CONCEPT OF RIGHTS AND DUTIES

WITH HOHFELD CLASSIFICATION

Mayank Yadav

B.A LL.B (5 th Sem.)

Self Finance

INTRODUCTION

Jurisprudence is the branch of philosophy which deals with principles of law and the legal systems through
which the law is applied. Hohfeld's contribution was to simplify; he created a very precise analysis which
distinguished between fundamental legal concepts (of correlatives & opposites) and then identified the
framework of relationships between them1 which consecutively help to clarify juridical relationship
between the relevant parties better interpretation of courts judgment.

This paper shows how Hohfeldian analysis of right and duties operates, his meaning of the terms use in
defining these jural relations with examples, and how it clarifies legal issues with case illustration and
diagram.

ABOUT HOHFELD

Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld was a professor at Stanford University and later Yale University who wrote
only a few articles before his premature death in 1918. His most famous article Some Fundamental Legal
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning became a canonical landmark in American jurisprudence.2
His work remains a powerful contribution to modern understanding of the nature of rights and the
implications of liberty. To reflect Hohfeld's continuing importance, a chair at Yale University was named
after him. 3 Since the appearance of his Fundamental Legal Conceptions in 1913, his work has attracted

1
See Luca Fiorito and Massimiliano Vatiero, “Beyond Legal Relations: Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld's Influence on
American Institutionalism", 45 (1) Journal of Economics Issues: 199-222 (2011).
2
See Allen Thomas O’Rourke, “REFUGE FROM A JURISPRUDENCE OF DOUBT: HOHFELDIAN ANALYSIS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW”, available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1358336 pg. 3
3
See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld (Aug. 29, 2015, 6:49 PM) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wesley_Newcomb_Hohfeld

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both followers and critics; his ideas have appeared in United States Supreme Court opinions, and the
Restatement of Property.4

THE HOHFELD’S RELATIONS

Hohfeldian analysis enhances legal reasoning by allowing one to deduce one legal concept from another. 5
Professor Hohfeld identified eight atomic particles by splitting the atom of legal discourage which he called
"the lowest common denominators of the law."6 He defined these eight basic jural relations to clarify legal
thinking and understanding, Hohfeld divided the eight into pairs which cannot exist together (opposites),
and those which must exist together (correlatives).7

JURAL RIGHT PRIVILEGE POWER IMMUNITY

OPPOSITES NO- RIGHT DUTY DISABILITY LIABILITY

JURAL RIGHT PRIVILEGE POWER IMMUNITY

CORRELATIVES DUTY NO-RIGHT LIABILITY DISABILITY

Jural Opposites are the legal relations which are opposite in nature to each other like

Right ↔ No- Right & Power ↔ Disability

Whereas Jural Correlatives are subordinate to each other, for instance

Right ↔ Duty & Power ↔ Liability

4
See Mark Andrews, “Hohfeld’s Cube”, 16:3 Akron Law Review; 471 (1979).
5
See Supra note 2 at pg. 13
6
See Alan D. Cullison, “A Review of Hohfeld's Fundamental Legal Concepts”, 16 Cleveland -Marshall Law Review
559 (1967)
7
See Supra note 3

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EXPLANATION OF RELATIONS

Hohfeld’s relations can be best understood through examples. Following are the different examples of
different legal relations.

Hohfeld explained the correlations as “if X has a right against Y that he shall stay off the formers (X) land,
the correlative is that Y is under a duty toward X to stay off his place”. Thus, a right is enjoyed by an
individual as against another individual is that the second shall do or refrain from doing something for the
first. Thus X has a right against Y with regard to act A, if and only if Y has a duty to X with regard to act
A.8

Hohfeld has also explained "no-right" and "privilege” concepts as well. They are, respectively, the opposites
of "right" and "duty." The terms "privilege" and "no-right" are also correlatives. X has a privilege against
Y with regard to act A, if and only if Y has a no-right against X with regard to A. 9

A “liability” is the correlative of a “power”. A person X is under a liability, if there is an act another person
can perform that will affect the legal relations of X.10

“Disabilities” and “immunities” are the opposites of “powers” and “liabilities”. If X does not have a power
with regard to individual Y, then X is under a disability with regard to Y. Similarly, if Y is not under a
liability with regard to X, then Y has an immunity with regard to X.11 Whereas “Disabilities” and
“immunities” are also correlatives of each other. If X has a disability with regard to Y, that is, X has no
power to affect Y's legal relations, then Y is immune from having his or her legal relations affected by X.
Similarly, if Y is immune with regard to X, then X is under a disability with regard to Y.12

If rights and duties must always be paired, then no-rights and privileges must also always be paired. Thus,
an individual has a no-right against another individual with regard to a particular act if and only if that
individual does not have a right against the second individual with regard to that act. Similarly, an individual
has a privilege against a second individual with regard to a particular act if and only if the individual does
not have a duty toward the second individual with regard to that act.

8
See Supra note 4 at 468.
9
Ibid.
10
Ibid.
11
Ibid.
12
Ibid.

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SOURCES OF HOHFELD'S TERMS

Hohfeld explicitly declines to provide any specific definitions for his eight conceptions. They are sui
generis. Instead, he accords meaning to these conceptions by articulating their relations, by demonstrating
their instantiation in case law and legal scholarship, and by showing how they can be used to reveal sloppy
thinking and faulty analyses.13 Before understanding further about the Hohfeld’s relations let us first
understand what he meant by the terms “right”, “duty”, “privilege”, “immunity”. The first thing that needs
clarifying is what kind of rights, duties, etc., Hohfeld was talking about and where do they come from?
Hohfeld's rights, duties, privileges, and no-rights are simply shorthand terms for saying what liabilities the
law prescribes between two people for the doing or not doing of an act.14 Hohfeld's "duty" arises from rules
of positive law.15

The term "DUTY" is commonly misinterpreted by others as Hohfeld used it. By "duty" he did not mean
the moralist duties or duties of a son towards his father; Hohfeld was talking about legal duties, whereas
powers, immunities, liabilities and disabilities involve changes in legal relations they exist in situations in
which the potential change in legal relations is dependent on the volitional act of some person.16

A "RIGHT" as Hohfeld viewed it, is merely a "duty" from the other fellow's viewpoint. Rights and Duties,
Hohfeld said, are jural correlatives. Whenever there is a duty there must also be a correlative right, and vice
versa.17

Hohfeld's system is often misunderstood, and probably the most frequently misunderstood of his terms is
his "PRIVILEGE." To many people when someone has a "privilege" it means that he is free to act or not
as he sees fit. Thus, one of Hohfeld's critics wrote:

[F] or me to have a privilege of doing a thing, means . . . (1) to have no duty of doing the thing, (2) to have
no claim or right against others that they should refrain from interfering with my doing the thing, and (3)
to be under no duty not to do the thing.18

13
See Pierre Schlag,“How to do things with Hohfeld”, 78 Law and Contemporary Problems, available at:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2465148 pg. 189
14
See Supra note 6 at pg. 8
15
See Supra note 6 at pg. 559
16
See Kevin W. Saunders, “A Formal Analysis of Hohfeldian Relations”, 23 Akron L. Rev. 465 (1989-1990) pg. 16
17
See Supra note 13 at pg. 563
18
See Husik, “Hohfeld's Jurisprudence”, 72 U. Pa. L. Rev. 263, 267 (1924).

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For example, under ordinary circumstances A owes B neither a duty to paint A's house nor a duty not to
paint it. That is to say, A is ordinarily privileged as against B to paint A's house or not as he sees fit. In
neither case would the rules of law make him liable to B. However, suppose A enters into a binding contract
with B whereby A agrees to paint the house. Under these circumstances A would owe B a duty to paint the
house since the law would make him liable to B (in contract) if he failed to paint it as he promised. A would
not have a privilege as against B not to paint the house, but he would have a privilege to paint the house.
On the other hand, if A contracts with B not to paint the house, then he would have no privilege to paint the
house, but he would be privileged not to paint it. These illustrations show that it is possible, under
appropriate circumstances, for A to have both privileges (to do the thing or not to do it), or to have just one
of them (either one). Evidently it is not possible for A to have neither privilege, for that would mean A
would be liable to B whether he painted the house or not.19

“POWER” is one's ability to alter legal (or moral) relations. 20 For example, when someone make an offer
of a contract, that gives the offeree the power to create a contract by accepting the offer (or not). If the
power to create the contract is exercised, then both parties have rights and duties with respect to each other.
Courts have power, only if plaintiffs or prosecutors exercise their power to commence a lawsuit.21

“IMMUNITY”: If X has an immunity against Y, it means that Y has no power to change X's legal position
with respect to any entitlements covered by the immunity. For instance, if the state has no power to place
me under a duty to wear a hat when I go out, I have immunity in that respect, and the state a disability (a
correlative to immunity). Simmonds in notes of ‘Constitutional Bills of Rights’ stated that:

“Hohfeldian analysis of rights is very important given its clarity and precision to ensure that the state does
not overpower the individual. Hohfeld's analysis is useful in getting a clear sight of the jural relations of
the parties involved and their legal positions”.22

HOHFELD'S CUBE THEORY

The theory presented here is that the eight jural relations may be effectively graphed as the eight corners of
a cube, and this image unifies all eight into a single logical structure. This structure symbolizes real legal

19
See Supra note 6 at pg. 566.
20
See Nikolai Lazarev, “Hohfeld’s Analysis of Rights: An Essential Approach to a Conceptual and Practical
Understanding of the Nature of Rights” available at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MurUEJL/2005/9.html
21
See Joseph William Singer, “The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from Bentham to Hohfeld”,
1982 Wis.L.Rev. 975, 986-87 available at: http://www.kentlaw.edu/perritt/courses/property/Hohfeld.htm
22
See Supra note 20

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relationships and assists an understanding of the way legal relations work.23

CONSTRUCTION OF THE CUBE

First arbitrarily choose a place to locate the relation "Right," and then subsequently locating the other
concepts. Here "Right" is placed at the upper left-hand
corner of the back of the cube, "Duty" then appears on the
corresponding corner of the front of the cube. The next
jural relation, "Privilege" which is the opposite of “Duty”,
and bears no direct relation to “Right”. So “Privilege” will
lie on a diagonal on the same side of the cube as “Duty”,
which is the traditional method of symbolizing two
opposing statements on a square of opposition. "No-Right" is the correlative of “Privilege”, and thus it
appears on the corresponding back corner of the cube. The cube now contains the first four concepts of
Hohfeld.24 Similarly other jural relations are also place at the corners of the cube as shown in the figure.

The cube demonstrates that Hohfeld's ideas fulfill his original intention - to clarify legal thinking. Once it
is known that there are eight and only eight jural relations, that there are well-defined relationships among
them, and that these relationships behave in
predictable ways, then the analysis of all
legal questions, even the most complex,
becomes easier. Two disputing parties are
able to define their unsettled question more
precisely, and the court, agency, or
legislature is able to settle the same question
with correspondingly greater precision. Of
greater practical interest, however, is the
possibility that Hohfeld's Cube may enable
a computer to draw analogies.25
Hohfeld jural relation in Venn diagram

23
See Supra note 16 at pg. 472
24
See Supra note 16 at pg. 474
25
See Supra note 16 at pg. 484

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APPLICATION TO CASE ANALYSIS

Hohfeldian analysis allows one to identify and define people’s relative positions under the law and the legal
issues involved in any dispute. This section illustrates how.

1. O’Brien v. Cunard S.S. Co., Ltd.26

Mary O’Brien was a passenger aboard a steamship from Queenstown to Boston. As the ship neared Boston,
a physician began vaccinating the passengers. O’Brien never expressly requested a vaccination, but she
stood in line with about 200 women awaiting vaccinations. When her turn came, O’Brien presented her
apparently unvaccinated arm to the physician, and he vaccinated her. She later sued Cunard Steam-Ship
Company in the Superior Court of Suffolk County, Massachusetts, alleging that Cunard’ physician
assaulted her by vaccinating her against her will. After the Superior Court found in Cunard’s favor, O’Brien
appealed to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. O’Brien’s allegation implies that at the moment
when she was vaccinated Cunard’s physician had a duty not to vaccinate her, she had a correlative claim
that he not vaccinate her, and the physician violated his duty by giving her the vaccination. The court
reasoned, however, that “[i]f the plaintiff’s behavior was such as to indicate consent on her part, he was
justified in his act, whatever her unexpressed feelings may have been.”

Thus, while Cunard’s physician may have had the mentioned duty, O’Brien had a power to change that
duty into a liberty by giving her consent. The factual question for the court thus became whether she had
exercised her power before the critical moment when Cunard’s physician vaccinated her. Finding that
O’Brien had consented, the court concluded that Cunard was not liable to an order to pay damages. Thus,
the relevant legal relation involved a liberty and a no-claim. Cunard’s physician had a liberty to vaccinate
O’Brien, and she had a no-claim that he not vaccinate her. O’Brien also had liberties to step away or
withdraw her arm, but she did neither.27

2. Feinberg v. Pfeiffer, Co.28

26
O’Brien v. Cunard S.S. Co., Ltd., 154 Mass. 272, 273-74 (1891).
27
See Supra note 2 at pg. 8
28
Feinberg v. Pfeiffer, Co., 322 S.W.2d 163, 164 (Mo. App. 1959).

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Anna Feinberg worked for the Pfeiffer Company for decades. One day, Pfeiffer’s board of directors
resolved “that she be afforded the privilege of retiring from active duty in the corporation at any time she
may elect to see fit so to do upon retirement pay of $200.00 per month, for the remainder of her life.”
Pfeiffer began sending Feinberg monthly $200 checks when she later retired, but after two changes in
management, the company discontinued these payments. Feinberg brought an action in the Circuit Court
of St. Louis, Missouri, requesting an order for Pfeiffer to pay the amount owed. After the Circuit Court
found in Feinberg’s favor, Pfeiffer appealed to the St. Louis Court of Appeals.

Feinberg argued that, by passing the resolution, Pfeiffer’s board had imposed a duty on Pfeiffer to pay her
$200 monthly. She would thus have a correlative claim to those payments. Pfeiffer responded that because
the resolution did not satisfy the elements required to form a contract, Pfeiffer never had such a duty.
Instead, it said that Feinberg had merely been receiving $200 gifts. The Court of Appeals agreed with
Pfeiffer on this question, reasoning that while Pfeiffer had a power to contract with Feinberg, the alleged
duty to pay $200 monthly could not have resulted from the resolution because Feinberg never gave any
consideration in exchange for the promise. Thus, under these circumstances, the legal relation between
Pfeiffer and Feinberg involved a liberty and a no-claim.

The Court further observed, however, that Feinberg had relied to her detriment on Pfeiffer’s promise by
stopping work at an age when she could not easily find another job. Under the doctrine of promissory
estoppel, Feinberg’s reliance effectively exercised a power to create the desired contract with Pfeiffer.
Viewing her behavior in this light, the Court affirmed the lower court’s order that Pfeiffer pay damages to
Feinberg. This order created a duty for Pfeiffer and a correlative claim for Feinberg.29

CONCLUSION

Hohfeld's fundamental legal relations are essentially shorthand ways of describing the legal effects of acts
done by human beings. The ultimate legal effect in a court judgment.30 Hohfeld analysis thus in theory,
assist in completely describing the legal effects of any act of any person.

29
See Supra note 2 at pg. 8
30
See Supra note 6 at pg. 573

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