G.R. No.

L-2855 July 30, 1949

BORIS MEJOFF, petitioner,
vs. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, respondent.

FACTS:

Petitioner Boris Mejoff is an alien of Russian descent who was brought to this country from Shanghai as a
secret operative by the Japanese forces during the latter's regime in these Islands. Upon liberation he was
arrested as a Japanese spy, by U. S. Army Counter Intelligence Corps. He was handed by the government
and later on ordered his release. But it was found out that he had entered the Philippines illegally without
inspection and admission by the immigration officials thus ordered his deportation on the first available
transportation to Russia. The petitioner was then detained while arrangements for his deportation are being
made. Thereafter two boats of Russian nationality arrived but their masters refused to take petitioner.

ISSUE: Whether or not too long detention of the petitioner was valid?

HELD:

The Supreme Court ruled against the petitioner.

Under section 37 of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 any alien who enters this country "without
inspection and admission by the immigration authorities at a designated point of entry" is subject to
deportation within five years. In a recent decision of a similar litigation (Borovsky vs. Commissioner of
Immigration) we denied the request for habeas corpus, saying:

"It must be admitted that temporary detention is a necessary step in the process of exclusion or expulsion
of undesirable aliens and that pending arrangements for his deportation, the Government has
the right to hold the undesirable alien under confinement for a reasonable lenght of time.
However, under established precedents, too long a detention may justify the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus.

"The meaning of "reasonable time" depends upon the circumstances, specially the difficulties of obtaining
a passport, the availability of transfortation, the diplomatic arrangements concerned and the efforts
displayed to send the deportee away. Considering that this Government desires to expel the alien, and does
not relish keeping him at the people's expense, we must presume it is making efforts to carry out the decree
of exclusion by the highest officer of the land. On top of this presumption assurances were made during the
oral argument that the Government is really trying to expedite the expulsion of this petitioner. On the other
hand, the record fails to show how long he has been under confinement since the last time he was
apprehended. Neither does he indicate neglected opportunities to send him abroad. And unless it is shown
that the deportee is being indefinitely imprisoned under the pretense of awaiting a chance for deportation
or unless the Government admits that it can not deport him or unless the detainee is being held for too long
a period our courts will not interfere.

Separate Opinion
"To continue keeping petitioner under confinement is a thing that shocks conscience. Under the
circumstances, petitioner is entitled to be released from confinement. He has not been convicted for any
offense for which he may be imprisoned. Government's inability to deport him no pretext to keep him
imprisoned for an indefinite length of time. The constitutional guarantee that no person shall be deprived
of liberty without due process of law has been intended to protect all inhabitants or residents who may
happen to be under the shadows of Philippine flag. Our vote is to grant the petition and to order the
immediate release of petitioner, without prejudice for the government to deport him as soon as the
government could have the means to do so. In the meantime, petitioner is entitled to live a normal life in a
peaceful country, ruled by the principles of law and justice." (Perfecto, J.)
Agustin vs Edu 88 SCRA 195
Facts
This case is a petition assailing the validity or the constitutionality of a Letter of Instruction No. 229, issued by
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, requiring all vehicle owners, users or drivers to procure early warning devices to
be installed a distance away from such vehicle when it stalls or is disabled. In compliance with such letter of
instruction, the Commissioner of the Land Transportation Office issued Administrative Order No. 1 directing the
compliance thereof.
This petition alleges that such letter of instruction and subsequent administrative order are unlawful and
unconstitutional as it violates the provisions on due process, equal protection of the law and undue delegation of
police power.

Issue
Whether or not the Letter of Instruction No. 229 and the subsequent Administrative Order issued is
unconstitutional

Ruling
The Supreme Court ruled for the dismissal of the petition. The statutes in question are deemed not
unconstitutional. These were definitely in the exercise of police power as such was established to promote public
welfare and public safety. In fact, the letter of instruction is based on the constitutional provision of adopting to
the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. The letter of instruction
mentions, as its premise and basis, the resolutions of the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and
the discussions on traffic safety by the United Nations - that such letter was issued in consideration of a growing
number of road accidents due to stalled or parked vehicles on the streets and highways.

US vs. Guinto (Consti1)

Facts:
 In the 4 consolidated suits, the USA moves to dismiss the cases on the ground that they
are in effect suits against it which it has not consented

On the first suit:

 On February 24, 1986, the Western Pacific Contracting Office, Okinawa Area Exchange,
US Air Force, solicited bids for barber services contracts through its contracting officer James F.
Shaw
 Among those who submitted their bids were private respondents Roberto T. Valencia,
Emerenciana C. Tanglao, and Pablo C. del Pilar
 Bidding was won by Ramon Dizon over the objection of the private respondents who
claimed that he had made a bid for 4 facilities, including the Civil Engineering Area which was not
included in the invitation to bid
 The Philippine Area Exchange (PHAX), through its representatives petitioners Yvonne
Reeves and Frederic M. Smouse, upon the private respondents' complaint, explained that the Civil
Engineering concession had not been awarded to Dizon
 But Dizon was alreayd operating this concession, then known as the NCO club concession
 On June 30, 1986, the private respondents filed a complaint in the court below to compel
PHAX and the individual petitioners to cancel the award to Dizon, to conduct a rebidding for the
barbershop concessions and to allow the private respondents by a writ of preliminary injunction
to continue operating the concessions pending litigation
 Respondent court directed the individual petitioners to maintain the status quo
 On July 22, 1986, the petitioners filed a motion to dismiss and opposition to the petition
for preliminary injunction on the ground that the action was in effect a suit against USA which
had not waived its non-suability
 On July 22, 1986, trial court denied the application for a writ of preliminary injunction
 On Oct. 10, 1988, trial court denied the petitioners' motion to dismiss

On the second suit:

 Fabian Genove filed a complaint for damages against petitioners Anthony Lamachia,
Wilfredo Belsa, Rose Cartalla and Peter Orascion for his dismissal as cook in the US Air Force
Recreation Center at the John Hay Air Station in Baguio City
 It had been ascertained that Genove had poured urine into the soup stock used in cooking
the vegetables served to the club customers
 His dismissal was effected on March 5, 1986 by Col. David C. Kimball, Commander of the
3rd Combat Support Group, PACAF Clark Air Force Base
 Genove filed a complaint in the RTC of Baguio
 The defendants, joined by the United States of America, moved to dismiss the complaint,
alleging that Lamachia (the manager) as an officer of the US Air Force was immune from suit for
the acts done by him in his official capacity; they argued that the suit was in effect against USA,
which had not given its consent to be sued
 Motion was denied by respondent judge: although acting intially in their official capacities,
the defendants went beyond what their functions called for; this brought them out of the
protective mantle of whatever immunities they may have had in the beginning

On the third suit:

 Luis Bautisa, who was employed as a barracks boy in Camp O'Donnell, an extension of
Clark Air Base, was arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by the individual
petitioners Tomi J. King, Darrel D. Dye and Stephen F. Bostick, officers of the US Air Force and
special agents of the Air Force of Special Investigators (AFOSI)
 Bautista was dismissed from his employment as a result of the filing of the charge
 He then filed a complaint for damages against the individual petitioners, claiming that it
was because of their acts that he was removed
 Defendants alleged that they had only done their duty in the enforcement of laws of the
Philippines inside the American bases, pursuant to the RP-US Military Bases Agreement
 The counsel for the defense invoked that the defendants were acting in their official
capacity; that the complaint was in effect a suit against the US without its consent
 Motion was denied by respondent judge: immunity under the Military Bases Agreement
covered only criminal and not civil cases; moreover, the defendants had come under the
jurisdiction of the court when they submitted their answer

On the fourth suit:

 Complaint for damages was filed by private respondents against the petitioners (except
USA)
 According to the plaintiffs, the defendants beat them up, handcuffed the, and unleashed
dogs on them
 Defendants deny this and claim that the plaintiffs were arrested for theft and were bitten
by dogs because they were struggling and resisting arrest
 USA and the defendants argued that the suit was in effect a suit against the United States
which had not given its consent to be sued; that they were also immune from suit under the RP-
US Bases Treaty for acts done by them in the performance of their official functions
 Motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court: the acts cannot be considered Acts of
State, if they were ever admitted by the defendants
Issue:
 Whether or not the suits above are in effect suits against United States of America without
its consent
 In relation, whether or not the defendants are also immune from suit for acting within
their official functions.
Holding and Ratio:
 1st suit: No. The barbershops concessions are commercial enterprises operated by private
persons. They are not agencies of the US Armed forces. Petitioners cannot plead immunity. Case
should be remanded to the lower court.
 2nd suit: No. The petitioners cannot invoke the doctrine of state immunity. The
restaurants are commercial enterprises. By entering into the employment contract with Genove,
it impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit. (However, the petitioners are only
suable, not liable.)
 3rd suit: Yes. It is clear that the petitioners were acting in the exercise of their official
functions. For discharging their duties as agents of the US, they cannot be directly impleaded for
acts attributable to their principal, which has not given its consent to be sued.
 4th suit: The contradictory factual allegations deserve a closer study. Inquiry must first be
made by the lower court. Only after can it be known in what capacity the petitioners were acting
at the time of the incident.

Secretary of Justice vs. Judge Lantion GR 139465

Facts: On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs of the United
States requesting for the extradition of Mark Jimenez for various crimes in violation of US laws. In compliance
with the related municipal law, specifically Presidential Decree No. 1069 “Prescribing the Procedure for
Extradition of Persons Who Have committed Crimes in a Foreign Country” and the established “Extradition
Treaty Between the Government of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America”, the
department proceeded with proceeded with the designation of a panel of attorneys to conduct a technical
evaluation and assessment as provided for in the presidential decree and the treaty. The respondent requested
for a copy of the official extradition request as well as the documents and papers submitted therein. The petitioner
denied the request as it alleges that such information is confidential in nature and that it is premature to provide
such document as the process is not a preliminary investigation but a mere evaluation. Therefore, the
constitutional rights of the accused are not yet available.

Issue: 1.Whether or not private respondent, Mark B. Jimenez, be granted access to the official extradition request
and documents with an opportunity to file a comment on or opposition thereto

2.Whether or not private respondent’s entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the
proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of the Philippine Government under the RP-US Extradition
Treaty

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the private respondent be furnished a copy of the extradition request and
its supporting papers and to give him a reasonable period of time within which to file his comment with
supporting evidence. In this case, there exists a clear conflict between the obligation of the Philippine
Government to comply with the provisions of the treaty and its equally significant role of protection of its citizens
of its right of due process. The processes outlined in the treaty and in the presidential decree already pose an
impending threat to a prospective extraditee’s liberty as early as the evaluation stage. It is not an imagined threat
to his liberty, but a very imminent one. On the other hand, granting due process to the extradition case causes
delay in the process. The rule of pacta sunt servanda, one of the oldest and most fundamental maxims of
international law, requires the parties to a treaty to keep their agreement therein in good faith. The doctrine of
incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situations in which there appears to
be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of a local state.
Efforts should be done to harmonize them. In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a
choice has to be made between a rule of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that
municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts. The doctrine of incorporation decrees that rules of
international law are given equal standing, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments. In this case,
there is no conflict between international law and municipal law. The United States and the Philippines share a
mutual concern about the suppression and punishment of crime in their respective jurisdictions. At the same
time, both States accord common due process protection to their respective citizens. In fact, neither the Treaty
nor the Extradition Law precludes the rights of due process from a prospective extradite.

KURODA VS. JALANDONI

KURODA VS. JALANDONI

83 Phil. 171 (1949) Court of the Philippines

Facts:

Kuroda, Lieutenant General of the Japanese Imperial Army, was prosecuted for war crimes before the
Military Commission set up by Executive Order No. 68 of the President of the Philippines. Kuroda
challenged the legality and constitutionality of the Military Commission and contended that it lacked
jurisdiction to try him for violation of the Hague and Geneva Conventions on the Laws of War, since the
Philippines was not a signatory to these conventions.

Issue: Whether or not the established Military Commission is legal and constitutional.

Held:

The court ruled that the Military Commission was legal and constitutional base on the citation of Article II,
Section 3 of the Philippine Constitution declaring that “the Philippine adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the nation”.

The court ruled that in accordance with the generally accepted principles of international law of the present
day, including the Hague Convention, the Geneva Convention, and significant precedents of international
jurisprudence established by the United Nations, all those persons, military or civilian, who had been guilty
of planning, preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the commission of crimes and offenses
consequential and incidental thereto, in violation of the laws and customs of war, of humanity and
civilization, were held accountable therefore. Although the Philippines was not a signatory to the
conventions embodying them, our Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive in its scope and
is not confined to the recognition of rules and principles of international law as contained in treaties to
which our government may have been or shall be a signatory. Consequently, in the promulgation and
enforcement of Executive Order No. 68, the President of the Philippines had acted in conformity with the
generally accepted principles and policies of international law which are part of our Constitution.
Abbas vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 89651 November 10, 1989

Facts: A plebiscite in thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities in Mindanao and Palawan, was scheduled
for November 19, 1989, in implementation of RA 6734, entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for
the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao" (Organic Act). These consolidated petitions pray that the
Court: (1) enjoin the COMELEC from conducting the plebiscite; and (2) declare RA 6734, or parts thereof,
unconstitutional. The arguments against R.A. 6734 raised by petitioners may generally be categorized into
either of the following: (a) that R.A. 6734, or parts thereof, violates the Constitution, and (b) that certain
provisions of R.A. No. 6734 conflict with the Tripoli Agreement.

Issue: Whether or not certain provisions of the Organic Act are unconstitutional.

Held: The petition has no merit and the law is constitutional.

1. Petitioner contends that the tenor of a provision in the Organic Act makes the creation of an autonomous
region absolute, such that even if only two provinces vote in favor of autonomy, an autonomous region
would still be created composed of the two provinces where the favorable votes were obtained. there is a
specific provision in the Transitory Provisions (Article XIX) of the Organic Act, which incorporates
substantially the same requirements embodied in the Constitution and fills in the details, thus:

SEC. 13. The creation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao shall take effect
when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units provided in
paragraph (2) of Sec. 1 of Article II of this Act in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier
than ninety (90) days or later than one hundred twenty (120) days after the approval of this
Act: Provided, That only the provinces and cities voting favorably in such plebiscite shall
be included in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The provinces and cities
which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain
the existing administrative determination, merge the existing regions.

Thus, under the Constitution and R.A. No 6734, the creation of the autonomous region shall take effect only
when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite, and only those
provinces and cities where a majority vote in favor of the Organic Act shall be included in the autonomous
region. The provinces and cities wherein such a majority is not attained shall not be included in the
autonomous region. It may be that even if an autonomous region is created, not all of the thirteen (13)
provinces and nine (9) cities mentioned in Article II, section 1 (2) of R.A. No. 6734 shall be included therein.
The single plebiscite contemplated by the Constitution and R.A. No. 6734 will therefore be determinative
of (1) whether there shall be an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao and (2) which provinces and cities,
among those enumerated in R.A. No. 6734, shall compromise it.

2. The question has been raised as to what this majority means. Does it refer to a majority of the total votes
cast in the plebiscite in all the constituent units, or a majority in each of the constituent units, or both?

The 1987 Constitution provides: The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved
by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that
only provinces, cities and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the
autonomous region. [Art. X, sec, 18, para, 2]. It will readily be seen that the creation of the autonomous
region is made to depend, not on the total majority vote in the plebiscite, but on the will of the majority in
each of the constituent units and the proviso underscores this.

3. Petitioner avers that not all of the thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities included in the Organic Act,
possess such concurrence in historical and cultural heritage and other relevant characteristics. By including
areas, which do not strictly share the same characteristic as the others, petitioner claims that Congress has
expanded the scope of the autonomous region which the constitution itself has prescribed to be limited.
Petitioner's argument is not tenable. The Constitution lays down the standards by which Congress shall
determine which areas should constitute the autonomous region. Guided by these constitutional criteria,
the ascertainment by Congress of the areas that share common attributes is within the exclusive realm of
the legislature's discretion. Any review of this ascertainment would have to go into the wisdom of the law.

4. Both petitions also question the validity of R.A. No. 6734 on the ground that it violates the constitutional
guarantee on free exercise of religion [Art. III, sec. 5]. The objection centers on a provision in the Organic
Act which mandates that should there be any conflict between the Muslim Code and the Tribal Code on the
one had, and the national law on the other hand, the Shari'ah courts created under the same Act should
apply national law. Petitioners maintain that the islamic law (Shari'ah) is derived from the Koran, which
makes it part of divine law. Thus it may not be subjected to any "man-made" national law. Petitioner Abbas
supports this objection by enumerating possible instances of conflict between provisions of the Muslim
Code and national law, wherein an application of national law might be offensive to a Muslim's religious
convictions.

In the present case, no actual controversy between real litigants exists. There are no conflicting claims
involving the application of national law resulting in an alleged violation of religious freedom. This being
so, the Court in this case may not be called upon to resolve what is merely a perceived potential conflict
between the provisions the Muslim Code and national law.

5. According to petitioners, said provision grants the President the power to merge regions, a power which
is not conferred by the Constitution upon the President.

While the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a
power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of
general supervision over local governments. There is no conflict between the power of the President to
merge administrative regions with the constitutional provision requiring a plebiscite in the merger of local
government units because the requirement of a plebiscite in a merger expressly applies only to provinces,
cities, municipalities or barangays, not to administrative regions.

6. Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. Based on the grounds raised by petitioners
to challenge the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6734, the Court finds that petitioners have failed to overcome
the presumption. The dismissal of these two petitions is, therefore, inevitable.

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL petitioner, vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE

SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL, respondents.

Facts:
The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to
the privatization program of the Philippine Government, decided to sell through public bidding 30%
to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). The
winning bidder, or the eventual “strategic partner,” will provide management expertise or an
international marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and
performance of the Manila Hotel.
In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila
Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000
shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel
operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of
petitioner. Prior to the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder, petitioner Manila Prince
Hotel matched the bid price and sent a manager’s check as bid security, which GSIS refused to accept.
Apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale may be
consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner filed a petition before the Court.
Issues:

1. Whether or not Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.
2. Whether or not the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony.
3. Whether or not the submission of matching bid is premature
4. Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents in refusing the
matching bid of the petitioner.

Rulings:
In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:

1. It is a self-executing provision.
1. Since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is
deemed written in every statute and contract. A provision which lays down a general principle,
such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a
provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary
or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it
grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.
2. A constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and
the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an
examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject
is referred to the legislature for action. Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is
necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of
the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring
legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and
practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.
3. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is
complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its
enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in
operation. It is per sejudicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that in the grant
of rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State
shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that – qualified Filipinos shall be
preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified
circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence
of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to
enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and
puissance, and from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right
there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
2. The Court agree.
1. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the
Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the
Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also
to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
2. It also refers to Filipino’s intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. In the present case, Manila
Hotel has become a landmark, a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was
restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in 1912, a concourse for the elite, it has
 since then become the venue of various significant events which have shaped Philippine
history.
3. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51%
of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it
comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51%
will have actual control and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot
be disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands.
3. It is not premature.
1. In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning
the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony,
thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to be
allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign
firm the award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if the Court is to give life and meaning
to the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this may neither be
expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent
to be simply disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.
2. The Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may discourage foreign
investors. But the Constitution and laws of the Philippines are understood to be always open
to public scrutiny. These are given factors which investors must consider when venturing into
business in a foreign jurisdiction. Any person therefore desiring to do business in the
Philippines or with any of its agencies or instrumentalities is presumed to know his rights and
obligations under the Constitution and the laws of the forum.
4. There was grave abuse of discretion.
1. To insist on selling the Manila Hotel to foreigners when there is a Filipino group willing to
match the bid of the foreign group is to insist that government be treated as any other ordinary
market player, and bound by its mistakes or gross errors of judgement, regardless of the
consequences to the Filipino people. The miscomprehension of the Constitution is regrettable.
Thus, the Court would rather remedy the indiscretion while there is still an opportunity to do
so than let the government develop the habit of forgetting that the Constitution lays down the
basic conditions and parameters for its actions.
2. Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to
the bidding rules, respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but to award to petitioner the
block of shares of MHC and to execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the
sale in accordance not only with the bidding guidelines and procedures but with the
Constitution as well. The refusal of respondent GSIS to execute the corresponding documents
with petitioner as provided in the bidding rules after the latter has matched the bid of the
Malaysian firm clearly constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

Hence, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL

CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT
CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST from selling 51% of the shares of the
Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the matching bid of petitioner
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila
Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the necessary agreements and
documents to effect the sale, to issue the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as
may be necessary for the purpose.