REMEDIAL LAW II

Assignment No. 3

1. Actual truth are set facts and circicumstances that are undisputedly took placed or
occured. On the contrary, legal truth are set of facts that constitute justification or exemption of
any liabilities arising from the acts or omission which constituted a crime.

As illustrated in the movie entitled “A Few Good Men” that at the Guantanamo Bay Naval
Base in Cuba, Private First Class William T. Santiago has been murdered in what looks to be a
hazing incident gone wrong. He is found dead with his head shaved and a rag stuffed in his mouth.
Two of his fellow Marines, Lance Corporal Harold W. Dawson and Private First Class Louden
Downey, stand accused of this crime. The defense, has to prove that their client were innocent and
should not be punished for obeying their superior to give the accused ”Code Red” a long practice in
navy to discipline an officer who violated the chain of command which pertains to their duty to their
unit, core, God and country these are their hierarchy of their foundation as they stated. The
allegations of the two accused as the theory of the defense that they are were only doing their job,
to execute the order of their superior. The Court held in this movie, that accused were not guilty of
the crime of murder for obeying the order of their superior but guilty of conduct of unbecoming and
dishonorable discharged from service.

2. Judicial notice is a rule in the law of evidence that allows a fact to be introduced into
evidence if the truth of that fact is so notorious or well known, or so authoritatively attested, that it
cannot reasonably be doubted. This is done upon the request of the party seeking to rely on the
fact at issue. Facts and materials admitted under judicial notice are accepted without being formally
introduced by a witness or other rule of evidence, and they are even admitted if one party wishes to
lead evidence to the contrary.

Judicial notice is frequently used for the simplest, most obvious common sense facts, such
as which day of the week corresponded to a particular calendar date or the approximate time at
sunset However, it could even be used within one state to notice a law of another state—such as
one which provides average baselines for motor vehicle stopping distances.

An illustration is Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 79 S.Ct. 136, 3 L.Ed.2d 125
(1958), in which the Court refused to discard the common law rule that one spouse could not testify
against the other, saying, “Adverse testimony given in criminal proceedings would, we think, be
likely to destroy almost any marriage.” This conclusion has a large intermixture of fact, but the
factual aspect is scarcely “indisputable.” See Hutchins and Slesinger, Some Observations on the
Law of Evidence—Family Relations, 13 Minn.L.Rev. 675 (1929). If the destructive effect of the
giving of adverse testimony by a spouse is not indisputable, should the Court have refrained from
considering it in the absence of supporting evidence.

“If the Model Code or the Uniform Rules had been applicable, the Court would have been
barred from thinking about the essential factual ingredient of the problems before it, and such a
result would be obviously intolerable. What the law needs as its growing points is more, not less,
judicial thinking about the factual ingredients of problems of what the law ought to be, and the
needed facts are seldom ‘clearly’ indisputable.” Davis, supra, at 83.

“In determining the content or applicability of a rule of domestic law, the judge is
unrestricted in his investigation and conclusion. He may reject the propositions of either party or of
both parties. He may consult the sources of pertinent data to which they refer, or he may refuse to
do so. He may make an independent search for persuasive data or rest content with what he has
or what the parties present.

The parties do no more than to assist; they control no part of the process.” Morgan,
Judicial Notice, 57 Harv.L.Rev. 269, 270–271 (1944).

This is the view which should govern judicial access to legislative facts. It renders
inappropriate any limitation in the form of indisputability, any formal requirements of notice other
than those already inherent in affording opportunity to hear and be heard and exchanging briefs,
and any requirement of formal findings at any level. It should, however, leave open the possibility
of introducing evidence through regular channels in appropriate situations. See Borden's Farm
Products Co. v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 194, 55 S.Ct. 187, 79 L.Ed. 281 (1934), where the cause was
remanded for the taking of evidence as to the economic conditions and trade practices underlying
the New York Milk Control Law.

Similar considerations govern the judicial use of nonadjudicative facts in ways other than
formulating laws and rules. Thayer described them as a part of the judicial reasoning process.
 3. A collateral matter is evidence solely affecting the credibility of a witness. While
questioned about a collateral matter, the party cross examining the witness is bound by the
witness's answer to matters solely affecting credibility. It precludes the cross examiner from calling
other witnesses or producing documentary evidence to contradict the witness.

The collateral evidence doctrine forbids the introduction of extrinsic evidence to contradict a
witness on a collateral matter. Frederick C. Moss, The Sweeping-Claims Exception and the
Federal Rules of Evidence, 1982 Duke Law Journal 61-112 (1982). Its purpose is to “limit the
scope of impeachment to the introduction of evidence that is relevant to the important issues in
dispute.” Id. Therefore, it functions as a corollary to the relevancy requirement; it excludes
evidence that is logically relevant to the credibility of witnesses. Id.

“It is a fundamental principle of law that counsel may not introduce extrinsic evidence on a
collateral matter for the purpose of impeaching credibility.” David E. Seidelson, Extrinsic Evidence
on a Collateral Matter May Not Be Used to Impeach Credibility: What Constitutes Collateral Matter,
9 Rev. Litig. 203, 242 (1990). When a cross-examiner is questioning a witness about a collateral
matter, the cross-examiner is bound by the witness’s answer to matters solely affecting credibility.
The cross examiner cannot call another witness to refute answers that the witness gave during
cross-examination. The basic reason for the rule is that if the cross examiner were able to call a
subsequent witness to impeach the first witness’s credibility on the collateral matter, opposing
counsel would do the same to the second witness, in an effort to rehabilitate the first witness’s
credibility. Id. Thus, a large portion of trial could be solely focused on a collateral issue and create
a “trial within a trial,” and thereby distract the jury from the substantive issues of the trial at hand.
David E. Seidelson, Extrinsic Evidence on a Collateral Matter May Not Be Used to Impeach
Credibility: What Constitutes Collateral Matter, 9 Rev. Litig. 203, 242 (1990).