Adelino H. Ledesma v. Hon. Rafael C. Climaco wrote a letter3 to one of his hometown”s barrio lieutenants.
The letter
G.R. No. L- 23815 (June 28, 1974)
Facts:
Petitioner Ledesma was assigned as counsel de parte for an
accused in a case pending in the sala of the respondent judge. On
October 13, 1964, Ledesma was appointed Election Registrar for the
Municipality of Cadiz, Negros Occidental. He commenced
discharging his duties, and filed a motion to withdraw from his
position as counsel de parte. The respondent Judge denied him and
also appointed him as counsel de oficio for the two defendants. On
November 6, Ledesma filed a motion to be allowed to withdraw as
counsel de oficio, because the Comelec requires full time service
which could prevent him from handling adequately the defense.
Judge denied the motion. So Ledesma instituted this certiorari
proceeding.
Issue:
Whether or not the order of the respondent judged in denying the
motion of the petitioner is a grave abuse of discretion?
Holding:
No, Ledesma's withdrawal would be an act showing his lack of
fidelity to the duty rqeuired of the legal profession. He ought to have
known that membership in the bar is burdened with conditions. The
legal profession is dedicated to the ideal of service, and is not a mere
trade. A lawyer may be required to act as counsel de oficio to aid in
the performance of the administration of justice. The fact that such
services are rendered without pay should not diminish the lawyer's
zeal.
Ratio:
“The only attorneys who cannot practice law by reason of their office
are Judges, or other officials or employees of the superior courts or
the office of the solicitor General (Section 32 Rule 127 of the Rules
of Court [Section 35 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of
Court]. The lawyer involved not being among them, remained as
counsel of record since he did not file a motion to withdraw as
defendant-appellant’s counsel after his appointment as Register of
Deeds. Nor was substitution of attorney asked either by him or by the
new counsel for the defendant-appellant (People vs. Williams CA
G.R. Nos. 00375-76, February 28, 1963)
To avoid any frustration thereof, especially in the case of an
indigent defendant, a lawyer may be required to act as counsel de
officio (People v. Daban) Moreover, The right of an accused in a
criminal case to be represented by counsel is a constitutional right of
the highest importance, and there can be no fair hearing with due
process of law unless he is fully informed of his rights in this regard
and given opportunity to enjoy them (People vs. Holgado, L-2809,
March 22, 1950)
The trial court in a criminal case has authority to provide
the accused with a counsel de officio for such action as it may deem
fit to safeguard the rights of the accused (Provincial Fiscal of Rizal
vs. Judge Muñoz Palma, L-15325, August 31, 1930)
In re Luis B. Tagorda (1929) (card and letter)
Doctrine: • The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for
a young lawyer, and especially with his brother lawyers, is the
establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity
and fidelity to trust.
Facts: Luis B. Tagorda was an attorney who was elected as the third
member of the provincial board of Isabela. He admits that prior to his
election, he made use of a card2 written in Spanish and Ilocano,
which contains a list of tasks he may undertake as a notary public,
and a lawyer, as well as a general invitation to consult with him for
free. Tagorda also admits that after he was elected into office, he
basically informed the recipient of Tagorda”s intention to continue
residing in Echague, despite having to attend board sessions in
Ilagan, in order that he may continue to serve his hometown as a
notary public and lawyer. The letter subtly offered information
regarding Tagorda”s office hours, together with an express request
that the recipient spread the word as to his willingness to accept land
registration cases for a fee of P3.00 per title. The government,
through the provincial fiscal of Isabela, together with the Attorney-
General, brought this matter to the attention of the Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the advertisement of Atty. Tagorda through the card a
nd letter is wrong and be punished.
RULING:
Yes. The acts of Atty Tagorda of direct and indirect advertising and st
irring up litigation were violative of the Code of Ethics. Still, the most
worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer
and especially with his brother lawyers, is the establishment of a we
ll-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust.
It becomes the duty of the court to condemn in no uncertain terms th
e ugly practice of solicitation of cases by lawyers. It is destructive of
the honor of a great profession. It lowers the standards of that profes
sion. It works against the confidence of the community in the integrity
of the members of the bar. It results in needless litigation and in ince
nting to strife otherwise peacefully inclined citizens.
The commission of offenses of this nature would amply justify perma
nent elimination from the bar. But as mitigating, circumstances worki
ng in favor of the respondent there are, first, his intimation that he wa
s unaware of the impropriety of his acts, second, his youth and inexp
erience at the bar, and, third, his promise not to commit a similar mist
ake in the future. Atty. Tagorda is suspended for one month.
ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR. vs. ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO
Facts:
The administrative complaint arose from the paid advertisement that
appeared in the July 5, 2000 issue of Philippine Daily Inquirer which
read: Annulment of Marriage Specialist 532-4333/521-2667. Ms. Ma.
Theresa Espeleta, a staff member of the Public Information Office of
the Supreme Court, took notice of the advertisement and inquired by
pretending as an interested party. After such inquiry, confirming that
Atty. Rizalino Simbillo is actually promoting himself as an expert in
handling annulment cases and is guaranteeing a court decree within
four to six months with a fee of P48,000 to be paid in installment
basis, further research was conducted by the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA). The research revealed other similar
advertisements published in two other newspapers – August 2 and 6,
2000 issues of Manila Bulletin and August 5, 2000 issue of The
Philippine Star. Atty. Ismael Khan, Jr., afterwards, in his capacity as
Assistant Court Administrator and Chief of the Public Information
Office filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Simbillo for
improper advertising and solicitation in violation of Rule 2.03 and
Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) and Rule
138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court. The IBP, taking cognizance of
the referral to investigate, report and recommend, found the
respondent guilty. Respondent, then, filed an Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration, which was denied. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Rizalino Simbillo is guilty of violating Rule 2.03
and Rule 3.01 of CPR.
Held:
Yes. The Court agreed with the IBP’s resolution, holding that the
practice of law is not a business but a profession in which duty to
public service and not money is the primary consideration. By
advertising himself as an “Annulment Specialist,” he undermined the
stability and sanctity of marriage —encouraging people who might
have otherwise been disinclined and would have refrained from
dissolving their marriage bonds, to do so. In addition, although
solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed, for
solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the
legal profession which the petitioner failed to do. Therefore, the Court
suspended the petitioner from the practice of law for one year and
sternly warned him that a repetition of the same or similar offense will
be dealt with more severely.
Mauricio C. Ulep vs. The Legal Clinic, Inc.
B.M. No. 553. June 17, 1993
Facts:
Mauricio C. Ulep, petitioner, prays this Court "to order the
respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., to cease and desist from issuing
advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of Annexes `A'
and `B' (of said petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or
entities from making advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the
law profession other than those allowed by law.” The advertisements
complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:
Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
THEPlease call: 521-0767,
LEGAL5217232, 5222041
CLINIC, INC.8:30 am-6:00 pm
7-Flr. Victoria Bldg. UN Ave., Mla.
Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce
through The Legal Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office
hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa
Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of
Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in
the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
THE 7 F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave.
LEGALErmita, Manila nr. US Embassy
CLINIC, INC. Tel. 521-7232521-7251
522-2041; 521-0767
It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements
above reproduced are champertous, unethical, demeaning of the law
profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in the
integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal
profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said advertisements,
hence the reliefs sought in his petition as herein before quoted.
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of
publication of said advertisements at its instance, but claims that it is
not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal
support services" through paralegals with the use of modern
computers and electronic machines. Respondent further argues that
assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the act of
advertising these services should be allowed supposedly in the light
of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of
Arizona, reportedly decided by the United States Supreme Court on
June 7, 1977.
Issue:
Whether or not the services offered by respondent, The Legal
Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in
either case, whether the same can properly be the subject of the
advertisements herein complained of.
Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the services offered by the
respondent constitute practice of law. The definition of “practice of
law” is laid down in the case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, as defined:
Black defines "practice of law" as:
"The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the
application of legal principles and technique to serve the interest of
another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or
advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the
preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal
instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It
embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in
matters connected with the law."
The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal
support services can neither be seriously considered nor sustained.
Said proposition is belied by respondent's own description of the
services it has been offering. While some of the services being
offered by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical and
technical know-how, such as the installation of computer systems
and programs for the efficient management of law offices, or the
computerization of research aids and materials, these will not suffice
to justify an exception to the general rule. What is palpably clear is
that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and
lawyers. Its contention that such function is non-advisory and non-
diagnostic is more apparent than real. In providing information, for
example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it
strains the credulity of this Court that all that respondent corporation
will simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client,
and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and
so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client
the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course
of action to be taken as may be provided for by said law. That is what
its advertisements represent and for which services it will
consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within
the jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion
will not be altered by the fact that respondent corporation does not
represent clients in court since law practice, as the weight of
authority holds, is not limited merely to court appearances but
extends to legal research, giving legal advice, contract drafting, and
so forth.
That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry
out its services is not controlling. What is important is that it is
engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the services
it renders which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory
prohibitions against the advertisements which it has caused to be
published and are now assailed in this proceeding. The standards of
the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his
talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession,
advertise his talents or skills as in a manner similar to a merchant
advertising his goods. The proscription against advertising of legal
services or solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental
postulate that the practice of law is a profession. The canons of the
profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a
well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust,
which must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct.
Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the community has
a way of publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity
is a normal by-product of effective service which is right and proper.
A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate
it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between
a normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome result of
propaganda.
Dacanay v. Baker & McKenzie
NATURE: Atty. Dacanay, in his verified complaint, sought to enjoin
Juan G. Collas, Jr. and 9 other lawyers from practising law under the
name of Baker & McKenzie, a law firm organized in Illinois.
FACTS: Respondents are members of the Philippine bar practising
under the firm name of Guerrero & Torres. They are likewise
members or associates of Baker & Mckenzie.
Torres, one of the respondents, made a letter using as
letterhead “Baker & McKenzie”. Included therein were the names of
the other lawyer-respondents. Through the said letter, they asked
Clurman for the release of 87 shares of Cathay Products
International, Inc. to Gabriel, a client of the respondents.
Atty. Dacanay denied any liability of Clurman to Gabriel. He
requested that he be informed whether the lawyer of Gabriel is Baker
& McKenzie and the purpose of using the said letterhead. Not having
received any reply, he filed the instant complaint.
ISSUE: W/N respondents are enjoined from practicing law under the
firm name Baker & McKenzie.
HELD: YES.
RATIO: Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice
law in the Philippines. As admitted by the respondents in their
memorandum, Baker & McKenzie is a professional partnership
organized in 1949 in Chicago, Illinois with members and associates
in 30 cities around the world.
As pointed out by the Solicitor General, respondents' use of
the firm name Baker & McKenzie constitutes a representation they
they could "render legal services of the highest quality to
multinational business enterprises and others engaged in foreign
trade and investment". This is unethical because Baker & McKenzie
is not authorized to practice law in the country.
Samonte v. Gatdula, [February 26, 1999], 363 PHIL 369-376)
CANON 3 - A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL
SERVICES SHALL USE ONLY TRUE, HONEST, FAIR, DIGNIFIED
AND OBJECTIVE INFORMATION OR STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Rule 3.03 - Where a partner accepts public office, he shall withdrawal
from the firm and his name shall be dropped from the firm name
unless the law allows him to practice law currently.
Facts:
Respondent Gatdula was charged with grave misconduct in
engaging in the private practice of law. Complainant was the
representative of her sister for ejectment pending with the MTC. The
execution of that decision in favor of plaintiff was enjoined by Branch
220, RTC, Quezon City where respondent is the Branch Clerk of
Court. Complainant alleged that respondent tried to convince her to
change his lawyer if she wanted the execution of the judgment to
proceed and even gave her his calling card with the name "Baligod,
Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig and Celera Law Offices'' with address at
220 Mariwasa Bldg., 717 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City which
complainant attached to her affidavit-complaint. Respondent, when
asked to comment, claimed that it was complainant who showed him
said calling card and asked him if he could handle the case but to
which he refused as he was not connected with the law firm, though
he was invited to join the firm. The case was set for hearing for
several times but complainant nor her counsel did not appear. The
return of the service stated that complainant was abroad.
Respondent testified in his own behalf and vehemently denied
complainant's allegation. He, however, did not deny that his name
appeared on the calling card or that the calling card was printed
without his knowledge and consent.
The Court ruled that the inclusion or retention of respondent's name
in the professional card constitutes an act of solicitation which is a
violation of Section 7, subparagraph (b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713
(Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials or
Employees).
The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with the
dispensation of justice from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk
must not only be characterized by propriety and decorum but above
all else must be above suspicion.
Issue:
WON the respondent violated canon 3.03 for engaging in the private
practice of law while holding public office.
Held:
Yes. While the respondent vehemently denies the complainant's
allegations, he does not deny that his name appears on the calling
card attached to the complaint, which admittedly came into the hands
of the complainant. The above explanation tendered by the
Respondent is an admission that it is his name which appears on the
calling card, a permissible form of advertising or solicitation of legal
services. Respondent does not claim that the calling card printed
without his knowledge or consent, and the calling card carries his
name primarily and the name of Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig
and Celera with address at 220 Mariwasa Bldg., 717 Aurora Blvd.,
Cubao, Quezon City" in the left corner. The card clearly gives the
impression that he is connected with the said law firm. The
inclusion/retention of his name in the professional card constitutes an
act of solicitation which violates Section 7 sub-par. (b)(2) of Republic
Act No. 6713, otherwise known as "Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees."
"(2) Engage in the private practice of their
profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law,
provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to
conflict with official functions."
The conduct and behavior of every one connected with an office
charged with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to
the lowliest clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of
responsibility. His conduct, at all times must not only be
characterized by propriety and decorum but above all else must be
above suspicion. Responded was reprimanded and ordered by the
court to exclude his name in the firm name of any office engaged in
the private practice of law.
CRUZ vs SALVA
FACTS:
A certain Manuel Monroy was murdered. CFI Pasay found
Castelo, de Jesus, Bonifacio, Mendoza, Berdugo et al. guilty of
murder. They all appealed and Castelo sought new trial. Castelo
was again found guilty.
Pres Magsaysay ordered reinvestigation. Philippine
Constabulary questioned people and got confessions pointing to
persons other than those convicted.
Castelo et al wrote to Fiscal Salva to conduct
reinvestigation on basis of new confessions. Fiscal conferred w/
SolGen and the Justice Sec decided to have the results of
investigation made available to counsel for appellants.
Chief of Phil Constabulary furnished Fiscal Salva copies of
the affidavits and confessions. Salva organized a committee for
reinvestigation and subpoenaed Timoteo Cruz, who was implicated
as instigator and mastermind in the new affidavits and confessions.
Cruz’ counsel questioned jurisdiction of the committee and of Salva
to conduct preliminary investigation because the case was pending
appeal in the SC. Counsel filed this present petition.
Salva said he subpoenaed Cruz bec of Cruz’ oral and
personal request to allow him to appear at the investigation. SC
issued writ of preliminary injunction stopping the prelim investigation.
ISSUES
Whether or not Salva conducted the investigation property?
RULING:
No. the members of the Court were greatly disturbed and
annoyed by such publicity and sensationalism, all of which may
properly be laid at the door of respondent Salva. In this, he
committed what was regard a grievous error and poor judgment for
which we fail to find any excuse or satisfactory explanation. His
actuations in this regard went well beyond the bounds of prudence,
discretion and good taste. It is bad enough to have such undue
publicity when a criminal case is being investigated by the
authorities, even when it being tried in court; but when said publicity
and sensationalism is allowed, even encouraged, when the case is
on appeal and is pending consideration by this Tribunal, the whole
thing becomes inexcusable, even abhorrent, and the Court, in the
interest of justice, is constrained and called upon to put an end to it
and a deterrent against its repetition by meting an appropriate
disciplinary measure, even a penalty to the one liable.