Can the Muslim fight back?

Reflections from fieldwork in West Bengal

By Abdul Qaiyum

Islam has been defined in different terms in different countries, as per the nature and need of the
ideological and political populism dominant there. The consistent rise in the violence against the
Muslims, especially in India, has been somehow accepted with little outrage. On the contrary, the
nature of the ‘rage’ found among the Dalits and its expression is somehow absent among the
Muslims1. There is no apparent political mobilization or an ‘expression of rage’ visible among
them, even though Dalits as well as Muslims have become ‘permanent targets’ for random
groups of men expressing their masculinity, in their apparent defense of the cow (‘gau mata’) and
the safekeeping of the integrity of the country (“Bharat mata”). In no uncertain terms do I
consider these men to be ideologically vacuous, rather their acts are informed by a strong will to
power; however in the absence of any such tangible power to make decisions, they are trying to
outdo each other through such populist acts, a rat race of sorts of meting out gratuitous violence
for the population in this age of instant gratification. These acts are neither openly condoned nor
are condemned by the ruling party2. In its essence, it’s a free for all to incite the largest minority
population within the country to retaliate and take matters into their hands. It is here that the
malaise of Islamophobia, with its rampant reach, proves to be a detriment to any such
mobilization. It has been successful in not only creating a ‘fear psychosis’ among the larger
population, rather it has made even the Muslims wary of any radical assertion of their religion in
political terms. There are Muslim political figures which have emerged in the aftermath of the
populist right wing discourse3; however, their reach and support is limited. The fractured nature
of the Muslim body politic has given rise to responses which are atomized, local and nowhere
comparable to the Dalit movement. Since conjectures have no place in sociology, I would try and
explore the circumstances in which such outrage becomes improbable based on my field work in
West Bengal. It is just a small foray into the Muslim lifeworld represented through the narratives
of people involved in everyday struggles to achieve their aspirations of a better life.
The state of West Bengal has been at the epicenter of major upheavals in terms of population,
culture, politics as well as religion. The partition of the country determined the demography of
the state and its areas, wherein certain pockets became Muslim enclaves, the community at large
was reduced to a minority with little contribution to politics, culture and economy. Thus, any
conversation or discussion on Muslims in the state has to be tempered accordingly.
This small write up does not provide the space to delve into this matter in depth. Instead, I
would try and elucidate my points through the use of examples from my field work in West

1
The recent demonstration by the Bhim Army at Jantar Mantar against the murder of dalits in Saharanpur, Uttar
Pradesh. A similar demonstration by the Muslims in such large number has seldom been witnessed.
2
The Bharatiya Janta Party (BJP) is the majority party in power and formed the government in 2015.
3
For example, Asaddudin Owaisi and All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen (AIMIM) has become one of the more
vocal Muslim voices. There are similar Muslim voices which such as Indian Union Muslim League in Kerala and the
All India United Democratic Front of Assam; but their reach is considerably small.
Bengal. For 37 years, the Left Front headed by CPIM 4 was in power riding on the back of a land
redistribution movement. The volume of the change or the lack of it, has been discussed at
length, and was clear in the electoral defeat suffered by them. However, they did manage to
instill a secular organizational system through their network of party cadres and members. It was
because of the existence of the ‘party office’ as an institution that there were no major religion
based riots within the state. However, as an added consequence of the same, one does not find a
huge presence of any major Muslim issue based political party operating in the state 5 or for that
matter one can’t find any Dalit issue based party in the state as well. The manner in which
religion and caste became invisible in West Bengal politics was commendable; but the buck stops
there. In terms of education, employment and political representation, the conspicuous absence
of Muslims6 and Dalits reveals the reproduction of the same feudal structure of the past and the
failure of the mainstream communist politics. Thus, the lack of riots or religion based violence
does not take away from the fact that there emerged, in the 37 year old rule of CPIM, an
institutionalized system of inequality. The land redistribution which was supposed to usher in a
more equal society only managed to make a small dent in the existing system; rather, what
followed was a social structure which inherited the inequalities of the past with a different veneer
to it.
This was evident in a village near Manteswar block of the Bardhaman district, where I conducted
my field work. Historically, the Sain clan, a Kshatriya sub caste, had been dominant until a
gradual shift of power towards the Muslims, the Sk. clan, who have become the majority
population owning the lion’s share of land. The majority of Sain families have moved out of the
village owing to their urban calling and economic pursuits. The remaining population consists of
older Muslim families along with an increasing number of new families weather related by blood
or marriage. The village also has a sizeable denomination of Scheduled Caste families.
Nonetheless, as I observed during the course of my field work, the majority of the population
owned less than one acre of land, the literacy rate7 is 68.4% with a miniscule percentage pursuing
higher studies8. In terms of occupational history of families, there was a change in the choice of
work mainly among the age group of 15-40. I would highlight the travails of this age group as
they could be considered the harbingers of change with less vested interests than the ones older
than them. The majority of the population in this age group has left the village to work in
different states across the country. It could be said that the dual aspects of low returns from
agriculture produce on small pieces of land as well as the pressure to earn a standard amount of
money like the rest and make use of the social capital at their disposal pushed these individuals
4
Communist Party of India (Marxist) formed the government in 1977 and remained in power until 2011.
5
Siddiqullah Chowdhury’s party People’s Democratic Conference of India (PDCI) merged with the All India United
Democratic Front (AIUDF) and contested elections in 2014. However, in 2016, Siddiqullah Chowdhury had joined All
India Trinamool Congress (AITMC), contested under its patronage and won a seat. He went on to hold an important
portfolio in the current West Bengal government.
6
The Sachar Committee Report (2006) posited that the Muslims parallel the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes in under representation in education, employment and access to power. SCR(2006):GoI.
7
Census Report (2011)
8
Ibid.
into accepting manual work in the informal sector. The majority of these individuals are Muslims
who time their travel according to the crop cycles. The ones who do not leave the state for work
are engaged in the same old traditional work practices of thika farming or work as agricultural
labourers. This population of young individuals who have inherited either the work of a labourer
or thika tenancy from their fathers has very little to contribute to politics as discourse and
practice as their socio-economic circumstances bind them to the big landlords they work for. The
big landlords are the elites who control not only socio-economic processes but have a say in the
politics in collusion with the upper caste Hindu elites.
The politics in the village now revolves around a few major issues such as-100 days’ work under
the MNREGA scheme, roads and electricity; hence, what transpires is a tug of war between
different political stakeholders to earn as much money as possible from the tranche of payment
which trickles down from the coffers. It has gone to the extent that there are two factions of the
same ruling party within the village engaged in fights over who gets to control over the flow of
money. In such a scenario, what remains of the politics is a husk without its kernel, and
dominated by individuals who have gained a reputation for themselves. More often than not, the
majority of the population do not want to get involved in the daily affairs, and are content with
what ‘comrade’(as one of the political leaders are called) has to offer them. There emerges
thereby a disengagement from the process itself which makes it impossible to mobilise them. If
there are discussions on the state of Indian politics, it is limited to discussions among peer groups
over ‘bidis’ or at tea stalls where the discussions are taken over by the entertainment in the form
of card games or what is being shown on the television.
The fractured nature of Muslim politics is exemplified with the help of two incidents which
happened in the village, the movements related to it, compromise and eventual betrayal by the
senior leaders. The village under discussion has a neighbouring village with a majority Hindu
upper caste population. The main market lies within the geographical vicinity of the above
village. To cut a long story short, two Muslim entrepreneurs on two separate occasions were not
allowed to open a permanent shop there, given the market being the stronghold of the
neighbouring village dominated by upper caste Hindus. However, the majority of the villages
surrounding this main market are Muslim dominated, and as expected there were movements
which were organized to fight against such outright discrimination. The movement petered out
after a few days as there was a sustained effort from the powers that be to quell the movement as
soon as possible. It was not a compromise that was reached upholding the secular ideals; rather
what emerged was a collusion of the elites to defray the demands of the Muslims while certain
vested interests were ensured. As a respondent of mine narrated the incidents,
“I told them (CPIM party members) that if I associate with you now in this and help with the
issue, the moment you receive 2 lakhs from Putsuri, we would get backstabbed in return. As we
have witnessed before as well, it is the Muslim brokers who give money to other Muslims and
encourage to buy from Putshuri or set up shop there, and then they would come and fight with us
if we go against their wishes. So when we would go under your tutelage to fight, you have lost
that position as we had to return empty handed, embarrassed and humiliated. So there is no
cause for us to go again. The fault is not of the Hindus but the Muslims who cannot sustain a
movement….. There is no problem with Muslims residing in the village but it becomes a problem
when the Muslims try to do business in the same, then it becomes unacceptable for everyone and
they can’t let it happen.”(Excerpts from the interview with Mr. I)

The incidents happened when the Left front government was in power. This brazen display of
unhinged discrimination has its roots in the politics practiced during that period. The
disenchantment from politics of one of the more vocal members of the part exemplifies the
general mood of the people, and the reduction of politics to economic transactions. It is
impossible for someone to keep faith in a party which betrays the people in successive incidents.
In the above example which brings out the inability of the CPIM to view the underprivileged as
capable of politics, we find that the reproduction of inequalities of access to power is directly
proportional to the access to different forms of capital-economic, social and cultural. Those who
can often wield the power of such capital and / can get away with deliberate acts of wanton
discrimination. In the next few lines we hear from a leading political activist of the village who
shifted his allegiance from CPIM to TMC. He highlights the inability of the left to declass itself
and historicizes the eventual propagation the same feudal system they were supposed to fight and
overthrow.
When a bunch of illiterate Muslims, Scheduled Tribes stopped a bus by blocking the road, the
Officer in charge came in. Now the illiterate protesters are not able to converse with the OC, so
someone like X (A landed upper caste, educated member of the Sain family) would go there
posing as an intellectual and talk either in Farsi, Urdu or English and become the leader of
these people. Gradually, the left front started taking these kind of people in the party and when
the very same people like X started exploiting the poor, the left front turned a blind eye towards
all of it. (Excerpts from the Interview with Mr. L)

He went on to narrate the problems associated with the functioning of the party, the privileging
of the upper caste as well as the eventual failure of the land redistribution in the village. The land
redistribution was supposed to help bring in a more equal society; instead it provided a modicum
of change whereby the landless were provided with miniscule amount of low lying lands near the
canal which was under water for six months and only one crop a year could be cultivated. The
decreasing rate of profit from one cycle of crop has made it impossible to survive on agriculture.
It is in this context that one can notice that the major portion of the population has to depend on
other sources of income and employment.
These sources of income and employment become important when one considers the upward
aspirations of the population, especially the younger generation and their inability to find the
same in the old forms of work that their fathers were involved in. The need for smartphones,
motorcycles and clothes along with modern urban amenities is concomitant to the need for land
and big houses. This requires them to seek a life beyond agriculture. This has been detrimental in
low percentage of the youth pursuing higher studies. The lack of ample ideological as well as
educational insight into the politics has turned these individuals, even though intelligent and
street smart, as pawns in the hands of the political parties. Their incessant need for more material
gratification coupled with the ‘development dole’ based politics in the rural areas, the political
expectations have changed, and in its wake, there is a visible depoliticization or lack of serious
engagement with politics.
If the Muslims could live together as one, as united then whatever is unjust or wrong, one should
be capable of calling it what it is. No one should accept what is unjust. However, that ability to
differentiate between unjust and just is not there among the Muslims anymore, that ability to
decide whether to stand up against the unjust or fall back, but that mentality is somehow lacking
among the Muslims. The Muslims answer to money and do not take into account whether
something is unjust or not, they are there wherever there is money to be had. This is what the
reality is of the current generation, wherever there is money there are Muslims. (Excerpts from
the interview with Mr. I)
Even if the above statements sound harsh, they highlight a widespread rise of individualism
under neoliberalism. An added consequence of neoliberalism is the uncertain nature of the work,
informal and manual, in other states, which often makes them anxious about their future. The
lack of education, permanent employment, low returns from agriculture as well as the lack of
politicization has made it impossible for this group of individuals to come forth and mobilise to
seek or redress the wrongs as they are stuck in a vicious circle. As another respondent, 25 years
old working as a mason in Kerala, put it, “I want to study but if I do that then my home would
slip back into poverty. Since I am the eldest of the family, I have to send at least 10,000Rs a
month which would be a great support for the family. If I don’t do it then the younger ones would
not be able to better their lives.” (Excerpts from the interview with Mr. M). The struggle to
improve their lives and that of their families emanates from systemic violence against the
community; hence, leaving no time or energy to fight for the wider Muslim community.