Spouses Canezo vs.

Spouses Bautista
Facts: Canezo and both own lands covered by TCTs in Coronado Heights Mandaluyong City, which are adjacent to each other.
Canezo started construction of a building on the land, which is when he realized that structures of Bautista encroached upon his
land without his knowledge or consent. 3 surveys confirmed the encroachment, but upon demand, Bautista refused to remove
the structures, which was proceeded by a complaint in the RTC for the issuance of a writ of demolition. RTC granted, but CA
reversed, hence this appeal.
Issue: WON Canezo can order the structures of Bautista demolished.
Ruling: Yes. The present case is an accion reinvindicatoria under Art. 434, where Canezo seeks to recover ownership of
encroached land by Bautista. The article requires two requisites: identity of the property, and title of ownership. In this case,
Canezo was able to present the identity of his property, evidenced by relocation survey plans, TCT, and photographs. The TCT
itself constitutes the title required to prove ownership. The testimony and the relocation survey plan both show that the spouses
Bautista were aware of the encroachment upon their lot by the owner of Lot 15 and thus they made a corresponding
encroachment upon the lot of the spouses Cañezo. This awareness of the two encroachments made the spouses Bautista
builders in bad faith. The spouses Cañezo are entitled to the issuance of a writ of demolition in their favor and against the
spouses Bautista, in accordance with Article 450 of the Civil Code.
Sampaco vs. Lantud | July 18, 2011
Facts: Lantud is the owner in fee simple of a parcel of residential lot located at Marinaut, Marawi City. On August 25, 1984,
petitioner Datu Kiram Sampaco, through his daughter Soraya Sampaco-Macabando with several armed men, forcibly and
unlawfully entered his property and destroyed the nursery buildings, cabbage seedlings and other improvements therein worth
₱10,000.00. Sampaco argues that he is the owner of the said land since (1) the Torrens title of Lantud was obtained fraudulently
because the residential lot was obtained by free patent, even though only agricultural lands can be the subject thereof, and (2) it
is merely a portion of a larger land he inherited from his father. The petition to quiet title by Lantud was dismissed by the RTC,
but was reversed in the CA. hence this petition by Sampaco alleging ownership.
Issue: WON Lantud or Sampaco owns the land.
Ruling: Lantud owns the land.
The land is covered by a Torrens OCT held by Lantud, so this is an indefeasible evidence of ownership. There was no evidence
presented by Sampaco to support that the lot was residential, given that there was no declaration that it was such, pursuant to
the Public Land Act.
According to Art. 434, to successfully maintain an action to recover the ownership of a real property, the person who claims a
better right to it must prove two (2) things: first, the identity of the land claimed; and second, his title thereto. In regard to the first
requisite, in an accion reinvindicatoria, the person who claims that he has a better right to the property must first fix the identity of
the land he is claiming by describing the location, area and boundaries thereof. In this case, petitioner claims that the property in
dispute is part of his larger property. However, petitioner failed to identify his larger property by providing evidence of the metes
and bounds thereof, so that the same may be compared with the technical description contained in the title of respondent, which
would have shown whether the disputed property really formed part of petitioner’s larger property. The second requisite is shown
by Lantud through his Torrens title, but nothing but a naked claim by Sampaco.
Mendoza vs. Salinas | February 6, 2007
Facts: Salinas obtained a favorable judgment on her application for registration over a certain land in Olongapo City. Mendoza
opposed the application in the RTC, but the application was still granted. Hence, in this petition, Mendoza argues that they have
been in actual possession of the land from 1964, and the application is invalid because of this.
Issue: WON Salinas’s application for registration should be granted.
Ruling: No. It was ruled by the Court in Serra Serra vs. CA that a writ of possession cannot issue against possessors under claim
of ownership, as Art. 433 states that actual possession under claim of ownership raises a disputable presumption of ownership,
and the true owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of the property, not summarily through a motion for the
issuance of a writ of possession. As noted by the court, a land registration case over the land had been filed by Salinas along
with others, but their cases were dismissed in the LC. Salinas did not proceed with an appeal like the others, and decided to file
the writ of attachment. In this case, the granting of the application was null and avoid.
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System vs. Act Theater Inc | June 17, 2004
Facts: Four employees of the respondent Act Theater, Inc. were apprehended by members of the Quezon City police force for
allegedly tampering a water meter in violation of P.D. No. 401, for which they were criminally charged and the respondent’s water
service connection was cut off by MWSS without prior notice. The employees of Act Theater argue that due to lack of water, the
health and sanitation, not only of the respondent’s patrons but in the surrounding premises as well, were adversely affected.
They prayed that the petitioner be directed to pay damages in the civil case. The RTC ruled in favor of MWSS, but the CA
reversed, hence this petition.
Issue: WON the act of MWSS disconnecting Act’s waster service connection was valid.
Ruling: No. Article 429 of the Civil Code, relied upon by the petitioner in justifying its act of disconnecting the water supply of the
respondent without prior notice, reads: Art. 429. The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any person
from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may use such force as may be reasonable to repel or prevent an
actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property. However, Article 19 of the Civil Code precisely sets
the norms for the exercise of one’s rights: Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. While it is true that MWSS had sent a notice
of investigation to plaintiff-appellee prior to the disconnection of the latter’s water services, this was done only a few hours before
the actual disconnection. Upon receipt of the notice and in order to ascertain the matter, Act sent its assistant manager Teodulo
Gumalid, Jr. to the MWSS office but he was treated badly on the flimsy excuse that he had no authority to represent Act. Act’s
water services were cut at midnight of the day following the apprehension of the employees. Clearly, the plaintiff-appellee was
denied due process when it was deprived of the water services. As a consequence, thereof, Act had to contract another source
to provide water for a number of days.
Del Fierro vs. Seguiran | August 8, 2011
Facts: Del Fierro filed a reconveyance and cancellation of titles case against Seguiran alleging that the Del Fierros were the
owners and possessors of a parcel of land identified as Lot Nos. 1625 and 1626, formerly part of Lot No. 1197, situated at
Barangay Locloc, Palauig, Zambales. On July 26, 1964, Lodelfo and Narciso Marcial unlawfully entered the land occupied by
plaintiffs. Plaintiffs sued them for forcible entry before the Municipal Court of Palauig. The municipal court ruled in favor of
plaintiffs, which decision was affirmed on appeal by the CFI of Iba, Zambales, Branch II on August 1, 1973. Consequently,
Lodelfo and Narciso Marcial were ejected from the premises. Meanwhile, on June 29, 1964, Marcial had mortgaged the lots to
the Rural Bank of San Marcelino, Inc., which foreclosed the real estate mortgage on December 26, 1972, and consolidated
ownership over the lots on April 22, 1982. On October 28, 1981, defendant Rene S. Seguiran purchased from Lodelfo Marcial
(deceased) the subject lots. On November 9, 1981, defendant purchased the subject lots again from the Rural Bank of San
Marcelino, Inc. RTC and CA ruled against Del Fierro, hence this appeal.
Issue: WON Del Fierro can eject Seguiran in this accion reinvidicatoria.
Ruling: No, for failure to prove the identity of the land. The property subject to this case is lot 1197, but Del Fierro was never able
to prove that the said property was formerly a part of the awarded lots lot 1625 and 1626. They also failed to give a technical
description of the property. Moreover, the titles over 1625 and 1626 listed them as located in Barrio Liozon, not in Barrio Locloc
like 1197. Having failed to prove the identity of the land they sough to recover, the accion reinvindicatoria must fail.
Jakosalem vs. Barangan | February 15, 2012
Facts: Barangan bought a land in Antipolo, which he was not able to physically occupy due to his work as an Air Force. Upon
visit to attempt to build a retirement home, he discovered that Dulfo had been occupying the property. Barangan filed a case to
recover the property, which was opposed by Dulfo and his son-in-law Atty. Jakosalem, alleging new facts that the property was
acquired from a certain Samson by assignment as previous owner. The subject property was subsequently surveyed by the
DENR, and it was discovered that the land occupied by Dulfo was the same property in the Torrens title of Barangan.
Issue: WON Barangan can recover the property.
Ruling: Yes. Article 434 of the Civil Code provides that "[i]n an action to recover, the property must be identified, and the plaintiff
must rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the defendant’s claim." In other words, in order to recover
possession, a person must prove (1) the identity of the land claimed, and (2) his title. In this case, respondent Barangan was
able to prove the identity of the property and his title. To prove his title to the property, he presented in evidence the following
documents: (1) Land Purchase Agreement; (2) Deed of Absolute Sale;60 (3) and a Torrens title registered under his name. Also,
the relocation survey proves the identity of the property, and the Torrens title is an indefeasible proof of ownership.
Rodil Enterprises vs. CA | November 29, 2001
Facts: Rodil, lessee for a commercial property of the Republic, subleased it to respondent Association. By Virtue of BP 233, he
then proceeded to purchase the land which may now be alienated by the government with the authority of the DENR.
Simultaneously, the Association also attempted to lease the property directly with the Republic. The Republic initially rejected
Rodil’s offer, prompting the latter to filed a case of specific performance, but later the former granted it through a renewal
contract, extending his lease for a few more years, but Association refused to vacate the premises, which led to Rodil filing an
unlawful detainer against the Association. The MTC and RTC ruled in favor of Rodil, but the CA reversed due to the TRO issued
against Rodil enjoining him from obtaining the property, hence this petition arguing the validity of the renewal contract.
Issue: WON Rodil can eject Association by virtue of the renewal contract.
Ruling: Yes. The owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established by law.
Every owner has the freedom of disposition over his property. It is an attribute of ownership, and this rule has no exception. The
REPUBLIC being the owner of the disputed property enjoys the prerogative to enter into a lease contract with RODIL in the
exercise of its jus disponendi. Hence, as lessor, the REPUBLIC has the right to eject usurpers of the leased property where the
factual elements required for relief in an action for unlawful detainer are present. In this case, the contract entered into by Rodil
with the Republic is valid, since the TRO for the specific performance case was issued after they entered into the renewal
contract. Finally, the argument that the unlawful cannot prosper because Rodil was not in actual possession of the property
cannot prosper given that prior physical possession of the owner is not a requirement for unlawful detainer.
Villasi vs. Garcia | January 15, 2014
Facts: When Villasi won a civil case against Fil-Garcia Construction Inc (FGCI), she obtained a judgment requiring FGCI to
return the excess amount paid by Villasi for a construction which was not finished. The sheriff levied several proeprties of FGCI,
including a building allegedly owned by the Garcias. Garcia opposed the execution on the building through their Affidavit of Third
Party Claim, arguing that the building was owned by them as an accession of the land where it was erected.
Issue: WON Villasi can execute the building.
Ruling: No. Despite proving that Garcia owns the land via a Torrens Title, the building was proven by Villasi to be owned by
FGCI through tax declarations listing it in FGCI’s name. While it is a hornbook doctrine that the accessory follows the principal,
that is, the ownership of the property gives the right by accession to everything which is produced thereby, or which is
incorporated or attached thereto, either naturally or artificially, such rule is not without exception. In cases where there is a clear
and convincing evidence to prove that the principal and the accessory are not owned by one and the same person or entity, the
presumption shall not be applied and the actual ownership shall be upheld. In this case, the tax declaration, as well as the actual
possession of FGCI over the said building, will not allow the presumption of Accession follows the principal to apply.
Communities Cagayan vs. Spouses Nanol | Nov. 14, 2012
Facts: Sometime in 1994, respondent-spouses Arsenio and Angeles Nanol entered into contract to Sell with petitioner
Communities Cagayan, Inc., whereby the former agreed to sell to respondent-spouses a house and Lots 17 and 19″ locate Block
16, Camella Homes Subdivision, Cagayan de Oro City, for the price of P 368,000.00. Respondent-spouses, however, did not
avail of petitioner’s inhouse financing due to its high interest rates. Instead, they obtained a loan from Capitol Development Bank,
a sister company of petitioner, using the property as collateral. To facilitate the loan, a simulated sale over the property was
executed by petitioner in favor of respondent-spouses. Accordingly, titles were transferred in the names of respondent-spouses
under TCTs, and submitted to Capitol Development Bank for loan processing. Unfortunately, the bank collapsed and closed
before it could release the loan. Thus, on November 30, 1997, respondent-spouses entered into another Contract to Sell with
petitioner over the same property for the same price of P 368,000.00. This time, respondent-spouses availed of petitioner’s in-
house financing thus, undertaking to pay the loan over four years, from 1997 to 2001. Sometime in 2000, respondent Arsenio
demolished the original house and constructed a three-story house allegedly valued at P 3.5 million, more or less.18 In July
2001, respondent Arsenio died, leaving his wife, herein respondent Angeles, to pay for the monthly amortizations, which she
failed to do in 2003, prompting a notice of delinquency and cancellation of contract to sell, and later, this case. The RTC
rendered a decision ordering CCI to reimburse the imrpovements made by sps over the property. Hence this petition, arguing
that Art. 448 does not apply since the sps were builders in bad faith, given that they were in a contract to sell, wherein the seller
retains ownership until full payment. Given this, good faith contemplated by the article, where the builders honestly thought that
they owned the land, doesn’t apply to sps.
Issue: WON sps should be reimbursed.
Ruling: Yes. Petitioners argued using the general rule on good faith of builders. However, the court has held in Macasaet that
there is an exception to this: if the owner consented to the improvements. In this case, the Court applied Article 448 by
construing good faith beyond its limited definition. We find no reason not to apply the Courts ruling in Spouses Macasaet v.
Spouses Macasaet in this case. We thus hold that Article 448 is also applicable to the instant case. First, good faith is presumed
on the part of the respondent-spouses. Second, petitioner failed to rebut this presumption. Third, no evidence was presented to
show that petitioner opposed or objected to the improvements introduced by the respondent-spouses. Consequently, we can
validly presume that petitioner consented to the improvements being constructed. This presumption is bolstered by the fact that
as the subdivision developer, petitioner must have given the respondent-spouses permits to commence and undertake the
construction. Under Article 453 of the Civil Code, "it is understood that there is bad faith on the part of the landowner whenever
the act was done with his knowledge and without opposition on his part.” Given this, sps should be reimbursed as builders in
good faith.
Briones vs. Macabagdal | Aug 3, 2010
Facts: Briones built a house in Vergonville Subdivision on the land owned by Macabagdal, which Briones thought was theirs.
Mabagdal filed for recovery against Briones, and was granted by the RTC. Hence this petition by Briones, arguing that they built
the improvements in good faith and they cannot be expelled.
Issue: WON the house of Brioner should be demolished and WON they should be expelled from the property.
Ruling: No. ART. 448 provides: The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have
the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and
548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the
builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such
case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper
indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.
Moreover, petitioners have the right to be indemnified for the necessary and useful expenses they may have made on the
subject property. Articles 546 provides, Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the possessor in
good faith may retain the thing until he has been reimbursed therefor. Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in
good faith with the same right of retention, the person who has defeated him in the possession having the option of refunding the
amount of the expenses or of paying the increase in value which the thing may have acquired by reason thereof. In this case, the
case must be remanded to the RTC which shall conduct the appropriate proceedings to assess the respective values of the
improvement and of the land, as well as the amounts of reasonable rentals and indemnity, fix the terms of the lease if the parties
so agree, and to determine other matters necessary for the proper application of Article 448, in relation to Articles 546 and 548,
of the Civil Code.
Limense vs. Ramos | Oct 28, 2009
Facts: Dalmacio subdivided and donated his property to all his daughters. Lot 12-C was owned by the spouse of Limense, while
12-D was owned by the spouse of Ramos. Limense secured a building permit for the construction of a hollowblock fence around
the boundaries of 12-C, but then he discovered that a portion of Ramos’s house was encroaching upon 12-C. Limense then filed
a complaint for removal of obstruction and damages. The RTC and CA dismissed the complaint, hence this appeal. Due to the
death of the original parties, their survivors have taken their place in this case.
Issue: WON the parties have rights relative to the encroachment.
Ruling: In order to settle the rights of the parties relative to the undisputed encroachment, we should determine whether
respondents were builders in good faith. Good faith is an intangible and abstract quality with no technical meaning or statutory
definition; and it encompasses, among other things, an honest belief, the absence of malice and the absence of a design to
defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage. An individual’s personal good faith is a concept of his own mind and, therefore,
may not conclusively be determined by his protestations alone. It implies honesty of intention, and freedom from knowledge of
circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry. The essence of good faith lies in an honest belief in the validity of
one’s right, ignorance of a superior claim, and absence of intention to overreach another. Applied to possession, one is
considered in good faith if he is not aware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it. Good
faith is always presumed, and upon him who alleges bad faith on the part of the possessor rests the burden of proof. It is a
matter of record that respondents' predecessor-in-interest constructed their residential building on Lot No. 12-D, adjacent to Lot
No. 12-C, in 1932. Respondents' predecessor-in-interest owned the 1/3 portion of Lot No. 12-C at the time the property was
donated to them by Dalmacio Lozada in 1932. The Deed of Donation executed by the late Dalmacio Lozada, dated March 9,
1932, specifically provides that: I hereby grant, cede and donate in favor of Catalina Lozada married to Sotero Natividad, Isabel
Lozada married to Isaac Simense and Salud Lozada married to Francisco Ramos, all Filipinos, of legal age, the parcel of land
known as Lot No. 12-C, in equal parts. The portions of Lot No. 12-D, particularly the overhang, covering 1 meter in width and 17
meters in length; the stairs; and the concrete structures are all within the 1/3 share alloted to them by their donor Dalmacio
Lozada and, hence, there was absence of a showing that respondents acted in bad faith when they built portions of their house
on Lot No. 12-C. Using the above parameters, we are convinced that respondents' predecessors-in-interest acted in good faith
when they built portions of their house on Lot 12-C. Respondents being builders in good faith, the case should be remanded to
determine important facts to enforce the rights of accession of a builder in good faith.
Arangote vs. Spouses Maglunob | Feb. 18, 2009
Facts: Arangote holds the OCT for a certain parcel of land in Aklan, having obtained it from an affidavit donating the property to
them from Ezperanza. Maglunob et al then build hollowblock structures around the house and lot, blocking the main entrance.
This prompted Arangote to file a case to quiet title, and declare ownership and possession. The MeTC granted the complaint, but
both the RTC and CA reversed, hence this petition asserting Arangote’s rights as a builder in good faith.
Issue: WON Arangote is a builder in good faith.
Ruling: No. The court resolved that based on a review of the facts, the property of Ezperanza was not entirely in her disposal
when she executed the affidavit (which is also not a valid donation) because her parent’s will gave her and her siblings equal
share in the land, meaning that the land cannot be solely claimed by Arangote. In regard to Accession rights, in this case, the
subject property waived and quitclaimed by Esperanza to the petitioner and her husband in the Affidavit was only covered by a
tax declaration in the name of Esperanza. Petitioner did not even bother to look into the origin of the subject property and to
probe into the right of Esperanza to relinquish the same. Thus, when petitioner and her husband built a house thereon in 1989
they cannot be considered to have acted in good faith as they were fully aware that when Esperanza executed an Affidavit
relinquishing in their favor the subject property the only proof of Esperanza’s ownership over the same was a mere tax
declaration. This fact or circumstance alone was enough to put the petitioner and her husband under inquiry. Settled is the rule
that a tax declaration does not prove ownership. It is merely an indicium of a claim of ownership. Payment of taxes is not proof of
ownership; it is, at best, an indicium of possession in the concept of ownership. Neither tax receipts nor a declaration of
ownership for taxation purposes is evidence of ownership or of a right to possess realty when not supported by other effective
proofs.
Sulo sa Nayon vs. Nayong Pilipino | Jan. 20, 2009
Facts: Nayong Pilipino leased a land they owned to Sulo sa Nayon in order for the latter to build a hotel. The lease contract was
renewed after the first 25 years, but Sulo sa Nayon started defaulting in payments in January 2001. Nayong Pilipino sent
demand letters to Sulo threatening legal action, but Sulo sa Nayon refused. The LC rendered a decision in favor of Nayong
Pilipino by applying Art. 1678. Hence this petition by Sulo, arguing that they are builders in good faith, and Art. 448 and 546
should instead be applied.
Issue: WON Sulo sa Nayon is a builder in good faith.
Ruling: No. As contemplated in the presented articles, builders in good faith are those who introduced improvements to a land
with the honest belief that they had ownership thereof. In other words, builders in good faith are people with an adverse claim of
possession over a land. In this case, Sulo was not an adverse claimant, and instead, was a lessee who acknowledges the land
ownership of Nayong Pilipino. If the petition is granted, this would create a precedent that allows lessees to improve away the
properties of lessors. Given this, Art. 1678 applies, which states that at the option of the lessor, improvements by lessees, upon
termination of the contract, may be paid by the lessors for ½ of the value, or the lessee may remove them even if there would be
damage to the property.
Spouses Macasaet vs. Spouses Macasaet | Sep. 30, 2004
Facts: The parents filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Lipa City an ejectment suit against the children. The
parents invited Ismael to use two parcels of land for their house and construction business, in order to allow them to live near
one another, and resolve family problems together. The parents filed the case due to default in payment of rentals by Ismael.
The MTCCs and RTC held that the possession was by mere tolerance, and had an implied promise to vacate upon demand, so
they granted the ejectment suit without any reimbursement on the improvements. Hence this appeal, arguing for the rights of a
builder in good faith.
Issue: WON Ismael can avail the rights of a builder in good faith.
Ruling: Yes, Art. 448 applies. Toleration is defined as "the act or practice of permitting or enduring something not wholly
approved of." In this case, the Ismael was deemed not deemed a possessor by tolerance, given that the parents invited him to
live there and such was approved by the owner, so there was no implied promise to vacate. The exception to the general rule on
good faith also applies in this case. The instant case is factually similar to Javier v. Javier where the Court deemed the son to be
in good faith for building the improvement (the house) with the knowledge and consent of his father, to whom belonged the land
upon which it was built. Given this, since the parents consented to the possession of Ismael, then there is a presumption of good
faith on the part of Ismael. Hence, 448 applies, and the case is remanded to determine the option of the parents.
PNB vs. De Jesus | Sep 23, 2003
Facts: De Jesus filed a case against PNB for encroaching upon De Jesus’s land for having constructed a building on the
northern portion of the land, encroaching thereupon. PNB argued that it had attempted to remedy the problem with Mayor
Ignacio of Mamburao Mindoro by being offered to buy the land, though this never happened because the Mayor mortgaged the
land to DBP. The RTC and CA decided in favor of De Jesus, hence this petition asserting the rights of a builder in good faith.
Issue: WON PNB is a builder in good faith.
Ruling: No. As stated by PNB itself, it already knew of the issue when to attempted to remedy, hence they had built the building
with knowledge that they were not the owners of the land. Equally significant is the fact that the building, constructed on the land
by Ignacio, has in actuality been part of the property transferred to petitioner. Article 448, of the Civil Code refers to a piece of
land whose ownership is claimed by two or more parties, one of whom has built some works (or sown or planted something) and
not to a case where the owner of the land is the builder, sower, or planter who then later loses ownership of the land by sale or
otherwise for, elsewise stated, where the true owner himself is the builder of works on his own land, the issue of good faith or
bad faith is entirely irrelevant.
Heirs of Sarili vs. Lagrosa | Jan 15, 2014
Facts: Sarili obtained a fraudulent deed of absolute sale from a certain Ramon under the authority of an alleged SPA authorizing
him to sell or dispose of the same land owned by Lagrosa. Lagrosa then filed a complaint against Sarili, asserting ownership
over the subject land, presenting his certificate of title. The RTC dismissed the complaint, ruling over the authenticity of the SPA,
but the CA reversed, finding the opposite. Hence this petition.
Issue: WON Sarili has ownership over the property and WON he is entitled to refunds of the improvement and necessary
expenses.
Ruling: No. The SPA of Ramon is deemed inauthentic for presenting a different signature than that of owner Lagros, that it
lacked the proper community tax number required of Notarized Documents, and as a Private Document, as required by Rule
132, Sarili failed to prove the document purporting to be authentic, as duly executed and authentic by seeing it written, or by
having matching signatures. Given that the SPA was invalid, Lagrosa is the rightful owner. In terms of the improvements, 449,
450, 451, 452, and 546 must apply. The issue in this regard would be whether Sarili is a builder in good faith or not, allowing the
parties and the court to know the proper recourse. Hence, the case in this aspect, is remanded for the proper application of the
said articles.
MWSS vs. CA | Aug 25, 1986
Facts: The City of Dagupan filed a complaint against MWSS (formerly NAWASA) for recovery of ownership and possession of
the Dagupan Waterworks System. MWSS argues that it is the owner of said system by virtue of RA1383 which grants it
ownership of all waterworks systems throughout the Philippines, and asserts reimbursements for improvements. The RTC
rendered judgment in favor of Dagupan because they deemed that MWSS was a possessor in bad faith for placing the said
improvements multiple SC cases against MWSS declaring unconstitutional its taking of patrimonial waterworks of LGU’s without
just compensation, and is not entitled to reimbursements for the 250k improvements it alleges. Hence this petition, raising the
issue of whether MWSS can remove the improvements in light of the decision against it.
Issue: WON MWSS can remove the improvements.
Ruling: No. Article 449 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides that "he who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of
another, loses what is built, planted or sown without right to indemnity." As a builder in bad faith, NAWASA lost whatever useful
improvements it had made without right to indemnity. Moreover, under Article 546 of said code, only a possessor in good faith
shall be refunded for useful expenses with the right of retention until reimbursed; and under Article 547 thereof, only a possessor
in good faith may remove useful improvements if this can be done without damage to the principal thing and if the person who
recovers the possession does not exercise the option of reimbursing the useful expenses. The right given a possessor in bad
faith to remove improvements applies only to improvements for pure luxury or mere pleasure, provided the thing suffers no injury
thereby and the lawful possessor does not prefer to retain them by paying the value they have at the time he enters into
possession (Article 549, Id.).
Cosio vs. Palileo | May 31, 1965
Facts: Palileo bought a two-story building and lot in Antipolo, paying the partial purchase price, and mortgaging the same as
security for payment. Palileo defaulted, causing the property to be foreclosed advertised for sale in auction. Before being sold in
auction, Palileo was able to obtain 12k from Cosio to comply with her obligation, in exchange for signing the document
“Conditional Sale of Residential Building”, conveying the property to Cosio, but giving Palileo the right to repurchase it within one
year of the conveyance, before which, she will remain in possession of the property as tenant in leasehold. Due to a fire, brother
of Cosio entered the structure and instituted repairs without the consent of Palileo. Palileo then filed an ejectment case, and a
case for reformation of the deed of pacto de retro sale into a loan with an equitable mortgage. The former failed, but the latter
was successful. After those cases, Palileo filed a case to recover possession of the house pursuant to the reformation of the sale
into a loan. The LC declared that Cosio was a possessor in good faith, but the CA reversed this. Hence this case by Cosio,
contending that he is a possessor in good faith, and is entitled to retain the house and be reimbursed of the repairs.
Issue: WON Cosio is a possessor in good faith.
Ruling: No, but he is still entitled to a refund. Given that the sale was reformed into a loan with mortgage, it means that the
parties had knowledge that the house, which was the mortgaged property, was in the ownership of Palileo absent foreclosure of
the property in favor of Cosio. Having this knowledge, it means that Cosio entered the house and installed the repairs knowing
that the property was owned by Palileo, making Cosio a possessor in bad faith. Regardless, being a possessor in bad faith is
immaterial to the right of Cosio to be reimbursed of the repairs, since in this case, 449 cannot apply since the law involves
BUILDERS, not POSSESSORS, in bad faith, and is a rule on accession, not on necessary expenses. 546 is more proper in this
case, granting a refund to Cosio of the repairs, despite being a possessor in bad faith.