G.R. No.

163776 April 24, 2007

REV. FR. NARDO B. CAYAT, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (FIRST DIVISION), COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (EN BANC), and THOMAS
R. PALILENG, SR., Respondents.

x--------------------------x

G.R. No. 165736 April 24, 2007

REV. FR. NARDO B. CAYAT, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (FIRST DIVISION), COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (EN BANC), and THOMAS
R. PALILENG, SR., Respondents.

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

FELISEO K. BAYACSAN, Intervenor.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

For our resolution are two petitions for certiorari filed by Rev. Fr. Nardo B. Cayat (Cayat). G.R. No. 163776 is a
petition for certiorari1 of the Resolution dated 12 April 20042 and of the Order dated 9 May 20043 of the First Division
of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC First Division) in SPA Case No. 04-152. The 12 April 2004 Resolution
cancelled the certificate of candidacy of Cayat as mayoralty candidate of Buguias, Benguet in the 10 May 2004 local
elections. The 9 May 2004 Order denied Cayat’s motion for reconsideration for failure to pay the required filing fee.

G.R. No. 165736 is a petition for certiorari4 of the Order dated 25 October 20045 of the COMELEC First Division also
in SPA Case No. 04-152. The 25 October 2004 Order granted the motion for execution of judgment filed by Thomas
R. Palileng, Sr. (Palileng) and annulled Cayat’s proclamation. The 25 October 2004 Order also directed (1) the
COMELEC Law Department to implement the dispositive portion of the 12 April 2004 Resolution; (2) the Regional
Election Director of the Cordillera Autonomous Region (CAR) to create a new Municipal Board of Canvassers
(MBOC); (3) the new MBOC to convene and prepare a new Certificate of Canvass for Mayor of Buguias, Benguet
by deleting Cayat’s name and to proclaim Palileng as the duly elected Mayor of Buguias, Benguet. Feliseo K.
Bayacsan (Bayacsan), duly elected Vice-Mayor of Buguias, Benguet, filed a petition-in-intervention in G.R. No.
165736.

The Facts

Cayat and Palileng were the only candidates for the mayoralty post in Buguias, Benguet in the 10 May 2004 local
elections. Cayat filed his certificate of candidacy on 5 January 2004. On 26 January 2004, Palileng filed a petition for
disqualification against Cayat before the COMELEC Regional Election Office in Baguio City. Docketed as SPA
(PES) No. C04-001, Palileng’s petition alleged that:

3. On January 05, 2004, [Cayat] filed his Certificate [of] Candidacy for Mayor for the Municipality of Buguias,
Benguet, Philippines alleging among others as follows:

"I AM ELIGIBLE for the office [I] seek to [be] elected, x x x. I hereby certify that the facts stated herein are
true and correct of my own personal knowledge."

1
 x x x (Underscoring supplied).

Copy of his Certificate of Candidacy is hereto attached and marked as ANNEX "A";

4. The truth of the matter being that [Cayat] is not eligible to run as Mayor having been convicted by final judgment
for a criminal offense by the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City, Philippines, Branch 2, for the Crime of Forcible
Acts of Lasciviousness docketed as Criminal Case Number 110490. Copies of the Information and the Order of
conviction dated October 03, 2003 is [sic] hereto attached and marked as ANNEX "B" and "C";

5. In fact, [Cayat] is still under probation at the time he filed his Certificate of Candidacy on January 05, 2004 after
the Honorable Court granted his application for probation on November 06, 2003. Copies of the Application for
probation date[d] October 07, 2003 and the Order granting the probation is [sic] hereto attached and marked
as ANNEXES "D" and "E";

6. Despite assumption of obligation imposed by this oath that the facts stated in his Certificate of Candidacy are true
to the best of his knowledge, [Cayat] made misrepresentations and committed acts of perjury when he declared that
he is eligible for the said office while in truth and in fact, Respondent was convicted in the above-mentioned Criminal
Complaint;

7. At the time of filing his Certificate of Candidacy, [Cayat] is disqualified to [sic] said office as Mayor as he is still
serving his sentence and/or disqualification was not yet removed or cured[.]6 (Emphasis in the original)

Atty. Julius D. Torres (Atty. Torres), COMELEC Provincial Election Supervisor for Baguio-Benguet, served
summons on Cayat by telegram through the Telecommunications Office on 26 January 2004. However, Cayat did
not personally receive the telegram. The Telecommunications Office of Abatan, Buguias delivered the telegram to
Ferdinand Guinid (Guinid). Atty. Torres also instructed Mr. Francis Likigan, Election Officer of Buguias, Benguet, to
personally inform Cayat to file his answer within three days from receipt of notice. Cayat did not file an answer.

The Ruling of the COMELEC

Despite Cayat’s non-participation, Atty. Torres proceeded with SPA (PES) No. C04-001. Palileng filed his position
paper on 16 February 2004. Atty. Torres then resolved the issues based on available records. Atty. Torres also
submitted the entire record of the case together with his findings and recommendation to the Office of the Clerk of
the COMELEC on 24 February 2004. Pertinent portions of Atty. Torres’ report read:

It is important to note that based on the petition, [Palileng] seeks to disqualify [Cayat] for material misrepresentation
in his certificate of candidacy. This can be deduced from the fact that the petitioner cited in his petition that the
respondent declared that he is eligible for the office he is seeking to be elected where in fact, [Cayat] is not eligible
due to his conviction of a criminal offense. This being [the case,] the petition should have been a petition to deny
due course or to cancel certificate of candidacy which should have been filed within five (5) days from the last day of
filing certificates of candidacy. Obviously, a petition to deny due course could no longer be filed at the time the
petition was received.

However, it is important that the petition alleged the disqualification of the respondent by reason of his conviction of
a criminal offense, which is the main reason why the petitioner filed this case. On this note, the applicable provision
of law is now Sec. 40(a) of R.A. 7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code. Said provision of law reads:

Sec. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running fro [sic] any elective local position:

(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude for an offense punishable by
one (1) year or more of imprisonment within [two] (2) years after serving sentence;

(b) xxx xxx xxx

With this, the issue of disqualification rests on Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code and not on the material
misrepresentation in the certificate of candidacy.
2
The issue now to be resolved is whether or not the crime of Forcible Acts of Lasciviousness, to which [Cayat] was
convicted by final judgment, is a crime involving moral turpitude so as to bring the issue within the coverage of
Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code.

The conviction of [Cayat] was never questioned. In fact [Cayat] accepted his conviction by applying for probation
which was granted on November 6, 2003. It is already well settled that a judgment of conviction in a criminal case
ipso facto attains finality when the accused applies for probation. This brings us to the issue of moral turpitude.

Based on the Information filed, [Cayat] was convicted of Forcible Acts of Lasciviousness when he, with lewd desire
and/or with intention to obtain sexual gratification, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously hold the
complainant’s [AAA] arm which he placed on his crotch, grab[bed] and embraced her, as well as kiss[ed] her on the
lips and mashed her breasts and performed similar acts of indecency, with force and intimidation and against the will
of complainant.

Moral turpitude had been defined as everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of
baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in
general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. (IRRI vs[.] NLRC, May 12, 1993)

Moral turpitude implies something immoral in itself, regardless of the fact that it is punishable by law or not. It is not
merely mala prohibita, but the act itself must be inherently immoral. The doing of the act itself, and not its prohibition
by statute fixes the moral turpitude. Moral turpitude does not, however, include such acts as are not of themselves
immoral but those initially lies in their being positively prohibited (Dela Torre vs[.] COMELEC and Marcial Villanueva,
G.R. No. 121592, July 5, 1996).

From the definition of moral turpitude, it can be determined that the acts of [Cayat] involved moral turpitude. His acts
fell short of his inherent duty of respecting his fellowmen and the society. This was aggravated by the fact that
[Cayat] is a priest. The crime of acts of lasciviousness clearly involves moral turpitude.

Therefore, the respondent is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Applying Sec. 40(a) of the Local
Government Code, it is recommended that [Cayat] be disqualified from running as Mayor of the Municipality of
Buguias, Benguet.7

In its Resolution of 12 April 2004 of the case docketed as SPA Case No. 04-152, the COMELEC First Division found
no compelling reason to disturb Atty. Torres’ findings and consequently cancelled Cayat’s certificate of candidacy.
The dispositive portion of the COMELEC First Division’s Resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED as it hereby RESOLVES to CANCEL the
Certificate of Candidacy of Respondent REV. FATHER NARDO B. CAYAT.

The Law Department is directed to CANCEL the Certificate of Candidacy of REV. FR. NARDO B. CAYAT as
mayoralty candidate in Buguias, Benguet in connection with the May 10, 2004 Elections.

SO ORDERED.8

On 13 April 2004, Cayat received a telegram from the Telecommunications Office through an unnamed person.
Apparently, the Telecommunications Office asked the unnamed person to deliver the telegram to Cayat. In his
affidavit, Cayat stated that on 13 April 2004, someone gave "me a telegram which I received. Said telegram which I
read later, informed me that the COMELEC will promulgate its decision on April 12, 2004, at the Comelec Session
Hall in Intramuros, Manila."9

The officer in charge of the Telecommunications Office in Buguias, Benguet, Mr. Rufino G. Cabato, certified that he
delivered the telegram to Guinid. He further stated that Guinid, Cayat’s cousin, voluntarily accepted to deliver the
telegram to Cayat.

Cayat filed a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc on 16 April 2004. Cayat argued that the
COMELEC First Division Resolution of 12 April 2004 is void because the COMELEC did not acquire jurisdiction over
3
him. Cayat also argued that Section 5 of COMELEC Resolution No. 6452 (Resolution No. 6452) allowing service of
summons by telegram is void.

In an order dated 9 May 2004, the COMELEC First Division dismissed Cayat’s motion for reconsideration for failure
to pay the required filing fee. In the local elections held on 10 May 2004, Cayat’s name remained on the
COMELEC’s list of candidates. In the Certificate of Canvass of Votes dated 12 May 2004, Cayat received 8,164
votes.10 Palileng, on the other hand, received 5,292 votes.11 Cayat was thus proclaimed the duly elected Mayor of
Buguias, Benguet. Cayat took his oath of office on 17 May 2004.

Meanwhile, on 13 May 2004, Cayat received a photocopy of the 9 May 2004 order of the COMELEC First Division
denying his motion for reconsideration for his failure to pay the filing fee. On 26 May 2004, Cayat filed the petition
docketed as G.R. No. 163776 before this Court.

On 29 July 2004, pending the resolution of G.R. No. 163776, Palileng filed a petition for annulment of proclamation
with a prayer for the issuance of an injunctive relief, docketed as SPC No. 04-043, against the MBOC of Buguias
and Cayat before the COMELEC Second Division. On 28 August 2004, the COMELEC Second Division dismissed
Palileng’s petition pursuant to COMELEC Omnibus Resolution No. 7257 (Resolution No. 7257). Resolution No.
7257 enumerated the cases which survived from among those filed before the Clerk of the COMELEC in the 10 May
2004 elections and which required proceedings beyond 30 June 2004.12

On 29 July 2004, pending resolution by the COMELEC of SPC No. 04-043, Palileng also filed a motion for execution
of judgment in SPA Case No. 04-152. On 10 August 2004, the COMELEC First Division issued an order setting on
18 August 2004 the hearing on the motion for execution. Only Palileng’s counsel appeared during the hearing. The
parties were instructed to file their respective memoranda within five days. In an order dated 25 October 2004, the
COMELEC First Division granted the motion for execution and disposed of the case as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission (First Division) hereby GRANTS the instant Motion for
Execution of Judgment and ANNULS the proclamation of Respondent Rev. Fr. Nardo B. Cayat. Accordingly, it
directs as follows:

1. For the Law Department to implement the disposition of this Commission (First Division) in its Resolution
promulgated last April 12, 2004 and affirmed when it denied Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration in its
Order of May 9, 2004, for it to "CANCEL the Certificate of Candidacy of Rev. Father Nardo B. Cayat as
mayoralty candidate in Buguias, Benguet in connection with the May 10, 2004 Elections["];

2. For the Regional Election Director of Cordillera Autonomous Region (CAR) to create a new Municipal
Board of Canvassers;

3. After due notice to the parties, for the Board to convene and prepare a new Certificate of Canvass for
mayor of Buguias, Benguet deleting therefrom the name of disqualified candidate Rev. Fr. Nardo B. Cayat
and immediately proclaim petitioner Thomas R. Palileng, Sr. as the duly elected mayor of Buguias,
Benguet.13

Cayat filed an omnibus motion before the COMELEC First Division on 3 November 2004. Cayat prayed for the
1ªvvphi1.nét

recall of the 25 October 2004 order and for the suspension of further proceedings while the resolution of G.R. No.
163776 remains pending before this Court. The hearing on the motion was set for 12 November 2004.14

However, on 4 November 2004, Atty. Armando Velasco, Regional Director for the CAR, sent a notice that the new
MBOC would convene on 12 November 2004 for the implementation of the COMELEC First Division’s 25 October
2004 order. On 10 November 2004, Cayat filed a petition for certiorari before this Court which was docketed as G.R.
No. 165736. Cayat prayed that (1) a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to
enjoin COMELEC and its agents from enforcing the 25 October 2004 order and the 4 November 2004 notice; (2) an
order be issued reversing and setting aside the 25 October 2004 order and the 4 November 2004 notice; and (3) an
order be issued directing the COMELEC to suspend proceedings in SPA Case No. 04-152 until G.R. No. 163776 is
resolved by this Court with finality.

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On 12 November 2004, the new MBOC executed the COMELEC First Division’s order of 25 October 2004 and
proclaimed Palileng as Mayor of Buguias, Benguet. Palileng took his oath of office on the same day.

Bayacsan, elected Vice-Mayor of Buguias, Benguet, filed his petition-in-intervention in G.R. No. 165736 on 17
November 2004 before this Court. For his part, Bayacsan prayed that the 25 October 2004 order and the 12
November 2004 proclamation be nullified and that he be declared as the rightful Mayor of Buguias, Benguet.

The Issues

The present petition seeks to determine the legality of the orders cancelling Cayat’s Certificate of Candidacy,
nullifying Cayat’s proclamation as Mayor of Buguias, Benguet, and declaring Palileng as Mayor of Buguias,
Benguet.

The Ruling of the Court

The petition has no merit.

On the Late Filing of Cayat’s Motion for Reconsideration

Cayat learned about the promulgation of the COMELEC First Division Resolution of 12 April 2004 and its contents
through two separate telegrams. He narrates the circumstances of his receipt of these telegrams as follows:

10. On April 13, 2004, I took a jeepney ride to Loo, Buguias, to attend a farmers’ congress. When the jeep I was
riding in made a stop in front of the Lino’s Grocery in Abatan, somebody (who was not an employee of the Telecom
Office) came rushing to give me a telegram which I received. Said telegram, which I read later, informed me that the
Comelec will promulgate its decision on April 12, 2004, at the Comelec Session Hall in Intramuros, Manila;

11. I could not make a trip to my lawyer in Baguio City until April 15, 2004, because he was appearing with
Attorneys Samson Alcantara and Rene Gorospe before the Supreme Court which was holding oral arguments in
Baguio City;

12. On April 15, 2004, at about 3:00 o’clock, I received a text message in the office of my lawyer that a telegram was
served to Mr. Simon Guinid. The message was forwarded. It gave information that my Certificate of Candidacy
(COC) had been canceled by the First Division of the Comelec;

x x x x15

On 16 April 2004, Cayat filed a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution of 12 April 2004 before the
COMELEC en banc. Cayat alleged that although the Resolution was promulgated on 12 April 2004, he was notified
by telegram only on 13 April 2004. Hence, Cayat posits, he had until 16 April 2004 to move for reconsideration.

Cayat claims that he was not served the advance notice of promulgation required in Section 7 of Resolution No.
6452,16 stating:

Promulgation. — The promulgation of a decision or resolution of the Commission or a Division shall be made on a
date previously fixed, of which notice shall be served in advance upon the parties or their attorneys personally or by
registered mail or by telegram or fax.

The three-day period17 from promulgation of the resolution in Section 8 of Resolution No. 6452, within which to file a
motion for reconsideration, presupposes that the advance notice in Section 7 was served on Cayat.

The COMELEC sent the advance notice to Cayat by telegram to "Bayoyo, Buguias, Benguet," the address Cayat
wrote on the blank space provided beside "RESIDENCE" in the Certificate of Candidacy he filed with the
COMELEC.18 The COMELEC sent the telegram to Cayat before the date of promulgation. Cayat, who was traveling
throughout Buguias at the time, admitted in his affidavit that on 13 April 2004, someone gave "me a telegram which I

5
received. Said telegram which I read later, informed me that the COMELEC will promulgate its decision on April 12,
2004, at the Comelec Session Hall in Intramuros, Manila."19

Clearly, by the wordings of the telegram, the COMELEC sent the telegram to the residence address of Cayat before
12 April 2004, the date of promulgation. It is immaterial if Cayat personally received the telegram after 12 April 2004
as long as the telegram was sent and delivered before 12 April 2004 to the residence address Cayat indicated in his
Certificate of Candidacy.

However, there is no point belaboring this issue, which need not even be resolved. Whether the telegram reached
the residence address of Cayat before or after the date of promulgation will not affect the outcome of this case.
Cayat failed to pay the prescribed filing fee when he filed his motion for reconsideration on 16 April 2004. There is
no dispute that the failure to pay the filing fee made the motion for reconsideration a mere scrap of paper, as if
Cayat did not file any motion for reconsideration at all.

Thus, the disqualification of Cayat became final three days after 13 April 2004, based on Cayat’s own allegation that
he received the telegram only on 13 April 2004 and that he had until 16 April 2004 to file a motion for
reconsideration. Clearly, the COMELEC First Division’s Resolution of 12 April 2004 cancelling Cayat’s Certificate of
Candidacy due to disqualification became final on 17 April 2004, or 23 days before the 10 May 2004 elections.

On Cayat’s Failure to Pay the Filing Fee

for His Motion for Reconsideration

In an order dated 9 May 2004, the COMELEC First Division denied Cayat’s motion for reconsideration for failure to
pay the required filing fee. Cayat made a fatal error: he failed to pay the required filing fee for his motion for
reconsideration.

Although there is nothing in Resolution No. 6452 which mentions the need to pay a fee for filing a motion for
reconsideration, Section 7 of Rule 40 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure imposes a fee of ₱300 for filing a
motion for reconsideration of a decision, order, or resolution. The succeeding section further provides that the
COMELEC may refuse to take action until it is paid.

Cayat’s motion for reconsideration is merely pro forma because Cayat failed to pay the prescribed filing fee within
the prescribed period.20 This brings us to the conclusion that it is as if no motion for reconsideration had been filed,
resulting in the 12 April 2004 Resolution of the COMELEC’s First Division attaining finality. The COMELEC First
Division’s 12 April 2004 Resolution declaring Cayat’s disqualification became final on 17 April 2004, long before the
10 May 2004 local elections.

On Palileng’s Proclamation

There is no doubt as to the propriety of Palileng’s proclamation for two basic reasons.

First, the COMELEC First Division’s Resolution of 12 April 2004 cancelling Cayat’s certificate of candidacy due to
disqualification became final and executory on 17 April 200421 when Cayat failed to pay the prescribed filing fee.
Thus, Palileng was the only candidate for Mayor of Buguias, Benguet in the 10 May 2004 elections. Twenty–three
days before election day, Cayat was already disqualified by final judgment to run for Mayor in the 10 May 2004
elections. As the only candidate, Palileng was not a second placer. On the contrary, Palileng was the sole and only
placer, second to none. The doctrine on the rejection of the second placer, which triggers the rule on succession,
does not apply in the present case because Palileng is not a second-placer but the only placer. Consequently,
Palileng’s proclamation as Mayor of Buguias, Benguet is beyond question.

Second, there are specific requirements for the application of the doctrine on the rejection of the second placer. The
doctrine will apply in Bayacsan’s favor, regardless of his intervention in the present case, if two conditions concur:
(1) the decision on Cayat’s disqualification remained pending on election day, 10 May 2004, resulting in the
presence of two mayoralty candidates for Buguias, Benguet in the elections; and (2) the decision on Cayat’s
disqualification became final only after the elections.

6
Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC,22 which enunciates the doctrine on the rejection of the second placer, does not apply to the
present case because in Labo there was no final judgment of disqualification before the elections. The doctrine on
the rejection of the second placer was applied in Labo and a host of other cases23 because the judgment declaring
the candidate’s disqualification in Labo and the other cases24 had not become final before the elections. To repeat,
Labo and the other cases applying the doctrine on the rejection of the second placer have one common essential
condition — the disqualification of the candidate had not become final before the elections. This essential condition
does not exist in the present case.

Thus, in Labo, Labo’s disqualification became final only on 14 May 1992, three days after the 11 May 1992
elections. On election day itself, Labo was still legally a candidate. In the present case, Cayat was disqualified by
final judgment 23 days before the 10 May 2004 elections. On election day, Cayat was no longer legally a candidate
for mayor. In short, Cayat’s candidacy for Mayor of Buguias, Benguet was legally non-existent in the 10 May 2004
elections.

The law expressly declares that a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election cannot be voted for,
and votes cast for him shall not be counted. This is a mandatory provision of law. Section 6 of Republic Act No.
6646, The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, states:

Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case.— Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified
shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared
by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes
in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest
and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of
the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. (Emphasis added)

Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 covers two situations. The first is when the disqualification becomes
final before the elections, which is the situation covered in the first sentence of Section 6. The second is when the
disqualification becomes final after the elections, which is the situation covered in the second sentence of Section 6.

The present case falls under the first situation. Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law governing the first situation is
categorical: a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him
shall not be counted. The Resolution disqualifying Cayat became final on 17 April 2004, way before the 10 May
2004 elections. Therefore, all the 8,164 votes cast in Cayat’s favor are stray. Cayat was never a candidate in the 10
May 2004 elections. Palileng’s proclamation is proper because he was the sole and only candidate, second to
none.

Labo involved the second situation covered in the second sentence of Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law. In
Labo, the Court applied the second sentence of Section 6, and even italicized the second sentence for emphasis,
thus:

x x x In the first place, Sec. 72 of the Omnibus Election Code has already been repealed by Sec. 6 of RA No. 6646,
to wit:

"Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case.— Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified
shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared
by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes
in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest
and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of
the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong."

A perusal of the above provision would readily disclose that the Comelec can legally suspend the proclamation of
petitioner Labo, his reception of the winning number of votes notwithstanding, especially so where, as in this case,
Labo failed to present any evidence before the Comelec to support his claim of reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship.25 (Italicization in the original)

7
Cayat’s proclamation on 12 May 2004 is void because the decision disqualifying Cayat had already become final on
17 April 2004. There is no longer any need to ascertain whether there was actual knowledge by the voters of
Cayat’s disqualification when they cast their votes on election day because the law mandates that Cayat’s votes
"shall not be counted." There is no disenfranchisement of the 8,164 voters. Rather, the 8,164 voters are deemed by
law to have deliberately voted for a non-candidate, and thus their votes are stray and "shall not be counted."

To allow a candidate disqualified by final judgment 23 days before the elections to be voted for and have his votes
counted is a blatant violation of a mandatory provision of the election law. It creates confusion in the results of the
elections and invites needless new litigations from a candidate whose disqualification had long become final before
the elections. The doctrine on the rejection of the second placer was never meant to apply to a situation where a
candidate’s disqualification had become final before the elections.

In short, the COMELEC First Division Resolution of 12 April 2004 cancelling Cayat’s certificate of candidacy, on the
ground that he is disqualified for having been sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude,
became final on 17 April 2004. This constrains us to rule against Cayat’s proclamation as Mayor of Buguias,
Benguet. We also rule against Bayacsan’s petition-in-intervention because the doctrine on the rejection of the
second placer does not apply to this case.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS Rev. Fr. Nardo B. Cayat’s petitions and Feliseo K. Bayacsan’s petition-in-intervention.
We AFFIRM the Resolution of the First Division of the Commission on Elections dated 12 April 2004 and the Orders
dated 9 May 2004 and 25 October 2004.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 196804 October 9, 2012

MAYOR BARBARA RUBY C. TALAGA, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RODERICK A. ALCALA, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 197015

PHILIP M. CASTILLO, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, BARBARA RUBY TALAGA and RODERICK A. ALCALA, Respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

In focus in these consolidated special civil actions are the disqualification of a substitute who was proclaimed the
winner of a mayoralty election; and the ascertainment of who should assume the office following the substitute’s
disqualification.

The consolidated petitions for certiorari seek to annul and set aside the En Banc Resolution issued on May 20, 2011
in SPC No. 10-024 by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. REVERSING and SETTING ASIDE the January 11, 2011 Resolution of the Second Division;

8
 2. GRANTING the petition in intervention of Roderick A. Alcala;

3. ANNULLING the election and proclamation of respondent Barbara C. Talaga as mayor of Lucena City
and CANCELLING the Certificate of Canvass and Proclamation issued therefor;

4. Ordering respondent Barbara Ruby Talaga to cease and desist from discharging the functions of the
Office of the Mayor;

5. In view of the permanent vacancy in the Office of the Mayor of Lucena City, the proclaimed Vice-Mayor is
ORDERED to succeed as Mayor as provided under Section 44 of the Local Government Code;

6. DIRECTING the Clerk of Court of the Commission to furnish copies of this Resolution to the Office of the
President of the Philippines, the Department of Interior and Local Government, the Department of Finance
and the Secretary of the Sangguniang Panglunsod of Lucena City.

Let the Department of Interior and Local Government and the Regional Election Director of Region IV of COMELEC
implement this resolution.

SO ORDERED.1

Antecedents

On November 26, 2009 and December 1, 2009, Ramon Talaga (Ramon) and Philip M. Castillo (Castillo)
respectively filed their certificates of candidacy (CoCs) for the position of Mayor of Lucena City to be contested in
the scheduled May 10, 2010 national and local elections.2

Ramon, the official candidate of the Lakas-Kampi-CMD,3 declared in his CoC that he was eligible for the office he
was seeking to be elected to.

Four days later, or on December 5, 2009, Castillo filed with the COMELEC a petition denominated as In the Matter
of the Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. as Mayor for
Having Already Served Three (3) Consecutive Terms as a City Mayor of Lucena, which was docketed as SPA 09-
029 (DC).4 He alleged

therein that Ramon, despite knowing that he had been elected and had served three consecutive terms as Mayor of
Lucena City, still filed his CoC for Mayor of Lucena City in the May 10, 2010 national and local elections.

The pertinent portions of Castillo’s petition follow:

1. Petitioner is of legal age, Filipino, married, and a resident of Barangay Mayao Crossing, Lucena City but
may be served with summons and other processes of this Commission at the address of his counsel at 624
Aurora Blvd., Lucena City 4301;

2. Respondent Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. is likewise of legal age, married, and a resident of Barangay Ibabang
Iyam, Lucena City and with postal address at the Office of the City Mayor, City Hall, Lucena City, where he
may be served with summons and other processes of this Commission;

3. Petitioner, the incumbent city vice-mayor of Lucena having been elected during the 2007 local elections,
is running for city mayor of Lucena under the Liberal party this coming 10 May 2010 local elections and has
filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor of Lucena;

4. Respondent was successively elected mayor of Lucena City in 2001, 2004, and 2007 local elections
based on the records of the Commission on Elections of Lucena City and had fully served the aforesaid
three (3) terms without any voluntary and involuntary interruption;

9
 5. Except the preventive suspension imposed upon him from 13 October 2005 to 14 November 2005 and
from 4 September 2009 to 30 October 2009 pursuant to Sandiganbayan 4th Division Resolution in Criminal
Case No. 27738 dated 3 October 2005, the public service as city mayor of the respondent is continuous and
uninterrupted under the existing laws and jurisprudence;

6. There is no law nor jurisprudence to justify the filing of the certificate of candidacy of the respondent,
hence, such act is outrightly unconstitutional, illegal, and highly immoral;

7. Respondent, knowing well that he was elected for and had fully served three (3) consecutive terms as a
city mayor of Lucena, he still filed his Certificate of Candidacy for City Mayor of Lucena for this coming 10
May 2010 national and local elections;

8. Under the Constitution and existing Election Laws, New Local Government Code of the Philippines, and
jurisprudence the respondent is no longer entitled and is already disqualified to be a city mayor for the fourth
consecutive term;

9. The filing of the respondent for the position of city mayor is highly improper, unlawful and is potentially
injurious and prejudicial to taxpayers of the City of Lucena; and

10. It is most respectfully prayed by the petitioner that the respondent be declared disqualified and no longer
entitled to run in public office as city mayor of Lucena City based on the existing law and jurisprudence.5

The petition prayed for the following reliefs, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that the Certificate of Candidacy filed by the
respondent be denied due course to or cancel the same and that he be declared as a disqualified candidate under
the existing Election Laws and by the provisions of the New Local Government Code.6 (Emphasis supplied.)

Ramon countered that that the Sandiganbayan had preventively suspended him from office during his second and
third terms; and that the three-term limit rule did not then apply to him pursuant to the prevailing jurisprudence7 to the
effect that an involuntary separation from office amounted to an interruption of continuity of service for purposes of
the application of the three-term limit rule.

In the meantime, on December 23, 2009, the Court promulgated the ruling in Aldovino, Jr. v. Commission on
Elections,8 holding that preventive suspension, being a mere temporary incapacity, was not a valid ground for
avoiding the effect of the three-term limit rule. Thus, on December 30, 2009, Ramon filed in the COMELEC a
Manifestation with Motion to Resolve, taking into account the intervening ruling in Aldovino. Relevant portions of his
Manifestation with Motion to Resolve are quoted herein, viz:

4. When respondent filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Mayor of Lucena City, the rule that ‘where
the separation from office is caused by reasons beyond the control of the officer – i.e. involuntary – the service of
term is deemed interrupted’ has not yet been overturned by the new ruling of the Supreme Court. As a matter of
fact, the prevailing rule then of the Honorable Commission in [sic] respect of the three (3)-term limitation was its
decision in the case of Aldovino, et al. vs. Asilo where it stated:

"Thus, even if respondent was elected during the 2004 elections, which was supposedly his third and final term as
city councilor, the same cannot be treated as a complete service or full term in office since the same was interrupted
when he was suspended by the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division. And the respondent actually heeded the
suspension order since he did not receive his salary during the period October 16-31 and November 1-15 by reason
of his actual suspension from office. And this was further bolstered by the fact that the DILG issued a

Memorandum directing him, among others, to reassume his position." (Emphasis supplied.)

5. Clearly, there was no misrepresentation on the part of respondent as would constitute a ground for the denial of
due course to and/or the cancellation of respondent’s certificate of candidacy at the time he filed the same.
Petitioner’s ground for the denial of due course to and/or the cancellation of respondent’s certificate of candidacy
10
thus has no basis, in fact and in law, as there is no ground to warrant such relief under the Omnibus Election Code
and/or its implementing laws.

6. Pursuant, however, to the new ruling of the Supreme Court in respect of the issue on the three (3)-term limitation,
respondent acknowledges that he is now DISQUALIFIED to run for the position of Mayor of Lucena City having
served three (3) (albeit interrupted) terms as Mayor of Lucena City prior to the filing of his certificate of candidacy for
the 2010 elections.

7. In view of the foregoing premises and new jurisprudence on the matter, respondent respectfully submits the
present case for decision declaring him as DISQUALIFIED to run for the position of Mayor of Lucena City.9

Notwithstanding his express recognition of his disqualification to run as Mayor of Lucena City in the May 10, 2010
national and local elections, Ramon did not withdraw his CoC.

Acting on Ramon’s Manifestation with Motion to Resolve, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution on April
19, 2010,10 disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. is
hereby declared DISQUALIFIED to run for Mayor of Lucena City for the 10 May 2010 National and Local Elections.

SO ORDERED.

Initially, Ramon filed his Verified Motion for Reconsideration against the April 19, 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC
First Division.11 Later on, however, he filed at 9:00 a.m. of May 4, 2010 an Ex-parte Manifestation of Withdrawal of
the Pending Motion for Reconsideration.12 At 4:30 p.m. on the same date, Barbara Ruby filed her own CoC for Mayor
of Lucena City in substitution of Ramon, attaching thereto the Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance (CONA)
issued by Lakas-Kampi-CMD, the party that had nominated Ramon.13

On May 5, 2010, the COMELEC En Banc, acting on Ramon’s Ex parte Manifestation of Withdrawal, declared the
COMELEC First Division’s Resolution dated April 19, 2010 final and executory.14

On election day on May 10, 2010, the name of Ramon remained printed on the ballots but the votes cast in his favor
were counted in favor of Barbara Ruby as his substitute candidate, resulting in Barbara Ruby being ultimately
credited with 44,099 votes as against Castillo’s 39,615 votes.15

Castillo promptly filed a petition in the City Board of Canvassers (CBOC) seeking the suspension of Barbara Ruby’s
proclamation.16

It was only on May 13, 2010 when the COMELEC En Banc, upon the recommendation of its Law Department,17 gave
due course to Barbara Ruby’s CoC and CONA through Resolution No. 8917, thereby including her in the certified
list of candidates.18 Consequently, the CBOC proclaimed Barbara Ruby as the newly-elected Mayor of Lucena City.19

On May 20, 2010, Castillo filed a Petition for Annulment of Proclamation with the COMELEC,20 docketed as SPC 10-
024. He alleged that Barbara Ruby could not substitute Ramon because his CoC had been cancelled and denied
due course; and Barbara Ruby could not be considered a candidate because the COMELEC En Banc had approved
her substitution three days after the elections; hence, the votes cast for Ramon should be considered stray.

In her Comment on the Petition for Annulment of Proclamation,21 Barbara Ruby maintained the validity of her
substitution. She countered that the COMELEC En Banc did not deny due course to or cancel Ramon’s COC,
despite a declaration of his disqualification, because there was no finding that he had committed misrepresentation,
the ground for the denial of due course to or cancellation of his COC. She prayed that with her valid substitution,
Section 12 of Republic Act No. 900622 applied, based on which the votes cast for Ramon were properly counted in
her favor.

11
On July 26, 2010, Roderick Alcala (Alcala), the duly-elected Vice Mayor of Lucena City, sought to
intervene,23 positing that he should assume the post of Mayor because Barbara Ruby’s substitution had been invalid
and Castillo had clearly lost the elections.

On January 11, 2011, the COMELEC Second Division dismissed Castillo’s petition and Alcala’s petition-in-
intervention,24 holding:

In the present case, Castillo was notified of Resolution 8917 on May 13, 2010 as it was the basis for the
proclamation of Ruby on that date. He, however, failed to file any action within the prescribed period either in the
Commission or the Supreme Court assailing the said resolution. Thus, the said resolution has become final and
executory. It cannot anymore be altered or reversed.

xxxx

x x x. A close perusal of the petition filed by Castillo in SPA 10-029 (Dc) shows that it was actually for the
disqualification of Ramon for having served three consecutive terms, which is a ground for his disqualification under
the Constitution in relation to Section 4(b)3 of Resolution 8696. There was no mention therein that Ramon has
committed material representation that would be a ground for the cancellation or denial of due course to the CoC of
Ramon under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. The First Division, in fact, treated the petition as one for
disqualification as gleaned from the body of the resolution and its dispositive portion quoted above. This treatment of
the First Division of the petition as one for disqualification only is affirmed by the fact that its members signed
Resolution No. 8917 where it was clearly stated that the First Division only disqualified Ramon.

Having been disqualified only, the doctrine laid down in Miranda v. Abaya is not applicable. Ramon was rightly
substituted by Ruby. As such, the votes for Ramon cannot be considered as stray votes but should be counted in
favor of Ruby since the substituted and the substitute carry the same surname – Talaga, as provided in Section 12
of Republic Act No. 9006.

xxxx

Moreover, there is no provision in the Omnibus Election Code or any election laws for that matter which requires
that the substitution and the Certificate of Candidacy of the substitute should be approved and given due course first
by the Commission or the Law Department before it can be considered as effective. All that Section 77 of the
Omnibus Election Code as implemented by Section 13 of Resolution No. 8678 requires is that it should be filed with
the proper office. The respondent is correct when she argued that in fact even the BEI can receive a CoC of a
substitute candidate in case the cause for the substitution happened between the day before the election and mid-
day of election day. Thus, even if the approval of the substitution was made after the election, the substitution
became effective on the date of the filing of the CoC with the Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance.

There being no irregularity in the substitution by Ruby of Ramon as candidate for mayor of Lucena City, the counting
of the votes of Ramon in favor of Ruby is proper. The proclamation, thus, of Ruby as mayor elect of Lucena City is
in order. Hence, we find no cogent reason to annul the proclamation of respondent Barbara Ruby C. Talaga as the
duly elected Mayor of the City of Lucena after the elections conducted on May 10, 2010.25

Acting on Castillo and Alcala’s respective motions for reconsideration, the COMELEC En Banc issued the assailed
Resolution dated May 20, 2011 reversing the COMELEC Second Division’s ruling.26

Pointing out that: (a) Resolution No. 8917 did not attain finality for being issued without a hearing as a mere incident
of the COMELEC’s ministerial duty to receive the COCs of substitute candidates; (b) Resolution No. 8917 was
based on the wrong facts; and (c) Ramon’s disqualification was resolved with finality only on May 5, 2010, the
COMELEC En Banc concluded that Barbara Ruby could not have properly substituted Ramon but had simply
become an additional candidate who had filed her COC out of time; and held that Vice Mayor Alcala should succeed
to the position pursuant to Section 44 of the Local Government Code (LGC).27

Issues

12
The core issue involves the validity of the substitution by Barbara Ruby as candidate for the position of Mayor of
Lucena City in lieu of Ramon, her husband.

Ancillary to the core issue is the determination of who among the contending parties should assume the contested
elective position.

Ruling

The petitions lack merit.

1.

Existence of a valid CoC is a condition

sine qua non for a valid substitution

The filing of a CoC within the period provided by law is a mandatory requirement for any person to be considered a
candidate in a national or local election. This is clear from Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code, to wit:

Section 73. Certificate of candidacy — No person shall be eligible for any elective public office unless he files a
sworn certificate of candidacy within the period fixed herein.

Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code specifies the contents of a COC, viz:

Section 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy.—The certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing it is
announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the
Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which he
seeks to represent; the political party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office
address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support and defend the Constitution of
the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and
decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a
foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or
purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge. x x
x

The evident purposes of the requirement for the filing of CoCs and in fixing the time limit for filing them are, namely:
(a) to enable the voters to know, at least 60 days prior to the regular election, the candidates from among whom
they are to make the choice; and (b) to avoid confusion and inconvenience in the tabulation of the votes cast. If the
law does not confine to the duly-registered candidates the choice by the voters, there may be as many persons
voted for as there are voters, and votes may be cast even for unknown or fictitious persons as a mark to identify the
votes in favor of a candidate for another office in the same election.28 Moreover, according to Sinaca v. Mula,29 the
CoC is:

x x x in the nature of a formal manifestation to the whole world of the candidate’s political creed or lack of political
creed. It is a statement of a person seeking to run for a public office certifying that he announces his candidacy for
the office mentioned and that he is eligible for the office, the name of the political party to which he belongs, if he
belongs to any, and his post-office address for all election purposes being as well stated.

Accordingly, a person’s declaration of his intention to run for public office and his affirmation that he possesses the
eligibility for the position he seeks to assume, followed by the timely filing of such declaration, constitute a valid CoC
that render the person making the declaration a valid or official candidate.

There are two remedies available to prevent a candidate from running in an electoral race. One is through a petition
for disqualification and the other through a petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. The
Court differentiated the two remedies in Fermin v. Commission on Elections,30 thuswise:

13
x x x A petition for disqualification, on the one hand, can be premised on Section 12 or 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code, or Section 40 of the Local Government Code. On the other hand, a petition to deny due course to or cancel a
CoC can only be grounded on a statement of a material representation in the said certificate that is false. The
petitions also have different effects. While a person who is disqualified under Section 68 is merely prohibited to
continue as a candidate, the person whose certificate is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not
treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC.31

Inasmuch as the grounds for disqualification under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code (i.e., prohibited acts of
candidates, and the fact of a candidate’s permanent residency in another country when that fact affects the
residency requirement of a candidate) are separate and distinct from the grounds for the cancellation of or denying
due course to a COC (i.e., nuisance candidates under Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code; and material
misrepresentation under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code), the Court has recognized in Miranda v.
Abaya32 that the following circumstances may result from the granting of the petitions, to wit:

(1) A candidate may not be qualified to run for election but may have filed a valid CoC;

(2) A candidate may not be qualified and at the same time may not have filed a valid CoC; and

(3) A candidate may be qualified but his CoC may be denied due course or cancelled.

In the event that a candidate is disqualified to run for a public office, or dies, or withdraws his CoC before the
elections, Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code provides the option of substitution, to wit:

Section 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal. — If after the last day for the filing of
certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is
disqualified for any cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by, the same political party may file a certificate
of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified. The substitute candidate nominated
by the political party concerned may file his certificate of candidacy for the office affected in accordance with the
preceding sections not later than mid-day of the day of the election. If the death, withdrawal or disqualification
should occur between the day before the election and mid-day of election day, said certificate may be filed with any
board of election inspectors in the political subdivision where he is a candidate, or, in the case of candidates to be
voted for by the entire electorate of the country, with the Commission.

Nonetheless, whether the ground for substitution is death, withdrawal or disqualification of a candidate, Section 77
of the Omnibus Election Code unequivocally states that only an official candidate of a registered or accredited party
may be substituted.

Considering that a cancelled CoC does not give rise to a valid candidacy,33 there can be no valid substitution of the
candidate under Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code. It should be clear, too, that a candidate who does not file
a valid CoC may not be validly substituted, because a person without a valid CoC is not considered a candidate in
much the same way as any person who has not filed a CoC is not at all a candidate.34

Likewise, a candidate who has not withdrawn his CoC in accordance with Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code
may not be substituted. A withdrawal of candidacy can only give effect to a substitution if the substitute candidate
submits prior to the election a sworn CoC as required by Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code.35

2.

Declaration of Ramon’s disqualification

rendered his CoC invalid; hence, he was not
a valid candidate to be properly substituted

In the light of the foregoing rules on the CoC, the Court concurs with the conclusion of the COMELEC En Banc that
the Castillo petition in SPA 09-029 (DC) was in the nature of a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC under
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.

14
In describing the nature of a Section 78 petition, the Court said in Fermin v. Commission on Elections:36

Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC is not based on the lack of
qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made a material representation that is false, which may relate to the
qualifications required of the public office he/she is running for. It is noted that the candidate states in his/her CoC
that he/she is eligible for the office he/she seeks. Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the
constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the candidate subsequently
states a material representation in the CoC that is false, the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny
due course to or cancel such certificate. Indeed, the Court has already likened a proceeding under Section 78 to a
quo warranto proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC since they both deal with the eligibility or qualification of a
candidate, with the distinction mainly in the fact that a "Section 78" petition is filed before proclamation, while a
petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of the winning candidate.

Castillo’s petition contained essential allegations pertaining to a Section 78 petition, namely: (a) Ramon made a
false representation in his CoC; (b) the false representation referred to a material matter that would affect the
substantive right of Ramon as candidate (that is, the right to run for the election for which he filed his certificate); and
(c) Ramon made the false representation with the intention to deceive the electorate as to his qualification for public
office or deliberately attempted to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render him ineligible.37 The
petition expressly challenged Ramon’s eligibility for public office based on the prohibition stated in the Constitution
and the Local Government Code against any person serving three consecutive terms, and specifically prayed that
"the Certificate of Candidacy filed by the respondent Ramon be denied due course to or cancel the same and that
he be declared as a disqualified candidate."38

The denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC under Section 78 involves a finding not only that a person
lacks a qualification but also that he made a material representation that is false.39 A petition for the denial of due
course to or cancellation of CoC that is short of the requirements will not be granted. In Mitra v. Commission on
Elections,40 the Court stressed that there must also be a deliberate attempt to mislead, thus:

The false representation under Section 78 must likewise be a "deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a
fact that would otherwise render a candidate ineligible." Given the purpose of the requirement, it must be made with
the intention to deceive the electorate as to the would-be candidate’s qualifications for public office. Thus, the
misrepresentation that Section 78 addresses cannot be the result of a mere innocuous mistake, and cannot exist in
a situation where the intent to deceive is patently absent, or where no deception on the electorate results. The
deliberate character of the misrepresentation necessarily follows from a consideration of the consequences of any
material falsity: a candidate who falsifies a material fact cannot run; if he runs and is elected, he cannot serve; in
both cases, he can be prosecuted for violation of the election laws.

It is underscored, however, that a Section 78 petition should not be interchanged or confused with a Section 68
petition. The remedies under the two sections are different, for they are based on different grounds, and can result
in different eventualities.41 A person who is disqualified under Section 68 is prohibited to continue as a candidate, but
a person whose CoC is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not considered as a candidate at all
because his status is that of a person who has not filed a CoC.42 Miranda v. Abaya43 has clarified that a candidate
who is disqualified under Section 68 can be validly substituted pursuant to Section 77 because he remains a
candidate until disqualified; but a person whose CoC has been denied due course or cancelled under Section 78
cannot be substituted because he is not considered a candidate. 1âw phi 1

To be sure, the cause of Ramon’s ineligibility (i.e., the three-term limit) is enforced both by the Constitution and
statutory law. Article X, Section 8 of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law,
shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of
the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full
term for which he was elected.

Section 43 of the Local Government Code reiterates the constitutional three-term limit for all elective local officials,
to wit:

15
Section 43. Term of Office. – (a) x x x

(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service
for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected. (Emphasis supplied.)

The objective of imposing the three-term limit rule was "to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating excessive
power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office." The Court
underscored this objective in Aldovino, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,44 stating:

x x x The framers of the Constitution specifically included an exception to the people’s freedom to choose those who
will govern them in order to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating excessive power over a particular
territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office. To allow petitioner Latasa to vie for the
position of city mayor after having served for three consecutive terms as a municipal mayor would obviously defeat
the very intent of the framers when they wrote this exception. Should he be allowed another three consecutive terms
as mayor of the City of Digos, petitioner would then be possibly holding office as chief executive over the same
territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of eighteen consecutive years. This is the very scenario sought to be
avoided by the Constitution, if not abhorred by it.

To accord with the constitutional and statutory proscriptions, Ramon was absolutely precluded from asserting an
eligibility to run as Mayor of Lucena City for the fourth consecutive term. Resultantly, his CoC was invalid and
ineffectual ab initio for containing the incurable defect consisting in his false declaration of his eligibility to run. The
invalidity and inefficacy of his CoC made his situation even worse than that of a nuisance candidate because the
nuisance candidate may remain eligible despite cancellation of his CoC or despite the denial of due course to the
CoC pursuant to Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.45

Ramon himself specifically admitted his ineligibility when he filed his Manifestation with Motion to Resolve on
December 30, 2009 in the COMELEC.46 That sufficed to render his CoC invalid, considering that for all intents and
purposes the COMELEC’s declaration of his disqualification had the effect of announcing that he was no candidate
at all.

We stress that a non-candidate like Ramon had no right to pass on to his substitute. As Miranda v. Abaya aptly put
it:

Even on the most basic and fundamental principles, it is readily understood that the concept of a substitute
presupposes the existence of the person to be substituted, for how can a person take the place of somebody who
does not exist or who never was. The Court has no other choice but to rule that in all the instances enumerated in
Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code, the existence of a valid certificate of candidacy seasonably filed is a
requisite sine qua non.

All told, a disqualified candidate may only be substituted if he had a valid certificate of candidacy in the first place
because, if the disqualified candidate did not have a valid and seasonably filed certificate of candidacy, he is and
was not a candidate at all. If a person was not a candidate, he cannot be substituted under Section 77 of the Code.
Besides, if we were to allow the so-called "substitute" to file a "new" and "original" certificate of candidacy beyond
the period for the filing thereof, it would be a crystalline case of unequal protection of the law, an act abhorred by our
Constitution.47 (Emphasis supplied)

3.

Granting without any qualification of petition in

SPA No. 09-029(DC) manifested COMELEC’s intention to
declare Ramon disqualified and to cancel his CoC

That the COMELEC made no express finding that Ramon committed any deliberate misrepresentation in his CoC
was of little consequence in the determination of whether his CoC should be deemed cancelled or not.

16
In Miranda v. Abaya,48 the specific relief that the petition prayed for was that the CoC "be not given due course
and/or cancelled." The COMELEC categorically granted "the petition" and then pronounced — in apparent
contradiction — that Joel Pempe Miranda was "disqualified." The

Court held that the COMELEC, by granting the petition without any qualification, disqualified Joel Pempe Miranda
and at the same time cancelled Jose Pempe Miranda’s CoC. The Court explained:

The question to settle next is whether or not aside from Joel "Pempe" Miranda being disqualified by the Comelec in
its May 5, 1998 resolution, his certificate of candidacy had likewise been denied due course and cancelled.

The Court rules that it was.

Private respondent’s petition in SPA No. 98-019 specifically prayed for the following:

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Certificate of Candidacy filed by respondent for the position of
Mayor for the City of Santiago be not given due course and/or cancelled.

Other reliefs just and equitable in the premises are likewise prayed for.

(Rollo, p. 31; Emphasis ours.)

In resolving the petition filed by private respondent specifying a very particular relief, the Comelec ruled favorably in
the following manner:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Commission (FIRST DIVISION) GRANTS the Petition. Respondent
JOSE "Pempe" MIRANDA is hereby DISQUALIFIED from running for the position of mayor of Santiago City,
Isabela, in the May 11, 1998 national and local elections.

SO ORDERED.

(p.43, Rollo; Emphasis ours.)

From a plain reading of the dispositive portion of the Comelec resolution of May 5, 1998 in SPA No. 98-019, it is
sufficiently clear that the prayer specifically and particularly sought in the petition was GRANTED, there being no
qualification on the matter whatsoever. The disqualification was simply ruled over and above the granting of the
specific prayer for denial of due course and cancellation of the certificate of candidacy. x x x.49

xxxx

x x x. There is no dispute that the complaint or petition filed by private respondent in SPA No. 98-019 is one to deny
due course and to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Jose "Pempe" Miranda (Rollo, pp. 26-31). There is likewise
no question that the said petition was GRANTED without any qualification whatsoever. It is rather clear, therefore,
that whether or not the Comelec granted any further relief in SPA No. 98-019 by disqualifying the candidate, the fact
remains that the said petition was granted and that the certificate of candidacy of Jose "Pempe" Miranda was denied
due course and cancelled. x x x.50

The crucial point of Miranda v. Abaya was that the COMELEC actually granted the particular relief of cancelling or
denying due course to the CoC prayed for in the petition by not subjecting that relief to any qualification.

Miranda v. Abaya applies herein. Although Castillo’s petition in SPA No. 09-029 (DC) specifically sought both the
disqualification of Ramon and the denial of due course to or cancellation of his CoC, the COMELEC categorically
stated in the Resolution dated April 19, 2010 that it was granting the petition. Despite the COMELEC making no
finding of material misrepresentation on the part of Ramon, its granting of Castillo’s petition without express
qualifications manifested that the COMELEC had cancelled Ramon’s CoC based on his apparent ineligibility. The

17
Resolution dated April 19, 2010 became final and executory because Castillo did not move for its reconsideration,
and because Ramon later withdrew his motion for reconsideration filed in relation to it.

4.

Elected Vice Mayor must succeed

and assume the position of Mayor
due to a permanent vacancy in the office

On the issue of who should assume the office of Mayor of Lucena City, Castillo submits that the doctrine on the
rejection of the second-placer espoused in Labo, Jr. v. Commission on Elections51 should not apply to him because
Ramon’s disqualification became final prior to the elections.52 Instead, he cites Cayat v. Commission on
Elections,53 where the Court said:

x x x In Labo there was no final judgment of disqualification before the elections. The doctrine on the rejection of the
second placer was applied in Labo and a host of other cases because the judgment declaring the candidate’s
disqualification in Labo and the other cases had not become final before the elections. To repeat, Labo and the
other cases applying the doctrine on the rejection of the second placer have one common essential condition — the
disqualification of the candidate had not become final before the elections. This essential condition does not exist in
the present case.

Thus, in Labo, Labo’s disqualification became final only on 14 May 1992, three days after the 11 May 1992
elections. On election day itself, Labo was still legally a candidate. In the present case, Cayat was disqualified by
final judgment 23 days before the 10 May 2004 elections. On election day, Cayat was no longer legally a candidate
for mayor. In short, Cayat’s candidacy for Mayor of Buguias, Benguet was legally non-existent in the 10 May 2004
elections.

The law expressly declares that a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election cannot be voted for,
and votes cast for him shall not be counted. This is a mandatory provision of law. Section 6 of Republic Act No.
6646, The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, states:

Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case.— Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified
shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be

counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he
is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with
the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may
during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of
his guilt is strong. (Emphasis added)

Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 covers two situations. The first is when the disqualification becomes
final before the elections, which is the situation covered in the first sentence of Section 6. The second is when the
disqualification becomes final after the elections, which is the situation covered in the second sentence of Section 6.

The present case falls under the first situation. Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law governing the first situation is
categorical: a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him
shall not be counted. The Resolution disqualifying Cayat became final on 17 April 2004, way before the 10 May
2004 elections. Therefore, all the 8,164 votes cast in Cayat’s favor are stray. Cayat was never a candidate in the 10
May 2004 elections. Palileng’s proclamation is proper because he was the sole and only candidate, second to
none.54

Relying on the pronouncement in Cayat, Castillo asserts that he was entitled to assume the position of Mayor of
Lucena City for having obtained the highest number of votes among the remaining qualified candidates.

It would seem, then, that the date of the finality of the COMELEC resolution declaring Ramon disqualified is
decisive. According to Section 10, Rule 19 of the COMELEC’s Resolution No. 8804,55 a decision or resolution of a
18
Division becomes final and executory after the lapse of five days following its promulgation unless a motion for
reconsideration is seasonably filed. Under Section 8, Rule 20 of Resolution No. 8804, the decision of the COMELEC
En Banc becomes final and executory five days after its promulgation and receipt of notice by the parties.

The COMELEC First Division declared Ramon disqualified through its Resolution dated April 19, 2010, the copy of
which Ramon received on the same date.56 Ramon filed a motion for reconsideration on April 21, 201057 in
accordance with Section 7 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8696,58 but withdrew the motion on May 4, 2010,59 ostensibly
to allow his substitution by Barbara Ruby. On his part, Castillo did not file any motion for reconsideration. Such
circumstances indicated that there was no more pending matter that could have effectively suspended the finality of
the ruling in due course. Hence, the Resolution dated April 19, 2010 could be said to have attained finality upon the
lapse of five days from its promulgation and receipt of it by the parties. This happened probably on April 24, 2010.
Despite such finality, the COMELEC En Banc continued to act on the withdrawal by Ramon of his motion for
reconsideration through the May 5, 2010 Resolution declaring the April 19, 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC First
Division final and executory.

Yet, we cannot agree with Castillo’s assertion that with Ramon’s disqualification becoming final prior to the May 10,
2010 elections, the ruling in Cayat was applicable in his favor. Barbara Ruby’s filing of her CoC in substitution of
Ramon significantly differentiated this case from the factual circumstances obtaining in Cayat. Rev. Fr. Nardo B.
Cayat, the petitioner in Cayat, was disqualified on April 17, 2004, and his disqualification became final before the
May 10, 2004 elections. Considering that no substitution of Cayat was made, Thomas R. Palileng, Sr., his rival,
remained the only candidate for the mayoralty post in Buguias, Benguet. In contrast, after Barbara Ruby substituted
Ramon, the May 10, 2010 elections proceeded with her being regarded by the electorate of Lucena City as a bona
fide candidate. To the electorate, she became a contender for the same position vied for by Castillo, such that she
stood on the same footing as Castillo. Such standing as a candidate negated Castillo’s claim of being the candidate
who obtained the highest number of votes, and of being consequently entitled to assume the office of Mayor.

Indeed, Castillo could not assume the office for he was only a second placer. Labo, Jr. should be applied. There,
1âw phi 1

the Court emphasized that the candidate obtaining the second highest number of votes for the contested office
could not assume the office despite the disqualification of the first placer because the second placer was "not the
choice of the sovereign will."60 Surely, the Court explained, a minority or defeated candidate could not be deemed
elected to the office.61 There was to be no question that the second placer lost in the election, was repudiated by the
electorate, and could not assume the vacated position.62 No law imposed upon and compelled the people of Lucena
City to accept a loser to be their political leader or their representative.63

The only time that a second placer is allowed to take the place of a disqualified winning candidate is when two
requisites concur, namely: (a) the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is disqualified; and (b) the
electorate was fully aware in fact and in law of that candidate’s disqualification as to bring such awareness within the
realm of notoriety but the electorate still cast the plurality of the votes in favor of the ineligible candidate.64 Under this
sole exception, the electorate may be said to have waived the validity and efficacy of their votes by notoriously
misapplying their franchise or throwing away their votes, in which case the eligible candidate with the second
highest number of votes may be deemed elected.65 But the exception did not apply in favor of Castillo simply
because the second element was absent. The electorate of Lucena City were not the least aware of the fact of
Barbara Ruby’s ineligibility as the substitute. In fact, the COMELEC En Banc issued the Resolution finding her
substitution invalid only on May 20, 2011, or a full year after the decisions.

On the other hand, the COMELEC En Banc properly disqualified Barbara Ruby from assuming the position of Mayor
of Lucena City. To begin with, there was no valid candidate for her to substitute due to Ramon’s ineligibility. Also,
Ramon did not voluntarily withdraw his CoC before the elections in accordance with Section 73 of the Omnibus
Election Code. Lastly, she was not an additional candidate for the position of Mayor of Lucena City because her
filing of her CoC on May 4, 2010 was beyond the period fixed by law. Indeed, she was not, in law and in fact, a
candidate.66

A permanent vacancy in the office of Mayor of Lucena City thus resulted, and such vacancy should be filled
pursuant to the law on succession defined in Section 44 of the LGC, to wit:67

19
Section 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor, and Vice-Mayor. – If a
permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice-governor or vice-mayor concerned shall
become the governor or mayor. x x x

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petitions in these consolidated cases; AFFIRMS the Resolution issued on
May 20, 2011 by the COMELEC En Banc; and ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 195649 April 16, 2013

CASAN MACODE MAQUILING, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO, LINOG G. BALUA, Respondents.

DECISION

SERENO, CJ.:

THE CASE

This is a Petition for Certiorari ender Rule 64 in conjunction with Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to review the
Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). The Resolution1 in SPA No. 10-1 09(DC) of the
COMELEC First Division dated 5 October 201 0 is being assailed for applying Section 44 of the Local Government
Code while the Resolution2 of the COMELEC En Banc dated 2 February 2011 is being questioned for finding that
respondent Rommel Arnado y Cagoco (respondent Arnado/Arnado) is solely a Filipino citizen qualified to run for
public office despite his continued use of a U.S. passport.

FACTS

Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen.3 However, as a consequence of his subsequent naturalization
as a citizen of the United States of America, he lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation under
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on 10 July 2008.4 On the same day an Order of Approval of his
Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was issued in his favor.5

The aforementioned Oath of Allegiance states:

I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, solemnly swear that I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines and
I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of
evasion.6

On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation
of his foreign citizenship, which states:

I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, do solemnly swear that I absolutely and perpetually renounce all allegiance and fidelity
to the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA of which I am a citizen, and I divest myself of full employment of all civil and
political rights and privileges of the United States of America.

I solemnly swear that all the foregoing statement is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.7

On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, which
contains, among others, the following statements:

20
I am a natural born Filipino citizen / naturalized Filipino citizen.

I am not a permanent resident of, or immigrant to, a foreign country.

I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected to.

I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto. I will obey the laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities.

I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.8

On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify
Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in
connection with the 10 May 2010 local and national elections.9

Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that he is a
foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010 indicating the
nationality of Arnado as "USA-American."10To further bolster his claim of Arnado’s US citizenship, Balua presented
in his Memorandum a computer-generated travel record11 dated 03 December 2009 indicating that Arnado has been
using his US Passport No. 057782700 in entering and departing the Philippines. The said record shows that Arnado
left the country on 14 April 2009 and returned on 25 June 2009, and again departed on 29 July 2009, arriving back
in the Philippines on 24 November 2009.

Balua likewise presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010, certifying that the name
"Arnado, Rommel Cagoco" appears in the available Computer Database/Passenger manifest/IBM listing on file as of
21 April 2010, with the following pertinent travel records:

DATE OF Arrival : 01/12/2010

NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN

PASSPORT : 057782700

DATE OF Arrival : 03/23/2010

NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN

PASSPORT : 05778270012

On 30 April 2010, the COMELEC (First Division) issued an Order13 requiring the respondent to personally file his
answer and memorandum within three (3) days from receipt thereof.

After Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua moved to declare him in default and to present evidence ex-parte.

Neither motion was acted upon, having been overtaken by the 2010 elections where Arnado garnered the highest
number of votes and was subsequently proclaimed as the winning candidate for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte.

It was only after his proclamation that Arnado filed his verified answer, submitting the following documents as
evidence:14

1. Affidavit of Renunciation and Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines dated 03 April 2009;

21
 2. Joint-Affidavit dated 31 May 2010 of Engr. Virgil Seno, Virginia Branzuela, Leoncio Daligdig, and Jessy
Corpin, all neighbors of Arnado, attesting that Arnado is a long-time resident of Kauswagan and that he has
been conspicuously and continuously residing in his family’s ancestral house in Kauswagan;

3. Certification from the Punong Barangay of Poblacion, Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte dated 03 June 2010
stating that Arnado is a bona fide resident of his barangay and that Arnado went to the United States in 1985
to work and returned to the Philippines in 2009;

4. Certification dated 31 May 2010 from the Municipal Local Government Operations Office of Kauswagan
stating that Dr. Maximo P. Arnado, Sr. served as Mayor of Kauswagan, from January 1964 to June 1974
and from 15 February 1979 to 15 April 1986; and

5. Voter Certification issued by the Election Officer of Kauswagan certifying that Arnado has been a
registered voter of Kauswagan since 03 April 2009.

THE RULING OF THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION

Instead of treating the Petition as an action for the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy based on
misrepresentation,15 the COMELEC First Division considered it as one for disqualification. Balua’s contention that
Arnado is a resident of the United States was dismissed upon the finding that "Balua failed to present any evidence
to support his contention,"16 whereas the First Division still could "not conclude that Arnado failed to meet the one-
year residency requirement under the Local Government Code."17

In the matter of the issue of citizenship, however, the First Division disagreed with Arnado’s claim that he is a
Filipino citizen.18

We find that although Arnado appears to have substantially complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 9225,
Arnado’s act of consistently using his US passport after renouncing his US citizenship on 03 April 2009 effectively
negated his Affidavit of Renunciation.

xxxx

Arnado’s continued use of his US passport is a strong indication that Arnado had no real intention to renounce his
US citizenship and that he only executed an Affidavit of Renunciation to enable him to run for office. We cannot turn
a blind eye to the glaring inconsistency between Arnado’s unexplained use of a US passport six times and his claim
that he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship and renounced his US citizenship. As noted by the Supreme Court in
the Yu case, "a passport is defined as an official document of identity and nationality issued to a person intending to
travel or sojourn in foreign countries." Surely, one who truly divested himself of US citizenship would not continue to
avail of privileges reserved solely for US nationals.19

The dispositive portion of the Resolution rendered by the COMELEC

First Division reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for disqualification and/or to cancel the certificate of candidacy
of Rommel C. Arnado is hereby GRANTED. Rommel C. Arnado’s proclamation as the winning candidate for
Municipal Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Nore is hereby ANNULLED. Let the order of succession under Section
44 of the Local Government Code of 1991 take effect.20

The Motion for Reconsideration and

the Motion for Intervention

Arnado sought reconsideration of the resolution before the COMELEC En Banc on the ground that "the evidence is
insufficient to justify the Resolution and that the said Resolution is contrary to law."21 He raised the following
contentions:22

22
 1. The finding that he is not a Filipino citizen is not supported by the evidence consisting of his Oath of
Allegiance and the Affidavit of Renunciation, which show that he has substantially complied with the
requirements of R.A. No. 9225;

2. The use of his US passport subsequent to his renunciation of his American citizenship is not tantamount
to a repudiation of his Filipino citizenship, as he did not perform any act to swear allegiance to a country
other than the Philippines;

3. He used his US passport only because he was not informed of the issuance of his Philippine passport,
and that he used his Philippine passport after he obtained it;

4. Balua’s petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Arnado was filed out of time, and the First
Division’s treatment of the petition as one for disqualification constitutes grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction;23

5. He is undoubtedly the people’s choice as indicated by his winning the elections;

6. His proclamation as the winning candidate ousted the COMELEC from jurisdiction over the case; and

7. The proper remedy to question his citizenship is through a petition for quo warranto, which should have
been filed within ten days from his proclamation.

Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another candidate for mayor of Kauswagan, and who garnered the
second highest number of votes in the 2010 elections, intervened in the case and filed before the COMELEC En
Banc a Motion for Reconsideration together with an Opposition to Arnado’s Amended Motion for Reconsideration.
Maquiling argued that while the First Division correctly disqualified Arnado, the order of succession under Section 44
of the Local Government Code is not applicable in this case. Consequently, he claimed that the cancellation of
Arnado’s candidacy and the nullification of his proclamation, Maquiling, as the legitimate candidate who obtained the
highest number of lawful votes, should be proclaimed as the winner.

Maquiling simultaneously filed his Memorandum with his Motion for Intervention and his Motion for Reconsideration.
Arnado opposed all motions filed by Maquiling, claiming that intervention is prohibited after a decision has already
been rendered, and that as a second-placer, Maquiling undoubtedly lost the elections and thus does not stand to be
prejudiced or benefitted by the final adjudication of the case.

RULING OF THE COMELEC EN BANC

In its Resolution of 02 February 2011, the COMELEC En Banc held that under Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646,
the Commission "shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest even after the proclamation
of the candidate whose qualifications for office is questioned."

As to Maquiling’s intervention, the COMELEC En Banc also cited Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 which allows
intervention in proceedings for disqualification even after elections if no final judgment has been rendered, but went
on further to say that Maquiling, as the second placer, would not be prejudiced by the outcome of the case as it
agrees with the dispositive portion of the Resolution of the First Division allowing the order of succession under
Section 44 of the Local Government Code to take effect.

The COMELEC En Banc agreed with the treatment by the First Division of the petition as one for disqualification,
and ruled that the petition was filed well within the period prescribed by law,24 having been filed on 28 April 2010,
which is not later than 11 May 2010, the date of proclamation.

However, the COMELEC En Banc reversed and set aside the ruling of the First Division and granted Arnado’s
Motion for Reconsideration, on the following premises:

First:

23
By renouncing his US citizenship as imposed by R.A. No. 9225, the respondent embraced his Philippine citizenship
as though he never became a citizen of another country. It was at that time, April 3, 2009, that the respondent
became a pure Philippine Citizen again.

xxxx

The use of a US passport … does not operate to revert back his status as a dual citizen prior to his renunciation as
there is no law saying such. More succinctly, the use of a US passport does not operate to "un-renounce" what he
has earlier on renounced. The First Division’s reliance in the case of In Re: Petition for Habeas Corpus of Willy Yu v.
Defensor-Santiago, et al. is misplaced. The petitioner in the said case is a naturalized citizen who, after taking his
oath as a naturalized Filipino, applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport. Strict policy is maintained in the
conduct of citizens who are not natural born, who acquire their citizenship by choice, thus discarding their original
citizenship. The Philippine State expects strict conduct of allegiance to those who choose to be its citizens. In the
present case, respondent is not a naturalized citizen but a natural born citizen who chose greener pastures by
working abroad and then decided to repatriate to supposedly help in the progress of Kauswagan. He did not apply
for a US passport after his renunciation. Thus the mentioned case is not on all fours with the case at bar.

xxxx

The respondent presented a plausible explanation as to the use of his US passport. Although he applied for a
Philippine passport, the passport was only issued on June 18, 2009. However, he was not notified of the issuance of
his Philippine passport so that he was actually able to get it about three (3) months later. Yet as soon as he was in
possession of his Philippine passport, the respondent already used the same in his subsequent travels abroad. This
fact is proven by the respondent’s submission of a certified true copy of his passport showing that he used the same
for his travels on the following dates: January 31, 2010, April 16, 2010, May 20, 2010, January 12, 2010, March 31,
2010 and June 4, 2010. This then shows that the use of the US passport was because to his knowledge, his
Philippine passport was not yet issued to him for his use. As probably pressing needs might be undertaken, the
respondent used whatever is within his control during that time.25

In his Separate Concurring Opinion, COMELEC Chairman Sixto Brillantes cited that the use of foreign passport is
not one of the grounds provided for under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 63 through which Philippine
citizenship may be lost.

"The application of the more assimilative principle of continuity of citizenship is more appropriate in this case. Under
said principle, once a person becomes a citizen, either by birth or naturalization, it is assumed that he desires to
continue to be a citizen, and this assumption stands until he voluntarily denationalizes or expatriates himself. Thus,
in the instant case respondent after reacquiring his Philippine citizenship should be presumed to have remained a
Filipino despite his use of his American passport in the absence of clear, unequivocal and competent proof of
expatriation. Accordingly, all doubts should be resolved in favor of retention of citizenship."26

On the other hand, Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento dissented, thus:

Respondent evidently failed to prove that he truly and wholeheartedly abandoned his allegiance to the United
States. The latter’s continued use of his US passport and enjoyment of all the privileges of a US citizen despite his
previous renunciation of the afore-mentioned citizenship runs contrary to his declaration that he chose to retain only
his Philippine citizenship. Respondent’s submission with the twin requirements was obviously only for the purpose of
complying with the requirements for running for the mayoralty post in connection with the May 10, 2010 Automated
National and Local Elections.

Qualifications for elective office, such as citizenship, are continuing requirements; once any of them is lost during his
incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed forfeited. If a candidate is not a citizen at the time he ran for office or if
he lost his citizenship after his election to office, he is disqualified to serve as such. Neither does the fact that
respondent obtained the plurality of votes for the mayoralty post cure the latter’s failure to comply with the
qualification requirements regarding his citizenship.

24
Since a disqualified candidate is no candidate at all in the eyes of the law, his having received the highest number of
votes does not validate his election. It has been held that where a petition for disqualification was filed before
election against a candidate but was adversely resolved against him after election, his having obtained the highest
number of votes did not make his election valid. His ouster from office does not violate the principle of vox populi
suprema est lex because the application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a
matter of popularity. To apply it is to breath[e] life to the sovereign will of the people who expressed it when they
ratified the Constitution and when they elected their representatives who enacted the law.27

THE PETITION BEFORE THE COURT

Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the propriety of declaring Arnado qualified to run for public office
despite his continued use of a US passport, and praying that Maquiling be proclaimed as the winner in the 2010
mayoralty race in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.

Ascribing both grave abuse of discretion and reversible error on the part of the COMELEC En Banc for ruling that
Arnado is a Filipino citizen despite his continued use of a US passport, Maquiling now seeks to reverse the finding
of the COMELEC En Banc that Arnado is qualified to run for public office.

Corollary to his plea to reverse the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc or to affirm the First Division’s disqualification of
Arnado, Maquiling also seeks the review of the applicability of Section 44 of the Local Government Code, claiming
that the COMELEC committed reversible error in ruling that "the succession of the vice mayor in case the
respondent is disqualified is in order."

There are three questions posed by the parties before this Court which will be addressed seriatim as the
subsequent questions hinge on the result of the first.

The first question is whether or not intervention is allowed in a disqualification case.

The second question is whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship amounts to
undoing a renunciation earlier made.

A better framing of the question though should be whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing
foreign citizenship affects one’s qualifications to run for public office.

The third question is whether or not the rule on succession in the Local Government Code is applicable to this case.

OUR RULING

Intervention of a rival candidate in a

disqualification case is proper when
there has not yet been any
proclamation of the winner.

Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling intervened at the stage when respondent Arnado filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the First Division Resolution before the COMELEC En Banc. As the candidate who garnered the
second highest number of votes, Maquiling contends that he has an interest in the disqualification case filed against
Arnado, considering that in the event the latter is disqualified, the votes cast for him should be considered stray and
the second-placer should be proclaimed as the winner in the elections.

It must be emphasized that while the original petition before the COMELEC is one for cancellation of the certificate
of candidacy and / or disqualification, the COMELEC First Division and the COMELEC En Banc correctly treated the
petition as one for disqualification.

The effect of a disqualification case is enunciated in Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646:

25
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified
shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared
by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes
in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest
and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of
the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

Mercado v. Manzano28

clarified the right of intervention in a disqualification case. In that case, the Court said:

That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the disqualification against private
respondent is clear from Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which
provides: Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the
votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court
or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is strong. Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in proceedings
for disqualification even after election if there has yet been no final judgment rendered.29

Clearly then, Maquiling has the right to intervene in the case. The fact that the COMELEC En Banc has already
ruled that Maquiling has not shown that the requisites for the exemption to the second-placer rule set forth in
Sinsuat v. COMELEC30 are present and therefore would not be prejudiced by the outcome of the case, does not
deprive Maquiling of the right to elevate the matter before this Court.

Arnado’s claim that the main case has attained finality as the original petitioner and respondents therein have not
appealed the decision of the COMELEC En Banc, cannot be sustained. The elevation of the case by the intervenor
prevents it from attaining finality. It is only after this Court has ruled upon the issues raised in this instant petition that
the disqualification case originally filed by Balua against Arnado will attain finality.

The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of
representation as to one’s nationality and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino citizenship regained by
repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an elective position.

Section 5(2) of The Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 provides:

Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be
subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following
conditions:

xxxx

(2)Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public office as
required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.

x x x31

Rommel Arnado took all the necessary steps to qualify to run for a public office. He took the Oath of Allegiance and
renounced his foreign citizenship. There is no question that after performing these twin requirements required under
Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003, he became eligible to run
for public office.

Indeed, Arnado took the Oath of Allegiance not just only once but twice: first, on 10 July 2008 when he applied for
repatriation before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Francisco, USA, and again on 03 April 2009
26
simultaneous with the execution of his Affidavit of Renunciation. By taking the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic,
Arnado re-acquired his Philippine citizenship. At the time, however, he likewise possessed American citizenship.
Arnado had therefore become a dual citizen.

After reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, Arnado renounced his American citizenship by executing an Affidavit of
Renunciation, thus completing the requirements for eligibility to run for public office.

By renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was deemed to be solely a Filipino citizen, regardless of the effect of such
renunciation under the laws of the foreign country.32

However, this legal presumption does not operate permanently and is open to attack when, after renouncing the
foreign citizenship, the citizen performs positive acts showing his continued possession of a foreign citizenship.33

Arnado himself subjected the issue of his citizenship to attack when, after renouncing his foreign citizenship, he
continued to use his US passport to travel in and out of the country before filing his certificate of candidacy on 30
November 2009. The pivotal question to determine is whether he was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen at the
time he filed his certificate of candidacy, thereby rendering him eligible to run for public office.

Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship, and 30 November 2009, the date he filed his
COC, he used his US passport four times, actions that run counter to the affidavit of renunciation he had earlier
executed. By using his foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily represented himself as an American, in
effect declaring before immigration authorities of both countries that he is an American citizen, with all attendant
rights and privileges granted by the United States of America.

The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be professed at any time, only to be
violated the next day. It requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full
divestment of all civil and political rights granted by the foreign country which granted the citizenship.

Mercado v. Manzano34 already hinted at this situation when the Court declared:

His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should he betray
that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in
appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, we sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner
on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese
passport and declared in commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar
sanction can be taken against anyone who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but
subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.

While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in Commonwealth Act No. 63
constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship,35 it is nevertheless an act which repudiates the very oath
of renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of another country to be qualified to run for
a local elective position.

When Arnado used his US passport on 14 April 2009, or just eleven days after he renounced his American
citizenship, he recanted his Oath of Renunciation36 that he "absolutely and perpetually renounce(s) all allegiance
and fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA"37 and that he "divest(s) himself of full employment of all civil and
political rights and privileges of the United States of America."38

We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a foreign passport does not divest Arnado of his
Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation. However, by representing himself as an American citizen,
Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive;
it took place the instant Arnado represented himself as an American citizen by using his US passport.

This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is fatal to Arnado’s bid for public office,
as it effectively imposed on him a disqualification to run for an elective local position.

27
Arnado’s category of dual citizenship is that by which foreign citizenship is acquired through a positive act of
applying for naturalization. This is distinct from those considered dual citizens by virtue of birth, who are not required
by law to take the oath of renunciation as the mere filing of the certificate of candidacy already carries with it an
implied renunciation of foreign citizenship.39 Dual citizens by naturalization, on the other hand, are required to take
not only the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines but also to personally renounce foreign citizenship
in order to qualify as a candidate for public office.

By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009, Arnado was a dual citizen enjoying the rights
and privileges of Filipino and American citizenship. He was qualified to vote, but by the express disqualification
under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code,40 he was not qualified to run for a local elective position.

In effect, Arnado was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen only for a period of eleven days, or from 3 April 2009
until 14 April 2009, on which date he first used his American passport after renouncing his American citizenship.

This Court has previously ruled that:

Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of
appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required
qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. x x x.41

The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a continuing one. It must be possessed not just at the time of
the renunciation of the foreign citizenship but continuously. Any act which violates the oath of renunciation opens
the citizenship issue to attack.

We agree with the pronouncement of the COMELEC First Division that "Arnado’s act of consistently using his US
passport effectively negated his "Affidavit of Renunciation."42 This does not mean, that he failed to comply with the
twin requirements under R.A. No. 9225, for he in fact did.

It was after complying with the requirements that he performed positive acts which effectively disqualified him from
running for an elective public office pursuant to Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991.

The purpose of the Local Government Code in disqualifying dual citizens from running for any elective public office
would be thwarted if we were to allow a person who has earlier renounced his foreign citizenship, but who
subsequently represents himself as a foreign citizen, to hold any public office.

Arnado justifies the continued use of his US passport with the explanation that he was not notified of the issuance of
his Philippine passport on 18 June 2009, as a result of which he was only able to obtain his Philippine passport
three (3) months later.43

The COMELEC En Banc differentiated Arnado from Willy Yu, the Portuguese national who sought naturalization as
a Filipino citizen and later applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport. That Arnado did not apply for a US
passport after his renunciation does not make his use of a US passport less of an act that violated the Oath of
Renunciation he took. It was still a positive act of representation as a US citizen before the immigration officials of
this country.

The COMELEC, in ruling favorably for Arnado, stated "Yet, as soon as he was in possession of his Philippine
passport, the respondent already used the same in his subsequent travels abroad."44 We cannot agree with the
COMELEC. Three months from June is September. If indeed, Arnado used his Philippine passport as soon as he
was in possession of it, he would not have used his US passport on 24 November 2009.

Besides, Arnado’s subsequent use of his Philippine passport does not correct the fact that after he renounced his
foreign citizenship and prior to filing his certificate of candidacy, he used his US passport. In the same way that the
use of his foreign passport does not undo his Oath of Renunciation, his subsequent use of his Philippine passport
does not undo his earlier use of his US passport.

28
Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge of identity that comes with attendant civil and political rights
accorded by the state to its citizens. It likewise demands the concomitant duty to maintain allegiance to one’s flag
and country. While those who acquire dual citizenship by choice are afforded the right of suffrage, those who seek
election or appointment to public office are required to renounce their foreign citizenship to be deserving of the
public trust. Holding public office demands full and undivided allegiance to the Republic and to no other.

We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US passport after renouncing his American citizenship, has recanted
the same Oath of Renunciation he took. Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code applies to his situation. He is
disqualified not only from holding the public office but even from becoming a candidate in the May 2010 elections.

We now resolve the next issue.

Resolving the third issue necessitates revisiting Topacio v. Paredes45 which is the jurisprudential spring of the
principle that a second-placer cannot be proclaimed as the winner in an election contest. This doctrine must be re-
examined and its soundness once again put to the test to address the ever-recurring issue that a second-placer who
loses to an ineligible candidate cannot be proclaimed as the winner in the elections.

The Facts of the case are as follows:

On June 4, 1912, a general election was held in the town of Imus, Province of Cavite, to fill the office of municipal
president. The petitioner, Felipe Topacio, and the respondent, Maximo Abad, were opposing candidates for that
office. Topacio received 430 votes, and Abad 281. Abad contested the election upon the sole ground that Topacio
was ineligible in that he was reelected the second time to the office of the municipal president on June 4, 1912,
without the four years required by Act No. 2045 having intervened.46

Abad thus questioned the eligibility of To p a c i o on the basis of a statutory prohibition for seeking a second re-
election absent the four year interruption.

The often-quoted phrase in Topacio v. Paredes is that "the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible
candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally
cast ballots."47

This phrase is not even the ratio decidendi; it is a mere obiter dictum. The Court was comparing "the effect of a
decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office because of fraud or irregularities in the elections x x x with that
produced by declaring a person ineligible to hold such an office."

The complete sentence where the phrase is found is part of a comparison and contrast between the two situations,
thus:

Again, the effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office because of fraud or irregularities in the
elections is quite different from that produced by declaring a person ineligible to hold such an office. In the former
case the court, after an examination of the ballots may find that some other person than the candidate declared to
have received a plurality by the board of canvassers actually received the greater number of votes, in which case
the court issues its mandamus to the board of canvassers to correct the returns accordingly; or it may find that the
manner of holding the election and the returns are so tainted with fraud or illegality that it cannot be determined who
received a plurality of the legally cast ballots. In the latter case, no question as to the correctness of the returns or
the manner of casting and counting the ballots is before the deciding power, and generally the only result can be
that the election fails entirely. In the former, we have a contest in the strict sense of the word, because of the
opposing parties are striving for supremacy. If it be found that the successful candidate (according to the board of
canvassers) obtained a plurality in an illegal manner, and that another candidate was the real victor, the former must
retire in favor of the latter. In the other case, there is not, strictly speaking, a contest, as the wreath of victory cannot
be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one
receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots. In the one case the question is as to who received a plurality of the
legally cast ballots; in the other, the question is confined to the personal character and circumstances of a single
individual.48 (Emphasis supplied)

29
Note that the sentence where the phrase is found starts with "In the other case, there is not, strictly speaking, a
contest" in contrast to the earlier statement, "In the former, we have a contest in the strict sense of the word,
because of the opposing parties are striving for supremacy."

The Court in Topacio v. Paredes cannot be said to have held that "the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from
an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality
of the legally cast ballots."

A proper reading of the case reveals that the ruling therein is that since the Court of First Instance is without
jurisdiction to try a disqualification case based on the eligibility of the person who obtained the highest number of
votes in the election, its jurisdiction being confined "to determine which of the contestants has been duly elected" the
judge exceeded his jurisdiction when he "declared that no one had been legally elected president of the municipality
of Imus at the general election held in that town on 4 June 1912" where "the only question raised was whether or not
Topacio was eligible to be elected and to hold the office of municipal president."

The Court did not rule that Topacio was disqualified and that Abad as the second placer cannot be proclaimed in his
stead. The Court therein ruled:

For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion and so hold that the respondent judge exceeded his jurisdiction in
declaring in those proceedings that no one was elected municipal president of the municipality of Imus at the last
general election; and that said order and all subsequent proceedings based thereon are null and void and of no
effect; and, although this decision is rendered on respondents' answer to the order to show cause, unless
respondents raised some new and additional issues, let judgment be entered accordingly in 5 days, without costs.
So ordered.49

On closer scrutiny, the phrase relied upon by a host of decisions does not even have a legal basis to stand on. It
was a mere pronouncement of the Court comparing one process with another and explaining the effects thereof. As
an independent statement, it is even illogical.

Let us examine the statement:

"x x x the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole
question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots."

What prevents the transfer of the wreath of victory from the ineligible candidate to another candidate?

When the issue being decided upon by the Court is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast
ballots and ineligibility is thereafter established, what stops the Court from adjudging another eligible candidate who
received the next highest number of votes as the winner and bestowing upon him that "wreath?"

An ineligible candidate who receives the highest number of votes is a wrongful winner. By express legal mandate,
he could not even have been a candidate in the first place, but by virtue of the lack of material time or any other
intervening circumstances, his ineligibility might not have been passed upon prior to election date. Consequently, he
may have had the opportunity to hold himself out to the electorate as a legitimate and duly qualified candidate.
However, notwithstanding the outcome of the elections, his ineligibility as a candidate remains unchanged.
Ineligibility does not only pertain to his qualifications as a candidate but necessarily affects his right to hold public
office. The number of ballots cast in his favor cannot cure the defect of failure to qualify with the substantive legal
requirements of eligibility to run for public office.

The popular vote does not cure the

ineligibility of a candidate.

The ballot cannot override the constitutional and statutory requirements for qualifications and disqualifications of
candidates. When the law requires certain qualifications to be possessed or that certain disqualifications be not
possessed by persons desiring to serve as elective public officials, those qualifications must be met before one even
becomes a candidate. When a person who is not qualified is voted for and eventually garners the highest number of
30
votes, even the will of the electorate expressed through the ballot cannot cure the defect in the qualifications of the
candidate. To rule otherwise is to trample upon and rent asunder the very law that sets forth the qualifications and
disqualifications of candidates. We might as well write off our election laws if the voice of the electorate is the sole
determinant of who should be proclaimed worthy to occupy elective positions in our republic.

This has been, in fact, already laid down by the Court in Frivaldo v. COMELEC50 when we pronounced:

x x x. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary
rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for
elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone.

The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they
mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application
when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe
his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.51 (Emphasis
supplied)

This issue has also been jurisprudentially clarified in Velasco v. COMELEC52 where the Court ruled that the ruling in
Quizon and Saya-ang cannot be interpreted without qualifications lest "Election victory x x x becomes a magic
formula to bypass election eligibility requirements."53

We have ruled in the past that a candidate’s victory in the election may be considered a sufficient basis to rule in
favor of the candidate sought to be disqualified if the main issue involves defects in the candidate’s certificate of
candidacy. We said that while provisions relating to certificates of candidacy are mandatory in terms, it is an
established rule of interpretation as regards election laws, that mandatory provisions requiring certain steps before
elections will be construed as directory after the elections, to give effect to the will of the people. We so ruled in
Quizon v. COMELEC and Saya-ang v. COMELEC:

The present case perhaps presents the proper time and opportunity to fine-tune our above ruling. We say this with
the realization that a blanket and unqualified reading and application of this ruling can be fraught with dangerous
significance for the rule of law and the integrity of our elections. For one, such blanket/unqualified reading may
provide a way around the law that effectively negates election requirements aimed at providing the electorate with
the basic information to make an informed choice about a candidate’s eligibility and fitness for office.

The first requirement that may fall when an unqualified reading is made is Section 39 of the LGC which specifies the
basic qualifications of local government officials. Equally susceptive of being rendered toothless is Section 74 of the
OEC that sets out what should be stated in a COC. Section 78 may likewise be emasculated as mere delay in the
resolution of the petition to cancel or deny due course to a COC can render a Section 78 petition useless if a
candidate with false COC data wins. To state the obvious, candidates may risk falsifying their COC qualifications if
they know that an election victory will cure any defect that their COCs may have. Election victory then becomes a
magic formula to bypass election eligibility requirements. (Citations omitted)

What will stop an otherwise disqualified individual from filing a seemingly valid COC, concealing any disqualification,
and employing every strategy to delay any disqualification case filed against him so he can submit himself to the
electorate and win, if winning the election will guarantee a disregard of constitutional and statutory provisions on
qualifications and disqualifications of candidates?

It is imperative to safeguard the expression of the sovereign voice through the ballot by ensuring that its exercise
respects the rule of law. To allow the sovereign voice spoken through the ballot to trump constitutional and statutory
provisions on qualifications and disqualifications of candidates is not democracy or republicanism. It is electoral
anarchy. When set rules are disregarded and only the electorate’s voice spoken through the ballot is made to matter
in the end, it precisely serves as an open invitation for electoral anarchy to set in.
1âw phi 1

Maquiling is not a second-placer as

he obtained the highest number of

31
votes from among the qualified
candidates.

With Arnado’s disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the winner in the election as he obtained the highest
number of votes from among the qualified candidates.

We have ruled in the recent cases of Aratea v. COMELEC54 and Jalosjos v. COMELEC55 that a void COC cannot
produce any legal effect.

Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not considered at all in determining the winner of an
election.

Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are disregarded, the will of the electorate is still respected, and
even more so. The votes cast in favor of an ineligible candidate do not constitute the sole and total expression of the
sovereign voice. The votes cast in favor of eligible and legitimate candidates form part of that voice and must also
be respected.

As in any contest, elections are governed by rules that determine the qualifications and disqualifications of those
who are allowed to participate as players. When there are participants who turn out to be ineligible, their victory is
voided and the laurel is awarded to the next in rank who does not possess any of the disqualifications nor lacks any
of the qualifications set in the rules to be eligible as candidates.

There is no need to apply the rule cited in Labo v. COMELEC56 that when the voters are well aware within the realm
of notoriety of a candidate’s disqualification and still cast their votes in favor said candidate, then the eligible
candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may be deemed elected. That rule is also a mere obiter that
further complicated the rules affecting qualified candidates who placed second to ineligible ones.

The electorate’s awareness of the candidate’s disqualification is not a prerequisite for the disqualification to attach to
the candidate. The very existence of a disqualifying circumstance makes the candidate ineligible. Knowledge by the
electorate of a candidate’s disqualification is not necessary before a qualified candidate who placed second to a
disqualified one can be proclaimed as the winner. The second-placer in the vote count is actually the first-placer
among the qualified candidates.

That the disqualified candidate has already been proclaimed and has assumed office is of no moment. The
subsequent disqualification based on a substantive ground that existed prior to the filing of the certificate of
candidacy voids not only the COC but also the proclamation.

Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 provides:

Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is
not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning
number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action,
inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

There was no chance for Arnado’s proclamation to be suspended under this rule because Arnado failed to file his
answer to the petition seeking his disqualification. Arnado only filed his Answer on 15 June 2010, long after the
elections and after he was already proclaimed as the winner.

The disqualifying circumstance surrounding Arnado’s candidacy involves his citizenship. It does not involve the
commission of election offenses as provided for in the first sentence of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code,
the effect of which is to disqualify the individual from continuing as a candidate, or if he has already been elected,
from holding the office.

32
The disqualifying circumstance affecting Arnado is his citizenship. As earlier discussed, Arnado was both a Filipino
and an American citizen when he filed his certificate of candidacy. He was a dual citizen disqualified to run for public
office based on Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code.

Section 40 starts with the statement "The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local
position." The prohibition serves as a bar against the individuals who fall under any of the enumeration from
participating as candidates in the election.

With Arnado being barred from even becoming a candidate, his certificate of candidacy is thus rendered void from
the beginning. It could not have produced any other legal effect except that Arnado rendered it impossible to effect
his disqualification prior to the elections because he filed his answer to the petition when the elections were
conducted already and he was already proclaimed the winner.

To hold that such proclamation is valid is to negate the prohibitory character of the disqualification which Arnado
possessed even prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy. The affirmation of Arnado's disqualification,
although made long after the elections, reaches back to the filing of the certificate of candidacy. Arnado is declared
to be not a candidate at all in the May 201 0 elections.

Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been counted. This leaves Maquiling as
the qualified candidate who obtained the highest number of votes. Therefore, the rule on succession under the Local
Government Code will not apply.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the COMELEC En Bane dated 2
February 2011 is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Respondent ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO is disqualified
from running for any local elective position. CASAN MACODE MAQUILING is hereby DECLARED the duly elected
Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in the 10 May 2010 elections.

This Decision is immediately executory.

Let a copy of this Decision be served personally upon the parties and the Commission on Elections.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

33