The Clarification Theory of "Katharsis"

Author(s): Leon Golden

Source: Hermes, 104. Bd., H. 4 (1976), pp. 437-452
Published by: Franz Steiner Verlag
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4475981
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Hermes

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 THE CLARIFICATION THEORY OF KATHARSIS

Without doubt katharsis is the most celebrated concept in the entire field
of literary criticicm, and its appeal is immense to the broad community of
scholars, critics, and creative writers who concern themselves with tragedy.
Neither the intensity of the attraction to this term nor the widespread popu-
larity which it enjoys has been blunted by the disturbing fact that we are not
yet certain of its precise meaning. In actuality, four widely different inter-
pretations of katharsis have been advanced, which explain the concept,
variously, as a moral, medical, structural, or intellectual phenomenon. We
must investigate the claim of each of these views to represent Aristotle's
original intention.
The reason that we are troubled about the meaning of katharsis is that
Aristotle provided neither a definition nor a commentary for this key term
in the Poetics, itself, at least as that work has come down to us. Two courses
of action are open to us when we confront a significant term that is left unde-
fined in the context in which it appears. We may look for relevant external
help in other treatises written by the author or we may center our attention
on the work, itself, to see if its internal argument provides an implicit definition
or explanation. Those who understand katharsis in a moral or medical sense
justify their interpretations on external grounds; those who see katharsis in
structural or intellectual terms chiefly base their views on the general theory
of tragedy developed in the Poetics. We must now identify and assess the
arguments used in support of each of these interpretations of katharsis.
That katharsis is meant to represent some form of moral 'purification' has
been held most influentially by LESSING; it is a view that has not been popular
with classical scholars since the work of BERNAYS in the latter part of the
i9th century but BUTCHER, MOULINIER, and ROSTAGNI have all argued for
somewhat eclectic interpretations in which moral considerations play a
part'. This view has been revived in a purer form by Humphry HouSE 2.
Those who maintain this interpretation cite, as their principal justification,
Aristotle's judgment in the Nicomachean Ethics, Iio6 b I5-23 that the nature
of moral virtue is to aim at a mean in between excess and deficiency. Both
pity and fear, among other emotions, are mentioned in this passage in the
Ethics and the holders of the moral view of katharsis use this as a bridge from
the Ethics to the Poetics where pity and fear are designated as the essential
tragic emotions. They argue, on the basis of this very tenuous connection
between the two works, that katharsis in the Poetics must be the process

1 See S. H. BUTCHER, Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art, London, I923,
pp. 266-267; L. MOULINIER, Le pur et l'impur dans la pensee des Grecs d'Homere h
Aristote, Paris, 1952, P. 419; and A. RoSTAGNI, Aristotele, Poetica, Turin, 1945, PP.
XLII-XLIII. 2 See H. HOUSE, Aristotle's Poetics, London, 1958, pp. ioo-iIi.

Hermes, 104. Band, Heft 4 (1976) ? Franz Steiner Verlag GmbH, Wiesbaden, BRD

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 438 LEON GOLDEN

indicated in the Ethics of training the individual to respond with the proper
amount of pity and fear, under the proper conditions, to the proper objects.
The result of this process, in HouSE'S words, is that #our responses are brought
nearer to those of the good and wise mana.
Now we must object to this view that there is not a single word in the
Poetics, itself, to justify it. When Aristotle explicitly discusses the essential
pleasure of tragedy at I453 b II-I4 he makes no mention at all of the moral
conditioning of our emotions but instead expressly states that it is the task
of the poet to provide pleasure XTo eX6ou xocl cp6orou &t rLanco'. Clearly
the essential pleasure of tragedy is a function of the pleasure involved in
mimesis and on mimetic pleasure Aristotle has some very clear and explicit
things to say in the Poetics. As we shall see in some detail later, mimesis for
Aristotle is an intellectual process involving learning and inference by which
we move from a perception of particulars to the knowledge of universals. No
moral conditions of any kind are set by Aristotle on this learning process that
is described in the Poetics. We, therefore, must reject the moral interpretation
of katharsis both because there is no evidence for it in the Poetics, itself, and
because it stands isolated from the central mimetic pleasure attributed by
Aristotle to all art forms, including, of course, tragedy.
While only a few still interpret katharsis as 'moral purification', the vast
majority of those who concern themselves with the problem accept the view
that this concept is a metaphor derived from Greek medicine and signifies
the 'purgation' of pity and fear from the audience who witnessess (or reads)
a tragedy. This interpretation which has a long history to it looks for justifica-
tion to the theory of Greek homeopathic medicine. Already in the i6th century
MINTURNUS3 had made this connection between medicine and tragedy and
MILTON, in his preface to the Samson Agonistes states it concisely:

)>Tragedy is ... said by Aristotle to be of power, by raising pity and

fear, or terror, to purge the mind of those and such-like passions
Nor is Nature wanting in her own effects to make good his assertion;
for so in physic things of melancholic hue and quality are used against
melancholy, sour against sour, salt to remove salt humours. (

This view was repeated by scholars in the igth century and received its most
influential formulation in the work of BERNAYS in the latter half of that

8 3 J. E. SPINGARN, A History of Literary Criticism in the Renaissance, New York,

1924, p. 8o quotes from MINrURNUS' Arte Poetica as follows: ))As a physician eradicates,
by means of poisonous medicine, the perfervid poison of disease which affects the body,
so tragedy purges the mind of its impetuous perturbations by the force of these emotions
beautifully expressed in verse. < The early history of the medical theory of katharsis has
been documented by I. BYWATER, Milton and the Aristotelian Definition of Tragedy,
Journal of Philology 27, I900, Pp. 267-275.

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 The Clarification Theory of Katharsis 439

century4. Since the widespread acceptance of the medical interpretation of

katharsis is due to the work of BERNAYS we must carefully examine his argu-
ments.
BERNAYS' medical interpretation is based on three premises. First, he
asserts that, aside from a general sense of 'cleansing', katharsis, 'concretely
understood' has only two meanings in Greek: religious purification of guilt
and sin and medical relief of illness. Secondly, BERNAYS cites the actual
occurrence of katharsis in the Politics of Aristotle where it is used to describe
the effect of wild and violent melodies on highly excited people. He asserts
that this effect must be purgative, and not purificatory, because Aristotle
would never have explained one complex and obscure phenomenon (the
quieting of an emotionally disturbed person through the use of exciting melo-
dies) by means of another equally complex and obscure phenomenon (the
removal of the sense of guilt and sin from one who had committed an act of
moral pollution). BERNAYS then argues that Aristotle must have used katharsis
in this passage in the Politics in the sense of medical 'purgation' since it thus
offers both a simple explanation of the mechanism of the musical process
involved and is (in his view) the only remaining meaning of the word. As
BERNAYS sees it, the quieting of emotionally disturbed persons as described
in the Politics takes place in the same way as illness is removed from the body
under the homeopathic theory of medicine. Thirdly, BERNAYS concludes that
the purgative action attributed to the katharsis of certain types of music in
the Politics must be the same effect we are to expect from the katharsis of
tragedy that is described in chapter 6 of the Poetics.
With these premises of BERNAYS we must take strong issue. First, the
assertion that 'concretely understood' katharsis means in Greek only religious
purification or medical purgation is demonstrably false. Katharsis has a range
of meanings and one particularly important nuance that can be attested to
in Plato, Epicurus, and Philodemus is that of 'intellectual clarification'".
BERNAYS' failure to come to terms with all of the possible meanings of katharsis
must be considered a serious weakness in his argument since it arbitrarily
limited the scope of his investigation into this much disputed term. Secondly,
BERNAYS' view that katharsis means purgation rather than purification because

4 See J. BERNAYS, Zwei Abhandlungen fiber die aristotelische Theorie des Drama,
Berlin, i88o [originally published, I857], PP. II-I3.
5 For a discussion of the limitations of BERNAYS' interpretation of katharsis see A. DY-
ROFF, tber die aristotelische Katharsis, Berliner Philologische Wochenschrift 38, I9I8,
pp. 6I5-624; 634-644. He shows that BERNAYS was mistaken in limiting his view of
katharsis to the two meanings of 'moral purification' and 'medical purgation' and observes,
concerning this point, (p. 6I7): ))Aber wir haben neben jenen zwei Bedeutungen von
katharsis noch manche andere und vor allem 'die ganz allgemeine', und diese muB3 gar
nicht so unbestimmt sein, wie B. annimmt. # We will discuss later the use of katharsis to
represent 'intellectual clarification'.

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 440 LEON GOLDEN

the mechanism of the medical metaphor is easier to grasp than that of the
religious image, has no compelling logic to it. While simplicity and clarity
are valuable goals in the use of metaphor, they offer no binding guarantees of
the validity of the image. There are, however, other good reasons for under-
standing katharsis in the Politics as 'purgation'. Our third disagreement with
BERNAYS' premises is that he assumes that evidence from the Politics can be
applied unhesitatingly to the solution of a problem in the Poetics. We believe that
the unargued assumption that the meaning of katharsis in the Poetics must
be the same as its meaning in the Politics represents a grave methodological
error because it fails to take account of the individuality of the works concerned
and the specific contexts in which the term appears. Richard McKEON
has called attention to this kind of error in noting that the Politics and the
Poetics, just as much as Plato's Republic and Laws are based on different
first principles and one member of each pair cannot be used automatically to
explicate the other6.
Since the Politics and the Poetics are based on different first principle5, it
should not surprise us that their treatment of art would vary. In actual fact
two very important contradictions exist in the discussion of art in both works
which should make us wary of making direct connections between them. The
first of these contradictions concerns the audience response to the artistic
mimesis and its model and the second to the nature of the audience itself.
In the Politics I340 a 22-27 we are told that whatever essential pleasure or
pain we feel toward an imitation we will also feel toward the object of that
imitation; in the Poetics, however, we are told at I448 b IO-I2 that we feel
pleasure in very accurate imitations of objects which evoke pain when they
are confronted in reality. Secondly, in the Politics I342 b I8-22 we are
informed that there is a double audience for art consisting of educated and
uneducated persons who require different kinds of artistic representations;
in the Poetics, however, we are told at I448 b 9-I7 that all men enjoy a single
intellectual pleasure in artistic mimesis although there is a quantitative difference
in this regard between philosophers and ordinary men 7. Discrepancies such
as these lend support to McKEON'S warning against a too facile assumption
that doctrines in the Politics can automatically be used to illuminate doctrines
in the Poetics.
On the basis of these considerations we conclude that BERNAYS was in
error in assuming, without justifying arguments, that the meaning of katharsis
in the Poetics must be the same as its meaning in the Politics. Indeed, Aristotle

6 See R. McKEON, Literary Criticism and the Concept of Imitation in Antiquity, in

Critics and Criticism:Ancient and Modern ed. by R. S. CRANE, Chicago, 1952, p. I66.
7 I have discussed in greater detail the different views of art taken in the Politics and
the Poetics in: The Purgation Theory of Catharsis, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

3', I973, PP. 473-479.

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 The Clarification Theory of Katharsis 44I

gives us a clear and explicit indication that this cannot be the case in the very
passage of the Politics we have been discussing. At I34I b I-2 he tells us
that he 'will speak of katharsis generally now' but that he will tell us 'more
precisely' what he means by this term in the Poetics. Now a few lines later,
at I342 a 7-i7, he tells us that some highly emotional people, after they
have been exposed to violent melodies, react as if they had received 'medical
treatment' (iatreia) and 'purgation' (katharsis). If Aristotle's concept of
katharsis were limited to medical purgation there would be little reason for
him to advise the reader to await a more precise discussion of the term in
the Poetics. As FLASHAR has elaborately documented, katharsis, in the sense
of medical purgation, would have been an easily and commonly understood
term that would not require additional explanation8. Aristotle's notification
that he will give a further analysis of katharsis in the Poetics makes good
sense only if he is going to develop the concept well beyond its meaning in
the present passage in the Politics.
We have argued that there are serious flaws in BERNAYS' argument,
accepted by many scholars and critics, that katharsis means medical purgation
in the definition of tragedy in chapter 6 of the Poetics. The principal reason,
however, that we reject this interpretation is the same one which justified the
rejection of the theory that katharsis means moral purification: there exists
no evidence within the Poetics, itself, to support the view that Aristotle
conceived of art as a therapeutic activity. And that medical therapy is what
is intended by the holders of this interpretation is clear from BYWATER'S
description of the cathartic process:

)>With some adaptation of the statements and hints in Pol. 8, 7, as

thus interpreted, it is not difficult to recover the outlines at any rate
of the Aristotelian theory of the cathartic effect of Tragedy: Pity and
fear are elements in human nature, and in some men ... they are
present in a disquieting degree... With these latter the tragic excitement
is a necessity ... but it is also in a certain sense good for all. It serves
as a sort of medicine producing a catharsis to lighten and relieve the
soul ... of the accumulated emotion within it; and as the relief is
wanted, there is always a harmless pleasure attending the process
of relief 9. (#

We have, however, previously noted that the effect of tragic mimesis must
reflect the effect of mimesis in general and, in the Poetics, that effect is clearly
stated to be intellectual and not therapeutic. Because of this, and because no

8See H. FLASHAR, Die medizinischen Grundlagen der Lehre von der Wirkung der
Dichtung in der griechischen Poetik, Hermes 84, 1956, pp. I2-48.
9 I. BYWATER, Aristotle on the Art of Poetry, London and New York, 1909, P. I55.

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 442 LEON GOLDEN

other aspect of the general argument of the Poetics supports the view that
katharsis means medical purgation, we cannot accept this widely held view
as valid.
The medical interpretation of katharsis, for all of its weaknesses, is superior
to the moral interpretation because it can at least cite the use of katharsis,
in the sense of purgation, in a context concerned with art outside of the Poetics.
The structural interpretation of katharsis, as developed by OTTE and ELSE, is,
in turn, superior to the medical theory because it is based on the internal
argument of the Poetics, itself, and not on external justifications from other
works of Aristotle.
In OTTE'S version of this interpretation, emphasis is placed on the fact
that not every serious drama is considered 'tragic' by Aristotle10. Only those
dramas which express the pitiable and fearful and awaken these emotions
in the audience can earn this designation. Other serious works may represent

morally impure or polluted actions (VLapM' 7p&cy,uoc') which contradict our

sense of what is morally right and fail to evoke the tragic emotions of pity
and fear. OTTE reasons that to create a tragedy the poet must make certain
that he purifies the oppressive events of his drama of any taint of moral
pollution so that the audience may show the proper response of pity and fear.
In OTTE'S view, katharsis is this act of purification which is directed not at
purging the emotions of the audience, but at purifying the events of the plot.
Thus katharsis is seen as a significant characteristic of plot construction but
does not function as the telos of the tragic experience.
This theory has been given a more fully developed and influential statement
by Gerald ELSE". He argues that the structure of the plot of an effective
tragedy demonstrates that the deed of horror in the drama, of itself an act
of moral pollution, was performed in essential ignorance by the hero. We are
able to exonerate the hero from the charge of moral pollution and consequently
feel the requisite emotions of pity and fear when we recognize that ignorance
rather than malice was the cause of the deed. This crucial point is reached
when, in ELSE'S words, we are able to say to ourselves ))You may pity this
man, for he is like us, a good man rather than a bad, and he is katharos, free
of pollution. (( The essence of ELSE'S position is found in the following statement:

)>Thus the catharsis is not a change or end-product in the spectator's

soul, or in the fear and pity (i. e., the dispositions to them) in his soul,
but a process carried forward in the emotional material of the play by
its structural elements, above all by the recognition. For the recognition
is the pay-off, to use a vulgar but expressive modernism; or, in more

10 See H. OTTE, Neue Beitrage zur Aristotelischen Begriffsbestimmung der Trag6die,

Berlin, 1928, p. io.
11 See G. F. ELSE, Aristotle's Poetics: The Argument, Cambridge, Mass., I957, PP.
221-232; 436-444.

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 The Clarification Theory of Katharsis 443

conventional figure, it is the hinge on which the emotional structure of

the play turns. The carthasis, that is, the purification of the tragic act

by the demonstration that its motive was not [Lop6v, is accomplished

by the whole structure of the drama, but above all by the recognition.
This interpretation makes catharsis a transitive or operational factor
within the tragic structure itself, precedent to the release of pity, and
ultimately of the tragic pleasure, rather than the be-all and end-all of
tragedy itself (p (p. 439).

The attraction of the structural interpretation of katharsis is that it artic-

ulates this concept with aspects of the general argument of the Poetics in a
way that did not occur in the moral and medical theories. ELSE states his
view of the precise nature of this articulation in reference to the action of the

Oedip,us Tyrannus. We begin with the nikoq or deed of horror which is

'inherently ,uocp6v but performed in ingnorance'. There follows a 'steady
augmentation of the horror as the climax approaches' which results in 'recog-
nition, undoing (reversing)' of the ignorance. This leads to a manifestation of
the 'grief and remorse of the doer' which certifies 'ignorance as the cause of
the deed and the deed, therefore, as ov ,uLocpov (not morally polluted)'. We are
then authorized to feel pity which leads to the experiencing of the tragic
pleasure. The principal difficulty with this theory of katharsis is that it divests
Aristotle's definition of tragedy of any reference to the telos of tragic mimesis.
Now Aristotle introduces his definition at I449 b 22-24 with the following

statement: -xep'. a TpocycYPoca XyCO[Lv &v XoCrB6ovrge oc&un ex rTcv LpI[Vkv

TOv yLVOpLeV0v Opov 'rT oV6a'4. He clearly proposes to define the essence'
of tragedy and any such definition must reach its climax in a description
of the telos of tragedy. Except for OTTE and ELSE all other major scholars
have acknowledged this point and have sought to understand katharsis
as the essential telos or pleasure of tragedy. For it would seem absurd that
Aristotle would discuss relatively minor matters (such as aesthetically pleas-
urable language) in his essential definition and omit any reference to the telos
of the genre. Moreover, the structural interpretation of katharsis fails, as
much as the medical and moral interpretations, to bring the process and
pleasure of tragic mimesis into harmony with the process and pleasure of
mimesis, in general, which Aristotle explicitly describes for us in the Poetics.
We have argued that the essential definition of tragedy must contain a
reference to the telos of tragedy and that this telos must be in harmony with
the telos of mimesis, in general. Now, as we shall see in some detail below, the
telos of mimesis, in general, is a learning experience with its attendant intellec-
tual pleasure. If tragic mimesis is to be brought into association with the goal
of mimesis, in general, it will have to share in this intellectual character and
pleasure. Nearly all scholars have agreed that katharsis is the only term in

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 444 LEON GOLDEN

Aristotle's definition which can represent the goal of tragic mimesis and we
shall now attempt to demonstrate that there exists a valid interpretation of
katharsis, in the sense of 'intellectual clarification', that, alone among all
other theories, can establish the required unity between the goal of mimesis,
in general, and the goal of tragic mimesis, in particular.
We have seen earlier that BERNAYS asserted that, 'concretely understood',
katharsis bears only the two meanings in Greek of moral purification and
medical purgation. We have noted that BERNAYS was in error on this pcint
since LSJ certifies the use of katharsis in the sense of 'intellectual clarification'
in Epicurus and Philodemus. Moreover, there are two very significant uses
of the term, katharsis, by Plato that indicate that a clear intellectual nuance
was attached to the word.
In the Sophist 226 D-23o E it is stated that there are a number of forms
of katharsis which are concerned with the body and a number which are
directed at the soul (227 B-C). In regard to the soul it is established that there
are two large categories of evil. One embraces such spiritual deformities as
insolence, injustice, and cowardice ard has as its specific corrective the art
that is most closely related to justice. The other large evil of the soul is ignorance
which requires instruction as its corrective (229 A-B). Ignorance consists
in the holding of false opinions and we are told that the greatest and most
authoritative katharsis of this ignorance is dialectical cross-examination or

EXSYxoq (230 E). In this context katharsis is defined as the process of eliminating
ignorance by showing that the false opinions on which it is based are self-
contradictory. Plato tells us that a person who has not undergone this form
of katharsis must be considered uneducated (&orc2xsurov) and unable to
appreciate the benefits of true instruction or knowledge (aLc%tkrcv 6wvaLv).
In summarizing this argument, Plato's Elean stranger reminds us that, of
the general art of discrimination (3&aXpL-&x' 'g6V-w), there is a part that is
kathartic in nature and, of this katlhartic element, there is a part that is concerned
with the soul. Of this kathartic element directed at the soul, there is a sub-
division concemed with instruction (mcaxo6kLx), a part of which we desig-
nate as education ( ocL3zu-L&x). An important part of education consists of
the dialectical cross-examination (iXeyxoq), which Plato terms, as we have
seen, the greatest and most authoritative katharsis of ignorance (23I B).
Thus we note the profound intellectual orientation of katharsis in the Sophist.
An interesting and relevant passage also occurs in the Phaedo 67 C-D
where katharsis is used to describe the process of separation of the soul from
the body which is the lifelong goal of philosophers and which is perfectly
achieved only at death. This separation of the soul from the body is important
to the philosopher because the body continually interferes with the soul's
drive to contemplate reality, itself. In this passage, then, katharsis is the
process of separation of soul from body which has as its essential goal the

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 The Clarification Theory of Katharsis 445

apprehension of true reality. We are further informed here that katharsis is

a source of joy and pleasure to the philosopher because it serves as the climax
to his lifelong striving for real knowledge. Here katharsis designates not only
the process of separation of soul from body but also the intellectual pleasure
of ultimate clarification about reality that occurs in direct consequence of
this separation. As such, katharsis is used in a sense that is closely related to
our interpretation of the term in Aristotle's formal definition of tragedy as the
climactic 'clarification' of the learning process involved in miimesis.
We have demonstrated that katharsis can mean 'clarification'; we must
now proceed with the justification for interpreting the term in this way in
Aristotle's definition of tragedy. We know from the Poetics, I447 a I3-I6,
that all poetry is a form of mimesis. We know from the discussion at I448 b
4-19 precisely what essential goal and pleasure Aristotle attributed to
nmimesis, in general. He writes: 'EoLxoat ae yzvv6a=L ,uev OAxC T& V
7OVJTLXYNV aLTLaL ai5O TLVV5 XML MMtTL qPUaLXX'L. TO 'r ySp tLL,ueraOML aK,UpUTOv
TOL4 0CVOp&t)'COLq ?X 7r0CE&OV 'Tal XXL TOiUM 8LOC(PCPOUGL TG)V da(,)V B Gcov b TL
FL0nTLX@TTOV ?TaL XaL tzOC 7a rmeLs 2ouL,TL OLQ La TQXC 7rpWTQCq, XOCL To
XOCLV TOL J FL MMLaL 7sVTO(4. aY%LeLoV ? TOVTOU TO aU6V3CXtVOV EM TV ?pyOV'
a yo&p LXt&a XmCpWs 6p'PC[v, TouT&v ta; elxO6Vg T&% [La?LWat YXpLP3CJ)L&VMq
XALEV Oewpo5vT?5, OtOV OlpLeV T? Lopya& TGV MTLpLOT7XlWV xOaL vSXp&v.
QC'L'tov ? xO troVTOU, OtL [LOVOOVeLV oU 0L6vov t0oZ pLXoa6po9Lq MLatov &'aa xoca
TQL4 &X?,OLc 0'[OLUOq, xXV b7tL ? 3pP?XU XOLVCOVOUaLV TOU. aLa yap TOUto xaLpOUaL
T&g zLX6VQM Op6vT?z, OTL aU0tcLVe& 0WpOU$vTaq pLXVOV?LV XOCL aU Oy'L4SaL Tl
exa,Tov, otov OTL O05TOq LXeLVO5 brel ?&v L T6UX npO?JpOX6, oUX 1 a
7tOLla?L T7rV YOWCV OCX?B O TYnV WcpyMaLOv T7)V XPOLOV Y a toLOCv T7VV
,,... , ,
OAA)&V oLTLocV.

The essential point made about the nature of mimesis in this passage is
that it represents a learning process that affords the pleasure of understanding
(uav5&vev) and inference (au oyt'?atao) to all human beings. The ultimate
proof of this point is found in the pleasure we feel when we view mimetic
representations of objects that would cause us pain in real life such as certain
kinds of animals and corpses and, we may add, the oppressive events portrayed
in many tragedies. The source of our pleasure is our deepened understanding
of the precise nature of the pitiable and fearful events represented. Thus
Aristotle has clearly asserted that the essential pleasure of mimesis, in general,
is the intellectual perception involved in the learning process.
Now at I45I b 5-IlI Aristotle further defines this learning process that is
associated with mimesis as follows: &8O xO cplXoaocp(06 TrpOV XO(L M7OaucLot,-
pOV 7tOLM5L lTOPLOCq eGTLV- [ Le yap =tW)ML tFCXXOV t& XXO6?o)U, I 3' EaropLa TA
xocO rxacatov x6yel. 6aTLv 8C X0O6XOU [LV, Tr 7rOL T& 7roM &CTT auTa POCEveL
?eyeCV I 7rpOVTTelV XZOT0C TO ?LXO5 l TO avayxaCov, oT0 YTOy ?tt L 7rO[JaL
Ov6[otoc tLTLOel0?kV7* TO e xacO ?XaaTOV, Tl 'AXXLMl8&) bpxiev n Tl ?xcxv.

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 446 LEON GOLDEN

We clearly see that what differentiates poetry, which is essentially defined

as mimesis, from history is its concern with the expression of what is universal
as opposed to what is particular. We observe that the 'philosophical' dimension
of poetry is this capacity it possesses to represent universals which can illu-
minate the meaning of all particulars subsumed under them. The movement
from the particular to the universal involved in all mimetic experiences is an
act of learning and evokes the intellectual pleasure which Aristotle describes
at I448 b 4-I9. Kurt VON FRITZ is one of the few scholars who has seen the
immense importance of the passage quoted above for our understanding of
the meaning of katharsis. He writes:

)>Die xa'caMpGl -Cv 7rcoj-oCrcov ist nicht die einzige wesentliche Wir-
kung der Tragodie; oder vielmehr: die katharsis hat nicht nur eine
emotionale Seite. Die Tragodie ist nach Meinung des Aristoteles auch
'philosophischer', d. h. zu tieferer Einsicht fuihrend, als die Geschichte.
Ihre Erkenntnisfunktion ist also ebenso wichtig wie ihre emotionale
Wirkung. Beide sind in Wirklichkeit voneinander untrennbar. Der
tagliche und alltagliche Jammer, eigener und Mitjammer mit anderen,
und die taglichen Angste des Lebens sind geeignet, die Seele des Menschen
zu verkrampfen und eng zu machen. Die Teilnahme an einem grol3en

Leiden und einem groBen Schicksal erregt diese 7rocb,u-[rc und lost
zugleich den Krampf. Das ist die 'medizinische' Seite der katharsis,
die von den besten Interpreten des Aristoteles mit Recht immer wieder
hervorgehoben worden ist. Darin wendet sich Aristoteles gegen Platon.
Aber diese Reinigung oder Losung ware wenig wert und Brecht hatte
mit seinem Spott uber die 'vergntigliche Waschung' und das 'barbarische
Vergniigen' recht, wenn die Losung nicht bedingt ware durclh die von
Aristoteles nicht minder hervorgehobene durch die Trag6die bedingte
Einsicht in ein x%oct86'ou, ein Allgemeines, die allgemeinen Bedingun-
gen der condition humaine'2.#<

The deep insight into the universal conditions of human existence which
VON FRITZ describes above is a precise statement of the learning process which
Aristotle attributes to mimesis, in general.
We have seen so far that mimesis, in general, is an intellectually pleasant
learning experience that involves the representation of universals. At I453
b 8-I4 Aristotle tells us precisely how tragic mimesis relates to mimesis, in
general: o'L 8' [ tL o ypoprpo6v &L& g 6pco o CX?g r -r tzpoCXr8rC, tovov
-napma6xeU0aC0v'rc ouaev tpOCycPLa, XOL@voVuaLv oV yap Tca6cv az ITezv Ov,V
Mro TpoycaLao &aXX&X Trv OLXSLOCV. erL & TIV aXbo EXou xat y6Poou aLX
~uL,Uaewq )6O 7?L t'v 7tOLI1-nV, aCpvzp0v cg TouTo eV ?OL0
7rpOCypCaLv L7UCOLYMoV.

12 K. VON FRITZ, Antike und moderne Tragodie, Berlin, I962, p. XXVI.

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 The Clarification Theory of Katharsis 447

Here Aristotle requires that the pleasure of tragedy be that which is

derived from pity and fear through imitation. Aristotle is thus telling us in this
passage that tragic mimesis must afford the same intellectual pleasure and
learning experience that has been attributed to mimesis, in general. The
learning and universalizing activities of tragic mimesis are, however, specifically
directed at the pitiable and fearful dimensions of human experience. The telos
of tragic mimesis, therefore, as determined by the argument of the Poetics at
I448 b 4-I9, I45i b 5-II, and I453 b 8-I4, is the experience of an intellec-
tually pleasant learning process that is concemed with the universal nature of
pity and fear in the human condition.
We have seen that nearly all scholars agree that in Aristotle's definition of
tragedy the term katharsis functions as the essential telos of tragic mimesis.
All of the principal interpretations of katharsis, involving concepts of purgation
or purification, are, however, in conflict with the telos that is attributed to
tragic mimesis by the argument of the Poetics that has been analyzed above.
There is no suggestion anywhere in the Poetics, explicit or implicit, that
mimesis is in any way concerned with purgation or purification. Aristotle does,
however, explicitly define mimesis as an intellectually pleasant learning
experience. Thus it is only katharsis in the sense of 'intellectual clarification'
that can provide a telos for tragedy that is in harmony with the general argument
of the Poetics. Since we have shown that katharsis bears the meaning of
'clarification', there is no barrier to accepting this interpretation which brings
the telos of tragic mimesis into full harmony with the telos of mimtesis, in
general.

The argument for an intellectual interpretation of katharsis has been developed by a

number of scholars. The earliest statement known to me on this matter is a letter from
Otto IMMISCH to S. 0. HAUPT which is quoted in the latter's: Wirkt die Tragodie auf das
Gemiut oder den Verstand oder die Moralitat der Zuschauer ?, Znaim, I9I5, P. i8: #Damals
schrieb mir Herr Universitatsprofessor Dr. Otto IMMISCH in Giellen unter dem IO. X. I907:
'Bislang glaube ich noch: i. daB der Passus iuber die Katharsis nur infolge einer Polemik
gegen Plato der Definition angehangt ist: das gpyov (die Wirkung) hat an sich, nach Aristote-
les' eigenen Satzen uiber das Definieren, im 6poq oiaoocq nichts zu suchen; 2. daB die
Katharsis in Aristoteles' Sinn weder ethisch noch 'hedonisch' noch therapeutisch ist,
sondern intellektualistisch.(( IMMIscH apparently did not pursue his insight any further
but HAUPT did discover significant justifications for this theory which he defended in a
somewhat abrasive and polemical way and with which he associated a somewhat eccentric
system for the analysis of all types of drama. He was, however, the first to call attention
to some of the important justifications for the clarification theory of katharsis. He saw
that Aristotle clearly indicated, in his discussion of katharsis in the Politics, that he intended
to develop a significantly different view of that concept in the Poetics. He also clearly saw
the importance of chapter 4 of the Poetics in ultimately solving the problem of katharsis
(pp. 77-78). Moreover, in: Die L6sung der Katharsis-Theorie des Aristoteles, Znaim,
I9II, P. 17, he makes the perceptive, although undemonstrated remark, that #von den
durch die dramatischen Kuinste im Zuhorer erregten ethischen, asthetischen, asthetisch-
intellektualistischen und rein intellektualistischen Gefuhlen sind jedoch nur die rein

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 448 LEON GOLDEN

intellektualistischen allgemein zwingend, also beweisend; die ethischen, asthetischen und

asthetisch-intellektualistischen Gefuhle k6nnen im Zuh6rer geweckt werden, mulssen es
aber nicht. e

E. ZELLER recognized an intellectual dimension within the kathartic process when

he wrote in: Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung (rep.
Hildesheim, I963) II, 2, P. 784 as follows: #Weil uns aber der tragische Dichter in seinen
Helden und ihren Geschicken allgemeinguiltige Typen des menschlichen Wesens und
Lebens darstellt, so bleibt unser Mitgefuihl nicht bei diesen bestimmten Personen als
Einzelnen stehen, sondern es erweitert sich zum Gefuhl dessen, was der menschlichen
Natur gemein ist; und indem so einerseits die auf uns selbst bezuglichen, der Furcht und
dem Mitleid verwandten Stimmungen in der Theilnahme an den Erlebnissen der handelnden
Personen zur Bethatigung kommen, andererseits aber unser eigenes Leid fur unsere
Empfindung gegen das fremde zurficktritt, unsere pers6nlichen Klagen in der Anschauung
des gemeinsamen Schicksals verstummen, werden wir von dem Drucke, der auf uns lag,
befreit, und unsere Gemiutsbewegung komnmnt schlieplich in der Ahnunzg der ewigen Gesetze,
welche sich uins in deni Verlaufe des Kunsstwerks offenbaren, zur Ruhe. (( (italics mine)
The importance to the intellectual interpretation of katharsis of Aristotele's judgment
that poetry is concerned with what is universal was recognized by K. VON FRITZ in a
passage already quoted (see n. 12) and by Anna TUMARKIN, Die Kunsttheorie von Aristo-
teles im Rahmen seiner Philosophie, Museum Helveticum 2, I945, P. I20. She writes:
*Und Wirklichkeit ist endlich auch die Wirkung der Trag6die auf den Philosophen, der,
wie Aristoteles, das Leben sehen will, wie es wirklich ist, ohne an den dem Schicksal
gegenilber so ohnmachtigen Menschen einen absoluten MaBstab anzulegen, und dem die
dichterische mimesis der Wirklichkeit, wenn sie nur den Blick uiber das dargestellte
Einzelgeschehen hinaus auf das Allgemeine (T& =o1M?,ou), das Wahrscheinliche, das
geschehen konnte (oot Mv yivotro), lenkt, darin philosophischer als die historische Dar-
stellung des Einzelgeschehens, auch eine rein theoretische Freude bereitet. (4

W. J. VERDENIUS, K&aoclapat xxv 7=4cnsIocrdov, in: Autour d'Aristote, Louvain,

1955, PP. 367-373 has perceptively identified the need for an intellectual climax in
tragedy although, for the most part, he adheres to the traditional medical interpretation
of katharsis. He points out that the needs of the educated part of the double audiencc
identified by Aristotle in the Politics are not met by the simple 'purgation' of emotions
(pp. 37-72). He sees that their concern must rather be with the koxywy' which Aristotle
tells us in the Politics is one of the goals of music. He shows that 8LCyXCOy 'consists of
intellectual enjoyment' and concludes that the important terms from the Poetics )>TO aTIou-
8LOv, t0 Pb,XTLOv, t6 xocM6Xou, may be assumed to express those aspects of tragedy which
produce the pleasures of 8Loyoy'. (x Our argument, based on Aristotle's explicit statement
that all men derive intellectual pleasure from mimesis, is that katharsis precisely represents
the universal 8oyoy' inherent in the learning experience of mimesis.
Aspects of the structural arguments in support of the clarification theory of catharsis
have been developed in my articles: Catharsis, TAPA 93, I962, PP. 5i-6o and: Mimesis
and Katharsis, Classical Philology 64, I969, pp. I45-153. See also H. D. F. KITTO,
Catharsis, in: The Classical Tradition: Literary and Historical Studies in Honor of Harry
CAPLAN, Ithaca, N. Y., I966, pp. I40-147.
Finally, we may cite the intuitive judgment of the eminent Aristotelian scholar
W. D. Ross. In: Aristotle, London, I930, Pp. 284-285 he writes: )>Do most men in fact
go about with an excessive tendency to pity and fear? And are they in fact relieved by
witnessing the sufferings of the tragic hero? That we somehow benefit by seeing or reading
a great tragedy, and that it is by pity and fear that it produces its effect, is beyond doubt;
but is not the reason to be found elsewhere ? Is it that people deficient in pity and fear

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 The Clarification Theory of Katharsis 449

because their lives give little occasion for such feelings are for once taken out of themselves
and made to realise the heights and depths of human experience ? Is not this enlarging of
our experience, and the accompanying teaching of 'self-knowledge and self-respect', the
real reason of the value which is placed upon tragedy?<a

Unfortunately, the purgation theory of katharsis is a deeply entrenched

one and, so far, has remained highly resistant to widespread challenge. In this
regard the work of Pedro LAIfN ENTRALGO is of extreme importance since, to
my knowledge, he is the only major historian of medicine to make an exhaustive
investigation of the katharsis question. The importance of LAIfN ENTRALGO'S
work is that he denies the validity of the physical purgation theory of katharsis
as that theory has been advocated in the major philological treatments of
this question'3.
LAIN ENTRALGO'S discussion of the katharsis question begins with his
analysis of the concept of verbal char-m (nas`) in Plato. The charm is a
story, myth, or any verbal device, in general, that serves to persuade or educate
such as the well known myths in the Platonic dialogues. LAI'N ENTRALGO tells
us that ))under the influence of the enchanting word the mind of the hearer -
and subsequently his body, to the extent possible - are calmed, enlightened,
and set in good order, become a6cppov?, are 'sophronized', if so expressive
a neologism may be allowed((. He shows that this concept of brcoU has an
important relationship to the Platonic view of katharsis which he pursues after
first describing the five strands of meaning of katharsis which he finds in
Plato. This range of meaning consists of the cleansing of dirty material objects,
religious purification, medical purgation, philosophical purification embracing
both religious and intellectual elements, and a fifth sense which contains
ethical, psychological and medical nuances.
LAIfN ENTRALGO notes that for Plato the soul needs purification because
it has been infected by the body and from the Sophist we know that this infection
takes two forms: disease and ignorance. In discussing the kathartic agents which
must be used to treat the disorders (mpELoc) of the soul, LAf N ENTRALGO
establishes the connection between hrwV and katharsis in Plato as follows:

))What can the xocaocpuoL' be, those cathartic agents able to restore
order in souls affected by oc,utzpx'c? Perhaps the fumigations with
sulfur or the lustral baths of traditional katharsis? Only in the measure
in which such practices exert a suasive and educative effect upon the
soul of one who undergoes them, for it is wholly evident that the proper
katharsis for moral disorder can be no other than the suitable and
suasive word, the S'-8pJ in the most Platonic sense of the term.
From time immemorial the Greeks had been using song and recitation

1I P. LAfN ENTRALGO, The Therapy of the Word in Classical Antiquity, New Haven,
Conn., 1970, PP. IO8-I38, 17I-239.

Hermes 104,4 29

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 450 LEON GOLDEN

for specifically cathartic purposes. Plato, accordingly, remaining within

that old tradition but rationalizing it religiously and philosophically,
terms x paa&CPGL q Puxq 'purification of the soul', the proper verbal
reordering of the beliefs, knowledge, feelings, and appetites that give

content to the "soul' of man; Aa -rou ?o6you x&pocpanL, 'purification

by the word', a neo-Platonist will say centuries later< (p. I35).

Having cited the evidence for the existence of a ))verbalizing and rational-
izing katharsis of the 'diseases' of the soul((, LAIN ENTRALGO establishes the
essential connection between itn and katharsis in Plato. He asserts that

'every ecnyV is a verbal xocxpyocpt6, a means for the purification of the soul
by means of the word'. The goal of the tcp3 is to evoke ac)cppOarn and
that concept, he tells us, 'whatever its ultimate essence may be, manifests
itself descriptively as a well-regulated and lucid composure of all that which
makes up the soul of man: beliefs, knowledge, feelings, and impulses'. The
precise thrust of Plato's teaching can be seen from the fact that the Platonist
Chion (or, as LAIfN ENTRALGO says, the writer who later assumed that name)
declared that philosophy, itself, is brwa.
LAfIN ENTRALGO has thus established that in Plato katharsis assumed a
complex system of meanings, among which the persuasive and educative effect
of verbal communication on ignorance and fear plays an extremely important
role. In our investigation of the precise signification of Aristotelian katharsis
we must remain aware of the full range of meanings that term possessed when
it was inherited by Aristotle from Plato.
LAIN ENTRALGO then goes on to link Plato's concept of katharsis as an
educative process to Aristotle's use of this term in chapter 6 of the Poetics.
LAIfN ENTRALGO notes that the spectator who witnessess the reversal of fortune
in a tragedy would manifest, on the emotional level, pity and fear and, on the
intellectual level, 'a tense and confused disorientation'. This disorientation
arises because the events of the drama are not turning out in conformity
with the original expectations of the audience and this has an oppressive
effect because the universal nature of poetry places the artistically represented
action in direct, concrete relationship with the real existence of the audience.
According to LAIN ENTRALGO, this disorientation is relieved by the action of
&vocxy,vCOpLtaL in the drama. For iVOCYV(OpLaL4 is a transition from ignorance
to knowledge and it is through such a transition, occurring on stage, that the
spectator comes to realize what is happening in the drama 'and therefore in
his own life'.
We must recall that the audience of a Greek tragedy was witnessing a
dramatization of an aspect of a heroic legend which was so constructed by the
poet so as to have universal applicability and, therefore, personal relevance
to each member of the audience. Such a situation arises if the tragedy genuinely

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 The Clarification Theory of Katharsis 45I

evokes pity and fear for these emotions must be felt eit
or to someone similar to oneself. The spectator must, therefore, personally
feel the difficulties and dangers which threaten the tragic hero and also the
disquietude and confusion which beset the hero after the reversal of fortune
takes place. This confusion rises to a peak until the &ocsyvcpLaL4 or recognition
resolves it. In an important passage, LAfN ENTRALGO describes this process:

)>Thanks to the &vOCyvWpLaLq the spectator knows and recognizes what

really is occurring on stage and therefore is his own possible fate; and
he knows it in a specific way, arranged in orderly fashion, in fair words,
in credible actions, and in precise sensory images. The original confusion
of life is transformed into order, a sorrowful or happy order, depending
upon the denouement of the tragic action, but at length crystal clear.
Only because the oxvocyvcwpvLq permits it can there be a denouement,
fatal or fortunate, in the course of the tragedy. Only by virtue of the
recognition do the truth, the inner coherence and the meaning of the
plot - a superhuman meaning almost always - become evident in the
mind of the spectator. The (&voyv6pLaLq represents, in short, the
triumph of that deep demand for expression and clarification of the
human destiny - a figurative, verbal expression and clarification
that in the face of every possible purely musical and Dionysiac inter-
pretation beats deep within the breast of Attic tragedy. The Poetics calls
this 'resolution' of the affective state of the spectator katharsis (p. 230).

By establishing a connection between avocyvwpLaLq and katharsis LAIN ENT-

RALGO has shown that a strong kinship exists between the use of this term by
Plato and by Aristotle. In LAIfN ENTRALGO'S view, Aristotelian katharsis is a
complex concept involving four distinct strands of meaning. He identifies a
religious-moyal nuance of katharsis which is involved in the illumination of the
profound religious and moral problems which dominate the action of many
tragedies. A second dimension of katharsis is a purely dianoetic or logical one.
What is meant here is not some form of 'ineffable illumination' but a psycho-
logical process by which the spectator passes from inarticulate confusion to
articulate knowledge. Finally there are the two phases of katharsis that, up to
now, have occupied the attention of nearly all scholars: the fathetic or affective
aspect and the somatic or medicinal aspect. From his research into Greek
medical practice and theory, LAIfN ENTRALGO draws some interesting conclusions
about the nature of katharsis that contradict the traditional interpretations of
this term. He writes:

))... the impulse unshackling the cathartic process did not come to the
spectator 'from below' - from his viscera and his humors I mean to
say, even though the tragic state of mind might affect both - but 'from
above', from the dianoetic enlightenment elicited by the logos of the

29*

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452 LEON GOLDEN: The Clarification Theory of Kathlarsis

poem. The words of the tragic poem, insofar as they concerned the
beliefs of the spectator, stirred up and promoted passions; insofar as
they were expressive of a terrible, threatening, and surprising fate, the
well-composed climax of those words made the emotional tension
extremely great; insofar as they determined an englightening knowledge,
they swept confusion out of the soul and induced catharsis . . . Accord-
ingly, tragic catharsis was pleasurable because it was suitable to the
whole nature of man. This of course was so because it produced a thermal
and humoral purging of the crasis, especially intense in the melancholy,
by means of which the body of the spectator might return to a state
more in harmony witlh his nature, more xocra y6V61,. But this element
of 8ovn was merely resultant or terminal. Previous to it and deter-
mining its genesis were and had to be those pertaining to the good
order of the soul, both of affective character (having to do with the
&u,u6) and of intellective nature (concerning the &LOcvoLo) ...
Pleasure, I shall once more repeat, is thle perfection of an unhindered
natural activity, superadded or crowning perfection (btLyLvwevov),
just as the physical beauty of the youth is added to the fullness of his
growth. The activity on which tragic Bouv bestows pleasure and
perfection is an existential transition - dianoetic, affective, and physical
at one and the same time - from confusion and disorder to well-ordered
enlightenment. Aristotle says that there is not only activity in move-
ment, but in the freedom to move as well. Hence, passing from the
realm of appearance to the realm of essences, the tragic pleasure would be
that belonging to the human activity of knowing oneself better and dis-
posing more freely and consciously of one's own destiny(( (pp. 235-236).

The work of LAIN ENTRALGO shows that katharsis is a much more complex
concept than has apparently been understood by the majority of those who
have interpreted Aristotle's Poetics. The highly intellectual orientation of the
term, even within its medical usage, confirms the results of our analysis of the
internal argument of the Poetics, itself. We have seen tllat katharsis can and
does mean 'clarification'. LAIN ENTRALGO has demonstrated that the well
known somatic effects of katharsis are only the final manifestations of a process
that must begin with dianoetic enlightenment. Moreover, we have observed that
the pleasure of tragedy is that which is derived 'from pity and fear tllrough
mimesis' and thus must involve the intellectual pleasure of learning which is
identified as an essential aspect of snimesis by Aristotle. For all of these reasons
we argue that katharsis, at I449 b 28 of the Poetics, should not be translated
as 'purgation' or 'purification' but, rather, as 'intellectual clarification'.

Florida State University LEON GOLDEN

Tallahassee

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