Legislative Department

DUMAUAL, Jeanne Pauline J.
[Year]
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
Aquino III V. Comelec

Apr. 7, 2010
Issue:
This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse
Robredo seek the nullification as unconstitutional of Republic Act No. 9716, entitled “An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second
(2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment.”
Republic Act No. 9716 originated from House Bill No. 4264, and was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009. It took
effect on 31 October 2009 creating an additional legislative district for the Province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing first and second
legislative districts of the province.
The Province of Camarines Sur was estimated to have a population of 1,693,821,2 distributed among four (4) legislative districts. Following the enactment
of Republic Act No. 9716, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to create an additional legislative district for the
province. Hence, the first district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the second district
municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second legislative district.
Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul of the explicit constitutional standard that requires a
minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) for the creation of a legislative district. Petitioners rely on Section 5(3), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution as basis for the cited 250,000 minimum population standard. The provision reads:
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.
The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and second districts of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the
proposed first district will end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.
Issue:
w/n a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a new legislative district in a province?
Held:
We deny the petition.
Ruling:
There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population that must compose a legislative district.
The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase “each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand” from the phrase “or
each province” point to no other conclusion than that the 250,000 minimum population is only required for a city, but not for a province.26
Atty. Reynaldo Lopez, Constitutional Law Review Page 1

DUMAUAL, Jeanne Pauline J. [Year]
Apropos for discussion is the provision of the Local Government Code on the creation of a province which, by virtue of and upon creation, is entitled to at
least a legislative district. Thus, Section 461 of the Local Government Code states:
Requisites for Creation. –

(a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos
(P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office.
Notably, the requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement, but is merely an alternative addition to the indispensable income requirement.
Aldaba vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 188078, January 25, 2010
Facts: This case is an original action for Prohibition to declareunconstitutional, R.A. 9591 which creates a legislative district for the City of Malolos, Bulacan.
Allegedly, the R.A. violates the minimum population requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a city. Before the May 1, 2009, the province of
Bulacan was represented in Congress through 4 legislative districts. Before the passage of the Act through House Bill 3162 (later converted to House Bill 3693)
and Senate Bill 1986, Malolos City had a population of 223, 069 in 2007.
House Bill 3693 cites the undated Certification, as requested to be issued to Mayor Domingo (then Mayor of Malolos), by Region III Director Miranda of NSO that
the population of Malolos will be as projected, 254,030 by the year 2010.
Petitioners contended that R.A. 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum population threshold of 250,000 for a city to meritrepresentative in
Congress.
Issue: Whether or not R.A. 9591, “Án act creating a legislative district for the City of Malolos, Bulacan” is unconstitutional as petitioned. And whether the City of
Malolos has at least 250,000 actual or projected.
Held: It was declared by the Supreme Court that the R.A. 9591 isunconstitutional for being violative of Section 5 (3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and
Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution on the grounds that, as required by the 1987 Constitution, a city must have at least 250,000
population. In relation with this, Regional Director Miranda issued a Certification which is based on the demographic projections, was declared without legal
effect because the Regional Director has no basis and no authority to issue the Certification based on the following statements supported by Section 6 of E.O.
135 as signed by President Fidel V. Ramos, which provides:

The certification on demographic projection can be issued only if such are declared official by the Nat’l Statistics Coordination Board. In this case, it was not
stated whether the document have been declared official by the NSCB.
The certification can be issued only by the NSO Administrator or his designated certifying officer, in which case, the Regional Director of Central Luzon NSO is
unauthorized.
The population projection must be as of the middle of the year, which in this case, the Certification issued by Director Miranda was undated.
It was also computed that the correct figures using the growth rate, even if compounded, the Malolos population of 223,069 as of August 1, 2007 will grow to
only 249,333 as of August 1, 2010.
It was emphasized that the 1935 Constitution, that this Court ruled that the aim of legislative reappointment is to equalize the population and voting power
among districts.
G.R. No. 207851, July 8, 2014

Angel Naval
vs COMELEC and Nelson Julia
Facts:
Naval had served as member of the Sanggunian, 2nd District of CamSur. On October 12, 2009, RA 9716 was
approved, reapportioning the legislative district of Province of CamSur.
Notably, 8 out of 10 towns were taken from the old Second District to form the present Third District.
The present Second District is composed of the two remaining towns, Gainza and Milaor, merged with five
towns from the old First District.
In the 2010 elections, Naval once again won as among the members of the Sanggunian, Third District. He
served until 2013.
In the 2013 elections, Naval ran anewand was re-elected as Member of the Sanggunian, Third District.
Julia was likewise a Sanggunian Member candidate from the Third District in the 2013 elections. On
October 29, 2012, he invoked Section 7810 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) and filed before the
COMELEC a Verified Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of Naval. Julia
posited that Naval had fully served the entire Province of Camarines Sur for three consecutive terms as
a member of the Sanggunian, irrespective of the district he had been elected from. The three-term limit
rule’s application is more with reference to the same local elective post, and not necessarily in
connection with an identical territorial jurisdiction. Allowing Naval to run as a Sanggunian member for
the fourth time is violative of the inflexible three-term limit rule enshrined in the Constitution and
the LGC, which must be strictly construed.
COMELEC cancelled Naval's COC.

The conditions for the application of the three-term limit rule are present in the instant case as the
records clearly establish that [Naval] is running for the 4th time for the same government post. To put
things in a proper perspective, it is imperative to review and discuss the salient points in the case of
Latasa v. [COMELEC]. The case involves the question of whether or not a municipal mayor, having been
elected and had already served for three (3) consecutive terms, canrun as city mayor in light of the
conversion of the municipality to a city. In applying the three-term limit rule, the Court pointed out
that the conversion of the municipality into a city did not convert the office of the municipal mayor
into a local government post different from the office of the city mayor. The Court took into account
the following circumstances: (1) That the territorial jurisdiction of [the] city was the same as that of
the municipality; (2) That the inhabitants were the same group of voters who elected the municipal mayor
for three (3) consecutive terms; and (3) That the inhabitants were the same group of voters [over] whom
he held power and authority as their chief executive for nine years.
Ruling:
Court denies the petition.
A republic is a representative government, a government run by and for the people. It is not a pure
democracy where the people govern themselves directly. The essence of republicanism is representation
and renovation, the selection by the citizenry of a corps of public functionaries who derive their
mandate from the people and act on their behalf, serving for a limited period only, after which they are
replaced or retained, at the option of their principal.

R.A.No. 9716 plainly state that the new Second Districtis to be created, but the Third Districtis to be
renamed. Verba legis non est recedendum. The terms used in a legal provision to be construed compels
acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers mean
what they say.
The rationale behind reapportionment is the constitutional requirement to achieve equality of

representation among the districts. It is with this mindset that the Court should consider Naval’s
argument anent having a new set of constituents electing him into office in 2010 and 2013.
Naval’s ineligibility to run, by reason of violation of the three-term limit rule, does not undermine
the right to equal representation of any of the districts in Camarines Sur. With or without him, the
renamed Third District, which he labels as a new set of constituents, would still be represented, albeit
by another eligible person.
Bagabuyo vs COMELEC
Plebescite
FACTS:
Cagayan de Oro only had one legislative district before. In 2006, CdO congressman Jaraula sponsored a bill to have two legislative districts in CdO instead. The
law was passed (RA 9371) hence two legislative districts were created. Bagabuyo assailed the validity of the said law and he went immediately to the Supreme
Court. He was contending that the 2nd district was created without a plebiscite which was required by the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not a plebiscite was required in the case at bar.
HELD: No, a plebiscite is not required in the case at bar. RA 9371 merely increased the representation of Cagayan de Oro City in the House of Representatives
and Sangguniang Panglungsod pursuant to Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution; the criteria established under Section 10, Article X of the 1987
Constitution only apply when there is a creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of a province, city, municipality, or
barangay; in this case, no such creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundaries of a local government unit took place; and R.A. No. 9371 did
not bring about any change in Cagayan de Oro’s territory, population and income classification; hence, no plebiscite is required.

Petitioner: Regina Ongsiako Reyes

Respondents: Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and Joseph Socorro B. Tan
Facts:
Petitioner filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of Representative of the lone district of Marinduque.
Respondent, a registered voter and resident of the Municipality of Torrijos, Marinduque, filed before the COMELEC a
petition for the cancellation of petitioner’s COC. On October 31, 2012, the respondent filed the amended petition on the
ground that the petitioner’s COC contained material misrepresentations regarding the petitioner’s marital status, residency,
date of birth and citizenship. Respondent alleged that the petitioner is an American citizen and filed in February 8, 2013 a
manifestation with motion to admit newly discovered evidence and amended last exhibit.
On March 27, 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution cancelling the petitioner’s COC on the basis that
petitioner is not a citizen of the Philippines because of her failure to comply with the requirements of Republic Act (RA) No.
9225.
The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on April 8, 2013. But on May 14, 2013 the COMELEC en banc promulgated
a Resolution denying the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.
On May 18, 2013, petitioner was proclaimed winner of the May 13, 2013 elections and on June 5, 2013 took her oath of office
before the Speaker of House of Representatives. She has yet to assume office at noon of June 30, 2013.
On June 5, 2013, the COMELEC en banc issued a Certificate of Finality declaring the May 14, 2013 Resolution of the
COMELEC en banc final and executory.
Petitioner then filed before the court Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Status Quo
Ante Order.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the COMELEC has the jurisdiction over the petitioner who is a duly proclaimed winner and who has already taken her
oath of office for the position of member of the House of Representative.
2. Whether or not the COMELEC erred in its ruling that the petitioner is illegible to run for office
Discussion:
1. Pursuant to Section 17, Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution, the House of Representative Electoral Tribunal has the exclusive jurisdiction to
be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election returns and qualification of the members of House of Representative.
2. In R.A 9925, for a respondent to reacquire Filipino citizenship and become eligible for public office, the law requires that she must have
accomplished the following 1) take the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the consul-general of the Philippine
Consulate in the USA, and 2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of her American citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath. In the case at bar, there is no showing that petitioner complied with the requirements. Petitioner’s oath of office as
Provincial Administrator cannot be considered as the oath of allegiance in compliance with RA 9225. As to the issue of residency, the
court approved the ruling if the COMELEC that a Filipino citizen who becomes naturalized elsewhere effectively abandons his domicile
of origin. Upon reacquisition of Filipino citizenship, he must still show that he chose to establish his domicile in the Philippines through
positive acts, and the period of his residency shall be counted from the time he made it his domicile of choice. In this case, there is no
showing that the petitioner reacquired her Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 so as to conclude that the petitioner renounced her
American citizenship, it follows that she has not abandoned her domicile of choice in the USA. Petitioner claim that she served as
Provincial Administrator of the province of Marinduque from January 18, 2011 to July 13, 2011 is not sufficient to prove her one-year
residency for she has never recognized her domicile in Marinduque as she remains to be an American citizen. No amount of her stay in
the said locality can substitute the fact that she has not abandoned her domicile of choice in the USA.
Held:
The instant petition was DISMISSED, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC.
G.R. No. 179271 April 21, 2009

BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY (BANAT), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (sitting as the National Board of Canvassers), Respondent.
ARTS BUSINESS AND SCIENCE PROFESSIONALS, Intervenor.
AANGAT TAYO, Intervenor.
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (SENIOR CITIZENS), Intervenor.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 179295 April 21, 2009
BAYAN MUNA, ADVOCACY FOR TEACHER EMPOWERMENT THROUGH ACTION, COOPERATION AND HARMONY TOWARDS EDUCATIONAL
REFORMS, INC., and ABONO, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
Facts:
On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution, docketed as NBC
No. 07-041 (PL) before the NBC. BANAT filed its petition because "the Chairman and the Members of the COMELEC have recently been quoted in
the national papers that the COMELEC is duty bound to and shall implement the Veterans ruling, that is, would apply the Panganiban formula in
allocating party-list seats."
BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the ruling in NBC Resolution No. 07-88. BANAT did not file a motion for
reconsideration of NBC Resolution No. 07-88.
On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC, to reconsider its decision to use the Veterans
formula as stated in its NBC Resolution No. 07-60 because the Veterans formula is violative of the Constitution and of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A.
No. 7941). On the same day, the COMELEC denied reconsideration during the proceedings of the NBC.
Issue:
Considering the allegations in the petitions and the comments of the parties in these cases, we defined the following issues in our advisory for the
oral arguments set on 22 April 2008:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling?
2. Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
3. Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for one seat constitutional?
4. How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?
5. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the party-list elections? If not, can the major political parties be
barred from participating in the party-list elections?

Held:
WHEREFORE we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELEC dated 3 August 2007 in NBC No. 07-041
(PL) as well as the Resolution dated 9 July 2007 in NBC No. 07-60. We declare unconstitutional the two percent threshold in the distribution of
additional party-list seats.
Ratio: Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the entire 20% allocation of party-list representatives found in the
Constitution. However, we cannot allow the continued existence of a provision in the law which will systematically prevent the constitutionally
allocated 20% party-list representatives from being filled. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified party-list
organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party from dominating the party-list elections.
We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the
additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold
makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the number of available party list seats
exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the
permissive ceiling.
In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our allocation of additional seats to the two-percenters. The percentage of
votes garnered by each party-list candidate is arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of
votes cast for party-list candidates. There are two steps in the second round of seat allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by the remaining
available seats, 38, which is the difference between the 55 maximum seats reserved under the Party-List System and the 17 guaranteed seats of
the two-percenters. The whole integer of the product of the percentage and of the remaining available seats corresponds to a party’s share in the
remaining available seats. Second, we assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next in rank until all available seats are completely
distributed. We distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in the second round of seat allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine the
number of seats each qualified party-list candidate is entitled.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers
of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of
the Constitutional Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral seats, and in the alternative the reservation of the party-list system to
the sectoral groups. In defining a "party" that participates in party-list elections as either "a political party or a sectoral party," R.A. No. 7941 also
clearly intended that major political parties will participate in the party-list elections. Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections is
manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-political
engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties from the party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the
law.
In view of the inclusion of major political parties (according to Puno, J.)
The Court today effectively reversed the ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani v. COMELEC with regard to the computation of seat allotments and the
participation of major political parties in the party-list system. I vote for the formula propounded by the majority as it benefits the party-list system but
I regret that my interpretation of Article VI, Section 5 of the Constitution with respect to the participation of the major political parties in the election of
party-list representatives is not in direct congruence with theirs, hence

There is no gainsaying the fact that the party-list parties are no match to our traditional political parties in the political arena. This is borne out in
the party-list elections held in 2001 where major political parties were initially allowed to campaign and be voted for. The results confirmed the fear
expressed by some commissioners in the Constitutional Commission that major political parties would figure in the disproportionate distribution of
votes: of the 162 parties which participated, the seven major political parties made it to the top 50. These seven parties garnered an accumulated
9.54% of the total number of votes counted, yielding an average of 1.36% each, while the remaining 155 parties (including those whose
qualifications were contested) only obtained 90.45% or an average of 0.58% each. Of these seven, three parties or 42.8% of the total number of the
major parties garnered more than 2% of the total number of votes each, a feat that would have entitled them to seat their members as party-list
representatives. In contrast, only about 4% of the total number of the remaining parties, or only 8 out of the 155 parties garnered more than 2%.
In sum, the evils that faced our marginalized and underrepresented people at the time of the framing of the 1987 Constitution still haunt them
today. It is through the party-list system that the Constitution sought to address this systemic dilemma. In ratifying the Constitution, our people
recognized how the interests of our poor and powerless sectoral groups can be frustrated by the traditional political parties who have the machinery
and chicanery to dominate our political institutions. If we allow major political parties to participate in the party-list system electoral process, we will
surely suffocate the voice of the marginalized, frustrate their sovereignty and betray the democratic spirit of the Constitution. That opinion will serve
as the graveyard of the party-list system.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, I dissent on the ruling allowing the entry of major political parties into the party-list system.
In view of 2% being unconstitutional (according to Nachura, J.)

However, I wish to add a few words to support the proposition that the inflexible 2% threshold vote required for entitlement by a party-list group
to a seat in the House of Representatives in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This minimum vote requirement ─ fixed at 2% of the
total number of votes cast for the party list system ─ presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5 (2), Article VI, of the
Philippine Constitution. As such, it effectively defeats the declared constitutional policy, as well as the legislative objective expressed in the enabling
law, to allow the people’s broadest representation in Congress,the raison d’etre for the adoption of the party-list system.
Today, a little over eight (8) years after this Court’s decision in Veterans Federation Party, we see that in the 14th Congress, 55 seats are
allocated to party-list representatives, using the Veterans formula. But that figure (of 55) can never be realized, because the 2% threshold vote
requirement makes it mathematically impossible to have more than 50 seats. After all, the total number of votes cast for the party-list system can
never exceed 100%.
Lest I be misunderstood, I do not advocate doing away completely with a threshold vote requirement. The need for such a minimum vote
requirement was explained in careful and elaborate detail by Chief Justice Puno in his separate concurring opinion in Veterans Federation Party. I
fully agree with him that a minimum vote requirement is needed --
1. to avoid a situation where the candidate will just use the party-list system as a fallback position;
2. to discourage nuisance candidates or parties, who are not ready and whose chances are very low, from participating in the elections;
3. to avoid the reserve seat system by opening up the system;
4. to encourage the marginalized sectors to organize, work hard, and earn their seats within the system;
5. to enable sectoral representatives to rise to the same majesty as that of the elected representatives in the legislative body, rather than owing to
some degree their seats in the legislative body either to an outright constitutional gift or to an appointment by the President of the Philippines;

6. if no threshold is imposed, this will actually proliferate political party groups and those who have not really been given by the people sufficient
basis for them to represent their constituents and, in turn, they will be able to get to the Parliament through the backdoor under the name of the
party-list system; and
7. to ensure that only those with a more or less substantial following can be represented.9
However, with the burgeoning of the population, the steady increase in the party-list seat allotment as it keeps pace with the creation of
additional legislative districts, and the foreseeable growth of party-list groups, the fixed 2% vote requirement is no longer viable. It does not
adequately respond to the inevitable changes that come with time; and it is, in fact, inconsistent with the Constitution, because it prevents the
fundamental law from ever being fully operative.
It is correct to say, and I completely agree with Veterans Federation Party, that Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, is not mandatory, that
it merely provides a ceiling for the number of party-list seats in Congress. But when the enabling law, R.A. 7941, enacted by Congress for the
precise purpose of implementing the constitutional provision, contains a condition that places the constitutional ceiling completely beyond reach,
totally impossible of realization, then we must strike down the offending condition as an affront to the fundamental law. This is not simply an inquiry
into the wisdom of the legislative measure; rather it involves the duty of this Court to ensure that constitutional provisions remain effective at all
times. No rule of statutory construction can save a particular legislative enactment that renders a constitutional provision inoperative and ineffectual.
ATONG PAGLAUM, INC. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, (G)
G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013
FACTS:
The case constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by 52 party-list groups and organizations assailing the Resolutions
issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) disqualifying them from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their
petitions for registration under the party-list system, or cancellation of their registration and accreditation as party-list organizations.
Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941) and COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9366 and 9531, approximately 280 groups and organizations
registered and manifested their desire to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections

December 5, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the COMELEC Second Division’s resolution to grant Partido ng Bayan ng Bida’s (PBB) registration and
accreditation as a political party in the National Capital Region. However, PBB was denied participation in the elections because PBB does not represent any
"marginalized and underrepresented" sector.
13 petitioners were not able to secure a mandatory injunction from the Court. The COMELEC, on 7 January 2013 issued Resolution No. 9604, and excluded the
names of these 13 petitioners in the printing of the official.
Pursuant to paragraph 2 of Resolution No. 9513, the COMELEC En Banc scheduled summary evidentiary hearings to determine whether the groups and
organizations that filed manifestations of intent to participate in the elections have continually complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 7941 and Ang Bagong
Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC (Ang Bagong Bayani).
39 petitioners were able to secure a mandatory injunction from the Court, directing the COMELEC to include the names of these 39 petitioners in the printing of
the official ballot for the elections.
Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. This Court issued Status Quo Ante Orders in all
petitions.
ISSUE:
Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the
elections.
HELD:
No, the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing decisions in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming
elections. However, since the Court adopts new parameters in the qualification of the party-list system, thereby abandoning the rulings in the decisions applied
by the COMELEC in disqualifying petitioners, we remand to the COMELEC all the present petitions for the COMELEC to determine who are qualified to register
under the party-list system, and to participate in the coming elections, under the new parameters prescribed in this Decision.

Moreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that, during the first three consecutive terms of Congress after the ratification of the 1987
Constitution, "one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector." This provision
clearly shows again that the party-list system is not exclusively for sectoral parties for two obvious reasons.
First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives would naturally be open to non-sectoral party-list representatives, clearly negating
the idea that the party-list system is exclusively for sectoral parties representing the "marginalized and underrepresented."
Second, the reservation of one-half of the party-list seats to sectoral parties applies only for the first "three consecutive terms after the ratification of this
Constitution," clearly making the party-list system fully open after the end of the first three congressional terms. This means that, after this period, there will be
no seats reserved for any class or type of party that qualifies under the three groups constituting the party-list system.
Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained in Section 5(1) and (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the
party-list system is not for sectoral parties only, but also for non-sectoral parties.
R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or organizations to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. To require all
national and regional parties under the party-list system to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" is to deprive and exclude, by judicial fiat,
ideology-based and cause-oriented parties from the party-list system. How will these ideology-based and cause-oriented parties, who cannot win in legislative
district elections, participate in the electoral process if they are excluded from the party-list system? To exclude them from the party-list system is to prevent
them from joining the parliamentary struggle, leaving as their only option the armed struggle. To exclude them from the party-list system is, apart from being
obviously senseless, patently contrary to the clear intent and express wording of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941
G.R. Nos. 206844-45, July 23, 2013

Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizen in the Philippines, Inc.
vs COMELEC
Facts:
March 2007, COMELEC accredited Senior Citizen as a party-list organization. Senior Citizen then
participated in the May 2007 elections, however failed to get the 2% total votes cast. In accordance

with the procedure set forth in BANAT for the allocation of additional seats under the party-list
system, Senior Citizen was given one seat.
Subsequently, Senior Citizen was allowed to participate in the May 2010 elections. After the conduct of
the May 10, 2010 elections, SENIOR CITIZENS ranked second among all the party-list candidates and was
allocated two seats in the House of Representatives. The first seat was occupied by its first nominee,
Rep. Arquiza, while the second was given to its second nominee, David L. Kho (Rep. Kho).
Later, David Kho tendered his resignation letter as representative which was followed by a board
resolution of Senior Citizen accepting such resignation in accordance with the term-sharing agreement
made between the nominees of the party-list. COMELEC, however, did not recognize the resignation saying
that it is against public policy. The term of public offcials cannot be made subject to any agreement of
private parties for public office is not a commodity that can be shared, apportioned or be made subject
to any private agreement. COMELEC resolved to cancel the registration of the Senior Citizens as party-
list.
December 11, 2012, SC initially granted status quo ante orders of Senior Citizens and directed COMELEC
to include the name of Senior Citizens in the printing of offcial ballots for the May 2013 elections. SC
later ruled that the cancellation of registration was in order. Thus, this petition.
Ruling:
We find merit.
(1) In the instant case, the review of the registration of SENIOR CITIZENS was made pursuant to COMELEC
Resolution No. 9513 through a summary evidentiary hearing carried out on August 24, 2012 in SPP No. 12-
157 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-191 (PLM). In this hearing, both the Arquiza Group and the Datol Group were
indeed given the opportunity to adduce evidence as to their continuing compliance with the requirements
for party-list accreditation. Nevertheless, the due process violation was committed when they were not
apprised of the fact that the term-sharing agreement entered into by the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS in
2010 would be a material consideration in the evaluation of the organization’s qualifications as a
party-list group for the May 13, 2013 elections. As it were, both factions of SENIOR CITIZENS were not
able to answer this issue squarely. In other words, they were deprived of the opportunity to adequately
explain their side regarding the term-sharing agreement and/or to adduce evidence, accordingly, in
support of their position.

In its Comment to the petitions, the COMELEC countered that petitioners were actually given the
opportunity to present their side on the issue of the term-sharing agreement during the hearing on April
18, 2012. Said hearing was allegedly conducted to determine petitioners’ continuing compliance for
accreditation as a party-list organization.
The Court is not persuaded. It is true that during the April 18, 2012 hearing, the rival groups of
SENIOR CITIZENS admitted to the existence of the term-sharing agreement. Contrary to the claim of
COMELEC, however, said hearing was conducted for purposes of discussing the petition of the Arquiza
Group in E.M. No. 12-040. To recall, said petition asked for the confirmation of the replacement of Rep.
Kho, who had tendered his resignation effective on December 31, 2011. More specifically, the transcript
of the hearing reveals that the focus thereof was on the petition filed by the Arquiza group and its
subsequent manifestation, praying that the group be allowed to withdraw its petition. Also, during the
hearing, COMELEC Chairman Brillantes did admonish the rival factions of SENIOR CITIZENS about their
conflicts and warned them about the complications brought about by their term-sharing agreement.
However, E.M. No. 12-040 was not a proceeding regarding the qualifications of SENIOR CITIZENS as a
party-list group and the issue of whether the term-sharing agreement may be a ground for
disqualification was neither raised nor resolved in that case. Chairman Brillantes’s remonstration was
not sufficient as to constitute a fair warning that the term-sharing agreement would be considered as a
ground for the cancellation of SENIOR CITIZENS’ registration and accreditation.
(2) The term-sharing agreement among the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS, was not implemented. This fact was
manifested by the Arquiza Group even during the April 18, 2012 hearing conducted by the COMELEC En Banc
in E.M. No. 12-040 wherein the Arquiza Group manifested that it was withdrawing its petition for
confirmation and approval of Rep. Kho’s replacement. Thereafter, in its Resolution dated June 27, 2012
in E.M. No. 12-040, the COMELEC En Banc itself refused to recognize the term-sharing agreement and the
tender of resignation of Rep. Kho. The COMELEC even declared that no vacancy was created despite the
execution of the said agreement. Subsequently, there was also no indication that the nominees of SENIOR
CITIZENS still tried to implement, much less succeeded in implementing, the term-sharing agreement.
Before this Court, the Arquiza Group and the Datol Group insist on this fact of non-implementation of
the agreement. Thus, for all intents and purposes, Rep. Kho continued to hold his seat and served his
term as a member of the House of Representatives, in accordance with COMELEC Resolution No. 9366 and the
COMELEC En Banc ruling in E.M. No. 12-040. Curiously, the COMELEC is silent on this point.

Indubitably, if the term-sharing agreement was not actually implemented by the parties thereto, it
appears that SENIOR CITIZENS, as a party-list organization, had been unfairly and arbitrarily penalized
by the COMELEC En Banc. Verily, how can there be disobedience on the part of SENIOR CITIZENS when its
nominees, in fact, desisted from carrying out their agreement? Hence, there was no violation of an
election law, rule, or regulation to speak of. Clearly then, the disqualification of SENIOR CITIZENS and
the cancellation of its registration and accreditation have no legal leg to stand on.
ATTY. ISIDRO Q. LICO v. COMELEC EN BANC,

GR No. 205505, 2015-09-29
FACTS:
Ating Koop filed its Manifestation of Intent to Participate in the PartyList System of Representation for the May 2010 Elections. Also, a list of its nominees was
filed with the COMELEC, the list includes petitioner Atty. Isidro Lico. Subsequently, COMELEC proclaimed Ating Koop as one of the winning party-list groups and
Ating Koop earned a seat in the House of Representatives. Petitioner Lico took his oath of office and thereafter assumed office. Several months prior to its
proclamation as one of the winning partylist organizations, Ating Koop issued Central Committee Resolution 2010-01, which incorporated a term-sharing
agreement signed by its nominees. Under the agreement, petitioner Lico was to serve as Partylist Representative for the first year of the three-year term Ating
Koop introduced amendments to its Constitution and By-laws. Among the salient changes was the composition of the Central Committee. The amendments
likewise mandated the holding of an election of Central Committee members within six months after the Second National Convention. In effect, the
amendments cut short the three-year term of the incumbent members (referred to hereafter as the Interim Central Committee) of the Central Committee. The
said Interim Central Committee was dominated by members of the Rimas Group. Almost one year after petitioner Lico had assumed office, the Interim Central
Committee expelled him from Ating Koop for disloyalty. Apart from allegations of malversation and graft and corruption, the Committee cited petitioner Lico's
refusal to honor the term-sharing agreement as factual basis for disloyalty and as cause for his expulsion under Ating Koop's Amended Constitution and By-laws.
Rimas Group lodged a petition with COMELEC against petitioner Lico and prayed that petitioner Lico. be ordered to vacate the office of Ating Koop in the House
of Representatives. The COMELEC En Banc held that it had no jurisdiction to expel Congressman Lico from the House of Representatives, considering that his
expulsion from Ating Koop affected his qualifications as member of the House of Representatives, and it is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET) that had jurisdiction over the Petition. However, the COMELEC upheld the validity of petitioner Lico's expulsion from Ating Koop, explaining that when
the Interim Central Committee ousted him from Ating Koop, the said Committee's members remained in hold-over capacity even after their terms had expired
and that the COMELEC was not in a position to substitute its judgment for that of Ating Koop with respect to the cause of the expulsion.

ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC is vested with jurisdiction to rule upon the validity of the expulsion of Atty. Lico from Ating Koop.
RULING:
While the COMELEC correctly dismissed the Petition to expel petitioner Lico from the House of Representatives for being beyond its jurisdiction, it nevertheless
proceeded to rule upon the validity of his expulsion from Ating Koop - a matter beyond its purview. Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution endows the
HRET with jurisdiction to resolve questions on the qualifications of members of Congress. In the case of party-list representatives, the HRET acquires jurisdiction
over a disqualification case... upon proclamation of the winning party-list group, oath of the nominee, and assumption of office as member of the House of
Representative. In this case, the COMELEC proclaimed Ating Koop as a winning party-list group; petitioner Lico took his oath; and subsequently, assumed office
in the House of Representatives. Thus, it is the HRET, 2 and not the COMELEC, that has jurisdiction over the disqualification case. And the action of the COMELEC
in upholding the validity of the expulsion of petitioner Lico from Ating Koop, despite its own ruling that the HRET has jurisdiction over the disqualification issue is
without legal basis. Also, these findings already touch upon the qualification requiring a party-list nominee to be a bona fide member of the party-list group
sought to be represented. The rules on intra-party matters and on the jurisdiction of the HRET are not parallel concepts that do not intersect. Rather, the
operation of the rule on intra-party matters is circumscribed by Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and jurisprudence on the jurisdiction of electoral
tribunals. The jurisdiction of the HRET is exclusive. It is given full authority to hear and decide the cases on any matter touching on the validity of the title of the
proclaimed winner. The Court held that it was for the HRET to interpret the meaning of the requirement of bona fide membership in a party-list organization. It
reasoned that under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, the HRET is the sole judge of all contests when it comes to qualifications of the members of the
House of Representatives
G.R. No. 206952 : OCTOBER 22, 2013
ABANG LINGKOD PARTY-LIST (ABANG LINGKOD), Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

Respondents.
REYES, J.:
FACTS:

ABANG LINGKOD is a sectoral organization that represents the interests of peasant farmers and fisherfolks, and was
registered under the party-list system on December 22, 2009. It failed to obtain the number of votes needed in the May 2010
elections for a seat in the House of Representatives.
On August 16, 2012, ABANG LINGKOD, in compliance with the COMELEC August 9, 2012 resolution, filed with the
COMELEC pertinent documents to prove its continuing compliance with the requirements under R.A. No. 7941.
In a Resolution dated November 7, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc cancelled ABANG LINGKOD registration as a party-list
group. It pointed out that ABANG LINGKOD failed to establish its track record in uplifting the cause of the marginalized and
underrepresented; that it merely offered photographs of some alleged activities it conducted after the May 2010 elections.
ABANG LINGKOD field a petitioner for certiorari alleging that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in cancelling its
registration under the party-list system. The said petition was consolidated with the separate petitions filed by 51 other party-
list groups whose registration were cancelled or who were denied registration under the party-list system. The said party-list
groups, including ABANG LINGKOD, were able to obtain status quo ante orders from the court.
The Court remanded to the COMELEC the cases of previously registered party-list groups, including that of ABANG
LINGKOD, to determine whether they are qualified under the party-list system pursuant to the new parameters laid down by
the Court and, in the affirmative, be allowed to participate in the May 2013 party-list elections.
On May 10, 2013, the COMELEC issued the herein assailed Resolution, which, inter alia, affirmed the cancellation of ABANG
LINGKOD's registration under the party-list system. The COMELEC issued the Resolution dated May 10, 2013 sans any
summary evidentiary hearing, citing the proximity of the May 13, 2013 elections as the reason therefor.
On May 12, 2013, ABANG LINGKOD sought a reconsideration of the COMELEC's Resolution dated May 10, 2013. However,
on May 15, 2013, ABANG LINGKOD withdrew the motion for reconsideration it filed with the COMELEC and, instead,
instituted the instant petition with this Court, alleging that there may not be enough time for the COMELEC to pass upon the

merits of its motion for reconsideration considering that the election returns were already being canvassed and consolidated
by the COMELEC.
ISSUE: hether or not ABANG LINGKOD was denied due process?
HELD: BANG LINGKOD was not denied of due process.
POLITICAL LAW: administrative due process
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or as applied to administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings,
an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal
or trial type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirements are satisfied when the parties are
afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is the
absolute lack of notice or hearing.
In the instant case, while the petitioner laments that it was denied due process, the Court finds that the COMELEC had
afforded ABANG LINGKOD sufficient opportunity to present evidence establishing its qualification as a party-list group. It
was notified through Resolution No. 9513 that its registration was to be reviewed by the COMELEC. That ABANG LINGKOD
was able to file its Manifestation of Intent and other pertinent documents to prove its continuing compliance with the
requirements under R.A. No. 7941, which the COMELEC set for summary hearing on three separate dates, belies its claim
that it was denied due process.
There was no necessity for the COMELEC to conduct further summary evidentiary hearing to assess the qualification of
ABANG LINGKOD pursuant to Atong Paglaum. ABANG LINGKOD's Manifestation of Intent and all the evidence adduced by
it to establish its qualification as a party-list group are already in the possession of the COMELEC. Thus, conducting further
summary evidentiary hearing for the sole purpose of determining ABANG LINGKOD's qualification under the party-list
system pursuant to Atong Paglaumwould just be a superfluity.

Contrary to ABANG LINGKOD's claim, the Court, in Atong Paglaum, did not categorically require the COMELEC to conduct
a summary evidentiary hearing for the purpose of determining the qualifications of the petitioners therein pursuant to the
new parameters for screening party-list groups.
POLITICAL LAW: cancellation of party-list registration
Court finds that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in cancelling the registration of ABANG LINGKOD under the
party-list system. The COMELEC affirmed the cancellation of ABANG LINGKOD's registration on the ground that it declared
untruthful statement in its bid for accreditation as a party-list group in the May 2013 elections, pointing out that it
deliberately submitted digitally altered photographs of activities to make it appear that it had a track record in representing
the marginalized and underrepresented. Essentially, ABANG LINGKOD's registration was cancelled on the ground that it
failed to adduce evidence showing its track record in representing the marginalized and underrepresented.
R.A. No. 7941 did not require groups intending to register under the party-list system to submit proof of their track record as
a group. The track record requirement was only imposed in Ang Bagong Bayani where the Court held that national, regional,
and sectoral parties or organizations seeking registration under the party-list system must prove through their, inter alia,
track record that they truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented.
In Atong Paglaum, the Court has modified to a great extent the jurisprudential doctrines on who may register under the
party-list system and the representation of the marginalized and underrepresented. For purposes of registration under the
party-list system, national or regional parties or organizations need not represent any marginalized and underrepresented
sector; that representation of the marginalized and underrepresented is only required of sectoral organizations that represent
the sectors stated under Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 that are, by their nature, economically marginalized and
underrepresented.
Contrary to the COMELEC's claim, sectoral parties or organizations, such as ABANG LINGKOD, are no longer required to

adduce evidence showing their track record, i.e. proof of activities that they have undertaken to further the cause of the sector
they represent. Indeed, it is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector.
Otherwise stated, it is sufficient that the ideals represented by the sectoral organizations are geared towards the cause of the
sector/s, which they represent.
Dissenting, Mr. Justice Leonen, however, maintains that parties or organizations intending to register under the party-list
system are still required to present a track record notwithstanding the Court's pronouncement in Atong Paglaum; that the
track record that would have to be presented would only differ as to the nature of their group/organization. He opines that
sectoral organizations must prove their links with the marginalized and underrepresented while national or regional parties
or organizations must show that they have been existing as a bona fide organization. GRANTED.
G.R. No. 189466 February 11, 2010
DARYL GRACE J. ABAYON, Petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, PERFECTO C. LUCABAN, JR., RONYL S. DE LA CRUZ and
AGUSTIN C. DOROGA, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 189506
CONGRESSMAN JOVITO S. PALPARAN, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET), DR. REYNALDO LESACA, JR., CRISTINA PALABAY, RENATO M. REYES, JR.,
ERLINDA CADAPAN, ANTONIO FLORES and JOSELITO USTAREZ, Respondents.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:

These two cases are about the authority of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) to pass upon the eligibilities of the nominees of the
party-list groups that won seats in the lower house of Congress.
The Facts and the Case
In G.R. 189466, petitioner Daryl Grace J. Abayon is the first nominee of the Aangat Tayo party-list organization that won a seat in the House of
Representatives during the 2007 elections.
Respondents Perfecto C. Lucaban, Jr., Ronyl S. Dela Cruz, and Agustin C. Doroga, all registered voters, filed a petition for quo warranto with respondent
HRET against Aangat Tayo and its nominee, petitioner Abayon, in HRET Case 07-041. They claimed that Aangat Tayo was not eligible for a party-list seat
in the House of Representatives, since it did not represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors.
Respondent Lucaban and the others with him further pointed out that petitioner Abayon herself was not qualified to sit in the House as a party-list nominee
since she did not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, she being the wife of an incumbent congressional district representative. She
moreover lost her bid as party-list representative of the party-list organization called An Waray in the immediately preceding elections of May 10, 2004.
Petitioner Abayon countered that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) had already confirmed the status of Aangat Tayo as a national multi-sectoral
party-list organization representing the workers, women, youth, urban poor, and elderly and that she belonged to the women sector. Abayon also claimed
that although she was the second nominee of An Waray party-list organization during the 2004 elections, she could not be regarded as having lost a bid for
an elective office.
Finally, petitioner Abayon pointed out that respondent HRET had no jurisdiction over the petition for quo warranto since respondent Lucaban and the
others with him collaterally attacked the registration of Aangat Tayo as a party-list organization, a matter that fell within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC. It
was Aangat Tayo that was taking a seat in the House of Representatives, and not Abayon who was just its nominee. All questions involving her eligibility
as first nominee, said Abayon, were internal concerns of Aangat Tayo.
On July 16, 2009 respondent HRET issued an order, dismissing the petition as against Aangat Tayo but upholding its jurisdiction over the qualifications of
petitioner Abayon.1 The latter moved for reconsideration but the HRET denied the same on September 17, 2009,2 prompting Abayon to file the present
petition for special civil action of certiorari.
In G.R. 189506, petitioner Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. is the first nominee of the Bantay party-list group that won a seat in the 2007 elections for the members of
the House of Representatives. Respondents Reynaldo Lesaca, Jr., Cristina Palabay, Renato M. Reyes, Jr., Erlinda Cadapan, Antonio Flores, and Joselito
Ustarez are members of some other party-list groups.
Shortly after the elections, respondent Lesaca and the others with him filed with respondent HRET a petition for quo warranto against Bantay and its
nominee, petitioner Palparan, in HRET Case 07-040. Lesaca and the others alleged that Palparan was ineligible to sit in the House of Representatives as
party-list nominee because he did not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors that Bantay represented, namely, the victims of communist
rebels, Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUs), former rebels, and security guards. Lesaca and the others said that Palparan committed
gross human rights violations against marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organizations.
Petitioner Palparan countered that the HRET had no jurisdiction over his person since it was actually the party-list Bantay, not he, that was elected to and
assumed membership in the House of Representatives. Palparan claimed that he was just Bantay’s nominee. Consequently, any question involving his
eligibility as first nominee was an internal concern of Bantay. Such question must be brought, he said, before that party-list group, not before the HRET.
On July 23, 2009 respondent HRET issued an order dismissing the petition against Bantay for the reason that the issue of the ineligibility or qualification of
the party-list group fell within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC pursuant to the Party-List System Act. HRET, however, defended its jurisdiction over the
question of petitioner Palparan’s qualifications.3 Palparan moved for reconsideration but the HRET denied it by a resolution dated September 10,
2009,4 hence, the recourse to this Court through this petition for special civil action of certiorari and prohibition.
Since the two cases raise a common issue, the Court has caused their consolidation.
The Issue Presented
The common issue presented in these two cases is:
Whether or not respondent HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan as nominees of Aangat Tayo and
Bantay party-list organizations, respectively, who took the seats at the House of Representatives that such organizations won in the 2007 elections.
The Court’s Ruling
Petitioners Abayon and Palparan have a common theory: Republic Act (R.A.) 7941, the Party-List System Act, vests in the COMELEC the authority to
determine which parties or organizations have the qualifications to seek party-list seats in the House of Representatives during the elections. Indeed, the
HRET dismissed the petitions for quo warranto filed with it insofar as they sought the disqualifications of Aangat Tayo and Bantay. Since petitioners
Abayon and Palparan were not elected into office but were chosen by their respective organizations under their internal rules, the HRET has no jurisdiction
to inquire into and adjudicate their qualifications as nominees.
If at all, says petitioner Abayon, such authority belongs to the COMELEC which already upheld her qualification as nominee of Aangat Tayo for the women
sector. For Palparan, Bantay’s personality is so inseparable and intertwined with his own person as its nominee so that the HRET cannot dismiss the quo
warranto action against Bantay without dismissing the action against him.
But, although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the organization that sits as and becomes a member of the House of
Representatives. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution,5 identifies who the "members" of that House are:

Sec. 5. (1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be
elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system
of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. (Underscoring supplied)
Clearly, the members of the House of Representatives are of two kinds: "members x x x who shall be elected from legislative districts" and "those who x x
x shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations." This means that, from the
Constitution’s point of view, it is the party-list representatives who are "elected" into office, not their parties or organizations. These representatives are
elected, however, through that peculiar party-list system that the Constitution authorized and that Congress by law established where the voters cast their
votes for the organizations or parties to which such party-list representatives belong.
Once elected, both the district representatives and the party-list representatives are treated in like manner. They have the same deliberative rights,
salaries, and emoluments. They can participate in the making of laws that will directly benefit their legislative districts or sectors. They are also subject to
the same term limitation of three years for a maximum of three consecutive terms.
It may not be amiss to point out that the Party-List System Act itself recognizes party-list nominees as "members of the House of Representatives," thus:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives
through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens
belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could
contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of
Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the
legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible. (Underscoring supplied)
As this Court also held in Bantay Republic Act or BA-RA 7941 v. Commission on Elections,6 a party-list representative is in every sense "an elected
member of the House of Representatives." Although the vote cast in a party-list election is a vote for a party, such vote, in the end, would be a vote for its
nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the House of Representatives.
Both the Constitution and the Party-List System Act set the qualifications and grounds for disqualification of party-list nominees. Section 9 of R.A. 7941,
echoing the Constitution, states:
Sec. 9. Qualification of Party-List Nominees. – No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the
election, able to read and write, bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days
preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election. 1avvphi1

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election.
Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue until the expiration of his term.
In the cases before the Court, those who challenged the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan claim that the two do not belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors that they ought to represent. The Party-List System Act provides that a nominee must be a "bona fide member
of the party or organization which he seeks to represent."7
It is for the HRET to interpret the meaning of this particular qualification of a nominee—the need for him or her to be a bona fide member or a
representative of his party-list organization—in the context of the facts that characterize petitioners Abayon and Palparan’s relation to Aangat Tayo and
Bantay, respectively, and the marginalized and underrepresented interests that they presumably embody.
Petitioners Abayon and Palparan of course point out that the authority to determine the qualifications of a party-list nominee belongs to the party or
organization that nominated him. This is true, initially. The right to examine the fitness of aspiring nominees and, eventually, to choose five from among
them after all belongs to the party or organization that nominates them.8 But where an allegation is made that the party or organization had chosen and
allowed a disqualified nominee to become its party-list representative in the lower House and enjoy the secured tenure that goes with the position, the
resolution of the dispute is taken out of its hand.
Parenthetically, although the Party-List System Act does not so state, the COMELEC seems to believe, when it resolved the challenge to petitioner
Abayon, that it has the power to do so as an incident of its authority to approve the registration of party-list organizations. But the Court need not resolve
this question since it is not raised here and has not been argued by the parties.
What is inevitable is that Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution9 provides that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to, among other
things, the qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. Since, as pointed out above, party-list nominees are "elected members" of the
House of Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy
with the cases of district representatives, once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath
and assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and
the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.10
The Court holds that respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it dismissed the petitions for quo warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list
and Bantay party-list but upheld its jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the consolidated petitions and AFFIRMS the Order dated July 16, 2009 and Resolution 09-183 dated September 17,
2009 in HRET Case 07-041 of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal as well as its Order dated July 23, 2009 and Resolution 09-178 dated
September 10, 2009 in HRET Case 07-040.
SO ORDERED.

Dante Liban, et al. v. Richard Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, January 18, 2011
RESOLUTION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
I. THE FACTS
Petitioners Liban, et al., who were officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City Red Cross Chapter, filed with the Supreme Court what they
styled as “Petition to Declare Richard J. Gordon as Having Forfeited His Seat in the Senate” against respondent Gordon, who was elected Chairman of the
Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors during his incumbency as Senator.
Petitioners alleged that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent Gordon ceased to be a member of the Senate
pursuant to Sec. 13, Article VI of the Constitution, which provides that “[n]o Senator . . . may hold any other office or employment in the Government, or
any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without
forfeiting his seat.” Petitioners cited the case of Camporedondo vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 129049, decided August 6, 1999, which held that the PNRC is a
GOCC, in supporting their argument that respondent Gordon automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate when he accepted and held the position of
Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors.
Formerly, in its Decision dated July 15, 2009, the Court, voting 7-5,[1] held that the office of the PNRC Chairman is NOT a government office or an
office in a GOCC for purposes of the prohibition in Sec. 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The PNRC Chairman is elected by the PNRC Board of
Governors; he is not appointed by the President or by any subordinate government official. Moreover, the PNRC is NOT a GOCC because it is a privately-
owned, privately-funded, and privately-run charitable organization and because it is controlled by a Board of Governors four-fifths of which are private
sector individuals. Therefore, respondent Gordon did not forfeit his legislative seat when he was elected as PNRC Chairman during his incumbency as
Senator.
The Court however held further that the PNRC Charter, R.A. 95, as amended by PD 1264 and 1643, is void insofar as it creates the PNRC as a
private corporation since Section 7, Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution states that “[t]he Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the
formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations, unless such corporations are owned or controlled by the Government or any subdivision or
instrumentality thereof.” The Court thus directed the PNRC to incorporate under the Corporation Code and register with the Securities and Exchange
Commission if it wants to be a private corporation. The fallo of the Decision read:
WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross is not a government office or an office in a government-
owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. We also declare that Sections 1, 2, 3, 4(a), 5, 6, 7,
8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 of the Charter of the Philippine National Red Cross, or Republic Act No. 95, as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 1264 and 1643, are
VOID because they create the PNRC as a private corporation or grant it corporate powers.

Respondent Gordon filed a Motion for Clarification and/or for Reconsideration of the Decision. The PNRC likewise moved to intervene and filed
its own Motion for Partial Reconsideration. They basically questioned the second part of the Decision with regard to the pronouncement on the nature
of the PNRC and the constitutionality of some provisions of the PNRC Charter.
II. THE ISSUE
Was it correct for the Court to have passed upon and decided on the issue of the constitutionality of the PNRC charter? Corollarily: What is the
nature of the PNRC?
III. THE RULING
[The Court GRANTED reconsideration and MODIFIED the dispositive portion of the Decision by deleting the second sentence thereof.]
NO, it was not correct for the Court to have decided on the constitutional issue because it was not the very lis mota of the case. The
PNRC is sui generis in nature; it is neither strictly a GOCC nor a private corporation.
The issue of constitutionality of R.A. No. 95 was not raised by the parties, and was not among the issues defined in the body of the Decision; thus,
it was not the very lis mota of the case. We have reiterated the rule as to when the Court will consider the issue of constitutionality in Alvarez v. PICOP
Resources, Inc., thus:
This Court will not touch the issue of unconstitutionality unless it is the very lis mota. It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a
constitutional question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it is raised, if the record also
presents some other ground upon which the court may [rest] its judgment, that course will be adopted and the constitutional question will be left for consideration
until such question will be unavoidable.
[T]his Court should not have declared void certain sections of . . . the PNRC Charter. Instead, the Court should have exercised judicial restraint
on this matter, especially since there was some other ground upon which the Court could have based its judgment. Furthermore, the PNRC, the entity
most adversely affected by this declaration of unconstitutionality, which was not even originally a party to this case, was being compelled, as a
consequence of the Decision, to suddenly reorganize and incorporate under the Corporation Code, after more than sixty (60) years of existence in this
country.
Since its enactment, the PNRC Charter was amended several times, particularly on June 11, 1953, August 16, 1971, December 15, 1977, and
October 1, 1979, by virtue of R.A. No. 855, R.A. No. 6373, P.D. No. 1264, and P.D. No. 1643, respectively. The passage of several laws relating to the
PNRC’s corporate existence notwithstanding the effectivity of the constitutional proscription on the creation of private corporations by law is a recognition
that the PNRC is not strictly in the nature of a private corporation contemplated by the aforesaid constitutional ban.

A closer look at the nature of the PNRC would show that there is none like it[,] not just in terms of structure, but also in terms of history, public
service and official status accorded to it by the State and the international community. There is merit in PNRC’s contention that its structure is sui
generis. It is in recognition of this sui generis character of the PNRC that R.A. No. 95 has remained valid and effective from the time of its enactment in
March 22, 1947 under the 1935 Constitution and during the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and the 1987 Constitution. The PNRC Charter and its
amendatory laws have not been questioned or challenged on constitutional grounds, not even in this case before the Court now.
[T]his Court [must] recognize the country’s adherence to the Geneva Convention and respect the unique status of the PNRC in consonance with its
treaty obligations. The Geneva Convention has the force and effect of law. Under the Constitution, the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles
of international law as part of the law of the land. This constitutional provision must be reconciled and harmonized with Article XII, Section 16 of the
Constitution, instead of using the latter to negate the former. By requiring the PNRC to organize under the Corporation Code just like any other private
corporation, the Decision of July 15, 2009 lost sight of the PNRC’s special status under international humanitarian law and as an auxiliary of the State,
designated to assist it in discharging its obligations under the Geneva Conventions.
The PNRC, as a National Society of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, can neither “be classified as an instrumentality of
the State, so as not to lose its character of neutrality” as well as its independence, nor strictly as a private corporation since it is regulated by international
humanitarian law and is treated as an auxiliary of the State.
Although [the PNRC] is neither a subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of the government, nor a GOCC or a subsidiary thereof . . . so much so
that respondent, under the Decision, was correctly allowed to hold his position as Chairman thereof concurrently while he served as a Senator, such a
conclusion does not ipso facto imply that the PNRC is a “private corporation” within the contemplation of the provision of the Constitution, that must be
organized under the Corporation Code. [T]he sui generis character of PNRC requires us to approach controversies involving the PNRC on a case-to-case
basis.
In sum, the PNRC enjoys a special status as an important ally and auxiliary of the government in the humanitarian field in accordance with its
commitments under international law. This Court cannot all of a sudden refuse to recognize its existence, especially since the issue of the constitutionality
of the PNRC Charter was never raised by the parties. It bears emphasizing that the PNRC has responded to almost all national disasters since 1947, and
is widely known to provide a substantial portion of the country’s blood requirements. Its humanitarian work is unparalleled. The Court should not shake its
existence to the core in an untimely and drastic manner that would not only have negative consequences to those who depend on it in times of disaster
and armed hostilities but also have adverse effects on the image of the Philippines in the international community. The sections of the PNRC Charter that
were declared void must therefore stay.
[Thus, R.A. No. 95 remains valid and constitutional in its entirety. The Court MODIFIED the dispositive portion of the Decision by deleting the
second sentence, to now read as follows:
WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross is not a government office or an office in a government-
owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution .]

Pobre v. Defensor-Santiago (A.C. No. 7399)

August 25, 2009 | A.C. No. 7399
Antero J. Pobre, complainant

Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago, respondent
FACTS:
In one of her privilege speeches before the Senate, Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago delivered the following remarks:
x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel
like throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts
in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in a different
environment than in a Supreme Court of idiots. x x x
Her speech came as a response to the decision of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) declaring that only sitting members of the Supreme Court can be
nominated for the impending vacancy of the CJ post. Consequently, nominees who were not incumbent members of the Court, including Sen. Defensor-
Santiago, were automatically disqualified.
Private complainant Antero J. Pobre filed the instant petition before the Court, contending that the lady senator's utterances amounted to a total disrespect
towards then CJ Panganiban and a direct contempt of Court. Accordingly, he wanted disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary actions to be taken against
Sen. Defensor-Santiago.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a ground for Sen. Defensor-Santiago to be disbarred or subjected to disciplinary action by the Court for her questioned speech.
HELD:
No, the Court sided with Sen. Defensor-Santiago's defense that she should be afforded parliamentary immunity from suit pursuant to Section 11, Art. VI of the
1987 Constitution, which section states in part that "no [Senator] x x x shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the
Congress or in any committee thereof." Although there was no express admission on the part of the lady senator that she did indeed say those words, there was
no categorical denial either, which the Court ultimately regarded as an implied admission.
Despite the dismissal of the letter-complaint, the Court heavily chastised the lady senator for indulging in "insulting rhetoric and offensive personalities." In
fact, her excuse that her questioned speech was a prelude to crafting remedial legislation on the JBC struck the Court as being a mere afterthought in light of
the controversy her utterances had managed to stir.

Still, the Court held that parliamentary immunity is essential because without it, the parliament or its equivalent would "degenerate into a polite and
ineffective forum." However, it should be noted that "[l]egislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of of their legislative duties, not
for their private indulgence, but for the public good."
Macalintal vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 157013. July 10, 2003

Suffrage, Overseas Absentee Voting
JANUARY 27, 2018
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Romulo B. Macalintal, a member of the Philippine Bar, seeking a declaration that certain
provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) suffer from constitutional infirmity. Claiming that he has actual
and material legal interest in the subject matter of this case in seeing to it that public funds are properly and lawfully used and appropriated, petitioner
filed the instant petition as a taxpayer and as a lawyer.
Petitioner posits that Section 5(d) is unconstitutional because it violates Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution which requires that the voter
must be a resident in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he proposes to vote for at least six months immediately preceding an
election. Petitioner cites the ruling of the Court in Caasi vs. Court of Appeals to support his claim. In that case, the Court held that a green card holder
immigrant to the United States is deemed to have abandoned his domicile and residence in the Philippines.
Petitioner further argues that Section 1, Article V of the Constitution does not allow provisional registration or a promise by a voter to perform a
condition to be qualified to vote in a political exercise; that the legislature should not be allowed to circumvent the requirement of the Constitution on
the right of suffrage by providing a condition thereon which in effect amends or alters the aforesaid residence requirement to qualify a Filipino
abroad to vote. He claims that the right of suffrage should not be granted to anyone who, on the date of the election, does not possess the
qualifications provided for by Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.

ISSUE:
Is RA 9189 [Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003], valid & constitutional?
RULING:
Contrary to petitioner’s claim that Section 5(d) circumvents the Constitution, Congress enacted the law prescribing a system of overseas absentee
voting in compliance with the constitutional mandate. Such mandate expressly requires that Congress provide a system of absentee voting that
necessarily presupposes that the “qualified citizen of the Philippines abroad” is not physically present in the country.
The petition was partly GRANTED. The following portions of R.A. No. 9189 are declared VOID for being UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
17. a) The phrase in the first sentence of the first paragraph of Section 17.1, to wit: “subject to the approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee;”
18. b) The portion of the last paragraph of Section 17.1, to wit: “only upon review and approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee;”
19. c) The second sentence of the first paragraph of Section 19, to wit: “The Implementing Rules and Regulations shall be submitted to the Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee created by virtue of this Act for prior approval;” and
20. d) The second sentence in the second paragraph of Section 25, to wit: “It shall review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations
promulgated by the Commission” of the same law;
for being repugnant to Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution mandating the independence of constitutional commission, such as COMELEC.
Pursuant to Section 30 of R.A. No. 9189, the rest of the provisions of said law continues to be in full force and effect.
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST VS PURISIMA

G.R. No. 166715 August 14, 2008

ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (formerly AASJS)1 OFFICERS/MEMBERS SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, ED VINCENT S. ALBANO, ROMEO R. ROBISO,
RENE B. GOROSPE and EDWIN R. SANDOVAL, petitioners,
vs.
HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, HON. GUILLERMO L. PARAYNO, JR., in his capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau
of Internal Revenue, and HON. ALBERTO D. LINA, in his Capacity as Commissioner of Bureau of Customs, respondents.
Facts:
Petitioners seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing Republic Act (RA) 9335. R.A. 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability
and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed
their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance
Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of employment status.
Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax reform legislation. They contend that, by establishing a
system of rewards and incentives, the law “transforms the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters” as they will do their best
only in consideration of such rewards. Thus, the system of rewards and incentives invites corruption and undermines the constitutionally mandated duty of these officials
and employees to serve the people with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.
Petitioners also claim that limiting the scope of the system of rewards and incentives only to officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional
guarantee of equal protection. There is no valid basis for classification or distinction as to why such a system should not apply to officials and employees of all other
government agencies.
In addition, petitioners assert that the law unduly delegates the power to fix revenue targets to the President as it lacks a sufficient standard on that matter. While Section
7(b) and (c) of RA 9335 provides that BIR and BOC officials may be dismissed from the service if their revenue collections fall short of the target by at least 7.5%, the
law does not, however, fix the revenue targets to be achieved. Instead, the fixing of revenue targets has been delegated to the President without sufficient standards. It will
therefore be easy for the President to fix an unrealistic and unattainable target in order to dismiss BIR or BOC personnel.
Finally, petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that it violates the doctrine of separation of powers. While the legislative
function is deemed accomplished and completed upon the enactment and approval of the law, the creation of the congressional oversight committee permits legislative
participation in the implementation and enforcement of the law.
Issues:

1. Whether or not the scope of the system of rewards and incentives limitation to officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of
equal protection.
2. Whether or not there was an unduly delegation of power to fix revenue targets to the President.
3. Whether or not the doctrine of separation of powers has been violated in the creation of a congressional oversight committee.
Discussions:
1. The Court referred to the ruling of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union, which states that “the guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of
equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens of the State.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping
of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of
classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality.
The Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. “
2. To determine the validity of delegation of legislative power, it needs the following: (1) the completeness test and (2) the sufficient standard test. A law is complete
when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate. It lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines
or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must specify
the limits of the delegate’s authority, announce the legislative policy and identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented.
3. Based from the ruling under Macalintal v. Commission on Elections, it is clear that congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither
necessarily constitutes an encroachment on the executive power to implement laws nor undermines the constitutional separation of powers. Rather, it is integral to the
checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of government. It may in fact even enhance the separation of powers as it prevents the over-accumulation of
power in the executive branch.
Rulings:
1. The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a classification that has a reasonable foundation or rational basis and not arbitrary.22 With respect
to RA 9335, its expressed public policy is the optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC.23 Since the subject of the law

is the revenue- generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC, the incentives and/or sanctions provided in the law should logically pertain to the said
agencies. Moreover, the law concerns only the BIR and the BOC because they have the common distinct primary function of generating revenues for the national
government through the collection of taxes, customs duties, fees and charges.
Both the BIR and the BOC principally perform the special function of being the instrumentalities through which the State exercises one of its great inherent functions –
taxation. Indubitably, such substantial distinction is germane and intimately related to the purpose of the law. Hence, the classification and treatment accorded to the BIR
and the BOC under R.A. 9335 fully satisfy the demands of equal protection.
2. R.A. 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in fixing revenue targets and the implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of
the law under Sec 2 and 4 of the said Act. Moreover, the Court has recognized the following as sufficient standards: “public interest,” “justice and equity,” “public
convenience and welfare” and “simplicity, economy and welfare.”33 In this case, the declared policy of optimization of the revenue-generation capability and
collection of the BIR and the BOC is infused with public interest.
3. The court declined jurisdiction on this case. The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335 was created for the purpose of approving the implementing
rules and regulations (IRR) formulated by the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC. On May 22, 2006, it approved the said IRR. From then on, it became functus
officio and ceased to exist. Hence, the issue of its alleged encroachment on the executive function of implementing and enforcing the law may be considered moot and
academic.
OTHER CASES: Imbong v Ochoa; Belgica v Ochoa
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL v. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (G.R. No. 191618;

NOVEMBER 23, 2010)
FACTS: Atty. Romulo Macalintal questions the constitutionality of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal(PET) as an illegal and
unauthorized progeny of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution.
ISSUES: Whether the creation of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is unconstitutional for being a violation of paragraph 7,
Section 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
Whether the designation of members of the supreme court as members of the presidential electoral tribunal is
unconstitutional for being a violation of Section 12, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
HELD: First Issue: Petitioner, a prominent election lawyer who has filed several cases before this Court involving
constitutional and election law issues, including, among others, the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003),cannot claim ignorance of: (1) the invocation of our jurisdiction
under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution; and (2) the unanimous holding thereon. Unquestionably, theoverarching
frameworkaffirmed inTecson v. Commission on Electionsis that the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to decide
presidential and vice-presidential election protests while concurrentlyacting as an independent Electoral Tribunal.
Verba legisdictates that wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except
where technical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. However, where there is
ambiguity or doubt, the words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers orratio
legis et anima. A doubtful provision must be examined in light of the history of the times, and the condition and
circumstances surrounding the framing of the Constitution. Last,ut magis valeat quam pereat the Constitution is to be
interpreted as a whole.
By the same token, the PET is not a separate and distinct entity from the Supreme Court, albeit it has functions peculiar only
to the Tribunal. It is obvious that the PET was constituted in implementation of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution, and
it faithfully complies not unlawfully defies the constitutional directive. The adoption of a separate seal, as well as the change
in the nomenclature of the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices into Chairman and Members of the Tribunal, respectively,
was designed simply to highlight the singularity and exclusivity of the Tribunals functions as a special electoral court. the
PET, as intended by the framers of the Constitution, is to be an institution independent,but not separate, from the judicial
department,i.e., the Supreme Court.
Second Issue: It is also beyond cavil that when the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a presidential or vice-presidential
election contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial power. In the landmark case ofAngara v. Electoral
Commission,Justice Jose P. Laurel enucleated that "it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a
mechanism by which to direct the course of government along constitutional channels." In fact,Angarapointed out that "[t]he
Constitution is a definition of the powers of government." And yet, at that time, the 1935 Constitution did not contain the
expanded definition of judicial power found in Article VIII, Section 1, paragraph 2 of the present Constitution. DENIED.
G.R. No. 191988 August 31, 2010
ATTY. EVILLO C. PORMENTO, Petitioner,

vs.
JOSEPH "ERAP" EJERCITO ESTRADA and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, C.J.:
What is the proper interpretation of the following provision of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution: "[t]he President shall not be eligible for any
reelection?"
The novelty and complexity of the constitutional issue involved in this case present a temptation that magistrates, lawyers, legal scholars and law students
alike would find hard to resist. However, prudence dictates that this Court exercise judicial restraint where the issue before it has already been mooted by
subsequent events. More importantly, the constitutional requirement of the existence of a "case" or an "actual controversy" for the proper exercise of the
power of judicial review constrains us to refuse the allure of making a grand pronouncement that, in the end, will amount to nothing but a non-binding
opinion.
The petition asks whether private respondent Joseph Ejercito Estrada is covered by the ban on the President from "any reelection." Private respondent
was elected President of the Republic of the Philippines in the general elections held on May 11, 1998. He sought the presidency again in the general
elections held on May 10, 2010. Petitioner Atty. Evillo C. Pormento opposed private respondent’s candidacy and filed a petition for disqualification.
However, his petition was denied by the Second Division of public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC).1 His motion for reconsideration was
subsequently denied by the COMELEC en banc.2
Petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari3 on May 7, 2010. However, under the Rules of Court, the filing of such petition would not stay the execution
of the judgment, final order or resolution of the COMELEC that is sought to be reviewed.4 Besides, petitioner did not even pray for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction. Hence, private respondent was able to participate as a candidate for the position of President
in the May 10, 2010 elections where he garnered the second highest number of votes.5 1avv phi 1
Private respondent was not elected President the second time he ran. Since the issue on the proper interpretation of the phrase "any reelection" will be
premised on a person’s second (whether immediate or not) election as President, there is no case or controversy to be resolved in this case. No live
conflict of legal rights exists.6 There is in this case no definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy that touches on the legal relations of parties having

adverse legal interests.7 No specific relief may conclusively be decreed upon by this Court in this case that will benefit any of the parties herein.8 As such,
one of the essential requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review, the existence of an actual case or controversy, is sorely lacking in this case.
As a rule, this Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies.9 The Court is not empowered to decide moot questions or abstract propositions, or
to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the result as to the thing in issue in the case before it.10 In other words, when a case is moot, it
becomes non-justiciable.11
An action is considered "moot" when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues involved have become academic or dead or when
the matter in dispute has already been resolved and hence, one is not entitled to judicial intervention unless the issue is likely to be raised again between
the parties. There is nothing for the court to resolve as the determination thereof has been overtaken by subsequent events.12
Assuming an actual case or controversy existed prior to the proclamation of a President who has been duly elected in the May 10, 2010 elections, the
same is no longer true today. Following the results of that elections, private respondent was not elected President for the second time. Thus, any
discussion of his "reelection" will simply be hypothetical and speculative. It will serve no useful or practical purpose.
Accordingly, the petition is denied due course and is hereby DISMISSED.
G.R. No. 184740 February 11, 2010

DENNIS A. B. FUNA, Petitioner, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, Office of the President, SEC. LEANDRO R. MENDOZA, in his
official capacity as Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications, USEC. MARIA ELENA H. BAUTISTA, in her official
capacities as Undersecretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications and as Officer-in-Charge of the Maritime Industry
Authority (MARINA), Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction, to declare as unconstitutional the designation of respondent Undersecretary Maria Elena H. Bautista as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the
Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA).
On October 4, 2006, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed respondent Maria Elena H. Bautista (Bautista) as Undersecretary of the Department of
Transportation and Communications (DOTC).
On September 1, 2008, following the resignation of then MARINA Administrator Vicente T. Suazo, Jr., Bautista was designated as Officer-in-Charge
(OIC), Office of the Administrator, MARINA, in concurrent capacity as DOTC Undersecretary.

On October 21, 2008, Dennis A. B. Funa in his capacity as taxpayer, concerned citizen and lawyer, filed the instant petition challenging the constitutionality
of Bautista’s appointment/designation, which is proscribed by the prohibition on the President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies and
assistants to hold any other office or employment.
On January 5, 2009, during the pendency of this petition, Bautista was appointed Administrator of the MARINA and she assumed her duties and
responsibilities as such on February 2, 2009.
Petitioner argues that Bautista’s concurrent positions as DOTC Undersecretary and MARINA OIC is in violation of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution .
On the other hand, the respondents argue that the requisites of a judicial inquiry are not present in this case. In fact, there no longer exists an actual controversy
that needs to be resolved in view of the appointment of respondent Bautista as MARINA Administrator effective February 2, 2009 and the relinquishment of her
post as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport, which rendered the present petition moot and academic. Petitioner’s prayer for a temporary restraining
order or writ of preliminary injunction is likewise moot and academic since, with this supervening event, there is nothing left to enjoin.
Issue: Whether or not the designation of respondent Bautista as OIC of MARINA, concurrent with the position of DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport to
which she had been appointed, violated the constitutional proscription against dual or multiple offices for Cabinet Members and their deputies and assistants.
Held:
The petition is meritorious.
Petitioner having alleged a grave violation of the constitutional prohibition against Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants holding two (2) or more
positions in government, the fact that he filed this suit as a concerned citizen sufficiently confers him with standing to sue for redress of such illegal act by public
officials.
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no
practical use or value. Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground of mootness. But even in cases where supervening events had
made the cases moot, this Court did not hesitate to resolve the legal or constitutional issues raised to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, bar, and
public. In the present case, the mootness of the petition does not bar its resolution.
Resolution of the present controversy hinges on the correct application of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other
profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of
interest in the conduct of their office.
The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President shall not, during his tenure, be appointed as Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including government-
owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.
On the other hand, Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B reads:
Sec. 7. x x x
Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
Noting that the prohibition imposed on the President and his official family is all-embracing, the disqualification was held to be absolute, as the holding of
"any other office" is not qualified by the phrase "in the Government" unlike in Section 13, Article VI prohibiting Senators and Members of the
House of Representatives from holding "any other office or employment in the Government"; and when compared with other officials and employees
such as members of the armed forces and civil service employees, we concluded thus:

These sweeping, all-embracing prohibitions imposed on the President and his official family, which prohibitions are not similarly imposed on other public
officials or employees such as the Members of Congress, members of the civil service in general and members of the armed forces, are proof of the intent of
the 1987 Constitution to treat the President and his official family as a class by itself and to impose upon said class stricter prohibitions.
Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment in the government during their tenure when such is
allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by
the Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public
officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, the Vice-President,
Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.
Since the evident purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to impose a stricter prohibition on the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet,
their deputies and assistants with respect to holding multiple offices or employment in the government during their tenure, the exception to this prohibition must
be read with equal severity. On its face, the language of Section 13, Article VII is prohibitory so that it must be understood as intended to be a positive and
unequivocal negation of the privilege of holding multiple government offices or employment. Verily, wherever the language used in the constitution is prohibitory,
it is to be understood as intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation. The phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" must be given
a literal interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited in the Constitution itself, to wit: the Vice-President being appointed as a
member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII; or acting as President in those instances provided under Section 7, pars. (2) and
(3), Article VII; and, the Secretary of Justice being ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.
Respondent Bautista being then the appointed Undersecretary of DOTC, she was thus covered by the stricter prohibition under Section 13, Article VII and
consequently she cannot invoke the exception provided in Section 7, paragraph 2, Article IX-B where holding another office is allowed by law or the primary
functions of the position. Neither was she designated OIC of MARINA in an ex-officio capacity, which is the exception recognized in Civil Liberties Union.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The designation of respondent Ma. Elena H. Bautista as Officer-in-Charge, Office of the Administrator, Maritime Industry
Authority, in a concurrent capacity with her position as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport, is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being violative
of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution and therefore, NULL and VOID.
Note:
Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given
office. When completed, usually with its confirmation, the appointment results in security of tenure for the person chosen unless he is replaceable at
pleasure because of the nature of his office. Designation, on the other hand, connotes merely the imposition by law of additional duties on an
incumbent official, as where, in the case before us, the Secretary of Tourism is designated Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Tourism
Authority, or where, under the Constitution, three Justices of the Supreme Court are designated by the Chief Justice to sit in the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate
or the House of Representatives. It is said that appointment is essentially executive while designation is legislative in nature.
Designation may also be loosely defined as an appointment because it likewise involves the naming of a particular person to a specified public
office. That is the common understanding of the term. However, where the person is merely designated and not appointed, the implication is that he
shall hold the office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing authority. In this sense, the designation is
considered only an acting or temporary appointment, which does not confer security of tenure on the person named.
Funa vs Agra
G.R. No. 191644 February 19, 2013

Facts: The petitioner alleges that on March 1, 2010, President Gloria M. Macapagal Arroyo appointed Agra as the Acting Secretary of Justice following the resignation of
Secretary Agnes VST Devanadera in order to vie for a congressional seat in Quezon Province; that on March 5, 2010, President Arroyo designated Agra as the Acting Solicitor
General in a concurrent capacity; that on April 7, 2010, the petitioner, in his capacity as a taxpayer, a concerned citizen and a lawyer, commenced this suit to challenge the
constitutionality of Agra’s concurrent appointments or designations, claiming it to be prohibited under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution; that during the pendency of
the suit, President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed Atty. Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz as the Solicitor General; and that Cadiz assumed as the Solicitor General and commenced his
duties as such on August 5, 2010. Agra renders a different version of the antecedents. He represents that on January 12, 2010, he was then the Government Corporate Counsel
when President Arroyo designated him as the Acting Solicitor General in place of Solicitor General Devanadera who had been appointed as the Secretary of Justice; that on March
5, 2010, President Arroyo designated him also as the Acting Secretary of Justice vice Secretary Devanadera who had meanwhile tendered her resignation in order to run for
Congress representing a district in Quezon Province in the May 2010 elections; that he then relinquished his position as the Government Corporate Counsel; and that pending the
appointment of his successor, Agra continued to perform his duties as the Acting Solicitor General. Notwithstanding the conflict in the versions of the parties, the fact that Agra
has admitted to holding the two offices concurrently in acting capacities is settled, which is sufficient for purposes of resolving the constitutional question that petitioner raises
herein.
Issue: Whether or not Agra’s holding of concurrent position is unconstitutional.
Held: Yes. At the center of the controversy is the correct application of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, viz:
Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other
office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially
interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.
A relevant and complementing provision is Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, to wit:
Section 7. x x x Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
Being designated as the Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his position of Acting Solicitor General, therefore, Agra was undoubtedly covered by Section 13, Article VII,
supra, whose text and spirit were too clear to be differently read. Hence, Agra could not validly hold any other office or employment during his tenure as the Acting Solicitor
General, because the Constitution has not otherwise so provided.
It was of no moment that Agra’s designation was in an acting or temporary capacity. The text of Section 13, supra, plainly indicates that the intent of the Framers of the
Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and the Members of his Cabinet in so far as holding other offices or employments in the Government or in
government-owned or government controlled-corporations was concerned. In this regard, to hold an office means to possess or to occupy the office, or to be in possession and
administration of the office, which implies nothing less than the actual discharge of the functions and duties of the office. Indeed, in the language of Section 13 itself, supra, the
Constitution makes no reference to the nature of the appointment or designation. The prohibition against dual or multiple offices being held by one official must be construed as to
apply to all appointments or designations, whether permanent or temporary, for it is without question that the avowed objective of Section 13, supra, is to prevent the concentration
of powers in the Executive Department officials, specifically the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet and their deputies and assistants. To construe

differently is to “open the veritable floodgates of circumvention of an important constitutional disqualification of officials in the Executive Department and of limitations on the
Presidents power of appointment in the guise of temporary designations of Cabinet Members, undersecretaries and assistant secretaries as officers-in-charge of government
agencies, instrumentalities, or government-owned or controlled corporations.
It is not amiss to observe, lastly, that assuming that Agra, as the Acting Solicitor General, was not covered by the stricter prohibition under Section 13, supra, due to such position
being merely vested with a cabinet rank under Section 3, Republic Act No. 9417, he nonetheless remained covered by the general prohibition under Section 7, supra. Hence, his
concurrent designations were still subject to the conditions under the latter constitutional provision. In this regard, the Court aptly pointed out in Public Interest Center, Inc. v.
Elma:
The general rule contained in Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution permits an appointive official to hold more than one office only if “allowed by law or by the primary functions
of his position.” In the case of Quimson v. Ozaeta, this Court ruled that, “[t]here is no legal objection to a government official occupying two government offices and performing
the functions of both as long as there is no incompatibility.” The crucial test in determining whether incompatibility exists between two offices was laid out in People v. Green –
whether one office is subordinate to the other, in the sense that one office has the right to interfere with the other.
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL –
ARROYO
G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010
FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs just days after the coming
presidential elections on May 10, 2010.
These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief
Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9,
Article VIII, that “vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof” from a “list of at least three
nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy.” Also considering that Section 15, Article VII
(Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits the President or Acting President from making appointments
within two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety.
The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the position of
Chief Justice.

Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC “automatically considered” for the position of Chief Justice the five most
senior of the Associate Justices of the Court, namely: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C.
Corona; Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice
Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last two declined their nomination through letters dated January 18, 2010
and January 25, 2010, respectively.
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice, because the prohibition under
Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not apply to appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues that any
vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days from its occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII of
the Constitution; that had the framers intended the prohibition to apply to Supreme Court appointments, they could
have easily expressly stated so in the Constitution, which explains why the prohibition found in Article VII (Executive
Department) was not written in Article VIII (Judicial Department); and that the framers also incorporated in Article VIII
ample restrictions or limitations on the President’s power to appoint members of the Supreme Court to ensure its
independence from “political vicissitudes” and its “insulation from political pressures,” such as stringent qualifications
for the positions, the establishment of the JBC, the specified period within which the President shall appoint a Supreme
Court Justice.
A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC properly initiated the process, there being an
insistence from some of the oppositors-intervenors that the JBC could only do so once the vacancy has occurred (that is,
after May 17, 2010). Another part is, of course, whether the JBC may resume its process until the short list is prepared, in
view of the provision of Section 4(1), Article VIII, which unqualifiedly requires the President to appoint one from the
short list to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court (be it the Chief Justice or an Associate Justice) within 90 days from the
occurrence of the vacancy.
ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement.
HELD:
Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to
other appointments to the Judiciary.
Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.

The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15. Two months immediately before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except
temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety.
The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court shall be composed
of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven
Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members
of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the
provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being
equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1),
Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting
President making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the
President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members
of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the
provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being
equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1),
Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting
President making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the
President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they affect the power of the President
to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to appointments within the Executive Department renders
conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that

every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be considered
together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. It is absurd to assume
that the framers deliberately situated Section 15 between Section 14 and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover
all kinds of presidential appointments. If that was their intention in respect of appointments to the Judiciary, the
framers, if only to be clear, would have easily and surely inserted a similar prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within
Section 4 (1) thereof.
G.R. No. 203372 June 16, 2015
ATTY. CHELOY E. VELICARIA-GARAFIL, Petitioner,

vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT and HON. SOLICITOR GENERAL JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 206290
ATTY. DINDO G. VENTURANZA, Petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, LEILA M. DE LIMA, in her capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Justice, CLARO A. ARELLANO, in his capacity
as the Prosecutor General, and RICHARD ANTHONY D. FADULLON, in his capacity as the Officer-in-Charge of the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City,Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 209138
IRMA A. VILLANUEVA and FRANCISCA B. ROSQUITA, Petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 212030
EDDIE U. TAMONDONG, Petitioner,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Respondent.
The present consolidated cases involve four petitions: G.R. No. 203372 with Atty. Cheloy E. Velicaria-Garafil (Atty. Velicaria-Garafil), who was appointed State
Solicitor II at the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), as petitioner; G.R. No. 206290 with Atty. Dindo G. Venturanza (Atty. Venturanza), who was appointed
Prosecutor IV (City Prosecutor) of Quezon City, as petitioner; G.R. No. 209138 with Irma A. Villanueva (Villanueva), who was appointed Administrator for Visayas
of the Board of Administrators of the Cooperative Development Authority (CDA), and Francisca B. Rosquita (Rosquita), who was appointed Commissioner of the
National Commission of Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), as petitioners; and G.R. No. 212030 with Atty. Eddie U. Tamondong (Atty. Tamondong), who was appointed
member of the Board of Directors of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), as petitioner. All petitions question the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 2
(EO 2) for being inconsistent with Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

Prior to the conduct of the May 2010 elections, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (President Macapagal-Arroyo) issued more than 800 appointments to
various positions in several government offices.
The ban on midnight appointments in Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution reads:
Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except
temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
Thus, for purposes of the 2010 elections, 10 March 2010 was the cutoff date for valid appointments and the next day, 11 March 2010, was the start of the ban on
midnight appointments. Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution recognizes as an exception to the ban on midnight appointments only "temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety."
None of the petitioners claim that their appointments fall under this exception.
On 30 June 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III (President Aquino) took his oath of office as President of the Republic of the Philippines. On 30 July 2010,
President Aquino issued EO 2 recalling, withdrawing, and revoking appointments issued by President Macapagal-Arroyo which violated the constitutional ban on
midnight appointments.
Issue:
(1) whether petitioners' appointments violate Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, and
(2) whether EO 2 is constitutional.
Held:
The following elements should always concur in the making of a valid (which should be understood as both complete and effective) appointment:
(1) authority to appoint and evidence of the exercise of the authority;
The President's exercise of his power to appoint officials is provided for in the Constitution and laws. Discretion is an integral part in the exercise of the power of
appointment. Considering that appointment calls for a selection, the appointing power necessarily exercises a discretion.
The power to appoint is, in essence, discretionary. The appointing power has the right of choice which he may exercise freely according to his judgment, deciding
for himself who is best qualified among those who have the necessary qualifications and eligibilities.
(2) transmittal of the appointment paper and evidence of the transmittal;
It is not enough that the President signs the appointment paper. There should be evidence that the President intended the appointment paper to be issued. It could
happen that an appointment paper may be dated and signed by the President months before the appointment ban, but never left his locked drawer for the entirety
of his term. Release of the appointment paper through the MRO is an unequivocal act that signifies the President's intent of its issuance.

For purposes of verification of the appointment paper's existence and authenticity, the appointment paper must bear the security marks (i.e., handwritten signature
of the President, bar code, etc.) and must be accompanied by a transmittal letter from the MRO.
(3) a vacant position at the time of appointment; and
Petitioners have failed to raise any valid ground for the Court to declare EO 2, or any part of it, unconstitutional. Consequently, EO 2 remains valid and
constitutional.
(4) receipt of the appointment paper and acceptance of the appointment by the appointee who possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications.
Acceptance is indispensable to complete an appointment. Assuming office and taking the oath amount to acceptance of the appointment. An oath of office is a
qualifying requirement for a public office, a prerequisite to the full investiture of the office.
Petitioners have failed to show compliance with all four elements of a valid appointment. They cannot prove with certainty that their appointment papers were
transmitted before the appointment ban took effect. On the other hand, petitioners admit that they took their oaths of office during the appointment ban.
Petitioners have failed to raise any valid ground for the Court to declare EO 2, or any part of it, unconstitutional. Consequently, EO 2 remains valid and
constitutional.
GR NO. 181293
ANA THERESIA “RISA” HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL VS TOLL REGULATORY BOARD
FACTS: Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), pursuant to P.D. 1113 with the right, privilege, and authority to construct, and operate toll facilities
Toll Expressways, in a series of agreements transferred authority to perform operations of the South Metro Manila Skyway to Skyway O & M Corporation
(SOMCO). Legislators and the Union of PNCC oppose the said transfer. They argue that the Toll Operation Certificate issued by the The Toll Regulatory Board
(TRB) to SOMCO is highly irregular and that the transfer of authority is grossly disadvantageous to the government.
ISSUES:
1. Whether petitioners have standing;
2. Whether the TRB has the power to grant authority to operate a toll facility;
3. Whether the assumption of toll operations by SOMCO is disadvantageous to the government.
HELD:
1. Petitioner filed as a legislator in her capacity as party-list representative of Akbayan. Hence, petitioners do not have the requisite legal standing, and as such,
she was only allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action when it infringes on their prerogatives as members of Congress.

2. The Court has ruled that first, it is clear that Congress does not have the sole authority to grant franchises for the operation of public utilities. Congress is not
required before each and every public utility may operate. Unless there is a law that specifically requires a franchise for the operation of a public utility,
particular agencies in the executive branch may issue authorizations and licenses for the operation of certain classes of public utilities. The authority to operate a
public utility can be granted by administrative agencies when authorized by law.
3. The allegations of petitioners are nothing more than speculations, apprehensions, and suppositions. It is understandable that SOMCO does not yet have a
proven track record in toll operations, considering that it was only the Amendment to the Supplemental Toll Operation Agreement (ASTOA) and the
Memorandum of Agreement that gave birth to it.

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DUMAUAL, Jeanne Pauline J.

Aquino III V. Comelec

Atty. Reynaldo Lopez, Constitutional Law Review Page 1

Requisites for Creation. –

Aldaba vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 188078, January 25, 2010

Atty. Reynaldo Lopez, Constitutional Law Review Page 2

G.R. No. 207851, July 8, 2014

COMELEC cancelled Naval's COC.

Court denies the petition.

Atty. Reynaldo Lopez, Constitutional Law Review Page 4

The rationale behind reapportionment is the constitutional requirement to achieve equality of

ISSUE: Whether or not a plebiscite was required in the case at bar.

Atty. Reynaldo Lopez, Constitutional Law Review Page 5

Petitioner: Regina Ongsiako Reyes

Atty. Reynaldo Lopez, Constitutional Law Review Page 6

G.R. No. 179271 April 21, 2009

Atty. Reynaldo Lopez, Constitutional Law Review Page 7

G.R. No. 179295 April 21, 2009

Atty. Reynaldo Lopez, Constitutional Law Review Page 8

Atty. Reynaldo Lopez, Constitutional Law Review Page 9

In view of 2% being unconstitutional (according to Nachura, J.)

Atty. Reynaldo Lopez, Constitutional Law Review Page 10

ATONG PAGLAUM, INC. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, (G)

G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013

Atty. Reynaldo Lopez, Constitutional Law Review Page 11

Atty. Reynaldo Lopez, Constitutional Law Review Page 12

G.R. Nos. 206844-45, July 23, 2013

Atty. Reynaldo Lopez, Constitutional Law Review Page 13

Atty. Reynaldo Lopez, Constitutional Law Review Page 14

Atty. Reynaldo Lopez, Constitutional Law Review Page 15

ATTY. ISIDRO Q. LICO v. COMELEC EN BANC,

Atty. Reynaldo Lopez, Constitutional Law Review Page 16

G.R. No. 206952 : OCTOBER 22, 2013

ABANG LINGKOD PARTY-LIST (ABANG LINGKOD), Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

Atty. Reynaldo Lopez, Constitutional Law Review Page 17

Atty. Reynaldo Lopez, Constitutional Law Review Page 18

ISSUE: hether or not ABANG LINGKOD was denied due process?

HELD: BANG LINGKOD was not denied of due process.

POLITICAL LAW: administrative due process

Atty. Reynaldo Lopez, Constitutional Law Review Page 19

POLITICAL LAW: cancellation of party-list registration

Atty. Reynaldo Lopez, Constitutional Law Review Page 20

G.R. No. 189466 February 11, 2010

DARYL GRACE J. ABAYON, Petitioner,

G.R. No. 189506

CONGRESSMAN JOVITO S. PALPARAN, JR., Petitioner,

Atty. Reynaldo Lopez, Constitutional Law Review Page 21

The Facts and the Case

The Issue Presented

The common issue presented in these two cases is:

The Court’s Ruling

Atty. Reynaldo Lopez, Constitutional Law Review Page 23

Atty. Reynaldo Lopez, Constitutional Law Review Page 24

Atty. Reynaldo Lopez, Constitutional Law Review Page 25

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Atty. Reynaldo Lopez, Constitutional Law Review Page 26

II. THE ISSUE

III. THE RULING

Atty. Reynaldo Lopez, Constitutional Law Review Page 27

Atty. Reynaldo Lopez, Constitutional Law Review Page 28

Pobre v. Defensor-Santiago (A.C. No. 7399)

Antero J. Pobre, complainant

Atty. Reynaldo Lopez, Constitutional Law Review Page 29

Macalintal vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 157013. July 10, 2003