Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
1942
The division is conformed in France in November 11 of 1942 like the SS
Division Panzergrenadier "DAS Reich" from the SS Motorized division
"DAS Reich". In April 24 of 1942, the division this conformed by:
• 2º SS DIVISION PANZER
• Control of Division
• 1 Section of Machine guns
• 1 motorized Section of Maps
• Regiments of Infanteria Motorized Deutschland and Der Führer
• Each one with:
• Control of Regiment
o 1 Motorized squad of Signals
o 1 Squad of Motorciclistas (6 LMG)
o 1 Motorized squad antitank (3 50mm PAK36, 2 LMG)
• 3 Battalions each one with:
o 3 motorized Companies of Infanteria (18 LMG, 4 HMG, 2 mortars 50mm
and 2 lanzallmas each one)
• 1 Heavy Company
o 1 Squad of Engineers
o 1 antitank Section (3 50mm PAK 36, 2 rifles antitank)
o 1 Section of support tubes (4 75mm leIG)
• 1 motorized Company of tubes of infanteria (4 150mm sIG)
• SS Panzer Battalion "Give Reich"
o Company Panzer de Mando
o 1 Company average Panzer
o 2 slight Companies Panzer
o 1 armored Company of maintenance
• SS Regiment of Artilleria "Give Reich"
o Four battalions, each one with:
o 1 Motorized squad of Control
o 3 Baterias motorized (4 105mm leFH18, 2 LMG)
• Flak Battalion
• SS Battalion of signals "DAS Reich"
• SS Engineer battalion "Give Reich"
• SS Reconnaissance battalion "Give Reich"
• SS Antitank Battalion "Give Reich"
o 1 motorized Section of Control
o 1 motizado Squad of signals
o 1 antitank self-propelled Company (9 75mm, 6 LMG)
o 2 motorized Companies antitank (9 50mm PAK38, 6 LMG each one)
• SS Administrative Service "Give Reich"
• SS Medico Service "Give Reich"
• SS Service of Provisions "Give Reich"
• Others
o SS motorized Service of Post office
o SS motorized Military Policia
In November of 1942 the battalion Panzer "DAS Reich" is expanded at level of regiment
with two battalions and a control. The division receives a great change in the used
equipment and for November of 1942 it consists of:
• 2º SS DIVISION PANZER
• Control of Division
• Regiment Panzergrenadier "Der Führer"
o Control of Regiment
o 1 Motorized squad of signals
o 1 Squad of motorciclistas 86 LMG)
o 1 Motorized squad antitank (3 75mm PAK 40, 2 LMG)
o 1º & 2º Battalions each one with:
o 3 motorized Companies Panzergrenadier (18 LMG, 4HMG, 2 mortars
80mm, 2 lanzallams each one)
o 1 Heavy Company with:
o 1 Mortar squad (6 80mm)
o 1 Antitank squad (3 75mm PAK 40)
o 1 Antitank squad (3 rifles antitank)
o 1 Section of support tubes (4 75mm leIG)
o 3º Battalions
o 3 Panzergrenadier Companies (4 HMG, 34 LMG, 2 mortars 80mm, 2
flame throwers)
o 1 Heavy Company with:
o 1 Section of tubes (4 75mm leIG)
o 1 Antitank squad (3 75mm PAK 40)
o 1 Antitank squad (3 rifles heavy antitank)
• 1 motorized Company of support tubes (4 150mm sIG)
• 1 self-propelled Airline company (12 20mm)
• 1 Company of motorciclistas (4 HMG, 18 LMG, 2 mortars 80mm, 3 75mm PAK
40)
• 1 motorized Company of support tubes (4 150mm sIG)
• Regiment Panzergrenadier Deutschland
• Battalions SS "Give Reich"
• Reconnaissance regiment SS Langemark
• Battalions Flak SS "Give Reich"
o 1 motorized Company of control
o 1 Airline company self-propelled average (9 37mm)
o 3 Baterias antiaerial motorized heavy (4 88mm, 3 20mm, 2 LMG)
o 1 Convoy light of provisions
• Regiment of Artilleria SS "Gives Reich"
o 1 Control of regiment
o 1 Bateria of control
o 1º Battalion
o 1 Control of battalion
o 1 Bateria of battalion control (6 LMG)
o 3 Baterias self-propelled leFH(6 105mm leFH SdKfz 124 Wespe each one)
o 2º & 3º Battalions
o Control and bateria of control (6 LMG)
o 2 Baterias motorized (6 105mm leFH & 2 LMG each one)
o 4º Battalions
o Control and bateria of control (6 LMG)
o 2 Baterias motorized (6 150mm sFH, 2 LMG each one)
o 1 motorized Bateria (6 105mm sK 18/40, 2 LMG)
• Battalions of Signals SS "Give Reich"
• Engineer battalions SS "Give Reich"
• Antitank Battalion SS "Gives Reich"
• Administrative Services SS "Give Reich"
• Service Medico SS "Gives Reich"
• Service of Provisions SS "Gives Reich"
1943
The armored part of the division this constituted in February of 1943 by:
2º SS DIVISION PANZER
1 /, 2/2º SS Panzer Regiment
1 Squad of signals
1 light Squad Panzer
Each battalion with:
• 78 PzKpfw IV (long)
• 79 PzKpfw V Panter
• 13 StuG
• 12 Flakpz38
The division seriously is damaged during the battles in Normandia between June and
Julio of 1944; it is retired of the reconstructed front line and between Octubre/Noviembre
1944. In December organizacion and inventory of the armored part of the division are:
1 /, 2/2° SS Panzer Regiment
Command and control company
Battalion
Command and control company of battalion
4 average Panzer Companies (PzKpfw V Panther)
Battalion
Command and control company of battalion
2 average Panzer Companies (PzKpfw IV)
2 StuG Companies
28 StuG
28 PzKpfw IV (long)
58 PzKpfw V Panther
4 FlakpzIV (2V)
4 FlakpzIV (37)
In December it takes part in the Offensive from the Ardennes. The
division surrenders to the Americans in 1945.
CAMPAIGNS
France
Yugoslavia
Smolenk
Vyazma
Moscu
Rzhev
Charkov
Poltava
Kiev
Tolouse
Normandia
The Ardennes
Hungria
Winniza
Stock market of I had
COMMANDERS
General Paul Hausser 10.10.39 to 10.14.41
General Wilhelm Bitrich 10.14.41 to 12.31.41
General Mathias Kleinheiterkamp 12.31.41 to 4.19.42
General George Kepler 4.19.42 to 2.10.43
Greater General Herbert-Ernst Vahl 2-10-43 to 3.18.43
Colonel Kurt Brasack 3.18.43 to 3.29.43
General Walter Krüger 3.29.43 to 10.23.43
General lieutenant Heinz Lammerding 10.23.43 to 7.24.44
Colonel Christian Tychsen 7.24.44 to 7.28.44
Greater General Otto Baum 7.28.44 to 10.23.44
General lieutenant Heinz Lammerding 10.23.44 to 1.20.45
Colonel Karl Kreutz 1.20.45 to 1.29.45
General lieutenant Werner Ostnedorff 1-20,45 to 3.09.45
Colonel Rudolf Lehmann 3.09.45 to 4.13.45
Colonel Karl Kreutz 4.13.45 to 5.08.45
1940
The 2º SS takes part in the campaign from Low France and the
Paises in 1940 like Division SS-VT, his first action battle takes place
in Rotterdam, being used to reduce bags of resistance in the front,
at the end of the campaign is in the border with Spain. Originally
Division SS-VT this composing by the three of the four SS-
Standarten, being the quarter LAH, these three is the Deutschland,
Germania and Der Führer, despues of the campaign of France the
division is reorganized. The SS-Standarten Germania is transferred
outside the division and along with the Standarten Nordland and
Westland conform the nucleo for division SS Germania,
denominated despues Wiking. During the later period to the caida
one of France, the division remains in this in operational training
Marine Leon, the Invasion of England.
1941
The division that now is denominated "Reich" is transferred to
Rumania to participate in the Invasion of Yugoslavia and Greece in
March of 1941. In April of 1941 it takes part in ocupacion from
Belgrade, capital of Yugoslavia, despues is transferred to Poland to
take part in the Barbarroja Operation. Part in the battle from Yalnya
is assigned to the Group of Ejercitos Center taking surrounds soon
to Smolensk and in the front for the capture of Moscu. The "Reich"
reaches to arrive closely together at Moscu, when winter 1941/42
appears contrataque Russian of l, the division is forced to back
down, is retired towards France with the purpose of being
reequipped and being transformed into a Panzergrenadier Division;
part of the division remains in Russia taking the name from
Kampfgruppe Ostendorf, being sent in June 1942 towards France to
meet with the rest of the division.
1942
2º SS DAS Reich was conformed in France the 11 of September of
1942 like the SS Division Panzergrenadier "DAS Reich" from the SS
Motorized division "DAS Reich. In November of 1942 to the
Battalion Panzer "DAS Reich" it is expanded at level of Regiment,
with organizacion of his Control and the 2º battalion. The Division is
reequipped and a change in its constitution in November is done to
him of 1942.
1943
At the beginning of 1943, the "DAS Reich" is transferred to the front
This where it participates in the actions around jarkov. participates
in the Citadel Operation. The 1 of May of 1943 is ordered to the
Regiment Panzer DAS Reich to send a battalion towards Germany
with the purpose of conforming an equipped battalion to PzKpfw V
Panther. One of the battalions is organized in two heavy companies
and two light ones. The third battalion is organized in two
companies equipped with T-34 captured and light a Panzer company.
He authorizes himself to the company equipped with PzKpfw I SAW
have 15 tanks. For the battle of Kursk the division counts on 104
tanks and 33 assault guns.
1944
In April 11 of 1944 the Kampfgruppe is retired from the front battle
and transferred to the Front the West where he is reincorporado to
the reformed division and reequipped. The 1/2 SS Panzer Regiment
is equipped with four 17 companies of Panther each one. The 2º
Battalion is a mixed battalion, with two 22 companies of PzKpfw IV
each one and two of StuG with 22 each one. The 2º Battalion is
reconstructed in June of 1944 and one company of StuG is
reequipped with PzKpfw IV. Despues of the Invasion of Normandia,
the division is sent to close stop the allied disembarkations to Caen
and St; the division Mortain recapture, but is forced to retire, being
catched in stock-market of Falaise, thanks to the actions of the
"DAS the 9 Reich" andº Panzer Division, a great part of the German
troops can escape. The division seriously is damaged in the
disembarkations of Normandia, being retired from the front in
Octubre/Noviembre 1944. In December it takes part in the
Offensive from the Ardennes.
1945
At the beginning of 1945 it is retired towards Germany where it is
reconstituted and sent towards Hungria, with the purpose of
recapturing Budapest, which is not carried out, happening the rest
of the war in the zone of Dresden, the Prague and Vienna. The
division surrenders to the Americans in May 8 of 1945.
OPERATIONAL HISTORY
The following catagories will document the history of
2nd SS Panzer Division "Das Reich"
A formal SS Division did not exist until October 1939, however certain SS-VT units did participate
in the Polish Campaign. In July 1939, The Oberkommandoheer [OKH] decided to create a unique
unit in preparation for the assault on Poland. This unit was officially designated as the East
Prussian Tank Unit and command was given to Generalmajor Werner Kempf. Kempf was the
former commander of the 4th Panzer Brigade, and after taking command of the East Prussian
Tank Unit, the unit would be referred to as Panzer Division Kempf. Along with Kempf, other
members of the 4th Pz. Brigade (which was subsequently disbanded) formed the core of the new
division staff.
The Staff set up headquarters at the Stablak Training area, south of K önigsberg, East Prussia and
made preparations for the remaining units of the division to arrive. Pz. Division Kempf was indeed
a unique unit, since it was the first Heer division to be composed of both Heer and Waffen SS
units. The following units come under the divisions command (all SS Units are from the SS-VT):
On July 25th, 1939 units of the SS-Verf ügungstruppe arrived by rail and sea at Stettin and
Königsberg. Independent of the SS-VT units, the 7th Pz. Regiment (which also have previously
been part of the 4th Pz. Bge) was transferred by freighters to K önigsberg and proceed on to their
assembly area near Zinten.
The "official" German government explanation for the sudden movement of large numbers of
troops into East Prussia was they were part of a new Panzer Division and would participate as
"Wehrmacht representatives" at the Tannenberg celebration. The Tannenberg Celebration was to
commemorate Hindenberg's victory at the battle of Tannenberg in World War I. In fact a large
memorial had been constructed at the battle site in which were entombed the remains of
Hindenberg and his wife.
Despite the fact that Pz. Division Kempf was structured as a regular Heer Panzer Division, in fact
it was no more than a reinforced Pz. Brigade. Pz. Kempf only had one (1) motorized infantry
regiment as opposed to the authorized strength of two regiments. In addition, the unit was severly
lacking in vehicles with cross-country capability, except for the 7th Pz. Regiment and the SS-
Aufklarungs Battalion. However, the division was a unique experiment, and became the
predecessor of the first SS division. Recognizing the potential for further expansion of the Waffen
SS, Gruppenführer Paul Hausser accompanied the unit for the duration of its operations in
Poland.
Throughout the month of August, the soldiers of Pz. Div. Kempf were engaged in manouvers as
well as assisting the local population with the fall harvest. At the same time preparations for the
Tannenberg celebrations continued. The preparations (which even involved bringing in WWI
veterans from Germany) were used to disguise the true purpose of the military build-up in East
Prussia, that being the invasion of Poland.
On August 19th, Pz. Division Kempf, along with 61. and 11. Infanterie Divsionen were assigned to
the I Armee Korps. This resulted in the division moving closer to the border with Poland. Despite
the obvious tension that was mounting between Germany and Poland, the units of the division
continued to receive orders to practice for the Grand Parade planned for the Tannenberg
celebrations.
However, by August 24th, the planned parade did not occur and the division was moved even
further south to Kommusin Forest near Neidenberg, well within site of the border. The various
Regimental and Battalion commanders and their adjutants made regular reconnaisance trips,
scouting out possible assembly areas for the Division. After negotiations broke down between
Germany and Poland on August 25th, the division's troops were ordered to move forward to their
assembly areas along with the rest of I Armee Korps. Orders arrived soon after that the Korps'
attack would begin the next morning at 0600 hours.
After dark, the subunits of "Deutschland" deployed along the East Prussian/Polish border. At the
same time the divisional artillery began to emplace its batteries to support the assault in the
morning. Pz. Division Kempf occupied the souther most position of in East Prussia, directly in front
of a strong Polish bunker system known as the "Mlava position". At the last minute (literally) the
order to attack was postponned. However, due to the poor roads, and a recent rain storm, the
message was not passed to all elements of "Deutschland" in time. A reconnaissance patrol from
9./Deutschland had advanced several km across the border. No shots were fired and it required
considerable effort to get the orders to all the units. It was not until almost 0900 that all the units
had been recalled to their assembly points.
The "false start" in some respects had been a good learning exercise since it became apparent
that Polish forces would not engage the division at the border, and that the first point of resistence
would probably be encountered at the Mlava Position.
After the recall, the units of the I Armee Korps were withdrawn from the Polish frontier, and
reassembled at the former divisional command post at Neidenburg. Negotiations to prevent
hostilities between Poland and Germany fell through for a final time on August 30th, and once
again the troops of Pz. Division Kempf were brought together with the other units of the I Armee
Korps to prepare for an advance into Poland. A briefing for the commanders of the Regiments
took place in the divisional HQ at Neidenburg. To the amazement of the officers assembled,
Generalmajor Kempf ordered the division "back into their old foxholes". This was an odd order
considering one of the tenants of war was not to occupy previous assembly positions for a second
time if they had been originally discovered by the enemy. Despite this, the men of SS Regiment
"Deutschland" moved into their own positions and waited for the coming events.
The attack was set for 0445 on September first, and this time no halt order arrived to arrest the
invasion.
ASSAULT ON BELGRADE
The following is a list of the various commanders and adjutants of the regiments and
battalions of SS-Division "Reich" prior to Operation Barbarossa
SS-Regiment "Deutschland"
Regts.-Kdr. Oberführer Bittrich
Regts.-Adj. Hauptsturmführer Koller
I.Battalion
Btl.Kdr. Sturmbannführer Gr.v.Westphalen
Btl.Adj. Obersturmführer Schuster
II.Battalion
Btl.Kdr. Oberstrumbannführer Wagner
Btl.Adj. Untersturmführer Birke
III.Battalion
Btl.Kdr. Haupsturmführer Schultz
Btl.Adj. Untersturmführer Kumpf
SS-Regiment "Der Führer"
Rgts.-Kdr. Bridgadeführer Keppler
Rgts.-Adj. Haupsturmführer Lingner
I.Battalion
Btl.Kdr. Haupsturmführer Ehrath
Btl.Adj. Obersturmführer Schulze
II.Battalion
Btl.Kdr. Sturmbannführer Harmel
Btl.Adj. Untersturmführer Herdey
III.Battalion
Btl.Kdr. Sturmbannführer Kumm
Btl.Adj. Obersturmführer Schober
SS-Infanterie-Regiment 11
Rgts.-Kdr. Obersturmbannführer Brandt
Rgts.-Kdr. Hauptsturmführer Graf
I.Battalion
Btl.Kdr. N/A N/A
Btl.Adj. N/A N/A
II.Battalion
Btl.Kdr. Sturmbannführer Schmidhuber
Btl.Adj. Obertsturmführer Hoffmann
III.Battalion
Btl.Kdr. Sturmbannführer Ax
Btl.Adj. Obersturmführer Luther
SS-Artillerie-Regiment
Rgts.-Kdr. Oberführer Hansen
Rgts.-Adj. Hauptsturmführer Sander
I.Abteilung
Abt.Kdr. Sturmbannführer Wunder
Abt.Adj. Untersturmführer Köhler
II.Abteilung
Abt.Kdr. Hauptsturmführer Rumohr
Abt.Adj. Untersturmführer Wurach
III.Abteilung
Abt.Kdr. Obersturmbannführer Kersten
Abt.Adj. Obersturmführer de Vriess
IV.Abteilung
Abt.Kdr. Haupsturmführer Kreutz
Abt.Adj. Untersturmführer Gast
SS-Aufklarung-Abteilung
Abt.Kdr. Hauptsturmführer Mühlenkamp
Abt.Adj. Obersturmführer Poetschke
SS-Kradschützen-Battalion
Abt.Kdr. Sturmbannführer Zehender
Abt.Adj. Untersturmführer Hillger
SS-Panzerjäger-Abteilung
Abt.Kdr. Sturmbannführer Leiner
Abt.Adj. Obersturmführer Zinn
SS-Flak-Abteilung
Abt.Kdr. Sturmbannführer Blume
Abt.Adj. Obersturmführer von. Kuester
SS-Pionier-Battalion
Btl.Kdr. Sturmbannführer Tietz
Btl.Adj. Obersturmführer Fleischer
SS-Nachrichten-Abteilung
Abt.Kdr. Obersturmbannführer Weiss
Abt.Adj. Obersturmführer Wiegel
SS-Div.Nachschubführer
Führer Sturmbannführer Delfs
Adj. Untersturmführer Meese
SS-Verwaltungsdienste
Leiter Hauptsturmführer Waldmann
SS-Feldlazarett
Chefarzt Sturmbannführer Barth
SS-Instandsetzungs-Abteilung
Abt.Kdr Sturmbannführer Raddatz
THE BATTLE FOR JELNJA
JULY 19 - AUGUST 9, 1941
The Corps ordered the 10th Pz. Div. to occupy Jelnja and capture the Ugra area. The SS
Division “Reich” was to push a battle group to Dorogobush and close ranks with the bulk
of the division to secure the crossroads between Baltutino and Choslawitschi. Inf. Rgt.
“GD” was ordered to conduct a strong point type defense of the road between Rjasna and
Kasskowa.
Early on July 19 the Aufklarungs Abt. of the SS Div. “Reich” and Regiment “Der Fuhrer”
moved out toward Dorogobush. Despite bad road conditions and weak enemy resistance
the Aufklarungs Abt. reached Matrenino around 09:00 hours.
The Pz. Brig., in combat against strong enemy artillery, reached two enormous anti tank
ditches (2 km. west of Jelnja) then detoured to the north and drove through a gap in the rail
embankment to reach the Jelnja train station at 11:00 hours.
By order of the Panzer Group, the primary mission of the Corps was to capture
Dorogobush and the Dnjepr crossing west of Swirklolutschje. The main strength of the SS
Div. “Reich” was directed to Swirklolutschje and a rearward battle group of the 10th Pz.
Div. was to be sent toward Dorogobush. The enemy was immediately encountered near
Iwonino. Meanwhile the forward elements of the 10th Pz. Div. drove further into Jelnja
and in bitter combat cleared the burning town by 23:00 hours. Russian artillery (up to 21
cm caliber) made itself felt to a level not seen up to this time.
At Jelnja there existed an operational level defensive position consisting of bunkers and
deep anti-tank ditches which had been in place for weeks. The positions extended from the
area of Dorogobush along the east shore of the Usha and Djesna toward the south.
The 10th Pz. Div. was able to break through this important defensive position by using the
Pz. Brig., with its last oil and gasoline, to quickly assault this main strongpoint. The
Kampfgruppe of the SS Div. “Reich” driving for Swirkolutschje was able to make only
small gains due to bad road conditions. Against light resistance, the Kampfgruppe reached
Miljejewa by the end of the day.
Taking advantage of the low cloud cover, enemy aircraft attacked the march columns with
bombs and onboard weapons for the first time. The Corps command post was located
northwest of the Prudki crossroad. For July 20, the 10th Pz. Div. was ordered to clear the
Jelnja area, secure the line Popowka – east of Pronino, Kljematina and to continue to push
a Kampfgruppe to Dorogobush.
The SS Div. “Reich” was ordered to capture the Dnjepr bridge at Swirkolutschje with a
Kampfgruppe and to secure the north flank of the Corps facing Smolensk. The division
was to send elements to occupy the area of the Schatalowka airport in the Stomjatj sector
as well as securing the area south of Strigino and Baltutino. A reinforced Regiment was to
move to the Dankowo – Prudki – Kisseljewka area and stand by to attack in any direction.
Inf. Rgt. “GD” was ordered to secure the right flank of the Corps at Rjasna, Mstislawl and
Kasskowa until relieved by 2nd Army and also establish contact with the 3rd Pz. Div.
Today the enemy repeatedly attacked Jelnja with infantry and tanks supported by countless
artillery, including heavy guns, in an attempt to retake this important town. The 10th Pz.
Div. was able to successfully defend against these attacks and inflict bloody losses on the
enemy.
In order to secure the Schatalowka airfield for the Luftwaffe close support group and push
enemy out of the Stomjatj region, the SS Regt. “Deutschland” was deployed on either side
of the Roslawl road and the SS Regt. 11 on both sides of the road to Chmara. Nevertheless,
it was not enough to capture the Stomjatj area due to the enemy’s tough defense.
The splintering of the strength of the corps through the different required missions as well
as the constantly increasing strength of the enemy has caused the Corps to report that the
mission to take Swirkolutschje, Dorogobush and Rattschino cannot be accomplished
without seriously jeopardizing the defense of Jelnja.
In the meantime, Inf. Rgt. “GD” received the task of pulling rearward security elements on
the supply road forward without relief in order to bring urgently needed reinforcements to
the Jelnja area. These units were to secure the Schatalowka airfield in the Stomjatj area in
order to relieve the elements of the SS Div. “Reich” defending the airfield and free them
for other tasks.
During the night of July 20 - 21, the Pz. Group decided that the most important mission
was to hold Jelnja as well as to block the bridgehead at Swirkolutschje and thus delayed
the mission to Dorogobush.
July 21: After fighting in the Stomjatj sector SS Rgts. “Deutschland” and 11 were
relieved by the Inf. Rgt. “GD” and assembled in the area of Iwonino.
Detailed reconnaissance reports from the Kampfgruppe at Swirkolutschje showed that this
mission could not to be fulfilled due to the swampy roads in the area. Marching on foot
over the 40 km long route of advance was ruled out as having no chance of success. Such
an advance could not be sustained because heavy infantry weapons or ammunition could
not be brought along.
After describing the Corps situation to the Pz. Group, the reply came that the concentration
of strength to secure Jelnja was the most urgent task. However the O.K.H. and Army
Group wish to push to Swirkolutschje to cut the Smolensk road and have placed more
worth on that mission.
Consequentially, the SS Div. “Reich” was ordered to send a Battalion from the
Swirkolutschje Kampfgruppe as far north as possible and send strong patrols from this Btl.
on foot to disrupt traffic on the Dorogobush – Swirkolutschje road. The patrols were also
to destroy bridges, especially the one at Michajlowka. One Btl. had already received the
mission to drive forward to secure the Dorogobush – Jelnja road in the area of the hill near
Roshestwo. The further advanced Aufklarungs Abt. of SS Div. “Reich” struck an prepared
enemy defenses north of Kusino while driving north during the afternoon.
During the course of the day, the 10th Pz. Div. managed to push the enemy back as far as 4
km. east of Jelnja and to repel an enemy attack in the evening. On July 22 both Divisions
were deployed in a unified attack near Jelnja.
Mission:
10th Pz. Div.: after reassembly break through the enemy position south of Jelnja and roll
up the entire Djesna position with the goal of the attack being the hill north of
Maruschkina.
SS Div. “Reich”: from the area northeast of Jelnja first attack Pronino and Hill 125.6 then
along the road to Kamjenjetz with the goal of the attack being the heights near
Shegloshki. The objective of the attack is to reach a defensive position that can be held
with the least possible forces.
Inf. Rgt. “GD” shall continue to secure the southern flank of the Corps and the airfields of
the Nakafu in the Stomjatj sector.
The 10th Pz. Div. was attacked multiple times in the jump off position near Jelnja during
the early morning hours by the enemy in thick columns. The enemy attacks were beaten
back with bloody losses and small breakthroughs were cleared up by counterattacks. The
Div. then attacked the enemy and broke through the depth of the defensive line which was
also occupied by bunkers and reached the stream sector southeast of Jelnja. Lipnja was
captured at approximately 23:00 hours.
SS Div. “Reich” attacked to the left of the 10th Pz. Div. and after breaking tough enemy
resistance, especially at the railroad embankment, and being slowed by heavy artillery fire
drove into the area of Tschemuty and captured Hill 125.6 around 21:00 hours while
suffering heavy casualties.
The Aufklarungs Abt. of SS Div. “Reich” with the mission to break the Swirkolutschje –
Dorogobush road, was able to reach Saprudja despite enemy resistance and bad road
conditions.
The villages south of the road were once again determined to be improved and occupied by
the enemy. Individual patrols were able to reach the road towards evening. Inf. Rgt. “GD”
defended against enemy attacks in the Stomjatj sector and enemy assembly areas to the
south were successfully attacked by Stukas.
Our own Luftwaffe repeatedly attacked ground targets east of Jelnja with definite effect
and disrupted enemy assembly areas and battery positions. Pi. Btl. 41 was deployed to
Uschakowa and there established a defense to the north. During the morning hours enemy
aircraft attacked 10th Pz. Div. multiple times with bombs. During the afternoon, enemy
aircraft performed low level attacks against the road east of Jelnja.
The Corps command post is at Strigino and the forward command post is located at
Jegorje. During the course of 23 July in continued attack the Divisions reached a suitable
defensible line which was Lipnja – Staraja – Hill 125.6 – Koloschino – Pronino –
Kljematina – Matina – Szemjeschina – Uschakowa.
After reaching the defensive line the enemy attacked in thick columns against Tschemuty
and Pronino and the attacks were driven back with heavy losses to the enemy. The
Aufklarungs Abt. of SS Div. “Reich” was pulled back to the area north of the Glinka
railroad station due to the superior enemy pressure from differing directions. Since July 22,
but especially today, the ammunition shortage of the artillery has been especially
noticeable. Since greater amounts cannot be counted on in the coming days considerable
efforts must be made to economize the ammunition. This ammunition shortage is
especially alarming with a strongpoint type of defense as the gaps cannot be adequately
closed by fire.
In front of Inf. Rgt. “GD” the enemy is constantly strengthening himself and has launched
constant attacks since the early morning. Here also the enemy is driving his infantry
forward in thick columns into our MG’s. The enemy is attempting to encircle the Inf. Rgt.
“GD” by lengthening the east and west flanks.
From July 24 to 26 the enemy repeatedly attacked the entire thinly held position occupied
by the Corps with freshly brought up troops despite suffering bloody losses. The Corps
position extended for 50 km. and was occupied by only 14 battalions. The
enemy artillery was stronger from one day to the next, and the heavy and heaviest calibers
with abundant ammunition were being brought forward. The attacks were supported by
tanks. When a small breakthrough is cleared up in the south the report comes that another
breakthrough has occurred in a different position. Enemy tanks appeared near Jelnja and
brought disorder to the rearward services. Despite this not a foot of ground was lost and the
weak battalions of both Divisions fought admirably. Daily many tanks were destroyed, for
example, on July 25 alone 78 tanks were destroyed. The SS troops particularly
distinguished themselves with their fearlessness and bravery. They jumped onto the heavy
Russian tanks, which could not be destroyed by even the 5 cm. Pak, and fired into the
vision slits with pistols and poured gasoline over the tanks and set them afire.
On the afternoon of July 24 a serious breakthrough of the Pi. Btl. 41 at Uschakowa placed
the entire northern position in danger. The breakthrough was cleared up late in the evening
under the active and decisive personal command of the 1a of SS Div. “Reich” using the last
reserve of the Div., the SS Pioniere. At any rate, the Corps could not fail to recognize that
the situation was becoming daily more critical due to the lack reserves by the Divisions and
the Corps. The most effective counterattack reserve – the Panzer Brig. of the 10th Pz. Div.
- was at this time immobilized due to the oil shortage. Only on the night of July 25 - 26 did
the Corps receive as its only reserve the Geb. Pi. Btl. 85.
The relief of Inf. Rgt. “GD” – which has been constantly attacked, subjected to heavy
artillery fire and suffered great losses of men and material – was put off from day to day
because first the 18th Pz. Div. and later the 263rd Inf. Div. could not be brought forward
due to other employments.
An attack against Dorogobush by 17th Pz. Div. and supported by Inf. Rgt. “GD” ordered
for July 26 was cancelled by order of the Panzer Group. But at least the 17th Pz. Div. was
able to take over the security of the left flank west of Uschakowa. From July 27 to 31 the
enemy continued to attack. The very strong artillery fire continued to make things
especially uncomfortable, and was likened to the “drum fire” of the years 1917-18 by those
who participated in the world war.
On the front of a single company up to 200 impacts, including those of the heaviest
calibers, were counted in a 5 minute period. The friendly artillery cannot fight the enemy
artillery due to the ammunition shortage, and it must be allowed to occur that the enemy
often brings his guns forward and fires into the lines of the forward infantry causing many
casualties by direct hits in the foxholes. As before, the Russian infantry and tank attacks
are repulsed without any special difficulties.
Finally, on July 27, the first elements of Inf. Rgt. “GD” were relieved south of the airfield.
The Rgt. was deployed on both sides of Uschakowa, the hot point of the north front, during
the night of July 29 – 30. Geb. Pi. Btl. 85 was relieved and placed in Corps reserve after 2
days of employment at Uschakowa. During this and the following 2 nights the Schutzen
Brig. of the 10th Pz. Div. and 2 Battalions of the SS Div. “Reich” were relieved on the
south and southeast front by the 268th Inf. Div.
Even with the relief from the 268th Inf. Div. the Corps situation did not become
appreciably easier. The freed elements of the SS had to be deployed to fill out the
remainder of the front which was constantly becoming thinner. 10th Pz. Div. remained the
all around reserve behind the right flank of the Corps. Based on prisoner statements and
captured orders it is clear that the continued goal of the enemy is the absolute recapture of
Jelnja. The important Brjansk – Jelnja – Smolensk railroad line, which our aircraft are only
able to disrupt for hours – remains especially important for the enemy to bring forward
reserves and ammunition for Smolensk. With this new Divisions are attacking daily from
morning until evening and during the night small probes occur. The flanks of the enemy
attack are being pushed further to the west in the south
and especially in the north. The fighting quality of the enemy infantry is by itself low. The
employment of tanks now affected the infantry only to a small extent. They had become
accustomed to them and destroyed the tanks by the superior and exemplary use of artillery.
However, fear of the well directed enemy artillery fire remained and on one day 5000
impacts were counted in the sector of a single Rgt.
From August 1 – 6 the Corps was required to hold the Jelnja bend with the 268th Inf. Div.,
SS Div. “Reich”, and Inf. Rgt. “GD” without once even the prospect of relief for the
deployed elements. The “drum fire” continued with undiminished strength. Not only the
casualties of officers, NCOs and men but also the losses of weapons and equipment
became daily more serious. Overall, the company strengths were only 50 – 80 men at the
most.
The availability of artillery ammunition became somewhat better, but was still not enough
to have a noticeable effect on fighting the enemy artillery. Only by the exemplary and
comradely manner in which the Nakafu employed his Stukas day after day to attack the
most dangerous locations, was it possible to compensate for the lack of artillery support
and clear up many critical situations.
On August 4, the combat strength of the Inf. Rgt. “GD” had been so weakened that a
breakthrough of 4 km. west of Uschakowa could not be corrected with the Rgt.’s own
forces. The Rgt, as well as the weak Corps reserve, was subordinated to the SS Div.
“Reich”, and it was possible, on August 5, to reestablish the positions at Uschakowa. The
enemy attacks daily with undiminished strength using fighters and bombers in ground
attack. His fighter defense hindered the aerial reconnaissance and artillery aircraft on many
days.
During the nights of August 6 – 7 and 7 – 8 the 15th Inf. Div. was brought forward by the
vehicles of the SS Div to relieve Inf. Rgt. “GD” and SS Div. “Reich”. The relief proceeded
smoothly as a result of the exemplary preparation of the SS Div. “Reich”.
The bulk of the SS Div. “Reich” had therefore been on the defensive for 18 days without
relief against constant attacks and heavy artillery fire. During the same time Inf. Rgt.
“GD”, after first suffering many casualties in heavy defensive combat south of
Schatalowka, had since July 30 has been employed in the hard fought north front at
Uschakowa.
The difficulty of the combat can be measured by the fact that during the period from July
20 – August 9, elements of 20 enemy divisions have attacked the Jelnja bend. From these 7
were definitely identified including 2 tank divisions. During this time the enemy has
supported his attacks with approximately 50 identified batteries supplied with large
amounts of ammunition.
The bloody losses of the enemy during this time period amounted to 35,000 men
dead and the following prisoner and equipment losses;
Prisoners Tanks and Armored Cars Guns Pak Aircraft
(7/30-8/8)
Korps Troops 13
The losses of the Korps for the period from July 22 to August 8 were:
4,252 officers, NCOs, and men.
(7/30 – 8/8)
Korps Troops 3 12 64 192 12
Das Reich panzers played a key role in the Kharkov campaign in early 1943. At the end
of January, the division entered combat southwest of that city. Included in its armor
strength on February 1st were 66 Panzer III's, 60 Pz. IV's, and 4 Tigers. The panzer
regiment's commander was Standartenfuehrer (Staf.) Herbert-Ernst Vahl, its Ist Battalion
c/o was Sturmbannfuehrer (Stubaf.) Albin von Reitzenstein, its IInd Battalion c.o was
Stubaf. Christian Tychsen. Reitzenstein took over command of the regiment on Feb. 1st
when Vahl c/o of the division. In mid-Feb. Hstuf. Grader was killed, and briefly Hstuf.
Herbert Kuhlmannm then Hstuf. Fritz Herzig took over the Tiger company.
On the 19th, 33 Pz. III's were combat fit. Just after 9:15 a.m. on the 22nd, 150 km south
of Kharkov, Hauptscharfuehrer (Hscha.) Karl Kloskowski in Pz. III #431 seized a bridge
across the Woltschia River on the western outskirts of Pavlograd, in the process
destroying three T-34s and a number of anti-tank guns. Soon, assisted by
Unterscharfuehrer (Uscha.) Paul Egger's Tiger, the two panzers held the bridge until
reinforcements arrived, allowing Das Reich panzergrenadiers to secure the town less than
2 hours later. Kloskowski was awarded the Knight's Cross in July, 1943 for this action.
Eleven Pz. III's remained combat fit on March 4th. At 2:00 p.m. on March 14th, Hscha.
Karl-Heinz Worthmann in Pz. IV #631 raced ahead of Kampfgruppe Harmel to storm
Hill 209.3 near Wossyschtschewo, 13 km southeast of Kharkov. He destroyed 27 heavy
anti-tank guns, 2 artillery pieces, and numerous MG nests, driving the Russians from a
strongpoint that was preventing the encirclement of the city. After Kharkov fell to the SS
Panzer Korps, Das Reich tanks were involved in the seizing of Belgorod during the third
week in March. The division knocked out a total of 292 tanks and SU's in the Kharkov-
Belgorod campaign, and lost 77 tanks and assault guns.
For his brilliant leadership of its IInd Battalion during this period, Stubaf. Tychsen
received the K.C. on the 31st, as did Karl-Heinz Worthmann. In April, Ostuf. Karl-Heinz
Lorenz, winner of the German Cross in Gold as c/o of the 2nd Pz. Company, joined the
IInd Pz.Abt. staff, while Hstuf. Herbert Zimmermann took over the Tiger Company.
Worthmann was promoted to Untersturmfuehrer (Ustuf.) and became c/o of the 6th Pz.
Company. Klowkowski transferred to the 7th panzer company, becoming its 3rd Platoon
leader. The majority of the Ist Battalion's personnel travelled west to train on the new
Panther tanks, and didn't return to Russia until after Operation Citadel. Thus to bolster
Das Reich's lone remaining panzer battalion for Kursk, the IInd, captured T34 tanks were
formed into a company (its 9th). The 5th and 6th companies had Pz. IV's for the
upcoming battle, but the former's strength had to be filled out by a platoon of Pz. III's,
most left over from the Kharkov battles.
Kursk and Beyond - Summer 1943
Although from July 5th through the 16th, Das Reich accounted for 448 Russian tanks and SU's,
losing a total of 46 panzers and assault guns destroyed, Army Group South failed to completely
break through to the final Russian defense line south of Kursk. On the 28th, before it departed for
Italy, the Leibstandarte handed over to Das Reich 9 Tigers, 39 Pz. IV's, and 4 Pz. III's, which
already had 33 Pz. III's, 17 Pz. IV's, 2 T-34's, and 2 Tigers combat ready.
In battles around Kharkov from Aug. 22 through Sept. 2, Das Reich scored 463 armor kills. On
Aug. 27 it had 4 Pz. III's, 31 Pz. IV's, 6 Tigers, and 6 command tanks combat fit, plus one Panther
company. The other Panther companies were briefly attached to other divisions. Das Reich
panzers moved to the Walki area early in Sept. On the 13th, some 60 km SW of Charkow and 20
km west of Walki, over 70 T-34's attacked Das Reich's recon battalion. From their reserve position,
Hstuf. Friedrich Holzer in Panther #101 led 7 tanks of his company to the rescue. In a 40 minute
battle the Panthers destroyed 28 T-34's. In 2 days, 78 Soviet tanks were left burning on the long
grass of the steppes.
Throughout September Das
Reich Tigers scored heavily
against Russian armor. On the
23rd, Ustuf. Alois Kalls (Tiger
S31) received the G.C. in Gold
for his adept leadership of his
platoon during the late
summer. His assistant platoon
leader, Hsch. Johann
Reinhardt was posthumously
awarded the G.C. in Gold on
the 25th. At the end of the
month Das Reich moved to the
Dnjepr front, having destroyed
268 tanks around Walki.
On October 29th, just outside of Khodorov on the western bank of the Dnjepr River, some 75 km
SE of Kiev, 20 T-34's pierced Das Reich's defense line after 5 a.m.. Quickly advancing to this
dangerous breakthrough, Hscha. Willy Simke in Pz. IV #531 and his third platoon, 5th Pz. Co.,
fired upon the T-34's from 20 to 30 meters, and knocked out 17 of them. In the same area on Nov.
1 the Russians tried to secure their bridgehead over the Dnjepr. Stubaf. Tychsen's IInd Pz. Abt.
was on the right flank of Das Reich's position. When enemy tanks and infantry attempted to
outflank his unit, Tychsen led his panzer HQ stab and an engineer platoon to the attack around Hill
188. Three T-34's appeared over a rise: Tychsen's BeflPz.III knocked out two, then his swiftly
advancing force destroyed 6 more and drove off the rest. That same day in Tiger S11, Hsha. Hans
Soretz, I Zug leader 8/Pz.Rgt. DR, scored the 2000th armor kill for the division in 1943. Its panzer
regiment had accounted for some 1100 of these, to its ownlosses of over 250 tanks. On the 11th in
Slavia, Tigers shot up more than a
dozen Russian tanks.
On Nov. 26, Das Reich had 9 Pz.IV's, 2 Tigers, 7 Panthers and 2 command tanks combat fit. In
mid-December, most of the division was ordered to France to resupply and retrain. A kampfgruppe
remained behind, its depleted panzer force formed a battalion of only 2 companies, one led by
Ostuf. Schomka, the second led by Ostuf. Kloskowski. The acting battalion c/o was Hstuf. Willi
Endemann. Six Pz.IV's, 4 Panthers, and 5 Tigers were combat fit. From Dec. 25 through Jan. 18,
1944, the battalion destroyed only 12 tanks, 14 SU's, and 12 anti-tank guns. Three of its Tigers
were knocked out on March 4th east of Semjalintzy. Ustuf. Tegthoff and Sta.Ju. von Einboeck
were mortally wounded. A handful of Das Reich tanks fought on until April.
The Tiger Company was disbanded that spring, its surviving personnel distrubuted among the 3
companies of the forming 102 sSS Pz.Abt. (most D.R. veterans went to its first company). In all,
Das Reich's Pz.Rgt. scored 1200 armor kills by April, and lost c. 300 tanks in combat against the
Russians.
Normandy and Falaise - April to August
1944
In April 1944, remnants of the once powerful 2nd SS Panzer Division "Das Reich" were
transferred from the muddy Eastern front to rest and refit in Southern France. The great
Russian offensive of 1944 had been stalled by the spring thaw, this provided a window for the
redeployment of German forces to France to prepare for the invasion of Fortress Europa.
Das Reich had been reduced to a mere 2500 men (renamed Kampfgruppe Lammerding) and
this "core" of seasoned troops would form the backbone of Das Reich during its battles in
France. To fill the ranks of the depleted division, 9000 replacements (mostly untrained boys -
17 and 18 years of age) joined the division which had set up a cantonment near the town of
Montaubaun, just north of Toulouse. The reasoning behind this deployment was that the
division would be available to intervene on either the Northern or Southern coasts of France,
when an Allied invasion occured. Also Das Reich could guarantee the lines of communication
between Army Groups G and B, which were constantly threatened by French Resistance
attacks.
Das Reich was an important key to the defense of France since its 209 tanks and assault
guns formed fully one tenth of the German armored forces in France. 2nd SS would be relied
upon to strike swiftly when the Allies landed on French soil. However, much to the chagrin of
Rommel and others, Das Reich was placed some 450 miles from the northern French
coastline, which is where most agreed the Allied invasion would occur.
Throughout April and May, Das Reich trained in the countryside surrounding Montaubaun.
The raw recruits began to resemble fighting men. Das Reich was seriously lacking in
motorized transport for its infantry regiments, but the men of Das Reich tried to make due with
what they had. Training was constantly disrupted by harassing Resisitance fighters and Das
Reich spent considerable time and resources pursuing these partisans. In mid May, Das
Reich received orders to begin a reconnaisance of the local railway and road systems in
preparation for a move northward. It was also at this time that Das Reich received Panther
tanks and Panzer IV's to bolster the tank regiment. This influx of vehicles brought Das Reich
up to near full strength. In addition, Das Reich had a full compliment of Sturmgesch ützen and
both Panzergrenadier regiments were at full strength.
When the Allies landed in Normandy, Das Reich's Pz.Rgt. was commanded by Ostubaf.
Tychsen, its 1st Abt. c/0 Stubaf. Rudolf Enseling, its 2nd Abt. c/o Stubaf. Kesten. It travelled
from Toulouse area in SW France, arriving SW of Caen in late June. Taken from reserve
during the first week in July, its strength was 26 Panthers in the 1st Abt. and 50 Pz.IV's in the
2nd Abt. The 5th and 7th Pz. Companies were attached to the 17th SS Pz-Grn.Div. along the
Periers to Carentan road, the 6th Pz. company attached to I "Deutschland", the rest of the
Pz.Rgt. positioned south of Sainteny.
On July 7-8 the 5th and 7th Pz. companies, that had formed a defensive line running from Les
Landes to Lemonderie, were attacked by the U.S. 83rd Infantry Division. On the 9th, along a
road near le Desert, a company of the U.S. 743rd Tank Battalion in pursuit of two Pz.IV's was
ambushed from the flank by Ostuf. Kloskowski's 7th Pz. company. In 15 minutes, 9 Shermans
were destroyed, 3 damaged (and abondoned). The next day, II Pz.Rgt. Das Reich clashed
with American armor near Sainteny and Chateau de Bois Grimot. From the Periers area, I
Pz.Rgt. D.R. attacked NE toward Sainteny, running into the 3rd Division. By dark, Das Reich
had scored 98 armor kills in 8 days.
On the 12th, 600 meters west of Chateau d'Auxais, the 3rd and 4th Pz. companies battled
U.S. armor and infantry while the 5th Pz. company was engaged near Bois Grimot. The
division scored some 30 more kills by the 13th. On July 15th Sta.Ju. Fritz Langanke in
Panther #231 spotted 5 Shermans coming up the road near Saint Denis. His tank cut across
the road and wheeled around to fire on the Shermans, knocking out four. The fifth backed
away into a thicket, but was soon sighted and destroyed. A month later Langanke gained the
K.C. for this and other tank killing feats during July.
Das Reich's Pz.Rgt. had 8 command tanks, 35 Pz.IV's and 35 Panthers combat ready on July
23rd. Having retrieved his Panther #424 from the workshop on the morning of the 27th, some
10 km NE of Coutances, Uscha. Ernst Barkmann drove along the road to St. Lo in order to
intercept a force of Shermans. In the melee that followed, he knocked out 9 of them. His
Panther was so badly damaged by tanks and fighter-bombers that it had to return to the
workshop. For the entire month of July, Barkmann scored 25 armor kills.
On July 28th, Oak Leaves holder of the K.C. Ostubaf. Tychsen, having two days earlier
assumed command of the division, was killed in his VW just NE of the village of Cambry.
Thus died Das Reich's greatest high level panzer commander.
Just after midnight on August 7th, the Avranches counterattack began, with Das Reich
overrunning Mortain, its panzers striking further west, as well as SW toward Saint Hilaire.
For a detailed description of the actions of DAS REICH around Mortain, please click HERE
A week later, the attack had been completely smashed, and many German divisions began to
be cut off in the Falaise pocket. On the 19th, some tanks from the 1st Polish Armoured
Division took up defence positions on Hill 262 and 239, about 2 km west of Mont Ormel ridge.
The next day a mixed group of Pz.IV's and Panthers advanced on Hill 239, then from its
heights, shelled Hill 262 a km away, destroying 5 tanks and allowing some German units to
escape the closing Falaise noose.
On the 23rd, Stubaf. Enseling received the K.C. for his leadership of the mixed panzer group
during this action twelve days previously, Ostuf. Karl Kloskowski had become the third of only
6 company commanders in the whole panzertruppen to be awarded the Oak Leaves to the
K.C. Duing the battle for Normandy, his company led Das Reich Pz.IV companies in kills.
Ustuf. Adolf Reeb, the 7th company's leading ace, received the K.C. on August 23rd.
During 7 weeks of combat in France, Das Reich's panzer regiment knocked out over 200
Allied tanks to a combat loss of some 75 tanks, plus 30 more abandoned around Falaise as a
result of mechanical problems or lack of fuel. Kloskowski left Das Reich in the fall, and Ostuf.
Horst Gresiak took over command of its 7th Pz. company. Wilhelm Matzke was promoted to
Hstuf. and went from command of the 3rd Pz. company to that of the 1st Pz.Abt. Ostuf.
Johann Veith assumed command of the 3rd Pz. company. Ostubaf. Enseling was now c/o of
the Pz.Rgt., with Stubaf. Dieter Kesten remaining as IInd Pz.Abt. c/o.
Mortain - August 6-10, 1944
2200 hours - The DER FUHRER Regiment is tangled up in a traffic jam caused by the I
Abteilung LAH at a crossroads northeast of Mortain. The Liebstandarte units have priority of
road movement and DER FUHRER has to sit and wait until the LAH Panthers pass by.
Several precious hours are wasted until Otto Weidinger is able to get his units moving again.
Beginning at 0100 hours, the main effort of the 2nd SS Panzer Division - DEUTSCHLAND
and SS Panzeraufklarungs Abteilung 2 - launch an attack to secure Mortain itself and overrun
U.S. units to the south of the town. By 0230 hours, the attacking SS troops have overcome
several roadblocks and scattered a TD platoon, infantry platoon, and antitank platoon
belonging to 2/120th Infantry Regiment, 30th U.S. Infantry Division. Panzer Regiment DAS
REICH, will trail behind DEUTSCHLAND and exploit any breakthroughs in the American
defenses. The ultimate objective of this attack is the Pontaubalt Bridge at Avranches some 35
kilometers to the west. Once the bridge is taken, the entire U.S. 3rd Army under General
Patton will be cut off from General Bradley's forces.
0430 hours - III Abteilung "DF" approaches the crossroads of L'Abbaye Blanche just to the
north of Mortain. It is very foggy and visibility is down to 100 meters. III/DF is supported by
four Sturmgeschutz under Hauptsturmfuhrer Roeder. Weidinger's DF Regiment is tasked with
seizing the crossroads and maintaining contact with the southern flank units of LAH. As 9.
Kompanie nears the small cluster of houses, two 3-inch antitank guns from the 1st platoon of
A/823rd TD battalion begin engaging the German vehicles. Nine vehicles, to include 6 Sdkfz
251's, are destroyed. Many of the surviving panzergrenadiers are killed by machinegun fire as
they tumble from the stricken halftracks. No one is able to spot the positions of the American
defenders. The delay caused by the LAH Panther battalion has deprived DF of any chance of
a surprise attack on the American defenses. Otto Weidinger and the III Abteilung commander
are forced to take shelter in a nearby farmhouse when their command vehicles come under
fire. As the regimental commander, III Abteilung commander, and selected staff are sheltering
under a table in the kitchen, a mortar shell explodes on the roof and showers them with debris
and shrapnel. Fortunately, no one is injured.
1000 hours - I Abteilung "D" reports that it has taken Mortain after a fierce fight with C/120th
Infantry. Scattered resistance continues in the town for the remainder of the afternoon. One
platoon from C/120th Infantry takes shelter atop Hill 314 with the remainder of the 2nd
Battalion, 120th Infantry. A battlegroup consisting of elements of the 17th SS Panzergrenadier
Division attached to "DR" has not been able to budge the stubborn American defenders atop
the hill. Hill 314, just east of Mortain, provides American artillery observers with an excellent
view of the entire countryside for miles around. The I Abteilung "D" is able to link up with
elements from II "DF" which have penetrated into the northern outskirts of Mortain. "DF" was
able to overrun a platoon of the 120th antitank company as well as the headquarters platoon
of F/120th Infantry during this period. The American prisoners taken during this action later
volunteered to carry back to the "DF" aid station the burned survivors of two "DR"
Sturmgeschutz knocked out near L'Abbaye Blanche.
1200 hours - II Abteilung "D" has gained its initial objectives near Romagny, just southwest of
Mortain. The lead elements of II/D ambushed the I&R platoon of the U.S. 120th Infantry
Regiment in Romagny earlier that morning and after a two hour fight killed or captured all of
the Americans with the exception of three soldiers who were able to escape. A small group of
panzergrenadiers from II/D, supported by two Pzkfw IV from 6/SS-Panzerregiment 2, attacked
C/197th Field Artillery soon after Romagny had been taken. The Americans recovered rapidly
from the surprise assault and managed to hold off the German infantry for several hours. An
American truck mechanic assigned to the artillery battery managed to knock out one of the
two panzers with a bazooka, killing two of its crew. The Germans suffered six other casualties
while the Americans lost one man killed and several wounded. One American truck and a
jeep were destroyed by cannon fire from the panzers. Again, dense fog seemed to have
helped the defenders fend off a surprise attack.
1400 hours - The Americans are reacting to the German counterattack with fighter-bombers
and artillery fire. Heavy artillery and mortar fire is falling on the "DF" regiment positions north
of Mortain. A group of SS men from "D" are sheltering inside some houses in Mortain. One of
them, perhaps to relieve the tension, is playing the harmonica. Soon all of the German
soldiers are singing "Oh, the Beautiful Rhine." An American soldiers, also seeking cover from
the artillery fire, opens the door upon hearing the singing. He is looking at the SS men and
shakes his head, muttering that "war is a merry thing." The Germans, along with their
bemused prisoner, escape injury during the shelling.
1600 hours - A lull in the American shelling allows the Germans to fully deploy their forces
into defensive positions and begin tying in with their neighboring units. The "DF" and "D"
regiments have linked up on the hills immediately to the west of Mortain. "DR" however, has
not been able to establish contact with the Liebstandarte to the north. In the center of the
"DR" sector is the 17th SS Panzergrenadier battlegroup. It has been unable to take Hill 314
despite a heavy artillery preparation. American artillery threw back every assault the Gotz Von
Berlichingen unit made. In the south, Panzer Aufklarungsabteilung "DR" has established
positions from the area of Bonberouge to Mortain.
2100 hours - An American medical convoy consisting of several ambulances of the 105th
Medical Battalion has driven up from Barenton in the south and blundered into an outpost
manned by Panzer Aufklarungsabteilung "DR". There were fifteen wounded men in the
ambulances from 3/120th Infantry. The Germans kept the lightly wounded as prisoners and
freed the remainder of the convoy.
8 August 1944
0815 Hours - Kampgruppe Ullrich, consisting of an infantry abteilung (-) from SS-
Panzergrenadier Division 17 and a zug of Pzkfw IV from Panzer Regiment "DR", attacked the
positions of B/120th Infantry on Hill 285 located just to the northwest of Mortain. KG Ullrich
had assaulted the hill the previous morning and seized the eastern half, but lost at least three
Pzkfw IV doing so, as well as a number of personnel casualties. The 8 August assault started
with patrol activity shortly after midnight on 7/8 August. Approximately 5-6 panzergrenadiers
armed with grenades and a flammenwerfer approached the positions of the 2nd Platoon,
B/120th Infantry. An American outpost detected the patrol, following which an exchange of
grenades ensued. The Germans brought the flamethrower into action, but it malfunctioned
and only sprayed one American soldier with oil. When a grenade wounded several of the
Germans, they decided to retreat, leaving the flammenwerfer and one seriously wounded
grenadier behind. At 0815 hours, three Pzkfw IV moved forward to attack the American rifle
company, but quickly pulled back when the lead vehicle was destroyed at 50 meters range by
a dug in 3-inch towed AT gun from Lieutenant Francis J. Connors' 2nd platoon of A Company,
823rd TD Battalion. The Americans begin firing artillery to ensure the SS infantry did not
follow up the abortive assault made by the "DR" panzers. Several of the rounds struck near
the American positions, forcing the U.S. infantry and 3-inch gun crew to seek shelter. A
captured Sherman tank manned by "DR" panzer crewman took advantage of this situation to
penetrate the U.S. infantry company position, but when it realized that none of the
panzergrenadiers had been able to exploit the situation, the "Sherman" pulled back to the
German lines. Just to the north, a dismounted attack by KG Ullrich was more successful and
forced A/120th Infantry to pull back two hedgerows. Two U.S. antitank guns from Lieutenant
Connors' platoon did not retreat and found themselves occupying a salient forward of A and B
Companies of the 120th Infantry.
0900 hours - DR dispositions around Mortain are as follows DF REgiment is arrayed north of
the town with III/DF linking up with Liebstandarte at Road Junction 278 above the U.S.
roadblock at L'Abbaye Blanche. The DF pionere company is on the right flank of III/DF. The
roadblock is still being held by elements of the 1st platoon of A/823rd TD as well as the 1st
and 2nd platoons of F/120th Infantry. An attack against the TD positions earlier that morning
was repulsed with the loss of two German halfracks carrying 75mm howitzers and an
ammunition carrier. Two DR panzerspahwagen and a gasoline truck were destroyed by
bazooka fire shortly afterwards. II/DF had occupied positions just south of L'Abbaye Blanche
opposing the 2/117th Infantry and elements of the 629th TD Battalion (M10 SP guns). The
U.S. battalion is in reality a company (-) in strength due to the fact that two rifle companies
had been detached the previous day to assist other units. 2/117th had also launched a failed
attack against II/DF during the evening of 7 August and had suffered approximately 75
casualties.
1000 - Hausser, commander of the 7 Armee, visits the division command post. He told "DR"
that the attack would continue after the XLVII Panzer Korps recieved addtional tanks
promised by the Fuhrer (Panzer Division 9 which would be diverted to Mayenne to seal up a
breakthrough in the LXXXI Armee Korps line).
1400 hours - DR launches a counterattack against the northern flank of the 35th Infantry
Division. The 35th Division had been committed south of Mortain in order to seal up a gap
which had developed between the 30th Division at Mortain and 2nd Armored Division (-) at
Barenton to the south. Barenton lies halfway between Mortain and Mayenne, where CCA, 3rd
Armored Division, 1st U.S. Infantry Division, and 90th U.S. Infantry Division were in the
process of breaking through LXXXI Armee Korps. The counterattack consisted of elements of
Krag's panzeraufklarungs abteilung, reinforced by reconnaissance troops from 2 Panzer
Division and 116 Panzer Division, as well as a Pzkfw IV platoon and Panther platoon
commanded by Willy Durr. Durr's panzers overrun a section of the 134th Infantry's cannon
company, killing seven Americans and destroying two 105mm howitzers. The Pzkfw IV
platoon is able to ambush the Sherman platoon supporting the 1/134th Infantry, knocking out
five American tanks for no loss. One of Durr's Panthers also knocks out two M-10 TD's from
the 654th Tank Destroyer Battalion. The counterattack also overruns the aid station of the
2/134th Infantry and the motor park of the same battalion. A number of medics are captured,
but the headquarters company of 2/134th Infantry does not suffer many casualties as the
panzers do not have very much infantry support. After a Panther and Pzkfw IV are knocked
out by bazooka fire, a pair of Pzkfw IVs occupy a position astride the main supply route
leading to the 1/134th Infantry and 2/134th Infantry. Both of the U.S. battalion are cut off from
support. Interestingly enough, the panzer crews capture several officers from the 134th
Infantry, as well as medics from the 737th Tank Battalion, all of whom are released after
being captured.
1800 hours - The 1/119th Infantry attacks II/D at Romagny. Artillery fire wounds
Sturmbannfuhrer Schreiber, commander of II/D. The U.S. troops launch two attacks against
Romagny, losing two Shermans destroyed and suffering several casualties amongst the two
infantry companies making the attack. The U.S. tanks manage to destroy one Pzkfw IV and
an ammunition vehicle during the fighting. Convinced that the assault on Romagny will not be
successful unless his battalion is reinforced, the attack is halted for the night.
9 August 1944
0200 hours - During the night new orders came in. DAS REICH was to remain on the
defensive. It was not known when the attack would be resumed.
0900 hours - American fighter bombers become active once the fog begins to burn
off. American artillery observers are bringing heavy fires down all along the DAS REICH front,
although it is especially heavy in the I/D sector (near Romagny).
1100 hours - In the late morning, the Americans attacked from the direction of Juvigny against
the positions of the DER FUHRER regiment (note must have been the 12th Infantry
Regiment). Several other American attacks, supported by tanks, came in from the north and
northwest, but were brought to a halt. Several American tanks were knocked out by
Panzerfaust. The right flank of DER FUHRER is particularly threatened. The link with LAH is
severed. Casualties are heavy. Hill 285, northwest of Mortain, is reoccupied by the
Americans, but is recaptured by a counterattack.
1200 hours - Twelve American tanks are sighted northwest of Barenton (south of
Panzeraufklarungs Abteilung DAS REICH). In that town is positioned a battalion of Infanterie
Division 275 (note this unit was driven out by a TF from 3rd AD and 3/120th Infantry
Regiment on 6 August). A blocking group from the DAS REICH division staff section was set
up on Hill 266, about 1.5 kilometers southwest of the division CP, in order to protect it from
the advancing American tanks.
2030 hours - The Americans attacked with tanks against Romagny. A counterattack by II/D,
supported by panzers, forced the Americans (1/119th Infantry) to break off their
assault. Three American tanks were shot up near Bion. The II/D and Aufklarungs Abteilung
DR quickly set up a defense along the Mortain - La Houberte - Bion line in order to stop the
advance of the U.S. 35th Infantry Division.
10 August, 1944
1500 hours - American troops attacked the I/D and II/D without success. Almost
simultaneously, Aufklarungs Abteilung DR was also attacked. Their commander,
Sturmbannfuhrer Krag, rallied his troops and restored their positions (although an entire
battalion of U.S. Infantry had already passed through AA "DR" defensive positions and were
now behind them). In the Der Fuhrer sector, tanks from the U.S. 3rd Armored Division
attacked. Several of them were knocked out with Panzerfaust (note to include the
commander of H/33rd Armor, Lieutenant Wray, who was machinegunned trying to get his
driver out of his burning Sherman). Several panzergrenadiers from DF, thinking that the
American attack has been halted, walk out into a field to look at a knocked out American
tank. They are fired upon by troops from F/119th Infantry and lose several men. German
casualties were very heavy.
1600 hours - Troops from KG Fick took Hill 307 just to the south of Hill 314. The surrounded
American rifle companies from 2/120th Infantry which are trapped atop Hill 314 are able to
link up for the first time. An airdrop takes place that afternoon, with about half of the supplies
being recovered by the Americans, half by DAS REICH. An attack against the surrounded
American troops is unsuccessful.
1800 hours - At this point in the battle, DAS REICH came under control of the LVIII Reserve
Panzer Korps. It had previously been under the operational control of XLVII Panzer
Korps. The order was given to pull back the DR main line of resistance to just east of Mortain.
2200 hours - DEUTSCHLAND pulled back, despite rough terrain and severe American
artillery fire. This concluded the fiercest fighting of the Mortain battle for DAS REICH. The
German troops had faced especially violent air and artillery attacks.
Battle of the Bulge -
December 1944 to January 1945
When the Ardennes Offensive began, Das Reich's panzers (28 Pz.IV's, 59 Panthers, 28
assault guns, and some 20 Jagd-Pz.IV/70) were held in reserve to be used to exploit any
significant German breakthroughs in its battle sector. This was slow to occur, so on Dec. 23rd
the 7th Pz. company (it and the 8th had Pz.IV's, the 5th and 6th Pz. companies had StuG's)
was attached to II "Der Fuehrer" and an assault gun company to III "DF", and given the task
of seizing the important crossroads at Baraque de Fraiture. Ostuf. Gresiak in Pz. #701 led
eight Pz.IV's north to the crossroads just after 4:20 p.m., battling a platoon of Shermans from
the U.S. 3rd Armored Division, knocking out 2 and losing 2 panzers to the Shermans and 2
more to a howitzer. Some of the panzers then approached from the east, finished off the
Shermans, and overran the the crossroads by 6:00 p.m. Gesiak's company claimed a total of
17 armor kills for the day. Seriously wounded the next morning, he received the K.C. a month
later.
On December 24th
around 10:00 p.m.,
7th Armored Division
tanks and other
vehicles were
retreating NW of B.
de Fraiture to the
moonlit Manhay
crossroads. Hscha.
Franz Frauscher in
Panther #431 and
another Panther of
his platoon slipped
unnoticed into the
American column. On
the ascending S
curve of Highway
N15 just south of
town, the Panthers
swung out of line and shot up the column and some partially dug-in Shermans, scattering the
American armor in confusion. Nine Shermans were destroyed. During the takeover of Manhay,
the 4th Pz. Company's c/o, Hstuf. Ortwin Pohl, was wounded, and early the next day (the
25th) Ostuf. Reeb in Pz.IV #711 was killed.
The following few days saw Das Reich futiley trying to continue its advance against regrouped
and reinforced American units. For Enseling's panzers the rest of December and early
January 1945 became a battle of attrition, in which Ostuf. Veith, was killed while commanding
Panther #301 and posthmously awarded the K.C.
In the period Dec. 23 to Jan. 15, Das Reich claimed 324 armor kills to its own losses of 68
panzers, including 34 Pz.IV's and 28 Panthers.
HUNGARY AND THE END -
FEBRUARY TO MAY 1945
By mid-February, the Pz.Rgt. had been transported to the Bakony Forest in
Hungary. It had 13 Pz.III's, 18 Pz.IV's, 8 Jagd-Pz.IV's, and 23 Panthers on
strength. The regiment advanced along the NW to the NE of Lake Balaton
and on March 6 became engaged in combat SW of Budapest. On the 9th, DR
panzers reinforced by III (gep.) "Der Fuehrer" overran Hill 159. On the 12th,
fierce combat raged in the Kulso, Puskop, and Myr areas. Hscha. Emil
Seibold in Pz.IV #831 scored his 65th kill that day. "Der Fuehrer" then
advanced with the division's remaining panzers to Heinrich Major. In that area
on the 17th, one day after the Russian counter offensive Operation Vienna
began. Osch. Barkmann's platoon knocked out five T-34's, scoring the
division's 3000 armor kill since the start of 1943.
Driven back south of Komorn during the third week of March, Das Reich
personnel claimed to have met the JS-3 for the first time in combat. On the
28th, Das Reich's Pz.Rgt. had 5 Pz.IV's, 2 Panthers, and 5 Jagd-Panthers
combat fit as it retreated NW toward Vienna. On the morning of April 2nd
north of Baden, Stubaf. Kesten, c/o of II/Pz.Rgt. Das Reich, was killed.
Assaulted by the 5th Guards Tank Corps from the NW and the 9th
Gds.Mechanized Corps from the south, most of Das Reich's panzers were
backed up against the Donau Canal, just north of Vienna during the second
wek of April. The division's last significant tank battle was fought there on the
13th.
Early that morning, Oscha. Barkmann's Panther was put out of action, not by
enemy fire, but by driving into a bomb crater and damaging its steering. In the
vicinity, near the west end of the Floridsdorf bridge across the Donau Canal, a
lone 6th Pz. company Pz.IV fought on, but soon was silenced. Ostuf. Karl-
Heinz Boska, c/o of that company, rounded up 3 Panthers on the other side of
the bridge and led them toward the German's dwindling bridghead. The 3
tanks made it halfway back across the bridge before they were knocked out
and Boska wounded. Das Reich's panzer force had virtually ceased to exist.
DAS REICH UNIT DESIGNATIONS
The following is a list of the various designations of the 2nd SS Panzer Division Das
Reich from 1939-1945
**While the majority of Das Reich returned to France for refit, portions of the
division remained behind to fight as a Kampfgruppe**
DAS REICH DIVISION COMMANDERS
SS-Obergruppenführer SS-Brigadeführer
Paul Hausser Wilhelm Bittrich
October 14th, 1941 to
October 19th, 1939 to December 31st, 1941
October 14th, 1941
SS-Brigadeführer SS-Gruppenführer
Matthias Kleinheisterkamp Georg Keppler
January 1st, 1942 to April 1st, 1942 to
April 1st, 1942 February 15th, 1943
SS-Oberführer SS-Standartenführer
Herbert Ernst Vahl Kurt Brasack
February 15th, 1943 to March 18th, 1943 to
March 18th, 1943 April 3rd, 1943
SS-Gruppenführer SS-Brigadeführer
Walter Krüger Heinz Lammerding
April 3rd, 1943 to December 9th, 1943 to
November 1st, 1943 July 26, 1944
SS-Obersturmbannführer SS-Standartenführer
Christian Tychsen Otto Baum
July 26th, 1944 to July 28th, 1944 to
July 28th, 1944 October 23rd, 1944
SS-Brigadeführer SS-Standartenführer
Heinz Lammerding Karl Kreutz
October 23rd, 1944 to January 20th, 1945 to
January 20th, 1945 February 4th, 1945
SS-Gruppenführer SS-Standartenführer
Werner Ostendorff Rudolf Lehmann
February 4th, 1945 to March 9th, 1945 to
March 9th, 1945 April 13th, 1945
SS-Standartenfürher
Karl Kreutz
April 13th, 1945 to
May 8th, 1945
SS-Obergruppenführer und General der Waffen-SS
Paul Hausser
Wilhelm Bittrich
Matthias Kleinheisterkamp
Georg Keppler
Walther Krüger
In 1945, he was attached to Himmler's "Army Group Vistula", serving as his Chief of
Staff. Other significant appointments included service as Chief of Staff to Eicke in the
Totenkopf Division and subsequently to von dem Bach. For unclear reasons, he and
other higher ranking officers were not tried for war crimes in France in 1951 and
1953, though 21 NCOs from the Division were judged for the French reprisals and
served minor sentences.
He survived the war, prospering as an engineer working in Germany until his death in
Dusseldorf. For a detailed accounting of the various minor postings and commands he
held, see Yerger, "Das Reich" Vol. 1 pps.52-55: this source contains a detailed listing
of his other decorations.
SS-Obersturmbannführer
Christian Tychsen
Otto Baum
Karl Kreutz
Werner Ostendorff
Rudolf Lehmann
Fritz Klingenberg
Emil Seibold entered the SS in April 1940 with the SS-Totenkopf-Standarte and
experienced his first combat in the infantry. In November 1940 he was t transferred to
the division and joined the 3/Pz-Jager Abteilung as a motorcycle driver and became a
gun commander in the same Kompanie. In March 1943 the remnants of the Abteilung
were given T-34's and formed into the III. Abteilung. Seibold scored many kills in his T-
34 and went on to become one of the divisions most successful Tank Aces. He was
awarded one of the last KC of Das Reich after scoring his 65th kill.
SS-Oberscharführer Ernst Barkmann
The following is the official account for the awarding of the Knight's Cross to Ernst
Barkmann:
"SS-Untersharführer Barkmann was left behind with his Panther on 27 July 1944 to
guard two broken down vehicles north of Canisy. During the night of 28/29 July the vast
backward moves of the Division completely cut him off from his own forces. He
destroyed one tank and started his march towing the other. Partly crossing American lines
and partly driving among them at night, he knocked out 14 enemy tanks and reached his
own lines on 30 July 1944."
SS-Obersturmführer Fritz Langanke
Fritz Langanke joined "Germania" in 1937 and was assigned to 10. Kompanie where
he served in the infantry. In 1938 he transferred to the newly formed Panzerspahzug
of "Germania" as a radio operator, and later as a vehicle commander. In 1942 he
transferred to the Panzer Abteilung and served as a Panzer Kommandant in the
Aufklarungszug. In late 1943 the division was reformed and Langanke was assigned
to I. Abteilung as an Ordonnanzoffizier until D-Day. He took command of 2.
Kompanie on December 25th, 1944 and remained at this post till the end of the war.
SS-Obersturmbannführer
Sylvester Stadler
Awards
Iron Cross 2nd Class: July 21, 1940
Iron Cross 1st Class: Aug 3, 1941
German Cross in Gold: July 9, 1942
Knights Cross: Aug 23, 1944
Promotions
Untersturmführer: April 20, 1937
Oberstrumführer: January 30, 1939
Hauptsturmführer: April 20, 1941
Sturmbannführer: June 21, 1943
Obertsturmbannführer: Nov. 9, 1944
Rudolf Enseling joined the SS in 1933 and was posted with 62.Standarte. In 1935 he joined the
newly-established Pioniersturmbann SS/VT. He would remain with the Pionier for over nine
years. From April 1936 to February 1937 Enseling attened SS-Junkerschule Braunschweig and
upon completion of his training was posted as 2.Zugf ührer of the Pioniersturmbann SS/VT. After
the campaigns in Poland, Enseling served with the Pionier-Erstaz-Kompanie (which was
stationed in Dresden) before returning to the Division to lead the leichte Pionier Kolonne (light
engineer column). He later became 3.Kompanie Chef in January 1941 and also served with
Kampfgruppe SS "Reich" during which time he was awarded the German Cross in Gold for
bravery. In June 1942 he became Pionier Batallionskommandeur after the Kampfgruppe "Das
Reich" rejoined the remainder of the Division, which was undergoing refit in France. After the
initial fighting in Normandy in 1944, he took command of I.Abteilung in July 1944. On July 26,
1944 after Christian Tychsen took temporary command of 2.SS-Panzer-Division "Das Reich",
Enseling become 2.SS-Panzer-Regiment Kommandeur. He would remain in this position until
the end of the war.
SS-Sturmbannführer
Dieter Kesten
Friedrich Holzer joined the 11.Standarde of the SS in 1934 and remained there until
October 1936, when he joined "Germania". He was fortunate to attend SS-Junkerschule
Braunschweig and graduated in 1939, and soon after he was posted to Regiment "Der
Führer" as a Zugführer with 3/DF. He remaind at this position until May 1939, when he
assumed the same position with 11/DF. After a stint as Ordonnoffizier, Holzer was
transferred to 7/DF. He continued to rise through the ranks, attaining the positions of
7.Kompanie Chef in late 1941 and later Regimentsadjutant under Otto Kumm in January
1942. Holzer was awarded for his bravery with "Der Führer" with the German Cross in
Gold for his actions around Rshew in February 1942. After the difficult battles of the
winter of 1942, Holzer moved to to the Panzer Regiment, and later became 2.Kompanie
Chef. It was during this command that Holzer was awarded the Knight's Cross for his
bravery at Nikolajewka. In 1944, Holzer assumed the command of the Panzer-
Ausbildungs-und Ersatz-Regiment which became Panzer Regiment "Holzer" of SS-
Panzer-Brigade "Westfalen" and ended the war at this command.
OPERATION "ZITADELLE"
Das Reich Order of Battle - July
1943
The following diagrams provide basic information regarding the vehicle and manpower make
up of the 2.SS-Pz.Gren.Div. "Das Reich" during the battle for Kursk in July 1943. This
breakdown does not represent all of the units that comprised "Das Reich" or their complete
TO&E, rather it provides a basic understanding of what units fielded a particular piece of
equipment, and what the manpower availability was for the Pz.Gren. Regiments, Pionere Bt.
and the Aufk.Abt. The camouflage represented on the icons does not necessarily represent
the exact schemes used by "Das Reich" during the Kursk offensive.
SS.Panzer.Regiment 2
SS.Panzer.Grenadier.Regiment.3 "Deutschland"
SS.Panzer.Jäger.Abteilung.2
SS.Artillerie.Regiment.2
4./SS.Aufk.Abt.DR (Infanterie)
5./SS.Aufk.Abt.DR (Infanterie)
2 vehicles
3 guns
6./SS.Aufk.Abt.DR (motorized)
4 guns
SS.Panzer.Regiment 2
SS.Panzer.Grenadier.Regiment.3 "Deutschland"
15./SS.Pz.Gren.Regt. 3 (motorcyle) ?
SS.Panzer.Jäger.Abteilung.2
SS.Artillerie.Regiment.2
TACTICAL MARKINGS
With the addition of the new Tiger tank to Das Reich in 1942, the newly
formed eighth company adopted its own unique tactical markings.
1942
800 801
1943-1944
The Tiger company changed the first digit from an 8 to an S for schwere
(heavy) was followed by a two digit tank number denoting platoon and
vehicle
S01 S02
8./SS-Pz.Rgt.2 (DR)
August 1943 to April
1944
S01 S02 S03 S04
S05
It was terribly cold and together with the gunner I had gotten off the car, trying to
warm up a bit by moving. Because inside the vehicle it was like sitting on an ice
block when the motor didn't run for some time. To stand, to drive a couple of
meters and stand again, that went on for hours until we finally reached the exit
and wanted to take off for Gshatsk. I indicated for the driver to pull the car to the
right but he continued nearly straight on until the anti-tank gun shield hit the
snow wall heaped up at the road sides. Immediately a group of MP's were there
to throw our car off the road but they realized quickly that it wouldn't work
because the car was too heavy. Supported by their worst cursing we pushed the
car to and fro several times before we finally were able to round the bend.
Thereafter the terrain allowed us to get off the road and in a wide circle we
reached the rim of the town. With a strong eastern wind blowing the temperature
that night was around -40 degrees Celsius. The grease of the needle bearings of
our rec. car had become too stiff. You could turn the steering wheel only with
very great difficulty. Next day, we tried to get it going freely but didn't really know
what to do.
Therefore I left the rest of the crew back with our vehicle and set out alone to
reach our company (1st Kp, Recon Bn., SS Reich). On January 21, I understood
the command post was at Moshaisk at that time. On the Rollbahn I had just
managed to jump on a vehicle going east, when shortly thereafter the whole
traffic came to a standstill. As far as you could see in both directions all columns
had stopped and most drivers or crews were standing on the road, looking
northwest to gaze in wonder at a stunning natural occurrence. In this cold winter
splendor where glittering snow and radiant sunshine nearly blinded your eyes,
two big rainbows stood, mirror inverted on top of each other. There must have
been thousands of Landser who at that time admired this appearance and forgot
for a while the whole war.
At Moshaisk there was only a small detachment left to pack up the last stuff. The
Rec. Bn had already moved to Ssytschewka, where on the 21st at temperatures
between -45 to -48 Celsius, the counterattack on the Russian Divisions who had
smashed the German defense at Rshew had started. It lasted until February. It
was the beginning of the winter battle of Rshew, one of the most decisive
struggles in Russia. Next to the company command post was an evacuation
hospital in a big dark brick building. Here was manifested the whole
mercilessness of the winter war. At the back side of the house under the
windows, up to the sills, amputated hands, feet, arms and legs were heaped up.
They were thrown outside after the operations (In this extreme winter the losses
by Frostbite were in many units much higher than by enemy actions).
The next day I reached via Ssytschewka the engagement area of my battalion,
the place Swineroika, had been taken the day before after very hard fighting. It
was a somewhat larger village with 3 or 4 streets lined with houses. For our
"sister unit" the motorcycle battalion, that day was particularly bitter. In their fight
for Pisino they had 250 losses (out of 450). Of these, four officers and 170 non-
coms and men were killed. After the fight, 450 dead Russian soldiers were
counted on the battlefield.
We, with two or three other comrades who had come from Moshaisk were
welcomed real nice at that place where early in the morning, the temperature
dropped to -51 degrees. The entrance to the village was a somewhat elevated
crossroads with a destroyed German gun. The strong wind, piling up snow in
hollows and dips more than 1 meter high, kept this piece clear all the time.
Therefore, it was a good aiming point for our Russian friends. Whenever
anything moved up here the Russians fired immediately with tanks and anti-tank
guns from some distance. Quite puffed did we reach the company C.P. close to
the end of the sloping street, received by the grinning faces of our chums, who
had followed our "Russian Roulette" with high interest. They told us the chances
to get through that area in daylight were 50-50 and they felt I hadn't deserved to
have made it since I had spent some nice time in the repair shop while they had
to chatter with cold out here.
Shortly thereafter, I was standing outside with Sepp Rinesch from Steiermark
(forward driver) and Rudi Tonner from Salzburg (radio operator and backward
driver), who together with Hermann Buhler (gunner) and Ustuf. Prix made up the
crew of the last 8 wheeled armored rec. car still with the company (there were no
more 4 wheel armored cars left). They were just explaining what had happened
the last weeks when quite a distance away, a shell hit the ground. It was so far
away that none of us tried to take cover. But some minor fragments reached our
group and those two comrades were hit in the belly. The wounds weren't so bad
and Sepp Rinesch cried joyfully "Hurrah a homer!" But nonetheless they had to
be taken to a dressing station and that meant Ssytschewka.
Thereupon I had to take over their car as driver with Hermann Buhler from
Bahlingen (Schwaben) as gunner. He was one of those many guys who you
could blindly rely on in all situations-after our sister car had been knocked out at
Puchowice in the Pripet swamps (the whole crew died in the burning vehicle) we
were all the time highly satisfied and glad when, starting for a reconnaissance
party, we had the crew, Buhler, Wimmer Krais with us. Although he had lost the
big toe of one foot by frostbite during the retreat from the Rusa-line and although
he could walk only with great pains, he didn't take off to the hospital, but stayed
with the company. Whenever in some quarters he took off his boot to change the
rag with which he had covered the open place where formerly his big toe was,
the stench was so bad that we were close to throwing him out of the house and
into the snow outside.
Our rec. car was only limited operational. Two wheels were flat beyond repair
and the turret couldn't be traversed; it was blocked. So for shooting, the vehicle
had to be handled similar to an assault gun. But in those critical days it was of
course indispensable and a strong support for the riflemen in their snow holes. At
that period there was a week when at night the temperatures dropped several
times below -50. The slightest pollution of the gasoline (traces of water)
immediately plugged the carburetor. And then to have to disassemble the
carburetor or the fuel pump at those beastly temperatures was terrible. You
could only stay on it for a couple of minutes. Then you had to rush into your
quarters to warm up again. Cold and violent anger let tears run down your face.
Those were among the hardest days I experienced during the war. Every two or
three hours you had to run the motor and move the car somewhat to keep it
operable.
The very first night I had an experience that for quite some time haunted me as a
nightmare. Since I wasn't yet acquainted with the details of that place, I let the
gunner Hermann Buhler wake up together with me. We climbed into the vehicle
and we drove a short distance operating the steering system all the time. All of a
sudden the steering wouldn't work any more. I jumped out to check what was
wrong. Looking under the car I got the shock of my life. A Russian was lying
there, wedged into the carriage unit and appeared to be holding one wheel. It
took many seconds before I regained my composure. A lot of dead Russians
were lying in the streets of Swinoroika, covered by snow. I had rolled over one
such dead soldier and his stiffly frozen limbs were now completely wedged into
the lower parts of our vehicle. We tried very hard to pull him out but it didn't work.
Seeing no other possibility, I grabbed our saw, crawled close to the Russian and
sawed off his arms. It was extremely ghastly. The Russian was an elderly man, a
typical Mushik with a long beard. Our faces were quite close together. The
sawing of course moved his whole body a little bit and it appeared as if he would
shake his head disapprovingly. I nearly turned crazy but there was no choice.
Only very few occasions during the war have shaken me in such a way.
The winter war had actually gained a completely new aspect. Firm and clearly
defined front lines didn't exist any more. Buildings, shelter against the coldness
were the aims everybody was fighting for (and of course in the framework of the
tactical planning.) Whoever was not in a position to warm up in a house after
some hours in the cold had only a slim chance to survive at these low
temperatures.
Without the skill of improvisation of every individual of all ranks (skis, sleighs, self
construction adaptation of weapons and equipment to these low temperatures
and the tremendous mostly unknown problems caused by the cold; and that with
supply lines mostly interrupted) and the unshakable determination to endure and
finally beat the enemy…even outstanding leadership wouldn't have been enough
to win this winter battle of Rshew. Fortunately this type of leadership was
available in the exceptional person of the commanding general of the 9th Army,
Generaloberst Model. Mostly at night or when during the day strong winds
whirled up the snow, thus blurring the sight, scouting patrols or larger units
penetrated the small towns and villages or disrupted the connections between
them. Although generally speaking the enemy front was west and north of us, the
Russians could even with larger outfits, pop up from the east or south. To be a
messenger, to get back wounded soldiers (mostly volunteering comrades), to
come up with supplies; all these were suicide missions, very often fatal. When at
night we heard the alarm "Russians are there", sometimes 2-3 times whereby
one cottage after the other went up in flames, Hermann Buhler and myself
jumped out of the house and dived under our car, feet to feet, so we could cover
both sides of the vehicle. Like many comrades, he didn't rely on automatic
weapons; too many had failed at these temperatures. He always used a Russian
carbine. I always had my submachine gun under my anorak and pulled it out only
for shooting; it never let me down. We could make out the Russians very well
against the white snow because in this area they had no winter camouflage suits
only their brown uniforms. So we identified them quickly although their usual
"Hurrah" came now only sporadically. The following morning most dead were
already covered with snow. Now and then we had to jump up for hand to hand
fighting when the attackers came too close. At such occasion, Hermann Buhler
most probably had plunged his bayonet straight into the heart of a Russian who
must have gotten abruptly a cramp and over the night he was frozen stiff. Early
in the morning we found him in this position; facing our car, bent on one knee,
the body upright, the arms and hands in the way he had held his rifle when he
died. Only the rifle had fallen down.
When a bullet hit the face you sometimes could see on the frozen dead soldier,
starting radially from the point of entry very fine droplets or traces of blood. That's
what -50 degrees can do, what normally doesn't happen at all. Dead in all kinds
of grotesque postures, like in a lunatic dance macabre. It was war in its most
horrible and dreadful way.
On January 23, our battalion in Swinoroika was attacked quite heavily with armor
support from three sides. The struggle see-sawed for hours. Only after the last
available man had been thrown in the fight (again and again hand to hand), were
we able to throw the enemy out of the village with very heavy losses. All
headquarters and supply units present were fully involved. The signal platoon,
led by Ustuf. Brummer was particularly successful. Obersturmfuhrer Krag who
had joined the recon bn. Some days ago and taken over one company was with
his riflemen at one of the focal points of these desperate fights against a far
superior enemy. (from the Summer of 1944 thru the end of the war he was
commanding officer of the Recon. Bn.) Despite a penetration wound in the right
elbow, he was able to carry along his men in a nearly hopeless situation to turn
the fate, to annihilate the enemy and to hold that part of the village. At this
chaotic jumble it could and did happen to be caught by friendly fire.
The next three days there were no big attacks but continuous fights with
reconnaissance or assault parties from all directions. Whenever possible our
"Panzer" took part busily. After every couple burst of fire from our weapons we
had to change position, not to be picked up by Russian tanks or anti-tank guns,
against which our poor armor plating offered no protection.
Our cottage was also shelter for Hauptsturmfuhrer Hans Weiss (after Weidinger
and before Potschke he had been our company C.O.). His 4th company had
dwindled away to a very small remnant. Therefore, he was nearly out of a job.
His nickname was "The Brown Bomber" and he had some harsh sides. (Mid
February he took over the motorcycle battalion after Tychsen had been
wounded.) But in these days in our shelter, he showed a completely different
facet of his personality. Our riflemen in their snow foxholes were relieved every
hour and came into the cottage to warm up again. Weiss would tend them with
great care. He pulled them out of their anoraks, got them to a prepared bed of
straw, put warm stones on their stomach (he always had several of them on the
stove) and threw a couple of blankets on them. All this in a quite natural,
unobtrusive way. He was simply an unselfish person, caring for the men. He had
adapted to this unusual situation in the most remarkable way.
Very often we had no vehicles to move our wounded. Then sleighs or travois had
to be used. Russian horses were still in plenty. Sepp Rinesch and Rudi Tonner
had likewise been brought to Ssytschewka. Terrified we learned after a few days
that on the 22nd both had died although only light wounded. The long strenuous
drive at this strong frost and the biting wind had been too much for them; the fate
of many wounded soldiers at that time.
The last days in January a bigger number of replacements were brought up to
us. Young recruits, after rather short training, were thrown into this maelstrom.
After two to three days, most of them were already gone, not so much by
wounding but by frostbite. They just had no chance to slowly acclimatize.
On January 28 we get the order to take the village of Lentjewo. The attack was
executed with two spearheads. We were to the right side of the road Swinoroika-
Lentjewo and the other one left of it. We had a visual contact. The left spearhead
was led by the last assault gun of the division. We, with our lame recon car were
the spearhead of our group. In not too heavy fire, we worked our way toward our
target. For our vehicle it was similarly difficult as for the riflemen who
occasionally sank into the snow breast-deep. Particularly restarting after a longer
stop for shooting was very troublesome. The vibrations had always worked us
rather deep into the loose snow. Then we stopped for awhile to await the result
of a dive bomber attack. Some of the bombs we could see hopping along the
ground; they wouldn't detonate.
When the Stukas had left we moved again. Shortly thereafter we saw how the
assault gun practically exploded. That didn't raise our spirits at all. With even
more dread than before, we now expected to be knocked out by some gun in
front of us as we though had happened to the assault gun. (Later we learned it
had hit mines.) After all, we were no tank, but merely a poorly armored rec. car
not meant for such engagements. But the desperate need of the situation made
it imperative to risk everything. After a short combat, a fierce hand to hand fight
which was usual at that time, Lentjewo was taken and we did hold it after
warding off several counterattacks.
Under the circumstances Jan. 29 and 30 were quiet days for us. On the 31st
Bortschweko was taken by our recon. Battalion after a strong fire barrage. This
action was part of a combined operation of Group Ssytschewka (1st Armored
Division and SS-Division Reich). It became increasingly inconceivable that our
quite visible recon car hadn't yet been knocked out long ago on these exposed
wide snow fields.
The general aim of the tactical objective: annihilation of the 29th and 30th
divisions of the Soviet Army which had broken through the German defense line
at Rshew with the wiping out of their defense block at Karabanova-Rshawinje-
Nikitje-Maxjimovo had been reached with severe casualties. Now the Army
Corps to which we belonged moved up north, toward Rshew. Our division
without Regiment "DF" which had already closed the gap where the Russians
had crossed the frozen Volga and thereafter kept this front-line self sacrificingly
had to undertake the flank protection of our corps to the west. The next 3-4 days
there was no fighting for us.
The 9th and 10th of February I was ordered to drive to Ssytschewka where we
were to be entrained to Germany for reactivation, while the units of our division
were transferred to the Rshew area. Hermann Buhler (who was later killed in
Russia) and myself took leave from the few comrades who had survived, most of
whom we would never see again, led by Haupsturmfuhrer Potschke (he had
taken over the Rec. Bn. After the C.O. Hauptsturmfuhrer Kment hit a mine while
on skis and lost both legs). They fought at Rshew and in the Volga bend until the
end of May with Task Force Ostendorf.
Here in the town there were other 8-wheeled recon cars of 1st company. Two of
them were not in running order. The third was my own car, which had been
brought up in the meantime from Wjasma. The driver, Walter Schulte had
washed out all of the grease of the needle bearings of the steering gear and filled
them with diesel. At the existing temperature, the viscosity of that fluid was good
enough for sufficient lubrication.
Full of life and skinny, in poor winter clothing (we left our anoraks behind) each
towing half a wreck we started with our two cars in running order to Smolensk via
Wjasma. Both towns were threatened by Russian paratroopers who had been
dropped in the area between them.
Here with great difficulty, I procured for us the necessary documents for boarding
the train from Roslawl. I got them from "Transportkommandantur Mitte" (that was
in my memory the name of that department responsible for all rail transportation
in the middle sector of the Russian Front). But first we had to drive on the road to
Roslawl. From there on the rail via Orscha, Minsk, Brest-Litovsk, Warschau, to
Leipzig. The Transport Kommandantur was accommodated in a special train (4
passenger cars and a locomotive). They were hidden nicely camouflaged in a
wood, I think not far away from later to become the ill-fated "Katyn".
To find out where their hideout was took me some days. Those having business
here were of course higher ranks and one was mainly dealing with divisions and
corps. But who could stop a "Panzer Aufklarer" at that time?
From the time we left Ssytschewka till we reached our "home port", Leipzig
weeks had passed.
I want to finish off with what Otto Weidinger said about the Winterschlacht of
Rshew in our divisional history:
The outcome of this battle not only meant the surviving of Army Group Mitte, but
had consequences reaching far beyond. Ultimately it decided the whole
continuation of the campaign in Russia.
But this "miracle at the Volga" did not come without some good reason. It
wouldn't have been possible without the brilliant German leadership, with their
unmatched skill to improvise and find ever new stopgaps, represented by the
fascinating personality of Gerneraloberst Model perfectly. But the "miracle"
wouldn't have happened without the gallantry, the readiness to make sacrifices,
the stamina and insuperable will to survive of the German soldier."
CHRONOLOGY OF THE ACTIONS OF 2nd SS PANZER
DIVISION DAS REICH AT MORTAIN
August 6th, 1994
2200 hours - The DER FUHRER Regiment is tangled up in a traffic jam caused by the I
Abteilung LAH at a crossroads northeast of Mortain. The Liebstandarte units have priority of
road movement and DER FUHRER has to sit and wait until the LAH Panthers pass by.
Several precious hours are wasted until Otto Weidinger is able to get his units moving again.
Beginning at 0100 hours, the main effort of the 2nd SS Panzer Division - DEUTSCHLAND
and SS Panzeraufklarungs Abteilung 2 - launch an attack to secure Mortain itself and overrun
U.S. units to the south of the town. By 0230 hours, the attacking SS troops have overcome
several roadblocks and scattered a TD platoon, infantry platoon, and antitank platoon
belonging to 2/120th Infantry Regiment, 30th U.S. Infantry Division. Panzer Regiment DAS
REICH, will trail behind DEUTSCHLAND and exploit any breakthroughs in the American
defenses. The ultimate objective of this attack is the Pontaubalt Bridge at Avranches some 35
kilometers to the west. Once the bridge is taken, the entire U.S. 3rd Army under General
Patton will be cut off from General Bradley's forces.
0430 hours - III Abteilung "DF" approaches the crossroads of L'Abbaye Blanche just to the
north of Mortain. It is very foggy and visibility is down to 100 meters. III/DF is supported by
four Sturmgeschutz under Hauptsturmfuhrer Roeder. Weidinger's DF Regiment is tasked with
seizing the crossroads and maintaining contact with the southern flank units of LAH. As 9.
Kompanie nears the small cluster of houses, two 3-inch antitank guns from the 1st platoon of
A/823rd TD battalion begin engaging the German vehicles. Nine vehicles, to include 6 Sdkfz
251's, are destroyed. Many of the surviving panzergrenadiers are killed by machinegun fire as
they tumble from the stricken halftracks. No one is able to spot the positions of the American
defenders. The delay caused by the LAH Panther battalion has deprived DF of any chance of
a surprise attack on the American defenses. Otto Weidinger and the III Abteilung commander
are forced to take shelter in a nearby farmhouse when their command vehicles come under
fire. As the regimental commander, III Abteilung commander, and selected staff are sheltering
under a table in the kitchen, a mortar shell explodes on the roof and showers them with debris
and shrapnel. Fortunately, no one is injured.
1000 hours - I Abteilung "D" reports that it has taken Mortain after a fierce fight with C/120th
Infantry. Scattered resistance continues in the town for the remainder of the afternoon. One
platoon from C/120th Infantry takes shelter atop Hill 314 with the remainder of the 2nd
Battalion, 120th Infantry. A battlegroup consisting of elements of the 17th SS Panzergrenadier
Division attached to "DR" has not been able to budge the stubborn American defenders atop
the hill. Hill 314, just east of Mortain, provides American artillery observers with an excellent
view of the entire countryside for miles around. The I Abteilung "D" is able to link up with
elements from II "DF" which have penetrated into the northern outskirts of Mortain. "DF" was
able to overrun a platoon of the 120th antitank company as well as the headquarters platoon
of F/120th Infantry during this period. The American prisoners taken during this action later
volunteered to carry back to the "DF" aid station the burned survivors of two "DR"
Sturmgeschutz knocked out near L'Abbaye Blanche.
1200 hours - II Abteilung "D" has gained its initial objectives near Romagny, just southwest of
Mortain. The lead elements of II/D ambushed the I&R platoon of the U.S. 120th Infantry
Regiment in Romagny earlier that morning and after a two hour fight killed or captured all of
the Americans with the exception of three soldiers who were able to escape. A small group of
panzergrenadiers from II/D, supported by two Pzkfw IV from 6/SS-Panzerregiment 2, attacked
C/197th Field Artillery soon after Romagny had been taken. The Americans recovered rapidly
from the surprise assault and managed to hold off the German infantry for several hours. An
American truck mechanic assigned to the artillery battery managed to knock out one of the
two panzers with a bazooka, killing two of its crew. The Germans suffered six other casualties
while the Americans lost one man killed and several wounded. One American truck and a
jeep were destroyed by cannon fire from the panzers. Again, dense fog seemed to have
helped the defenders fend off a surprise attack.
1400 hours - The Americans are reacting to the German counterattack with fighter-bombers
and artillery fire. Heavy artillery and mortar fire is falling on the "DF" regiment positions north
of Mortain. A group of SS men from "D" are sheltering inside some houses in Mortain. One of
them, perhaps to relieve the tension, is playing the harmonica. Soon all of the German
soldiers are singing "Oh, the Beautiful Rhine." An American soldiers, also seeking cover from
the artillery fire, opens the door upon hearing the singing. He is looking at the SS men and
shakes his head, muttering that "war is a merry thing." The Germans, along with their
bemused prisoner, escape injury during the shelling.
1600 hours - A lull in the American shelling allows the Germans to fully deploy their forces
into defensive positions and begin tying in with their neighboring units. The "DF" and "D"
regiments have linked up on the hills immediately to the west of Mortain. "DR" however, has
not been able to establish contact with the Liebstandarte to the north. In the center of the
"DR" sector is the 17th SS Panzergrenadier battlegroup. It has been unable to take Hill 314
despite a heavy artillery preparation. American artillery threw back every assault the Gotz Von
Berlichingen unit made. In the south, Panzer Aufklarungsabteilung "DR" has established
positions from the area of Bonberouge to Mortain.
2100 hours - An American medical convoy consisting of several ambulances of the 105th
Medical Battalion has driven up from Barenton in the south and blundered into an outpost
manned by Panzer Aufklarungsabteilung "DR". There were fifteen wounded men in the
ambulances from 3/120th Infantry. The Germans kept the lightly wounded as prisoners and
freed the remainder of the convoy.
8 August 1944
0815 Hours - Kampgruppe Ullrich, consisting of an infantry abteilung (-) from SS-
Panzergrenadier Division 17 and a zug of Pzkfw IV from Panzer Regiment "DR", attacked the
positions of B/120th Infantry on Hill 285 located just to the northwest of Mortain. KG Ullrich
had assaulted the hill the previous morning and seized the eastern half, but lost at least three
Pzkfw IV doing so, as well as a number of personnel casualties. The 8 August assault started
with patrol activity shortly after midnight on 7/8 August. Approximately 5-6 panzergrenadiers
armed with grenades and a flammenwerfer approached the positions of the 2nd Platoon,
B/120th Infantry. An American outpost detected the patrol, following which an exchange of
grenades ensued. The Germans brought the flamethrower into action, but it malfunctioned
and only sprayed one American soldier with oil. When a grenade wounded several of the
Germans, they decided to retreat, leaving the flammenwerfer and one seriously wounded
grenadier behind. At 0815 hours, three Pzkfw IV moved forward to attack the American rifle
company, but quickly pulled back when the lead vehicle was destroyed at 50 meters range by
a dug in 3-inch towed AT gun from Lieutenant Francis J. Connors' 2nd platoon of A Company,
823rd TD Battalion. The Americans begin firing artillery to ensure the SS infantry did not
follow up the abortive assault made by the "DR" panzers. Several of the rounds struck near
the American positions, forcing the U.S. infantry and 3-inch gun crew to seek shelter. A
captured Sherman tank manned by "DR" panzer crewman took advantage of this situation to
penetrate the U.S. infantry company position, but when it realized that none of the
panzergrenadiers had been able to exploit the situation, the "Sherman" pulled back to the
German lines. Just to the north, a dismounted attack by KG Ullrich was more successful and
forced A/120th Infantry to pull back two hedgerows. Two U.S. antitank guns from Lieutenant
Connors' platoon did not retreat and found themselves occupying a salient forward of A and B
Companies of the 120th Infantry.
0900 hours - DR dispositions around Mortain are as follows DF REgiment is arrayed north of
the town with III/DF linking up with Liebstandarte at Road Junction 278 above the U.S.
roadblock at L'Abbaye Blanche. The DF pionere company is on the right flank of III/DF. The
roadblock is still being held by elements of the 1st platoon of A/823rd TD as well as the 1st
and 2nd platoons of F/120th Infantry. An attack against the TD positions earlier that morning
was repulsed with the loss of two German halfracks carrying 75mm howitzers and an
ammunition carrier. Two DR panzerspahwagen and a gasoline truck were destroyed by
bazooka fire shortly afterwards. II/DF had occupied positions just south of L'Abbaye Blanche
opposing the 2/117th Infantry and elements of the 629th TD Battalion (M10 SP guns). The
U.S. battalion is in reality a company (-) in strength due to the fact that two rifle companies
had been detached the previous day to assist other units. 2/117th had also launched a failed
attack against II/DF during the evening of 7 August and had suffered approximately 75
casualties.
1000 - Hausser, commander of the 7 Armee, visits the division command post. He told "DR"
that the attack would continue after the XLVII Panzer Korps recieved addtional tanks
promised by the Fuhrer (Panzer Division 9 which would be diverted to Mayenne to seal up a
breakthrough in the LXXXI Armee Korps line).
1400 hours - DR launches a counterattack against the northern flank of the 35th Infantry
Division. The 35th Division had been committed south of Mortain in order to seal up a gap
which had developed between the 30th Division at Mortain and 2nd Armored Division (-) at
Barenton to the south. Barenton lies halfway between Mortain and Mayenne, where CCA, 3rd
Armored Division, 1st U.S. Infantry Division, and 90th U.S. Infantry Division were in the
process of breaking through LXXXI Armee Korps. The counterattack consisted of elements of
Krag's panzeraufklarungs abteilung, reinforced by reconnaissance troops from 2 Panzer
Division and 116 Panzer Division, as well as a Pzkfw IV platoon and Panther platoon
commanded by Willy Durr. Durr's panzers overrun a section of the 134th Infantry's cannon
company, killing seven Americans and destroying two 105mm howitzers. The Pzkfw IV
platoon is able to ambush the Sherman platoon supporting the 1/134th Infantry, knocking out
five American tanks for no loss. One of Durr's Panthers also knocks out two M-10 TD's from
the 654th Tank Destroyer Battalion. The counterattack also overruns the aid station of the
2/134th Infantry and the motor park of the same battalion. A number of medics are captured,
but the headquarters company of 2/134th Infantry does not suffer many casualties as the
panzers do not have very much infantry support. After a Panther and Pzkfw IV are knocked
out by bazooka fire, a pair of Pzkfw IVs occupy a position astride the main supply route
leading to the 1/134th Infantry and 2/134th Infantry. Both of the U.S. battalion are cut off from
support. Interestingly enough, the panzer crews capture several officers from the 134th
Infantry, as well as medics from the 737th Tank Battalion, all of whom are released after
being captured.
1800 hours - The 1/119th Infantry attacks II/D at Romagny. Artillery fire wounds
Sturmbannfuhrer Schreiber, commander of II/D. The U.S. troops launch two attacks against
Romagny, losing two Shermans destroyed and suffering several casualties amongst the two
infantry companies making the attack. The U.S. tanks manage to destroy one Pzkfw IV and
an ammunition vehicle during the fighting. Convinced that the assault on Romagny will not be
successful unless his battalion is reinforced, the attack is halted for the night.
9 August 1944
0200 hours - During the night new orders came in. DAS REICH was to remain on the
defensive. It was not known when the attack would be resumed.
0900 hours - American fighter bombers become active once the fog begins to burn
off. American artillery observers are bringing heavy fires down all along the DAS REICH front,
although it is especially heavy in the I/D sector (near Romagny).
1100 hours - In the late morning, the Americans attacked from the direction of Juvigny against
the positions of the DER FUHRER regiment (note must have been the 12th Infantry
Regiment). Several other American attacks, supported by tanks, came in from the north and
northwest, but were brought to a halt. Several American tanks were knocked out by
Panzerfaust. The right flank of DER FUHRER is particularly threatened. The link with LAH is
severed. Casualties are heavy. Hill 285, northwest of Mortain, is reoccupied by the
Americans, but is recaptured by a counterattack.
1200 hours - Twelve American tanks are sighted northwest of Barenton (south of
Panzeraufklarungs Abteilung DAS REICH). In that town is positioned a battalion of Infanterie
Division 275 (note this unit was driven out by a TF from 3rd AD and 3/120th Infantry
Regiment on 6 August). A blocking group from the DAS REICH division staff section was set
up on Hill 266, about 1.5 kilometers southwest of the division CP, in order to protect it from
the advancing American tanks.
2030 hours - The Americans attacked with tanks against Romagny. A counterattack by II/D,
supported by panzers, forced the Americans (1/119th Infantry) to break off their
assault. Three American tanks were shot up near Bion. The II/D and Aufklarungs Abteilung
DR quickly set up a defense along the Mortain - La Houberte - Bion line in order to stop the
advance of the U.S. 35th Infantry Division.
10 August, 1944
1500 hours - American troops attacked the I/D and II/D without success. Almost
simultaneously, Aufklarungs Abteilung DR was also attacked. Their commander,
Sturmbannfuhrer Krag, rallied his troops and restored their positions (although an entire
battalion of U.S. Infantry had already passed through AA "DR" defensive positions and were
now behind them). In the Der Fuhrer sector, tanks from the U.S. 3rd Armored Division
attacked. Several of them were knocked out with Panzerfaust (note to include the
commander of H/33rd Armor, Lieutenant Wray, who was machinegunned trying to get his
driver out of his burning Sherman). Several panzergrenadiers from DF, thinking that the
American attack has been halted, walk out into a field to look at a knocked out American
tank. They are fired upon by troops from F/119th Infantry and lose several men. German
casualties were very heavy.
1600 hours - Troops from KG Fick took Hill 307 just to the south of Hill 314. The surrounded
American rifle companies from 2/120th Infantry which are trapped atop Hill 314 are able to
link up for the first time. An airdrop takes place that afternoon, with about half of the supplies
being recovered by the Americans, half by DAS REICH. An attack against the surrounded
American troops is unsuccessful.
1800 hours - At this point in the battle, DAS REICH came under control of the LVIII Reserve
Panzer Korps. It had previously been under the operational control of XLVII Panzer
Korps. The order was given to pull back the DR main line of resistance to just east of Mortain.
2200 hours - DEUTSCHLAND pulled back, despite rough terrain and severe American
artillery fire. This concluded the fiercest fighting of the Mortain battle for DAS REICH. The
German troops had faced especially violent air and artillery attacks.
DEFENSIVE BATTLE IN NORMANDY
By Fritz Langanke
(Herr Langanke was a Mark V Panther tank commander and officer candidate in
2d company, 2nd SS Panzer Regiment 'Das Reich' in June-July of 1944 in
Normandy)
The beginning of 1944 saw the Division "Das Reich" in the Bordeau-Toulouse
area. Here, Ostuf. Schlomka took over 2nd company of SS Pz Rgt 2 and I was
leader of 1st platoon of that company. We were the last ones to take over new
tanks at the Magdeburg depot. While there, Invasion in Normandy started. We
were supposed to go straight to that battle area. But bombing of the bridges and
railroad facilities in Northern France had made that impossible. On the rail we
therefore nearly surrounded the whole country. We drove to the Saar down along
the Rhone, close to the Mediterranean, up the Atlantic coast via Nantes to
Alencon. There we detrained and from there took the road north to the area north
of Percy. Later we moved north and bivouacked at St Sebastian de Raids, south
of the road from Carentan to Periers as operational reserve.
Several times we have minor engagements. And then, in the afternoon of July 9,
alarm! An American breakthrough at Sainteny! I get the order to block the road
with my platoon and stop the enemy under all circumstance. We have no map,
no further information, don't know anything about our own troops. Hastily, we
start and reach the road at Raids that is under heavy fire. One thing is clear, if
the American advance succeeds, they have overcome the swamp and can move
freely via Periers to Coutances the way they did it north toward Cherbourg.
My order says block the road. Since I am alone with my vehicles and during the
night rather helpless against infantry, I draw back a short distance and find a
better position along some hedgerows (on both sides of the road), where we stay
over night. The enemy did move up but only to the next hedgerow in front of us.
Probably none of us did sleep that night because sitting in a tank in a dark night
in broken country without infantry protection is very nasty. Fortunately the
Americans carried out night attacks very seldom. Mostly, come dark, they called
it a day.
Next morning shelling set in, but was not too strong. Unmolested, slow, low flying
American artillery observers moved for hours in those days, over our position.
We could now see that the Americans had dug in at the next or over next
hedgerows.
Being so close together was in one respect advantageous. Artillery and fighter
bombers were reluctant to aim straight at us for fear of endangering their own
troops. So the main concentration of that fire was a bit behind us although bad
enough anyhow. During the day we finally could breathe freely. III Bn 'DF' took
over a section of the main line of resistance of which our position was a part.
They had moved down from la Haye du Puits area.
The Grenadiere from 10th Company 'DF' dug their foxholes right beside our
tanks. An old comrade of mine from pre war time when I was an infantryman
showed up. He was in charge of the infantry gun unit of 'DF' ('Grillen' Self
Propelled Guns). He established his command post right under my Panther.
Since he had direct contact to the artillery observer and the Infantry platoon
leader was close to my tank too, there was excellent cooperation for the next
(better than) two weeks, while we kept this position. The foxholes were directly
behind the hedgerows and the Grenadiere had pierced holes through to be able
to stick their weapons through.
Next morning, we had just renewed our camouflage with fresh bushes, when the
C.O. of III Bn 'DF' appeared. He was checking the defense line and personally
finding out the details of the layout. Our greeting was buoyant. 1937 we had
been recruits in the same Battalion and hadn't seen each other since 1939. He
was one of the young CO's of our troop who combined highest efficiency with
self discipline and the best Prussian attitude: "Mehr sein als scheinen" (Be more
than one appears to be"). His men would swear by him.
When the Americans had found out about our new defense line, artillery fire set
in that temporarily reached the intensity we never before had experienced on any
battlefield; and this day after day, sometimes for over an hour. Only during the
night for a more or less extended period of time there was no shooting. Then you
could hear traffic noise. Supply was coming up, etc. We used this time for the
same activities. The top Sgt or motor transport Sgt drove with their cars right up
to our tanks with food and ammunition. One night when they drove back, we
heard loud explosions on the road. Rushing over we saw that one of our vehicles
had been blown up by mines, two men were dead. The Americans had found out
about our supply timing. In a most daring way, some of them had used the span
between arrival and departure of our cars and mined the road. They had
managed to get behind our lines and back again unnoticed. From now on, our
supply vehicles didn't drive up to us and the crews had to carry all the stuff some
400 meters to our Panther. Very cumbersome!
The second or third day, the shelling reaches a new climax. The impacts are
frequent and close by, so incessantly that we feel a light tremble in the tank. Of
course it is minor, but when you are sitting in the turret and think about nothing
else but the shelling, you feel it like a real swaying. All hatches are closed (it's
mid summer). Temperatures are increasing, tension makes the stay in the tank
more and more disagreeable. Nearly no talk at all anymore. If you are hit by shell
fragments it's merely greeted as diversion. You are reduced to a poor, tortured
creature, fighting for self assertion and preserving of your willpower. That's the
decisive fight every man has to stand up against. Its outcome will decide whether
your morale is broken or you can still be considered a fighter. That is the decisive
aspect of the impact by heavy weapons on the single man, not the destruction of
target objectives.
For hours this fire falls down on us. Big caliber guns are in action too, maybe the
naval guns from battleships in the beachhead (I have no idea whether that was
possible)? Occasionally a muffled gurgle can be heard, probably duds. Peculiar
though that you could distinguish this so distinctly in all this big noise.
Then, the shelling lessens and fog shells cover the whole landscape with a thick,
whitish blanket. Sure, that's preparation for a major attack! I jump out of my tank,
talk to the leader of the infantry guns and jump from foxhole to foxhole, telling
guys to hold their fire until I open up. So we will start shooting altogether
simultaneously. I hasten back to my Panther and thereafter it doesn't take too
long. The shelling ebbed away nearly completely. The terrible din that had
surrounded us before now changed into a threatening silence. Only our rear was
still under fire.
Slowly the fog dissolves from my level of view in my turret (3m above ground) I
can overlook the meadowland on our left front, bordered by a little wood. Here,
bigger units of American infantry have gathered. They prepare for an attack.
They seem to be completely careless. 150m in front of us there is one single
tree. One man comes leisurely to this tree, looks around and signals back what
seems to mean "all clear". Thereupon all units at the rim of the wood start
moving in nearly close formations. They must have thought that tremendous
barrage of the last hours had annihilated everything on our side. Meanwhile, the
sight even close to the ground is intolerable. I wait a little bit and open fire with all
weapons, all of us. It's devastating. Pretty soon our artillery sets in too and we
barely can believe it after our rocket launchers joined in, we nearly could keep up
with the Americans. It was the strongest artillery concentration on our side I have
witnessed during the war. Without delay, the enemy brought his barrage back to
the previous top level too. But we feel elated to know that here the Americans
will not succeed.
The tank attack which we actually had expected, did come the next days but on
the right side of the road, where we thought the terrain was far less suitable for
tanks. By that time we didn't yet know that the open meadow to the left was
swampy ground that would not carry heavy vehicles. But expecting here a
possible tank attack I was standing on that side with four tanks-the artillery
preparation was as intense as at the last attack.
Suddenly we hear the noise of battle from the right side of the road. Tank guns
and machineguns fire uninterruptedly. Pretty soon the commander of the Panther
on the other road side reports that he had a gun failure and had backed-up into
some cover. Then some riflemen mostly wounded, run to my Panther crying all
lost, the Americans are breaking through, our defense line is gone! Antitank gun
and machinegun fire is raking the road, but badly aimed. In the field in front of
the hedgerow formerly our defense line five Shermans are standing. Shooting
into the foxholes they have killed, wounded, or driven out our infantry.
Fortunately for us they didn't immediately exploit their success.
I have seen enough, run back and together with a second Panther I get ready.
Our chances to cross the road are slim but we have no choice. This section of
the front line has a key position. It is the only good road from the Carentan area
through the marsh and swamps to the open grounds of south Cotentin. We have
to risk everything to prevent the enemy from "rolling".
We have about 50m run up and use it to get to the highest speed possible to
cross the road. We make it. The antitank guns don't hit us. On the other roadside
there is a shelled down building. I order the other tank to take cover behind it. I
continue another 30-40m (the "longest" ones in my whole life). I can only crawl
because the ground is dotted by craters. My gunner nearly gets crazy because I
don't let him turn the turret and fire while we are approaching our final position.
But that would have been idiocy. At such a cross country drive, with the gun
pointing to the side, you just can't hit anything. The distance to the Shermans is
only 250-300m and it is unbelieveable: every vehicle shot once or twice at us
and we were not hit (even today I cannot understand that). When we reached the
position we had aimed for we tore the Panther around at a right angle with the
chain brake, got a good lay on the front Sherman, fired and it burned. Very
quickly, four were destroyed. Sweat and the fear of death had completely
drenched us at our drive; when every second we expected to be hit and die, the
stomach cramps and you feel a lump coming up your throat. Now, the danger
over, the relief is indescribable. Meanwhile, the second Panther had started firing
too, its main battery was on the American infantry. The fifth Sherman had backed
into a cluster of shrubs in the corner of that field, close to the road.
I jumped out of my vehicle and half running, half crawling along the road ditch, I
reached the point where probably the Sherman would be. Jumping up a few
times to the top of the hedge, I finally spotted the tank. Rushing back to my
Panther, I was lucky again not to be caught by the enemy machineguns. I
climbed back into my turret and cried we got it. Wth some bursts of machinegun
fire and some H.E. rounds we could clear the sight of our enemy. The Sherman
tried desperately to negotiate the hedgerow behind him backwards, but each
time it was at a certain angle, the motor was killed and they slumped down
again. When high up once more with the rear, we hit this tank practically from
above. The turret was blown off.
For quite awhile I am busy, jumping from foxhole to foxhole, re establishing our
defense line. All infantry officers are dead or wounded and the riflemen rely on
me. Thereafter, the enemy artillery is back again in full strength and ours
answers in the same way. A sixth Sherman in the next field becomes a victim of
this duel. It explodes with a jet of flame.
That was the end of major attacks on our position. The next 10 days it was
"invasion-every-day" life which was bad enough. For example, for hours with
only short interruptions, automatic weapons from the next hedgerow used to fire
at our hatches and observation positions every so often, so we nearly couldn't
fight them at all.
Our disabled tank, while driving back, was stuck in a very big crater. It had to be
pulled out by a recovery vehicle. Relieved by the 6th company of our regiment
we nearly regretted to leave that position. Never before or thereafter during the
war have I experienced such excellent cooperation of all weapons.
The next day already we are thrown into a gap northwest of Periers, briefed for
that engagement by our regimental C.O. in very heavy artillery shelling. The
following day the big retreat began, with numerous stops and counterattacks that
ended for me at the "Westwall" (Siegfried Line) when I arrived at the German
border.
A PANTHER IN RETREAT IN NORMANDY
By Fritz Langanke
The last July days in 1944 brought the final decisive battles at the foot of the
Cotentin Peninsula. Breakthrough, encirclement, breakout, made the situation
for fighting units and rear echelon, extremely involved. Single actions became
ever so more the main fighting activities. Desperately, commanders of all
levels tried to keep their units under control, execute orderly disengagement's,
and withdraw to new defense lines. Failing and steadfastness, panic and
determined performance of one's duty, giving oneself up and surpassing
ourselves in hopeless situations, all these features transformed these days
into a cauldron of whirling and overwhelming events. And every man fate had
thrown into these stupendous happenings, will keep this period especially in
his remembrance.
After close to two days with heavy shelling and fighter bomber attacks, we
withdrew further east. We passed the Foret de St Sever and early next
morning, I was again standing at a crossroads waiting for the Americans.
Supposedly, at the right side of the road, paratroopers were in position. On
the left side, infantry from the 2nd Panzer Division, I knew from the days
before, were expected to form a defensive line. I took position on the right
roadside, thoroughly camouflaged (without camouflage you were pretty soon
the victim of the plans that made any movement on the roads at daylight
nearly impossible). Sometime later, my infantry friends from Wien showed up;
the small rest of a battered battalion. I had a lot of trouble to persuade them to
dig themselves in about 100 to 150m in front of me, where the terrain was
favorable. Shortly thereafter, a second "Panther" came as support. It was my
company C.O., Ostuf Schlomka. Both of us then drove into the orchard of the
farm that was right beside me, left of the street. I was standing at the right
corner of the orchard, close to the farm building, and Schlomka at the left
corner, maybe 50m apart. That was good hiding against the planes. I could
observe the road 200-300m. About 100m in front of us, a lane took off the
road in a sharp angle, and led then to the side, close in front of our orchard.
In the late morning, fog came up and the visibility was poor. The take off point
of the lane was barely visible. All of a sudden, an American tank came in sight,
slowly driving down the road, the commander standing upright, looking out of
the turret. With the hand traverse, my gunner tried to turn the turret as fast as
possible, the loader helping by operating the auxiliary traverse handle. We
couldn't use the hydraulic power traverse system, because the motor wasn't
running. Shortly before the tank disappeared behind the farmhouse we fired,
but we didn't reach the vehicle. Meanwhile, we had started the motor in a
hurry, backed up our Panther and rushed to the road that was quite a bit
elevated compared to the surrounding ground. We turned the turret already to
the right, went up the road slope, thereby overturning a roadside tree with the
left track, so as to have some protection against being made out immediately
by other American tanks we felt sure would be there, further down the road.
We felt our chances to get on the road at all were slim, but we made it.
As soon as we tipped to normal level we knocked out the tank that had
passed us and was standing about 50m distant. A hit in the motor destroyed it.
The commander, still standing in his turret and watching the terrain in front of
him, could jump out and get away. Using our track brake, we pulled our
vehicle round so as to face the other Americans with the turret in normal
position. Two we could make out in about 150m distance, one on each side of
the road. We knocked them out with just one round each. We could see
soldiers running between these tanks and were about to fire at them when we
could see they had the hands up. So we assumed it was Americans
surrendering to our infantry, left of the road. Later on, we learned it had been
the other way around; our infantry had surrendered to the Americans, who
later on had withdrawn again. For some time, I stayed on the road, waiting for
possible further American drives. After awhile, our Regimental C.O. appeared.
He inspected the various roadblocks established by our regiment. Of course,
he was happy about our action.
Suddenly, a jeep with a Red Cross sign drove up to us, with a surgeon and
two medics. The surgeon got out of his car and came to us to look after the
crew in the knocked out tank. The medics were busily using their walkie
talkies. Since they had meanwhile found out everything about our positions,
we couldn't let them go back. They were taken to the command post of Rgt
'DF', as prisoners.
About noon, the fog had dissolved and visibility was good again. I then drove
back again to my orchard corner. Soon thereafter, heavy shelling set in,
mainly concentrated on the orchard where we two Panthers were standing.
For one or two hours, I had changed places with my gunner. His seat was
much more comfortable than the one of the commander. One could lean one's
head against the sighting telescope and sleep in a relative relaxed posture.
And I definitely needed some sleep, all of us close to complete exhaustion.
We just had climbed back to our normal places when suddenly, a Sherman
appeared on the road, swerved into the lane in front of us, and came rushing
toward our orchard at full speed, its gun pointing straight at us. Our local
situation must have been well known to that crew. We were so used to the
standard pattern of American advance, after they had met resistance: first,
plenty artillery, then even more planes, and then a tank spearhead, that we
were completely surprised by this unbelievably plucky attack, since the
number of fighter bombers harassing us had only been the "usual". The crew
in the other "Panther" felt the same. Its gun was probably in a better position
than ours. They let off but missed the Sherman. Now it was a race against
death between the Sherman crew and ourselves. Their gun pointed straight at
us but they had to correct the elevation. We had the right elevation but were
desperately traversing to get the final lay. We were a little bit faster. I had my
head out of the cupola and got the impression my eyes were exactly in line
with the Sherman's gun barrel when we were ready to fire (again it was hand
traversing, because the motor didn't run). Our first round destroyed the tank.
All this happened within a few minutes, which seemed to everybody involved
a space of time without end. The daredevil straight on drive, by a hair's
breadth a success, came to an end some 40-50 meters in front of us. The
commander was lucky enough to bail out and get away unwounded as far as I
could see. This was the most daring and exceptional single action of the
American soldier I have witnessed during the war.
The shelling having been reduced before the attack, gained momentum again
and didn't allow us any time to take notice of our fluttering nerves. Slowly, it
became unbearable in the vehicle. It was a very hot day. We had no food and
nothing to drink. The strong enemy action forced us to keep all hatches closed
and overfatigue was wearing us down. Time and again, one would doze off for
a moment, to startle when your head hit on some part of the tank or piece of
equipment. The worst thing was, I couldn't watch the surroundings any more.
Shell fragments and machinegun fire had made the cupola episcopes
unserviceable. Time was dragging on uncanny slow. Everybody knew
something must and would happen soon. But whatever one would have to
face in such situations, your wish to let it happen, to get out of this intolerable
tension, becomes stronger every minute. Every word, every movement of the
crew gets in your nerves. More and more it is difficult to contain self discipline.
Panic-like emotional outbursts get hold of the crew. You feel locked-up,
hopeless, worn out. Suddenly, someone wants to bail out and get away. One
is on the verge of breaking. But almost more serious is the status of total
indifference, when you give a damn for the whole world and you are just
dejectedly sitting there, awaiting some kind of end. To keep out of this mood,
that takes the greatest effort.
I had just dozed off once more, when all of us became wide awake. Very
strong bursts of machinegun fire hit our 'Panther' and we hear the second
tank start its motor and get going. Then there is a tremendous bang on our
vehicle, as if hit by a big calibre. I must somewhat open my hatch to find out
what is going on. I see the other Panther is rushing through the orchard, onto
the road, thereby knocking over trees. One fell on us; that was the big bang.
I thought the second tank had seen approaching Shermans and was gaining
the road to engage them. So we hastened to follow them. All the while, we are
under heavy machinegun fire. The radio communication didn't work. We could
hear something, but we couldn't understand it. Our antenna was gone.
I realize I must be able to observe better. So I open fully my hatch, risking the
danger for the whole vehicle. But, 'field of fire' has precedence over 'cover',
(the basic military rule), and when you want to shoot, you first have to see
something. At high speed, we nearly shoot ahead to the other roadside, swing
the tank around to face the enemy and immediately get a whole burst of hits.
Driver and gunner cry we can't see any more. Myself, watching over the rim of
my cupola can make out what's going on. A number of Shermans are
standing behind their knocked out comrade on the left roadside in a row, so
that only the gun of each tank can shoot along the turret of the vehicle in front,
and they are firing salvoes.
The events of the last minutes have driven out all fatigue, weakness and
despair. Forced to action, you feel like newborn. The crew is back again to
normal, cool and self-assured. It functions like a machine in good shape. Such
moments of the very highest challenge let a man develop energy and abilities
far beyond the every day level.
All this of course, split-second. While instructing the driver the second or third
time "pull to the left", we are hit again by a salvo mainly on the sloped glacis,
this time that hard that the welding seam between the front and sideplate of
the hull sprang open, and the radio set (located on the gear box between
driver and radio operator) was thrown out of its clamping fixture and didn't
function any more. Meanwhile, we keep firing, whether with or without result, I
can't say.
I order "straight on, straight on", but the driver, not hearing the order,
continues pulling to the left. Pretty soon, our hull is nearly across to the road.
That, I tell myself, is the end for us. Immediately, there is a big bang in our
tank, although not too loud and the loader (Sturmmann Fahnrich from
Duisburg) stands in a big flame. It was as if a great number of sparklers were
burning. I only holler "bail out" and jump out of the cupola into the road ditch. I
tumble over, lie for awhile on my back, and see immediately thereafter the
gunner and loader jump out in the same way (the loader had only minor
splinters in his back, and there his uniform was somewhat scorched). Only
then we realized that we had been knocked out by a bazooka from the right
side of the road, where the terrain was a little bit elevated, and not by the
Shermans. Likewise, it became clear to us that we were surrounded by
American infantry.
After the turret crew had bailed out, the Panther was covered heavily by
automatic weapons fire, so that driver and radio operator were pinned down in
the burning tank. Opening their hatches would have meant death for them.
They had nerves of steel, pulled the Panther right close to the ditch, waited a
moment until the fire slacked off, threw open the hatches simultaneously and
made it to jump out, to join us in the ditch.
Now, the whole crew was lying on the roadside, panting with exertion, except
for the minor scratches of the loader, miraculously unhurt. Most urgently, we
wanted to get away, before our burning tank would blow up. But as soon as
we raised our heads, we got fire from all sides.
Only then did we remember the other Panther and saw that it was standing a
good 100 meters behind us. It's gun was defective and defenseless against
the Shermans; he stayed a little outside their field of fire. Despite his
precarious situation, Schlomka had not left us. It is evident without him, we
would have been lost. Firing with both machineguns, he held down the
Americans around us. After we understood what was going on, we mustered
our last reserves and ran toward the Panther which, always firing, slowly
drove back, until on a downward slope of the road, it found some cover.
To dodge the turret weapons was not too difficult, but to avoid the sheafs of
fire of the hull machinegun, while running as fast as you could in a crouched
posture, that needed nearly acrobatic skill. But when life is at stake and you
are firmly determined not to give in, you can mobilize considerably more out of
your tired body than can normally be expected. We reach Schlomka's tank
and fall to the ground, completely done. While lying there, panting and
recuperating, one explosion after another shook our burning Panther. But as
long as we watched, the turret didn't come off.
Schlomka with his Panther stayed there to block the road, which for the time
being was barricaded anyhow by our tank. With my crew, I started off for the
command post of Rgt 'DF'. Shortly before we arrived there (in my memory,
about 1 Km), we had to pass high ground with nearly no coverage. There, a
group of fighter bombers caught us. Probably, they were on the way back to
their advanced airfield and wanted to get rid of the ammunition they still had
left. Fortunately, we were very close to a drainage trench under construction.
It was narrow and deep. We threw ourselves into it and then, for awhile, the
planes had a nice time target practicing. They attacked from all sides. They
split in two groups, working like stunters, we in the middle. Fortunately, they
were flying so low that their bullets (and there came a plenty), didn't hit us.
The edges of the trench rumbled down on us, together with pieces of the clay
tubes that were piled up at the side of the trench. It was definitely the last
strain we could stand that day. Two or three times we thought the pilots would
call it a day and disappear. But is was always a nasty feint. Every time we
raced to the nearest grove, we had to turn around and were just lucky to hit
our beloved trench just in time, before the firing started again. We could have
reached them with a stone, and that flight altitude nearly cracked your nerves.
It was late afternoon when this torture finally ended. One of our fighter friends
was finally shot down by 2-cm flak when they passed over the Rgt 'DF'
command post. He was lucky to come down unhurt in his parachute. Shortly
thereafter, we reached the command post. We got some food, rested awhile
and then proceeded to our maintenance and repair unit. Two, three days later,
we started with an overhauled Panther to take part in the Mortain
counterattack. Unfortunately, this tank had a couple mechanical flaws.
To this account of one phase of the Normandy battle, I want to add that
besides me, only my driver survived the war. Loader and gunner drowned at
my side as we tried to swim the Seine. After our fight at Elbeuf, that was
already occupied by the U.S. 2nd Armored Division (we were able there to
knock out 2 tanks of the 2nd Bn, 66th Armored Rgt), we crossed the Seine
together with the rest of the III Btl Rgt Deutschland. Both comrades were poor
swimmers and we had all reached the end of our physical possibilities.
The radio operator, later on my gunner, was the last man in 2nd company SS
Pz Rgt Das Reich to die in WW2. He was killed as tank commander by
Russian artillery fire close to St Polten, Austria. We buried him at the
community graveyard at Erlauf.
DAS REICH SS UNIFORMS
SS-Hauptsturmführer of Engineers
SS-Sturmann of Infantry
Field style; four patch pockets with pleats; dark green wool
collar; slip on shoulder boards with grass green piping and gilt
metal "DF" ciphers; aluminum flat wire sleeve eagle; aluminum
flat wire DER FÜHRER cuffband in gothic; silver twist cord
piped collar tabs: hand-embroidered enlisted-style runes tab
and rank tab with four metal pips. Badges include a Close
Combat Clasp in Silver under the ribbon bar, Iron Cross First
Class, Panzer Assault Badge in Bronze and Wound Badge in
Silver. Standard Army officer's brown leather belt with claw
buckle. Hat is a gray-green gabardine M1943 styled cap with
single button front, officer's aluminum piping and two piece
insignia on front.
SS-Obersturmführer of Infantry
SS-Obersturmführer of Engineers
SS-Sturmmann of Feldgendarmerie
SS-Hauptsturmführer of Infantry