Islamic Studies 51:1 (2012) pp.

69–87 69

Criticism of Ibn Taymiyyah on the Aristotelian

Logical Proposition
SOBHI RAYAN

Abstract
This article deals with Ibn Taymiyyah’s criticism of the Aristotelian logical
proposition. According to Ibn Taymiyyah, all universal judgments are in fact
particular judgments. Therefore, the transition is from the particular to the universal.
The basis for the axioms of proof is particular and not universal, and is founded upon
experience and not on the intellect. This means that a person arrives at the particular
proposition before the universal one.

Introduction
Ibn Taymiyyah (1263–1328 A.D.) criticizes the Aristotelian Logic in his book
al-Radd ‘al┐ ’l-Man═iqiyy┘n. He believes that the proposition (al-qa╔iyyah) that
is based on experience can ensure true knowledge, it can be subjected to
examination and empirical proof. Although the universal proposition (al-
qa╔iyyah al-kulliyyah) is derived from the particular one, it does not exist in the
experiential world but only in the intellect. This means that we can think it,
but we cannot prove it by empirical means. Therefore for Ibn Taymiyyah the
particular and experiential proposition assumes a fundamental importance.
In his book De Interpretatione, Aristotle distinguished between different
types of propositions: a proposition (in the sense of “assertion”) is whatever
can be said to be true or false.1 A prayer, on the other hand, is a proposition
that is neither true nor false. This is because one cannot ask if a prayer
proposition is true or false, while a universal proposition asserts something
and subjects its claim to the bar of truth or falsity. Aristotle speaks about an
assertive proposition that reveals the truth of things.
Most Muslim philosophers have accepted Aristotle’s definition of the
proposition. Al-F┐r┐b┘ (d. 950 A.D.) refers to the proposition in his book on

1
Aristotle, On Interpretation, Ch. 4, 17a.
 SOBHI RAYAN
70

syllogism, Kit┐b al-Qiy┐s.2 He deals there with the proposition as an assertion,

defining it by saying that the proposition is a statement in which there exists a
judgment (╒ukm) of one thing about another thing, and the knowledge of one
thing about another thing. For example, a person is walking, or man is a living
being. The informative part is the predicate and the part concerning which the
information is given is the subject. The predicate can be a noun or a verb that
indicates past, present or future time. The subject does not indicate a specific
time except when it is accompanied by words such as “was,” “became,” or
“existed.”
According to Ibn Rushd, (d. 1198 A.D.) the proposition must include a
verb or a copula that links subject and predicate. The copula can indicate a
specific time while in a categorical statement the copula can indicate a link that
is not limited by time. According to Ibn Rushd, the noun and verb do not
indicate truth or falsity, while the proposition does indicate this and is called
decisive or judgmental.3
In contrast to most Muslim philosophers, Ibn Taymiyyah rejected the
definition of the Aristotelian proposition. Perhaps, though, it would be better
not to concentrate on the critique of definitions, but rather on the theory of
universals which ibn Taymiyyah sees as a part and parcel on that critique. He
is a firm nominalist, and argues that universals should be analysed entirely in
terms of the individuals which make them up. We can construct universals,
but we should always be aware that they are merely shorthand for grouping
together lots of particulars, and have no independent existence of their own.4
Ibn Taymiyyah claimed that the proposition is composed of subject and
predicate and is a predicative proposition. However, the proposition could
also be composed of either two expressions or of many expressions if their
content was confined within specific boundaries as they are termed by
linguists such as qualities, attributes, adverbs of manner, place, time etc.
Therefore, when a proposition is so confined, it cannot be composed of two
expressions but of many expressions and of multiple meanings.5
It is also not true that logicians refer only to two meanings in a
proposition because there can be one or two or many meanings. It all depends
whether the person in question is the researcher, the learner or the
demonstrator. Each one of them can imply one or more meanings. A

2
Ab┴ Na╖r Mu╒ammad b. Mu╒ammad al-F┐r┐b┘, al-Qiy┐s, Series of Logic by al-F┐r┐b┘ (Qum:
The Grand Library of Ayatullah al-Uzma Marashi Najafi (R.A.), 1987), 1: 116.
3
Ibn Rushd, Al-‘Ib┐rah, Ma╒m┴d Q┐sim ed. (Cairo: General Egyptian Book Organization,
1981), 68–69.
4
Oliver Leaman. “Islamic Philosophy and the Attack on Logic,” Topoi 19 (2000), 21, for details
see, 17–24.
5
Ibn Taymiyyah, Al-Radd ‘al┐ ’l-Man═iqiyy┘n (Beirut: D┐r Fikr Lubn┐n┘, 1993), 1: 177.
CRITICISM OF IBN TAYMIYYAH ON THE ARISTOTELIAN LOGICAL PROPOSITION
71

proposition can also be composed of one or more expressions. For example:

“Is wine forbidden?” The response to this question can be “Yes,” this
expression being sufficient and equivalent to the reply, “It is forbidden.”6
According to Ibn Taymiyyah the single noun can contain the significance
of an entire proposition just as the proposition can include different
propositions. For example, in the sentence: “Is man a sensory being who
grows, moves at will, speaks or is he not so?” What is being asked here
includes all these six attributes that are considered as a single sentence. Ibn
Taymiyyah thinks that the proposition does not have to be composed of a
subject and predicate, but can be composed of a single noun or many
expressions, depending of the relationship to the person in question.7
It may be said that the unit of thought in Ibn Taymiyyah is the judgment
and not the concept. He thinks that one can reduce the concept to a judgment
and vice versa, and he cannot accept that the concept is a simple idea without
assertion or denial. Every idea that is without assertion or denial is a falsehood
(b┐═il) that is not considered as information at all.8 Therefore the important
element in a proposition is the judgment that is related to truth or falsity,
since Ibn Taymiyyah thinks that the proposition expresses the relationship
between things that occur or the relationship between the qualities of things,
and the relationship between ideas.

Criticism of the Middle Term al-Wasa═

In Prior Analytics, Aristotle discusses the syllogistic proposition that contains
no less than three terms, with each term appearing twice:

(a) The subject term of the inference — called the (major premise).
(b) The predicate term of the inference — called the (minor premise).
(c) The middle term — this has to appear in both premises. The function of the
middle term is to mediate between the subject term and the predicate term
of the inference and to establish the connection between them. Neither of
the premises contains the inference, but both of them together contain it. So
long as the middle term is linked separately with each of the two terms,
each premise stands alone.9

The conclusion is that the middle term, after assisting in linking the two
terms, is set aside and is deleted. But according to Nikolai Hartmann, the

6
Ibid., 1: 178.
7
Ibid., 1: 179.
8
Ibid., 1: 101.
9
H. Bergmann, Introduction to the Study of Logic (Jerusalem: Bialik Institute, 2000), 291.
 SOBHI RAYAN
72

middle term is the very essence of the syllogism in which the inference is not
contained in the major premise or in the minor premise, but nevertheless
emerges from both of them. The function of the mediation is placed upon the
middle term, and by this mediation the new content is created.10
According to Ibn Taymiyyah, logicians divide propositions into two
types: axioms and theoretical propositions, and it is impossible for all
propositions to be theoretical since the theoretical needs the axiomatic.
Axiomatic knowledge is the recognition that the subject and predicate in it are
sufficient to obtain judgment without a mediate term between them, while
theoretical knowledge is obtained through thought.
Therefore the criticism on the division of propositions is based on the
idea of relativism, that is to say: two kinds of knowledge — necessary
axiomatic knowledge and acquired theoretical knowledge that are relatively
dependent upon the person and not on the knowledge itself. He says that the
difference between these two types of knowledge is relative, and it may be that
a certain knowledge is axiomatic for someone, but other people cannot obtain
this knowledge except by means of a theoretical process that is either short or
long (the effort invested by the person who is interested in acquiring
knowledge), and it may be that others will find it difficult to acquire this
knowledge by theoretical means.11 According to Ibn Taymiyyah, there is no
axiomatic or theoretical knowledge in itself because it depends on the person.
The type of knowledge is determined according to the ability and level of that
person’s intellect.
Ibn Taymiyyah claims that in spite of the important function of the
middle term in a syllogism, this method that necessitates the presence of a
middle term is not the exclusive way of thanking. We can think correctly
without needing the idea of mediation or a middle term. He says that
knowledge of the subject and predicate is sufficient for obtaining judgment in
axiomatic propositions, and this knowledge does not need a means for
mediating between subject and predicate — the middle term — whether the
knowledge of both subject and predicate was axiomatic or not.12 The
achievement of a correct inference or judgment is not done solely by the
syllogism, but this can be achieved in other ways without the need for a
middle term.
In his opinion, people differ more in their intellectual powers than in
their physical powers. Some people can know both subject and predicate in a
perfect manner, and they can thus acquire perfect knowledge that reveals the

10
Ibid., 291.
11
Ibn Taymiyyah, Al-Radd ‘al┐ ’l-Man═iqiyy┘n, 1: 104.
12
Ibid.
CRITICISM OF IBN TAYMIYYAH ON THE ARISTOTELIAN LOGICAL PROPOSITION
73

accidental attributes. These attributes are not revealed to those who are unable
to recognize the subject and predicate in a perfect manner.13 That is to say,
people differ considerably in the speed of acquiring knowledge and its quality.
Therefore, the statement that claims it is impossible to obtain concepts except
through the syllogism — is a faulty statement, because some people have no
need for the middle term.
According to Ruth Mas,14 Ibn Taymiyyah bases his criticism of the
middle term on the principle of relativism. There is no doubt that there is an
element of relativism in the epistemological thought of Ibn Taymiyyah,
especially when he says that people who differ in their intellectual ability grasp
things at different levels and also according to different methods, and
therefore, it is impossible to determine that a certain method is the correct and
only one for them.
It is clear that some people require the middle term, while others do not,
for the former knows the proposition through theory and proof, while the
latter sees a certain proposition as experimental, or proven, or by transmission
report (taw┐tur). Therefore, many people do not require any verification of
the relation between subject and predicate, but they need this proof to satisfy
other people.15
Ibn Taymiyyah says that certain logicians such as Ibn S┘n┐ (d. 1037 A.D.)
think that the recognition of some of the accidental attributes necessitates the
middle term. That is to say, the knowledge of certain attributes demands
mediation that cannot be discovered in a direct manner. For example, one may
know that two is half of four, but to know what is half of a bigger number
such as one thousand three hundred and seventy-two requires mediation or
proof. However, in the opinion of others such as Ibn al-╓┐jib, (d. 1284 A.D.)
the knowledge of some of the accidental attributes demands “explanation”
ta‘l┘l (knowledge of the cause) and not a middle term. On the other hand, Ibn
Taymiyyah claims that if there exists in the accidental attributes some that is
definitive in itself and does not require mediation or cause, then there is no
difference between an essential and an accidental attribute. However, if a
person who recognizes the essential attribute as part of the accidental ones, his
knowledge will be more perfect than that of a person who distinguishes
between the two kinds of attributes.16
Knowledge of attributes does not require a certain mediation that
necessitates its use by everyone in order to grasp the attributes. Since

13
Ibid.
14
Ruth Mas, “Qiyas: a Study in Islamic Logic,” Folia Orientalis 34 (1998), 123.
15
Ibn Taymiyyah, Al-Radd ‘al┐ ’l-Man═iqiyy┘n, 1: 106.
16
Ibid., 1: 105.
 SOBHI RAYAN
74

everything is necessitated by some other thing and can be proved by that other
thing if the cause for the concomitance (malz┴m) is known,17 it is not possible
to compare between the middle term and the cause as philosophers have
asserted. The cause by means of which the effect can be attained corresponds
to the middle term that exists in the thing itself. The cause is a more specific
proof than the intellectual middle term since this term is more universal than
those existing in the external world. Also, since proof is more universal than
the cause, the middle term is also more universal than the cause. Every cause is
the means for inferring the effect, but not every proof is based on a cause that
exists in the thing itself. Ibn Taymiyyah believes that every means that exists
in the thing itself can be an intellectual means and also constitute proof, but
not vice versa because proof is necessary for the thing proven,18 while the
intellectual means does not necessarily constitute proof of anything.
The middle term is not an invariable fact in itself, but differs from one
person to another in such a way that for one person it may be necessary for
judgment but not for another.19 In the opinion of Ibn Taymiyyah, it is
possible to attain correct judgment through the complete knowledge of the
middle term and not only through the logical syllogism. For example, the
syllogism includes three terms: the major, minor and the middle term. In the
statement “All wine is liquor, and all liquor is forbidden”: the minor term is
wine, the middle term is liquor, and forbidden is the major term. The minor
term is part of the middle term because it is more specific or equal to the
middle term.20
According to Aristotle, the argument must include three terms in the
following manner:

All liquor is forbidden

All wine is liquor
Therefore all wine is forbidden

Here wine is the minor term, forbidden is the major term, and liquor is
the middle term that must appear in both premises and its function is to
mediate between the subject term and the predicate term of the inference.
Ibn Taymiyyah does not agree that the middle term is a logical necessity
that must be an integral part of the syllogism. He proposes instead to have a
middle term based on common and universal attribute — the balance (m┘z┐n)

17
Ibid., 2: 137.
18
Ibid., 1: 195.
19
Ibid., 1: 194.
20
Ibid., 2: 96.
CRITICISM OF IBN TAYMIYYAH ON THE ARISTOTELIAN LOGICAL PROPOSITION
75

which is a common attribute that can be used to measure new cases in relation
to the primary case in both religious and intellectual matters.21
The knowledge of the middle term that is necessary for the minor and
major terms is sufficient for knowing the correct judgement. For example, a
person who knows that wine is forbidden, and that all liquor is wine, must
know that all liquor is forbidden.
This concept is an arrangement of two premises in the mind, that is to say
a person can think in an intuitive manner and does not always need the two
premises. For Ibn Taymiyyah, this concept does not negate the knowledge,
but rather necessitates it. When a person knows the middle term and its
necessary relation to the judgment, he can reach the conclusion. This is a
transference from primary matters to the required matters.22
The trend reflected in the approach of Ibn Taymiyyah is that the
proposition expresses the relation between the attributes that characterize the
nouns. The proposition in fact determines the connection of a certain attribute
to another attribute in a constant manner, which means that every time a
certain attribute appears it necessitates the presence of another attribute. He
thinks that the aim of the proposition is to prove the presence of the attributes
of things and not their names.

Criticism of the Universal Proposition

Aristotle exemplifies the universal and particular proposition by saying23 that
there is a universal proposition, such as: All pleasure is good, and not only one
good pleasure exists, and a particular proposition such as: There may be one
good pleasure, or one pleasure that is not good. When we realize that
something is universal, this means that it also applies to the particular. Even
when we realize that something does not exist, it means that non-existence
also applies to the particular.24 The quantitative division constitutes the logical

21
Mu╒ammad ╓asan┘ ’l-Zayn, Man═iq Ibn Taymiyyah wa Manhajuh al-Fikr┘ (Beirut: al-Maktab al-
Isl┐m┘, 1979), 93.
22
Ibn Taymiyyah, Al-Radd ‘al┐ ’l-Man═iqiyy┘n, 2: 97.
23
The distinction between the universal and the particular is made by means of the question:
“Does the predicate necessitate or negate the entire subject?” Therefore, the universal
proposition is uniform because the predicate necessitates or negates the entire subject. But the
particular proposition is not uniform because the predicate necessitates or negates part of the
subject, for the proposition refers to the entire range of a certain concept. This kind of
proposition is said to be distributed with regard to this concept. It is clear that the subject of
universal propositions is always distributed, while in incomplete propositions the subject is not
distributed. On the other hand, the subject is distributed in negative propositions and is not
distributed in positive propositions. See, Morris R. Cohen and Ernest Nagel, An Introduction to
Logic and Scientific Method (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963).
24
Aristotle, Topics, Bk. 2, Ch.1, 109a, 1–10.
 SOBHI RAYAN
76

basis for Aristotle because this division distinguishes between universal and
particular propositions, and quantity distinguishes and separates the universal
from the particular in nature.25
According to Aristotelian logic, both hypothetical and certain knowledge
can be acquired only through proof (burh┐n), and proof necessitates the
presence of the universal proposition, for the universal proposition is the basic
component in a proof. Therefore, it is not possible to construct an inference
from two negative or incomplete sentences.
Ibn Taymiyyah claims that there is no useful value in a universal
proposition, for the proof must include a universal proposition, and we have
to know whether this proposition is universal or not. If the knowledge of the
universal proposition was axiomatic, it is almost certain that the knowledge of
the particulars of the proposition was also axiomatic. However, if the
knowledge is theoretical, it needs axiomatic knowledge, and this creates
circularity.26 This is valid for all universal axiomatic propositions that
constitute the basis of proof, whether these propositions are grasped by the
external or internal senses that a person is aware of in his mind, or if they are
propositions known through experience tajribiyy┐t or transmission reports al-
mutaw┐tir┐t, or through intuition ╒iss. In every proof in which these
propositions constitute the main premise the inference can be known without
the mediation of the universal proposition.
People know that one is half of two, and half of two is one. They know
this without the mediation of the universal proposition. This also applies to
oppositions. Everyone knows that something cannot be both black and white,
and cannot be both dynamic and static. In order to know this there is no need
for the universal proposition: “Nothing can be both black and white, or both
dynamic and static.”27
According to Ibn Taymiyyah, all universal propositions are in fact
specific judgments. Therefore, the transition is from the particular to the
universal. The basis for the axioms of proof is the particular and not the
universal, and is based on experience and not on the intellect. This means that
a person arrives at the particular proposition before the universal one. We find
a consistent and empirical outlook in the philosophical teachings of Ibn

25
The division according to quantity in universal propositions is usually indicated by adjectives
of quantity such as all, every, each one …
(a) Universal propositions refer to general things in a universal sense such as: All men are
mortal.
(b) Particular propositions refer to general things but not in a universal sense such as: Some
people are honest.
26
Ibn Taymiyyah, Al-Radd ‘al┐ ’l-Man═iqiyy┘n, 1: 120.
27
Ibid., 1: 121.
CRITICISM OF IBN TAYMIYYAH ON THE ARISTOTELIAN LOGICAL PROPOSITION
77

Taymiyyah, according to which all universal propositions, including the

general mathematical and geometrical ones, are acquired through the empirical
observation of particulars.28
The contribution of the universal proposition is limited to the knowledge
of things that exist in the external world, for the follow reasons:

(a) The universal proposition can be refuted.29 It needs only one example to
disprove the universality of a positive proposition. For example: All living
creatures move their lower jaws. But the existence of an exceptional
creature such as the crocodile, which moves its upper jaw, is sufficient to
refute the universal proposition.
(b) The universal proposition may have the status of an analogical inference
qiy┐s al-tamth┘l 30 in which the universality is reduced and limited with
regard to the original and the new case since both share the same cause. The
universality here refers to the determination of the specific original and new
case by the application of judgment on the accidental situation.
(c) The universal proposition does not contribute to the knowledge of specific
things that exist, but contributes to the knowledge of things that exist in the
intellect, such as arithmetic and geometry. Even when the universal
proposition deals with existing things, they cannot be known by inference,
but only by the senses.31 That is to say, arithmetic and geometry are subjects
that do not exist in the external world, but exist in the intellect. They
correspond to the external world only when there exists something
numerical or measurable to which the propositions of these two sciences
apply. Therefore the fact that the propositions of pure mathematics
conform to something that exists objectively (what is natural in the external
world), or do not conform, has nothing to do with formal logic but with
the method that transmits the sensual content of the natural object into a
mathematic formula such as the science of astronomy.
(d) The universal proposition is not only the concern of philosophers but is the
shared concern of everyone without the knowledge of logical principles,
similar to the use of general or partial analogies.32

In addition to this, Ibn Taymiyyah criticizes the Aristotelian proposition

that is composed of subject, predicate, and a conjunctive word that links them.
This creates the impression that the subject and predicate stand apart from

28
W. B. Hallaq, Ibn Taymiyyah against the Greek Logicians (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1993), xxxi.
29
Ibn Taymiyyah, Al-Radd ‘al┐ ’l-Man═iqiyy┘n, 2: 100.
30
Ibid.
31
Ibid.
32
Ibid.
 SOBHI RAYAN
78

each other and away the connection of the conjunctive word. This is contrary
to the perception of the proposition by Ibn Taymiyyah who says that: “When
I ask who is barking and the answer is “a dog,” the term “dog” is like a simple
concept. But in fact this is a proposition because this term implies that “a dog
is barking.”33 Regarding the epistemological question, Ibn Taymiyyah claims
that the unit of thought is not the concept but the proposition.34

Proof and Existing Entities

Ibn Taymiyyah claims that proof does not contribute to the knowledge of
universals, and that the universal exists only in the intellect and not in objects.
He reaches the conclusion that: If proof only contributes to the knowledge of
universals, and the universal exists only in the intellect and not in objects, and
nothing exists in the external world except particular (objective) things, then
no object or any existing thing can be known by proof. Through proof one
can only know the things that exist in the intellect, and that do not necessarily
exist in the external world.35
It is therefore impossible to speak about the perfect soul that knows only
universal and abstract things, but one should know specific and partial entities
together with the knowledge of God because the mind cannot be perfect
without the recognition of God and his works. Existence is an obvious matter
that does not need to be defined or proved. Therefore existence is not the aim
of intellectual proof, but there are aspects of existence that are in need of proof
such as: necessity, possibility, substance, accidental attribute, cause and effect,
and the fact that the world was created.36
Necessary existence w┐jib al-wuj┴d is the most perfect kind of existence
among existing entities, and its specific (objective) existence is not general.
This is because the knowledge of universals does not prevent the inclusion of
other concepts such as that man in a rational animal or a speaking creature,
while the knowledge of necessary existence prevents the inclusion of other
concepts and meanings.37 Therefore it is not possible to attain the knowledge
of necessary existence through proof, nor metaphysical concepts such as the
Ten Intellects (according to Neo-platonic philosophy), or the stars and
elements which are specific substances and not general things. This means that

33
C. A. Qadir, “An Early Islamic Critic of Aristotelian Logic: Ibn Taimiyyah,” International
Philosophical Quarterly, 8: 4 (1968), 508, for details see, 498–512.
34
‘Al┘ S┐m┘ al-Nashsh┐r, Man┐hij al-Ba╒th ‘ind Mufakkir┘ ’l-Isl┐m wa Iktish┐f al-Manhaj al-‘Ilm┘
f┘ ’l-└lam al-Isl┐m┘ (n.p.: D┐r al-Ma‘┐rif, 1966), 214.
35
Ibn Taymiyyah, Al-Radd ‘al┐ ’l-Man═iqiyy┘n, 1: 135.
36
Ibid., 1: 136.
37
Ibid., 1: 135.
CRITICISM OF IBN TAYMIYYAH ON THE ARISTOTELIAN LOGICAL PROPOSITION
79

Ibn Taymiyyah states that proof does not contribute to any real knowledge.
As for possible entities, proof does not contribute to general things, because
possible entities do not remain in the same situation, but are subject to change.
Ibn Taymiyyah believes that absolute entities, which have no existence or
proof in reality such as the abstract essences in themselves, have no real
existence, and there is no “man” in himself, or “existence” in itself, or
“blackness” in itself in the external world. These entities have no existence in
the external world and are only intellectual things. According to Ibn
Taymiyyah, the error of the philosophers is that they do not distinguish
between two kinds of possibility: the intellectual possibility and the external-
world possibility.38 He refers to Muslim philosophers influenced by Plato such
as the Mu‘tazilites and Shi‘ites.
Intellectual possibility Imk┐n dhihn┘ occurs when something is presented
to the intellect which is assumed to exist, not because the intellect knows it
exists, but because the intellect knows that it is not an impossibility, even
though it may not be possible in the external world.39
External-world possibility Imk┐n kh┐rij┘ occurs when something is
presented to the intellect and its existence is confirmed by the intellect
because: (1) It knows its existence, (2) or the existence of something that is
analogous to it, (3) or the existence of something that is far away from it. In
situations where the thing that exists is analogous or far away, the fact of its
existence is to be preferred.40 In his opinion, the method of external world
possibility and its three aspects is the method of the Qur'an in proving
resurrection on the Day of Judgment.41
Ibn Taymiyyah opposed the proof of the external world possibility
through ignorance of the impossible, or through the possible knowledge of the
external world possibility in the intellect, or proof of the external world
possibility through intellectual analysis: the existing thing can be analogous to
something else, or opposed to something else, or neither analogous nor
opposed.42 He tries to reach the conclusion that the external world possibility
cannot know the absolute thing only by knowing the possibility. Therefore,
there is nothing that the intellect knows unless it actually exists in the external
world.
Besides this error, both Ibn S┘n┐ and al-R┐z┘ (d. 1209 A.D.) were mistaken
in supposing that one can prove the existence of the external-world possibility

38
Ibid., 2: 67.
39
Ibid., 2: 68.
40
Ibid.
41
Ibid.
42
Ibid., 2: 71.
 SOBHI RAYAN
80

through intellectual knowledge, and that universal abstract essences such as the
infinite universality of man exist in the external world, and their existence
corresponds to particular instances. This is wrong because the concept of
infinite and universal man exists only in the intellect.43 The particular concern
of Ibn Taymiyyah is with the idea that essences or concepts exist somewhere
before existing in reality, and that they as a result bear a determining or
limiting control over God.44

Valid Propositions that do not Include a Universal Proposition

Logicians assert that valid propositions are the universal premises of a proof.
But Ibn Taymiyyah tries to prove that such propositions are neither universal
nor valid:45

(a) Things that are grasped through the senses. These are not universal at all,
since the senses do not grasp universal things that are only grasped through
the intellect. The things of the senses are understood by analogy, or
experience, or common usage, or by reductive induction. In addition, there
is no universal proposition of the sensory that cannot be refuted, even
though the universal proposition is not of the senses. But in a sensory
proposition such as “this fire burns” the senses grasp only the particular
thing. As for intellectual judgment, it is not as the logicians claim, that the
mind can impose a universal proposition on particular things, but is a kind
of “analogy.” It universality is not valid except in a situation in which it is
known that the universal judgment is necessarily linked to the cause
commonly shared among the objects. Things are grasped through internal
feelings (╒issiyy┐t). These are not considered as universals but as a particular
perception that is not common to everyone. People differ more in their
grasp of these things than of sensory things, since grasping the former is
more specific and particular for the perceiver and the thing perceived than
the latter. Perhaps people will be similar in their grasping of a certain type
of things perceived by the senses such as the sun, etc., but are not alike in
their pains and pleasures.
(b) Things that are grasped through experience (tajribiyy┐t). These are based on
experiments that deal only with specific and objective matters.
(c) Things that are grasped by transmission reports (mutaw┐tir┐t). These are
known through the senses, either hearing or sight. Something that is heard
is a specific expression, and what is seen is a specific body, or color, or
action, or any specific thing.

43
Ibid.
44
Oliver Leaman, “Islamic Philosophy and the Attack on Logic,” Topoi 19 (2000), 17–24, 20.
45
Ibn Taymiyyah, Al-Radd ‘al┐ ’l-Man═iqiyy┘n, 2: 52–54.
CRITICISM OF IBN TAYMIYYAH ON THE ARISTOTELIAN LOGICAL PROPOSITION
81

(d) Intuitive things correspond to things that are grasped through experience,
and are referred to as certainties. However, the difference between them is
that experiences are the result of the activities of people who are trying to
do something, while intuitive things are basically connected with indirect
experimental activities. Therefore certain logicians see both of them as
things of experience. According to Ibn Taymiyyah, the things that are
grasped through the senses, or transmission reports, or experience,
correspond and are similar to each other. Just as people are similar in their
sensory knowledge of certain types of sensual things, even though their
opinions differ as to the essential nature of things, they are also alike in their
knowledge of things known through transmission reports, or experience,
even though they differ in the conception of their essential nature. People
agree among themselves with regard to the genus of things, even though
certain people know certain things through transmission reports or
experience while other people have neither experienced them nor known
them through transmission reports.46
On the other hand, logicians think that those things that are known
through transmission reports, or experience, or intuition, are specific and
private for the person who knows them, and are not considered as proof
except for the person who knows them. At the same time, logicians
consider that things grasped through the senses are universal propositions.
Ibn Taymiyyah is opposed to the view of the logicians, and takes the
contrary view. That is to say, that things known through transmission
reports are more certain than knowledge acquired through the senses, since
the propositions of transmission reports are passed on through many people
and heard by many people, while the knowledge of things acquired through
the senses is shared only by those who sense them. Can people share in the
taste, touch or smell of things? These things of the senses are personal for
each one who knows them, and are not proof for others.47
(e) Well-known propositions (mashh┴r┐t) are ethical concepts and spiritual
values such as the goodness of justice, the ugliness of evil, the praise of
truth, the denunciation of lies, the beauty of loyalty and the cruelty of
treason, etc.48 Ibn Taymiyyah claims, contrary to the view of the logicians,49
that the well-known propositions have certainty for the following reasons:
(i) These propositions are better known than propositions of experience
because the meanings included in the well-known propositions are
more familiar than those of experience.

46
Ibid., 2: 124.
47
Ibid.
48
Ibid., 2: 152.
49
The reference here, according to the views of al-R┐z┘ and Ibn S┘n┐, is that well-known
propositions are illusory and invalid. They claim that such propositions are not based on the
intellect and the senses but on the fact that they are familiar and widespread among people. See,
Ibn Taymiyyah, Al-Radd ‘al┐ ’l-Man═iqiyy┘n, 2: 133.
 SOBHI RAYAN
82

(ii) The well-known propositions are based on an innate quality (fi═rah)

shared by all men. People by nature love good traits and hate that are
bad, and therefore the well-known propositions are essential qualities
for mankind from which no one can be disjoined. This is expressed in
the pleasure felt in recognizing a good trait and the pain that results
from a bad trait.50
(iii) There is greater agreement among people regarding well-known
propositions than empirical and axiomatic propositions considered as
certainties among logicians. It may be that a person knows particular
propositions and does not call to mind the general logical principle of
these propositions. On the other hand, a person cannot live without
praising good traits and condemning bad traits.51

In the opinion of Ibn Taymiyyah, the certainty of well-known

propositions is clearer than most of the categorical propositions known
through the intellect, because judgment precedes concept. For example, one
first considers the meaning of the phrase “justice is good and evil is ugly” and
then tries to prove the relationship between the subject and predicate. He
thinks that people have experienced the well known propositions more than
any other proposition, since these propositions are agreed upon among people
and are known in natural way.
Ibn Taymiyyah claims that the mathematical sciences are intuitive, while
the natural sciences and astronomy are experiential, and are not certain at all
but are based on the personal experiments of people. These propositions are
not known through well established transmission reports, but may have been
transmitted through “knowledge passed on by someone else” (khabar al-
w┐╒id). But when a group of people and not a single person performs the
experiment, the experiment is passed on from one generation to another.
These are the “known propositions through personal transmission reports”
(taw┐tur kh┐╖╖).52 According to Ibn Taymiyyah, traditional matters, which are
said to have been contradicted by reason, like the affirmation of attribute, the
world to come, and so on, are known through necessary knowledge, which
ensues from the process of taw┐tur.53
This criticism indicates the general trend in Ibn Taymiyyah that logic is a
matter of consensus and not a necessary intellectual law. The divisions of logic
is not fixed and certain but are a relative matter among logicians. This

50
Ibn Taymiyyah, Al-Radd ‘al┐ ’l-Man═iqiyy┘n, 2: 161.
51
Ibid., 2: 156.
52
Ibid., 2: 131.
53
Binyamin Abrahamov, “Ibn Taymiyya on the Agreement of Reason with Tradition,” The
Muslim World 82: 3–4 (1992), 261, for details see, 256–273.
CRITICISM OF IBN TAYMIYYAH ON THE ARISTOTELIAN LOGICAL PROPOSITION
83

approach by Ibn Taymiyyah is inductive, based on experience, that is to say

the transition from the particular to the general in opposition to the deductive
method. Therefore, this method cannot be absolute and necessary but only
probabilistic, and deals with things that change and are not constant.

Contribution of the Universal Proposition

In spite of the harsh criticism of Ibn Taymiyyah against the universal
proposition, he recognizes its contribution in two spheres: the sphere of
primary axioms, or things that are necessitated by the intellect, and the sphere
of religious research.

(a) Primary axioms al-bad┘h┐t al-‘aqliyyah. Ibn Taymiyyah recognizes that they
are considered as universal propositions and also asserts that the syllogism
contributes to mathematical knowledge. But primary axioms exist in the
intellect and not in the external world.54 They are the premises for
mathematical science and its propositions. The proof of a syllogism does not
demonstrate something directly and positively except in the sphere of
mathematics. The two prominent areas in the sphere of mathematics are:
arithmetic, which is the science of discreet quantities, and geometrical
science. These two sciences are categorical and not subject to refutation. For
example, the addition of numbers, their division and multiplication and the
relations between numbers, are things commonly shared among all rational
people who must know something about this subject. Mathematics is
important both in science and in practical action, and there is no doubt that
mathematical propositions are general, cannot be refuted, and must be
accepted.55

Mathematical knowledge accustoms the mind to correct knowledge.

Correct propositions and valid inferences contribute to correct logic and
thinking so that the mind becomes used to knowing truth and its
expressions in order to utilize it for higher knowledge. Mathematics delights
the mind, and it is a science that contains no error. It is not a science needed
for its own sake, and the soul is not perfected by it.56 Therefore the
contribution of mathematics is the knowledge of numbers and the things
that exist in the external world such as bodies and their attributes.
Mathematics is a science that is intended to serve other sciences. Geometry,
for example, is considered an introduction to astronomy, and is used to
prove the forms of stars. This practical tendency is characteristic of the
science and distinguishes it from other spheres of human knowledge.

54
Ibn Taymiyyah, Al-Radd ‘al┐ ’l-Man═iqiyy┘n, 2: 55.
55
Ibid., 1: 143.
56
Ibid., 1: 142, 145.
 SOBHI RAYAN
84

Ibn Taymiyyah tries to link logic with geometry by saying that geometry is
the introduction or beginning of logic. Logicians have given logic forms that
resemble those of geometry, and called them “definitions” like those of
geometrical forms in order to pass from a concrete form to an intellectual
form. This indicates intellectual weakness and defective knowledge.57
Ibn Taymiyyah says that the knowledge of the forms of logical proof is
similar to the calculation of slaves and property. A person knows the valid
inference by his innate qualities and not through study. People speak
instinctively about the types of classical logic just as they speak about
mathematic calculation.58 Ibn Taymiyyah tries to separate logical forms
from their content. When logic is separated from content it is considered as
pure mathematics. Therefore one can reduce mathematics to logic and vice
versa since both sciences are considered as being the same.
On the other hand, pure mathematics (mathematical calculation and logic)
and applied mathematics (empirical science) are both considered as the
product of social consensus. The former deals with the calculation of signs
and symbols and the latter with the transmission of natural facts to the
conceptual sphere so that they can be treated by pure mathematics.
Pure mathematics (arithmetic and geometry) is true in itself, but does not
exist in the external world, and is merely the mental estimation of number
and quantity. However, it does not correspond to everything that has
number and quantity in the external world. Logical proof is based only on
things that exist in the mind and not on things that exist in the external
world. For example, geometry contributes to astronomy by measuring the
motion of stars. Some of these things are known by proof and the greater
part cannot be known through proof but only by means of analogical
inference.59 Ibn Taymiyyah distinguishes between pure mathematics and
applied mathematics. Pure mathematics is intellectual thought that is not
based on experience in the empirical world, but is based on proof that is a
mental act, while applied mathematics is considered as one of the empirical
sciences. Although pure mathematics is considered as a purely intellectual
science, this does not mean that it is disconnected from the empirical world.
On the contrary, general concepts are created in the mind after knowing
specific particulars and what characterizes the intellect is the knowledge of
the general by means of the knowledge of particulars.60 Mathematics cannot
be detached from experience, but exists by means of experience. Since the
source of intellectual knowledge is the world of experience, there cannot be
absolute intellectual knowledge that originates in the intellect alone.

57
Ibid., 2: 146.
58
Ibid., 2: 50.
59
Ibid., 2: 52.
60
Ibid., 2: 110.
CRITICISM OF IBN TAYMIYYAH ON THE ARISTOTELIAN LOGICAL PROPOSITION
85

Ibn Taymiyyah criticizes the philosophical teachings of Pythagoras that

abstract numbers exist outside the intellect. That is to say, it is the
mathematical attributes that essentially characterize things and determines
their quality. Even Plato thought that abstract entities such as “infinite
man” exist outside the intellect and are eternal. Later on Aristotle realized
that this was false and he saw these entities as existing in the external world
in correspondence with the existence of particular things. On the other
hand, Ibn Taymiyyah thought that things existing in the external world
were not universals, and that the only things that exist in the external world
are specific and particular objects.61
(b) The religious sphere. Ibn Taymiyyah admits the contribution of the general
proposition in the sphere of religious research: “In the words of the
prophets one can see the use of the general proposition, for example, the
proposition of the Prophet Mu╒ammad peace be upon him: ‘All wine is
liquor, and all liquor is forbidden.’ ” However, Ibn Taymiyyah thinks that
this proposition is not according to the Greek syllogistic method but
belongs to general words of wisdom.62

Ibn Taymiyyah criticizes the ways in which the general proposition is

attained, and speaks of two methods:63

(a) “Inference of what is absent by what is present”64 (Qiy┐s al-Gh┐’ib ‘┐la ’l-
Sh┐hid) or the measurement of something by something that resembles it.
For example, if we know that this fire burns, it can be known that all fire
burns to the same extent. This is the analogical method for logicians. It is a
method based on supposition and is not certain.
(b) The second method is the influence of the general concept on the mind or
the intellect.65 When it senses particulars, the mind attains the knowledge of
the universal concept from the “active intellect.” Ibn Taymiyyah does not
accept this method, because if the knowledge of the universal propositions
is necessary, the knowledge of particulars is also necessary, and he thinks
that the knowledge of particulars is closer to the innate nature of man that

61
Ibid., 1: 144.
62
Ibid., 1: 123.
63
This syllogistic inference was used by Muslim theologians and includes three terms: the
original case (al-a╖l) the new case (al-far‘) and the cause (al-‘illah). In addition to the cause, the
mutakkallim┴n spoke about the condition, the indicator, the definition and the truth. Ab┴ Bakr
al-B┐qill┐n┘ defines the inference of the absent by the present in saying that: “The thing that
exists in present reality is judged and described by an attribute because of a certain cause, and
this is also valid regarding what is absent (al-gh┐’ib) which is characterized by the same
attribute.” This means that cause is common to both the present and absent case, and therefore
they receive the same judgment.
64
Ibn Taymiyyah, Al-Radd ‘al┐ ’l-Man═iqiyy┘n, 1: 127.
65
Ibid., 1: 127.
 SOBHI RAYAN
86

the knowledge of the universals. He is fundamentally opposed to the idea

because he bases knowledge on experience and not on the idea of Neo-
platonic “influence.” His theory of logic and legal logic rests on the
fundamental assumption that it is not the form of the argument, but rather
the material premises of that argument which determine the epistemological
status of the conclusion.66

Conclusion
According to Ibn Taymiyyah the proposition is composed of subject and
predicate, and is an informative proposition. The proposition can also be
composed of many expressions such as qualities, associations, adverbs of
manner, place and time etc. Ibn Taymiyyah believes that the proposition does
not have to be composed of subject and predicate, but can be composed of a
single noun or of many expressions, depending on the relationship to the
person in question.
The criticism on the division of propositions is based on the idea of
relativity, which states that there is no axiomatic or theoretical knowledge in
itself, but it depends on a person, and the type of knowledge is determined
according to his ability and level.
The trend reflected in the approach of Ibn Taymiyyah is that the
proposition expresses the relationship between the attributes that characterize
the nouns. The proposition in fact determines the connection of a certain
attribute to another in a constant manner. He believes that the aim of the
proposition is to prove the presence of the attributes of things and not their
nouns.
According to Ibn Taymiyyah, all universal propositions are in fact
specific propositions. Therefore the transition is from the particular to the
universal, and the axiomatic foundations of proof are particular and not
universal and are based on experience and not on the intellect. We find in the
philosophical teachings of Ibn Taymiyyah an empirical and consistent outlook
according to which all universal propositions, including mathematical and
geometrical propositions, are acquired through the empirical observation of
particulars.
In spite of the harsh criticism leveled by Ibn Taymiyyah against the
universal proposition, he recognizes its contribution in two spheres: the
primary axioms, or the things that are necessitated by the intellect, and the
sphere of religious research.

66
W. B. Hallaq, “Non-Analogical Arguments in Sunni Juridical Qiy┐s,” Arabica, 36: 3 (1989),
304–05, for details see, 286–306.
CRITICISM OF IBN TAYMIYYAH ON THE ARISTOTELIAN LOGICAL PROPOSITION
87

Ibn Taymiyyah, therefore, believes that the proposition based on

experience can ensure true knowledge because it can be tested and proved
empirically. Although the universal proposition is derived from the particular
proposition, it does not exist in the empirical world but only in the intellect.
That is to say, we can think it, but we cannot prove it by empirical methods.
Therefore, the unit of thought for Ibn Taymiyyah is the particular and
empirical proposition.

∗ ∗ ∗