SUNSET VIEW CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE the same parties for the same cause.

r the same cause. The petitioner filed its

HON. JOSE C. CAMPOS, JR. OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE, opposition.
BRANCH XXX, PASAY CITY and AGUILAR-BERNARES REALTY,
respondents. (G.R. No. L-52361 April 27, 1981)
The motion to dismiss was granted by the respondent Judge,
pursuant to Section 2 of Republic Act No. 4726, a “holder of a
Facts: separate interest” and consequently, a shareholder of the plaintiff
condominium corporation; and that “the case should be properly
The petitioner, Sunset View Condominium Corporationis a
filed with the Securities & Exchange Commission which has
condominium corporation within the meaning of Republic Act No.
exclusive original jurisdiction on controversies arising between
4726 in relation to a duly registered Amended Master Deed with
shareholders of the corporation.” the motion for reconsideration
Declaration of Restrictions of the Sunset View Condominium Project
thereof having been denied, the petitioner, alleging grave abuse of
located at 2230 Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City of which said petitioner
discretion on the part of respondent Judge, filed the instant petition
is the Management Body holding title to all the common and limited
for certiorari praying that the said orders be set aside.
common areas.

ISSUE: Whether the CFI or the City Courts have jurisdiction over the
The private respondent, Aguilar-Bernares Realty, a sole
claims filed by Sunset View, the condominium corporation.
proprietorship owned and operated by the spouses Emmanuel G.
Aguilar and Zenaida B. Aguilar, is the assignee of a unit, “Solana”, in
the Sunset View Condominium Project with La Perla Commercial,
Incorporated, as assignor. The La Perla Commercial, Incorporated
bought the “Solana” unit on installment from the Tower Builders,
Inc. The petitioner, Sunset View Condominium Corporation, filed
for the collection of assessments levied on the unit against Aguilar- Held: Not every purchaser of a condominium unit is a shareholder in
Bernares Realty. the corporation. The Mater Deed determines when ownership of
the unit and participation in the corporation vests in the purchaser.

The City Court and the CFI have jurisdiction.

The private respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on
the grounds (1) that the complaint does not state a cause of action: The share of stock appurtenant to the unit win be transferred
(2) that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject or nature accordingly to the purchaser of the unit only upon full payment of
other action; and (3) that there is another action pending between the purchase price at which time he will also become the owner of
the unit. Consequently, even under the contract, it is only the owner
of a unit who is a shareholder of the Condominium Corporation.
Inasmuch as owners is conveyed only upon full payment of the
purchase price, it necessarily follows that a purchaser of a unit who
has not paid the full purchase price thereof is not The owner of the
unit and consequently is not a shareholder of the Condominium
Corporation.
In this case, the Master Deed provides that ownership is transferred
only upon full payment of the purchase price.
Private respondents have not yet fully paid the purchase price;
hence they are not shareholders and the SEC has no jurisdiction
over the claims.
*now, special courts handle intra-corporate disputes
G.R. No. 188802: February 14, 2011
REVELINA LIMSON, Petitioner, v. WACK WACK CONDOMINIUM
CORPORATION, Respondent.
CARPIO MORALES., J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner purchased from Conchita Benitez an apartment unit (Unit
703) at Wack Wack Apartments. Upon moving in, Revelina noticed
defects in the electrical main panel located inside the unit. Racquel
Gonzalez, who sits as Member of respondent’s Board of Directors,
replied by letter under the Rules, it is the duty of the unit owner to
maintain the electrical and plumbing systems at his/her expense.
Respondent wrote Revelina to demand that repairs in line with the
above-stated recommendation of the City Building Office be
undertaken within ten (10) days.
Before the deadline, respondent’s Board of Directors resolved to
impose a daily fine of P1,000.00 on Revelina should the latter fail to
comply.
Revelina and her husband refused to undertake the repairs and to
pay the fine. They claimed that the electrical main panel forms part
of the common areas, citing Section 6 of Republic Act No. 4726.
The RTC dismissed respondent’s complaint. CA reversed the
decision of the trial court, holding in the main that for the electrical
main panel to be considered as part of the common areas, it should
have been intended for communal use and benefit. The subject
electrical main panel being located inside the unit and its principal
function being to control the flow of electricity into the unit, the
appellate court concluded that charges for its repair cannot be for
respondent’s account.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in its decision.
HELD:
Petition is meritorious. CIVIL LAW: Condominium
Respondent cannot disclaim responsibility for the maintenance of
the Apartments’ electrical supply system solely because a
component thereof is placed inside a unit.
Both the law and the Master Deed refer to utility installations as
forming part of the common areas, which reference is justified by
practical considerations. Repairs to correct any defects in the
electrical wiring should be under the control and supervision of
respondent to ensure safety and compliance with the Philippine
Electrical Code, not to mention security and peace of mind of the
unit owners.
Petition is GRANTED.
AMISTOSO VS ONG AND NERI
G.R. No. L-60219
June 29, 1984
Ponente: Cuevas
FACTS: Amistoso and Neri are owners of adjoining parcels of
agricultural land. An irrigation canal traverses the land of Neri
through which irrigation water from the Silmod River passes and
flows to the land of the Amistoso for the latter's beneficial use.
Amistoso filed a complaint for Recognition of Basement with
Preliminary Injunction and Damages against Neri and Ong(cultivator
of Neri’s land) for refusal, despite repeated demands, to recognize
the rights and title of the former to the beneficial use of the water
passing through the irrigation canal and to have Amistoso's rights
and/or claims annotated on the Certificate of Title of Neri. Neri
denied any right of Amistoso over the use of the canal, nor was
there any contract, deed or encumbrance on their property and
assert that they have not performed any act prejudicial to the
petitioner that will warrant the filing of the complaint against them.
Neri asserts that the complaint should be dismissed because
Amistoso’s claim is based on his right to use water coming from the
Silmod River and prays that Amistoso’s right to the utilization
thereof be respected and not be disturbed and/or obstructed by
Neri. The dispute is thus on the use, conservation and protection of
the right to water and the annotation is merely the relief prayed for
on the basis of the claim to the use and protection of water passing
through the land of Neri. And since the controversy hinges on the
right to use and protect the water from the Silmod River that passes
on the land of Neri to Amistoso's property, the proper authority to
determine such a controversy is the National Water Resources
Council, which is vested with exclusive jurisdiction over such
question. The trial court dismissed Amistoso’s complaint for lackof
jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
1. W/N Amistoso has the right over the use of the canal. – YES.
2. W/N National Water Resources Council has exclusive
jurisdiction over the matter. – NO.
RATIO: Based from the stipulation of facts between the parties, Neri
admits that Amistoso , has an approved Water Rights Grant issued
by the Department of Public Works, Transportation and
Communications. Neri contends that the said grant does not pertain
to the beneficial use of irrigation water from Silmod River. The
records, however, do not show any other irrigation water going to
petitioner's property passing thru respondents' lot aside from that
coming from the Silmod River, making Neri’s allegations invalid.
The record clearly discloses an approved Water Rights Grant
in favor of Amistoso. The grant was made three (3) years before the
promulgation of P.D. 1067 (Water Code of the Philippines). The
water rights grant partakes the nature of a document known as a
water permit recognized under Article 13 of P.D. 1067. the WATER
RIGHTS GRANT of Amistoso does not fall under "claims for a right to
use water existing on or before December 31, 1974" which under
P.D. 1067 are required to be registered with the National Water
Resources Council within two (2) years from promulgation of P.D.
1067, otherwise it is deemed waived and the use thereof deemed
abandoned.
The grant contradicts the erroneous findings of the
respondent Judge, and incontrovertibly entitles petitioner to the
beneficial use of water from Silmod River. That right is now a.
vested one and may no longer be litigated as to bring petitioner's
case within the jurisdiction of the National Water Resources
Council. To resurrect that issue will be violative of the rule on res
judicata. Amistoso is not asking the court to grant him the right to
use but to compel Neri to recognize that right and have the same
annotated on the latter’s TCT. The interruption of the free flow of
water caused by the refusal to re-open the closed irrigation canal
constituted petitioner's cause of action in the court below, which
decidedly do not fall within the domain of the authority of the
National Water Resources Council.
RAMOS VS. DIRECTOR OF LANDS- Adverse Possession
The general rule is that possession and cultivation of a portion of a
tract of land under the claim of ownership of all is a constructive
possession of all, if the remainder is not in the adverse possession of
another.
FACTS:
Restituto Romero gained possession of a considerable tract of land
located in Nueva Ecija. He took advantage of the Royal Decree to
obtain a possessory information title to the land and was registered
as such. Parcel No. 1 included within the limits of the possessory
information title of Romero was sold to Cornelio Ramos, herein
petitioner. Ramos instituted appropriate proceedings to have his
title registered. Director of Lands opposed on the ground that
Ramos had not acquired a good title from the Spanish government.
The Director of Forestry also opposed on the ground that the first
parcel of land is forest land. It has been seen however that the
predecessor in interest to the petitioner at least held this tract of
land under color of title.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the actual occupancy of a part of the land described
in the instrument giving color of title sufficient to give title to the
entire tract of land?
HELD:
The general rule is that possession and cultivation of a portion of a
tract of land under the claim of ownership of all is a constructive
possession of all, if the remainder is not in the adverse possession of
another. The claimant has color of title; he acted in good faith and
he has open, peaceable, and notorious possession of a portion of
the property, sufficient to apprise the community and the world
that the land was for his enjoyment. Possession in the eyes of the
law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square
meter of ground before it can be said that he is in possession.
Ramos and his predecessor in interest fulfilled the requirements of
the law on supposition that the premises consisted of agricultural
public land. On the issue of forest land, Forest reserves of public
land can be established as provided by law. When the claim of the
citizen and the claim of the government as to a particular piece of
property collide, if the Government desires to demonstrate that the
land is in reality a forest, the Director of Forestry should submit to
the court convincing proof that the land is not more valuable for
agricultural than for forest purposes.
In this case, the mere formal opposition on the part of the Attorney-
General for the Director of Forestry, unsupported by satisfactory
evidence will not stop the courts from giving title to the claimant.
Petitioner and appellant have proved a title to the entire tract of
land for which he asked for registration. Registration in the name of
the petitioner is hereby granted.
PLEASANTVILLE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, WILSON KEE, C.T. TORRES ENTERPRISES, INC.
and ELDRED JARDINICO, respondents
Facts:
Edith Robillo purchased a land from Pleasantville Development
Corporation, designated as Lot 9. In 1975, respondent Eldred
Jardinico brought the rights of the lot from Robillo. During the
purchase, the lot was empty. On March 26, 1974, Wilson Kee
brought Lot No. 8 of the same subdivision from CT Torres
Enterprises (CTTEI). One of CTTEI’s employees, Zenaida Octaviano,
accompanied Kee and his wife to the site and mistakenly pointed to
Lot 9 instead of Lot 8. Afterwards, Kee made improvements on Lot
9, constructing a residence, a store, etc. In the contract of sale on
installment signed by Kee, it is provided that the vendee shall bear
the expenses of whatever consequential change made in the
property
Issue:
Did Kee waive his rights against recovering damages resulting from
the company’s negligence by signing the contract?
Ruling:
No. Such waiver would be contrary to public policy and could not be
allowed. Kee was a builder in good faith, honestly thinking that he
was making improvements on his own property. Article 6 of the Civil
Code provides that “rights may be waived unless the waiver is
contrary to law, public, order, public policy, morals, or good
customs or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by
law.”