CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
Constitutional Law 1
Part I - Introduction
Q: What is the Constitution?
A: That written instrument enacted by direct action
of the people by which the fundamental powers of
the government are established, limited and
defined, and by which those powers are distributed
among the several departments for their safe and
useful exercise for the benefit of the body politic.1
Q: Is the Philippines a Democratic and
Republican state?
A: The Philippines is a democratic
and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the
people and all government authority emanates
from them.2
Q: What is the Constitution as a Social
Contract?
A: In Marcos v Manglapus,3 the Supreme Court
speaking through Justice Cortes categorically
opined that “the Constitution, aside from being an
allocation of power is also a social contract
whereby the people have surrendered their
sovereign powers to the State for the common
good.”
Social Contract asserts that the early states must
have been formed by deliberate and voluntary
compact among people to form a government of
their own.
Q: How do we read the Constitution?
A: The Court, in determining the merits of the
issues raised in a petition before it, must
necessarily turn to the Constitution itself which
employs the well-settled principles of constitutional
construction. In case of doubt, the Court resorts to
the following:
 Verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the
words used in the Constitution must be given
their ordinary meaning except where technical
terms are employed.
 Where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima.
The words of the Constitution should be
1 5
Malcolm, Philippine Constitutional Law, p.6
2
1987 Constitution of the Philippines, Article 2, Section 1
3
G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989
From the Syllabus of Atty. Jamon by Alvin Angelo C. Rufino (2013)
interpreted in accordance with the intent of its
framers.
 Ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution
is to be interpreted as a whole.4
Q: What is the Framework for Constitutional
Litigation?
A: The court’s power of judicial review, like almost
all powers conferred by the Constitution, is subject
to several limitations, namely:
 an actual case or controversy calling for the
exercise of judicial power;
 the person challenging the act must have
“standing” to challenge; he must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case
such that he has sustained, or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement;
 the question of constitutionality must be raised
at the earliest possible opportunity; and
 the issue of constitutionality must be the very
lis mota of the case.5
Part II – Amendment of the Constitution
Q: What is the involved in the amendment or
revision of the Constitution?
A: First is the proposal and the second is
ratification.6
Q: What are the three methods by which the
Constitution of the Philippines can be
proposed?
A: There are three modes:
 By Congress as a Constituent Assembly (Con-
Ass)
o A Constituent assembly is composed of all
members of the bicameral Philippine
Congress (Senate and the House of
Representatives). It is convened by
Congress to propose amendments to the
1987 constitution. Under Article XVII of the
Constitution of the Philippines,
amendments pass upon a vote of three-
fourths of all members of Congress, but it
is not clear if the Congress should vote as
4
G.R. No. 160261. November 10, 2003, Francisco v House
of Representatives
Supra.
6
Cruz, Isagani (2002). “Philippine Political Law: Central
Lawbook Publishing Co., Inc. pp. 376. ISBN 971-16-0491-4.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
a single body or as separate Houses. The
convention of Congress into a Constituent
Assembly is not explicitly provided for in
the Constitution.7
 By Constitutional Convention (Con- Con)
o Article XV of the Constitution provides:
The Congress in joint session assembled,
by a vote of three-fourths of all the
Members of the Senate and of the House
of Representatives voting separately, may
propose amendments to this Constitution
or call a contention for that purpose. Such
amendments shall be valid as part of this
Constitution when approved by a majority
of the votes cast at an election at
which the amendments are submitted to
the people for their ratification.
From our viewpoint, the provisions of
Article XV of the Constitution are satisfied
so long as the electorate knows that R. B.
H. No. 3 permits Congressmen to retain
their seats as legislators, even if they
should run for and assume the functions of
delegates to the Convention.8
 By the People through initiative
o In Santiago v COMELEC9, R.A. No. 6735
intended to include the System of Initiative
on Amendments to the Constitution, but is,
inadequate and incomplete to cover that
system because it does not contain any
implementation process for Amendments
to the Constitution and merely mentions it.
This law cannot use the rules and
regulations of COMELEC Resolution No.
2300 to compensate for this.
o Moreover, COMELEC Resolution No.
2300, insofar as it prescribes rules and
regulations on the conduct of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution, is void.
COMELEC cannot validly promulgate
rules and regulations to implement the
exercise of the right of the people to
directly propose amendments to the
Constitution through the system of
initiative. It does not have that power
under R.A. No. 6735. Reliance on the
COMELEC‘s power under Section 2(1) of
7
Cruz, Isagani (1995). "The Nature of the
Constitution". Constitutional Law. Philippines: Central
Lawbook Publishing Co., Inc. pp. 18–20. ISBN 971-16-0333-
0.
8
G.R. No. L-28196, November 9, 1967, Gonzales v
COMELEC.
9 12
G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997
Article IX-C of the Constitution is therefore
misplaced.10
o See also R.A. No. 6735, August 4, 1989.
Note:
All three required ratification by a majority vote in a
national referendum.
Q: What is the difference of Amendment and
Revision?
A: Lambino v COMELEC11, enumerates the
distinctions between revision and amendment, as
follows: Revision broadly implies a change that
alters a basic principle in the Constitution, like
altering the principle of separation of powers or the
system of checks and balances. There is also
revision if the change alters the substantial entirety
of the Constitution. On the other hand, amendment
broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces,
deletes, without altering the basic principle
involved. Revision generally affects several
provisions of the Constitution; while amendment
generally affects only the specific provision being
amended.
 In determining whether the Lambino proposal
involves an amendment or a revision, the
Court considered the two-part test. First the
quantitative test asks whether the proposed
change is so extensive in its provision as to
change directly the “substance entirety” of the
Constitution by the deletion or alteration of
numerous provisions. The court examines only
the number of provisions affected and does
not consider the degree of the change.
Second, the qualitative test, which inquires into
the qualitative effects of the proposed change
in the Constitution. The main inquiry is whether
the change will “accomplish such far- reaching
changes in the nature of our basic
governmental plan as to amount to a revision.”
 The Lambino proposal constituted a revision,
not simply an amendment, of the Constitution,
because it involved a change in the form of
government, from presidential to
parliamentary, and a shift from the present
bicameral to a unicameral legislature.12
Q: What is the procedure that constitutes the
elements of amendments directly proposed by
the people through initiative?
10
G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997.
11
G.R. No. 174153, October 25, 2006
G.R. No. 174153, October 25, 2006.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
A: The essence of amendments directly proposed
by the people through initiative upon a petition is
that the entire proposal on its face is a petition of
the people. Thus, two essential elements must be
present:
1. The people must author and sign the entire
proposal; no agent or representative can sign
in their behalf;
2. As an initiative upon a petition, the proposal
must be embodied in the petition.
The rationale for this requisite is that the signature
requirement would be meaningless if the person
supplying the signature has not first seen what it is
that he is signing, and more importantly, a loose
interpretation of the subscription requirement would
pose a significant potential for fraud.
In Lambino, the great majority of the 6.3 million
people who signed the signature sheets didn’t see
the full text of the proposed changes before
signing; they were not apprised of the nature and
effect of the proposed amendments. Failure to
comply with these requirements was fatal to the
validity of the initiative petition.13
Q: Doctrine of Proper Submission
A: In Tolentino v COMELEC14, the Constitutional
Convention of 1971 scheduled an advance
plebiscite on the proposal to lower the voting age
from 21 to 18, before the rest of the draft of the
Constitution then under revision had been
approved. The petition to prohibit this plebiscite
was granted by the Supreme Court, which strictly
interpreted the requirement of Article XV of the
1935 Constitution that the proposed amendments
shall be “approved by a majority of the votes cast
at an election at which the amendments are
submitted to the people for ratification.” The use of
the word “election” in the singular, according to the
Supreme Court, meant that the entire Constitution
must be submitted for ratification at one plebiscite
only. Furthermore, the people have to be given a
“proper frame of reference” in arriving at their
decision. Thus, submission for ratification of piece-
meal amendments by the Constitutional
Convention (which is tasked to revise the
Constitution) was disallowed since the people had,
at that time, no idea yet of what the rest of the
revised Constitution would be.
Q: Explain Ratification base on Sec. 4, Art. XVII.
13
Lambino v COMELEC, supra.
14
41 SCRA 702, 1971
From the Syllabus of Atty. Jamon by Alvin Angelo C. Rufino (2013)
A: The proposed amendment shall become part of
the Constitution when ratified by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite held not earlier than 60
nor later than 90 days after the approval of the
proposal by the Congress or the Constitutional
Convention, or after the certification by the
Commission on Elections of the sufficiency of the
petition for initiative under Sec. 2, Art. XVII.15
Part III – Judicial Review
Q: Separation of Powers
A: In Re Laureta and Maravilla16,
A: Interpretation of Sec 16(5) Art VIII – The
constitution allows the enactment of a law
authorizing the transfer of funds for the purpose of
augmenting an item from savings in another item in
the appropriation of the gov‘t branch. Par 1 Sec 44
of PD 1177 unduly extents the privilege granted
under the Sec 16(5). It empowers the Pres to
indiscriminately transfer funds without regard
whether the funds are actually savings or not.17
Q: What is the purpose of Separation of
Powers?
A: To prevent concentration of authority in one
person or group of persons that might lead to an
irreversible error or abuse in its exercise to the
detriment of republican institutions. “To secure
action, to forestall over action, to prevent
despotism and to obtain efficiency.”18
Q: May the Judiciary interfere with the due
exercise by co-equal branches of the
government of their official functions?
A: No. In La Bugal-B’Laan Tribal Association v
Ramos, G.R. No. 127882, December 1, 2004, the
Court restrained itself from intruding into policy
matters to allow the President and Congress
maximum discretion in using the mineral resources
of our country and in securing the assistance of
foreign groups to eradicate the grinding poverty of
our people and answer their cry for viable
employment opportunities in the country. “The
Judiciary is loath to interfere with the due exercise
by co-equal branches of the government of their
official functions”. Let the development of the
mining industry be the responsibility of the political
branches of government. The questioned
15
Sec. 4, Art. XVII.
16
148 SCRA 382, March 12, 1987.
17
148 SCRA 208 (1987), Demetria v Alba.
18
40 O.G. 8th Supp. 57, Pangasinan Transportation Co. v
Public Service Commission.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
provisions of R.A. 7942 (Philippine Mining Act of
1995) are not unconstitutional.
Q: What is the principle of blending of powers?
A: Instances when powers are not confined
exclusively within one department but are assigned
to or shared by several departments, e.g.
enactment of general appropriations law.19
Q: What is the principle of Checks and
Balances?
A: This allows one department to resist
encroachments upon its prerogatives or to rectify
mistakes or excesses committed by the other
departments, e.g. veto power of the President as
check on improvement legislation.20
Q: What is the role of the Judiciary?
A: The Judicial power, as defined in Sec. 1, Art.
VIII, “includes the duty of the court to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.”21
Q: What is the theory and justification of
Judicial Review?
A: Note that when the Court mediates to allocate
constitutional boundaries or invalidates the acts of
a coordinate body, what is upholds is not its own
superiority but the supremacy of the Constitution.22
In Angara v Electoral Commission, for example,
certain rules of procedure promulgated by the
respondent were challenged on the ground that
they had not been expressly authorized by the
1935 Constitution. The Supreme Court
nevertheless upheld them, declaring that they were
necessary to the proper exercise of the express
power granted to the body to hear and decide
election contests involving members of the
legislature.
In the aforementioned case, the Supreme Court
held that it is only the judicial department which
can be called upon to determine the proper
allocation of powers between the several
19
Nachura, Antonio Eduardo B. (2009). Outline/ Reviewer in
Political Law, p.74.
20
Supra.
21
Supra.
22
63 Phil. 139, 1936, Angara v Electoral Commission.
departments and among the integral or constituent
units thereof.23
Q: What is moderating power?
A: “Determines the proper allocation of powers” of
the different branches of the government and “to
direct the course of government along
constitutional channels”. It is inherent in all courts
as a necessary consequence of the judicial power
itself, which is “the power of the court to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable.”24
Q: What is the first and safest criterion to
determine whether a given power has been
validly exercised by a particular department?
A: It is asking whether or not the power has been
constitutionally conferred upon the department
claiming its exercise --- since the conferment is
usually done expressly. However, even in the
absence of express conferment, the exercise of the
power may be justified under the doctrine of
necessary implication, i.e. that the grant of an
express power carries with it all other powers that
may be reasonably inferred from it. Note also that
there are powers which although not expressly
conferred nor implied therefrom, are inherently or
incidental, e.g., the President’s power to deport
undesirable aliens which may be exercised
independently of constitutional or statutory
authority, because it is an “act of State”.25
Q: What is a Justiciable Question?
A: Miranda v Aguirre26
A: La Bugal-B’Laan v Ramos27
A: “A purely justiciable question implies a given
right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act
or omission violative of such right, and a remedy
granted and sanctioned by law for said breach of
right.”28
Q: What is a Political Question?
A: Political questions are “those questions which,
under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to
23
Supra.
24
G.R. No. 160261. November 10, 2003, Francisco v House
of Representatives.
25
Nachura, Antonio Eduardo B. (2009). Outline/ Reviewer in
Political Law, p.74.
26
G.R. No. 133064, September 16, 1999
27
G.R. No. 127882, December 1, 2004
28
92 SCRA 642, Casibang v Aquino
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of
the Government.” It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a
particular measure.29
“The term ‘political question’ connotes what it
means in ordinary parlance, namely a question of
policy. It refers to those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in
their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government.
It is concerned with issues dependent upon the
wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.”30
The determination of a truly political question from
a non-justiciable political question lies in the
answer to the question of whether there are
constitutionally imposed limits on powers or
functions conferred upon political bodies. If there
are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine
whether the branch or instrumentality of the
government properly acted within such limits. This
Court thus now applies this standard to the present
controversy.31
It is not clear, however, what discretionary acts are
subject to judicial review, outside of those
specifically mentioned in the Constitution, and what
acts remain prerogatives of the political
departments that, even with said enlargement of
judicial power, cannot be examined by the courts of
justice.32
Q: What is Judicial Review?
A: The power of the courts to test the validity of
executive and legislative acts in light of their
conformity with the Constitution.33
Q: What are the requisites of Judicial Review?
A: No constitutional question will be hear and
decided by the Court unless there is compliance
with what are known as the requisites of judicial
inquiry, which are the following:
1. There must be actual case or controversy;
29
G.R. No. 160261. November 10, 2003, Francisco v House
of Representatives.
30
31
100 Phil. 1101, Tañada v Cuenco.
G.R. No. 160261. November 10, 2003, Francisco v House
of Representatives.
32
Cruz, Isagani (2002). “Philippine Political Law: Central
Lawbook Publishing Co., Inc. pp. 89–90. ISBN 971-16-0491-
4.
33
63 Phil. 139, 1936, Angara v Electoral Commission
From the Syllabus of Atty. Jamon by Alvin Angelo C. Rufino (2013)
2. The question of constitutionality must be
raised by the proper party;
3. The constitutional question must be raised
at the earliest possible opportunity; and
4. The decision of the constitutional question
must be necessary to the determination of
the case itself.34
Q: When is there an actual Case or Controversy
or when is it Premature?
A: In PACU v Secretary of Education35, the
petitioners challenged a regulation of the
respondent requiring all private colleges and
universities to first obtain a permit from the
Department of Education before they could open
and operate. It appeared, however, that all the
petitioners had previously obtained the required
permit and that they were questioning the
regulation only because of the possibility that such
permit might be denied them in the future. The
Supreme Court declared that the case was
premature as there was no showing at the time of
any conflict of legal rights that would justify
assumption of jurisdiction by the judiciary. The
Court said that “mere apprehension that the
Secretary of Education might, under the law,
withdraw the permit of one of the petitioners does
not constitute a justiciable controversy.”
A request for an advisory opinion is not an actual
case or controversy. But an action for declaratory
relief is proper for judicial determination.
In Mariano v COMELEC, 242 SCRA 211, the
petition to declare R.A. No. 7854 (Converting the
municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City)
as unconstitutional was dismissed, because it was
premised on many contingent events the
happening of which was uncertain; the petitioner,
thus, posed a hypothetical issue which had not yet
ripened into an actual or controversy.
In Montesclaros v COMELEC, G.R. No. 152295,
July 9, 2002, it was held that a proposed bill is not
subject to judicial review, because it creates no
rights and imposes no duties enforceable by the
courts.
Q: When does a case becomes Moot?
A: A case becomes moot when there are facts,
injuries and heated arguments but for some reason
the legal problem has become stale.36
34
95 SCRA 392, Dumlao v COMELEC.
35
97 Phil. 806 (1955).
36
Guingona v CA, G.R. No. 125532, July 10, 1998
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
A: In Lacson v Perez, G.R. No. 147780, May 10,
2001, where cases were filed questioning the
declaration by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
of a “state of rebellion” in Metro Manila (under
General Order No. 1), the Supreme Court
dismissed the petitions because on May 6, 2001,
the President ordered the lifting of the “state of
rebellion”, and, thus, the issue raised in the
petitions had become moot and academic.
Atlas Fertilizer v Secretary, Department of Agrarian
Reform, G.R. No. 93100, June 19, 1997, because
Congress had already passed amendatory laws
excluding fishponds and prawn farms from the
coverage of CARL, the issue on the
constitutionality of the assailed provisions had
become moot and academic, and therefore, not
ripe for judicial review.
Q: What are the exceptions to Mootness?
A: In Sanlakas vs. Executive Secretary37, the Court
agrees with the Solicitor General that the issuance
of Proclamation 435, declaring that the state of
rebellion has ceased to exist, has rendered the
case moot.
As a rule, courts do not adjudicate moot cases,
judicial power being limited to the determination of
“actual controversies.” Nevertheless, courts will
decide a question, otherwise moot, if it is “capable
of repetition yet evading review.”
The present case is one such case. Once before,
the President on 1 May 2001 declared a state of
rebellion and called upon the AFP and the PNP to
suppress the rebellion through Proclamation 38
and General Order 1. On that occasion, “‘an angry
and violent mob armed with explosives, firearms,
bladed weapons, clubs, stones and other deadly
weapons’ assaulted and attempted to break into
Malacañang.” Petitions were filed before the
Supreme Court assailing the validity of the
President’s declaration. Five days after such
declaration, however, the President lifted the same.
The mootness of the petitions in Lacson v. Perez
and accompanying cases precluded the Court from
addressing the constitutionality of the declaration.
To prevent similar questions from reemerging, the
Supreme Court seized the opportunity to finally lay
to rest the validity of the declaration of a state of
rebellion when she merely exercised a wedding of
her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief
powers, notwithstanding the mootness of the
petitions.
37
G.R. 159085, February 03, 2004.
In Salonga v Pano38, where it was held that the
Court had the duty to formulate guiding and
controlling constitutional principles, precepts,
doctrines or rules, and the symbolic function to
educate the bench and the bar on the extent of
protection given by the constitutional guarantees.
However, the moot and academic principle is not a
magical formula that can automatically dissuade
the courts from resolving a case. In David v
Macapagal Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006,
it was held that courts will still decide cases
otherwise moot and academic if:
1. There is a grave violation of the
Constitution;39
2. There is an exceptional character of the
situation and paramount public interest is
involved;40
3. The constitutional issues raised require
formulation of controlling principles to
guide the bench, the bar and the public;41
and
4. The case is capable of repetition yet
evasive of review.42
A: In Pimentel v Ermita43, the Solicitor General
argues that the petition is moot because President
Arroyo had extended to respondents ad
interim appointments on Sept. 23 2004
immediately after the recess of Congress. As a
rule, the writ of prohibition will not lie to enjoin acts
already done. However, as an exception to the
rule on mootness, courts will decide a question
otherwise moot if it is capable of repetition yet
evading review. In the present case, the mootness
of the petition does not bar its resolution. The
question of the constitutionality of the President’s
appointment of department secretaries in an acting
capacity while Congress is in session will arise in
every such appointment.
Q: Who is a proper party and not?
A: A proper party is who has sustained or is in
imminent danger of sustaining an injury as a result
of the act complained of.44 To be proper party, one
must have a “legal standing”, or locus standi.
38
134 SCRA 438.
39
G.R. No. 152774, May 27, 2004, Province of Batangas v
Romulo.
40
G.R. No. 147780, May 10, 2001, Lacson v Perez.
41
134 SCRA 438, Salonga v Pano.
42
G.R. No. 159085, Feb. 02, 2004, Sanlakas v Exec.
Secretary.
43
G.R. 164978, October 13, 2005
44
Ex parte Levitt, 303 U.S. 633.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
A: In Joya v PCGG45, the petitioners having failed
to show that they were the owners of the masters’
paintings and antique silverware, were not deemed
proper parties to enjoin the PCGG from selling at
public auction the aforesaid items seized from
Malacañang and the Metropolitan Museum as
allegedly part of the ill-gotten wealth of the
Marcoses.
A: In Agan, Jr. v Philippine International Air
Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO)46, the petitioners,
NAIA concessionaries and service contractors,
were declared proper parties because they stood
to lose their source of livelihood by reason of the
implementation of the PIATCO contracts. The
financial prejudice brought about by the said
PIATCO contracts on them are legitimate interests
sufficient to confer on them the requisite standing
to file the instant petitions.
A: In Commission on Human Rights Employees
Association v Commission on Human Rights47, the
petitioner, an association consisting of rank-and-file
employees in the Commission of Human Rights,
protests that the upgrading and collapsing of
positions in the Commission, resulting in the
demoralization of rank-and-file employees. This,
according to the Supreme Court, meets the injury
tests.
A: In Automotive Industry Workers Alliance v
Romulo48, the petitioners, composed of ten labor
unions, seeking the declaration of
unconstitutionality of E.O. No. 185, dated March
10, 2003, which transfer administrative supervision
over the NLRC from the NLRC Chairman to the
Secretary of Labor, could not show that their
members sustained or were in danger of sustaining
injury from E.O. No. 185. This was because the
authority conferred upon the Secretary of Labor did
not extend to the power to review, revise, reverse
or modify the decisions of the NLRC in the exercise
of its quasi-judicial functions.
Q: What does the term “interest” means?
A: In IBP v Zamora, G.R. No. 141284, August 15,
2000, it was clarified that the term “interest” means
material interest, an interest in issue affected by
the challenged official act, as distinguished from
mere interest in the question involved, or a mere
incidental interest.
45
G.R. No. 96541, August 24, 1993/ 225 SCRA 568.
46
G.R. No. 155001, May 5 2003.
47
G.R. No. 155336, November 25, 2004.
48
G.R. No. 157509, January 18, 2005.
From the Syllabus of Atty. Jamon by Alvin Angelo C. Rufino (2013)
Q: Citizen Standing
A: In Tanada v Tuvera49,
A: In Chavez v Public Estates Authority and Amari,
G.R. No. 133250, July 9, 2002, the Supreme Court
said that the petitioner has legal standing to bring
this taxpayer’s suit because the petitioner seeks to
compel PEA to comply with its constitutional duties.
In this case, there were two constitutional issues
involved: first, the right of the citizen to information
on matters of public concern; and second, the
application of a constitutional provision intended to
insure equitable distribution of alienable lands of
the public domain among Filipino citizens.
Q: Associational Standing
A: In KMU Labor Center v Garcia, 239 SCRA 386,
the Court held that KMU members who avail of the
use of buses, trains and jeepneys everyday are
directly affected by the burdensome cost of
arbitrary increases in passenger fares. They are,
therefore, proper parties to contest the validity of
DOTC memoranda, etc., authorizing provincial bus
and jeepney operators to increase or decrease
transportation fares.
In the same vein, an association of registered
recruitment agencies had legal standing to
question the constitutionality of the Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipino Act, in order to
assert the concern of its constituents.
A: In Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) v
Zamora, G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000, the
petition seeking to nullify the order of President
Estrada for the deployment of the Philippine
Marines to join the PNP in visibility patrols around
the Metro Manila area, was dismissed on the
ground that the IBP had no legal standing to
question the presidential act.
The mere invocation of the IBP of its duty to
preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while
undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with
standing in this case—too general interest—not a
specific and substantial interest in the resolution of
the case. Not only is the presumed injury not
personal in character it is likewise too vague, highly
speculative and uncertain to satisfy the
requirement of standing.
A: In Executive Secretary v CA50, The modern view
is that an association has standing to complain of
injuries to its members. This view fuses the legal
49
136 SCRA 27 (1985)
50
429 SCRA 781, May 25, 2004
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
identity of an association with that of its
members. An association has standing to file suit
for its workers despite its lack of direct interest if its
members are affected by the action. An
organization has standing to assert the concerns of
its constituents.
A: In Kilosbayan v Guingona51, one of the issues
was the locus standi of the petitioner, an
association of citizens and taxpayers, to challenge
a contract entered into by the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office with a foreign corporation for
the operation of a nationwide lottery. The majority
opinion penned by Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.
declare:
“We find the instant petition to be of transcendental
importance to the public. The issues it raised are of
paramount public interest and of category even
higher than those involved in many of the
aforecited cases. The ramifications of such issues
immeasurably affect the social, economic and
moral well-being of the people even in the remotest
barangays of the country and the counter-
productive and retrogressive effects of the
envisioned on-line lottery system are as staggering
as the billions of pesos it is expected to raise. The
legal standing then of the petitioners deserves
recognition and, in the exercise of its sound
discretion, this Court hereby brushes aside the
procedural barrier which the respondents tried to
take advantage of.”
Q: Taxpayer’s Standing
A: In Information Technology Foundation v
COMELEC, G.R. No. 159139, January 13, 2004,
reiterated the principle that taxpayers are allowed
to sue when there is a claim of “illegal
disbursement of public funds”, or if public money is
being “deflected to any improper purpose”, or when
petitioners seek to restrain respondent from
“wasting public funds through the enforcement of
an invalid or unconstitutional law”. In this case, the
individual petitioners, suing as taxpayers, assert a
material interest in seeing to it that public funds are
properly and lawfully used, claiming that the
bidding was defective, the winning bidder not a
qualified entity, and the award of the contract
contrary to law and regulations.
Q: Voter’s Standing
A: In Tolentino v COMELEC52, petitioners assert
harm classified as a “generalized grievance.”
Although, the latter is shared in substantially equal
51
232 SCRA 110, (1994)
52
420 SCRA 438, January 21, 2004
measure by a large class of voters, if not all the
voters, who voted in that election, the Court,
however, accorded to petitioners legal standing in
their capacity as voters since they raise important
issues involving their right of suffrage, considering
that the issue raised in this petition is likely to arise
again.
Q: Legislative Standing
A: In Ople v Torres, 292 SCRA 141, the Supreme
Court held that Senator Blas Ople was a proper
party to question the constitutionality of A.O. No.
308 in his capacity as Senator, as taxpayer and
member of the GSIS. As Senator, he had the
requisite to bring suit assailing the issuance of the
A.O. as a usurpation of legislative power; as
taxpayer and GSIS member, he could impugn the
legality of misalignment of public funds and the
misuse of the GSIS to implement the A.O. No. 308.
Q: Governmental Standing
A: In People v Vera, 65 Phil. 56, the Supreme
Court declared that the Government of the
Philippines is a proper party to question the validity
of its own laws, because more than any one, it
should be concerned with the constitutionality of its
acts. In that case, it was held that the government
has substantial interest in having the Probation
Law declared as unconstitutional, because more
than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure
of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon
the fundamental law by enforcement of an invalid
statute.
In this instant, the Court also adopted of the direct
injury test, which states that a person who impugns
the validity of a statute must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained or will sustain a direct injury as a result.
Q: Facial challenge
A: In Estrada v Sandiganbayan53, the Court
defined the “face challenge”; A facial challenge is
allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one
which is overbroad because of possible "chilling
effect" upon protected speech.
The theory is that "when statutes regulate or
proscribe speech and no readily apparent
construction suggests itself as a vehicle for
rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution,
the transcendent value to all society of
constitutionally protected expression is deemed to
53
Estrada v Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, November
19, 2001
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes
with no requirement that the person making the
attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not
be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow
specificity." The possible harm to society in
permitting some unprotected speech to go
unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that
the protected speech of others may be deterred
and perceived grievances left to fester because of
possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes.
Criminal statutes have general in terms of effect
resulting from their very existence, and, if facial
challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the
State may well be prevented from enacting laws
against socially harmful conduct. In the area of
criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the
area of free speech. For this reason, it has been
held that "a facial challenge to a legislative act is
the most difficult challenge to mount successfully,
since the challenger must establish that no set of
circumstances exists under which the Act would be
valid."
As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a
litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it
is vague in all its possible applications. "A plaintiff
who engages in some conduct that is clearly
proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of
the law as applied to the conduct of others."
Q: Earliest Opportunity
A: In Umali v Guingona, G.R. No. 131124, March
21, 1999, the question of the constitutionality of the
Presidential Commission on Anti-Graft and
Corruption (PCAGC) was not entertained because
the issue was raised by the petitioner only in his
motion for reconsideration before the RTC of
Makati. It was too late to raise the issue for the first
time at that stage of the proceedings.
Q: Necessity of Deciding Constitutional
Questions
A: In Arceta v Mangrobang, G.R. No. 152895,
June 15, 2004, in a new challenge to the
constitutionality of B.P. 22, the Supreme Court did
not find the constitutional question to be the very lis
mota presented in the controversy. Every law has
in its favour the presumption of constitutionality,
and to justify its nullification, there must be a clear
and unequivocal breach of the Constitution and not
one that is doubtful, speculative or argumentative.
Part IV – The Three Branches of
Government
From the Syllabus of Atty. Jamon by Alvin Angelo C. Rufino (2013)
Legislative Department
Q: Who exercises legislative power?
A: Section 1, Article VII of the Constitution provides
that legislative power shall be vested in the
Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a
Senate and a House of Representatives, except to
the extent reserved to the people by the provision
on initiative and referendum.
Q: What is the composition of the Senate and
the qualifications and term of its members?
A: Section 254 states that “the Senate shall be
composed of twenty-four (24) Senators who shall
be elected at large by the qualified voters of the
Philippines, as may be provided by law.”
A: Section 355 provides that “No person shall be a
Senator unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, and, on the day of the election, is at
least thirty- five (35) years of age, able to read and
write, a registered voter, and a resident of the
Philippines for not less than two years immediately
preceding the day of the election.”
A: Under Sec. 4, par. 1, Art. VI56, “The term of
office of the Senators shall be six years and shall
commence, unless otherwise provided by law, at
noon on the thirtieth day of June next following
their election.”
Also, in Sec. 2, Art. XVIII57, “The Senators,
Members of the House of Representatives, and the
local officials first elected under this Constitution
shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992. “Of the
senators elected in the election in 1992, the first
twelve (12) obtaining the highest number of votes
shall serve for six years and the remaining twelve
for three (3) years.”
However, it should be noted that in Sec. 4, par. 2,
Art. VI58, it was mentioned that “No Senator shall
serve for more than two consecutive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length
of time shall not be considered as an interruption in
the continuity of his service for the full term for
which he was elected.”
54
1987 Philippine Constitution
55
Ibid.
56
57
Id.
Id.
58
Id.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
Q: What is the composition of the House of
Representatives and the qualifications and
term of its members?
A: Section 559. (1) The House of Representatives
shall be composed of not more than two hundred
and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law,
who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on the
basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those
who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a
party-list system of registered national, regional,
and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute
twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party list.
For three consecutive terms after the ratification of
this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to
party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided
by law, by selection or election from the labor,
peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other
sectors as may be provided by law, except the
religious sector.
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as
practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent
territory. Each city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall
have at least one representative.
(4) Within three years following the return of every
census, the Congress shall make a measure is a justifiable question, involving as it
reapportionment of legislative districts based on
the standards provided in this section
A: Section 660. No person shall be a Member of the
House of Representatives unless he is a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of
the election, is at least twenty-five years of age,
able to read and write, and, except the party-list
representatives, a registered voter in the district in
which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof
for a period of not less than one year immediately
preceding the day of the election.
In addition, the party-list representative must be a
bona fide member of the party he seeks to
represent at least ninety days before Election Day.
The youth representative must not be more than
thirty (30) years old but may continue beyond that
age until the end of his term.
59
Id.
60
Id.
A: Section 761. The Members of the House of
Representatives shall be elected for a term of three
years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided
by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next
following their election. No Member of the House
of Representatives shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not be considered
as an interruption in the continuity of his service for
the full term for which he was elected.
Q: What is the purpose of residence
requirement?
A: To ensure familiarity with the conditions and
problems of the constituency sought to be
represented and consequent efficiency and
concern in the discharge of legislative duties on its
behalf.62
Q: What is Gerrymandering?
A: It is the arrangement of districts in such a way
as to favor the election of preferred candidates
(usually re- electionists) through the inclusion
therein only of those areas where they expect to
win, regardless of the resultant shape of such
districts.63
Q: Where does apportionment of representative
districts should be based?
A: Macias v COMELEC64 is the authority for the
view that the validity of a legislative apportionment
does certain requirements the interpretation of
which does not call for the exercise of legislative
discretion. The Supreme Court in fact annulled the
challenged law in that case when it was shown that
the apportionment was not based on the number of
inhabitants in the various representatsive districts.
The Supreme Court noted that some big provinces
were given less representatives than certain
relatively smaller ones, e.g. Cebu got seven while
Rizal with a bigger population then got only four.
Q: Discuss the following cases:
A: In Tan v COMELEC65, the apportionment of the
Members of the House of Representatives is not
61
Id.
62
Cruz, Isagani (2002). “Philippine Political Law: Central
Lawbook Publishing Co., Inc. pp. 120. ISBN 971-16-0491-4.
63
Ibid., p.116
64
3 SCRA 1, 1961
65
142 SCRA 727 (1986)
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
valid because it is not based on the number of
inhabitants a province has.
A: In Veterans Federation Party v COMELEC66,
the Supreme Court reversed the COMELEC ruling
that the 38 respondent parties, coalitions and
organizations were each entitled to a party-list seat
despite their failure to obtain at least 2% each of
the national vote in the 1998 party-list election. The
Court said that the Constitution and RA 7941
mandate at least four inviolable parameters:
1. The 20% allocation: the combined
number of all party- list congressmen shall
not exceed 20% of the total membership
of the House of Representatives;
2. The 2% threshold: only those parties
garnering a minimum of 2% of the total
valid votes cast for the party- list system
are qualified to have a seat in the House;
3. The three- seat limit: each qualified
party, regardless of the number of votes it
actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum
of three seats, i.e. one qualifying and two
additional; and
4. Proportional representation: the
additional seats which a qualified party is
entitled to shall be computed “in proportion
to their total number of votes.
Below is the formula used in this case and in Ang
Bagong Bayani case for computing the additional
seats:
Votes cast for Qualified Party
Additional seat = x Alloted seats for
Votes cast for First Party First Party
A: In Ang Bagong Bayani- OFW Labor Party v
COMELEC67, the Supreme Court said that even if
major political parties are allowed by the
Constitution to participate in the party- list system,
they must show, however, that they represent the
interests of the marginalized and under-
represented. The following guidelines should be
followed in order that a political party registered in
the party- list system may be entitled to a seat in
the House of Representatives:
1. Must represent marginalized and under-
represented sectors;
66
G.R. 136781, October 06, 2000
67
G.R. No. 147589, June 26, 2001
From the Syllabus of Atty. Jamon by Alvin Angelo C. Rufino (2013)
2. Major political parties must comply with
this statutory policy;
3. Ang Bagong Buhay Hayaang
Yumabong (as a party) must be subject to
the express constitutional prohibition
against religious sects;
4. The party must not be disqualified
under RA 7941;
5. The party must not be an adjunct of an
entity or project funded by the
government;
6. The party and its nominees must
comply with the requirements of law;
7. The nominee must also represent the
marginalized or under- represented sector;
and
8. The nominee must be able to contribute
to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the
nation.
A: In Banat v COMELEC, the Court reversed its
ruling in Veteran’s case and declared that 20%
allocation of party-list representatives is merely a
ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more
than 20% of the members of the House of
Representatives. The continued operation of the
2% threshold in the distribution of the additional
seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive
ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of
Representatives shall consist of party-list
representatives.
A: In Aquino v COMELEC68, it was held that
Agapito Aquino failed to prove that he had
established not just residence but domicile of
choice in Makati. In his certificate of candidacy of
San Jose Concepcion, Tarlac, for 52 years; he was
a registered voter of the same district; his birth
certificate places Concepcion, Tarlac, as
birthplace. Thus, his domicile of origin was
Concepcion, Tarlac; and his bare assertion of
transfer of domicile from Tarlac to Makati is hardly
supported by the facts of the case.
A: In Marcos v COMELEC69, the Court upheld the
qualification of Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos,
despite her own declaration in her certificate of
candidacy that she had resided in the district for
only seven months, because of the following:
68
248 SCRA 400 (1995)
69
248 SCRA 300 (1995)
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
1. A minor follows the domicile of his
parents; Tacloban became Imelda’s
domicile of origin by operation of law when
her father brought the family to Leyte;
2. Domicile of origin is lost only when
there is actual removal or change of
domicile, a bonafide intention of
abandoning the former residence and
establishing a new one, and acts which
correspond with the purpose; in the
absence of clear and positive proof of the
concurrence of all these, the domicile of
origin should be deemed to continue;
3. The wife does not automatically gained
the husband’s domicile because the term
“residence” in Civil Law does not mean the
same thing in Political Law; when Imelda
married Marcos in 1954, she kept her
domicile of origin and merely gained a
new home, not a domicilium necessarium;
4. Even assuming that she gained a new
domicile after her marriage and acquired
the right to choose a new one only after
her husband died, her acts following her
return to the country clearly indicate that
she chose Tacloban, her domicile of
origin, as her domicile of choice.
A: In Torayno v COMELEC70, Emano having been
the governor of Misamis Oriental for three terms
and wanting to run as Mayor of CDO, could not be
said to be a stranger or newcomer to the city in the
last year of his third term when he decided to adopt
it as his permanent place of residence.
Q: When does Regular Election should be
held?
A: Section 871. Unless otherwise provided by law,
the regular election of the Senators and the
Members of the House of Representatives shall be
held on the second Monday of May.
Q: When does Special Election takes place?
A: Section 972. In case of vacancy in the Senate or
in the House of Representatives, a special election
may be called to fill such vacancy in the manner
prescribed by law, but the Senator or Member of
the House of Representatives thus elected shall
serve only for the unexpired term.
70
G.R. 137329, August 09, 2000
71
1987 Philippine Constitution
72
Ibid.
Q: Organizations and Sessions of Legislatives
Q: Election of Officers.
A: In Santiago v Guingona73, the agenda for the
day was the election of officers. Nominated by
Senator Ople to the position of Senate President
was Senator Fernan. Senator Tatad was also
nominated to the same position by Sen. Miriam
Defenser Santiago. By a vote of 20 to 2, Senator
Fernan was declared the duly elected President of
the Senate.
The following were likewise elected: Senator Ople
as president pro tempore, and Sen. Franklin M.
Drilon as majority leader.
Senator Tatad thereafter manifested that, with the
agreement of Senator Santiago, allegedly the only
other member of the minority, he was assuming the
position of minority leader. He explained that those
who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the
"majority," while only those who had voted for him,
the losing nominee, belonged to the "minority."
Seven senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-
UMDP Party, also a minority, had chosen Senator
Guingona as the minority leader. No consensus on
the matter was arrived at until on the third session
day. However Senator Guingona, as the minority
leader of the Senate, was subsequently recognized
by the Senate President. Thereafter, Senators
Santiago and Tatad filed a case before the Court
alleging that Senator Guingona had been usurping,
unlawfully holding and exercising the position of
Senate minority leader, a position that, according
to them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad.
Accordingly, the Court finds no constitutional or
legal infirmity or grave abuse of discretion attended
the recognition of and the assumption into office by
Respondent Guingona as the Senate minority
leader.
A: Section 16, (1)74. The Senate shall elect its
President and the House of Representatives, its
Speaker, by a majority vote of all its respective
Members. Each House shall choose such other
officers as it may deem necessary.
Q: What does Quorum means?
A: Any number sufficient to transact business75,
which may be less than the majority of the
73
G.R. 134577, November 18, 1998
74
1987 Constitution of the Philippines, Art. VI.
75
Javellana v Tayo, 6 SCRA 1048
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
membership. In our Constitution, it is required that
the quorum be a majority of the each House.76
A: In Avelino v Cuenco77, the petitioner, who was
then Senate President, motu proprio adjourned a
session of the Senate and walked out with his
followers, leaving twelve other members who
continued meeting and replaced him with the
respondent as Acting President. Avelino thereupon
filed quo warranto proceedings against Cuenco,
contending that the latter had not been validly
elected because twelve members did not constitute
a majority and, hence, a quorum of the 24-
member-Senate. The Supreme Court at first
dismissed the petition on the ground that it involved
a political question. On the motion for
reconsideration, however, it assumed jurisdiction
and ruled inter alia that the twelve members were
sufficient to constitute a quorum, being a majority
of twenty-three not twenty-four. The reason was
that one senator was then in the United States and
therefore outside the coercive jurisdiction of the
smaller number of members who could “adjourn
from day to day and compel the attendance of
absent member in such manner and under such
penalties” as the Senate might provide.
78
A: Section 16. (2) . A majority of each House shall
constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller
number may adjourn from day to day and may
compel the attendance of absent Members in such
manner, and under such penalties, as such House
may provide.
Q: Rules of Proceeding?
A: In Pacete v Comm. On Appointments79, the
Court ruled that Pacete’s confirmation stands and
what is decisive is that the same confirmation duly
made is not nullified simply by a motion of
reconsideration being filed, without its being voted
upon and approved.
The mere filing of a motion for reconsideration the
effect of which, if the motion was approved, would
dispense with the necessity of such approval, for
which the concurrence of a majority of the
members present is necessary. This is inconsistent
with Rule 21 of the Revised Rules of the
Commission.
In case of an adjournment sine die the period for
filing the motion for reconsideration having expired,
76
Cruz, Isagani (2002). “Philippine Political Law: Central
Lawbook Publishing Co., Inc. p. 134. ISBN 971-16-0491-4.
77
83 Phil. 17 (1949)
78
1987 Constitution of the Philippines, Art. VI.
79
40 SCRA 58 (1971)
From the Syllabus of Atty. Jamon by Alvin Angelo C. Rufino (2013)
under Section 22, then the motion for
reconsideration not having been acted upon is not
approved and therefore, has no effect whatsoever.
In the case at bar, Pacete alleged that he was
appointed by the then President of the Philippines
on August 31, 1964 as Municipal Judge of
Pigcawayan, Cotabato. He assumed office on
September 11, 1964 and discharged his duties as
such. As his appointment was made during recess
of Congress, it was submitted to the Commission
on Appointments at its next session in 1965.
Appointment was unanimously confirmed on May
20, 1965 (with Senate President and Chairman of
Commission on Appointments Ferdinand Marcos
even sending him a congratulatory telegram). Nine
months after his confirmation, on February 7, 1966,
the then Secretary of Justice advised petitioner to
vacate his position as municipal judge. Petitioner
was informed that on May 21, 1965, Senator
Rodolfo Ganzon (a member of the Commission on
Appointments) wrote to its Chairman stating that he
was filing a motion for reconsideration of the
appointment in view of derogatory information
which he had received.
A: In Arroyo v De Venecia80, the Supreme Court
noted that the challenge to the validity of the
enactment of RA 8240 (amending certain
provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code
by imposing so-called “sin taxes”) was premised on
alleged violations of internal rules of procedure of
the House of Representatives rather than of
constitutional requirements. Decided cases, both
here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all
deny to the courts the power to inquire into
allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of
Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in the
absence of showing that there was a violation of
constitutional requirements or the rights of private
individuals.
A: Arroyo v De Venecia81, in its Resolution on the
Motion for Reconsideration, the Supreme Court
ruled that it is well settled that a legislative act will
not be declared invalid for non-compliance with the
internal rules of the House.
Q: Discipline of members?
A: Section 16, (3)82. Each House may determine
the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for
disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of
two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a
80
G.R. 127255, August 14, 1997
81
G.R. No. 127255, June 26, 1998
82
1987 Constitution of the Philippines, Art. VI.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed,
shall not exceed sixty days.
A: In Alejandrino v Quezon83, the Court held that, it
cannot dictate action on the legislative department
without a gross usurpation of power. Precedents
have held that where a member has been expelled
by the legislative body, the courts have no power,
irrespective of whether the expulsion was right or
wrong, to issue a mandate to compel his
reinstatement.
In this case, a resolution was adopted by the
Philippine Senate composed of the respondent
Senators, on February 5, 1924, depriving Senator
Alejandrino of all the prerogatives, privileges, and
emoluments of his office for the period of one year
from the first of January, 1924 for disorderly
conduct and flagrant violation of the privileges of
the Senate for having assaulted the Honorable
Vicente de Vera, Senator for the Sixth District.
A: In Osmeña v Pendatun84, the President of the
Philippines himself who had been vilified by the
petitioner could not file any civil or criminal action
against him because of this immunity.
Nonetheless, the majority of the members of the
House of Representatives in which the questioned
speech was delivered were not precluded from
demonstrating their loyalty to the chief executive by
declaring Osmeña guilty of disorderly behavior and
suspending him in the exercise of their disciplinary
power under what is now Article VI, Section 16 (3),
of the Constitution.
Further, the Court said, in the case at bar, that the
determination of the acts which constitute
disorderly behavior is within the full discretionary
authority of the House concerned, and the Court
will not review such determination, the same being
a political question.
A: In Santiago v Sandiganbayan85, the Court held
that Sec. 13, RA 3019 (where it appears to be a
ministerial duty of the court to issue the order of
suspension upon a determination of the validity of
the criminal information filed before it) does not
state that the public officer should be suspended
only in the office where he is alleged to have
committed the acts charged. Furthermore, the
order of suspension provided in RA 3019 is distinct
from the power of Congress to discipline its own
ranks. Neither does the order of suspension
encroach upon the power of Congress. The
83
46 Phil. 83 (1924)
84
109 Phil. 863 (1960)
85
G.R. 126055, April 19, 2001
doctrine of separation of powers, by itself, is not
deemed to have effectively excluded the members
of the Congress from RA 3019 or its sanctions.
A: In De Venecia v Sandiganbayan86, the Court
held that the suspension or expulsion
contemplated in the Constitution is a House-
imposed sanction against its members. It is,
therefore, a penalty for disorderly behavior to
enforce discipline, maintain order in its
proceedings, or vindicate its honor and integrity.
The doctrine of separation of powers by itself may
not be deemed to have effectively excluded
members of Congress from Republic Act No. 3019
nor from its sanctions. The maxim simply
recognizes that each of the three co-equal and
independent, albeit coordinate, branches of the
government – the Legislative, the Executive and
the Judiciary – has exclusive prerogatives and
cognizance within its own sphere of influence and
effectively prevents one branch from unduly
intruding into the internal affairs of either branch.
Q: Journal and Record
A: Section 16, (4)87. Each House shall keep a
Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time
publish the same, excepting such parts as may, in
its judgment, affect national security; and
the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the
request of one-fifth of the Members present, be
entered in the Journal. Each House shall also
keep a Record of its proceedings.
Q: The Enrolled Bill Theory?
A: One which has been duly introduced, finally
passed by both houses, signed or authenticated by
the proper officers of each, approved by the
President and filed by the secretary of state.88
A: In the case of Casco Chemical Co. v
Gimenez89, the Court ruled that if a mistake was
made in the printing of the bill before it was
certified by the Congress and approved by the
President, the remedy is amendment or corrective
legislation, not a judicial decree. In this case,
petitioners claimed that the phrase “urea
formaldehyde” as used in a statue should be read
as “urea and formaldehyde,” to rectify an alleged
error in the printing of the enrolled bill. The
Supreme Court, in dismissing this claim, declared:
86
G.R. No. 130240, Feb. 05, 2002
87
1987 Constitution of the Philippines, Art. VI.
88
Black’s Law Dictionary, 4th rev. ed. 624
89
7 SCRA 347 (1963)
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
Hence, "urea formaldehyde" is clearly a finished
product, which is patently distinct and different
from urea" and "formaldehyde", as separate
articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic
resin known as "urea formaldehyde". Petitioner
contends, however, that the bill approved in
Congress contained the copulative conjunction
"and" between the terms "urea" and
"formaldehyde", and that the members of
Congress intended to exempt "urea" and
"formaldehyde" separately as essential elements
in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue
called "urea" formaldehyde", not the latter as a
finished product, citing in support of this view the
statements made on the floor of the Senate,
during the consideration of the bill before said
House, by members thereof. But, said individual
statements do not necessarily reflect the view of
the Senate. Much less do they indicate the intent
of the House of Representatives (see Song Kiat
Chocolate Factory vs. Central Bank, 54 Off. Gaz.,
615; Mayon Motors Inc. vs. Acting Commissioner
of Internal Revenue, L-15000 [March 29, 1961];
Manila Jockey Club, Inc. vs. Games & Amusement
Board, L-12727 [February 29, 1960]).
Furthermore, it is well settled that the enrolled bill
— which uses the term "urea formaldehyde"
instead of "urea and formaldehyde" — is
conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of
the measure passed by Congress and approved
by the President (Primicias vs. Paredes, 61 Phil.
118, 120; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1;
Macias vs. Comm. on Elections, L-18684,
September 14, 1961). If there has been any
mistake in the printing ofthe bill before it was
certified by the officers of Congress and approved
by the Executive — on which we cannot
speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of
separation of powers and undermining one of the
cornerstones of our democratic system — the
remedy is by amendment or curative legislation,
not by judicial decree.
Q: Probative Value of the Journal?
A: In United States v Pons90, Supreme Court
refused to go beyond the recitals in the legislative
journals, which it held to be conclusive on the
courts. “To inquire into the veracity of the journals
of the Philippine Legislature,” it ruled, “when they
are, as we have said, clear and explicit, would be
to violate both the letter and spirit of the organic
laws by which the Philippine Government was
brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and
independent department of the Government and to
interfere with the legitimate powers and functions
of the Legislature.
Q: Matters to be entered in the Journal?
Q: Journal Entry Rule vs. Enrolled Bill Theory?
90
34 Phil. 729 (1916)
From the Syllabus of Atty. Jamon by Alvin Angelo C. Rufino (2013)
A: Enrolled bill prevails, except as to matters
which, under the Constitution, must be entered in
the Journal. (See Astorga v Villegas, 56 SCRA
714)
Q: Congressional Record?
Q: Session
Q: Regular Sessions and Special Sessions?
A: Section 1591. The Congress shall convene once
every year on the fourth Monday of July for its
regular session, unless a different date is fixed by
law, and shall continue to be in session for such
number of days as it may determine until thirty
days before the opening of its next regular session,
exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal
holidays. The President may call a special session
at any time.
Q: When does Joint Session Congress
happens?
A: The House of Representatives and the Senate
Voting Separately on the following occasions:
1. Choosing the President (Sec. 4, Art. VII)
2. Determine President’s disability (Sec.
11, Art. VII)
3. Confirming nomination of the Vice
President (Sec. 9, Art. VII)
4. Declaring the existence of a state of war
(Sec. 23, Art. VI)
5. Proposing constitutional amendments
(Sec. 1, Art. XVII)
While in Voting Jointly, to revoke or extend
proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus or placing the Philippines under
martial law. (Sec. 18, Art. VII)
Q: Salaries, Privileges and Disqualifications.
Q: Salaries of Congress.
A: Section 1092. The salaries of Senators and
Members of the House of Representatives shall be
determined by law. No increase in said
compensation shall take effect until after the
expiration of the full term of all the Members of the
Senate and the House of Representatives
approving such increase.
91
1987 Constitution of the Philippines, Art. VI.
92
1987 Constitution of the Philippines, Art. VI
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
A: Section 2093. The records and books of
accounts of the Congress shall be preserved and
be open to the public in accordance with law, and
such books shall be audited by the Commission on
Audit which shall publish annually an itemized list
of amounts paid to and expenses incurred for each
Member.
A: In Philconsa v Mathay94, the Court ruled that,
Sec 14 of Art VI requires that not only the term of
all members of the House but also all of the
Senators who approved the increase must have
fully expired before those increases become fully
effective. Therefore, some parts of RA 4642 are
declared void. The intendment of the law also
requires the expiration of the full term of all
members of the Legislature who approved the
salary increase.
In this instant case, Sec 1 of RA 4134 (approved
1964) provided for the increase in salary of
members of Congress, to take effect in accordance
with the Constitution. However, the budget for the
fiscal year 1965-66 (RA 4642) implemented the
increase in the salary of members of the HOR set
by RA 4134— ahead of scheduled effectivity. The
reason given is that the term of the members of the
HOR who participated in approval of said Act
would expire in 1965, while the term of 8 senators
expires in 1969. Increase of salary, however, was
declared void by the Court.
A: In Ligot v Mathay95, the Court held that any
salary increase should not take effect until
retirement of all legislators who approved it. To
grant the petitioner‘s claim is a subtle way of
increasing his compensation during his term of
office and thus allow what the Constitution
prohibits. Thus, Rep. Ligot’s retirement pay should
not be computed based on the new increased
salary, which he never received as an incumbent.
In the case at bar, Rep. Ligot‘s term in Congress
will expire December 30, 1969. He is entitled to
retirement gratuity under Commonwealth Act 186,
Sec 12(c) as amended by RA 4968. The incoming
Members of Congress will have a salary increase
from P7,200 to P32,000 as provided for under RA
4134. Petitioner argues that his retirement pay
must be computed based on that salary increase,
and not on his actual salary as Congressman.
Auditor General denied his petition, as well as Rep.
Singson‘s who had a similar case.
Q: Freedom from Arrest?
93
Supra.
94
18 SCRA 300 (1966)
95
56 SCRA 823 (1974)
A: Section 1196. A Senator or Member of the
House of Representatives shall, in all offenses
punishable by not more than six years
imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the
Congress is in session. No Member shall be
questioned nor be held liable in any other place for
any speech or debate in the Congress or in any
committee thereof.
A: In People v Jalosjos97, the Supreme Court
denied the motion of Congressman Jalosjos that
he be allowed to fully discharged the duties of a
Congressman, including attendance at legislative
sessions and committee hearings despite his
having been convicted by the trial court of a non-
bailable offense. The denial was premised on the
following:
1. Membership in Congress does not
exempt an accused from statutes and
rules which apply to validly incarcerated
persons;
2. One rationale behind confinement,
whether pending appeal or after final
conviction, is public self-defense, i.e., it is
the injury to the public not, not injury to the
complainant, which state action in criminal
law seeks to redress;
3. It would amount to the creation of a
privileged class, without justification in
reason, if notwithstanding their liability for
a criminal offense, they would be
considered immune from arrest during
their attendance in Congress and in going
to and returning from the same; and
4. Accused-appellant is provided with an
office at the House of Representatives
with full complement of staff, as well as an
office at the Administration Building, New
Bilibid Prison, where he attends to his
constituents; he has, therefore, been
discharging his mandate as member of the
House of Representatives, and being a
detainee, he should not even be allowed
by the prison authorities to perform these
acts.
Q: Speech and Debate Clause?
A: In Jimenez v Cabangbang98, Supreme Court
held declared that the privilege could not be
96
1987 Constitution of the Philippines, Art. VI
97
G.R. 132875, February 03, 2000
98
17 SCRA 876 (1966)
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
invoked by a legislator who had allegedly maligned
the plaintiff in an open letter to the President of the
Philippines coursed through and published in the
newspapers. The finding was that he had written
the letter at a time when the Congress was in
recess and in his private capacity only.
Q: Distinguish Incompatible and Forbidden
Office.
A: Section 1399. (Incompatible office) No Senator
or Member of the House of Representatives may
hold any other office or employment in the
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his
seat. (Forbidden Office) Neither shall he be
appointed to any office which may have been
created or the emoluments thereof increased
during the term for which he was elected.
A: The purpose of incompatible office is to prevent
him from owing loyalty to another branch of the
government, to the detriment of the independence
of the legislature and the doctrine of separation of
powers. This prohibition, however, is not absolute;
what is not allowed is the simultaneous holding of
that office and the seat in Congress. Any legislator
may hold any office or employment provided he
forfeits, as a result, his position in the Congress.
Forfeiture of the legislator’s seat, or cessation of
his tenure, shall be automatic upon holding of the
incompatible office.100
A: Even if a member of the Congress is willing to
forfeit his seat therein, he may not be appointed to
any office in the government that has been created
or the emoluments thereof have been increased
during his term. Such a position is forbidden office.
Q: Disqualifications.
A: In Adaza v Pacana, Jr.101, the Petitioner and the
respondent were elected governor and vice-
governor, respectively, of Misamis Oriental. Both
subsequently ran for the Batasang Pambansa, but
only the petitioner won. Adaza then qualified as
member of the lawmaking body, whereupon
Pacana assumed the governorship as statutory
successor. Adaza challenged Pacana’s take over,
contending that under the parliamentary system a
legislator could concurrently serve as governor;
99
1987 Constitution of the Philippines, Art. VI.
100
Cruz, Isagani (1995). "The Nature of the
Constitution". Constitutional Law. Philippines: Central
Lawbook Publishing Co., Inc. p. 127. ISBN 971-16-0333-0.
101
135 SCRA 431 (1985)
From the Syllabus of Atty. Jamon by Alvin Angelo C. Rufino (2013)
hence, there was no vacancy in the governorship
that Pacana could fill. Through Justice Escolin, the
Court unanimously rejected this argument and held
that Adaza automatically forfeited the governorship
the moment he took his oath as a member of the
Batasang Pambansa.
A: Section 14102. No Senator or Member of the
House of Representatives may personally appear
as counsel before any court of justice or before the
Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other
administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or
indirectly, be interested financially in any contract
with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted
by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including any government-
owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary,
during his term of office. He shall not intervene in
any matter before any office of the Government for
his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called
upon to act on account of his office.
A: In Puyat vs. De Guzman103, a legislator entered
his appearance as counsel for one of the parties to
an intra-corporate dispute before the Securities
and Exchange Commission. He desisted when his
representation was challenged under Sec. 14, Art.
VI of the Constitution. Thereafter, he purchased
two hundred pesos worth of stocks in the
corporation from the faction he was representing
and sought to intervene in the said dispute, this
time as a stockholder. The Supreme Court did not
allow him to do so as his evident purpose was to
circumvent the constitutional prohibition.
Q: Duty to Disclose?
Q: Electoral Tribunals
A: Section 17104. The Senate and the House of
Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members. Each
Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine
Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the
Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief
Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of
the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the
case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political
parties and the parties or organizations registered
under the party-list system represented therein.
The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be
its Chairman.
102
1987 Constitution of the Philippines, Art. VI.
103
113 SCRA 31 (1982)
104
1987 Constitution of the Philippines, Art. VI.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
A: In Abbas v SET105, the Supreme Court held that
it cannot order the disqualification of the Senators-
members of the Electoral Tribunal simply because
they were themselves respondents in the electoral
protests, considering the specific mandate of the
Constitution and inasmuch as all the elected
Senators were actually named as respondents.
A: In Bondoc v Pineda106, a different question was
raised, to wit, whether the House of
Representatives could, at the request of the
dominant political party therein, change its
representative in the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal, presumably “to thwart the
promulgation of a decision freely reached by the
Tribunal.”
While acknowledging the independence of the
Tribunal as the “sole judge” of election contests
involving the members of the House of
Representatives, the Supreme Court assumed
jurisdiction, precisely to protect that independence.
HRET was created as a non-partisan court. It must
be independent of Congress and devoid of partisan
influence and consideration. “Disloyalty to the
party” and “breach of party discipline” are not valid
grounds for the expulsion of a member. HRET
members enjoy security of tenure; their
membership may not be terminated except for a
just cause such as the expiration of congressional
term, death, resignation from the political party,
formal affiliation with another party, or removal for
other valid causes.
A: In Codilla v De Venecia107, the Court held that,
the Constitution expressly grants to the House of
Representatives the prerogative, within
constitutionally defined limits, to choose from its
district and party-list representatives those who
may occupy the seats allotted to the House in
HRET and the CA. Thus, petitioner’s primary
recourse rests with the House of Representatives
and not with this Court. Under the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction, prior recourse to the House is
necessary before petitioners may bring the case to
the court. Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the
Constitution state that party-list representatives
must first show the House that they possess the
required numerical strength to be entitled to seats
in the HRET and CA. Moreover, facts show, at that
time, that party-list groups merely refrained from
participating in the election process. There was no
mention of nominees.
105
166 SCRA 651 (1988)
106
201 SCRA 792 (1991)
107
G.R. 150605, December 10, 2002
A: In Pimentel v HRET108, the Supreme Court said
that even assuming that party-list representatives
comprise a sufficient number and have agreed to
designate nominees to the HRET and the
Commission on Appointments, their primary
recourse clearly rests with the House of
Representatives and not with the Court. Only if the
House fails to comply with the directive of the
Constitution on proportional representation of
political parties in the HRET and Commission on
Appointments can the party-list representatives
seek recourse from this Court through judicial
review. Under the doctrine of primary
administrative jurisdiction, prior recourse to the
House is necessary before the petitioners may
bring the case to Court.
Q: Commission on Appointments
A: Section 18109. There shall be a Commission on
Appointments consisting of the President of the
Senate, as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators,
and twelve Members of the House of
Representatives, elected by each House on the
basis of proportional representation from the
political parties and parties or organizations
registered under the party-list system represented
therein. The chairman of the Commission shall not
vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall
act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty
session days of the Congress from their
submission. The Commission shall rule by a
majority vote of all the Members.
A: In Daza v Singson110, the petitioner questioned
his replacement in the Commission on
Appointments, insisting his designation thereto as
a representative of the Liberal Party was
permanent and could not be withdrawn. For his
part, the respondent contended that he could be
validly named in the petitioner’s place in view of the
political realignment in the House of
Representatives following the organization of the
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP). To which
he belonged. Both invoked the earlier case of
Cunanan v Tan111, where the Supreme Court had
held that the political affiliations in the two Houses
of Congress should be reflected in their respective
representations in the Commission on
Appointments. The petitioner claimed that the
formation of the LDP was a merely temporary
development whereas the respondent maintained
108
G.R. No. 141489, November 29, 2002
109
1987 Constitution of the Philippines, Art. VI.
110
180 SCRA 496 (1989)
111
5 SCRA 1
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
that it had permanently altered the political
composition of the House of or Representatives.
Ruling in favor of the respondent, the Supreme
Court declared inter alia:
The petitioner, to repeat, bases his argument
heavily on the non-registration of the LDP which,
he claims has not provided the permanent political
realignment to justify the questioned
reorganization. As he insists:
(c) Assuming that the so-called new coalesced
majority is actually the LDP itself, then the
proposed reorganization is likewise illegal and
ineffectual, because the LDP, not being a duly
registered political party, is not entitled to the
"rights and privileges granted by law to political
parties' (See. 160, BP No. 881), and therefore
cannot legally claim the right to be considered in
determining the required proportional
representation of political parties in the House of
Representatives.
xxx xxx xxx ... the clear constitutional intent behind
Section 18, Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution, is
to give the right of representation in the
Commission on Appointment only to political
parties who are duly registered with the Comelec.
On November 23, 1989, however, that argument
boomeranged against the petitioner. On that date,
the Commission on Elections in an en banc
resolution affirmed the resolution of its First
Division dated August 28, 1989, granting the
petition of the LDP for registration as a political
party. This has taken the wind out of the sails of
the petitioner, so to speak, and he must now limp
to shore as best he can.
The petitioner's contention that, even if registered,
the party must still pass the test of time to prove its
permanence is not acceptable. Under this theory,
a registered party obtaining the majority of the
seats in the House of Representatives (or the
Senate) would still not be entitled to representation
in the Commission on Appointments as long as it
was organized only recently and has not yet
"aged." The Liberal Party itself would fall in such a
category. That party was created in December
1945 by a faction of the Nacionalista Party that
seceded therefrom to support Manuel A. Roxas's
bid for the Presidency of the Philippines in the
election held on April 23, 1946. The Liberal Party
won. At that time it was only four months old. Yet
no question was raised as to its right to be
represented in the Commission on Appointments
and in the Electoral Tribunals by virtue of its status
as the majority party in both chambers of the
Congress.
The LDP has been in existence for more than one
year now. It now has 157 members in the House
of Representatives and 6 members in the Senate.
Its titular head is no less than the President of the
Philippines and its President is Senator Neptali A.
Gonzales, who took over recently from Speaker
Ramon V. Mitra. It is true that there have been,
and there still are, some internal disagreements
From the Syllabus of Atty. Jamon by Alvin Angelo C. Rufino (2013)
among its members, but these are to be expected
in any political organization, especially if it is
democratic in structure. In fact even the monolithic
Communist Party in a number of socialist states
has undergone similar dissension, and even
upheavals. But it surely cannot be considered still
temporary because of such discord.
If the petitioner's argument were to be pursued,
the 157 members of the LDP in the House of
Representatives would have to be denied
representation in the Commission on
Appointments and, for that matter, also the
Electoral Tribunal. By the same token, the KBL,
which the petitioner says is now "history only,"
should also be written off. The independents also
cannot be represented because they belong to no
political party. That would virtually leave the
Liberal Party only with all of its seventeen
members to claim all the twelve seats of the
House of Representatives in the Commission on
Appointments and the six legislative seats in the
House Electoral Tribunal.
A: Coseteng v Mitra, Jr.112
A: Guingona v Gonzales113, the Supreme Court
held that a political party must have at least two
elected senators for every seat in the Commission
on Appointments. Thus, where there are two or
more political parties represented in the Senate, a
political party/coalition with a single senator in the
Senate cannot constitutionally claim a seat in the
Commission on Appointments. It is not mandatory
to elect 12 Senators to the Commission; what the
Constitution requires is that there must be at least
a majority of the entire membership.
A: Section 19114. The Electoral Tribunals and the
Commission on Appointments shall be constituted
within thirty days after the Senate and the House of
Representatives shall have been organized with
the election of the President and the Speaker. The
Commission on Appointments shall meet only
while the Congress is in session, at the call of its
Chairman or a majority of all its Members, to
discharge such powers and functions as are herein
conferred upon it.
Q: Powers of Congress
Q: General Plenary Powers
A: General (plenary) legislative power (Sec.1, Art.
VI). Legislative power is the power to propose,
enact, amend and repeal laws.
112
187 SCRA 377 (1990)
113
214 SCRA 789 (1992)
114
1987 Constitution of the Philippines, Art. VI.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
Q: What are the limitations on the legislative
power?
A: 1. Substantive limitations
 Express
o Bill or rights (Art.III)
o On appropriations [Secs. 25 and 29 (1)
and (2), Art. VI]
o On taxation [Secs. 28 and 29 (3), Art.
VI; Sec. 4 (3), Art. XIV]
o On constitutional appellate jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court [Sec. 30, Art. VI]
o No law granting a title of royalty or
nobility shall be passed [Sec. 31, Art.
VI]
 Implied
o Non- delegation of powers; and
o Prohibition against the passage of
irrepealable laws.
2. Procedural limitations
 Only one subject
 Three readings on separate days
Q: Discuss Legislative Process
A: Requirements as to bills, As to titles of bills
A: In Tio vs. Videogram Regulatory Board115, in the
case at bar, imposition of tax is sufficiently related
to the regulation of video industry where the title is
comprehensive enough to include such subject
(taxation) related to the general purpose (creation
of Videogram Board)
A: In Lidasan v COMELEC116, the Court ruled that
the title of RA 4790 is misleading as it does not say
that part of the territory of the province of Cotabato
is being transferred to Lanao del Sur. The subject
of a bill should be expressed in the title. When part
of a statute is held unconstitutional and the
remainder valid, the parts will be separated and the
constitutional portion upheld. But when the parts
are mutually dependent and not separable, the
entire statute must be void.
In this case, RA 4790, creating the municipality of
Dianaton in the province of Lanao del Sur, included
as part of the new municipality a total of 12 barrios
from the neighboring province of Cotabato.
Petitioner, a resident of one of the barrios taken
115
151 SCRA 208
116
21 SCRA 479 (1967)
from Cotabato, filed an action to declare the act
unconstitutional.
A: In Cruz v Paras117,
A: In Tobias v Abalos118, provision providing for a
separate legislative district is germane to the
subject of the bill creating the City of Mandaluyong
Q: Requirements as to certain laws,
Q: Define Appropriation law.
A: A statute the primary and specific purpose of
which is to authorize the release of public funds
from the Treasury.
Q: What are the classifications of appropriation
law?
A: There are two classifications of appropriation
law and they are:
1. General appropriation law; passed by
annually, intended to provide for the
financial operations of the entire
government during one fiscal period.
2. Special appropriation law; designed for
a specific purpose.
Q: What are the implied (extra-constitutional)
limitations on appropriation measures?
A: The following are implied (extra-constitutional)
limitations on appropriation measures:
1. Appropriation must be devoted to a
public purpose.
2. The sum authorized to be released
must be determinate, or at least
determinable.
Q: What are the Constitutional limitations on
special appropriation measures?
A: The following are Constitutional limitations on
special appropriation measures:
1. Must specify the public purpose for
which the sum is intended.
2. Must be supported by funds actually
available as certified to by the National
Treasurer, or to be raised by a
117
123 SCRA 106 (1994)
118
239 SCRA 106 (1994)
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
corresponding revenue proposal included
therein. [Sec. 25 (4), Art. VI]
Q: What are the rules on general appropriations
measures?
A: Sec. 25, Art. VI
1. Congress may not increase the appropriations
recommended by the President for the operation of
the Government as specified in the budget.
2. The form, content and manner of preparation of
the budget shall be prescribed by law.
3. No provision or enactment shall be embraced
unless it relates specifically to some particular
appropriation therein. Any such provision or
enactment shall be limited in its operation to the
appropriation to which it relates. This is intended to
prevent riders, or irrelevant provisions included in
the bill to ensure its approval.
4. Procedure for approving appropriations for
Congress shall strictly follow the procedure for
approving appropriations for other departments
and agencies. This is to prevent sub rosa
appropriation by Congress.
5. Prohibition against transfer appropriaitons. [Sec.
25 (5), Art. VI]
6. Prohibition against appropriations for sectarian
benefit. [Sec. 29 (2), Art. VI]
7. Automatic reappropriation. [Sec. 25 (7), Art. VI]
A: In Demetria v Alba119, transfer of appropriations
was declared by the Court to be prohibited.
A: In Guingona v Caraque120, the Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of the automatic
appropriation for debt service under the 1990
General Appropriations Act. According to the
Court, the legislative intent of R.A. 4860, Sec. 31,
P.D. 1177, and P.D. 1967, is the amount needed
should be automatically set aside in order to
enable the Republic of the Philippines to pay the
principal, interest, taxes and other normal banking
charges on the loans, credit, indebtedness x x x
when they become due without the need to enact a
separate law appropriating funds therefor as the
need arises. x x x although the decrees do not
state the specific amounts to be paid x x x the
amounts nevertheless are made certain by the
119
148 SCRA 208 (1987)
120
196 SCRA 221 (1991)
From the Syllabus of Atty. Jamon by Alvin Angelo C. Rufino (2013)
legislative parameters provided in the decrees x x x
the mandate is to pay the principal, interest, taxes,
and other normal banking charges x x x when they
shall become due. No uncertainty arises in
executive implementation as the limit will be the
exact amounts as shown by the books in the
Treasury.
A: In Philconsa v Enriquez121, on the issue whether
the power given to the members of Congress
(under the 1994 GAA) to propose and identify the
projects to be funded by the Countrywide
Development Fund was an encroachment by the
legislature on executive power, the Supreme Court
stated: The spending power, called the “power of
the purse” belongs to the Congress, subject only to
the veto power of the President. While it is the
President who proposes the budget, still, the final
say on the matter of appropriations is lodged in
Congress. The power of appropriation carries with
it the power to specify the project or activity to be
funded under the appropriation law. It can be as
detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to be.
Q: Tax laws
A: In Tolentino v Sec. of Finance122, it was held
that RA 7716 (Expanded VAT Law) did not violate
Sec. 24, Art. VI of the Constitution. It is important to
emphasize that it is not the law, but the bill, which
is required to originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, because the bill may undergo
such extensive changes in the Senate that the
result may be a rewriting of the whole. As a result
of the Senate action, a distinct bill may be
produced. To insist that a revenue statue, not just
the bill, must be substantially the same as the
House bill would be to deny the Senate’s power not
only “to concur with amendments” but also to
“propose amendments”. It would violate the
coequality of legislative power of the Senate. The
Constitution does not prohibit the filing in the
Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its
receipt of the House bill.
A: Lung Center vs. Q.C., G.R.No. 144104, June
29, 2004
A: In Tan v Del Rosario, 237 SCRA 324 (2000),
the three purposes of Sec. 3(1), Art. VI are the
following:
1. to prevent hodge-podge or log-rolling
legislation
121
G.R. No. 113105, August 19, 1994
122
G.R. 115455, August 25, 1994
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
2. to prevent surprise or fraud upon the
legislature by means of provisions
which might be overlooked
3. to fairly apprise the people of the
subjects of legislation
A: Garcia vs. Executive Secretary, 211 SCRA 219
(1992), RIDER – a provision not related to the
appropriation act (is prohibited)
A: John Hay PAC v. Lim, G.R. No. 119775,
October 24, 2003
Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
Fabian v. Desierto, G.R. No. 129742, September
16, 1998
Q: Procedure for the passage of bills
A: In Tolentino v Secretary of Finance, the
Supreme Court declared that the Presidential
certification dispensed with the requirement not
only of printing and distribution but also that of
reading the bill on separate days.
A: In Philconsa v Enriquez123, on the issue of
whether Special Provision No.2 on the “Use of
Funds” in the appropriation for the modernization of
the AFP, General Appropriations Act of 1994,
which requires prior approval of Congress for the
release of corresponding modernization funds, is
unconstitutional, the Supreme Court did not resolve
the issue of legislative veto, but instead, ruled that
any provision blocking an administrative action in
implementing a law or requiring legislative approval
for executive acts must be incorporated in a
separate and substantive bill. Thus, since Special
Provision No. 2 is an “inappropriate provision, the
President properly vetoed the same.
A: In Gonzales v Macaraig, G.R. No. 87636, Nov.
19, 1990, the President can veto an item. Doctrine
of inappropriate provisions – a provision that is
constitutionally inappropriate may be singled out
for veto if it is not an appropriation or revenue item.
An inappropriate provision in an appropriations bill
is an item in itself.
A: In Bengzon v Drilon124, the Supreme Court
declared as unconstitutional the veto made by
President Aquino of appropriations intended for the
adjustment of pensions of retired justices [pursuant
to A.M. 91-8-225-CA] under R.A. 910, as amended
by R.A. 1797, as this is not an item veto. The
123
235 SCRA 506
124
208 SCRA 133 (1992)
President cannot veto part of an item in an
appropriation bill while approving the remaining
portion of the item. Furthermore, the President
cannot set aside a judgment of the Supreme Court;
neither can the veto power be exercised as a
means of repealing R.A. 1797. The veto also
impairs the fiscal autonomy of the Judiciary, and
deprives retired justices of the right to a pension
vested under R.A. 1797.
A: Miller v Mardo125,
Q: Effectivity of Laws.
A: Tanada v Tuvera126,
A: Executive Order No. 200127
Q: What is Question Hour?
A: Sec. 22, Art. VI provides that, “the heads of
departments may, upon their own initiative, with the
consent of the President, or upon the request of
either House, as the rules of each House shall
provide, appear before and be heard by such
House on any matter pertaining to their
departments. Written questions shall be submitted
to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of
the House of Representatives at least three days
before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations
shall not be limited to written questions, but may
cover matters related thereto. “When the security
of the State or the public interest so requires and
the President so states in writing, the appearance
shall be conducted in executive session.”
The objective of which is to obtain information in
pursuit of Congress’ oversight function.
Q: What is the power of Legislative
Investigation?
A: Sec. 21, Art. VI states that, “the Senate or the
House of Representatives or any of its respective
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published
rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing
in, or affected by, such inquiries shall be
respected.”
When the inquiry in which Congress requires their
appearance is “in aid of legislation” under Sec. 21,
the appearance is mandatory. When the Congress
exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for
125
2 SCRA 898 (1961)
126
136 SCRA 27 (1985)
127
June 18, 1987
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
department heads to exempt themselves therefrom
is by a valid claim of executive privilege.
A: In Armault v Nazareno128, Power of Investigation
includes power to punish a contumacious witness
for contempt. Experience has shown that mere
requests for information are frequently unavailing.
“In aid of legislation” - not difficult to satisfy.
Necessity or lack of necessity for legislative action
is determined by the sum total of information to be
gathered as a result of investigation, and not by a
fraction of such information elicited from single
question. It is sufficient that the question is
germane to the subject matter of inquiry. There is
no need for it to be directly related or connected to
possible legislation.
A: Armault v Balagtas129,
A: In Bengzon v Sen. Blue Ribbon Committee130,
investigation was not in aid of legislation where it
merely aims at determining whether a law is
violated. To allow such investigation is to violate
separation of powers.
A: In Senate v. Ermita131, when Congress merely
seeks to be informed on how department heads
are implementing the statutes, it is not imperative.
The “oversight function” of Congress may be
facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent
that it is performed in pursuit of legislation.
Appearance of department heads in question hour
is discretionary.
When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the
only way for the department heads to exempt
themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of
privilege. EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE – privilege
based on doctrine of separation of powers,
exempting executive from disclosure requirements
where such exemption is necessary to the
discharge of highly important executive
responsibilities. It covers “categories of
information” not of persons.
A: Sabio v. Gordon132,
A: In Neri v Senate133, Exception to legislative
inquiry: Executive Privilege (which is extended to
all close advisors of the President). It is wrong for
Senate to punish one for contempt where
executive privilege is properly invoked. Senate's
128
87 Phil. 29 (1950)
129
97 Phil. 358 (1955)
130
203 SCRA 767 (1991)
131
G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006,
132
G.R. No. 174340, October 17, 2006
133
G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008,
From the Syllabus of Atty. Jamon by Alvin Angelo C. Rufino (2013)
mistakes in the case at bar: (1) invitations to Neri
did not include possible statute; (2) contempt order
lacks required # of votes; (3) Senate did not first
rule on the claim of executive privilege and instead
dismissed Neri's explanation; (4) rules of
procedure on inquiries in aid of legislation – not
duly published.
1.
Other Powers:
a. Act as board of canvassers for
presidential election
Pimentel v. Joint Com., G.R.
163783, June 22, 2004
b. Call a special election for
Presidency
c. Decide on disability of the
President
d. Legislative veto or extension for
habeas corpus or declaration of
martial law
e. Presidential Amnesties
f. Concur in treaties
g. Declaration of existence of war
h. Delegation of emergency powers
i. Utilization of natural resources
j. Amendments of constitution
k. Power of Impeachment
Executive Department
The President
Q: Qualifications.
A: No person may be elected President unless he
is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a
registered voter, able to read and write, at least
forty years of age on the day of the election, and a
resident of the Philippines for at least ten years
immediately preceding such election.134
Q: Election.
A: The President and the Vice-President shall be
elected by direct vote of the people for a term of six
years which shall begin at noon on the thirtieth day
of June next following the day of the election and
shall end at noon of the same date, six years
thereafter. The President shall not be eligible for
any re-election. No person who has succeeded as
President and has served as such for more than
four years shall be qualified for election to the
same office at any time.
134
1987 Philippine Constitution, Sec. 2, Art. VII.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
No Vice-President shall serve for more than two
successive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not be considered
as an interruption in the continuity of the service for
the full term for which he was elected.
Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular
election for President and Vice-President shall be
held on the second Monday of May.
The returns of every election for President and
Vice-President, duly certified by the board of
canvassers of each province or city, shall be
transmitted to the Congress, directed to the
President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the
certificates of canvass, the President of the Senate
shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the
election, open all the certificates in the presence of
the Senate and the House of Representatives in
joint public session, and the Congress, upon
determination of the authenticity and due execution
thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the
votes.
The person having the highest number of votes
shall be proclaimed elected, but in case two or
more shall have an equal and highest number of
votes, one of them shall forthwith be chosen by the
vote of a majority of all the Members of both
Houses of the Congress, voting separately.
The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the
canvassing of the certificates.
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-
President, and may promulgate its rules for the
purpose.135
Q: Term.
A: Six (6) years. No re-election; and no person
who has succeeded as President and has served
for more than four years shall be qualified for
election to the same office at any time.
The six-year term of the incumbent President and
Vice-President elected in the February 7, 1986
election is, for purposes of synchronization of
elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30,
1992.136
Q: Oath of office.
135
1987 Philippine Constitution, Sec. 4, Art. VII.
136
1987 Philippine Constitution, Sec. 5, Art. XVIII
A: Before they enter on the execution of their
office, the President, the Vice-President, or the
Acting President shall take the following oath or
affirmation:
"I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will
faithfully and conscientiously fulfill my
duties as President (or Vice-President or
Acting President) of the Philippines,
preserve and defend its Constitution,
execute its laws, do justice to every man,
and consecrate myself to the service of
the Nation. So help me God." (In case of
affirmation, last sentence will be
omitted.)137
Q: Privileges (Official Residence and Salary).
A: The President shall have an official residence.
The salaries of the President and Vice-President
shall be determined by law and shall not be
decreased during their tenure. No increase in said
compensation shall take effect until after the
expiration of the term of the incumbent during
which such increase was approved. They shall not
receive during their tenure any other emolument
from the Government or any other source. Sec. 6,
Art. VII
A: In Republic v Sandiganbayan138, the Court
noted that the total accumulated salaries of the
Marcos couple amounted to P2, 319,583.33 which,
when converted to dollars at the exchange rate
then prevailing would have an equivalent value of
$304, 372.43. This sum should be held as the only
known lawful income of the respondents Marcos
since they did not file any Statement of Assets and
Liabilities, as required by law, from which their net
worth could be determined. Besides, under the
1935 Constitution, Ferdinand Marcos, as President
could not receive “any other emolument from the
government or any of its subdivisions and
instrumentalities”, and under the 1973 Constitution,
could not “receive during his tenure any other
emolument from the Government or any other
source”. In fact, his management of businesses,
like the administration of foundations to accumulate
funds, was expressly prohibited under the 1973
Constitution.
Q: Rule on Succession.
A: In case of vacancy at the beginning of the term.
137
1987 Philippine Constitution, Sec. 5, Art. VII.
138
G.R. No. 152154, July 15, 2003
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
(1) Death or permanent disability of the
President-elect: Vice President-elect shall
become President.
(2) President-elect fails to qualify: Vice
President-elect shall act as President until
the President-elect shall have qualified.
(3) President shall not have been chosen:
Vice President-elect shall act as President
until a President shall have been chosen
and qualified.
(4) No President and Vice President
chosen nor shall have qualified, or both
shall have died or become permanently
disabled: The President of the Senate or,
in case of his inability, the Speaker of the
House of Representatives shall act as
President until a President or a Vice
President shall have been chosen and
qualified. In the event of inability of the
officials mentioned, Congress shall, by
law, provide for the manner in which one
who is to act as President shall be
selected until a President or Vice
President shall have qualified.
A: In case of vacancy during term
(1) Death, permanent disability, removal
from office, or resignation of the President:
Vice President shall become the
President.
(2) No President and Vice President
chosen nor shall have qualified, or both
shall have died or become permanently
disabled: The President of the Senate or,
in case of his inability, the Speaker of the
House of Representatives shall act as
President until a President or a Vice
President shall have been chosen and
qualified. In the event of inability of the
officials mentioned, Congress shall, by
law, provide for the manner in which one
who is to act as President shall be
selected until a President or Vice
President shall have qualified.
Q: In case of temporary disability
A: When the President transmits to the Senate
President and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives his written declaration that he is
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his
office, and until he transmits to them a written
declaration to the contrary: such poers and duties
From the Syllabus of Atty. Jamon by Alvin Angelo C. Rufino (2013)
shall be discharged by the Vice President as Acting
President.
A: When a majority of all the members of the
Cabinet transmit to the Senate President and the
Speaker their written declaration that the President
is unable to discharge the powers and duties if his
office, the Vice President shall immediately
assume the powers and duties of the office as
Acting President. x x x Thereafter, when the
President transmits to the Senate President and
Speaker his written declaration that no inability
exists, he shall reassume the powers and duties of
his office. Meanwhile, should a majority of the
Members of the Cabinet transmit within 5 days to
the Senate President and Speaker their written
declaration that the President is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office,
Congress shall decide the issue. For this purpose,
Congress shall convene, if not in session, within 48
hours. And if, within 10 days from receipt of the last
written declaration or, if not in session, within 12
days after it is required to assemble, the Congress
determines by a 2/3 vote of both Houses, voting
separately, that the President is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office, the
Vice President shall act as President; otherwise,
the President shall continue exercising the powers
and duties of his office.
A: In Estrada v Arroyo139, the Supreme Court
declared that the resignation of President Estrada
could not be doubted as confirmed by his leaving
Malacañang. In the press release containing his
final statement:
1. he acknowledged the oath-taking of the
respondent as President;
2. he emphasized he was leaving the palace
for the sake of peace and in order to begin
the healing process (he did not say that he
was leaving due to any kind of disability
and that he was going to reassume the
Presidency as soon as the disability
disappears);
3. he expressed his gratitude to the people
for the opportunity to serve them as
President (without doubt referring to the
past opportunity);
4. he assured that he will not shirk from any
future challenge that may come in the
same service of the country; and
5. he called on his supporters to join him in
the promotion of a constructive national
spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
139
G.R. No. 146738, March 02, 2001
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
The Court declared that the elements of a valid
resignation are:
1. intent to resign; and
2. act of relinquishment.
Both were present when President Estrada left the
Palace.
Q: Removal.
A: By impeachment. The President, the Vice-
President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the
Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and
the Ombudsman may be removed from office on
impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable
violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft
and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of
public trust. All other public officers and employees
may be removed from office as provided by law,
but not by impeachment.140
Furthermore, Section 3, Article XI of
Constitution states that:
1. The House of Representatives shall have
the exclusive power to initiate all cases of
impeachment.
2. A verified complaint for impeachment may
be filed by any Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen upon a
resolution or endorsement by any Member
thereof, which shall be included in the
Order of Business within ten session days,
and referred to the proper Committee
within three session days thereafter. The
Committee, after hearing, and by a
majority vote of all its Members, shall
submit its report to the House within sixty
session days from such referral, together
with the corresponding resolution. The
resolution shall be calendared for
consideration by the House within ten
session days from receipt thereof.
3. A vote of at least one-third of all the
Members of the House shall be necessary
either to affirm a favorable resolution with
the Articles of Impeachment of the
Committee, or override its contrary
resolution. The vote of each Member shall
be recorded.
4. In case the verified complaint or resolution
of impeachment is filed by at least one-
third of all the Members of the House, the
same shall constitute the Articles of
140
1987 Philippine Constitution, Sec. 2, Art. XI.
Impeachment, and trial by the Senate
shall forthwith proceed.
5. No impeachment proceedings shall be
initiated against the same official more
than once within a period of one year.
6. The Senate shall have the sole power to
try and decide all cases of impeachment.
When sitting for that purpose, the
Senators shall be on oath or affirmation.
When the President of the Philippines is
on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No
person shall be convicted without the
concurrence of two-thirds of all the
Members of the Senate.
7. Judgment in cases of impeachment shall
not extend further than removal from office
and disqualification to hold any office
under the Republic of the Philippines, but
the party convicted shall nevertheless be
liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and
punishment, according to law.
the 8. The Congress shall promulgate its rules
on impeachment to effectively carry out
the purpose of this section.
Q: Prohibitions
Q: Exceptions to prohibition from holding another
office:
Q: Vice-President as member of the cabinet
A: The Vice President may be appointed as
Member of the Cabinet.
Q: Sec. of Justice as member of Judicial and
Bar Council
A: In Civil Liberties Union v Executive Secretary141,
the Supreme Court declared as unconstitutional
Executive Order No. 284 which allowed cabinet
members to hold two offices in government, in
direct contravention of Sec. 13, Art. VII. The
prohibition on the President and his official family is
all-embracing and covers both public and private
office employment, not being qualified by the
phrase “in the Government” x x x This is proof of
the intent of the Constitution to treat them as a
class by itself and to impose upon said class
stricter prohibitions.
A: In Cruz v COA142,
141
194 SCRA 317 (1991)
142
G.R. No. 138489, Nov. 29, 2001
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
A: In National Amnesty Commission v COA143, the
prohibition on the President, to hold any other
office or employment, declared in CLU case must
not, however, be construed as applying to posts
occupied by the Executive officials without
additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity,
as provided by law and as required by the primary
functions of the said officials’ office. The reason is
that these posts do not comprise “any other office”
within the contemplation of the constitutional
prohibition, but properly an imposition of additional
duties and functions on said officials. To illustrate,
the Secretary of Transportation and
Communications is the ex -officio Chairman of the
Board of the Philippine Ports Authority and the
Light Rail Transit Authority. The ex-officio position
being actually and in legal contemplation part of
the principal office, it follows that the official
concerned has no right to receive additional
compensation for his services in said position. The
reason is that these services are already paid for
and covered by the compensation attached to the
principal office.
Q: Powers and Functions of the President.
Q: Executive Power.
A: The executive power shall be vested in the
President of the Philippines.144 The President shall
have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws
be faithfully executed.145
A: In Marcos v Manglapus146, the Court referred to
the RESIDUAL powers of the President as the
Chief Executive of the country, which powers
include others not set forth in the Constitution.
EXAMPLE: The President is immune from suit and
criminal prosecution while he is in office. Such is
not limited to those set forth in the constitution.
A: In DENR v DENR Region 12 Employees147,
applying the doctrine of alter-ego, the power of the
President to reorganize the National Government
may validly be delegated to his Cabinet Members
exercising control over a particular executive
department. Accordingly, in this case, the DENR
Secretary can validly reorganize the DENR by
ordering the transfer of the DENR XII Regional
Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal, South
Cotabato. The exercise of this authority by the
DENR Secretary, as an alter ego of the President,
143
G.R. 156982, September 8, 2004
144
1987 Philippine Constitution, Sec. 1, Art. VII.
145
1987 Philippine Constitution, Sec. 17, Art. VII.
146
178 SCRA 760 (1989)
147
G.R. No. 149725, August 19, 2003
From the Syllabus of Atty. Jamon by Alvin Angelo C. Rufino (2013)
is presumed to be the act of the President because
the latter had not expressly repudiated the same.
The alter-ego principle is also known as the
doctrine of qualified political agency. Under this
doctrine which recognizes the establishment of a
single executive, all executives and administrative
organizations are adjuncts of the Executive
Department, the heads of the various executive
departments are assistants and agents of the Chief
Executive, and except in cases where the Chief
Executive is required by the Constitution or law to
act in person or the exigencies of the situation
demand that he act personally, the multifarious
executive and administrative functions of the Chief
Executive are performed by and through the
executive departments, and the acts of the
Secretaries of such departments performed and
promulgated in the regular course of business are,
unless disapproved or repudiated by the Chief
Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief
Executive.
Q: Control of executive departments
A: Sec. 17, Art. VII states that “the President shall
have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws
be faithfully executed.
A: Control is the power of an officer to alter or
modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties
and to substitute the judgment of the former for that
of the latter.148
A: In Blaquera v Alcala149, R.A. No. 6791 was
enacted pursuant to E.O. No. 292 or the Admin.
Code of 1987 provided for productivity incentives to
some employees of certain GOCCs. A number of
employees were given such incentives but a
deduction was made from their salaries, as a
refund, by the President because said incentives
were given by their departments without his
consent as required by the R.A. No. 6791.
The Court upheld the constitutionality of the refund.
It was further ruled that the President has Control
over all Government agencies and GOCCs. The
power of President as head of government
includes control which means the power to alter
what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for that of the latter.
148
Mondano v Silvosa
149
G.R. 109406, September 11, 1998
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
A: In Hutchinson Ports Phils. Ltd. v SBMA150, it
was discussed that the Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority (SBMA) is under the control of the office
of the President, All projects undertaken by SBMA
involving P2-million or above require the approval
of the President of the Philippines under LOI 620.
A: In NEA v COA151, the Court ruled that NEA is
under the control of the President of the Philippines
and is thus required to abide by the directives and
orders of the latter. Executive officials who are
subordinate to the President should not trifle with
the President’s constitutional power of control over
the executive branch. There is only one chief
executive who directs and controls the entire
executive branch, and all other executive officials
must implement in good faith his directives and
orders. This is necessary to provide order,
efficiency and coherence in carrying out the plans,
policies and programs of the executive branch.
NEA’s act of not implementing the salary increases
in accordance with the schedule of payment
specified in E.O. No. 389 and NBC No. 458 cannot
therefore be countenanced.
Q: General supervision over local
governments/ autonomous regions
A: In Pimentel v Aguirre152, the Supreme Court
held that Sec. 4, Administrative Order No. 327,
which withholds 5% of the Internal Revenue
Allotment (IRA) of local government units, is
unconstitutional, because the President’s power
over local governments is only one of general
supervision, and not one of control. A basic feature
of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of
LGU shares in the national internal revenue. This is
mandated by no less than the Consitution.
Q: Power of Appointment.
A: The President shall nominate and, with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments,
appoint the heads of the executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
or officers of the armed forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution.
He shall also appoint all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he
may be authorized by law to appoint. The
Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of
150
G.R. No. 131367, August 31, 2000
151
377 SCRA 233 (2002)
152
G.R. 132988, July 19, 2000
other officers lower in rank in the President alone,
in the courts, or in the heads of departments,
agencies, commissions, or boards. The President
shall have the power to make appointments during
the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or
compulsory, but such appointments shall be
effective only until disapproved by the Commission
on Appointments or until the next adjournment of
the Congress.153
Q: What is Appointment?
A: It is the selection by the authority vested with
the power, of an individual who is to exercise the
functions of a given office. It is distinguished from
designation in that the latter simply means the
imposition of additional duties, usually by law, o a
person already in the public service. It is also
different from the commission in that the latter is
the written evidence of the appointment.
Q: What are the classifications of
Appointment?
A: Permanent or Temporary. Permanent
A: Bermudez v Torres154,
A: In Sarmiento v Mison155, the Supreme Court
declared that the foregoing are the only categories
of appointments which require confirmation by the
Commission on Elections. In this case, it was held
that the appointment of Salvador Mison as
Commissioner of Customs needs no confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments, because the
Commissioner of the Customs is not among the
officers mentioned in the first sentence, Sec. 16,
Art. VII.
A: In Concepcion-Bautista v Salonga156, the
Supreme Court held that the appointment of the
Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights is
not otherwise provided for in the Constitution or in
the law. Thus, there is no necessity for such
appointment to be passed upon by the
Commission on Appointments.
A: In Calderon v Carale157, Article 254 of the Labor
Code, as amended by R.A. No. 6715, insofar as it
requires confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments of the appointment of the NLRC
Chairman and commissioners, is unconstitutional,
because it violates Sec. 16, Art. VII.
153
1987 Philippine Constitution, Sec. 16, Art. VII.
154
G.R. No. 131429, August 4, 1999
155
156 SCRA 549 (1987)
156
172 SCRA 160 (1989)
157
G.R. No. 91636, April 23, 1992
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
A: In Manalo v Sistoza158, the Supreme Court said
that Congress cannot, by law, require the
confirmation of appointments of government
officials other than those enumerated in the first
sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII.
A: In Soriano v Lista159, the Supreme Court said
that because the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) is
no longer part of the Philippine Navy or the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, but is now under the
Department of Transportation and Communications
(DOTC), a civilian agency, the promotion and
appointment of respondent officers of the PCG will
not require confirmation by the commission on
appointments. Obviously, the clause “officers of the
armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain” refers to military officers alone.
A: In Pimental v Ermita160, the power to appoint is
essentially executive in nature and the legislative
may not interfere with the exercise of this executive
power except in those instances when the
Constitution expressly allows it to interfere.
In this instant case, several Senators, including
members of the Commission on Appointments
questioned the constitutionality of the
appointments issued by the President to
respondents as Acting Secretaries of their
respective departments, and to prohibit them from
performing the duties of Department Secretaries. In
denying the petition, the Supreme Court said that
the essence of an appointment in an acting
capacity is its temporary nature. In case of vacancy
in an office occupied by an alter ego of the
President, such as the office of Department
Secretary, the President must necessarily appoint
the alter ego of her choice as Acting Secretary
before the permanent appointee of her choice
could assume office. Congress, through a law,
cannot impose on the President the obligation to
appoint automatically the undersecretary as her
temporary alter ego. An alter ego, whether
temporary or permanent, holds a position of great
trust and confidence. Acting appointments are a
way of temporarily filling important offices but, if
abused, they can also be a way of circumventing
the need for confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments. However, we find no abuse in the
present case. The absence of abuse is readily
apparent from President Arroyo’s issuance of an
ad interim appointment to respondents immediately
upon the recess of Congress, way before the lapse
of one year.
158
G.R. No. 107369, August 11, 1999
159
G.R. No. 153881, March 24, 2003
160
G.R. No. 164978, October 13, 2005
From the Syllabus of Atty. Jamon by Alvin Angelo C. Rufino (2013)
A: In re Valenzuela161, it was discussed that during
this period, the President is neither required to
make appointments to the courts nor allowed to do
so. Sections 4 (1) and 9 of Article VIII simply mean
that the President is required by law to fill up
vacancies in the courts within the time frames
provided therein, unless otherwise prohibited by
Sec. 15, Art. VII. While filling up of vacancies in the
judiciary is undoubtedly in the public interest, there
is no showing in this case of any compelling reason
to justify the making of the appointments during the
period of the ban.
A: In De Rama v CA162, the Supreme Court ruled
that this provision applies only to presidential
appointments. There is no law that prohibits local
executive officials from making appointments
during the last days of their tenure.
A: In Matibag v Benipayo163, the Court held that it
is a permanent appointment because it takes effect
immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by
the President once the appointee has qualified into
office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments does not alter its
permanent character.
An ad interim appointment can be terminated for
two causes specified in the Constitution:
disapproval of the appointment by the Commission
on Appointments, or adjournment by Congress
without the Commission on Appointments acting on
the appointment. There is no dispute that when the
Commission on Appointments disapproves an ad
interim appointment, the appointee can no longer
be extended a new appointment, inasmuch as the
disapproval is a final decision of the Commission in
the exercise of its checking power on the
appointing authority of the President. Such
disapproval is final and binding on both the
appointee and the appointing power. But when an
ad interim appointment is by-passed because of
lack of time or failure of the Commission on
Appointments to organize, there is no final decision
by the Commission to give or withhold its consent
to the appointment. Absent such decision, the
President is free to renew the ad interim
appointment.
A: Larin v Executive Secretary164,
Q: Executive Clemency
161
A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC, Nov. 9, 1998
162
G.R. No. 131136, February 28, 2001
163
G.R. No. 149036, April 02, 2002
164
G.R. 112745, October 16, 1997
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
A: Barrioquinto v Fernandez165,
A: Vera v People166,
A: Cristobal v Labarador167,
A: Pelobello v Palatino168,
A: In Re Lontok169,
A: In Torres v Gonzales170, on conditional pardon
the rule is reiterated in In re: Petition for Habeas
Corpus of Wilfredo S. Sumulong, that a conditional
pardon is in the nature of a contract between the
Chief Executive and the convicted criminal; by the
pardonee’s consent to the terms stipulated in the
contract, the pardonee has placed himself under
the supervision of the Chief Executive or his
delegate who is duty bound to see to it that the
pardonee complies with the conditions of the
pardon. Sec. 64(i), Revised Administrative Code,
authorizes the President to order the arrest and re-
incarceration of such person who, in his
judgement, shall fail to comply with the conditions
of the pardon. And the exercise of this Presidential
judgment is beyond judicial scrutiny.
Q: Commander-in-Chief
A: The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief
of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever
it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or
rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he
may, for a period not exceeding sixty days,
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
or place the Philippines or any part thereof under
martial law. x x x.171
A: In Integrated Bar of the Philippines v Zamora172,
the Court declared that the factual necessity of
calling out the armed forces is something that is for
the President to decide, but the Court may look into
the factual basis of the declaration to determine if it
was done with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court also said that when the
President calls out the armed forces to suppress
165
G.R. L-1278, January 21, 1949
166
7 SCRA 152 (1963)
167
71 Phil. 34 (1941)
168
72 Phil. 441 (1941)
169
43 Phil.293 (1923)
170
152 SCRA 273 (1987)
171
1987 Philippine Constitution, Sec.18, Art. VII.
172
G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000
lawless violence, rebellion or invasion, he
necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely
vested in his wisdom. The Court cannot overrule
the President’s discretion or substitute its own. The
only criterion is that “whenever it becomes
necessary”, the President may call out the armed
forces. In the exercise of the power, on-the-spot
decisions may be necessary in emergency
situations to avert great loss of human lives and
mass destruction of property. Indeed, the decision
to call out the armed forces must be done swiftly
and decisively if it were to have any effect at all.
A: In Sanlakas v Executive Secretary173,
A: In Aquino v Enrile174,
A: In Olaguer v Military Commission No.34175, it
was held that military tribunals cannot try civilians
when civil courts are open and functioning.
A: In Navales v Abaya176, the Supreme Court said
that in enacting R.A. No. 7055, lawmakers merely
intended to return to the civilian courts jurisdiction
over those offenses that have been traditionally
within their jurisdiction, but did not divest the
military courts jurisdiction over cases mandated by
the Articles of War. Thus, the RTC cannot divest
the General Court Martial of jurisdiction over those
charged with violations of Art. 63 (Disrespect
Toward the President), 64 (Disrespect Toward
Superior Officer), 67 (Mutiny or Sedition), 96
(Conduct unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman)
and 97 (General Articles) of the Articles of War, as
these are specifically include as “service-
connected offenses or crimes” under Sec. 1, R.A.
7055.
A: In Lansang v Garcia177,
A: In Re: De Villa178,
A: In David v Arroyo179, the Supreme Court said
that the petitioners failed to prove that President
Arroyo’s exercise of the calling- out power, by
issuing Presidential Proclamation No. 1017, is
totally bereft of factual basis. The Court noted the
Solicitor General’s Consolidated Comment and
Memorandum showing a detailed narration of the
events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with
supporting reports forming part of the record. Thus,
173
G.R. No. 159085, Feb. 02, 2004
174
59 SCRA 183 (1974)
175
150 SCRA 144 (1987)
176
G.R. No. 162318, October 25, 2004
177
42 SCRA 448 (1971)
178
G.R. No. 158802, November 17, 2004
179
G.R. No. 171390, May 03, 2006
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
absent any contrary allegations, the Court is
convinced that the President was justified in
issuing PP 1017, calling for military aid. Indeed,
judging from the seriousness of the incidents,
President Arroyo was not expected to simply fold
her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress
what she believed was lawless violence, invasion
or rebellion.
Q: Emergency Powers
Q: Contracting and guaranteeing foreign loans
A: In Constantino v Cuisia180,
Q: Foreign Affairs
A: The President may contract or guarantee
foreign loans on behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines with the prior concurrence of the
Monetary Board, and subject to such limitations as
may be provided by law. The Monetary Board
shall, within thirty days from the end of every
quarter of the calendar year, submit to the
Congress a complete report of its decision on
applications for loans to be contracted or
guaranteed by the Government or government-
owned and controlled corporations which would
have the effect of increasing the foreign debt, and
containing other matters as may be provided by
law.181
A: No treaty or international agreement shall be
valid and effective unless concurred in by at least
two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.182
A: In People’s Movement for Press Freedom, et al.
v Hon. Raul Manglapus183,
A: In Commissioner of Customs v Eastern Sea
Trading184, the Supreme Court distinguished
treaties from executive agreements, thus:
1. international agreements which involve
political issues or changes of national
policy and those involving international
arrangements of a permanent character
take the form of a treaty; while
international agreements involving
adjustment of details carrying out well
established national policies and traditions
and involving arrangements of a more or
180
G.R. No. 106064, October 13, 2005.
181
1987 Philippine Constitution, Sec.20, Art. VII.
182
1987 Philippine Constitution, Sec.21, Art. VII.
183
G.R. No. 84642, En Banc Resolution dated April 13, 1988
184
3 SCRA 351 (1961)
From the Syllabus of Atty. Jamon by Alvin Angelo C. Rufino (2013)
less temporary nature take the form of
executive agreements; and
2. In treaties, formal documents require
ratification, while executive agreements
become binding through executive action.
A: In Go Tek v Deportation Board185,
Q: Legislation
Q: Address Congress
A: The President shall address the Congress at the
opening of its regular session. He may also appear
before it at any other time.186
Q: Preparation and submission of the budget
A: The President shall submit to the Congress,
within thirty days from the opening of every regular
session as the basis of the general appropriations
bill, a budget of expenditures and sources of
financing, including receipts from existing and
proposed revenue measures.187
Q: Veto-Power
Q: Emergency Powers
Q: Immunity from suit
A: In Beltran v Macasiar188, the Court held that the
privilege of immunity from suit pertains to the
President by virtue of the office and may be
invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any
other person in the President’s behalf. The choice
of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive is
solely the President’s prerogative. It is a decision
that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other
person. Furthermore, there is nothing in our laws
that would prevent the President from waiving the
privilege.
A: In Gloria v CA189, the Court said that even if he
is an alter- ego of the President, the DECS
Secretary cannot invoke the President’s immunity
from suit in a case filed against him, inasmuch as
the questioned acts are not those of the President.
Vice-President
185
79 SCRA 17 (1977)
186
1987 Philippine Constitution, Sec.23, Art. VII.
187
1987 Philippine Constitution, Sec.22, Art. VII.
188
G.R. 82585, Nov. 14, 1988.
189
G.R. No. 119903, August 15, 2000.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
Q: Qualifications, election, term, oath and
removal.
A: The same as the President (Sec.3, Art.VII), but
no Vice President shall serve for more than 2
successive terms.
Q: Privileges and Salary
Q: Prohibitions
Q: Succession
Q: Pardoning Power
A: Except in cases of impeachment, or as
otherwise provided in this Constitution, the
President may grant reprieves, commutations, and
pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after
conviction by final judgment. He shall also have the
power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a
majority of all the Members of the Congress.190
1. Pardon is an act of grace which exempts
the individual on whom it is bestowed from
the punishment that the law inflicts for the
crime he has committed.
2. Commutation is the reduction or mitigation
of the penalty.
3. Reprieve is the postponement of a
sentence or stay of execution.
4. Parole is the release from imprisonment
but without full restoration of liberty, as
parolee is still in the custody of the law
although not in confinement.
5. Amnesty is an act of grace, concurred in
by the legislature, usually extended to
groups of persons who committed political
offenses, which puts into oblivion the
offense itself.
Judicial Department
Q: The Judicial Power
A: Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
190
1987 Philippine Constitution, Sec.19, Art.VII.
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.191
Q: Where Judicial Power is vested?
A: The judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.192
Q: Constitutional Safeguards to insure the
independence of the Judiciary.
A: The following insures the independence of the
Judiciary:
1. The Supreme Court is a constitutional
body it may not be abolished by the
legislature.
2. The members of the Supreme Court are
removable only by impeachment.
3. The Supreme Court may not be deprived
of its minimum original and appellate
jurisdiction; appellate jurisdiction may not
be increased without its advice and
concurrence.
4. The Supreme Court has administrative
supervision over all inferior courts and
personnel.
5. The Supreme Court has the exclusive
power to discipline judges/justices of
inferior courts.
6. The members of the Judiciary have
security of tenure.
7. The members of the Judiciary may not be
designated to any agency performing
quasi-judicial or administrative functions.
8. Salaries of judges may not be reduced;
the Judiciary enjoys fiscal autonomy.
Q: The Supreme Court
Q: Composition and Mode of Sitting
A: A Chief Justice and 14 Associate Justices. It
may sit en banc or its discretion, in divisions of
three, five or seven members. Any vacancy shall
be filled within ninety (90) days from occurrence
thereof.193
A: En Banc: All cases involving the constitutionality
of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or
law; and all other cases which, under the Rules of
Court, are to be heard en banc, including those
involving the constitutionality, application or
191
1987 Philippine Constitution, Sec.1,(2), Art. VIII.
192
1987 Philippine Constitution, Sec.1,(1), Art. VIII.
193
1987 Philippine Constitution, Sec.4 (1), Art.VIII
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
operation of presidential decrees, proclamations,
orders, instructions, ordinances and other
regulations. These cases are decided with the
concurrence of a majority of the members who
actually took part in the deliberation on the issues
and voted thereon.
A: Division: Other cases or matters may be heard
in division, and decided or resolved with the
concurrence of a majority of the members who
actually took part in the deliberations on the issue
and voted thereon, but in no case without the
concurrence of at least three (3) such members.
However, when the required number is not
obtained, the case shall be decided en banc.
Moreover, no doctrine or principle of law laid down
by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in
division may be modified or reversed except by the
court sitting en banc.
Q: Mode of Sitting
A: In MMDA v Jancom194,
195
A: In People v Gacott , it was held that the first
clause in the said section is a declaration of the
grant of the disciplinary power to, and the
determination of the procedure in the exercise
thereof by, the Court en banc. It did not intend that
all administrative disciplinary cases should be
heard and decided by the whole Court. The second
clause, intentionally separated from the first by a
comma, declared that the Court en banc may
“order their dismissal by a vote of a majority”. Thus,
only cases involving dismissal of judges of lower
courts are specifically required to be decided by
the Court en banc.
Q: Appointments to the Judiciary
Q: Qualifications
A: Of proven competence, integrity, probity and
independence.196
Q: Qualifications for Supreme Court
A: Natural born citizen of the Philippines, at least
40 years of age, for 15 years or more a judge of a
lower court or engaged in the practice of law in the
Philippines.197
194
G.R. 147465, April 10, 2002.
195
G.R. No. 116049, July 13, 1995
196
1987 Philippine Constitution, Sec.7,(3), Art. VIII.
197
1987 Philippine Constitution, Sec.7,(1), Art. VIII.
From the Syllabus of Atty. Jamon by Alvin Angelo C. Rufino (2013)
Q: Procedure for Appointment
A: Appointed by the President of the Philippines
from among a list of at least three nominees
prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every
vacancy; the appointment shall need no
confirmation.198
A: Any vacancy in the Supreme Court shall be
filled within ninety (90) days from the occurrence
thereof.199
A: For lower courts, the President shall issue the
appointment within ninety (90) days from the
submission by the JBC of such list.200
Q: No non-judicial work for judges
A: The Members of the Supreme Court and of
other courts established by law shall not be
designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial
or administrative function.201
A: In Meralco v Pasay Trans. Co.202,
A: In Garcia v Macaraig203,
Q: Salary
A: In Nitafan v Commissioner (Tan) Of Internal
Revenue204, it was held that imposition of income
tax on salaries of judges does not violate the
constitutional prohibition against decrease in
salaries.
Q: Tenure
A: Supreme Court: Justices may be removed only
by impeachment.205
Q: Removal
A: In Re: First Indorsement from Hon. Raul M.
Gonzales206, the Supreme Court said that the
Special Prosecutor (Tanodbayan) is without
authority to conduct an investigation on charges
against a member of the Supreme Court with the
end view of filing a criminal information against him
with the Sandiganbayan. This is so, because if
198
1987 Philippine Constitution, Sec.9, Art.VIII
199
1987 Philippine Constitution, Sec.4 (1), Art.VIII
200
1987 Philippine Constitution, Sec.9, Art.VIII
201
1987 Philippine Constitution, Sec.12, Art.VIII
202
57 Phil. 600 (1932)
203
3 SCRA 106 (1971)
204
152 SCRA 284 (1987)
205
1987 Philippine Constitution, Sec. 2, Art. XI.
206
A.M. No. 88-4-5433, April 15, 1988/ 160 SCRA 771
(1988)
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
convicted in the criminal case, the Justice would be
removed, and such removal would violate his
security of tenure.
Q: Fiscal autonomy
A: The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy.
Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be
reduced by the legislature below the amount
appropriated for the previous year and, after
approval, shall be automatically and regularly
released.207
Q: Jurisdiction
A: Original jurisdiction: over cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus.
Appellate jurisdiction: Review, revise, reverse,
modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law
or Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and
orders of lower courts in:
1. In all cases in which the
constitutionality or validity of any
treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential
decree, proclamation, order,
instruction, ordinance or
regulation is in question;
2. All cases involving the legality of
any tax, impost, assessment, or
toll, or any penalty imposed in
relation thereto;
3. All cases in which the jurisdiction
of any lower court is in issue;
4. All criminal cases in which the
penalty imposed is reclusion
perpetua or higher; and
5. All cases in which only an error or
question of law is involved.
Note that this power does not include the power of
the Supreme Court to review decisions of
administrative bodies, but is limited to final
judgments and orders of lower courts.208
207
1987 Philippine Constitution, Sec.3, Art.VIII
208
Ruffy v Chief of Staff
A: In Santiago v Bautista209, it was held that the
courts may not exercise judicial power when there
is no applicable law.
Hence, an award of honors to a student by a board
of teachers may not be reversed by a court where
the awards are governed by no applicable law.
A: In Felipe v Leuterio210,
Q: Deliberations
A: The conclusions of the Supreme Court in any
case submitted to it for the decision en banc or in
division shall be reached in consultation before the
case the case assigned to a Member for the writing
of the opinion of the Court. A certification to this
effect signed by the Chief Justice shall be issued
and a copy thereof attached to the record of the
case and served upon the parties. Any Member
who took no part, or dissented, or abstained from a
decision or resolution must state the reason
therefor. The same requirements shall be observed
by all lower collegiate court.211
A: Conclusions in any case submitted to it for
decision shall be reached in consultation before
the case is assigned to a member for the writing of
the opinion of the Court. A certification to this effect
signed by the Chief Justice shall be issued. This
requirement is applicable also to lower collegiate
courts.
However, this does requirement does not apply to
administrative cases.212
A: In Prudential Bank v Castro213, the Supreme
Court ruled that “lack of merit” is sufficient
declaration of the legal basis for denial of petition
for review or motion for reconsideration.
A: In Consing v Court of Appeals214,
Q: Voting
A: In Cruz v DENR215, when the votes are equally
divided and the majority vote is not obtained, then
pursuant to Sec. 7, Rule 56 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, the petition shall be dismissed.
209
32 SCRA 188 (1970)
210
91 Phil. 482 (1952)
211
1987 Philippine Constitution, Sec. 13, Art.VIII.
212
158 SCRA 646 (1988)
213
158 SCRA 646 (1988)
214
177 SCRA 14 (1989)
215
G.R. No. 135385, Dec. 06, 2000
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
Q: Requirements as to decisions
A: No decision shall be rendered by any court
without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the
facts and the law on which it is based.216
A: In Valladolid v Inciong217
A: In Nunal v COA218
A: In People v Bugarin219
A: In Hernandez v Court of Appeals220
A: In Yao v CA221
A: In Dizon v Judge Lopez222, respondent Judge
was held to have violated Sec. 15, Art. VIII,
because although she promulgated her decision
within three months from submission, only the
dispositive portion was read at such promulgation,
and it took one year and 8 months more before a
copy of the complete decision was furnished the
complainant. What respondent did was to render a
“sin perjuicio” judgment, which is a judgment
without a statement of the facts in support of its
conclusions, to be later supplemented by the final
judgment. As early as 1923, the Supreme Court
already expressed its disapproval of the practice of
rendering “sin perjuicio” judgments. What should
be promulgated must be the complete decision.
The decision, which consisted only of the
dispositive portion (denominated a sin perjuicio
judgment) was held invalid.
A: In Asiavest v CA223
Q: Petition for Review with Motion
Reconsideration
A: No petition for review or motion for
reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be
refused due course or denied without stating the
legal basis therefor.224
A: In Tichangco v Enriquez225, it was held that
when the Court, after deliberating on a petition and
216
1987 Philippine Constitution, Sec. 14(1), Art. VIII.
217
121 SCRA 205 (1992)
218
169 SCRA 356 (1989)
219
273 SCRA 384 (1996)
220
228 SCRA 429 (1993)
221
G.R. No. 132428, October 24, 2000
222
A.M. 96-1338, September 05, 1997
223
G.R. No. 110263, July 20, 2001
224
1987 Philippine Constitution, Sec. 14(2), Art. VIII.
225
G.R. No. 150629, June 30, 2004
From the Syllabus of Atty. Jamon by Alvin Angelo C. Rufino (2013)
any subsequent pleadings, manifestations,
comments or motions, decides to deny due course
to a petition, and states- in a minute resolution- that
the questions raised are factual or no reversible
error in the respondent court’s decision is shown or
some other legal basis stated in the resolution,
there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional
requirement.
A: In Fr. Martinez v CA226, the Court of Appeals
denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in
this wise: “Evidently, the motion poses nothing
new. The points and arguments raised by the
movants have been considered and passed upon
in the decision sought to be reconsidered. Thus,
we find no reason to disturb the same. “The
Supreme Court held that there was adequate
compliance with the constitutional provision.
Q: Periods for deciding cases
A: Section 15, Art. VII provides the period for
deciding cases:
1. All cases or matters filed after the
effectivity of this Constitution must be
decided or resolved within twenty-four
months from date of submission for the
Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by
the Supreme Court, twelve months for all
lower collegiate courts, and three months
for all other lower courts.
2. A case or matter shall be deemed
submitted for decision or resolution upon
the filing of the last pleading, brief, or
memorandum required by the Rules of
Court or by the court itself.
3. Upon the expiration of the corresponding
for period, a certification to this effect signed
by the Chief Justice or the presiding judge
shall forthwith be issued and a copy
thereof attached to the record of the case
or matter, and served upon the parties.
The certification shall state why a decision
or resolution has not been rendered or
issued within said period.
4. Despite the expiration of the applicable
mandatory period, the court, without
prejudice to such responsibility as may
have been incurred in consequence
thereof, shall decide or resolve the case or
matter submitted thereto for determination,
without further delay.
226
G.R. 123547, May 21, 2001
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1

A: In re: Problem of Delays in cases Before the A: Zaldivar vs. Gonzales239

Sandiganbayan227, Sandiganbayan Presiding
Justice Francis Garchitorena was fined P20,000 A: In re: Cunanan, 94 Phil. 534 (1954)
and was relieved of his powers, functions and
duties as Presiding Justice, so that he may devote A: Aguirre vs. Rana, Bar Matter No. 1036, June 10,
himself exclusively to decision-writing. His motion 2003
for reconsideration was denied on January 31,
2002. Q: Integration of the Bar

Q: Presidential Electoral Tribunal A: In re: Edillon240, it was discussed that, the

enforcement of the penalty of removal does not
Q: Administrative powers amount to deprivation of property without due
process of law. The practice of law is not a
A: The Supreme Court shall have administrative property right but a mere privilege, and as such
supervision over all courts and the personnel must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the
thereof.228 Supreme Court to exact compliance with the
lawyer’s public responsibilities.
Q: Supervision of lower courts
A: In re: IBP Elections Bar Matter No. 491241
229
A: In re Demetria ,
Q: Legal assistance to the Underprivileged
A: Temporarily assign judges to other stations as
public interest may require; but the assignment Q: Report on the Judiciary
shall not exceed six months without the consent of
the judge concerned.230 Q: Lower Courts

A: Order a change of venue or place of trial to Q: Qualifications for Lower Collegiate Courts
avoid miscarriage of justice.231
A: Natural born citizen of the Philippines, member
A: In People v Pilotin232 of the Philippine Bar, but Congress may prescribe
other qualifications.242
A: In Mondiguing v Abad233
Q: Qualifications for Lower Courts
A: In People v Sola234
A: Citizen of the Philippines, member of the
A: Appoint all officials and employees of the Philippine Bar, but Congress may prescribe other
Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service qualifications.243
Law.235
A: Lower Courts: The Members of the Supreme
A: Promulgate rules concerning the enforcement Court and judges of the lower court shall hold office
and protection of constitutional rights236 during good behavior until they reach the age of
seventy years or become incapacitated to
A: Promulgate Rules concerning pleading, practice discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme
and procedure237 Court en banc shall have the power to discipline
judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a
A: Admission to the Practice of Law238 vote of majority of the Members who actually took
part in the deliberations on the issues in the case
and voted in thereon.244
227
A.M. No. 00-8-05-SC, Nov. 28, 2001
228
1987 Philippine Constitution, Sec. 6, Art. VIII.
229
AM. No. 00-7-09-CA, March 27, 2001
230
1987 Philippine Constitution, Sec. 5, Art. VIII.
231
1987 Philippine Constitution, Sec. 5, Art. VIII.
232
65 SCRA 635 (1975)
233 239
SCRA 14 (1975) 166 SCRA 316 (1988)
234 240
103 SCRA 393 (1981) 84 SCRA 554 (1978)
235 241
1987 Philippine Constitution, Sec. 5, Art. VIII. (October 06. 1989)
236 242
1987 Philippine Constitution, Sec. 5, Art. VIII. 1987 Philippine Constitution, Sec.7,(1) and (2), Art. VIII.
237 243
1987 Philippine Constitution, Sec. 5, Art. VIII. 1987 Philippine Constitution, Sec.7,(1) and (2), Art. VIII.
238 244
1987 Philippine Constitution, Sec. 5, Art. VIII. 1987 Philippine Constitution, Sec. 11, Art. VIII.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
A: No law shall be passed reorganizing the
Judiciary when it undermines the security of tenure
of its members.245
A: In De La Llana v Alba246, it was held that B.P.
129 was a valid reorganization law, and that,
therefore, the abolition of then existing judicial
offices did not violate security of tenure. (Note: In
view of the clear declaration of Sec. 2, Art. VIII, the
ruling in De la Llana may be said to have been
modified accordingly.)
Q: The Judicial and Bar Council
A: Composition, Section 8 (1), Art. VIII:
1. Ex-officio members: Chief Justice,
as Chairman; the Secretary of
Justice, and a representative of
Congress.
2. Regular members: A remedy to protect the right to privacy, especially
representative of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, a professor
of law, a retired justice of the
Supreme Court, and
representative of the private
sector.
3. Secretary ex-officio: The Clerk of
the Supreme Court.
A: Appointment: The regular members shall be
appointed by the President for a term of four (4)
years, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments. They shall receive such
emoluments as ay be determined by the Supreme
Court.247
A: Powers/ Functions: Principal function of
recommending appointees to the Judiciary. May
exercise such other functions and duties as the
Supreme Court may assign to it.248
Q: Automatic Release of appropriations for the
judiciary
Q: Writ of Habeas Corpus
A: Writ issued by court directed to person detaining
another, commanding him to produce the body of
the prisoner at designated time and place, with the
day and cause of his capture and detention, to do,
245
1987 Philippine Constitution, Sec. 2, Art. VIII.
246
122 SCRA 291 (1983)
247
1987 Philippine Constitution, Sec. 8(2), Art. VIII.
248
1987 Philippine Constitution, Sec. 8(5), Art. VIII.
to submit to, and to receive whatever court or judge
awarding writ shall consider in his behalf.
Extends to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention by which any person is deprived of his
liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any
person is withheld from the person entitled
thereto.249
 May be granted by the SC on any day at
any time.
 May be granted by CA, in cases allowed
by law.
 May also be granted by the RTC –
enforceable only within RTC’s district.
Q: Writ of Habeas Data
A: The writ of habeas data is an independent
the right to informational privacy. The essence of
the constitutional right to informational privacy goes
to the very heart of a person’s individuality, an
a exclusive and personal sphere upon which the
State has no right to intrude without any legitimate
public concern. The basic attribute of an effective
right to informational privacy is the right of an
individual to control the flow of information
concerning or describing them.
It is a remedy available to any person whose right
to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a
private individual or entity engaged in gathering,
collecting or storing of data or information
regarding the person, family, honor and
correspondence of the aggrieved party.250
Q: Writ of Amparo
A: The nature and time-tested role of amparo has
shown that it is an effective and inexpensive
instrument for the protection of constitutional
rights.251
Amparo, literally “to protect” originated from Mexico
and spread throughout the Western Hemisphere
where it gradually evolved into various forms,
depending on the particular needs of each country.
249
Rule of Court, Rule 102.
250
A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, Sec.1(February 2,2008)
251
Azcuna, The Writ of Amparo: A Remedy to Enforce
Fundamental Rights, 37 Ateneo L J. 15 (1993)
From the Syllabus of Atty. Jamon by Alvin Angelo C. Rufino (2013)
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1

The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy

available to any person whose right to life, liberty
and security is violated or threatened with violation
by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity.252

An extraordinary feature is Section 14 of the Rule

which allows the grant by the court of interim
reliefs, which may either be a temporary protection
order, inspection order, production order or a
witness protection order.

Q: Define Writ of Kalikasan

A: A special civil action akin to writ of amparo but

protects one’s right for a healthy environment
rather than constitutional rights.

252
A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, Sec.1. (October 24, 2007)