De Guzman vs.
Board of Canvassers of La Election Law does not provide that a departure
Union
DOCTRINE: When the Election Law does not
provide that a departure from a prescribed form will
be fatal and such departure has been due to an
honest mistake or misinterpretation of the Election
Law on the part of him who was obligated to
observe it, and such departure has not been used
as a means for fraudulent practices or for the
intimidation of voters, and it is clear that there has
been a free and honest expression of the popular
will, the law will be held directory and such
departure will be considered a harmless irregularity.
FACTS: Tomas De Guzman filed a petition for
mandamus before the Supreme Court seeking to
compel the Board of Canvassers of La Union to
annul the votes counted in favor of Juan Lucero
and to declare him as the duly elected governor of
La Union based on the fact that certificate of
candidacy filed by Juan Lucero was not made
under oath in violation of Sec. 404 of the Election
Law. Lucero filed a motion to dismiss the petition
on 3 grounds namely: (1) that the court has no
jurisdiction on the subject-matter of the complaint;
(2) that the court has no jurisdiction over the person
of the members of the board of canvassers; and (3)
the petition failed to state a cause of action.
ISSUE: WON the failure of Lucero in filing his
certificate of candidacy under oath was fatal to his
proclamation as the duly elected governor of La
Union
HELD: No. The seeming irregularity in the filing of
Lucero’s certificate of candidacy does not invalidate
his election for the fundamental reason that after it
was proven by the count of the votes that Juan T.
Lucero had obtained the majority of the legal votes,
the will of the people cannot be frustrated by a
technicality consisting in that his certificate of
candidacy had not been properly sworn to. In the
case of Gardiner vs. Romulo, it was held that The
provisions of the Election Law declaring that a
certain irregularity in an election procedure is fatal
to the validity of the ballot or of the returns, or when
the purpose and spirit of the law would be plainly
defeated by a substantial departure from the
prescribed method, are mandatory. When the
from a prescribed form will be fatal and such
departure has been due to an honest mistake or
misinterpretation of the Election Law on the part of
him who was obligated to observe it, and such
departure has not been used as a means for
fraudulent practices or for the intimidation of voters,
and it is clear that there has been a free and honest
expression of the popular will, the law will be held
directory and such departure will be considered a
harmless irregularity. And in Lino Luna vs.
Rodriguez, it was held that he rules and
regulations, for the conduct of elections, are
mandatory before the election, but when it is sought
to enforce them after the election, they are held to
be directory only, if that is possible, especially
where, if they are held to be mandatory, innocent
voters will be deprived of their votes without any
fault on their part. The various and numerous
provisions of the Election Law were adopted to
assist the voters in their participation in the affairs
of the government and not to defeat that object.
When the voters have honestly cast their ballots,
the same should not be nullified simply because the
officers appointed under the law to direct the
election and guard the purity of the ballot have not
done their duty. The law provides a remedy, by
criminal action, against them. They should be
prosecuted criminally, and the will of the honest
voter, as expressed through his ballot, should be
protected and upheld.
JURILLA vs. COMELEC
Facts: On March 23, 1992, respondent Antonio V.
Hernandez filed with the Commission on Elections
his certificate of candidacy for one of the contested
seats for councilors in the Second District of
Quezon City. In Item No. 6 of his certificate he gave
as his address “B 26 L 1 New Capitol Estates,
Quezon City.” However, he did not indicate in the
space provided in Item No. 12 therein his Precinct
Number and the particular Barangay where he was
a registered voter. His biodata submitted together
with his certificate of candidacy gave his address
as “Acacia Street, Mariana, Quezon City,” which is
a part of the Fourth District of Quezon City. In other
words, his certificate of candidacy and his biodata
filed with the COMELEC did not expressly state
that he was a registered voter of Quezon City or
that he was a resident of the Second District
thereof within the purview of Sec. 39, par. (a), of
the Local Government Code of 1991.
Issue: Whether or not the failure of a candidate to
indicate his Precinct Number and the particular
Barangay where he was a registered voter
invalidates his certificate of candidacy.
Held: No. It may be gleaned from the provisions of
Sec. 39, par. (a), of the Local Government Code of
1991, earlier quoted, that the law does not
specifically require that a candidate must state in
his certificate of candidacy his Precinct Number
and the Barangay where he is registered.
Apparently, it is enough that he is actually
registered as a voter in the precinct where he
intends to vote, which should be within the district
where he is running for office. In the case at bar,
his failure to state in his certificate of candidacy his
Precinct Number is satisfactorily explained by him
in that at the time he filed his certificate he was not
yet assigned a particular Precinct Number in the
Second District of Quezon City. He was formerly a
registered voter of Manila, although for the past two
(2) years prior to the elections he was already a
resident of “B 26, L 1 New Capitol Estates,”
admittedly within the Second District of Quezon
City
SERGIO G. AMORA, JR., petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND ARNIELO S.
OLANDRIA, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner Amora filed his Certificate of Candidacy
for Mayor of Candijay, Bohol. At that time, Amora
was the incumbent Mayor of Candijay and had
been twice elected to the post in 2007 and in 2007.
Olandria, one of the candidates for councilor in the
same municipality, filed before the COMELEC a
Petition for Disqualification against Amora. Olandria
alleged that Amoras COC was not properly sworn
contrary to the requirements of the Omnibus
Election Code (OEC) and the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice. Olandria pointed out that, in
executing his COC, Amora merely presented his
Community Tax Certificate (CTC) to the notary
public, Atty. Oriculo Granada (Atty. Granada),
instead of presenting competent evidence of his
identity. Consequently, Amoras COC had no force
and effect and should be considered as not filed.
Amora countered that:
1. The Petition for Disqualification is actually a
Petition to Deny Due Course or cancel a certificate
of candidacy. Effectively, the petition of Olandria is
filed out of time;
2. Olandrias claim does not constitute a proper
ground for the cancellation of the COC;
3. The COC is valid and effective because he
(Amora) is personally known to the notary public,
Atty. Granada, before whom he took his oath in
filing the document;
4. Atty. Granada is, in fact, a close acquaintance
since they have been members of the League of
Muncipal Mayors, Bohol Chapter, for several years;
and
5. Ultimately, he (Amora) sufficiently complied with
the requirement that the COC be under oath.
The Second Division of the COMELEC granted the
petition and disqualified Amora from running for
Mayor of Candijay, Bohol.
ISSUE: Whether COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion in upholding Olandria's claim
that an improperly sworn COC is equivalent to
possession of a ground for disqualification.
HELD: The petition is meritorious.
POLITICAL LAW Election Law; Certificate of
Candidacy
In this case, it was grave abuse of discretion to
uphold Olandrias claim that an improperly sworn
COC is equivalent to possession of a ground for
disqualification. Not by any stretch of the
imagination can we infer this as an additional
ground for disqualification from the specific wording
of the Omnibus Eleciton Code in Section 68, which
reads:
SEC. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons
are disqualified from running for any elective local
position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an
offense involving moral turpitude or for an
offense punishable by one (1) year or more of
imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving
sentence;
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an
administrative case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for
violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or
nonpolitical cases here or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or
those who have acquired the right to reside
abroad and continue to avail of the same right
after the effectivity of this Code; and
(g) The insane or feeble-minded.
It is quite obvious that the Olandria petition is not
based on any of the grounds for disqualification as
enumerated in the foregoing statutory provisions.
Nowhere therein does it specify that a defective
notarization is a ground for the disqualification of a
candidate. Yet, the COMELEC would uphold that
petition upon the outlandish claim that it is a petition
to disqualify a candidate "for lack of qualifications
or possessing some grounds for disqualification."
Another red flag for the COMELEC to dismiss
Olandrias petition is the fact that Amora claims to
personally know the notary public, Atty. Granada,
before whom his COC was sworn. In this regard,
the dissenting opinion of Commissioner Larrazabal
aptly disposes of the core issue. He said that
accordind to the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice:
Section 2. Affirmation or Oath. The term
"Affirmation" or "Oath" refers to an act in which an
individual on a single occasion:
(a) appears in person before the notary public;
(b) is personally known to the notary public or
identified by the notary public through
competent evidence of identity as defined by
these Rules; and
(c) avows under penalty of law to the whole
truth of the contents of the instrument or
document.
Therefore, competent evidence of identity is not
required in cases where the affiant is personally
known to the Notary Public, which is the case
herein.
In this case, contrary to the declarations of the
COMELEC, Amora complied with the requirement
of a sworn COC. He readily explained that he and
Atty. Granada personally knew each other; they
were not just colleagues at the League of Municipal
Mayors, Bohol Chapter, but they consider each
other as distant relatives. Thus, the alleged defect
in the oath was not proven by Olandria since the
presentation of a CTC turned out to be sufficient in
this instance.
PNOC-ENERGY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION vs. NLRC
Facts: In November, 1987, while holding the
position of Geothermal Construction Secretary,
Engineering and Construction Department, at
Tongonan Geothermal Project, Ormoc City, Manuel
S. Pineda decided to run for councilor of the
Municipality of Kananga, Leyte, in the local
elections scheduled in January, 1988, and filed the
corresponding certificate of candidacy for the
position. Objection to Pineda’s being a candidate
while retaining his job in the PNOC-EDC was
shortly thereafter registered by Mayor Arturo
Cornejos of Kananga, Leyte.

Section 66 of the Election Code provides among
others that officers and employees of GOCCs are
considered as ipso facto resigned upon the filing of
their certificate of candidacy.
It was the argument of Pineda that PNOC-EDC was
not created through a special law, it is not covered
by the Civil Service Law and, therefore, not
contemplated under Section 66 of the Election
Code.
Issue: Whether or not an employee in a
government- owned or controlled corporation
without an original charter falls within the scope of
Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Held: Yes. If a corporation’s capital stock is owned
by the Government, or it is operated and managed
by officers charged with the mission of fulfilling the
public objectives for which it has been organized, it
is a government-owned or controlled corporation
even if organized under the Corporation Code and
not under a special statute. Employees thereof,
even if not covered by the Civil Service but by the
Labor Code, are nonetheless “employees in
government-owned or controlled corporation,” and
come within the letter of Section 66 of the Omnibus
Election Code, declaring them ipso facto resigned
from their office upon the filing of their certificate of
candidacy.
QUINTO and TOLENTINO, JR., vs. COMELEC
FACTS:
Before the Court is a petition for prohibition and
certiorari, with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and a writ of
preliminary injunction, assailing Section 4(a) of
Resolution No. 8678 of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC). They contend that the
COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it
issued the assailed Resolution. They aver that the
advance filing of CoCs for the 2010 elections is
intended merely for the purpose of early printing of
the official ballots in order to cope with time
limitations. Such advance filing does not
automatically make the person who filed the CoC a
candidate at the moment of filing. Petitioners further
posit that the provision considering them as ipso
facto resigned from office upon the filing of their
CoCs is discriminatory and violates the equal
protection clause in the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Are appointed officials considered resigned upon
filing of their certificates of candidacy? Is Section
13 of RA 9369 violative of the equal protection
clause?
RULING:
No to the first question and yes to the second.
“ANY PERSON WHO FILES HIS CERTIFICATE
OF CANDIDACY WITHIN THIS PERIOD SHALL
ONLY BE CONSIDERED AS A CANDIDATE AT
THE START OF THE CAMPAIGN PERIOD FOR
WHICH HE FILED HIS COC.” The said proviso
seems to mitigate the situation of disadvantage
afflicting appointive officials by considering persons
who filed their CoCs as candidates only at the start
of the campaign period, thereby, conveying the tacit
intent that persons holding appointive positions will
only be considered as resigned at the start of the
campaign period when they are already treated by
law as candidates.
In considering persons holding appointive positions
as ipso facto resigned from their posts upon the
filing of their CoCs, but not considering as resigned
all other civil servants, specifically the elective
ones, the law unduly discriminates against the first
class. The fact alone that there is substantial
distinction between those who hold appointive
positions and those occupying elective posts, does
not justify such differential treatment.
Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the
Court finds that the differential treatment of persons
holding appointive offices as opposed to those
holding elective ones is not germane to the
purposes of the law. There is thus no valid
justification to treat appointive officials differently
from the elective ones. The classification simply
fails to meet the test that it should be germane to
the purposes of the law. The measure
encapsulated in the second proviso of the third
paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and in
Section 66 of the OEC violates the equal protection
clause.
LANOT v. COMELEC
FACTS:
Henry Lanot, Vener Obispo, Roberto Peralta,
Reynaldo dela Paz, Edilberto Yamat and Ram Alan
Cruz, filed a petition for disqualification against
Vicente Eusebio before the COMELEC. Petitioners
alleged that Eusebio engaged in various forms on
various occasions premature campaigning.
Regional Director Ladra recommended to the
COMELEC the disqualification of Eusebio. The
COMELEC Fist Division adopted the findings and
recommendation of the Regional Director and
ordered the disqualification of Eusebio. The
resolution is immediately executory unless
restrained by the Commission en banc.
On May 9, 2004, Eusebio filed a motion for
reconsideration. On election day itself, Chairman
Abalos enjoined Director Ladra from implementing
the resolution of the COMELEC First Division due
to the motion for reconsideration filed by Eusebio.
On May 11, 2004, the day after the elections,
petitioners filed before the COMELEC en banc a
motion to suspend the counting and canvassing of
votes. The COMELEC en banc partially denied the
motion. It ordered the suspension, until further
orders of the Commission, the proclamation of
Eusebio in the event he receives the winning
number of votes.
On May 21, 2004, the Commission en banc lifted
and set aside the suspension of proclamation.
Eusebio was proclaimed City Mayor of Pasig. The
Commission also annulled the order of the
COMELEC First Division.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner Lanot can be proclaimed
and allowed to sit as mayor-elect in case of
disqualification of Eusebio.
RULING:
No. The disqualification of the elected candidate
does not entitle the candidate who obtained the
second highest number of votes to occupy the
office vacated. Votes cast in favor of the candidate
who obtained the highest number of votes are
presumed to have been cast in the belief that he is
qualified.
However, there is an exception which rests on two
assumptions: that the one who obtained the highest
number of votes is disqualified and that the voters
nonetheless voted for him despite knowing that he
is disqualified. The petitioners failed to prove the
applicability of the exception to this case. The rule
on succession shall apply. The Vice Mayor shall be
the Mayor.
Penera vs. COMELEC GR 181613 September 11,
2009 & November 25, 2009 Premature
Campaigning
NOVEMBER 23, 2017
FACTS:
Penera and private respondent Edgar T. Andanar
were mayoralty candidates in Sta. Monica during
the 14 May 2007 elections. On 2 April 2007,
Andanar filed before the Office of the Regional
Election Director, Caraga Region (Region XIII), a
Petition for Disqualification against Penera, as well
as the candidates for Vice-Mayor and Sangguniang
Bayan who belonged to her political party, for
unlawfully engaging in election campaigning and
partisan political activity prior to the
commencement of the campaign period.
Rosalinda A. Penera’s filed a motion for
reconsideration of this Court’s Decision of 11
September 2009.The assailed Decision dismissed
Penera’s petition and affirmed the Resolution dated
30 July 2008 of the COMELEC En Banc as well as
the Resolution dated 24 July 2007 of the
COMELEC Second Division. The Decision
disqualified Penera from running for the office of
Mayor in Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte and
declared that the Vice-Mayor should succeed
Penera.
ISSUE:
Is Penera guilty of premature campaigning? May
premature campaigning be committed by a person
who is not a candidate?
RULING:
No to both. Under the assailed September 11, 2009
Decision, a candidate may already be liable for
premature campaigning after the filing of the
certificate of candidacy but even before the start of
the campaign period. Thus, such person can be
disqualified for premature campaigning for acts
done before the start of the campaign period. In
short, the Decision considers a person who files a
certificate of candidacy already “candidate” even
before the start of the campaign period.
Now the Court holds that the assailed Decision is
contrary to the clear intent and letter of the law. In
Lanot v. COMELEC,it held that a person who files
a certificate of candidacy is not a candidate
until the start of the campaign period. Lanot was
decided on the ground that one who files a
certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until the
start of the campaign period.
Congress elevated the Lanot doctrine into a statute
by specifically inserting it as the second sentence
of the third paragraph of the amended Section 15 of
RA 8436. In RA 9369, Congress inserted the word
“only” so that the first proviso now reads:
x x x Provided, that, unlawful acts or omissions
applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon
the start of the aforesaid campaign period x x x.
Thus, Congress not only reiterated but also
strengthened its mandatory directive that election
offenses can be committed by a candidate “only”
upon the start of the campaign period. This clearly
means that before the start of the campaign period,
such election offenses cannot be so committed.
In layman’s language, this means that a candidate
is liable for an election offense only for acts done
during the campaign period, not before. The law is
clear as daylight — any election offense that may
be committed by a candidate under any election
law cannot be committed before the start of the
campaign period. In ruling that Penera is liable for
premature campaigning for partisan political acts
before the start of the campaigning, the assailed
Decision ignores the clear and express provision of
the law.
GO vs. COMELEC
Facts: Petitioner was the incumbent representative
of the Fifth District, province of Leyte when she filed
on February 27, 2001 with the municipal election
officer of the municipality of Baybay, Leyte, a
certificate of candidacy for mayor of the said
municipality.
On February 28, 2001, at 11:47 p.m., petitioner
filed with the provincial election supervisor of Leyte,
with office at Tacloban City, another certificate of
candidacy for governor. Simultaneously therewith,
she attempted to file with the provincial election
supervisor an affidavit of withdrawal of her
candidacy for mayor. However, the provincial
election supervisor refused to accept the affidavit of
withdrawal and suggested that, pursuant to
COMELEC Resolution No. 3253-A, she should file
it with the municipal election officer of Baybay,
Leyte where she filed her certificate of candidacy
for mayor.
Private respondents filed similar petitions to
disqualify petitioner on the ground that petitioner
filed certificates of candidacy for two positions,
namely, that for mayor, and that for governor, thus,
making her ineligible for both.
The COMELEC granted the petition and
disqualified the petitioner from running for both
position.
Issue: Whether or not an affidavit of withdrawal of
candidacy should be filed with the election officer of
the place where the certificate of candidacy was
filed.
Held: No. There is nothing in Section 73 of the
Omnibus Election Code which mandates that the
affidavit of withdrawal must be filed with the same
office where the certificate of candidacy to be
withdrawn was filed. Thus, it can be filed directly
with the main office of the COMELEC, the office of
the regional election director concerned, the office
of the provincial election supervisor of the province
to which the municipality involved belongs, or the
office of the municipal election officer of the said
municipality. While it may be true that Section 12 of
COMELEC Resolution No. 3253-A requires that the
withdrawal be filed before the election officer of the
place where the certificate of candidacy was filed,
such requirement is merely directory, and is
intended for convenience.
MONSALE V NICO
FACTS: Jose F. Monsale withdrew his certificate of
candidacy on October 10, 1947, but, on November
7, attempted to revive it by withdrawing his
withdrawal. The Commission on Elections,
however, ruled on November 8 that the protestant
could no longer be a candidate in spite of his desire
to withdraw his withdrawal. A canvass of the
election returns showed that the protestee Paulino
M. Nico received 2,291 votes; another candidate,
Gregorio Fagutao, 126, votes; and the protestant
Jose F. Monsale, none, evidently because the
votes cast in his favor had not been counted for the
reason that he was not a registered candidate.
Consequently, Nico was proclaimed elected.
ISSUE: Whether or not a candidate who has
withdrawn his certificate of candidacy may revive it,
either by withdrawing his letter of withdrawal or by
filing a new certificate of candidacy, after the
deadline provided by law for the filing of such
certificate.
RULING: There is no question as to the right of a
candidate to withdraw or annul his own certificate of
candidacy, there being no legal prohibition against
such withdrawal. Therefore, on October 10, or
thirty-one days before the election, the protestant
ceased to be a candidate by his own voluntary act,
and as a matter of fact the boards of election
inspectors of the municipality of Miagao were duly
notified of his withdrawal. His letter to the
Commission on Elections dated November 6, 1947,
which the subscribed and swore to before a notary
public on November 7, whereby he withdrew his
withdrawal of his certificate of candidacy, can only
be considered as a new certificate of candidacy
which, having been filed only four days before the
election, could not legally be accepted under the
law, which expressly provides that such certificate
should be filed at least sixty days before the
election.
PONTAWE V COMELEC
VILLANUEVA v. COMELEC
The will of the people cannot be frustrated by a
technicality.
(Guzman v. Board of Canvassers, 48 Phil 211).
FACTS
Mendoza, on the last day for filling, filed his
sworn certificate of candidacy for Vice Mayor of
Dolores Quezon for the 1980 elections. On the
same day, Mendoza filed an unsworn but
handwritten letter withdrawing his candidacy.
Immediately after Mendoza’s withdrawal,
Villanueva filed his own sworn Certificate of
candidacy in substitution of Mendoza’s. Villanueva
won. The COMELEC, however, disregarded the
votes cast in favour of Villanueva and declared the
other candidate as the sole winner.
The COMELEC argued that the withdrawal
of Mendoza was not valid and consequently he
could not have been substituted by Villanueva
since the withdrawal by Mendoza was not sworn to
as required by Section 27 of the Election Code
which provides:
 ... No certificate of candidacy duly
filed shall be considered withdraw ...
unless the candidate files with the
office which received the certificate ...
or with the commission a sworn
statement of withdrawal ...
ISSUE
Whether the petitioner should be
disqualified on the ground
of formal or technical defects?
HELD
No. The fact that Mendoza’s withdrawal was
not sworn is but a technicality which should not be
used to frustrate the people’s will in favour of the
petitioner as the substitute candidate. In Guzman
vs. Board of Canvassers (48 Phil. 211), which is
clearly applicable, mutatis mutandis, the Supreme
Court held that “The will of the people cannot be
frustrated by a technicality that the certificate of
candidacy had not been properly sworn to, This
legal provision is mandatory and non-compliance
therewith before the election would be fatal to the
status of the candidate before the electorate, but
after the people have expressed their will, the result
of the election cannot be defeated by the fact that
the candidate has not sworn to his certificate or
candidacy.” (See also Gundan vs. Court of First
Instance, 66 Phil. 125). As likewise ruled by this
Court in Canceran vs. COMELEC (107 Phil. 607),
the legal requirement that a withdrawal be under
oath will be held to be merely directory and
Mendoza’s failure to observe the requirement
should be considered a harmless irregularity. The
spirit of the law rather than its literal reading
should have guided Respondent Commission
in resolving the issue of last minute withdrawal
and substitution of other persons as candidates.
Note: Initially the Supreme Court dismissed
Villanueva’s petition. The Court considered its
dismissal when it was shown that the
COMELEC proclaimed winner abandoned the
position.
ADDITIONAL:
Whether the informal withdrawal of
Mendoza invalidates the election of Villanueva as
vice mayor. Section 28 of the 1978 Election Code
provides for such substitute candidates in case of
death, withdrawal or disqualification up to mid-day
of the very day of the elections. Mendoza’s
withdrawal was filed on the last hour of the last day
for regular filing of candidacies, which he had filed
earlier that same day. Further, the will of the
electorate should be respected; it should not be
defeated through the invocation of formal or
technical defects. The will of the people cannot be
frustrated by a technicality that the certificate of
candidacy had not been properly sworn to.
Statutes providing for election contests are
to be liberally construed to the end that the will of
the people in the choice of public officer may not be
defeated by mere technical objections
MIRANDA V COMELEC
PAPANDAYAN V COMELEC
Facts: In the May 14, 2001 elections, 3 candidates
ran for the position of mayor of Tubaran, Lanao del
Sur, namely: petitioner Papandayan Jr., respondent
Balt, who was the incumbent mayor seeking
reelection, and Bantuas. Respondent Balt sought
the disqualification of petitioner alleging that
petitioner was not a resident of Barangay Tangcal
in Tubaran, Lanao del Sur but a permanent
resident of Bayang, Lanao del Sur.
Petitioner claimed that he was a resident of
Tangcal, Tubaran; that in 1990, he transferred his
domicile from Bayang to Tangcal and stayed there
with his wife, a native of Tangcal; that he managed
an agricultural land in Tubaran; and that he filed in
1998 his COC for the position of municipal mayor of
Tubaran, which he later withdraw.
Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely
abused its discretion in declaring him disqualified in
a resolution, on the ground that he is not a resident
of Tubaran.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is disqualified to
run as an elective official.
Held: No. The petitioner has duly proven that,
although he was formerly a resident of Bayang, he
later transferred residence to Tangcal, Tubaran as
shown by his actual and physical presence therein
for 10 years prior to the May 14, 2001 elections.
Par. 39, Chapter 1, Title 2 of the Local Government
Code (RA 7160) provides that an elective official
must be a “…resident therein (barangay,
municipality, city or province) for at least 1 year
immediately preceding the day of the election…”
Domicile and residence are synonymous. The term
residence as used in election law, imports not only
an intention to reside in a fixed place but also
personal presence in that place, couple with
conduct indicative of such intention. Domicile
denotes a fixed permanent residence to which
when absent for business, pleasure, or for like
reasons, one intends to return.
Requisites in order to acquire a new domicile by
choice are: there must concur (1) residence or
bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an intention
to remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the
old domicile. There must be animus
manendi coupled with animus non revertendi.
LUNA V COMELEC
Facts: On January 15 2004, Hans Roger withdrew
his certificate of candidacy. On the same date,
Joy Chrisma Luna filed her certificate of candidacy
as a substitute candidate for Hans Roger for the
2004 elections as vice mayor of Lagayan, Abra.
Tomas Layao, together with several others filed a
disqualification petition against her since she was
not a registered voter Lagayan, Abra, but of
Bangued. It is also contested that there can be no
valid substitution since Hans Roger, the candidate
sought to be substituted, is only 20 years old on the
day of the election. COMELEC ruled in favor of the
disqualification case.
Issue: Whether or
not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discr
etion when it ruled that there was no valid
substitution by Luna for Hans Roger.
Held: The COMELEC acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in declaring that Hans Roger, being
under age, could not be considered to have filed a
valid certificate of candidacy and, thus, could not be
validly substituted by Luna. The substitution of
Luna for Hans Roger was valid.
The COMELEC may not, by itself, without the
proper proceedings, deny due course to or cancel a
certificate of candidacy filed in due form. Since
Hans Roger withdrew his certificate of candidacy
and the COMELEC found that Luna complied with
all the procedural requirements for a valid
substitution, Luna can validly substitute for Hans
Roger. The Court ruled that the question of
eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate for non-age is
beyond the usual and proper cognizance of the
COMELEC.
TAGOLINO V HRET
Facts: On November 30, 2009, Richard Gomez
(Richard) filed his certificate of candidacy (CoC)
with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC),
seeking congressional office as Representative for
the Fourth Legislative District of Leyte under the
ticket of the Liberal Party. Subsequently, on
December 6, 2009, one of the opposing
candidates, Buenaventura Juntilla (Juntilla), filed a
Verified Petition, alleging that Richard, who was
actually a resident of College Street, East
Greenhills, San Juan City, Metro Manila,
misrepresented in his CoC that he resided in 910
Carlota Hills, Canadieng, Ormoc City. In this
regard, Juntilla asserted that Richard failed to meet
the one (1) year residency requirement under
Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution (Constitution) and thus should be
declared disqualified/ineligible to run for the said
office. In addition, Juntilla prayed that Richard’s
CoC be denied due course and/or cancelled.
On February 17, 2010, the COMELEC First
Division rendered a Resolution6 granting Juntilla’s
petition without any qualification. The dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVE,
to GRANT the Petition to Disqualify Candidate for
Lack of Qualification filed by BUENAVENTURA O.
JUNTILLA against RICHARD I. GOMEZ.
Accordingly, RICHARD I. GOMEZ is
DISQUALIFIED as a candidate for the Office of
Congressman, Fourth District of Leyte, for lack of
residency requirement.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, Richard moved for reconsideration but
the same was denied by the COMELEC En Banc
through a Resolution dated May 4, 2010.7
Thereafter, in a Manifestation of even date, Richard
accepted the said resolution with finality “in order to
enable his substitute to facilitate the filing of the
necessary documents for substitution.”
On May 5, 2010, Lucy Marie Torres-Gomez (private
respondent) filed her CoC together with a
Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance10 from
the Liberal Party endorsing her as the party’s
official substitute candidate vice her husband,
Richard, for the same congressional post. In
response to various letter-requests submitted to the
COMELEC’s Law Department (Law Department),
the COMELEC En Banc, in the exercise of its
administrative functions, issued Resolution No.
889011 on May 8, 2010, approving, among others,
the recommendation of the said department to
allow the substitution of private respondent.
The substitution complied with the requirements
provided under Section 12 in relation to Section 13
of Comelec Resolution No. 8678 dated October 6,
2009.
xxxx
In view of the foregoing, the Law Department
RECOMMENDS the following:
xxxx
2. TO ALLOW CANDIDATE LUCY MARIE
TORRES GOMEZ AS A SUBSTITUTE
CANDIDATE FOR RICHARD GOMEZ: (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
Issue: Whether or not there is valid substitution.
Held: No. A. Distinction between a petition for
disqualification and a petition to deny due course
to/cancel a certificate of candidacy.
The Omnibus Election Code (OEC) provides for
certain remedies to assail a candidate’s bid for
public office. Among these which obtain particular
significance to this case are: (1) a petition for
disqualification under Section 68; and (2) a petition
to deny due course to and/or cancel a certificate of
candidacy under Section 78. The distinctions
between the two are well-perceived.
Primarily, a disqualification case under Section 68
of the OEC is hinged on either: (a) a candidate’s
possession of a permanent resident status in a
foreign country; or (b) his or her commission of
certain acts of disqualification. Anent the latter, the
prohibited acts under Section 68 refer to election
offenses under the OEC, and not to violations of
other penal laws. In particular, these are: (1) giving
money or other material consideration to influence,
induce or corrupt the voters or public officials
performing electoral functions; (2) committing acts
of terrorism to enhance one’s candidacy; (3)
spending in one’s election campaign an amount in
excess of that allowed by the OEC; (4) soliciting,
receiving or making any contribution prohibited
under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104 of the OEC;
and (5) violating Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261,
paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, subparagraph 634 of
the OEC. Accordingly, the same provision (Section
68) states that any candidate who, in an action or
protest in which he or she is a party, is declared by
final decision of a competent court guilty of, or
found by the COMELEC to have committed any of
the foregoing acts shall be disqualified from
continuing as a candidate for public office, or
disallowed from holding the same, if he or she had
already been elected.
It must be stressed that one who is disqualified
under Section 68 is still technically considered to
have been a candidate, albeit proscribed to
continue as such only because of supervening
infractions which do not, however, deny his or her
statutory eligibility. In other words, while the
candidate’s compliance with the eligibility
requirements as prescribed by law, such as age,
residency, and citizenship, is not in question, he or
she is, however, ordered to discontinue such
candidacy as a form of penal sanction brought by
the commission of the above-mentioned election
offenses.
On the other hand, a denial of due course to and/or
cancellation of a CoC proceeding under Section 78
of the OEC is premised on a person’s
misrepresentation of any of the material
qualifications required for the elective office aspired
for. It is not enough that a person lacks the relevant
qualification; he or she must have also made a
false representation of the same in the CoC. The
nature of a Section 78 petition was discussed in the
case of Fermin v. COMELEC, where the Court
illumined:
Let it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to
or the cancellation of the CoC is not based on the
lack of qualifications but on a finding that the
candidate made a material representation that is
false, which may relate to the qualifications
required of the public office he/she is running for. It
is noted that the candidates states in his/her CoC
that he/she is eligible for the office he/she seeks.
Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in
relation to the constitutional and statutory
provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public
office. If the candidate subsequently states a
material representation in the CoC that is false, the
COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to
deny due course to or cancel such certificate.
Indeed, the Court has already likened a proceeding
under Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding
under Section 253 of the OEC since they both deal
with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate,
with the distinction mainly in the fact that a “Section
78” petition is filed before proclamation, while a
petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation
of the winning candidate. (Emphasis supplied)
Corollary thereto, it must be noted that the
deliberateness of the misrepresentation, much less
one’s intent to defraud, is of bare significance in a
Section 78 petition as it is enough that the person’s
declaration of a material qualification in the CoC be
false. In this relation, jurisprudence holds that an
express finding that the person committed any
deliberate misrepresentation is of little
consequence in the determination of whether one’s
CoC should be deemed cancelled or not. What
remains material is that the petition essentially
seeks to deny due course to and/or cancel the CoC
on the basis of one’s ineligibility and that the same
be granted without any qualification.
Pertinently, while a disqualified candidate under
Section 68 is still considered to have been a
candidate for all intents and purposes, on the other
hand, a person whose CoC had been denied due
course to and/or cancelled under Section 78 is
deemed to have not been a candidate at all. The
reason being is that a cancelled CoC is considered
void ab initio and thus, cannot give rise to a valid
candidacy and necessarily, to valid votes. In Talaga
v. COMELEC (Talaga), the Court ruled that:
xxxx
While a person who is disqualified under Section 68
is merely prohibited to continue as a candidate, a
person who certificate is cancelled or denied due
course under Section 78 is not treated as a
candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC.
CERAFICA V COMELEC
Facts:
• Kimberly Cerafica filed her COC for Counciler of
Taguig for the 2013 Elections.
• Her COC stated that she was born on October 29,
1992, or that she will be 20 years of age on the day
of the elections, in contravention of the
requirements that one must be at least 23 years old
on the day of the elections as set out in Sec. 9(c) of
RA 8487 (Charter of Taguig City).
• Instead of attending the clarificatory hearing,
Kimberly filed a sworn Statement of Withdrawal of
COC on December 17, 2012.
• Simultaneously, Olivia Cerafica filed her own
COC as a substitute of Kimberly.
• Director Amora-Ladra of the Comelec Law Dept.
recommended the cancellation of Kimberly’s COC
and consequently, the denial of the substitution of
Kimberly by Olivia, and such recommendation was
adopted by Comelec.
o Dir. Amora Ladra opined that it was as if no COC
was filed by Kimberly; thus, she cannot be
substituted.
• Olivia filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for
the issuance of a TRO.
Issue/s: WON there was a valid substitution
Held: YES.
• Subject to its authority over nuisance candidates
and its power to deny due course to or cancel
COCs under Sec. 77 of BP 881, the Comelec has
the ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge
receipt of COCs.
• Under the express provision of Sec. 77, not just
any person, but only “an official candidate of a
registered or accredited political party” may be
substituted.
• Kimberly was an official nominee of the Liberal
Part; thus, she can be validly substituted.
• There was a valid withdrawal of Kimberly’s COC
after the last day for the filing of COCs and Olivia
belongs to and is certified to by the same political
party to which Kimberly belongs. Olivia filed her
COC not later than mid-day of election day.
• In simply relying on the Memorandum of Dir.
Amora-Ladra in cancelling Kimberly’s COC and
denying the latter’s substitution by Olivia, and
absent any petition to deny due course to or cancel
said COC, the Comelec gravely abused its
discretion.
• The Comelec, in the exercise of its adjudicatory
and quasi-judicial powers, the Constitution
mandates it to hear and decide cases first by
Division and, upon motion for reconsideration, by
the En Banc.
• As cancellation proceedings involve the exercise
of quasi-judicial functions of the Comelec, the
Comelec in Division should have first decided the
case.
• The determination of whether a candidate is
eligible for the position he is seeking involves a
determination of fact where parties must be allowed
to adduce evidence in support of their contentions.
ABCEDE V IMPERIAL
FACTS: Prior to September 7, 1957, petitioner
Alfredo Abcede filed, with the Commission on
Elections, his certificate of candidacy for the Office
of the President of the Philippines, in connection
with the elections to be held on November 12 of the
same year. On or about said date, Abcede and
other candidates were summoned by the
Commission on Elections to appear before the
same on September 23, 1957, "to show cause why
their certificates of candidacy should be considered
as filed in good faith and to be given due course,"
that their failure to appear would be sufficient
ground to deny said certificates. After due hearing,
the certificates were considered not given due
course. A reconsideration of such resolution having
been denied, Abcede filed petition before the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC can deny due
course to a certificate of candidacy of an aspiring
candidate.
RULING: No. While the Constitution has given the
Commission on Elections the "exclusive charge" of
the enforcement and administration of all laws
relative to the conduct of elections," the power of
decision of the Commission is limited to purely
"administrative questions." It cannot determine who
among those possessing the qualifications
prescribed by the Constitution, who have complied
with the procedural requirements relative to the
filing of certificates of candidacy - should be
allowed to enjoy the full benefits intended by law
therefor. This is a matter of policy, not of
administration and enforcement of the law, which
policy must be determined by Congress in the
exercise of its legislative functions.
CIPRIANO V COMELEC – sep
GARVIDA V SALES
FACTS:
Petitioner Garvida applied for registration as
member and voter of the Katipunan ng Kabataan of
a certain barangay. However the Board of election
tellers denied her application on the ground that
she is already 21 years and 10 months old. She
already exceeded the age limit for membership as
laid down in Sec 3(b) of COMELEC resolution no.
2824.
The municipal circuit trial court found her to be
qualified and ordered her registration as member
and voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan. The Board
of Election Tellers appealed to the RTC, but the
presiding judge inhibited himself from acting on the
appeal due to his close association with petitioner.
However, private respondent Sales a rival
candidate, filed with the COMELEC en banc a
“Petition of Denial and/or Cancellation of Certificate
of Candidacy” against Garvida for falsely
representing her age qualification in her certificate
of candidacy. He claimed that Garvida is
disqualified to become a voter and a candidate for
the SK for the reason that she will be more than
twenty-one (21) years of age on May 6, 1996; that
she was born on June 11, 1974 as can be gleaned
from her birth certificate.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Garvida can assume office as the
elected SK official
RULING:
In the case at bar, petitioner was born on June 11,
1974. On March 16, 1996, the day she registered
as voter for the May 6, 1996 SK elections,
petitioner was twenty-one (21) years and nine (9)
months old. On the day of the elections, she was
21 years, 11 months and 5 days old. When she
assumed office on June 1, 1996, she was 21 years,
11 months and 20 days old and was merely ten
(10) days away from turning 22 years old. Petitioner
may have qualified as a member of the Katipunan
ng Kabataan but definitely, petitioner was over the
age limit for elective SK officials set by Section 428
of the Local Government Code and Sections 3 [b]
and 6 of Comelec Resolution No. 2824.
Thus, she is ineligible to run as candidate for the
May 6, 1996 Sangguniang Kabataan elections.
LOONG V COMELEC – 1999
FACTS:
Automated elections systems was used for the May
11, 1998 regular elections held in the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) which
includes the Province of Sulu. Atty. Jose Tolentino,
Jr. headed the COMELEC Task Force to have
administrative oversight of the elections in Sulu.
On May 12, 1998, some election inspectors and
watchers informed Atty. Tolentino, Jr. of
discrepancies between the election returns and the
votes cast for the mayoralty candidates in the
municipality of Pata. To avoid a situation where
proceeding with automation will result in an
erroneous count, he suspended the automated
counting of ballots in Pata and immediately
communicated the problem to the technical experts
of COMELEC and the suppliers of the automated
machine. After the consultations, the experts told
him that the problem was caused by misalignment
of the ovals opposite the names of candidates in
the local ballots. They found nothing wrong with the
automated machines. The error was in the printing
of the local ballots, as a consequence of which, the
automated machines failed to read them correctly.
Atty. Tolentino, Jr. called for an emergency meeting
of the local candidates and the military-police
officials overseeing the Sulu elections. Among
those who attended were petitioner Tupay Loong
and private respondent Abdusakar Tan and
intervenor Yusop Jikiri (candidates for governor.)
The meeting discussed how the ballots in Pata
should be counted in light of the misaligned ovals.
There was lack of agreement. Some recommended
a shift to manual count (Tan et al) while the others
insisted on automated counting (Loong AND Jikiri).
Reports that the automated counting of ballots in
other municipalities in Sulu was not working well
were received by the COMELEC Task Force. Local
ballots in five (5) municipalities were rejected by the
automated machines. These municipalities were
Talipao, Siasi, Tudanan, Tapul and Jolo. The
ballots were rejected because they had the wrong
sequence code.
Before midnight of May 12, 1998, Atty. Tolentino,
Jr. was able to send to the COMELEC en banc his
report and recommendation, urging the use of the
manual count in the entire Province of Sulu. 6 On
the same day, COMELEC issued Minute
Resolution No. 98-1747 ordering a manual count
but only in the municipality of Pata.. The next day,
May 13, 1998, COMELEC issued Resolution No.
98-1750 approving, Atty. Tolentino, Jr.'s
recommendation and the manner of its
implementation. On May 15, 1998, the COMELEC
en banc issued Minute Resolution No. 98-1796
laying down the rules for the manual count. Minute
Resolution 98-1798 laid down the procedure for the
counting of votes for Sulu at the PICC.
COMELEC started the manual count on May 18,
1998.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not a petition for certiorari and
prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is
the appropriate remedy to invalidate the disputed
COMELEC resolutions.
2. Assuming the appropriateness of the remedy,
whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
ordering a manual count. (The main issue in the
case at bar)
2.a. Is there a legal basis for the manual count?
2.b. Are its factual bases reasonable?
2.c. Were the petitioner and the intervenor denied
due process by the COMELEC when it ordered a
manual count?
3. Assuming the manual count is illegal and that its
result is unreliable, whether or not it is proper to call
for a special election for the position of governor of
Sulu.
HELD:
the petition of Tupay Loong and the petition in
intervention of Yusop Jikiri are dismissed, there
being no showing that public respondent gravely
abused its discretion in issuing Minute Resolution
Nos. 98-1748, 98-1750, 98-1796 and 98-1798. Our
status quo order of June 23, 1998 is lifted.
(1.) Certiorari is the proper remedy of the petitioner.
The issue is not only legal but one of first
impression and undoubtedly suffered with
significance to the entire nation. It is adjudicatory of
the right of the petitioner, the private respondents
and the intervenor to the position of governor of
Sulu. These are enough considerations to call for
an exercise of the certiorari jurisdiction of this
Court.
(2a). A resolution of the issue will involve an
interpretation of R.A. No. 8436 on automated
election in relation to the broad power of the
COMELEC under Section 2(1), Article IX(C) of the
Constitution "to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election ,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall."
Undoubtedly, the text and intent of this provision is
to give COMELEC all the necessary and incidental
powers for it to achieve the objective of holding
free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible
elections.
The order for a manual count cannot be
characterized as arbitrary, capricious or whimsical.
It is well established that the automated machines
failed to read correctly the ballots in the municipality
of Pata The technical experts of COMELEC and the
supplier of the automated machines found nothing
wrong the automated machines. They traced the
problem to the printing of local ballots by the
National Printing Office. It is plain that to continue
with the automated count would result in a grossly
erroneous count. An automated count of the local
votes in Sulu would have resulted in a wrong count,
a travesty of the sovereignty of the electorate
In enacting R.A. No. 8436, Congress obviously
failed to provide a remedy where the error in
counting is not machine-related for human foresight
is not all-seeing. We hold, however, that the
vacuum in the law cannot prevent the COMELEC
from levitating above the problem. . We cannot kick
away the will of the people by giving a literal
interpretation to R.A. 8436. R.A. 8436 did not
prohibit manual counting when machine count does
not work. Counting is part and parcel of the conduct
of an election which is under the control and
supervision of the COMELEC. It ought to be self-
evident that the Constitution did not envision a
COMELEC that cannot count the result of an
election.
It is also important to consider that the failures of
automated counting created post election tension in
Sulu, a province with a history of violent elections.
COMELEC had to act desively in view of the fast
deteriorating peace and order situation caused by
the delay in the counting of votes
(2c) Petitioner Loong and intervenor Jikiri were not
denied process. The Tolentino memorandum
clearly shows that they were given every
opportunity to oppose the manual count of the local
ballots in Sulu. They were orally heard. They later
submitted written position papers. Their
representatives escorted the transfer of the ballots
and the automated machines from Sulu to Manila.
Their watchers observed the manual count from
beginning to end.
3. The plea for this Court to call a special election
for the governorship of Sulu is completely off-line.
The plea can only be grounded on failure of
election. Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code
tells us when there is a failure of election, viz:
returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such
election results in a failure to elect, and in any of
such cases the failure or suspension of election
would affect the result of the election, the
Commission shall on the basis of a verified petition
by any interested party and after due notice and
hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the
election, not held, suspended or which resulted in a
failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the
cessation of the cause of such postponement or
suspension of the election or failure to elect.
There is another reason why a special election
cannot be ordered by this Court. To hold a special
election only for the position of Governor will be
discriminatory and will violate the right of private
respondent to equal protection of the law. The
records show that all elected officials in Sulu have
been proclaimed and are now discharging their
powers and duties. These officials were proclaimed
on the basis of the same manually counted votes of
Sulu. If manual counting is illegal, their assumption
of office cannot also be countenanced. Private
respondent's election cannot be singled out as
invalid for alikes cannot be treated unalikes.
The plea for a special election must be addressed
to the COMELEC and not to this Court.

Sec. 6. Failure of election. — If, on account of force

majeure, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous
causes, the election in any polling place has not
been held on the date fixed, or had been
suspended before the hour fixed by law for the
closing of the voting, or after the voting and during
the preparation and the transmission of the election