosives and ammunition confiscated by the raiding team.
No search warrant was secured by the raiding team because, according to them, at that time there was
so much disorder considering that the nearby Camp Aguinaldo was being mopped up by the rebel
forces and there was simultaneous firing within the vicinity of the Eurocar office, aside from the fact
that the courts were consequently closed. The group was able to confirm later that the owner of
Eurocar office is a certain Mr. Gutierrez and that appellant is supposedly a “boy” therein.
Respondent’s Allegation: He cannot be held guilty of illegal possession of firearms because he did not
have either physical or constructive possession thereof considering that he had no intent to possess
the same; he is neither the owner nor a tenant of the building where the ammunition and explosives
were found; he was merely employed by Col. Matillano as an errand boy; he was guarding the
explosives for and in behalf of Col. Matillano; and he did not have actual possession of the explosives.
He claims that intent to possess, which is necessary before one can be convicted under Presidential
Decree No. 1866, was not present in the case at bar.
Court a Quo (RTC) Ruling: Trial court acquitted appellant Rolando de Gracia of attempted homicide,
but found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of illegal possession of firearms in
furtherance of rebellion and sentenced him to serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Moreover, it made a recommendation that “in as much as Rolando de Gracia appears to be merely
executing or obeying orders and pursuant to the spirit contained in the 2nd paragraph of Art. 135,
R.P.C., the court recommends that Rolando de Gracia be extended executive clemency after serving a
jail term of five (5) years of good behavior.”
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the case falls under one of the exceptions to the prohibitions againsta
warrantless arrest
HELD/RATIO - SC RULING (DOCTRINE/S): Yes. in People vs. Malmstedt, the Court ruled that “While it
is true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a search warrant when the search was made
over the personal effects of accused, however, under the circumstances of the case, there was
sufficient probable cause for said officers to believe that accused was then and there committing a
crime.”
“Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by this Court as valid,
because of existence of probable cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag
owned by the accused, or where the accused was acting suspiciously, and attempted to flee.”
“When NARCOM received the information, a few hours before the apprehension of herein accused,
that a Caucasian travelling from Sagada to Baguio City was carrying with him prohibited drugs, there
was no time to obtain a search warrant. In the Tangliben case, It was held that when faced with on-
the-spot information, the police officers had to act quickly and there was no time to secure a search
warrant.
“It must be observed that, at first, the NARCOM officers merely conducted a routine check of the bus
and the passengers therein, and no extensive search was initially made. It was only when one of the
officers noticed a bulge on the waist of accused, during the course of the inspection, that accused was
required to present his passport. The failure of accused to present his identification papers, when
ordered to do so, only managed to arouse the suspicion of the officer that accused was trying to hide
his identity. For is it not a regular norm for an innocent man, who has nothing to hide from the
authorities, to readily present his identification papers when required to do so.”
“The receipt of information by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in
his possession, plus the suspicious failure of the accused to produce his passport, taken together as a
whole, led the NARCOM officers to reasonably believe that the accused was trying to hide something
illegal from the authorities. From these circumstances arose a probable cause which justified the
warrantless search that was made on the personal effects of the accused. In other words, the acts of
the NARCOM officers in requiring the accused to open his pouch bag and in opening one of the
wrapped objects found inside said bag (which was discovered to contain hashish) as well as the two (2)
teddy bears with hashish stuffed inside them, were prompted by accused’s own attempt to hide his
identity by refusing to present his passport, and by the information received by the NARCOM that a
Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession. To deprive the NARCOM agents
of the ability and facility to act accordingly, including, to search even without warrant, in the light of
such circumstances, would be to sanction impotence and ineffectiveness in law enforcement, to the
detriment of society.”
Probable cause, Defined; Such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonable, discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the objects sought in connection
with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. The required probable cause that will justify a
warrantless search and seizure is not determined by any fixed formula but is resolved according to the
facts of each case.
223

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CONCEPCION 232. People vs. Racho, G.R. 186529, August 3, 2010
Full Title of the Case: People of the Philippines vs. Jack Racho y Raquero
G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE: G.R. No. 186529 / August 3, 2010
Ponente: Nachura, J.
Petition Filed: Appeal, Court of Appeals (CA) Decision dated May 22, 2008 in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 00425 affirming the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Joint Decision dated July 8, 2004 finding
appellant Jack Racho y Raquero guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 5, Article II of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165.
FACTS:
On May 19, 2003, a confidential agent of the police reported an information to the police
authorities regarding a transaction the former had made with Appellant Racho. The agent gave
Appellant Racho’s name, as well as his physical description, and that he would arrive in Baler Aurora
the following day. The police, acting on the information, assembled a team composed of members
from the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), the Intelligence group of the Philippine Army,
and the local police. The following day, May 20, 2003 at 11:00am, Appellant Racho called the agent
and informed him that he would be arriving at any time of the day wearing a red and white striped T-
shirt on board a Genesis Bus. At around 3:00pm on even date, a Genesis Bus arrived, and as Appellant
Racho alighted from the bus, the agent pointed him to the authorities as the one he transacted with.
As Appellant Racho was about board a tricycle, the team approached him and invited him to the police
station on suspicion of carrying shabu. Appellant Racho denied the accusation, but when he pulled out
his hands from his pocket, a white envelope containing a small sachet with the suspected drug.
Appellant Racho was charged with Violation of Sections 5 and 11 of R.A. 9165, Section 5 for
transporting and delivering, and Section 11 for possessing dangerous drugs.
During the trial of the criminal cases, Appellant Racho maintains that the charges against him
were false, no shabu was taken from him, and that he went to Baler, Aurora to visit his brother and tell
him of their ailing father. He argued while he was riding the tricycle, he was blocked and forced to
alight therefrom, then brought to Sea Breeze Lodge, stripped of his clothes and underwear, and then
brought to the police station.

On July 8, 2004, the RTC rendered a Joint Judgment convicting appellant of Violation of Section
5, Article II, R.A. 9165 and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine
of ₱500,000.00; but acquitted him of the charge of Violation of Section 11, Article II, R.A. 9165.
CA Ruling:
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision.
Appellant’s Argument:
Appellant Racho questions the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution. He argues that
the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the seized evidence (confiscated drug) due to the
team’s failure to mark the same immediately after seizure. Appellant Racho also questions, for the first
time, the validity of his arrest and the subsequent warrantless search, and the admissibility of the
confiscated sachet.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not “reliable information” from an informant alone is enough to establish probable
cause to effect a warrantless arrest?

Clearly, what prompted the police to apprehend appellant, even without a warrant, was the
tip given by the informant that appellant would arrive in Baler, Aurora carrying shabu. This
circumstance gives rise to another question: whether that information, by itself, is sufficient probable
cause to effect a valid warrantless arrest.
The long standing rule in this jurisdiction is that "reliable information" alone is not sufficient to
justify a warrantless arrest. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt act
that would indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense. We find no cogent reason to depart from this well-established doctrine.
“x x x [a]ppellant herein was not committing a crime in the presence of the police officers.
Neither did the arresting officers have personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested had committed, was committing, or about to commit an offense. At the time of the arrest,
appellant had just alighted from the Gemini bus and was waiting for a tricycle. Appellant was not acting
in any suspicious manner that would engender a reasonable ground for the police officers to suspect
and conclude that he was committing or intending to commit a crime. Were it not for the information
given by the informant, appellant would not have been apprehended and no search would have been
made, and consequently, the sachet of shabu would not have been confiscated.”
INADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE:
Obviously, this is an instance of seizure of the "fruit of the poisonous tree," hence, the
confiscated item is inadmissible in evidence consonant with Article III, Section 3(2) of the 1987
Constitution, "any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding."
Without the confiscated shabu, appellant’s conviction cannot be sustained based on the
remaining evidence. Thus, an acquittal is warranted, despite the waiver of appellant of his right to
question the illegality of his arrest by entering a plea and his active participation in the trial of the case.
As earlier mentioned, the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person
of the accused. A waiver of an illegal, warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the
inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest.
DE GUZMAN 233. Reyes v People, GR 229380, Jun 6, 2018
Full Title of the Case: LENIZA REYES Y CAPISTRANO, PETITIONER VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT
G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE: G.R. NO. 229380 / JUNE 06, 2018
Ponente: PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
Petition Filed: PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI filed by petitioner Reyes
assailing the Decision and Resolution of CA which affirmed the Decision of RTC finding Reyes guilty
beyond reasonable doubt in violating Sec. 11, Art. II of RA 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Act of
2002)
“Warrantless Arrests - Committed in the Presence of Police Officers”
FACTS/Respondent’s Allegation:
Police officers, including PO1 Monteras, were patrolling around Brgy. Looc, Cardona, Rizal when 2
teenagers approached and informed them that a woman with long hair and a dragon tattoo on her left arm had
just bought shabu in Brgy. Mambog. After a few minutes, a woman, later identified to be Reyes, who matched
the said description and smelled like liquor passed by the police officers. The latter asked if she bought shabu
and ordered her to bring it out. Reyes did not consent to the search, saying that the police officers cannot search
a woman. And at that point, she turned her back and pulled something from her breast area and held a small
sachet on her right hand. PO1 Monteras immediately confiscated the sachet and brought it to the police station
where he marked it. He also prepared the necessary documents, conducted the inventory and photography
before Brgy. Capt. Angeles. PO1 Monteras proceeded to the Rizal Provincial Crime Laboratory and turned over
the seized item for examination in which it was confirmed that the substance tested positive for 0.04 gram of
shabu.
Reyes alleged that she came from a drinking spree when she was blocked by 2 civilian men who ordered
her to bring out the shabu in her possession which she denied having. She was then brought to the police station
where the police officers extorted P35K from her in exchange for her freedom. But since she failed to give the
money, the police officers took her to Taytay for inquest proceedings.
Reyes further argues that no valid warrantless arrest took place as she did not do anything as to rouse
suspicion in the minds of the arresting officers that she had just committed, was committing, or was about to
commit a crime when she was just passing by.
RTC found Reyes guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of 0.11 gram of shabu. The RTC
ruled that the prosecution was able to prove that Reyes was validly arrested and thereupon, found to be in
possession of shabu, which she voluntarily surrendered to the police officers upon her arrest. Likewise, it
observed that the chain of custody of the seized item was sufficiently established through the testimony of PO1
Monteras, which was not ill-motivated.
CA Ruling:
CA affirmed Reyes’ conviction for the crime charged. It held that the search made on Reyes’ person
yielding the sachet of shabu was valid as she was caught in flagrante delicto in its possession and was legally
arrested on account thereof. The CA likewise found substantial compliance with the chain of custody rule and
that the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated item were properly preserved. It corrected the quantity
of shabu stated in the RTC’s dispositive portion to 0.04 gram in order to conform with the findings of PSI Villaraza
and accordingly, modified the penalty.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Reyes’ conviction for Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs under Sec. 11, Art. II of RA
9165 should be upheld.
No. In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5 (a), Rule 113, two (2) elements must concur: (a)
the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer.
The Court finds no lawful arrest was made on Reyes. PO1 Monteras admitted that Reyes passed by them
without acting suspiciously or doing anything wrong, except that she smelled liquor. As no other overt act could
be properly attributed to Reyes as to rouse suspicion in the mind of PO1 Monteras that she had just committed,
was committing, or was about to commit a crime, the arrest is bereft of any legal basis. The act of walking while
reeking of liquor cannot be considered as criminal act.
Section 5 (b), Rule 113 requires for its application that at the time of the arrest, the arresting officer had
personal knowledge of any fact or circumstance indicating that the accused had just committed a crime.
As ruled by the Court, hearsay tip itself does not justify a warrantless arrest. Law enforces must have personal
knowledge of facts, based on their observation, that the person sought to be arrested has just committed a crime.
In this case, records failed to show that PO1 Monteras had any personal knowledge that a crime had
been committed by Reyes, as in fact he even admitted that he merely relied on the 2 teenagers’ tip and that
everything happened by “chance”.
There being no lawful warrantless arrest – evidence – inadmissible.
Petition – GRANTED; Petitioner Reyes – ACQUITTED.
234 Luz v People
Full Title of the Case: RODEL LUZ y ONG, Petitioner vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent
G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE: 667 SCRA 421 430 (2012)
Ponente:Sereno, J.
Petition Filed: Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to set aside the Court of
Appeals (CA) Decision
FACTS:· On March 10, 2003 at around 3:00 o’clock in the morning, PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza,
who was then assigned as a traffic enforcer saw the accused, who was coming from the
direction of Panganiban Drive and going to Diversion Road, Naga City, driving a motorcycle
without a helmet; this prompted him to flag down the accused for violating a municipal
ordinance which requires all motorcycle drivers to wear helmet while driving said motor
vehicle, he invited the accused to come inside their sub-station since the place is almost in
front of the said sub-station.
He was alerted of the accused’s uneasy movement and thus asked to take out the contents of
the pocket of his jacket, as the latter may have a weapon inside it; the accused obliged and slowly
put out the contents of the pocket of his jacket which was a nickel-like tin or metal container
about two (2) to three (3) inches in size, including two (2) cellphones, one (1) pair of scissors and
one (1) Swiss knife; upon seeing the said container, he asked the accused to open it; after the
accused opened the container, he noticed a cartoon cover and something beneath it; and upon
his instruction, the accused spilled out the contents of the container on the table which turned
out to be four (4) plastic sachets, the two (2) of which were empty while the other two (2)
contained suspected shabu.
Petitioner’s Allegation: · Upon a petition for review on certiorari, petitioner claims that there
was no lawful search and seizure, because there was no lawful arrest. He claims that the
finding that there was a lawful arrest was erroneous, since he was not even issued a citation
ticket or charged with violation of the city ordinance. Even assuming there was a valid arrest,
he claims that he had never consented to the search conducted upon him.
Court a Quo (RTC) Ruling: · The RTC convicted petitioner of illegal possession of dangerous
drugs as the substances are positive of methampethamine hydrochloride.
CA Ruling: Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the RTCs Decision.
ISSUE/S: Whether the roadside questioning of a motorist, pursuant to a routine traffic stop can
be considered a formal arrest.
HELD/RATIO - SC RULING (DOCTRINE/S):There was no valid arrest. When the petitioner was
flagged down for committing a traffic violation, he was not, by the fact itself (ipso facto) and
solely for this reason, arrested. Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or
she may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. It is effected by an actual
restraint of the person to be arrested or by that person’s voluntary submission to the custody
of the one making the arrest. Neither the application of actual force, manual touching of the
body, or physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that there
be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other, and that there be an intent
on the part of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that submission is
necessary. There being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that resulted from it was
likewise illegal. The following are the instances when a warrantless search is allowed:
(i) a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;
(ii) search of evidence in “plain view;”
(iii) search of a moving vehicle;
(iv) consented warrantless search;
(v) customs search;
(vi) a “stop and frisk” search; and
(vii) exigent and emergency circumstances.
None of the above-mentioned instances, especially a search incident to a lawful arrest, are
applicable to this case.
The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are inadmissible. The drugs are the very
concrete evidence (corpus delicti) of the crime illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Thus,
their inadmissibility precludes conviction and calls for the acquittal of the accused
23235

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:

De Los Reyes 23236. People vs Gerente 219 SCRA 756 | 10 March 1993
People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Gabriel Gerente y Bullo; accused-appellant
GR No. 95847-48 | 219 SCRA 756 | 10 March 1993
Ponente: Grino-Aquino, J
Petition Filed: Appeal from the RTC Decision
FACTS: The Valenzuela Police Station received a report about a mauling incident. Upon learning at
the hospital that the victim died on arrival and being informed of the cause of death, the policemen
proceeded to the crime scene where they found a piece of wood with blood stains, a hollow block
and two roaches of marijuana. After being told by the eyewitness the identity of one of the three
assailants, the policemen went to appellant’s house where they introduced themselves, and
apprehended him and confiscated dried marijuana leaves.
Petitioner’s Allegation: His arrest was made without a warrant and that the seizure of the marijuana
leaves is not valid and should be inadmissible to the proceeding where the case is filed against him.
Respondent’s Allegation: That the arrest was valid and likewise the search.The policemen saw the
victim dead in the hospital and when they inspected the scene of the crime, they found the
instruments of death. The eyewitness reported the happening to the policemen and pinpointed her
neighbor, the appellant, as one of the killers. Under those circumstances, since the policemen had
personal knowledge of the violent death of the victim and of facts indicating that the appellant and
two others had killed him, they could lawfully arrest him without a warrant. If they had postponed his
arrest until they could obtain a warrant, he would have fled the law as his two companions did. The
search conducted on appellant’s person was likewise lawful because it was made as an incident to a
valid arrest.
Court a Quo (RTC) Ruling: RTC found the appellant guilty of Violation of Section 8 of Republic Act
6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a
term of twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to twenty (20) years, as maximum; and also
found him guilty of Murder for which crime he was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
CA Ruling: CA affirmed the appealed decision dismissing the petition.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the arrest is valid and likewise the search
HELD/RATIO - SC RULING (DOCTRINE/S): The search of appellant's person and the seizure of the
marijuana leaves in his possession were valid because they were incident to a lawful warrantless
arrest.
Paragraphs (a) and (b), Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court provide:
'SECTION 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without
a warrant, arrest a person:
"(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;"
"(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; . . .'
The search conducted on Gerente's person was likewise lawful because it was made as an incident to
a valid arrest. This is in accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court which
provides:
"SECTION 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. — A person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense,
without a search warrant."
The frisk and search of appellant's person upon his arrest was a permissible precautionary measure
of arresting officers to protect themselves, for the person who is about to be arrested may be armed
and might attack them unless he is first disarmed.
23237
Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
22238
Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
23239
Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
240
Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
241 . ROLITO GO V. CA G.R. No. 101837 February 11, 1992

Full Title of the Case: ROLITO GO y TAMBUNTING, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS;
THE HON. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO, Presiding Judge, Branch 168,
Regional Trial Court, NCJR Pasig, M.M.; and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE: G.R. 101837/ 11 FEB 1992
Ponente: FELICIANO, J.
Petition Filed: Review on Certiorari
FACTS: At the corner of Wilson and J. Abad Santos Sts., petitioner's and Eldon Maguan's cars nearly
bumped each other. Petitioner alighted from his car, walked over and shot Maguan inside his car.
Petitioner then boarded his car and left the scene. Having established that the assailant was probably
the petitioner, the police launched a manhunt for petitioner. Petitioner presented himself before the
San Juan Police Station to verify news reports that he was being hunted by the police; he was
accompanied by two (2) lawyers. The police forthwith detained him. An eyewitness to the shooting,
who was at the police station at that time, positively identified petitioner as the gunman. That same
day, the police promptly filed a complaint for frustrated homicide against petitioner with the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal. Provincial Prosecutor Ignacio informed petitioner, in the Presence of
his lawyers, that he could avail himself of his right to preliminary investigation but that he must first
sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner refused to execute
any such waiver. Petitioner posted bail, the prosecutor filed the case to the lower court, setting and
commencing trial without preliminary investigation. Prosecutor reasons that the petitioner has waived
his right to preliminary investigation as bail has been posted and that such situation, that petitioner
has been arrested without a warrant lawfully, falls under Section 5, Rule 113 and Section 7, Rule 112
of The 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides for the rules and procedure pertaining to
situations of lawful warrantless arrests. 2 days after and before the prosecutor filed the information in
court, Eldon Maguan died of gunshot wounds. Accordingly, instead of filing an information for
frustrated homicide, the prosecutor filed an information for murder before the RTC. No bail was
recommended. At the bottom of the information, the Prosecutor certified that no preliminary
investigation had been conducted because the accused did not execute and sign a waiver of the
provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code
Petitioner’s Allegation: Petitioner argues that he was not lawfully arrested without warrant because
he went to the police station six (6) days after the shooting which he had allegedly perpetrated. Thus,
petitioner argues, the crime had not been “just committed” at the time that he was arrested.
Moreover, none of the police officers who arrested him had been an eyewitness to the shooting of
Maguan and accordingly none had the “personal knowledge” required for the lawfulness of a
warrantless arrest. Since there had been no lawful warrantless arrest, Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules
of Court which establishes the only exception to the right to preliminary investigation, could not
apply in respect of petitioner.
Respondent’s Allegation: The trial court issued an Order granting leave to conduct preliminary
investigation and cancelling the arraignment set for 15 August 1991 until after the prosecution shall
have concluded its preliminary investigation. However, the respondent judge issued an order on July
17, 1991, recalling his bail, the leave to conduct P.I, and his omnibus for immediate release. Likewise,
the judge ordered the petitioner to surrender within 48 hours. Petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before the Supreme Court assailing the 17 July 1991 Order.
Petitioner contends that the information was null and void because no preliminary investigation had
been previously conducted, in violation of his right to due process. Petitioner also moved for
suspension of all proceedings in the case pending resolution by the Supreme Court of his petition;
this motion was, however, denied by respondent Judge
CA Ruling: the Court of Appeals rendered a consolidated decision dismissing the two (2) petitions
ISSUE/S:
1. whether or not a lawful warrantless arrest had been effected by the San Juan Police in respect of
petitioner Go;
2. whether petitioner had effectively waived his right to preliminary investigation
1. No. The Court does not believe that the warrantless “arrest” or detention of petitioner in the instant
case falls within the terms of Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which
provides as follows:
“Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person;
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in
accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.”
Petitioner’s “arrest” took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan. The “arresting” officers
obviously were not present, within the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time petitioner had allegedly
shot Maguan. Neither could the “arrest” effected six (6) days after the shooting be reasonably regarded
as effected “when [the shooting had] in fact just been committed” within the meaning of Section 5 (b).
Moreover, none of the “arresting” officers had any “personal knowledge” of facts indicating that
petitioner was the gunman who had shot Maguan. The information upon which the police acted had
been derived from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting — one stated that
petitioner was the gunman; another was able to take down the alleged gunman’s car’s plate number
which turned out to be registered in petitioner’s wife’s name. That information did not, however,
constitute “personal knowledge.”
Court held that there was no lawful warrantless arrest of petitioner within the meaning of Section 5 of
Rule 113.
2. No. In the circumstances of this case, the Court does not believe that by posting bail, petitioner had
waived his right to preliminary investigation. In People v. Selfaison, the Court held that appellants there
had waived their right to preliminary investigation because immediately after their arrest, they filed
bail and proceeded to trial “without previously claiming that they did not have the benefit of a
preliminary investigation.”
In the instant case, petitioner Go asked for release on recognizance or on bail and for preliminary
investigation in one omnibus motion. He had thus claimed his right to preliminary investigation before
respondent Judge approved the cash bond posted by petitioner and ordered his release on 12 July
1991. Accordingly, the Court cannot reasonably imply waiver of preliminary investigation on the part
of petitioner. In fact, when the Prosecutor filed a motion in court asking for leave to conduct
preliminary investigation, he clearly if impliedly recognized that petitioner’s claim to preliminary
investigation was a legitimate one.
242 242 People v. Calimlim, G.R. No. 123980, August 30, 2001
FACTS:The prosecution's case was mainly based on the testimony of private complainant, LANIE S.
LIMIN. According to her, she was fourteen (14) years old and had been living with the family of
Kagawad Manny Ferrer and Cresencia Ferrer (Ferrers) for the past three years. The night of April 2,
1995, she was left alone in one of the two houses of the Ferrers since her usual companions, the sons
of Manny and Cresencia, were out for the night. The Ferrers were in the other house about 15 meters
away. At around 11:30 P.M., she was awakened when she heard somebody, later identified as
appellant, enter her room. Appellant immediately poked a knife at the left side of her neck and said,
[6]
"Accompany me because I killed my wife." She was then dragged to the pig pen, about 8-9 meters
away from the place where she slept. Afterwards, she was again forcibly taken back to her room, then
to her cousin's room and to the kitchen. In each of these places, appellant forcibly had sexual
intercourse with her while he poked a knife against her neck. According to her, she first recognized
appellant while they were in the kitchen when she was able to remove the cloth covering his face. She
stated that she knew appellant because she had seen him always following her whenever she went to
school. After the fourth intercourse, appellant threatened that he would kill her if she reported the
[7]
incidents. Despite the threat, she told her cousin, Manicris Ferrer, who then reported the matter to
[8]
Dr. Nancy Quinto who lived nearby. On cross-examination, complainant stated that she did not
[9]
struggle nor shout nor resist because she was afraid that appellant might kill her.
[40]
More substantially, appellant avers that his arrest violated Section 5 of Rule 113, since his arrest
was made one day after the crime was committed, but without any judicial warrant, although the police
had ample time to get one. This he claims is also in violation of Article III, Sec. 2 of the
[41]
Constitution. But here it will be noted that appellant entered a plea of not guilty to each of the
informations charging him of rape. Thus, he had effectively waived his right to question any irregularity
[42]
which might have accompanied his arrest and the unlawful restraint of his liberty. This is clear from
[43]
a reading of Section 9 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure:
Sec. 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor. - The failure of the accused to assert
any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he
did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of
any objections except those based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g) and (i) of
section 3 of this Rule. (Underlining supplied)
ISSUE/S: won the irregularity of the warrantless arrest can be questioned? no
Given the circumstances of his case now, the exceptions do not apply here and we are constrained to
rule that appellant is estopped from raising the issue of the legality of his arrest.
Moreover, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment
rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error. The defense's claim of warrantless
arrest which is illegal cannot render void all other proceedings including those leading to the conviction
of the appellant, nor can the state be deprived of its right to convict the guilty when all the facts on record
point to his culpability.
243

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
244

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
245

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
MONTEADORA 246. People v. Plana G.R. No. 128285, November 27, 2001
Full Title of the Case: PEOPLE VS. ANTONIO PLANA alias "CATONG" EDGARDO PERAYRA, RENE
SALDEVEA and RICHARD BANDAY
G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE: G.R. No. 128285 November 27, 2001
Ponente: DAVIDE, JR.
Petition Filed:
This is an automatic review of the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15 of Roxas
City in Criminal Case No. 4659 finding accused-appellants Antonio Plana, Edgardo Perayra, Rene
Saldevea and Richard Banday guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with Homicide
and imposing upon them the supreme penalty of Death.
FACTS:
On 23 September 1994, at around 10:30 a.m., Felix Lagud was walking at the feeder road in
Barangay Cobe, Dumarao, Capiz. He just came from his farm in Alipasyawan, Dumarao and was on
his way home to Poblacion Ilawod. A movement at about 50 meters to his left side caught his
attention. He saw 3 persons who seemed to be wrestling. He came nearer so he would be able to
see them more clearly. From about a distance of 20 meters, he saw the 3 men holding a girl while
another man was on top of her. The girl was being raped and she was later stabbed. Frightened
that the assailants would see him, Lagud ran away. He intended to go straight home but when he
passed by the house of Porferio Haguisan, the latter invited him for a "milagrosa." Lagud obliged
and stayed at the house of his "kumpare" until 2:00 a.m.
On 26 September 1994, the victim, Helen Perote, was found dead by her brother and the
police in Brgy. Cobe, Dumarao, Capiz. The body was in prone position and was already in an
advance state of decomposition. Lagud identified Antonio Plana (@"Catong"), Edgardo Perayra and
Rene Saldevea as the three men who were holding the girl while their fourth companion was
raping her. At the time of the incident, he did not yet recognize the fourth man who was on top of
the girl. However, when he saw Plana, et. al. at the municipal hall where they were brought when
they were arrested on 26 September 1994, he identified the fourth man to be Richard Banday.
According to Dr. Betita, the victim died more than 72 hours already before the police
authorities found her body. An information was filed against Plana, et. al. for the crime of rape
with homicide before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15 of Roxas City (Criminal Case 4659). At
their arraignment, Plana, et. al. pleaded not guilty.
That on or about 10:30 o'clock in the morning of September 23, 1994, at Brgy. Cubi, Dumarao,
Capiz, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named accused did, then and there,
wilfully and feloniously, and by conspiring and helping one another, gang-up and have carnal
knowledge of HELEN PIROTE [should read Helen Perote] against her will, and, thereafter, by means
of cruelty which augmented her suffering, did, then and there, strike, mangle and stab said HELEN
PIROTE several times with both blunt and sharp-edged weapons thereby inflicting upon her serious
multiple wounds causing massive hemorrhage which resulted to [sic] her death.
Accused-appellants vigorously deny that they committed the rape and killing of Helen. They
maintain that their testimonies, taken together with that of the other defense witnesses, show
that they were not at the scene of the crime. In other words, they fault the trial court for not giving
credence to their defense of alibi. Corollarily, they point out the alleged inconsistencies and
improbabilities in the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution. Accused-appellants
likewise denounce as violative of their constitutional rights their detention without, at the time, a
judicial order or an information filed in court.
After due trial, a judgment was rendered by the trial court finding Plana, et. al. guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide. The trial court imposed upon them
the supreme penalty of death, and ordered them to pay jointly and severally the heirs of the
victim, Helen Perote, P25,000.00 as actual damages and P50,000.00 as civil liability.
ISSUE/S:
Whether the trial court erred in not censuring the actuation of the police authorities in
detaining Plana, et. al. without benefit of Court filed information nor judicial order of detention as
well as violation of their constitutional rights during their so-called custodial invitation and
interrogation.
Plana, et. al. already waived their right to question the irregularity, if any, in their arrest.
They respectively entered a plea of "not guilty" at their arraignment. By so pleading, they
submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing any defect in their arrest, for the
legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over their persons.
Murdock 24247. People v. Conde, G.R. No. 113269, April 10, 2001
Full Title of the Case: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. OSCAR CONDE y LUTOC, ALLAN ATIS y ABET
and ALEJANDRO PEREZ, JR. y CARSILLAR, OSCAR CONDE y LUTOC and ALLAN ATIS y ABET
G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE: G.R. No. 113269 April 10, 2001
Ponente: QUISUMBING, J.:
Petition Filed: appeal
FACTS: On 25 May 1992 at about 8:00 A.M., Apollo Romero was home sitting by the window and
drinking coffee when he saw 4 men in Santolan Street block the path of 2 Indian nationals (bombay)
on a motorcycle. Oscar Conde y Lutoc poked a gun at the two Indians while his three companions
(Alejandro Perez Jr. y Carsillar, Allan Atis y Abet, and another unidentified man) approached and
stabbed the Indians. Atis took the goods which were being sold by the two Indians on installment.
After the stabbing, the four men fled from the crime scene towards Mabolo Street. PO3
Rodencio Sevillano of the Intelligence and Investigation Division (IID) of the PNP, Kalookan City
investigated the incident. On 30 May 1992, the police arrested Conde, Perez and Atis. Police
recovered the weapons used in the robbery, when Felicidad Macabare, Conde's wife, went to the
police station to talk to Conde. These weapons were discovered inside her bag after a routine
inspection. Sevillano admitted, however, that they did not have a warrant of arrest when they
apprehended the accused. Nor did they have a search warrant when they inspected Felicidad's bag
and when they searched the house of a certain Jimmy where they found the stolen items. Conde,
Perez and Atis were charged with the crime of robbery with homicide. The accused entered pleas of
not guilty.
On 15 December 1993 the Regional Trial Court, Branch 129, Kalookan City found Conde, Atis
and Perez guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide and sentenced each of them
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties under the law, and to jointly
and severally indemnify the heirs of each of the victims, Sukhdev Singh and Biant Singh, in the
amount of P50,000.00. Conde, et. al. appealed. However, the counsel de parte for Perez, Atty. Jose
M. Marquez, failed to file brief for Perez, prompting this Court to dismiss his appeal. The decision of
the trial court became final and executory with respect to Perez. Hence the present appeal concerns
only Atis and Conde, who filed their separate briefs.
Petitioner’s Allegation: Alejandro Perez, Jr. testified that Oscar Conde and Allan Atis were his
townmates from Catbalogan, Samar. According to Perez, on May 25, 1992, at about 7:00 A.M., he
went to the Madrigal Compound at Las Piñas, Metro Manila to visit his cousin Danilo and apologize
for not attending his uncle's 40th death anniversary and their fiesta. Upon his arrival they went to the
Pulang Lupa Cemetery and visited the graves of his uncle and their grandfather. From the cemetery,
they went home where they drank some beer until late afternoon. Together with Oscar Conde and
Allan Atis, he was arrested in Tandang Sora, Quezon City on May 30, 1992.
Danilo Acutin corroborated Alejandro's testimony.
Oscar Conde testified that on May 25, 1992, he was in Barangay Polo Street, Parañaque
mending his fishing net. He was with his wife, Felicidad Macabare; and his uncle, Tancio Loto. He said
the police arrested Alejandro Perez, Jr., Allan Atis, Felicidad Macabare and him in Tandang Sora,
Quezon City on May 30, 1992. (Later reports indicated, however, that Felicidad was not among those
arrested.)
Allan Atis stated that he was in MCU where he worked as a construction worker for a certain
Romy Ramos on May 25, 1992. He denied having anything to do with the death of the two Indian
nationals.
Court a Quo (RTC) Ruling: Regional Trial Court, Branch 129, Kalookan City held accused Oscar Conde,
Allan Atis and Alejandro Perez, Jr., guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide and
sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties
under the law, and to jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of each of the victims, Sukhdev Singh
and Biant Singh, in the amount of P50,000.00.
ISSUE/S: Whether there was an illegal warrantless arrest; and
Whether the evidence obtained is admissible.
HELD/RATIO - SC RULING (DOCTRINE/S): The arrests of Conde, et. al. came after the lapse of 5 days
from the time they were seen committing the crime. At the time they were arrested, the police were
not armed with any warrants for their arrests. Section 5 of Rule 113, of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure 27 enumerates the instances when an arrest can be made without warrant, namely:
(a) When, in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
None of the above circumstances is present herein. Conde, et. al. were merely walking along
Tandang Sora Avenue and were not committing any crime. Neither can it be said that the crime had
just been committed as 5 days had already passed from the time of the robbery with homicide. It
cannot also be said that the arresting officers had probable cause based on personal knowledge, as
PO3 Sevillano admitted that they learned about the suspects from Apollo Romero and certain
unnamed informants.
Further, the lapse of 5 days gave the police more than enough time to conduct surveillance of
the appellants and apply for a warrant of arrest. Clearly, the rights of Conde, et. al., provided in Sec.
2, Art. III of the Constitution 28 were violated.
Unfortunately, they did not assert their constitutional rights prior to their arraignment. This is
fatal to their case. An accused is estopped from assailing the legality of his arrest if he failed to move
for the quashing of the Information against him before his arraignment. It is much too late for them
to raise the question of their warrantless arrests. Their pleas to the information upon arraignment
constitute clear waivers of their rights against unlawful restraint of liberty.
Furthermore, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid
judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after trial free from error. The warrantless arrest,
even if illegal, cannot render void all other proceedings including those leading to the conviction of
the appellants and his co-accused, nor can the state be deprived of its right to convict the guilty when
all the facts on record point to their culpability.
As for the stolen objects presented in evidence, their seizure was assailed by appellants. The
Supreme Court agreed that the warrantless search in the house of a certain Jimmy, based on the
confession of accused Alejandro Perez, Jr., is definitely questionable. PO3 Rodencio Sevillano
categorically stated that they were able to recover the stolen items, i.e., the beach towel and the
umbrella, because of the confession of Alejandro Perez, Jr. who was not assisted by counsel when he
confessed and eventually led the police to the whereabouts of the said items. The use of evidence
against the accused obtained by virtue of his testimony or admission without the assistance of
counsel while under custodial investigation is proscribed under Sections 12 and 17, Article III of the
Constitution.
Under the libertarian exclusionary rule known as the "fruit of the poisonous tree", evidence
illegally obtained by the state should not be used to gain other evidence because the illegally
obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained. Simply put, the objects confiscated at
said house are inadmissible as evidence.
248

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:

CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
249

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:

CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
250

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:

CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
22251

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:

CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
22252

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:

CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
Servañez 253. People v Villanueva
Full Title of the Case: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs CYRUS VILLANUEVA y ISO RENA
alias "Tutoy" and AL VIN SA YSON y ESPONCILLA alias "Alvin Talangka",
G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE: GR No. 226475, March 13, 2017
Ponente: Reyes, J.,
Petition: Petition for Review
FACTS:
On appeal is the Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the conviction of Cyrus Villanueva y Isorena
and Alvin Sayson y Esponcilla for Murder as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City.
During trial, Amie Bañaga narrated that when he was selling tapsilog to a group of persons playing cara
y cruz, he saw Villanueva and Sayson, and Valencia arrive and ask the group if they know Enrico
Enriquez, to which they answered in the negative. Thereupon, the three went to the tricycle terminal
where they saw Enrico. They then simultaneously attacked Enrico. Villanueva punched Enrico on the
face twice while Sayson hit the latter at the back of the head with a stone wrapped in a t-shirt. Valencia
then stabbed Enrico on the left side of his armpit twice. Enrico tried to fight back to no avail. The
assailants thereafter fled. However, Villanueva was caught by men aboard a pursuing tricycle.
Barangay Police Djohann Gonzales received a call requesting their assistance on a stabbing incident at
the tricycle terminal in Summitville. Gonzales then went to the said terminal with Romeo Arciaga.
Thereat, Gonzales saw a bloodied man, who was later identified as Villanueva, being held by the tricycle
drivers. Gonzales brought Villanueva to the Barangay Hall where the stabbing incident was recorded
in the barangay police blotter. Thereafter, Villanueva was brought to the Criminal Investigation Division
office of the Muntinlupa City Police Station where Villanueva's sister arrived and informed the
authorities that Sayson was still in their house.
Enrico was brought to the Muntinlupa Medical Center, but he was declared dead on arrival.
Respondent’s allegation:
On the other hand, Villanueva and Sayson denied the allegations against them. Villanueva claimed that
both of them and Valencia went to the house of their friend in Summitville to eat. Thereafter, Valencia
invited them to have a drinking spree with Alvin Abad and Charlotte. Valencia left the group and, 30
minutes thereafter, they also went home. On their way home, they saw Valencia arguing with Enrico
which led to a fistfight. They tried to pacify Valencia and Enrico, but the latter suddenly fell on the
ground. Valencia immediately ran away, leaving them standing near the body of Enrico. Villanueva
then ran away as he was scared that the bystanders in the tricycle terminal would gang up on them.
On his way home, Villanueva noticed a tricycle boarded by Bañaga and his companions. Bañaga then
forced him to board the tricycle and, once inside, he was beaten up by Bañaga and his companions.
Villanueva was then brought to the Philippine General Hospital to be treated. Villanueva was brought
to the CID office for investigation and thereafter to the Muntinlupa City Jail where he was detained.
Villanueva alleged that Bañaga pinpointed him as one of the assailants since he was angry at him as he
belonged to the same group as Valencia. Sayson corroborated Villanueva's testimony as regards the
stabbing incident. He averred that after Enrico fell on the ground, he ran to his house. He was surprised
when the two barangay officials arrived at his house later in the morning that same day to invite him
for questioning. Hence, Villanueva claims that there was no valid warrentless arrest.
RTC Ruling: The RTC rendered judgment finding all accused guilty for the crime of murder.
CA Ruling: The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Issue
WON the arrest of Villanueva is valid?
Ruling:
Yes. Likewise, without merit is the accused-appellants' contention as regards the validity of their
warrantless arrest. The accused-appellants never raised the supposed illegality of their arrest prior to
their arraignment. In fact, nowhere in any part of the proceedings before the R TC did the accused-
appellants assail the validity of their arrest. The accused-appellants only brought up the supposed
irregularity in their arrest for the first time in their appeal to the CA. It has been ruled time and again
that an accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity with regard to his arrest if he fails to raise
this issue or to move for the quashal of the information against him on this ground before his
arraignment. Any objection involving the procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction over the
person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed
waived.
254 Dabon v. People, GR 208775, Jan 22, 2018
Full Title of the Case: JORGE DABON, a.k.a. GEORGE DEBONE @ GEORGE, PETITIONER, V. THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
Ponente: TIJAM, J.
Petition Filed: Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner
Jorge Dabon (Dabon), questioning the Decision dated July 27, 2012 and Resolution dated July 8, 2013
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-CR No. 01414, affirming the Omnibus Decision dated July
10, 2008 and Omnibus Order dated February 1, 2010 rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Bohol, Tagbilaran City, Branch 2, in Criminal Case Nos. 11930, 11931 and 11932.
FACTS: Law enforcement agents applied for a search warrant and subsequently issued which armed
the law enforcement agents to search Dabon's residence for alleged violation of R.A No. 9165.
On July 26, 2003, P/Insp Mallari and other CIDG team proceeded to an apartment unit where the
residence of Dabon is situated. Upon reaching the apartment, the CIDG operatives requested Brgy.
Kagawad Angalot, City Councilor Angalot, SK Chairman Angalot, media representative Responte and
DOJ Castro to witness the search. The group entered the house, together with some of the witness
they went to the second floor where Dabon and his family resided. They found Dumaluan in the living
room while Dabon was inside one of the bedrooms. P/Insp. Mallari handed the copy of the search
warrant to Dabon, the CIDG operatives searched the kitchen where they found, in the presence of Brgy.
Kagawad Angalot, drug paraphernalia. The police officers then frisked Dumaluan and recovered from
his pocket, a coin purse, a lighter, a metal clip, three empty decks of suspected shabu, two pieces of
blade and crumpled tin foil. The police officers proceeded to search one of the bedrooms where they
found three plastic sachets containing suspected shabu. They also recovered the drug paraphernalia
On July 28, 2003, PNP Crime Laboratory received a letter signed by P/Insp. Mallari requesting the
conduct of chemical examination on the seized items. The letter and the seized items were turned over
to a Forensic Chemical Officer. The chemical examination and confirmatory test on the seized items
yielded positive results for the presence of methylamphetamine hydrochloride
Petitioner’s Allegation: Dabon filed a Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC. In said motion, he
essentially questioned the admissibility of the seized items as neither he nor any member of his family
was present when the search was conducted.
Court a Quo (RTC) Ruling: Convicted Dabon and denied the motion
CA Ruling: Affirmed lower court decision. The CA ratiocinated that the right of Dabon to question his
arrest was deemed waived because he failed to question the same before arraignment. In any case,
the CA ruled that the procedural flaw did not cast doubt on the fact that the illegal drugs and
paraphernalia were seized at the residence of Dabon
ISSUE/S: Whether the evidence obtained against Dabon admissible?
HELD/RATIO - SC RULING (DOCTRINE/S): NO
It must be clarified that a search warrant issued in accordance with the provisions of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure does not give the authorities limitless discretion in implementing the same as
the same Rules provide parameters in the proper conduct of a search. One of those parameters set by
law is Section 8 of Rule 126, to wit:
Section 8.
Search of house, room, or premise to be made in presence of two witnesses
No search of a house, room, or any other premise shall be made except in the presence of the lawful
occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, two witnesses of sufficient
age and discretion residing in the same locality.
The law is mandatory to ensure the regularity in the execution of the search warrant. This requirement
is intended to guarantee that the implementing officers will not act arbitrarily which may tantamount
to desecration of the right enshrined in our Constitution
255

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
256

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
257

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
258

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
259

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
260

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
261

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
262

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
263

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
264

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
DE GUZMAN 265. Vivares v St. Theresa's College 737 SCRA 92 (2014)
Full Title of the Case: RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES and SPS. MARGARITA and DAVID SUZARA,
Petitioners, vs. ST. THERESA'S COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T. ESCUDERO, and JOHN DOES,
Respondents.
G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE: G.R. No. 202666 / 737 SCRA 92 / September 29, 2014
Ponente: VELASCO, JR., J.
Petition Filed: Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, in relation to
Section 19 of A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC otherwise known as the "Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data."
Petitioners herein assail the Decision of RTC Cebu City which dismissed their habeas data petition.
FACTS:
Daluz and Suzara, among others, who are minors, were graduating high school students at St. Theresa’s College
(STC), Cebu City. Sometime in January 2012, while changing into their swimsuits for a beach party they were
about to attend, they took digital pictures of themselves clad only in their undergarments, drinking
hard liquor, and smoking cigarettes. The said photos were uploaded in Facebook.
Thereafter, some of their classmates reported said photo to their computer teacher, Escudero. Escudero, through
her students, viewed and downloaded said pictures. She showed the said pictures to STC’s Discipline-in-Charge
for appropriate action. Later, STC found the identified students to have violated the student’s handbook and
banned them from joining their commencement exercises.
RTC Cebu issued a TRO allowing the students to attend the graduation ceremony, to which STC filed an MR.
Despite the issuance of the TRO,STC, nevertheless, barred the sanctioned students from participating in the
graduation rites, arguing that, on the date of the commencement exercises, its adverted motion for
reconsideration on the issuance of the TRO remained unresolved.
Petitioners filed before the RTC a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Data against the school. They
argued, among others, that:
1. The privacy setting of their children’s Facebook accounts was set at “Friends Only.” They, thus, have a
reasonable expectation of privacy which must be respected.
2. The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be used and reproduced without their consent.
Escudero, however, violated their rights by saving digital copies of the photos and by subsequently showing them
to STC’s officials. Thus, the Facebook accounts of the children were intruded upon;
3. The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as copying of information, data, and digital images
happened at STC’s Computer Laboratory.
They prayed that STC be ordered to surrender and deposit with the court all soft and printed copies of the subject
data and have such data be declared illegally obtained in violation of the children’s right to privacy.
Respondents complied with the RTC’s directive and filed their verified written return, laying down the following
grounds for the denial of the petition: (a) petitioners are not the proper parties to file the petition; (b) petitioners
are engaging in forum shopping; (c) the instant case is not one where a writ of habeas data may issue; and (d)
there can be no violation of their right to privacy as there is no reasonable expectation of privacy on Facebook.
RTC Cebu dismissed the habeas data petition. Petitioners failed to prove the existence of an actual or threatened
violation of the minors’ right to privacy, one of the preconditions for the issuance of the writ of habeas data.
Moreover, the court a quo held that the photos, having been uploaded on Facebook without restrictions as to
who may view them, lost their privacy in some way. Besides, the RTC noted, STC gathered the photographs
through legal means and for a legal purpose, that is, the implementation of the school’s policies and rules on
discipline.
ISSUE/S: WON there was an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in the life, liberty,
or security of the minors that will entitle them to the writ of habeas data.
NONE. The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security
is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual
or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home
and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
The Supreme Court held that STC did not violate petitioners’ daughters’ right to privacy as the subject digital
photos were viewable either by the minors’ Facebook friends, or by the public at large.
Without any evidence to corroborate the minors’ statement that the images were visible only to the five of them,
and without their challenging Escudero’s claim that the other students were able to view the photos, their
statements are, at best, self-serving, thus deserving scant consideration.
It is well to note that not one of petitioners disputed Escudero’s sworn account that her students, who are the
minors’ Facebook “friends,” showed her the photos using their own Facebook accounts. This only goes to show
that no special means to be able to view the allegedly private posts were ever resorted to by Escudero’s students,
and that it is reasonable to assume, therefore, that the photos were, in reality, viewable either by (1) their
Facebook friends, or (2) by the public at large.
Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is “Public,” it can be surmised that the photographs in
question were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that petitioners’ children positively limited
the disclosure of the photograph. If such were the case, they cannot invoke the protection attached to the right
to informational privacy.
Using Facebook’s privacy tools, users can choose as to when and to what extent to disclose facts about
themselves – and to put others in the position of receiving such confidences. The utilization of these privacy tools
is the manifestation, in cyber world, of the user’s invocation of his or her right to informational privacy.
In the case at bar, the petitioners’ children’s Facebook accounts, allegedly, were under “Only Friends.”
However, the Court said that setting the privacy to “Friends” is no assurance since a user’s own Facebook friend
can share said content or tag his or her own Facebook friends thereto, resulting to greater number of users who
can view the content. In addition, respondent STC got the information from persons who had legitimate access
to the said posts. Clearly, STC did not violate petitioners’ daughters’ right to privacy.
Petition for habeas data is DENIED. Respondent STC and its officials did not violate the minors' privacy rights .
266 Lee v Ilagan
Full Title of the Case: DR. JOY MARGATE LEE, Petitioner, v. P/SUPT. NERI A. ILAGAN,
Respondent.
G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE:738 SCRA 59 (2014)
Ponente: PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:Neri, a police officer, filed a petition for the issuance of Writ of Habeas Data against Joy, her
former common law partner. According to him, sometime in July 2011, he visited Joy’s condominium and
rested for a while. When he arrived at his office, he noticed his digital camera missing. On August 23,
2011, Joy confronted him about a purported sex video she discovered from the digital camera showing
him and another woman. He denied the video and demanded the return of the camera, but she refused.
The had an altercation where Neri allegedly slammed Joy’s head against a wall and then walked away.
Because of this, Joy filed several cases against him, including a case for violation of Republic Act 9262 and
administrative cases before the Napolcom, utilising the said video.
The use of the same violated his life to liberty, security and privacy and that of the other woman, thus he
had no choice but to file the petition for issuance of the writ of habeas data.
Court a Quo (RTC) Ruling:After finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the RTC issued the
writ and directed Joy to appear before the RTC and produce Neri’s digital camera, as well as the original
and copies of the video, and to make a return within five days from receipt. In her return,. Joy admitted
keeping the memory card of the digital camera and reproducing the video but only for use as evidence in
the cases she filed against Neri. Neri’s petitions should be dismissed because its filing was only aimed at
suppressing the evidence in the cases she filed against him; and she is not engaged in the gathering,
collecting, or storing of data regarding the person of Neri. The RTC granted Neri’s petition and ordered
the turn-over of the video to Neri and enjoined Joy from reproducing the same. It disregarded Joy’s
defense that she is not engaged in the collection, gathering and storage of data, and that her acts of
reproducing the same and showing it to other persons (Napolcom) violated Neri’s right to privacy and
humiliated him. It clarified that it ruling only on the return of the video and not on its admissibility as
evidence. Dissatisfied, Joy filed the instant petition before the Supreme Court.
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S: W/N the filing of the petition for issuance of the writ of habeas data was proper
HELD/RATIO - SC RULING (DOCTRINE/S): NO.
A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, or the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data (Habeas Data Rule), was conceived as a
response, given the lack of effective and available remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the number
of killings and enforced disappearances. It was conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing the right to
privacy, most especially the right to informational privacy of individuals, which is defined as “the right to
control the collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of data about oneself.”
As defined in Section 1 of the Habeas Data Rule, the writ of habeas data now stands as “a remedy available
to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act
or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering,
collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home, and correspondence of the
aggrieved party.” Thus, in order to support a petition for the issuance of such writ, Section 6 of the Habeas
Data Rule essentially requires that the petition sufficiently alleges, among others, “[t]he manner the right
to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved
party.” In other words, the petition must adequately show that there exists a nexus between the right to
privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other. Corollarily, the allegations in
the petition must be supported by substantial evidence showing an actual or threatened violation of the
right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim. In this relation, it bears pointing out that the writ of
habeas data will not issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked
in support of the petitions therefor are vague and doubtful.
In this case, the Court finds that Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that his right to privacy in life,
liberty or security was or would be violated through the supposed reproduction and threatened
dissemination of the subject sex video. While Ilagan purports a privacy interest in the suppression of this
video – which he fears would somehow find its way to Quiapo or be uploaded in the internet for public
consumption – he failed to explain the connection between such interest and any violation of his right to
life, liberty or security. Indeed, courts cannot speculate or contrive versions of possible transgressions. As
the rules and existing jurisprudence on the matter evoke, alleging and eventually proving the nexus
between one’s privacy right to the cogent rights to life, liberty or security are crucial in habeas data cases,
so much so that a failure on either account certainly renders a habeas data petition dismissible, as in this
case.
In fact, even discounting the insufficiency of the allegations, the petition would equally be dismissible due
to the inadequacy of the evidence presented. As the records show, all that Ilagan submitted in support of
his petition was his self-serving testimony which hardly meets the substantial evidence requirement as
prescribed by the Habeas Data Rule. This is because nothing therein would indicate that Lee actually
proceeded to commit any overt act towards the end of violating Ilagan’s right to privacy in life, liberty or
security. Nor would anything on record even lead a reasonable mind to conclude that Lee was going to use
the subject video in order to achieve unlawful ends – say for instance, to spread it to the public so as to
ruin Ilagan’s reputation. Contrastingly, Lee even made it clear in her testimony that the only reason why
she reproduced the subject video was to legitimately utilize the same as evidence in the criminal and
administrative cases that she filed against Ilagan. Hence, due to the insufficiency of the allegations as well
as the glaring absence of substantial evidence, the Court finds it proper to reverse the RTC Decision and
dismiss the habeas data petition.
267

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
268

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
269

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
270

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
271

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
272

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
273

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
People v. Aruta, G.R. 120915, April 3, 1998

274
FACTS: On December 13, 1988, P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by his informant, known only as Benjie, that
a certain “Aling Rosa” would be arriving from Baguio City the following day, December 14, 1988, with a
large volume of marijuana. Acting on said tip, P/Lt. Abello assembled a team composed of P/Lt. Jose
Domingo, Sgt. Angel Sudiacal, Sgt. Oscar Imperial, Sgt. Danilo Santiago and Sgt. Efren Quirubin.
ISSUE/S:
HELD/RATIO - SC RULING (DOCTRINE/S): Having ascertained that accused-appellant was “Aling
Rosa,” the team approached her and introduced themselves as NARCOM agents. When P/Lt. Abello
asked “Aling Rosa” about the contents of her bag, the latter handed it to the former.
Upon inspection, the bag was found to contain dried marijuana leaves packed in a plastic bag marked
“Cash Katutak.” The team confiscated the bag together with the Victory Liner bus ticket to which Lt.
Domingo affixed his signature. Accused-appellant was then brought to the NARCOM office for
investigation where a Receipt of Property Seized was prepared for the confiscated marijuana leaves.
Upon examination of the seized marijuana specimen at the PC/INP Crime Laboratory, Camp Olivas,
Pampanga, P/Maj. Marlene Salangad, a Forensic Chemist, prepared a Technical Report stating that
said specimen yielded positive results for marijuana, a prohibited drug.
“Section 3(2). Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible
in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.”
From the foregoing, it can be said that the State cannot simply intrude indiscriminately into the houses,
papers, effects, and most importantly, on the person of an individual. The constitutional provision
guaranteed an impenetrable shield against unreasonable searches and seizures. As such, it protects
the privacy and sanctity of the person himself against unlawful arrests and other forms of restraint. [6]
Therewithal, the right of a person to be secured against any unreasonable seizure of his body and any
deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. A statute, rule or situation which allows
exceptions to the requirement of a warrant of arrest or search warrant must perforce be strictly
construed and their application limited only to cases specifically provided or allowed by law. To do
otherwise is an infringement upon personal liberty and would set back a right so basic and deserving
of full protection and vindication yet often violated.[7]
The following cases are specifically provided or allowed by law:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court[8] and by prevailing jurisprudence;
2. Seizure of evidence in “plain view,” the elements of which are:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in
the pursuit of their official duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are;
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and
(d) “plain view” justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle’s inherent mobility
reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly
reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;

5. Customs search;[9]
6. Stop and Frisk;[10] and
7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.[11]
The above exceptions, however, should not become unbridled licenses for law enforcement officers to
trample upon the constitutionally guaranteed and more fundamental right of persons against
unreasonable search and seizures. The essential requisite of probable cause must still be satisfied
before a warrantless search and seizure can be lawfully conducted.
People v. Solayao,[20] applied the stop and frisk principle which has been adopted in Posadas v. Court
of Appeals.[21] In said case, Solayao attempted to flee when he and his companions were accosted by
government agents. In the instant case, there was no observable manifestation that could have
aroused the suspicion of the NARCOM agents as to cause them to “stop and frisk” accused-appellant.
To reiterate, accused-appellant was merely crossing the street when apprehended. Unlike in the
abovementioned cases, accused-appellant never attempted to flee from the NARCOM agents when
the latter identified themselves as such. Clearly, this is another indication of the paucity of probable
cause that would sufficiently provoke a suspicion that accused-appellant was committing a crime.
The warrantless search and seizure could not likewise be categorized under exigent and emergency
circumstances, as applied in People v. De Gracia.[22] In said case, there were intelligence reports that
the building was being used as headquarters by the RAM during a coup d’etat. A surveillance team
was fired at by a group of armed men coming out of the building and the occupants of said building
refused to open the door despite repeated requests. There were large quantities of explosives and
ammunitions inside the building. Nearby courts were closed and general chaos and disorder prevailed.
The existing circumstances sufficiently showed that a crime was being committed. In short, there was
probable cause to effect a warrantless search of the building. The same could not be said in the
instant case.
Search warrants to be valid must particularly describe the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized. The purpose of this rule is to limit the things to be seized to those and only those,
particularly described in the warrant so as to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding
what articles they shall seize to the end that unreasonable searches and seizures may not be made. [30]
Had the NARCOM agents only applied for a search warrant, they could have secured one without too
much difficulty, contrary to the assertions of the Solicitor General. The person intended to be searched
has been particularized and the thing to be seized specified. The time was also sufficiently ascertained
to be in the afternoon of December 14, 1988. “Aling Rosa” turned out to be accused-appellant and the
thing to be seized was marijuana. The vehicle was identified to be a Victory Liner bus. In fact, the
NARCOM agents purposely positioned themselves near the spot where Victory Liner buses normally
unload their passengers. Assuming that the NARCOM agents failed to particularize the vehicle, this
would not in any way hinder them from securing a search warrant. The above particulars would have
already sufficed. In any case, this Court has held that the police should particularly describe the place
to be searched and the person or things to be seized, wherever and whenever it is feasible. [31]
(Emphasis supplied)
In fine, there was really no excuse for the NARCOM agents not to procure a search warrant
considering that they had more than twenty-four hours to do so. Obviously, this is again an instance of
seizure of the “fruit of the poisonous tree,” hence illegal and inadmissible subsequently in evidence.
The exclusion of such evidence is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction
against unreasonable searches and seizure. The non-exclusionary rule is contrary to the letter and
spirit of the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. [34]
While conceding that the officer making the unlawful search and seizure may be held criminally and
civilly liable, the Stonehill case observed that most jurisdictions have realized that the exclusionary rule
is “the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction” against abuse. This approach is
based on the justification made by Judge Learned Hand that “only in case the prosecution which itself
controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong, will the wrong be repressed.” [35]
Unreasonable searches and seizures are the menace against which the constitutional guarantees
afford full protection. While the power to search and seize may at times be necessary to the public
welfare, still it may be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of
the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the
basic principles of government.

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:

CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
280.) PHARMACEUTICAL Vs Duque
PHARMACEUTICAL Vs Duque
FACTS:
Named as respondents are the Health Secretary, Undersecretaries, and Assistant Secretaries of the
Department of Health (DOH). For purposes of herein petition, the DOH is deemed impleaded as a co-
respondent since respondents issued the questioned RIRR in their capacity as officials of said
executive agency.1Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon Aquino on
October 28, 1986 by virtue of the legislative powers granted to the president under the Freedom
Constitution. One of the preambular clauses of the Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect to
Article 112 of the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted
by the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981. From 1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted several
Resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected, hence, it
should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes.In 1990,
the Philippines ratified the International Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 24 of said
instrument provides that State Parties should take appropriate measures to diminish infant and child
mortality, and ensure that all segments of society, specially parents and children, are informed of the
advantages of breastfeeding. On May 15, 2006, the DOH issued herein assailed RIRR which was to
take effect on July 7, 2006.
Issue:.
Whether Administrative Order or the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations (RIRR) issued by
the Department of Health (DOH) is not constitutional;
Held: YES. Under Article 23, recommendations of the WHA do not come into force for members,in the
same way that conventions or agreements under Article 19 and regulations under Article 21 come into
force. Article 23 of the WHO Constitution reads:
Article 23. The Health Assembly shall have authority to make recommendations to Members with
respect to any matter within the competence of the Organization
for an international rule to be considered as customary law, it must be established that such rule is
being followed by states because they consider it obligatory to comply with such rules
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either
By transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be

transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The
incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to
have the force of domestic law.
Consequently, legislation is necessary to transform the provisions of the WHA Resolutions into
domestic law. The provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be considered as part of the law of the
land that can be implemented by executive agencies without the need of a law enacted by the
legislature

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
305, Fernado vs CA
305. FERNANDO VS CA- FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, MOVIE CENSORSHIP, OBSCENITY AND THE
RIGHT TO PRIVACY
Full Title of the Case: GAUDENCIO E. FERNANDO and RUDY ESTORNINOS, petitioners, vs .
COURT OF APPEALS, respondent

G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE: 159751/ 06 Dec 2006
Ponente: Quisimbing, J.
Petition Filed: Petition for Certiorari
FACTS: The warrant ordered the search of the store for copies of New Rave, Hustler, IOU magazine,
and VHS tapes.
On the same day, police officers of the PNP-CIDG NCR served the warrant on Rudy Estorninos, who,
according to the prosecution, introduced himself as the store attendant of Music Fair. The police
searched the premises and confiscated twenty-five (25) VHS tapes and ten (10) different magazines,
which they deemed pornographic. All appellants pled not guilty to the offenses charged. They
waived their right to present evidence. The RTC acquitted Tingchuy for lack of evidence to prove his
guilt, but convicted herein petitioners Fernando and Estorninos.
Petitioner’s Allegation: Petitioners contend that the prosecution failed to prove that at the time of
the search, they were selling pornographic materials. Fernando contends that since he was not
charged as the owner of an establishment selling obscene materials, the prosecution must prove
that he was present during the raid and that he was selling the said materials. Estorninos, on the
other hand, insists that he was not an attendant in Music Fair, nor did he introduce himself so.
Respondent’s Allegation: The Solicitor General counters that owners of establishments selling
obscene publications are expressly held liable under Article 201, and petitioner Fernando’s
ownership was sufficiently proven. As the owner, according to the Solicitor General, Fernando was
naturally a seller of the prohibited materials and liable under the Information.
Court a Quo (RTC) Ruling: The RTC convicted Gaudencio E. Fernando and Rudy Estorninos for
violation of Article 2012 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 960 and
969, and sentenced each to imprisonment of four (4) years and one (1) day to six (6) years of prision
correccional, and to pay the fine of P6,000 and cost of suit.
CA Ruling: The CA affirmed the decision.
ISSUE/S: whether the appellate court erred in affirming the petitioners' conviction.
HELD/RATIO - SC RULING (DOCTRINE/S): As obscenity is an unprotected speech which the State has
the right to regulate, the State in pursuing its mandate to protect, as parens patriae, the public from
obscene, immoral and indecent materials must justify the regulation or limitation.
One such regulation is Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code. To be held liable, the prosecution must
prove that (a) the materials, publication, picture or literature are obscene; and (b) the offender sold,
exhibited, published or gave away such materials. Necessarily, that the confiscated materials are
obscene must be proved.
There is no perfect definition of “obscenity” but the latest word is that of Miller v. California which
established basic guidelines, to wit: (a) whether to the average person, applying contemporary
standards would find the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the
applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value. It would be a serious misreading of Miller to conclude that the trier of
facts has the unbridled discretion in determining what is “patently offensive” . No one will be subject
to prosecution for the sale or exposure of obscene materials unless these materials depict or describe
patently offensive “hard core” sexual conduct.
What remains clear is that obscenity is an issue proper for judicial determination and should be
treated on a case to case basis and on the judge’s sound discretion.
In this case, the trial court found the confiscated materials obscene and the Court of Appeals
affirmed such findings. Findings of fact of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the trial court are
accorded great respect, even by this Court, unless such findings are patently unsupported by the
evidence on record or the judgment itself is based on misapprehension of facts
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated March 21, 2003 and the Resolution dated September 2, 2003, of
the Court of Appeals affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21, in
Criminal Case No. 99-176582 are hereby AFFIRMED
306 J.B.I. Reyes vs. Bagatsing, 125 SCRA 553 (1983)
FACTS: . Petitioner, retired Justice J.B. L. Reyes, on behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition, sought a
permit from the City of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on October 26, 1983 from 2:00 to
5:00 in the afternoon, starting from the Luneta, a public park, to the gates of the United States
Embassy, hardly two blocks away.
. It turned out that on October 19, such permit was denied. Petitioner was unaware of such a fact as
the denial was sent by ordinary mail. The reason for refusing a permit was due to "police intelligence
reports which strongly militate against the advisability of issuing such permit at this time and at the
place applied for."[6] To be more specific, reference was made to "persistent intelli¬gence reports
affirm[ing] the plans of subversive/criminal elements to infiltrate and/or disrupt any assembly or
congregations where a large number of people is expected to attend."[7]
ISSUE/S: won petitioner can hold a peaceful march and rally? YES
HELD/RATIO - SC RULING (DOCTRINE/S): . It is thus clear that the Court is called upon to protect
the exercise of the cognate rights to free speech and peaceful assembly, arising from the denial of a
permit. The Constitution is quite explicit: "No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for
redress of grievances."[10]
Freedom of assembly connotes the right of the people to meet peaceably for consultation and
discussion of matters of public concern.[17] It is entitled to be accorded the utmost deference and
respect. It is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing, as is the case with freedom of
expression, of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to
prevent.[18]
The sole justification for a limitation on the exercise of this right, so fundamental to the maintenance
of democratic insti¬tutions, is the danger, of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to
public safety, public morals, public health, or any other legitimate public interest.[21]
there can be no valid reason why a permit should not be granted for the proposed march and rally
starting from a public park that is the Luneta.
The authority of a municipality to impose regulations in order to assure the safety and convenience
of the people in the use of public highways has never been regarded as inconsistent with civil
liberties but rather as one of the means of safeguarding the good order upon which they ultimately
depend. The control of travel on the streets of cities is the most familiar illus¬tration of this
recognition of social need. Where a restriction of the use of highways in that relation is designed to
promote the public convenience in the interest of all, it cannot be disregarded by the attempted
exercise of some civil right which in other circumstances would be entitled to protection."[31]
.[34] That being the case, if there were a clear and present danger of any intrusion or damage, or
disturbance of the peace of the mission, or impairment of its dignity, there would be a justification
for the denial of the permit insofar as the terminal point would be the Embassy. Moreover,
respondent Mayor relied on Ordinance No. 7295 of the City of Manila prohibiting the holding or
staging of rallies or demonstrations within a radius of five hundred (500) feet from any foreign
mission or chancery; and for other purposes. Unless the ordinance is nullified, or declared ultra vires,
its invocation as a defense is understandable but not decisive, in view of the primacy accorded the
consti¬tutional rights of free speech and peaceable assembly.
To repeat, it is settled law that as to public places, especially so as to parks and streets, there is
freedom of access.
There could be danger to public peace and safety if such a gathering were marked by turbulence.
That would deprive it of its peaceful character.
While the general rule is that a permit should recognize the right of the applicants to hold their
assembly at a public place of their choice, another place may be designated by the licensing authority
if it be shown that there is a clear and present danger of a substantive evil if no such change were
made.
. By way of a summary. The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the
licensing authority of the date, the public place where and the time when it will take place.
Ordinarily, the remedy in cases of this character is to set aside the denial or the modification of the
permit sought and order the respondent official to grant it. Nonetheless, as there was urgency in this
case, the proposed march and rally being scheduled for the next day after the hearing, this Court, in
the exer¬cise of its conceded authority, granted the mandatory injunction in the resolution of
October 25, 1983.
307

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
312 Wallace vs Jaffree
Wallace vs Jaffree
Facts
In Alabama, where the Wallace v. Jaffree case took place, a parent found himself faced with this
choice. A 1978 statute, which authorized a moment of silence in the classroom, was amended in
1981 to allow meditation or prayer. The legislation's sponsor stated that the sole purpose of this
change was to bring prayer back into schools. In 1982, Alabama Governor Fob James, a staunch
supporter of school prayer, called a special legislative session seeking approval for a mandate that
would allow teachers to willingly lead prayers in the classroom. James recommended that teachers
use a prayer written by his son. The legislative session was successful, and teachers throughout the
state were encouraged to lead prayer in the classroom each day. This state legislation directly
conflicted with a 1962 United States Supreme Court ruling, which stated that organized prayer in the
classroom is unconstitutional.
The schools in Mobile County followed the new state law, and the school permitted the teachers and
students to take a minute each day to meditate or pray. Ishmael Jaffree, a citizen of Mobile County,
Alabama, had three children in the school system. He was not in favor of the minute of prayer or
meditation because he was an agnostic and did not pray or meditate. Jaffree also viewed this law and
practice of prayer and meditation as offensive and unconstitutional and said his children had been
ostracized for refusing to join in religious activities in school.
Prior to filing his case, Jaffree spoke with one of his children's teachers and protested the prayer. The
teacher said that the class would continue the prayer but that participation would be voluntary. In
other words, Jaffree's child was not required to take part in the prescribed prayer.
Jaffree filed a lawsuit in 1982 against his children's three teachers, stating that the one-minute of
prayer or meditation is unconstitutional. The suit was later expanded to include Governor Fob James,
various school officials, and state education officials.
Issue
Did Alabama law violate the First Amendment's Establishment Clause?
Held:
Yes. The Court determined the constitutionality of Alabama's prayer and meditation statute by
applying the secular purpose test, which asked if the state's actual purpose was to endorse or
disapprove of religion. The Court held that Alabama's passage of the prayer and meditation statute
was not only a deviation from the state's duty to maintain absolute neutrality toward religion, but
was an affirmative endorsement of religion. As such, the statute clearly lacked any secular purpose as
it sought to establish religion in public schools, thereby violating the First Amendment's
Establishment Clause.
329

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:

CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
330

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:

CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
331

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:

CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
332

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:

CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
333

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:

CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
334

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:

CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
335

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:

CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
336

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:

CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:
337. IN RE: EDILLON- FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
Full Title of the Case: In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty.
MARCIAL A. EDILLON (IBP Administrative Case No. MDD - 1).

G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE: Ac. No. 1928/ 03Aug 1978
Ponente: Castro, CJ.
Petition Filed:
FACTS: The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing Attorney in the Philippines.
The IBP Board of Governors recommended to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent
from its Roll of Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues assailing the provisions
of the Rule of Court 139-A and the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws
pertaining to the organization of IBP, payment of membership fee and suspension for failure to pay
the same.
Petitioner’s Allegation: Edillon contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of his
constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled as a pre-condition to maintain his
status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues,
and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he
is admitted personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and properly
guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes the above provisions of
the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.
Respondent’s Allegation: recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent
from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues" to the IBP since the
latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the court may compel Atty. Edillion to pay his membership fee to the IBP
HELD/RATIO - SC RULING (DOCTRINE/S): HELD: The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar which
every lawyer must be a member of as distinguished from bar associations in which membership is
merely optional and voluntary. All lawyers are subject to comply with the rules prescribed for the
governance of the Bar including payment a reasonable annual fees as one of the requirements. The
Rules of Court only compels him to pay his annual dues and it is not in violation of his constitutional
freedom to associate. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is
free to attend or not the meeting of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its election
as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The
Supreme Court in order to further the State’s legitimate interest in elevating the quality of
professional legal services, may require the cost of the regulatory program – the lawyers.
Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. The right to practice law
before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And if
the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize then a penalty designed to enforce
its payment is not void as unreasonable as arbitrary. Furthermore, the Court has jurisdiction over
matters of admission, suspension, disbarment, and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation as
part of its inherent judicial functions and responsibilities thus the court may compel all members of
the Integrated Bar to pay their annual dues.

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
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369. PEOPLE VS MORIAL- Counsel of Choice

Full Title of the Case: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs . EDWIN MORIAL,
LEONARDO MORIAL alias "CARDING" NONELITO ABIÑON * alias "NOLY”
G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE: 129295 / 15 Aug 2001
Ponente: per curiam
FACTS: On January 6, 1996, Paula and Albert Bandibas were killed and robbed. As a part of the
investigation and as a result of a witness’ testimony, Edwin and Leandro Morial were asked several
questions by the policemen and were invited to the police station for continuing investigation. They
were turned over to SPO4 Andres Fernandez and later interrogated again after they woke up at past
6 in the morning. That investigation conducted by SPO4 Fernandez resulted into the admission by
Leandro that he was one of those who participated in the robbery with homicide. With the latter’s
consent, his statements were reduced into writing. SPO4 Fernandez then advised him of his right to
remain silent and to have a counsel, whatever will be his answer will be used as evidence in court.
SPO4 Fernandez volunteered to obtain a lawyer for the suspect, to which Leandro consented. Atty.
Aguilar was contacted by the former and he first met the latter at January 9, 1996 at about 8:00 in
the morning. After Leandro agreed to answer voluntarily knowing that the same can be used against
him as evidence in court, the investigation was conducted by SPO4 Fernandez with the presence of
the counsel. After “all the material points” were asked, Atty. Aguilar asked the investigator if he can
leave due to very important engagement. The latter agreed to the lawyer’s request. But before
leaving, Atty. Aguilar asked Leonardo if he was willing to answer questions in his absence, the latter
agreed. During and despite Atty. Aguilar’s absence, SPO4 Fernandez continued with the investigation
and propounded several more questions to Leonardo, which the latter answered.
Petitioner’s Allegation: The suspects were interrogated after they awoke at past 6:00 that same
morning. Edwin was advised to tell the truth so he would not be killed. Nevertheless, he refused to
admit his alleged participation in the killings. Someone then struck his left hand with a pistol. His
hand swelled. A policeman in uniform warned him that if he did not tell the truth, he would be
brought to the toilet.
Court a Quo (RTC) Ruling: the RTC rendered a decision convicting all the three accused. Appellants'
conviction rests on two vital pieces of evidence: the extra-judicial confession of appellant Leonardo
Morial and the eyewitness account of Gabriel Guilao.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not Leonardo Morial’s right to counsel was waived during the investigation
HELD/RATIO - SC RULING (DOCTRINE/S): The Court finds Leonardo Morial's extra-judicial

confession invalid since he was effectively deprived of his right to counsel during the custodial
investigation.
A person under custodial investigation is guaranteed certain rights, which attach upon the
commencement thereof. These are the rights (1) to remain silent, (2) to competent and
independent counsel, preferably of his own choice, and (3) to be informed of the two other rights.
The prosecution must prove with clear and convincing evidence that the accused was accorded said
rights before he extra-judicially admitted his guilt to the authorities.
Leonardo was effectively deprived of his right to counsel during the custodial investigation;
therefore his quasi-judicial confession is inadmissible in evidence against him and his other co-
accused. The Court stressed out that an accused under custodial interrogation must continuously
have a counsel assisting him from the very start thereof. SPO4 Fernandez cannot justify that Atty.
Aguilar only left after Leonardo had admitted that he and his companions committed the crime.
Neither can Atty. Aguilar rationalize that he only left after Leonardo had admitted the “material
points”, referring to the participation of the three accused to the crime. Both are invalid since
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7438 requires that “any person arrested, detained or under custodial
investigation shall at all times be assisted by counsel.” Furthermore, the last paragraph of Section 3
states that “in the absence of any lawyer, no custodial investigation shall be conducted.”
Even granted that Leonardo consented Atty. Aguilar’s departure during the investigation and to
answer questions during the lawyer’s absence, such consent was an invalid waiver of his right to
counsel and his right to remain silent. Under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, these rights
cannot be waived unless the same is made in writing and in the presence of the counsel. In the
case at bar, no such written and counseled waiver of these rights was presented as evidence.
The Court has stressed that an accused under custodial interrogation must continuously have a
counsel assisting him from the very start thereof. In People vs. Lucero, where the suspect's counsel
left just when the interrogation was starting, this Court chastised both counsel and the trial court
for their lack of zeal in safeguarding the rights of the accused. SPO4 Fernandez cannot justify Atty.
Aguilar's leaving by claiming that when the lawyer left, he knew very well that the suspect had
already admitted that he (Leonardo) and his companions committed the crime. Neither can Atty.
Aguilar rationalize his abandoning his client by saying that he left only after the latter had admitted
the "material points," referring to the three accused's respective participation in the crime. For
even as the person under custodial investigation enjoys the right to counsel from its inception, so
does he enjoy such right until its termination — indeed, "in every phase of the investigation." An
effective and vigilant counsel "necessarily and logically requires that the lawyer be present and
able to advise and assist his client from the time the confessant answers the first question asked by
the investigating officer until the signing of the extrajudicial confession."
Furthermore, Section 2(a) of R.A. No. 7438 requires that "[a]ny person arrested, detained or under
custodial investigation shall at all times be assisted by counsel." The last paragraph of Section 3 of
the same law mandates that "[i]n the absence of any lawyer, no custodial investigation shall be
conducted
The Court found Leonardo Morial's extra-judicial confession invalid since he was effectively deprived
of his right to counsel during the custodial investigation. However, notwithstanding the
inadmissibility of the extra-judicial confession executed by Leonardo Morial, the Court found the
conviction of accused-appellants fully supported by the other pieces of evidence adduced by the
prosecution. The prosecution had established all the elements of the crime of robbery with
homicide.

Ponente:
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401. ALMEDA VS VILLALUZ- Standards for fixing bail
Full Title of the Case: LEONARDO ALMEDA, petitioner, vs. HON. ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ, in his capacity
as presiding judge of the Circuit Criminal Court, Seventh Judicial District, Pasig, Rizal, and HON.
GREGORIO PINEDA, City Fiscal of Pasay City, respondents.
G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE: G.R. No. L-31665/ August 6, 1975.
Ponente: Castro, J.
Petition Filed: Petition for certiorari
FACTS: Petitioner Leonardo Almeda (Nardong Paa) was charged, together with five others, with the
crime of qualified theft of a motor vehicle. The amount of the bond recommended for the
provisional release of Almeda was P15,000, and this was approved by the respondent judge with a
direction that it be posted entirely in cash. Almeda asked the trial court to allow him to post a
surety bond in lieu of the cash bond required of him. This request was denied, and so was an oral
motion for reconsideration, on the ground that the amended information imputed habitual
delinquency and recidivism on the part of Almeda. At the same hearing, the respondent city fiscal,
thru his assistant, reiterated his oral motion made at a previous hearing for amendment of the
information so as to include allegations of recidivism and habitual delinquency in the particular
case of Almeda. The trial court granted the respondent fiscal's motion in open court. An oral
motion for reconsideration was denied. Immediately thereafter, the assistant fiscal took hold of
the original information and, then and there, entered his amendment by annotating the same on
the back of the document. The petitioner forthwith moved for the dismissal of the charge on the
ground of double jeopardy, but this motion and a motion for reconsideration were denied in open
court.
Petitioner’s Allegation: the latter vigorously objected, arguing that (a) such an amendment was
premature since no copies of prior conviction could yet be presented in court, (b) the motion to
amend should have been made in writing in order to enable him to object formally, and (c) the
proposed amendment would place him in double jeopardy considering that he had already pleaded
not guilty to the information
Respondent’s Allegation: An oral motion made at a previous hearing for amendment of the
information so as to include allegations of recidivism and habitual delinquency in the particular case
of Almeda.
Court a Quo (RTC) Ruling: The trial court nevertheless granted the respondent fiscal's motion in
open court. An oral motion for reconsideration was denied.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the respondent judge has the authority to require a strictly cash bond and
disallow the petitioner's attempt to post a surety bond for his provisional liberty
HELD/RATIO - SC RULING (DOCTRINE/S): As defined in Section 1 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court,
bail is the security required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of the law,
that he will appear before any court in which his appearance may be required as stipulated in the
bail bond or recognizance.
The purpose of requiring bail is to relieve an accused from imprisonment until his conviction and yet
secure his appearance at the trial. In this jurisdiction, the accused, as of right, is entitled to bail prior
to conviction except when he is charged with a capital offense and the evidence of guilt is strong.
This right is guaranteed by the Constitution, and may not be denied even where the accused has
previously escaped detention, or by reason of his prior absconding. In order to safeguard the right
of an accused to bail, the Constitution further provides that excessive bail shall not be required. This
is logical because the imposition of an unreasonable bail may negate the very right itself. We have
thus held that where conditions imposed upon a defendant seeking bail would amount to a refusal
thereof and render nugatory the constitutional right to bail, we would not hesitate to exercise our
supervisory powers to provide the required remedy.
The condition that the accused may have provisional liberty only upon his posting of a cash bond is
abhorrent to the nature of bail and transgresses our law on the matter. The sole purpose of bail is
to insure the attendance of the accused when required by the court, and there should be no
suggestion of penalty on the part of the accused nor revenue on the part of the government. The
allowance of a cash bond in lieu of sureties is authorized in this jurisdiction only because our rules
expressly provide for it.
Were this not the case, the posting of bail by depositing cash with the court cannot be countenanced
because, strictly speaking, the very nature of bail presupposes the attendance of sureties to whom
the body of the prisoner can be delivered. And even where cash bail is allowed, the option to deposit
cash in lieu of a surety bond primarily belongs to the accused.
This is clearly deducible from the language of section 14 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 14. Deposit of money as bail. — At any time after the amount of bail is fixed by order, the
defendant, instead of giving bail, may deposit with the nearest collector of internal revenue, or
provincial, city, or municipal treasurer the sum mentioned in the order, and upon delivering to the
court a proper certificate of the deposit, must be discharged from custody. Money thus deposited,
shall be applied to the payment of the fine and costs for which judgment may be given; and the
surplus, if any, shall be returned to the defendant.
Thus, the trial court may not reject otherwise acceptable sureties and insist that the accused obtain
his provisional liberty only thru a cash bond. But while we repudiate the particular measure adopted
by the respondent judge, we cannot fault the motive that caused him to demur to the petitioner's
offer of a surety bond based on the petitioner's past record.
Fortunately, the court is not without devices with which to meet the situation.
First, it could increase the amount of the bail bond to an appropriate level.
Second, as part of the power of the court over the person of the accused and for the purpose of
discouraging likely commission of other crimes by a notorious defendant while on provisional liberty,
the latter could be required, as one of the conditions of his bail bond, to report in person periodically
to the court and make an accounting of his movements.
Third, the accused might be warned, though this warning is not essential to the requirements of due
process, that under the 1973 Constitution.
"Trial may proceed notwithstanding his absence provided that he has been duly notified and his
failure to appear is unjustified."

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433. PEOPLE VS LAYA- Right to speedy impartial trial
Full Title of the Case: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS ALFREDO C. LAYA

G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE: 53873 / 13 May 1988
Ponente:Gutierrez, Jr.
FACTS: Petitioners seek the review and setting aside of the order of the then Court of First Instance
of Cebu, Branch 15 which dismissed the criminal case against accused Soledad Castro and Crisologo
Abines on the ground that their constitutional right to speedy trial was violated. The private
respondents were charged with the crime of grave coercion in an information filed by the petitioners
The accused also manifested their readiness for trial. They insisted on proceeding with the hearing.
1980, the court, finding the grounds advanced by the accused meritorious, denied the motion for
postponement and sustained the objections of the accused. The case was ordered dismissed for
failure to prosecute. A motion for reconsideration filed by the People of the Philippines was denied.
Petitioner’s Allegation: petitioners contend that the respondent court acted with grave abuse of
discretion in the exercise of its judicial functions —
"a) in dismissing the information for Grave Coercion;
"b) in refusing arbitrarily and capriciously to reconsider his order of dismissal;
"c) by reason of which, the prosecution without due process of law was deprived of its day in court
— which would be a stall (sic) in the machinery of justice."
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the accused was denied his right to a speedy, impartial, trial
HELD/RATIO - SC RULING (DOCTRINE/S): We have defined the right to a speedy trial in the following
manner: ". . .[T]hat the accused is free from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays, its salutary
objective being to assure that an innocent person may be free from anxiety and expense of a court
litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the shortest possible time compatible
with the presentation and consideration of whatever legitimate defense he may interpose. The case
was a simple one. It did not need lengthy and tedious preparation for trial. This familiar ground for
postponement previous and tight schedules of the prosecuting fiscal — is so hackneyed and
overused that it is time the Prosecution Service takes remedial measures. The two-months' delay of
the trial from March 25, 1980 to May 1980, if requested for sound reasons may not be unreasonable.
However, owing to the nature of the case, the reasons for the postponements, and the fact that one
of the accused is a municipal mayor, who had to leave his work every time he was haled to court
only to be told to return another day, the delay became vexatious because the lower court stated —
"the delay is not only prejudicial to him but also to the people of Santander, Cebu
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44497. Tupaz VS Ulep
497. TUPAZ VS ULEP-Subsequent Prosecution Barred-Exceptions
Full Title of the Case: PETRONILA C. TUPAZ , petitioner, vs . HONORABLE BENEDICTO B. ULEP
Presiding Judge of RTC Quezon City, Branch 105, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
G.R. NO. / SCRA / DATE: 127777, 01 Oct 1999
Ponente: PARDO, J.
Petition Filed: Special Civil Action for Certiorari with application for restraining order
FACTS: On January 10, 1991, State Prosecutor Esteban A. Molon, Jr. filed with the Regional
Trial Court, Quezon City an information for the alleged nonpayment of deficiency corporate income
tax for the year 1979 against Petronila C. Tupaz and her husband Jose J. Tupaz, Jr. as corporate
officers of El Oro Engravers Corporation. The said case was ra􀁈ed to Branch 105, presided over by
respondent Judge Benedicto B. Ulep. However, on July 25 1993, Jose J. Tupaz, Jr. died. Then, on
September 20, 1994, Petronila C. Tupaz was arraigned and she pleaded not guilty to the information.
On April 16, 1996, State Prosecutor Alfredo P. Agcaoili filed a motion to withdraw information,
thinking that the accused was charged for nonpayment of deficiency contractor's tax but found that
the accused was exempted from paying said tax. Consequently, Judge Ulep granted the motion and
dismissed the case, as prayed for by the prosecution. On May 28, 1996, Prosecutor Agcaoili filed with
the trial court a motion to reinstate information on the ground that the motion to withdraw
information was made through palpable mistake and was the result of excusable neglect. Over the
objection of the accused that it would place her in double jeopardy, Judge Ulep granted the motion
and ordered the information reinstated.
Petitioner’s Allegation: Petitioner submits that respondent judge committed a grave abuse of
discretion in reinstating the information in Criminal Case No. Q-91-17321 because (a) the offense
has prescribed; or (b) it exposes her to double jeopardy. As regards the issue of prescription,
petitioner contends that: (a) the period of assessment has prescribed, applying the three (3) year
period provided under Batas Pambansa No. 700; (b) the offense has prescribed since the complaint
for preliminary investigation was 􀁈led with the Department of Justice only on June 8, 1989, and the
offense was committed in April 1980 when she 􀁈led the income tax return covering taxable year
1979.
Respondent’s Allegation: The Solicitor General, in his comment, maintains that the prescriptive
period forassessment and collection of petitioner's de􀁈ciency corporate income tax was five (5)
years. The Solicitor General asserts that the shortened period of three (3) years provided under
B.P. Blg. 700 applies to assessments and collections of internal revenue taxes beginning taxable
year 1984. Since the deficiency corporate income tax was for taxable year 1979, then petitioner
was still covered by the five (5) year period. Thus, the July 16,1984 tax assessment was made
within the prescribed period
ISSUE/S: whether or not the reinstatement of the criminal information has exposed petitioner to
double jeopardy
HELD/RATIO - SC RULING (DOCTRINE/S): We sustain petitioner's contention. The reinstatement of

the information would expose her to double jeopardy. An accused is placed in double jeopardy if
he is again tried for an offense for which he has been convicted, acquitted or in another manner in
which the indictment against him was dismissed without his consent. In the instant case, there was
a valid complaint filed against petitioner to which she pleaded not guilty. The court dismissed the
case at the instance of the prosecution, without asking for accused petitioner's consent. This
consent cannot be implied or presumed. Such consent must be expressed as to have no doubt as to
the accused's conformity. As petitioner's consent was not expressly given, the dismissal of the case
must be regarded as final and with prejudice to the re-filing of the case. 26 Consequently, the trial
court committed grave abuse of discretion in reinstating the information against petitioner in
violation of her constitutionally protected right against double jeopardy.
Petition Granted.

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:

Ponente:
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Ponente:
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Ponente:
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Ponente:
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Ponente:
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Ponente:
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Ponente:
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Ponente:
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Ponente:
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Ponente:
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Ponente:
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Ponente:
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Ponente:
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Ponente:
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Ponente:
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Ponente:
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Ponente:
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Ponente:
Petition Filed:
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Ponente:
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Ponente:
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Ponente:
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Ponente:
Petition Filed:
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Ponente:
Petition Filed:
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Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
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Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
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Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
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Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
ISSUE/S:

Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
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Ponente:
Petition Filed:
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CA Ruling:
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Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
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Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
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Ponente:
Petition Filed:
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Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
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Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
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Ponente:
Petition Filed:
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CA Ruling:
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Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
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Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
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Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
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Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
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Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
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Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
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Ponente:
Petition Filed:
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Ponente:
Petition Filed:
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Ponente:
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Ponente:
Petition Filed:
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Ponente:
Petition Filed:
FACTS:
CA Ruling:
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ALONZO 1. PBM Employees Org. vs. PBM Co., Inc.

, 51 SCRA 189 (1973)

ALVARO 2. MMDA v Viron Transportation G.R. 170656 (2007)

ISSUE/S: Whether or not E.O, 179 is constitutional.

HELD/RATIO - SC RULING (DOCTRINE/S):

BALISI 3. Gancayco vs City Gov't of QC and MMDA G.R. 177807 (2011)

Full Title of the Case:

HELD/RATIO - SC RULING (DOCTRINE/S):

CANAS 4. Tano v. Socrates, G.R. 110249, August 27, 1997

Full Title of the Case:

HELD/RATIO - SC RULING (DOCTRINE/S):

Full Title of the Case:

HELD/RATIO - SC RULING (DOCTRINE/S):

CONCEPCION 6. Fernando vs. St. Scholastica. G.R. 161107

Full Title of the Case:

HELD/RATIO - SC RULING (DOCTRINE/S):

HELD/RATIO - SC RULING (DOCTRINE/S):

Court a Quo (RTC) Ruling:

Full Title of the Case:

Court a Quo (RTC) Ruling:

HELD/RATIO - SC RULING (DOCTRINE/S):

Full Title of the Case:

Court a Quo (RTC) Ruling:

HELD/RATIO - SC RULING (DOCTRINE/S):

Court a Quo (RTC) Ruling:

HELD/RATIO - SC RULING (DOCTRINE/S):

Full Title of the Case:

Court a Quo (RTC) Ruling:

HELD/RATIO - SC RULING (DOCTRINE/S):

Full Title of the Case:

Court a Quo (RTC) Ruling:

HELD/RATIO - SC RULING (DOCTRINE/S):

Full Title of the Case:

LIBO-ON 15. Moday v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 368 (1997)

Full Title of the Case:

Court a Quo (RTC) Ruling:

HELD/RATIO - SC RULING (DOCTRINE/S):

MENDZ 16. Sps. Yasay v CA, G.R. 156684

Full Title of the Case:

Court a Quo (RTC) Ruling:

HELD/RATIO - SC RULING (DOCTRINE/S):

MERIDA 17. RP. v. PLDT, 26 SCRA 620 (1969)

Full Title of the Case:

Court a Quo (RTC) Ruling:

HELD/RATIO - SC RULING (DOCTRINE/S):

MONTEADORA 18. NIA v Rural Bank, G.R. No. 185124

Full Title of the Case:

Court a Quo (RTC) Ruling:

HELD/RATIO - SC RULING (DOCTRINE/S):

MURDOCK 19. Republic vs. Castelvi, 58 SCRA 336 (1974)

ISSUE/S: WON the taking of Castellvi’s property occurred in 1947 or in 1959.

HELD/RATIO - SC RULING (DOCTRINE/S): A number of circumstances must be present in the "taking"

Full Title of the Case:

Court a Quo (RTC) Ruling:

HELD/RATIO - SC RULING (DOCTRINE/S):

SECRETO 21. City of Manila v Laguio, GR 118127, Apr 12, 2005

Whether or not the Ordinance promulgated by the City of Manila constitutional?

Court a Quo (RTC) Ruling:

CA Ruling: Affirmed the decision of the court a quo.

SULIT 23. Napocor vs. Gutierrez, 193 SCRA 1 (1991)

Full Title of the Case: NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner,vs.SPS. MISERICORDIA

Court a Quo (RTC) Ruling:

HELD/RATIO - SC RULING (DOCTRINE/S):

Full Title of the Case: