THIRD DIVISION

DANTE T. TAN, G.R. No. 173637

Petitioner,
Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - CARPIO MORALES,*
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR., ** and
LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO,***JJ.

PEOPLE OF Promulgated:
THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents. April 21, 2009
x---------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed under Rule 45
of the Revised Rules of Court seeking the reversal and setting aside of the
Decision[1] dated 22 February 2006 and Resolution[2] dated 17 July 2006
issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 83068 entitled, People of
the Philippines v. Hon. Briccio C. Ygana, in his capacity as Presiding Judge
of Branch 153, Regional Trial Court, Pasig City and Dante Tan.
The assailed Decision reinstated Criminal Case No. 119830, earlier dismissed
by the trial court due to an alleged violation of petitioner Dante T. Tans right
to speedy trial. The assailed Resolution denied his Motion for Reconsideration
and Motion to Inhibit.

The factual and procedural antecedents of the instant petition are as follows:

On 19 December 2000, a Panel of Prosecutors of the Department of Justice

(DOJ), on behalf of the People of the Philippines (People), filed three
Informations against Dante T. Tan (petitioner) before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pasig City. The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases No. 119830,
No. 119831 and No. 119832, all entitled, People of the Philippines v. Dante
Tan.

Criminal Case No. 119830[3] pertains to allegations that petitioner employed

manipulative devises in the purchase of Best World Resources Corporation
(BW) shares. On the other hand, Criminal Cases No. 119831[4] and No.
119832[5] involve the alleged failure of petitioner to file with the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) a sworn statement of his beneficial
ownership of BW shares.

In two other related cases, two Informations were filed against a certain
Jimmy Juan and Eduardo G. Lim for violation of the Revised Securities Act
involving BW shares of stock. These were docketed as Criminal Cases No.
119828 and No. 119829.

On the same day, the DOJ, through Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Nilo C.
Mariano, filed a Motion for Consolidation praying that Criminal Cases No.
119830, No. 119831 and No. 119832 be consolidated together with Criminal
Cases No. 119828 and No. 119829, which the trial court granted.
On 21 December 2000, Criminal Cases No. 119830, No. 119831 and No.
119832 were raffled off to the Pasig RTC, Branch 153, presided by Judge
Briccio C. Ygana. Criminal Cases No. 119828 and No. 119829 also went to
the same court.
Petitioner was arraigned on 16 January 2001, and pleaded not guilty to the
charges.[6]

On 6 February 2001, the pre-trial was concluded, and a pre-trial order set,
among other things, the first date of trial on 27 February 2001.[7]
Atty. Celia Sandejas of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),
under the direct control and supervision of Public Prosecutor Nestor Lazaro,
entered her appearance for the People; Atty. Agnes Maranan for petitioner
Dante Tan; Atty. Sigfrid Fortun for Eduardo Lim, Jr.; and Atty. Rudolf
Brittanico for Jimmy Juan. State Prosecutors Susan Dacanay and Edna
Villanueva later on took over as lawyers for the People.

The People insists that during the pendency of the initial hearing on 27
February 2001, the parties agreed that Criminal Cases No. 119831 and No.
119832 would be tried ahead of Criminal Case No. 119830, and that petitioner
would not interpose any objection to its manifestation, nor would the trial
court disapprove it.
Thereafter, the People presented evidence for Criminal Cases No. 119831 and
No. 119832. On 18 September 2001, the prosecution completed the
presentation of its evidence and was ordered by the RTC to file its formal offer
of evidence within thirty days.

After being granted extensions to its filing of a formal offer of evidence, the
prosecution was able to file said formal offer for Criminal Cases No. 119831
and No. 119832 on 25 November 2003.[8]

On 2 December 2003, petitioner moved to dismiss Criminal Case No. 119830

due to the Peoples alleged failure to prosecute. Claiming violation of his right
to speedy trial, petitioner faults the People for failing to prosecute the case for
an unreasonable length of time and without giving any excuse or justification
for the delay. According to petitioner, he was persistent in asserting his right
to speedy trial, which he had allegedly done on several instances. Finally, he
claimed to have been substantially prejudiced by this delay.
The prosecution opposed the Motion, insisting on its claim that the parties had
an earlier agreement to defer the trial of Criminal Case No. 119830 until after
that of Criminal Cases No. 119831-119832, as the presentation of evidence
and prosecution in each of the five cases involved were to be done
separately. The presentation of evidence in Criminal Cases No. 119831-
119832, however, were done simultaneously, because they involved similar
offenses of non-disclosure of beneficial ownership of stocks proscribed under
Rule 36(a)-1[9] in relation to Sections 32(a)-1[10] and 56[11] of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 178, otherwise known as the Revised Securities Act. Criminal Case
No. 119830 pertains to alleged violation of Section 27 (b),[12] in relation to
Section 56 of said act.

On 22 December 2003, Judge Briccio C. Ygana of the Pasig RTC, Branch

153, ruled that the delays which attended the proceedings of petitioners case
(Criminal Case No. 119830) were vexatious, capricious and oppressive,
resulting in violation of petitioners right to speedy trial. The RTC
ordered[13] the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 119830, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises duly considered and finding the motion

to dismiss to be meritorious, the Court hereby orders Criminal Case No.
119830 DISMISSED.

On motion for reconsideration, the prosecution insisted that the parties agreed
to hold separate trials of the BW cases, with petitioner acquiescing to the
prosecution of Criminal Cases No. 119831 and No. 119832 ahead of Criminal
Case No. 119830. In an Order dated 20 January 2004, the RTC denied the
Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.
The RTCs order of dismissal was elevated to the Court of Appeals via a
petition for certiorari, with the People contending that:

RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN

RULING THAT THE PEOPLE VIOLATED DANTE TANS RIGHT TO
SPEEDY TRIAL, ALBEIT, THE LATTER AND RESPONDENT JUDGE
HIMSELF HAVE CONFORMED TO THE DEFERMENT OF
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 119830 PENDING HEARING OF THE TWO
OTHER RELATED CASES.

Setting aside the trial courts order of dismissal, the Court of Appeals granted
the petition for certiorari in its Decision dated 22 February 2006. In resolving
the petition, the appellate court reinstated Criminal Case No. 119830 in this
wise:

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the assailed Orders

dated December 22, 2003 and January 20, 2004 are set aside. Criminal Case
No. 119830 is reinstated and the trial court is ordered to conduct further
proceedings in said case immediately.[14]

Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the Decision and filed a motion for
inhibition of the Justices who decided the case.

On 17 July 2006, the Court of Appeals denied both motions.

Petitioner Dante Tan, henceforth, filed the instant petition for review
on certiorari, raising the following issues:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE ACTING SECRETARY OF JUSTICE MAY

VALIDLY EXECUTE THE CERTIFICATE OF NON-FORUM
SHOPPING ATTACHED TO THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
FILED BY THE PEOPLE WITH THE COURT OF APPEALS EVEN
THOUGH THE CRIMINAL ACTION WAS INSTITUTED BY A
COMPLAINT SUBSCRIBED BY THE AUTHORIZED OFFICERS OF
THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION.

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI VIOLATED

TANS RIGHT AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY.

III.
 WHETHER OR NOT CRIMINAL CASE NO. 119830 WAS
CORRECTLY DISMISSED BY THE TRIAL COURT ON THE
GROUND OF VIOLATION OF TANS RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL.

IV.

WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED GRAVE

ABUSE OF DISCRETION.

We first resolve the preliminary issues.

In an attempt at having the instant petition dismissed, petitioner contends that

the certificate of non-forum shopping attached to the Peoples appeal before
the Court of Appeals should have been signed by the Chairman of the SEC as
complainant in the cases instead of Acting DOJ Secretary Merceditas N.
Gutierrez.

Petitioners argument is futile. The Court of Appeals was correct in

sustaining the authority of Acting DOJ Secretary Merceditas Gutierrez to sign
the certificate of non-forum shopping of the petition for certiorari before said
court. It must be stressed that the certification against forum shopping is
required to be executed by the plaintiff.[15]Although the complaint-affidavit
was signed by the Prosecution and Enforcement Department of the SEC, the
petition before the Court of Appeals originated from Criminal Case No.
119830, where the plaintiff or the party instituting the case was the People of
the Philippines. Section 2, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court leaves no room for
doubt and establishes that criminal cases are prosecuted in the name of the
People of the Philippines, the offended party in criminal cases. Moreover,
pursuant to Section 3, paragraph (2) of the Revised Administrative Code, the
DOJ is the executive arm of the government mandated to investigate the
commission of crimes, prosecute offenders and administer the probation and
correction system. It is the DOJ, through its prosecutors, which is authorized
to prosecute criminal cases on behalf of the People of
the Philippines.[16] Prosecutors control and direct the prosecution of criminal
offenses, including the conduct of preliminary investigation, subject to review
by the Secretary of Justice. Since it is the DOJ which is the government
agency tasked to prosecute criminal cases before the trial court, the DOJ is
best suited to attest whether a similar or related case has been filed or is
pending in another court of tribunal. Acting DOJ Secretary Merceditas N.
Gutierrez, being the head of the DOJ, therefore, had the authority to sign the
certificate of non-forum shopping for Criminal Case No. 119830, which was
filed on behalf of the People of the Philippines.
The preliminary issues having been resolved, the Court shall proceed to
discuss the main issues.

At the crux of the controversy is the issue of whether there was a violation of
petitioner Dante Tans right to speedy trial.
Petitioner Dante Tan assails the Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 83068. The appellate court determined that he
impliedly agreed that Case No. 119830 would not be tried until after
termination of Criminal Cases No. 119831-119832, which finding was
grounded entirely on speculations, surmises and conjectures.

Both parties concede that this issue is factual. It is a basic rule that factual
issues are beyond the province of this Court in a petition for review, for it is
not our function to review evidence all over again.[17] Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court provides that only questions of law may be raised in this Court in a
petition for review on certiorari.[18] The reason is that the Court is not a trier
of facts.[19] However, the rule is subject to several exceptions.[20] Under these
exceptions, the Court may delve into and resolve factual issues, such as in
cases where the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are absurd,
contrary to the evidence on record, impossible, capricious or arbitrary, or
based on a misappreciation of facts.

In this case, the Court is convinced that the findings of the Court of
Appeals on the substantial matters at hand, while conflicting with those of the
RTC, are adequately supported by the evidence on record. We, therefore, find
no reason to deviate from the jurisprudential holdings and treat the instant case
differently.

An accuseds right to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial is guaranteed

in criminal cases by Section 14(2) of Article III of the Constitution. This right
to a speedy trial may be defined as one free from vexatious, capricious and
oppressive delays, its salutary objective being to assure that an innocent
person may be free from the anxiety and expense of a court litigation or, if
otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the shortest possible time
compatible with the presentation and consideration of whatsoever legitimate
defense he may interpose.[21] Intimating historical perspective on the
evolution of the right to speedy trial, we reiterate the old legal maxim, justice
delayed is justice denied. This oft-repeated adage requires the expeditious
resolution of disputes, much more so in criminal cases where an accused is
constitutionally guaranteed the right to a speedy trial.[22]
Following the policies incorporated under the 1987 Constitution, Republic
Act No. 8493, otherwise known as The Speedy Trial Act of 1998, was
enacted, with Section 6 of said act limiting the trial period to 180 days from
the first day of trial.[23] Aware of problems resulting in the clogging of court
dockets, the Court implemented the law by issuing Supreme Court Circular
No. 38-98, which has been incorporated in the 2000 Rules of Criminal
Procedure, Section 2 of Rule 119.[24]
In Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan,[25] the Court had occasion to state
The right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of the
case against him was designed to prevent the oppression of the citizen by
holding criminal prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite time, and
to prevent delays in the administration of justice by mandating the courts to
proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal cases. Such right
to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of a case is violated only when
the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays.
The inquiry as to whether or not an accused has been denied such right is
not susceptible by precise qualification. The concept of a speedy
disposition is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.

While justice is administered with dispatch, the essential ingredient is

orderly, expeditious and not mere speed. It cannot be definitely said how
long is too long in a system where justice is supposed to be swift, but
deliberate. It is consistent with delays and depends upon circumstances. It
secures rights to the accused, but it does not preclude the rights of public
justice. Also, it must be borne in mind that the rights given to the accused
by the Constitution and the Rules of Court are shields, not weapons; hence,
courts are to give meaning to that intent.

The Court emphasized in the same case that:

A balancing test of applying societal interests and the rights of the

accused necessarily compels the court to approach speedy trial cases on
an ad hoc basis.

In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right

to a speedy disposition of the case and to a speedy trial, four factors must
be considered: (a) length of delay; (b) the reason for the delay; (c) the
defendants assertion of his right; and (d) prejudice to the defendant. x x x.

Closely related to the length of delay is the reason or justification of

the State for such delay. Different weights should be assigned to different
reasons or justifications invoked by the State. x x x.[26]

Exhaustively explained in Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, an accuseds right to

speedy trial is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended
by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. In determining whether
petitioner was deprived of this right, the factors to consider and balance are
the following: (a) duration of the delay; (b) reason therefor; (c) assertion of
the right or failure to assert it; and (d) prejudice caused by such delay.[27]
From the initial hearing on 27 February 2001 until the time the prosecution
filed its formal offer of evidence for Criminal Cases No. 119831-119832
on 25 November 2003, both prosecution and defense admit that no evidence
was presented for Criminal Case No. 119830. Hence, for a period of almost
two years and eight months, the prosecution did not present a single evidence
for Criminal Case No. 119830.

The question we have to answer now is whether there was vexatious,

capricious, and oppressive delay. To this, we apply the four-factor test
previously mentioned.

We emphasize that in determining the right of an accused to speedy

trial, courts are required to do more than a mathematical computation of the
number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case. A mere
mathematical reckoning of the time involved is clearly insufficient,[28] and
particular regard must be given to the facts and circumstances peculiar to each
case.[29]

In Alvizo v. Sandiganbayan,[30] the Court ruled that there was no violation of

the right to speedy trial and speedy disposition. The Court took into account
the reasons for the delay, i.e., the frequent amendments of procedural laws by
presidential decrees, the structural reorganizations in existing prosecutorial
agencies and the creation of new ones by executive fiat, resulting in changes
of personnel, preliminary jurisdiction, and the functions and powers of
prosecuting agencies. The Court also considered the failure of the accused to
assert such right, and the lack of prejudice caused by the delay to the accused.

In Defensor-Santiago v. Sandiganbayan,[31] the complexity of the

issues and the failure of the accused to invoke her right to speedy disposition
at the appropriate time spelled defeat for her claim to the constitutional
guarantee.

In Cadalin v. Philippine Overseas Employment Administrations

Administrator,[32] the Court, considering also the complexity of the cases and
the conduct of the parties lawyers, held that the right to speedy disposition
was not violated therein.

Petitioners objection to the prosecutions stand that he gave an implied

consent to the separate trial of Criminal Case No. 119830 is belied by the
records of the case. No objection was interposed by his defense counsel when
this matter was discussed during the initial hearing.[33] Petitioners conformity
thereto can be deduced from his non-objection at the preliminary hearing
when the prosecution manifested that the evidence to be presented would be
only for Criminal Cases No. 119831-119832. His failure to object to the
prosecutions manifestation that the cases be tried separately is fatal to his
case. The acts, mistakes and negligence of counsel bind his client, except only
when such mistakes would result in serious injustice.[34] In fact, petitioners
acquiescence is evident from the transcript of stenographic notes during the
initial presentation of the Peoples evidence in the five BW cases on 27
February 2001, herein quoted below:

COURT: Atty. Sandejas, call your witness.

ATTY. SANDEJAS [SEC Prosecuting Lawyer]: May we make some

manifestation first, your Honor, before we continue presenting our
witness. First of all, this witness will only be testifying as to two (2)
of the charges: non-disclosure of beneficial ownership of Dante
Tan x x x.

xxxx

COURT: (to Atty. Sandejas) Call your witness.

ATTY. SANDEJAS: Our witness is Mr. Wilfredo Baltazar of the Securities

and Exchange Commission, your Honor. We are presenting this
witness for the purpose of non-disclosure of beneficial ownership
case

COURT: I would advise the counsel from the SEC to make it very clear
your purpose in presenting your first witness.

ATTY. SANDEJAS: Yes, your Honor. Can I borrow the file?

COURT: Show it to counsel.

ATTY. SANDEJAS: Crim. Case Nos. 119831 and 119832, for Violation of
RA Rule 36(a)1, in relation to Sec. 32 (a)-1 of the Revised Securities
Act when he failed to disclose his beneficial ownership amounting
to more than 10% which requires disclosure of such fact.[35]

During the same hearing, the People manifested in open court that the parties
had agreed to the separate trials of the BW Cases:

PROSECUTOR LAZARO:

May we be allowed to speak, your Honor?

Your Honor please, as we x x x understand, this is not a joint trial but a

separate trial x x x so as manifested by the SEC lawyer, the witness is being
presented insofar as 119831 and 119832 as against Dante Tan only x x x.[36]
The transcript of stenographic notes taken from the 3 April 2001 hearing
further clarifies that only the two cases against Dante Tan were being
prosecuted:
ATTY. DE LA CRUZ [new counsel for accused Eduardo Lim, Jr.]:
Your Honor, please, may I request clarification from the prosecutors
regarding the purpose of the testimony of the witness in the stand. While
the Private Prosecutor stated the purpose of the testimony of the witness. . .

xxxx

PROSECUTOR LAZARO:

I was present during the last hearing. I was then going over the transcript of
this case, well, I believe the testimony x x x mainly [is] on accused Dante
Tan, your Honor. As a matter of fact, there was a clarification made by the
parties and counsels after the witness had testified that the hearing in these
cases is not a joint trial because it involves separate charges, involving
different documents, your Honor. That is why the witness already testified
only concerning Dante Tan. Per the query made by Atty. Fortun, because at
that time, Atty. Fortun was still representing Mr. Lim, I believe, your Honor,
then I understand that the testimony of this witness cannot just be adopted
insofar as the other accused, your Honor.

ATTY. MARANAN:

We confirm that, your Honor, since x x x particularly since this is already

cross, it is clear that the direct examination dealt exclusively with Mr. Dante
Tan.

PROS. LAZARO:

Mr. Dante Tan, involving the 2 (two) cases.[37]

Moreover, although periods for trial have been stipulated, these periods are
not absolute. Where periods have been set, certain exclusions are allowed by
law.[38] After all, this Court and the law recognize that it is but a fact that
judicial proceedings do not exist in a vacuum and must contend with the
realities of everyday life. In spite of the prescribed time limits, jurisprudence
continues to adopt the view that the fundamentally recognized principle is that
the concept of speedy trial is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible
concept.[39]
As to the assertion that delay in the presentation of evidence for Criminal Case
No. 119830 has prejudiced petitioner because the witnesses for the defense
may no longer be available at this time, suffice it to say that the burden of
proving his guilt rests upon the prosecution.[40] Should the prosecution fail for
any reason to present evidence sufficient to show his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, petitioner will be acquitted. It is safely entrenched in our jurisprudence
that unless the prosecution discharges its burden to prove the guilt of an
accused beyond reasonable doubt, the latter need not even offer evidence in
his behalf.[41]

In the cases involving petitioner, the length of delay, complexity of the

issues and his failure to invoke said right to speedy trial at the appropriate time
tolled the death knell on his claim to the constitutional guarantee.[42] More
importantly, in failing to interpose a timely objection to the prosecutions
manifestation during the preliminary hearings that the cases be tried
separately, one after the other, petitioner was deemed to have acquiesced and
waived his objection thereto.

For the reasons above-stated, there is clearly insufficient ground to conclude

that the prosecution is guilty of violating petitioners right to speedy
trial. Grave abuse of discretion defies exact definition, but generally refers to
capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. Any capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment in dismissing
a criminal case is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. This is true in the instant
case.

There is also no merit to petitioners claim that a reversal of the RTCs

Order dismissing Criminal Case No. 119830 is a violation of his constitutional
right against double jeopardy which dismissal was founded on an alleged
violation of his right to speedy trial.

The constitutional protection against double jeopardy shields one from a

second or later prosecution for the same offense. Article III, Section 21 of the
1987 Constitution declares that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense, providing further that if an act is punished
by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute
a bar to another prosecution for the same act.
Following the above constitutional provision, Section 7, Rule 117 of the
Revised Rules of Court found it apt to stipulate:

SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. When an accused

has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent
jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused
had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the
dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense
charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for
any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the
offense charged in the former complaint or information.
For double jeopardy to attach then, the following elements in the first criminal
case must be present:

(a) The complaint or information or other formal charge was sufficient in

form and substance to sustain a conviction;

(b) The court had jurisdiction;

(c) The accused had been arraigned and had pleaded; and

(d) He was convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed or otherwise

terminated without the express consent of the accused.[43]

Among the above-cited elements, we are concerned with the fourth element,
conviction or acquittal, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without the express consent of the accused. This element is crucial since, as a
general rule, the dismissal of a criminal case resulting in acquittal, made with
the express consent of the accused or upon his own motion, will not place the
accused in double jeopardy.[44] This rule, however, admits of two exceptions,
namely: insufficiency of evidence and denial of the right to speedy
trial.[45] While indeed petitioner was in fact the one who filed the Motion to
Dismiss Criminal Case No. 119830, the dismissal thereof was due to an
alleged violation of his right to speedy trial, which would otherwise put him
in double jeopardy should the same charges be revived. Petitioners situation
is different. Double jeopardy has not attached, considering that the dismissal
of Criminal Case No. 119830 on the ground of violation of his right to speedy
trial was without basis and issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Where the right of the accused to speedy trial
has not been violated, there is no reason to support the initial order of
dismissal.
Following this Courts ruling in Almario v. Court of Appeals,[46] as petitioners
right to speedy trial was not transgressed, this exception to the fourth element
of double jeopardy that the defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the case
was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the
accused was not met. Where the dismissal of the case was allegedly
capricious, certiorari lies from such order of dismissal and does not involve
double jeopardy, as the petition challenges not the correctness but the validity
of the order of dismissal; such grave abuse of discretion amounts to lack of
jurisdiction, which prevents double jeopardy from attaching.[47]

As this Court ruled in People v. Tampal,[48] reiterated in People v.

Leviste,[49] where we overturned an order of dismissal by the trial court
predicated on the right to speedy trial
 It is true that in an unbroken line of cases, we have held that dismissal of
cases on the ground of failure to prosecute is equivalent to an acquittal that
would bar further prosecution of the accused for the same offense. It must
be stressed, however, that these dismissals were predicated on the clear right
of the accused to speedy trial. These cases are not applicable to the petition
at bench considering that the right of the private respondents to speedy trial
has not been violated by the State. x x x.

From the foregoing, it follows that petitioner cannot claim that double
jeopardy attached when said RTC order was reversed by the Court of
Appeals. Double jeopardy does not apply to this case, considering that there
is no violation of petitioners right to speedy trial.

The old adage that justice delayed is justice denied has never been more valid
than in our jurisdiction, where it is not a rarity for a case to drag in our courts
for years and years and even decades. It was this difficulty that inspired the
constitutional requirement that the rules of court to be promulgated by the
Supreme Court shall provide for a simplified and inexpensive procedure for
the speedy trial and disposition of cases.[50] Indeed, for justice to prevail, the
scales must balance, for justice is not to be dispensed for the accused alone.[51]

Evidently, the task of the pillars of the criminal justice system is to

preserve our democratic society under the rule of law, ensuring that all those
who appear before or are brought to the bar of justice are afforded a fair
opportunity to present their side. As correctly observed by the Court of
Appeals, Criminal Case No. 119830 is just one of the many controversial
cases involving the BW shares scam where public interest is undoubtedly at
stake. The State, like any other litigant, is entitled to its day in court, and to a
reasonable opportunity to present its case. A hasty dismissal, instead of
unclogging dockets, has actually increased the workload of the justice system
and unwittingly prolonged the litigation.[52]

Finally, we reiterate that the rights given to the accused by the Constitution
and the Rules of Court are shields, not weapons. Courts are tasked to give
meaning to that intent. There being no capricious, vexatious, oppressive delay
in the proceedings, and no postponements unjustifiably sought, we concur in
the conclusions reached by the Court of Appeals.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed 22 February

2006 Decision and 17 July 2006 Resolution issued by the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 83068 are hereby AFFIRMED.
The instant case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch
153, Pasig City for further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 119830 with
reasonable dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
 CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the
above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

*
Per Special Order No. 602, dated 20 March 2009, signed by Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, designating
Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales to replace Associate Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-
Martinez, who is on official leave.
**
Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. was designated to sit as additional member replacing Associate
Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura per Raffle dated 14 January 2008.
*** Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro was designated to sit as additional member replacing
Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio per Raffle dated 15 April 2009.
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta with Associate Justices Josefina Guevara-Salonga
and Sesinando E. Villon, concurring; rollo, pp. 90-100.
[2]
Id. at 102-112.
[3]
Id. at 228-230.
[4]
Id. at 231-232.
[5]
Id. at 233-235.
[6]
Records, p. 194.
[7]
Id. at 253-259.
[8]
Rollo, pp. 247-253.
[9]
Section 36. Directors, officers and principal stockholders.
(a) Every person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than ten per centum of any class
of any equity security which is registered pursuant to this Act, or who is a director or an officer of
the issuer of such security, shall file, at the time of the registration of such security on a securities
exchange or by the effective date of a registration statement or within ten days after he becomes
such a beneficial owner, director, or officer, a statement with the Commission and, if such security
is registered on a securities exchange, also with the exchange, of the amount of all equity securities
of such issuer of which he is the beneficial owner, and within ten days after the close of each calendar
month thereafter, if there has been a change in such ownership during such month, shall file with
the Commission, and if such security is registered on a securities exchange, shall also file with the
exchange, a statement indicating his ownership at the close of the calendar month and such changes
in his ownership as have occurred during such calendar month.
[10]
Section 32. Reports. (a) (1) Any person who, after acquiring directly or indirectly the beneficial ownership
of any equity security of a class which is registered pursuant to this Act, is directly or indirectly the
beneficial owner of more than ten (10%) per centum of such class shall, within ten days after such
acquisition or such reasonable time as fixed by the Commission, submit to the issuer of the security,
to the stock exchanges where the security is traded, and to the Commission a sworn statement x x
x.
[11]
Penalties. Any person who violates any of the provisions of this Act, or the rules and regulations
promulgated by the Commission under authority thereof, or any person who, in a registration
statement filed under this Act, makes any untrue statement of a material fact of omits to state any
material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading,
shall, upon conviction, suffer a fine of not less than five thousand (P5,000.00) pesos nor more than
five hundred thousand (P500,000.00) pesos or imprisonment of not less than seven (7) years nor
more than twenty one (21) years, or both in the discretion of the court. If the offender is a
corporation, partnership or association or other juridical entity, the penalty shall be imposed upon
the officer or officers of the corporation, partnership, association or entity responsible for the
 violation, and if such officer is an alien, he shall, in addition to the penalties prescribed, be deported
without further proceedings after service of sentence.
[12]
Section 27. Manipulative and deceptive devices. It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly,
by the use of any facility of any exchange
xxxx
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security, any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance.
[13]
Rollo, pp. 835-855.
[14]
Id. at 99-100.
[15]
Regalado, REMEDIAL LAW, p. 729.
[16]
Revised Administrative Code, Section 3(2).
[17]
Centeno v. Viray, 440 Phil. 881, 887 (2002).
[18]
Busmente, Jr. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 73647, 8 April 1991, 195 SCRA 710,
713.
[19]
Tad-y v. People, G.R. No. 148862, 11 August 2005, 466 SCRA 474, 492; Romago Electric Co., Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, 388 Phil. 964, 975 (2000).
[20]
Palon v. Nino, 405 Phil. 670, 681 (2001).
[21]
Acebedo v. Sarmiento, 146 Phil. 820, 823 (1970).
[22]
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION, Art. III, Sec. 14(2).
[23]
SECTION 6. Time Limit for Trial. In criminal cases involving persons charged of a crime, except those
subject to the Rules on Summary Procedure, or where the penalty prescribed by law does not exceed
six (6) months imprisonment, or a fine of One thousand pesos (P1,000.00) or both, irrespective of
other imposable penalties, the justice or judge shall, after consultation with the public prosecutor
and the counsel for the accused, set the case for continuous trial on a weekly or other short-term trial
calendar at the earliest possible time so as to ensure speedy trial. In no case shall the entire trial
period exceed one hundred eighty (180) days from the first day of trial, except as otherwise
authorized by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court pursuant to Section 3, Rule 22 of the Rules of
Court.
[24]
SEC. 2. Continuous trial until terminated; postponements.Trial once commenced shall continue from
day to day as far as practicable until terminated. It may be postponed for a reasonable period of
time for good cause.
The court shall, after consultation with the prosecutor and defense counsel, set the case for continuous trial
on a weekly or other short-term trial calendar at the earliest possible time so as to ensure speedy
trial. In no case shall the entire trial period exceed one hundred eighty (180) days from the first day
of trial, except as otherwise authorized by the Supreme Court.
The time limitations provided under this section and the preceding section shall not apply where special laws
or circulars of the Supreme Court provide for a shorter period of trial.
[25]
G.R. No. 162214, 11 November 2004, 442 SCRA 294, 312-313.
[26]
Id. at 313-314.
[27]
Abardo v. Sandiganbayan, 407 Phil. 985, 999-1000 (2001); Dela Pena v. Sandiganbayan, 412 Phil. 921,
929 (2001).
[28]
Socrates v. Sandiganbayan, 324 Phil. 151, 170 (1996); Tai Lim v. Court of Appeals, 375 Phil. 971, 977
(1999).
[29]
Santiago v. Garchitorena, G.R. No. 109266, 2 December 1993, 228 SCRA 214, 221.
[30]
G.R. No. 101689, 17 March 1993, 220 SCRA 55.
[31]
408 Phil. 767 (2001).
[32]
G.R. No. 104776, 5 December 1994, 238 SCRA 721.
[33]
TSN, 27 February 2001.
[34]
Producers Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 430 Phil. 812, 823 (2002); People v. Hernandez,
328 Phil. 1123, 1143 (1996).
[35]
TSN, 27 February 2001, pp. 3-7; CA rollo, pp. 87-91.
[36]
Id. at 71-74; id. at 155-156.

[37]
TSN, 3 April 2001, pp. 5-10; id. at 225-230.
[38]
Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Judge How, 393 Phil. 172, 184 (2000).
[39]
Id.
[40]
Republic v. Sandiganbayan and Marcos, 461 Phil. 598, 615 (2003).
[41]
People v. Ganguso, G.R. No 115430, 23 November 1995, 250 SCRA 268, 274-275; People v. Abellanosa,
332 Phil. 760, 788 (1996), citing People v. Baclayon, G.R. No. 110837, 29 March 1994, 231 SCRA
578, 584, citing People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 94187, 4 November 1992, 215 SCRA 349, 358-359.
[42]
Santiago v. Garchitorena, supra note 29.
[43]
Condrada v. People, 446 Phil. 635, 641 (2003).
[44]
Id.
[45]
Id.; Philippine Savings Bank v. Bermoy, G.R. No. 151912, 26 September 2005, 471 SCRA 94, 106,
citing People v. Bans, G.R. No. 104147, 8 December 1994, 239 SCRA 48, 55.
[46]
407 Phil. 279 (2002).
[47]
Regalado, REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM (Vol. II, 2001), p. 503.
[48]
314 Phil. 35, 45 (1995).
[49]
325 Phil. 525, 537 (1996).
[50]
Justice Isagani Cruz, PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW, p. 292.
[51]
Dimatulac v. Villon, 358 Phil. 328, 366 (1998); People v. Subida, G.R. No. 145945, 27 June 2006, 493
SCRA 125, 137.
[52]
People v. Leviste, supra note 49.