REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v.
MARELYN husband's marriage was previously registered, in order that it
TANEDO MANALO, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court (Rules) seeks to reverse and set aside the
September 18, 2014 Decision1 and October 12, 2015
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
100076. The dispositive portion of the Decision states:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED.
The Decision dated 15 October 2012 of the Regional Trial
Court of Dagupan City, First Judicial Region, Branch 43, in
SPEC. PROC. NO. 2012-0005 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Let a copy of this Decision be served on the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila.
SO ORDERED.3
The facts are undisputed.
On January 10, 2012, respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo
(Manalo) filed a petition for cancellation of entry of marriage
in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila, by virtue of a
judgment of divorce rendered by a Japanese court.
Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and in substance,
Branch 43 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City
set the case for initial hearing on April 25, 2012. The petition
and the notice of initial hearing were published once a week
for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation. During the initial hearing, counsel for Manalo
marked the documentary evidence (consisting of the trial
court's Order dated January 25, 2012, affidavit of publication,
and issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27,
2012, February 28 - March 5, 2012, and March 6-12, 2012) for
purposes of compliance with the jurisdictional requirements.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its
appearance for petitioner Republic of the Philippines
authorizing the Office of the City Prosecutor of Dagupan to
appear on its behalf. Likewise, a Manifestation and Motion
was filed questioning the title and/or caption of the petition
considering that, based on the allegations therein, the proper
action should be a petition for recognition and enforcement of
a foreign judgment.
As a result, Manalo moved to admit an Amended Petition,
which the court granted. The Amended Petition, which
captioned that it is also a petition for recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgment, alleged:
2. That petitioner is previously married in the Philippines to a
Japanese national named YOSHINO MINORO as shown by
their Marriage Contract x x x;
3. That recently, a case for divorce was filed by herein
[petitioner] in Japan and after due proceedings, a divorce
decree dated December 6, 2011 was rendered by the Japanese
Court x x x;
4. That at present, by virtue of the said divorce decree,
petitioner and her divorced Japanese husband are no longer
living together and in fact, petitioner and her daughter are
living separately from said Japanese former husband;
5. That there is an imperative need to have the entry of
marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila
cancelled, where the petitioner and the former Japanese
would not appear anymore that petitioner is still married to
the said Japanese national who is no longer her husband or is
no longer married to her; furthermore, in the event that
petitioner decides to be remarried, she shall not be bothered
and disturbed by said entry of marriage;
6. That this petition is filed principally for the purpose of
causing the cancellation of entry of the marriage between the
petitioner and the said Japanese national, pursuant to Rule
108 of the Revised Rules of Court, which marriage was
already dissolved by virtue of the aforesaid divorce decree;
[and]
7. That petitioner prays, among others, that together with the
cancellation of the said entry of her marriage, that she be
allowed to return and use. her maiden surname, MANALO.4
Manalo was allowed to testify in advance as she was
scheduled to leave for Japan for her employment. Among the
documents that were offered and admitted were:
1. Court Order dated January 25, 2012, finding the petition
and its attachments to be sufficient in form and in substance;
2. Affidavit of Publication;
3. Issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012,
February 28 - March 5, 2012, and March 6-12, 2012;
4. Certificate of Marriage between Manalo and her former
Japanese husband;
5. Divorce Decree of the Japanese court;
6. Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippine
Consulate General in Osaka, Japan of the Notification of
Divorce; and
7. Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce.5
The OSG did not present any controverting evidence to rebut
the allegations of Manalo.
On October 15, 2012, the trial court denied the petition for
lack of merit. In ruling that the divorce obtained by Manalo in
Japan should not be recognized, it opined that, based on
Article 15 of the New Civil Code, the Philippine law "does not
afford Filipinos the right to file for a divorce, whether they are
in the country or living abroad, if they are married to Filipinos
or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their marriage in the
Philippines or in another country" and that unless Filipinos
"are naturalized as citizens of another country, Philippine
laws shall have control over issues related to Filipinos' family
rights and duties, together with the determination of their
condition and legal capacity to enter into contracts and civil
relations, including marriages."6
On appeal, the CA overturned the RTC decision. It held that
Article 26 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code)
is applicable even if it was Manalo who filed for divorce
against her Japanese husband because the decree they
obtained makes the latter no longer married to the former,
capacitating him to remarry. Conformably with Navarro, et al.
v. Exec. Secretary Ermita, et al.7 ruling that the meaning of the
law should be based on the intent of the lawmakers and in
view of the legislative intent behind Article 26, it would be the
height of injustice to consider Manalo as still married to the
Japanese national, who, in turn, is no longer married to her.
For the appellate court, the fact that it was Manalo who filed
the divorce case is inconsequential. Cited as similar to this
case was Van Dorn v. Judge Romillo, Jr.8 where the marriage
between a foreigner and a Filipino was dissolved through a
divorce filed abroad by the latter.
The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied;
hence, this petition.
We deny the petition and partially affirm the CA decision.
Divorce, the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause
arising after marriage, are of two types: (1) absolute divorce
or a vinculo matrimonii, which terminates the marriage, and
(2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro, which suspends it and
leaves the bond in full force.9 In this jurisdiction, the following
rules exist:
1. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence,
our courts cannot grant it.10
2. Consistent with Articles 1511 and 1712 of the New Civil Code,
the marital bond between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved
even by an absolute divorce obtained abroad.13
3. An absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are
both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it
is consistent with their respective national laws.14
4. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, the
former is allowed to contract a subsequent marriage in case
the absolute divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.15
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino signed into
law Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209, otherwise known as The
Family Code of the Philippines, which took effect on August 3,
1988.16 Shortly thereafter, E.O. No. 227 was issued on July 17,
1987.17 Aside from amending Articles 36 and 39 of the Family
Code, a second paragraph was added to Article 26. 18 This
provision was originally deleted by the Civil Code Revision
Committee (Committee), but it was presented and approved at
a Cabinet meeting after Pres. Aquino signed E.O. No. 209.19 As
modified, Article 26 now states:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in
this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1),
(4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 confers jurisdiction on Philippine
courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a
Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the
validity of the dissolution of the marriage.20 It authorizes our
courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree
precisely because the Philippines does not allow
divorce.21 Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits
because it is tantamount to trying a divorce case.22 Under the
principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid
divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality, but the
legal effects thereof, e.g., on custody, care and support of the
children or property relations of the spouses, must still be
determined by our courts.23
According to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of
the Committee, the idea of the amendment is to avoid the
absurd situation of a Filipino as still being married to his or
her alien spouse, although the latter is no longer married to
the former because he or she had obtained a divorce abroad
that is recognized by his or her national law.24 The aim was
that it would solve the problem of many Filipino women who,
under the New Civil Code, are still considered married to their
alien husbands even after the latter have already validly
divorced them under their (the husbands') national laws and
perhaps have already married again.25
In 2005, this Court concluded that Paragraph 2 of Article 26
applies to a case where, at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one
of them acquired foreign citizenship by naturalization,
initiated a divorce proceeding, and obtained a favorable
decree. We held in Republic of the Phils. v. Orbecido III:26
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case
of Quita v. Court of Appeals. In Quita, the parties were, as in
this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife
became a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained a
divorce in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way
of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized
foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and
can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and
applying the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving
parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage
were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree.
The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as
if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to
sanction absurdity and injustice. x x x
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the
absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married
to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be
deemed as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the
application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been
celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the
time of the celebration of the marriage, but their
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.27
Now, the Court is tasked to resolve whether, under the same
provision, a Filipino citizen has the capacity to remarry under
Philippine law after initiating a divorce proceeding abroad
and obtaining a favorable judgment against his or her alien
spouse who is capacitated to remarry. Specifically, Manalo
pleads for the recognition and enforcement of the divorce
decree rendered by the Japanese court and for the
cancellation of the entry of marriage in the local civil registry
"in order that it would not appear anymore that [she] is still
married to the said Japanese national who is no longer her
husband or is no longer married to her; [and], in the event
that [she] decides to be remarried, she shall not be bothered
and disturbed by said entry of marriage," and to return and to
use her maiden surname.
We rule in the affirmative.
Both Dacasin v. Dacasin28 and Van Dorn29 already recognized a
foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by the
Filipino spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of
child custody and property relation, respectively.
In Dacasin, post-divorce, the former spouses executed an
Agreement for the joint custody of their minor daughter. Later
on, the husband, who is a US citizen, sued his Filipino wife to
enforce the Agreement, alleging that it was only, the latter
who exercised sole custody of their child. The trial court
dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, on the ground,
among others, that the divorce decree is binding following the
"nationality rule" prevailing in this jurisdiction. The husband
moved to reconsider, arguing that the divorce decree
obtained by his former wife is void, but it was denied. In
ruling that the trial court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit
but not to enforce the Agreement, which is void, this Court
said:
Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decree's alleged
invalidity - not because the Illinois court lacked jurisdiction or
that the divorce decree violated Illinois law, but because the
divorce was obtained by his Filipino spouse - to support the
Agreement's enforceability. The argument that foreigners in
this jurisdiction are not bound by foreign divorce decrees is
hardly novel. Van Dorn v. Romillo settled the matter by
holding that an alien spouse of a Filipino is bound by a divorce
decree obtained abroad. There, we dismissed the alien
divorcee's Philippine suit for accounting of alleged post-
divorce conjugal property and rejected his submission that
the foreign divorce (obtained by the Filipino spouse) is not
valid in this jurisdiction x x x.30
Van Dorn was decided before the Family Code took into effect.
There, a complaint was filed by the ex-husband, who is a US
citizen, against his Filipino wife to render an accounting of a
business that was alleged to be a conjugal property and to be
declared with right to manage the same. Van Dorn moved to
dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action was
barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings that
she initiated, but the trial court denied the motion. On his
part, her ex-husband averred that the divorce decree issued
by the Nevada court could not prevail over the prohibitive
laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that
the acts and declaration of a foreign court cannot, especially if
the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine courts
of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction. In
dismissing the case filed by the alien spouse, the Court
discussed the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and
their conjugal property in the Philippines. Thus:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada
divorce in any of the States of the United States. The decree is
binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For
instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her
husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in
this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this
jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public
policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in
Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are
covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same
being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and
morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which
may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in
Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from
the standards of American law, under which divorce
dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme
Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed.
794, 799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond
of matrimony by a court of competent jurisdiction are to
change the existing status or domestic relation of husband
and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage
tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A
husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is
unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the nature of a
penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party,
as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of
the former marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no
longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing
to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to
exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the
Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised
jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not
repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before
said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws,
petitioner has to be considered still married to private
respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under
Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner
should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect
and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The
latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible
rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated
against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be
served.31
In addition, the fact that a validly obtained foreign divorce
initiated by the Filipino spouse can be recognized and given
legal effects in the Philippines is implied from Our rulings
in Fujiki v. Marinay, et al.32 and Medina v. Koike.33
In Fujiki, the Filipino wife, with the help of her first husband,
who is a Japanese national, was able to obtain a judgment
from Japan's family court, which declared the marriage
between her and her second husband, who is a Japanese
national, void on the ground of bigamy. In resolving the issue
of whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a
petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the
subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign
citizen on the ground of bigamy, We ruled:
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the
Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy
because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to
Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file a
petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage
between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the
basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and
material interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage
he contracted and the property relations arising from it.
There is also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation
of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which
compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest
derives from the substantive right of the spouse not only to
preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances) his most intimate
human relation, but also to protect his property interests that
arise by operation of law the moment he contracts marriage.
These property interests in marriage include the right to be
supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the
family" and preserving the property regime of the marriage.
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by
the Constitution, but a spouse's right in a marriage extends
further to relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights
and Obligations between Husband and Wife") of the Family
Code. x x x34
On the other hand, in Medina, the Filipino wife and her
Japanese husband jointly filed for divorce, which was granted.
Subsequently, she filed a petition before the RTC for judicial
recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to
remarry pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Article 26. The RTC
denied the petition on the ground that the foreign divorce
decree and the national law of the alien spouse recognizing
his capacity to obtain a divorce decree must be proven in
accordance with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence. This Court agreed and ruled that,
consistent with Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, et al.35 and Garcia v.
Recio,36 the divorce decree and the national law of the alien
spouse must be proven. Instead of dismissing the case, We
referred it to the CA for appropriate action including the
reception of evidence to determine and resolve the pertinent
factual issues.
There is no compelling reason to deviate from the above-
mentioned rulings. When this Court recognized a foreign
divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino
spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of child
custody and property relation, it should not stop short in
likewise acknowledging that one of the usual and necessary
consequences of absolute divorce is the right to remarry.
Indeed, there is no longer a mutual obligation to live together
and observe fidelity. When the marriage tie is severed and
ceased to exist, the civil status and the domestic relation of
the former spouses change as both of them are freed from the
marital bond.
The dissent is of the view that, under the nationality principle,
Manalo's personal status is subject to Philippine law, which
prohibits absolute divorce. Hence, the divorce decree which
she obtained under Japanese law cannot be given effect, as
she is, without dispute, a national not of Japan, but of the
Philippines. It is said that a contrary ruling will subvert not
only the intention of the framers of the law, but also that of
the Filipino people, as expressed in the Constitution. The
Court is, therefore, bound to respect the prohibition until the
legislature deems it fit to lift the same.
We beg to differ.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of "a divorce x x x validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry. " Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision,
it only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained
abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that the alien
spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding
wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not
distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or
the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is
bound by the words of the statute; neither can We put words
in the mouths of the lawmakers.37 "The legislature is
presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have used
words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use
of such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est
recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no
departure."38
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained"
should be interpreted to mean that the divorce proceeding
must be actually initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court
will not follow the letter of the statute when to do so would
depart from the true intent of the legislature or would
otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general
purpose of the act.39 Laws have ends to achieve, and statutes
should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such
ends and purposes.40 As held in League of Cities of the Phils., et
al. v. COMELEC, et al.:41
The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in
the manner in which the resulting law is couched. Thus,
applying a verba legis or strictly literal interpretation of a
statute may render it meaningless and lead to inconvenience,
an absurd situation or injustice. To obviate this aberration,
and bearing in mind the principle that the intent or the spirit
of the law is the law itself, resort should be to the rule that the
spirit of the law controls its letter.
To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to
avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce
decree that is effective in the country where it was rendered,
is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The provision is a
corrective measure to address an anomaly where the Filipino
spouse is tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free
to marry under the laws of his or her country.42 Whether the
Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or
not, a favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and
capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the
same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a
husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce
proceeding is in the same place and in "like circumstance as a
Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated
proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should not make
a distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a means to
recognize the residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on
Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed
by operation of the latter's national law.
Conveniently invoking the nationality principle is erroneous.
Such principle, found under Article 15 of the Civil Code, is not
an absolute and unbending rule. In fact, the mere existence of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is a testament that the State may
provide for an exception thereto. Moreover, blind adherence
to the nationality principle must be disallowed if it would
cause unjust discrimination and oppression to certain classes
of individuals whose rights are equally protected by law. The
courts have the duty to enforce the laws of divorce as written
by the Legislature only if they are constitutional.43
While the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for
a valid classification and that its decision is accorded
recognition and respect by the courts of justice, such
classification may be subjected to judicial review. 44 The
deference stops where the classification violates a
fundamental right, or prejudices persons accorded special
protection by the Constitution.45 When these violations arise,
this Court must discharge its primary role as the vanguard of
constitutional guaranties, and require a stricter and more
exacting adherence to constitutional limitations.46 If a
legislative classification impermissibly interferes with the
exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar
disadvantage of a suspect class strict judicial scrutiny is
required since it is presumed unconstitutional, and the
burden is upon the government to prove that the
classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state
interest and that it is the least restrictive means to protect
such interest.47
"Fundamental rights" whose infringement leads to strict
scrutiny under the equal protection clause are those basic
liberties explicitly or implicitly guaranteed in the
Constitution.48 It includes the right of procreation, the right to
marry, the right to exercise free speech, political expression,
press, assembly, and so forth, the right to travel, and the right
to vote.49 On the other hand, what constitutes compelling
state interest is measured by the scale of rights and powers
arrayed in the Constitution and calibrated by history.50 It is
akin to the paramount interest of the state for which some
individual liberties must give way, such as the promotion of
public interest, public safety or the general welfare. 51 It
essentially involves a public right or interest that, because of
its primacy, overrides individual rights, and allows the former
to take precedence over the latter.52
Although the Family Code was not enacted by the Congress,
the same principle applies with respect to the acts of the
President, which have the force and effect of law unless
declared otherwise by the court. In this case, We find that
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 violates one of the essential
requisites53 of the equal protection clause.54 Particularly, the
limitation of the provision only to a foreign divorce decree
initiated by the alien spouse is unreasonable as it is based on
superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical classification.
A Filipino who is married to another Filipino is not similarly
situated with a Filipino who is married to a foreign citizen.
There are real, material and substantial differences between
them. Ergo, they should not be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and liabilities imposed. Without a doubt, there are
political, economic, cultural, and religious dissimilarities as
well as varying legal systems and procedures, all too
unfamiliar, that a Filipino national who is married to an alien
spouse has to contend with. More importantly, while a
divorce decree obtained abroad by a Filipino against another
Filipino is null and void, a divorce decree obtained by an alien
against his or her Filipino spouse is recognized if made in
accordance with the national law of the foreigner.55
On the contrary, there is no real and substantial difference
between a Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce
proceedings and a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree
upon the instance of his or her alien spouse. In the eyes of the
Philippine and foreign laws, both are considered as Filipinos
who have the same rights and obligations in a alien land. The
circumstances surrounding them are alike. Were it not for
Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are still married to their
foreigner spouses who are no longer their wives/husbands.
Hence, to make a distinction between them based merely on
the superficial difference of whether they initiated the divorce
proceedings or not is utterly unfair. Indeed, the treatment
gives undue favor to one and unjustly discriminate against the
other.
Further, the differentiation in Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is
arbitrary. There is inequality in treatment because a foreign
divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by a Filipino
citizen against his or her alien spouse would not be
recognized even if based on grounds similar to Articles 35, 36,
37 and 38 of the Family Code.56 In filing for divorce based on
these grounds, the Filipino spouse cannot be accused of
invoking foreign law at whim, tantamount to insisting that he
or she should be governed with whatever law he or she
chooses. The dissent's comment that Manalo should be
"reminded that all is not lost, for she may still pray for the
severance of her marital ties before the RTC in accordance
with the mechanisms now existing under the Family Code" is
anything but comforting. For the guidance of the bench and
the bar, it would have been better if the dissent discussed in
detail what these "mechanisms" are and how they specifically
apply in Manalo's case as well as those who are similarly
situated. If the dissent refers to a petition for declaration of
nullity or annulment of marriage, the reality is that there is no
assurance that our courts will automatically grant the same.
Besides, such proceeding is duplicitous, costly, and
protracted. All to the prejudice of our kababayan.
It is argued that the Court's liberal interpretation of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 encourages Filipinos to marry
foreigners, opening the floodgate to the indiscriminate
practice of Filipinos marrying foreign nationals or initiating
divorce proceedings against their alien spouses.
The supposition is speculative and unfounded.
First, the dissent falls into a hasty generalization as no data
whatsoever was shown to support what he intends to
prove. Second, We adhere to the presumption of good faith in
this jurisdiction. Under the rules on evidence, it is disputably
presumed (i.e., satisfactory if uncontradicted and overcome
by other evidence) that a person is innocent of crime or
wrong,57 that a person intends the ordinary consequences of
his voluntary acts,58 that a person takes ordinary care of his
concerns,59 that acquiescence resulted from a belief that the
thing acquiesced in was conformable to the law and
fact,60 that a man and woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage,61 and that the law has been obeyed.62 It is whimsical
to easily attribute any illegal, irregular or immoral conduct on
the part of a Filipino just because he or she opted to marry a
foreigner instead of a fellow Filipino. It is presumed that
interracial unions are entered into out of genuine love and
affection, rather than prompted by pure lust or profit. Third,
We take judicial notice of the fact that Filipinos are relatively
more forbearing and conservative in nature and that they are
more often the victims or at the losing end of mixed
marriages. And Fourth, it is not for Us to prejudge the motive
behind a Filipino's decision to marry an alien national. In one
case, it was said:
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex.
The State does not and cannot dictate on the kind of life that a
couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle
would go into the realm of their right to privacy and would
raise serious constitutional questions. The right to marital
privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages in
almost any way they see fit, to live together or live apart, to
have children or no children, to love one another or not, and
so on. Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes,
limited or otherwise, such as convenience, companionship,
money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all
the legal requisites, are equally valid. Love, though the ideal
consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid
cause for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by
law, may validly support a marriage.63
The 1987 Constitution expresses that marriage, as an
inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family
and shall be protected by the State.64 Nevertheless, it was not
meant to be a general prohibition on divorce because
Commissioner Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon, in response to a
question by Father Joaquin G. Bernas during the deliberations
of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, was categorical about
this point.65 Their exchange reveal as follows:
MR. RAMA. Mr. Presiding Officer, may I ask that
Commissioner Bernas be recognized.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Colayco). Commissioner
Bernas is recognized.
FR. BERNAS. Just one question, and I am not sure if it has been
categorically answered. I refer specifically to the proposal of
Commissioner Gascon. Is this to be understood as a
prohibition of a general law on divorce? His intention is to
make this a prohibition so that the legislature cannot pass a
divorce law.
MR. GASCON. Mr. Presiding Officer, that was not primarily my
intention. My intention was primarily to encourage the social
institution of marriage, but not necessarily discourage
divorce. But now that he mentioned the issue of divorce, my
personal opinion is to discourage it, Mr. Presiding Officer.
FR. BERNAS. No. my question is more categorical. Does this
carry the meaning of prohibiting a divorce law?
MR. GASCON. No. Mr. Presiding Officer.
FR. BERNAS. Thank you.66
Notably, a law on absolute divorce is not new in our country.
Effective March 11, 1917, Philippine courts could grant an
absolute divorce on the grounds of adultery on the part of the
wife or concubinage on the part of the husband by virtue of
Act No. 2710 of the Philippine Legislature.67 On March 25,
1943, pursuant to the authority conferred upon him by the
Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Japanese Forces in the
Philippines and with the approval of the latter, the Chairman
of the Philippine Executive Commission promulgated an E.O.
No. 141 ("New Divorce Law"), which repealed Act No. 2710
and provided eleven grounds for absolute divorce, such as
intentional or unjustified desertion continuously for at least
one year prior to the filing of the action, slander by deed or
gross insult by one spouse against the other to such an extent
as to make further living together impracticable, and a
spouse's incurable insanity.68 When the Philippines was
liberated and the Commonwealth Government was restored,
it ceased to have force and effect and Act No. 2710 again
prevailed.69 From August 30, 1950, upon the effectivity of
Republic Act No. 386 or the New Civil Code, an absolute
divorce obtained by Filipino citizens, whether here or abroad,
is no longer recognized.70
Through the years, there has been constant clamor from
various sectors of the Philippine society to re-institute
absolute divorce. As a matter of fact, in the current 17th
Congress, House Bill (H.B.) Nos. 116,71 1062,72 238073 and
602774 were filed in the House of Representatives. In
substitution of these bills, H.B. No. 7303 entitled "An Act
Instituting Absolute Divorce and Dissolution of Marriage in the
Philippines" or the Absolute Divorce Act of 2018 was submitted
by the House Committee on Population and Family Relations
on February 28, 2018. It was approved on March 19, 2018 on
Third Reading - with 134 in favor, 57 against, and 2
abstentions. Under the bill, the grounds for a judicial decree of
absolute divorce are as follows:
1. The grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of
the Family Code, modified or amended, as follows:
a. Physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed
against the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the
petitioner;
b. Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the
petitioner to change religious or political affiliation;
c. Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a
common child, or a child of the petitioner, to engage in
prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement;
d. Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment
of more than six (6) years, even if pardoned;
e. Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism or chronic gambling
of the respondent;
f. Homosexuality of the respondent;
g. Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous
marriage, whether in the Philippines or abroad;
h. Marital infidelity or perversion or having a child with
another person other than one's spouse during the marriage,
except when upon the mutual agreement of the spouses, a
child is born to them by in vitro or a similar procedure or
when the wife bears a child after being a victim of rape;
i. Attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner,
a common child or a child of the petitioner; and
j. Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without
justifiable cause for more than one (1) year.
When the spouses are legally separated by judicial decree for
more than two (2) years, either or both spouses can petition
the proper court for an absolute divorce based on said judicial
decree of legal separation.
1. Grounds for annulment of marriage under Article 45 of the
Family Code, restated as follows:
a. The party in whose behalf it is sought to
have the marriage annulled was eighteen
(18) years of age or over but below twenty-
one (21), and the marriage was solemnized
without the consent of the parents, guardian
or person having substitute parental
authority over the party, in that order,
unless after attaining the age of twenty-one
(21), such party freely cohabited with the
other and both lived together as husband or
wife;
b. either party was of unsound mind, unless
such party after coming to reason, freely
cohabited with the other as husband and
wife;
c. The consent of either party was obtained by
fraud, unless such party afterwards with full
knowledge of the facts constituting the
fraud, freely cohabited with the other as
husband and wife;
d. The consent of either party was obtained by
force, intimidation or undue influence,
unless the same having disappeared or
ceased, such party thereafter freely
cohabited with the other as husband and
wife;
e. Either party was physically incapable of
consummating the marriage with the other
and such incapacity continues or appears to
be incurable; and
f. Either party was afflicted with a sexually
transmissible infection found to be serious
or appears to be incurable.
Provided, That the grounds mentioned in b, e and f existed
either at the time of the marriage or supervening after the
marriage.
1. When the spouses have been separated in
fact for at least five (5) years at the time the
petition for absolute divorce is filed, and
reconciliation is highly improbable;
2. Psychological incapacity of either spouse as
provided for in Article 36 of the Family
Code, whether or not the incapacity was
present at the time of the celebration of the
marriage or later;
3. When one of the spouses undergoes a
gender reassignment surgery or transitions
from one sex to another, the other spouse is
entitled to petition for absolute divorce with
the transgender or transsexual as
respondent, or vice-versa;
4. Irreconcilable marital differences and
conflicts which have resulted in the total
breakdown of the marriage beyond repair,
despite earnest and repeated efforts at
reconciliation.
To be sure, a good number of the Filipinos led by the Roman
Catholic Church react adversely to any attempt to enact a law
on absolute divorce, viewing it as contrary to our customs,
morals, and traditions that has looked upon marriage and
family as an institution and their nature of permanence,
inviolability, and solidarity. However, none of our laws should
be based on any religious law, doctrine, or teaching;
otherwise, the separation of Church and State will be
violated.75
In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts
what the government can do with religion, it also limits what
religious sects can or cannot do. They can neither cause the
government to adopt their particular doctrines as policy for
everyone, nor can they cause the government to restrict other
groups. To do so, in simple terms, would cause the State to
adhere to a particular religion and, thus, establish a state
religion.76
The Roman Catholic Church can neither impose its beliefs and
convictions on the State and the rest of the citizenry nor can it
demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it sincerely
believes that they are good for the country.77 While marriage
is considered a sacrament, it has civil and legal consequences
which are governed by the Family Code.78 It is in this aspect,
bereft of any ecclesiastical overtone, that the State has a
legitimate right and interest to regulate.
The declared State policy that marriage, as an inviolable social
institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State, should not be read in total isolation
but must be harmonized with other constitutional provisions.
Aside from strengthening the solidarity of the Filipino family,
the State is equally mandated to actively promote its total
development.79 It is also obligated to defend, among others,
the right of children to special protection from all forms of
neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions
prejudicial to their development.80 To Our mind, the State
cannot effectively enforce these obligations if We limit the
application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 only to those foreign
divorce initiated by the alien spouse. It is not amiss to point
that the women and children are almost always the helpless
victims of all forms of domestic abuse and violence. In fact,
among the notable legislation passed in order to minimize, if
not eradicate, the menace are R.A. No. 6955 (prohibiting mail
order bride and similar practices), R.A. No. 9262 ("Anti-
Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004"), R.A.
No. 9710 ("The Magna Carta of Women"), R.A. No. 10354
("The Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of
2012"), and R.A. No. 9208 ("Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of
2003"), as amended by R.A. No. 10364 ("Expanded Anti-
Trafficking in Persons Act of 2012"). Moreover, in protecting
and strengthening the Filipino family as a basic autonomous
social institution, the Court must not lose sight of the
constitutional mandate to value the dignity of every human
person, guarantee full respect for human rights, and ensure
the fundamental equality before the law of women and men. 81
A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do
more harm than good. If We disallow a Filipino citizen who
initiated and obtained a foreign divorce from the coverage of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 and still require him or her to first
avail of the existing "mechanisms" under the Family Code, any
subsequent relationship that he or she would enter in the
meantime shall be considered as illicit in the eyes of the
Philippine law. Worse, any child born out of such "extra-
marital" affair has to suffer the stigma of being branded as
illegitimate. Surely, these are just but a few of the adverse
consequences, not only to the parent but also to the child, if
We are to hold a restrictive interpretation of the subject
provision. The irony is that the principle of inviolability of
marriage under Section 2, Article XV of the Constitution is
meant to be tilted in favor of marriage and against unions not
formalized by marriage, but without denying State protection
and assistance to live-in arrangements or to families formed
according to indigenous customs.82
This Court should not turn a blind eye to the realities of the
present time. With the advancement of communication and
information technology, as well as the improvement of the
transportation system that almost instantly connect people
from all over the world, mixed marriages have become not too
uncommon. Likewise, it is recognized that not all marriages
are made in heaven and that imperfect humans more often
than not create imperfect unions.83 Living in a flawed world,
the unfortunate reality for some is that the attainment of the
individual's full human potential and self-fulfillment is not
found and achieved in the context of a marriage. Thus, it is
hypocritical to safeguard the quantity of existing marriages
and, at the same time, brush aside the truth that some of them
are of rotten quality.
Going back, We hold that marriage, being a mutual and shared
commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be
productive of any good to the society where one is considered
released from the marital bond while the other remains
bound to it.84 In reiterating that the Filipino spouse should not
be discriminated against in his or her own country if the ends
of justice are to be served, San Luis v. San Luis85 quoted:
x x x In Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, the Court
stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its
results; and likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a
cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first
concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions
the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should
never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this
is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of
that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the
legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but
in consonance with justice. Law and justice are inseparable,
and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws
that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied
in a particular case because of its peculiar circumstances. In
such a situation, we are not bound, because only of our nature
and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish
obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a
balance between the word and the will, that justice may be
done even as the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not
unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded, yielding like robots
to the literal command without regard to its cause and
consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to
the words of a law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes
again, "where these words import a policy that goes beyond
them."
xxxx
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as
the constant and perpetual wish to render every one his due."
That wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses
the facts and the law in every case brought to it for decision.
Justice is always an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus
when the facts warrant, we interpret the law in a way that will
render justice, presuming that it was the intention of the
lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with
justice.86
Indeed, where the interpretation of a statute according to its
exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or
contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be
construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as
far as necessary the letter of the law.87 A statute may,
therefore, be extended to cases not within the literal meaning
of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent.88
The foregoing notwithstanding, We cannot yet write finis to
this controversy by granting Manalo's petition to recognize
and enforce the divorce decree rendered by the Japanese
court and to cancel the entry of marriage in the Civil Registry
of San Juan, Metro Manila.
Jurisprudence has set guidelines before Philippine courts
recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign
country. Presentation solely of the divorce decree will not
suffice.89 The fact of divorce must still first be proven.90 Before
a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the
party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. 91
x x x Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive
evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and
admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by
the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a
judgment is the judgment itself. The decree purports to be a
written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of
a foreign country.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a
writing or document may be proven as a public or official
record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication
or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal
custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the
Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a
certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer
in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by
the seal of his office.92
In granting Manalo's petition, the CA noted:
In this case, Petitioner was able to submit before the court a
quo the 1) Decision of the Japanese Court allowing the divorce;
2) the Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippine
Consulate General in Osaka, Japan of the Decree of Divorce;
and 3) Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce by Petitioner and
the Japanese national. Under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in
relation to Rule 39, Section 48 (b) of the Rules of Court, these
documents sufficiently prove the subject Divorce Decree as a
fact. Thus, We are constrained to recognize the Japanese
Court's judgment decreeing the divorce.93
If the opposing party fails to properly object, as in this case,
the divorce decree is rendered admissible as a written act of
the foreign court.94 As it appears, the existence of the divorce
decree was not denied by the OSG; neither was the
jurisdiction of the divorce court impeached nor the validity of
its proceedings challenged on the ground of collusion, fraud,
or clear mistake of fact or law, albeit an opportunity to do
so.95
Nonetheless, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved.
x x x The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges the
existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or
defense of an action." In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden
of proving the material allegations of the complaint when
those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the
burden of proving the material allegations in their answer
when they introduce new matters. x x x
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot
take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they
must be alleged and proved. x x x The power of judicial notice
must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt
upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.96
Since the divorce was raised by Manalo, the burden of proving
the pertinent Japanese law validating it, as well as her former
husband's capacity to remarry, fall squarely upon her.
Japanese laws on persons and family relations are not among
those matters that Filipino judges are supposed to know by
reason of their judicial function.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED.
The September 18, 2014 Decision and October 12, 2015
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 100076,
are AFFIRMED IN PART. The case is REMANDED to the court
of origin for further proceedings and reception of evidence as
to the relevant Japanese law on divorce.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 186571 August 11, 2010
GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR
GENERAL, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
1
Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 11,
elevated via a petition for review on certiorari2 under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court (present petition).
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen
who acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization
on November 29, 2000.3 On January 18, 2005, Gerbert
married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in
Pasig City.4 Due to work and other professional
commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the
wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April
2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that
his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and
disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a
petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor,
Ontario, Canada granted Gerbert’s petition for divorce on
December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a month
later, on January 8, 2006.5
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has
found another Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his new
Filipina fiancée in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig
City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian
divorce decree on his and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate.
Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of
the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that
the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under
Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree
must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine
court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.6
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition
of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as
dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although summoned,
Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading but submitted
instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court.
She offered no opposition to Gerbert’s petition and, in fact,
alleged her desire to file a similar case herself but was
prevented by financial and personal circumstances. She,
thus, requested that she be considered as a party-in-
interest with a similar prayer to Gerbert’s.
In its October 30, 2008 decision,7 the RTC denied Gerbert’s
petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert was not the
proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of
the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian
citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the
remedy, under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code,8 in order for him or her to be able to remarry
under Philippine law.9 Article 26 of the Family Code reads:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be
valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles
35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner
is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity
to remarry under Philippine law.
This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the
legislative intent behind the enactment of the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as determined
by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido III;10 the provision was
enacted to "avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse."11
THE PETITION
From the RTC’s ruling,12 Gerbert filed the present petition.13
Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is
essentially for declaratory relief, similar to that filed in
Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a determination of his
rights under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code. Taking into account the rationale behind the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, he
contends that the provision applies as well to the benefit of
the alien spouse. He claims that the RTC ruling unduly
stretched the doctrine in Orbecido by limiting the standing
to file the petition only to the Filipino spouse – an
interpretation he claims to be contrary to the essence of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. He
considers himself as a proper party, vested with sufficient
legal interest, to institute the case, as there is a possibility
that he might be prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his
Filipina fiancée in the Philippines since two marriage
certificates, involving him, would be on file with the Civil
Registry Office. The Office of the Solicitor General and
Daisylyn, in their respective Comments,14 both support
Gerbert’s position.
Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends
to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for
the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
THE COURT’S RULING
The alien spouse can claim no right under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the
substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino
spouse
The resolution of the issue requires a review of the
legislative history and intent behind the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code.
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective
marriages – void15 and voidable16 marriages. In both cases,
the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or
annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of the
marriage. Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates the
dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising after the
marriage.17 Our family laws do not recognize absolute
divorce between Filipino citizens.18
Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in
marriages between a Filipino and an alien, President
Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers
under the Freedom Constitution,19 enacted Executive Order
No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the Family Code to its
present wording, as follows:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be
valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles
35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner
is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity
to remarry under Philippine law.
Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code, EO 227 effectively incorporated into the law this
Court’s holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.20 and Pilapil v.
Ibay-Somera.21 In both cases, the Court refused to
acknowledge the alien spouse’s assertion of marital rights
after a foreign court’s divorce decree between the alien and
the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that the foreign
divorce had already severed the marital bond between the
spouses. The Court reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that:
To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse]
has to be considered still married to [the alien spouse] and
still subject to a wife's obligations x x x cannot be just. [The
Filipino spouse] should not be obliged to live together with,
observe respect and fidelity, and render support to [the
alien spouse]. The latter should not continue to be one of
her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She
should not be discriminated against in her own country if
the ends of justice are to be served.22
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in
the law "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse."23 The legislative intent is for the benefit of the
Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status,
settling the doubts created by the divorce decree.
Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive
right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse
considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to
remarry.24 Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree
of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for
that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding,
would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our
laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the
marital bond;25 Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the
policy against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by
judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion
of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code
provides the direct exception to this rule and serves as
basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage
between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to the
recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds
that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the
courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise
capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this
jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for the
alien spouse (other than that already established by the
decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally
governed by his national law.26
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and
the purpose of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the
applicability of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino
spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the
alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.
The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a
right that clothes the party with legal interest to petition for
its recognition in this jurisdiction
We qualify our above conclusion – i.e., that the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no
rights in favor of aliens – with the complementary statement
that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss
Gerbert’s petition before the RTC. In other words, the
unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of
legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his
foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself,
after its authenticity and conformity with the alien’s national
law have been duly proven according to our rules of
evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in
favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign
judgments. This Section states:
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.—The
effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign
country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final
order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a
specific thing, the judgment or final order is
conclusive upon the title of the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a
person, the judgment or final order is presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors in interest by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled
by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the
foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the
requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for
the recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce
situation, we have declared, no less, that the divorce
obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or
her national law.27
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce
judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take
judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice
Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to
give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a
tribunal of another country."28 This means that the foreign
judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under
our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable
national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien
himself or herself.29 The recognition may be made in an
action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another
action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an
integral aspect of his claim or defense.
In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce decree and
the national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity
to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign
authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes
into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) official
publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having
legal custody of the documents. If the copies of official
records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign
service stationed in the foreign country in which the record
is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a
copy of the divorce decree, as well as the required
certificates proving its authenticity,30 but failed to include a
copy of the Canadian law on divorce.31 Under this situation,
we can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for
insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it
more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to
determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the
Canadian divorce law.
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of
action, given the Article 26 interests that will be served and
the Filipina wife’s (Daisylyn’s) obvious conformity with the
petition. A remand, at the same time, will allow other
interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and
overcome a petitioner’s presumptive evidence of a right by
proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to
state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity
with our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign
judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res
judicata32 between the parties, as provided in Section 48,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.33
In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by
the practice of reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments
between nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign
judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis for
extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien
spouse bound by its terms. This same effect, as discussed
above, will not obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for
the substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code provides.
Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign
divorce decree
As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note that the
Pasig City Civil Registry Office has already recorded the
divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage
certificate based on the mere presentation of the
decree.34 We consider the recording to be legally improper;
hence, the need to draw attention of the bench and the bar
to what had been done.
Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and
judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall
be recorded in the civil register." The law requires the entry
in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal
consequences touching upon a person’s legal capacity and
status, i.e., those affecting "all his personal qualities and
relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily
terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or
illegitimate, or his being married or not."35
A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a
foreign one, affecting a person’s legal capacity and status
that must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on
Registry of Civil Status specifically requires the registration
of divorce decrees in the civil registry:
Sec. 1. Civil Register. – A civil register is established for
recording the civil status of persons, in which shall be
entered:
(a) births;
(b) deaths;
(c) marriages;
(d) annulments of marriages;
(e) divorces;
(f) legitimations;
(g) adoptions;
(h) acknowledgment of natural children;
(i) naturalization; and
(j) changes of name.
xxxx
Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. — The local registrars shall
keep and preserve in their offices the following books, in
which they shall, respectively make the proper entries
concerning the civil status of persons:
(1) Birth and death register;
(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not
only the marriages solemnized but also divorces
and dissolved marriages.
(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption,
change of name and naturalization register.
But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in
the civil registry, the law and the submission of the decree
by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decree’s
registration. The law should be read in relation with the
requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment
before it can be given res judicata effect. In the context of
the present case, no judicial order as yet exists recognizing
the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil
Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without authority
of law when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on
Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate, on the strength
alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert.
Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of
the requirement of a court recognition, as it cited NSO
Circular No. 4, series of 1982,36 and Department of Justice
Opinion No. 181, series of 198237 – both of which required
a final order from a competent Philippine court before a
foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be registered
in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the
registration of the decree. For being contrary to law, the
registration of the foreign divorce decree without the
requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot
produce any legal effect.1avvphi1
Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the
recognition that the RTC may extend to the Canadian
divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation
of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for recognition of a
foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding,
contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation
of entries in the civil registry.
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil
register shall be changed or corrected, without judicial
order." The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the
Civil Code by specifically providing for a special remedial
proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be
judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural
requirements that must be complied with before a
judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be
annotated in the civil registry. It also requires, among
others, that the verified petition must be filed with the RTC
of the province where the corresponding civil registry is
located;38 that the civil registrar and all persons who have or
claim any interest must be made parties to the
proceedings;39 and that the time and place for hearing must
be published in a newspaper of general circulation.40 As
these basic jurisdictional requirements have not been met
in the present case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert
filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court.
We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not
be construed as requiring two separate proceedings for the
registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry –
one for recognition of the foreign decree and another
specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce
decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the
object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or
right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial
proceeding41 by which the applicability of the foreign
judgment can be measured and tested in terms of
jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on
certiorari, and REVERSE the October 30, 2008 decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well
as its February 17, 2009 order. We order the REMAND of
the case to the trial court for further proceedings in
accordance with our ruling above. Let a copy of this
Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar General. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013
MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER,
vs.
MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA,
LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE
ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF
THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE, RESPONDENTS.
DECISI ON
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 107, Quezon City, through a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on a
pure question of law. The petition assails the Order1 dated 31
January 2011 of the RTC in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 and its
Resolution dated 2 March 2011 denying petitioner’s Motion
for Reconsideration. The RTC dismissed the petition for
"Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of
Absolute Nullity of Marriage)" based on improper venue and
the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the
petition.
The Facts
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who
married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in
the Philippines2 on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit
well with petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his
wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact
with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara
(Maekara). Without the first marriage being dissolved,
Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in
Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan.
However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from
Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki. 3
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to
reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay
obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which
declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on
the ground of bigamy.4 On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a
petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign
Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki
prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be
recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay
and Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4)
and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines;5 and (3) for the
RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to
annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the
Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to
endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrator
and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office
(NSO).6
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately
issued an Order dismissing the petition and withdrawing the
case from its active civil docket.7 The RTC cited the following
provisions of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC):
Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages. –
(a) Who may file. – A petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or
the wife.
xxxx
Sec. 4. Venue. – The petition shall be filed in the Family Court
of the province or city where the petitioner or the respondent
has been residing for at least six months prior to the date of
filing, or in the case of a non-resident respondent, where he
may be found in the Philippines, at the election of the
petitioner. x x x
The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition
was in "gross violation" of the above provisions. The trial
court based its dismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC which provides that "[f]ailure to comply with any of the
preceding requirements may be a ground for immediate
dismissal of the petition."8 Apparently, the RTC took the view
that only "the husband or the wife," in this case either
Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their
marriage void, and not Fujiki.
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC contemplated ordinary civil actions for
declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage. Thus, A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply. A petition for recognition of
foreign judgment is a special proceeding, which "seeks to
establish a status, a right or a particular fact,"9 and not a civil
action which is "for the enforcement or protection of a right,
or the prevention or redress of a wrong."10 In other words, the
petition in the RTC sought to establish (1) the status and
concomitant rights of Fujiki and Marinay as husband and wife
and (2) the fact of the rendition of the Japanese Family Court
judgment declaring the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara as void on the ground of bigamy. The petitioner
contended that the Japanese judgment was consistent with
Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines 11 on
bigamy and was therefore entitled to recognition by
Philippine courts.12
In any case, it was also Fujiki’s view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
applied only to void marriages under Article 36 of the Family
Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.13 Thus,
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC provides that "a petition
for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages may be
filed solely by the husband or the wife." To apply Section 2(a)
in bigamy would be absurd because only the guilty parties
would be permitted to sue. In the words of Fujiki, "[i]t is not,
of course, difficult to realize that the party interested in
having a bigamous marriage declared a nullity would be the
husband in the prior, pre-existing marriage."14 Fujiki had
material interest and therefore the personality to nullify a
bigamous marriage.
Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of
Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court is
applicable. Rule 108 is the "procedural implementation" of
the Civil Register Law (Act No. 3753)15 in relation to Article
413 of the Civil Code.16 The Civil Register Law imposes a duty
on the "successful petitioner for divorce or annulment of
marriage to send a copy of the final decree of the court to the
local registrar of the municipality where the dissolved or
annulled marriage was solemnized."17 Section 2 of Rule 108
provides that entries in the civil registry relating to
"marriages," "judgments of annulments of marriage" and
"judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning" are
subject to cancellation or correction.18 The petition in the RTC
sought (among others) to annotate the judgment of the
Japanese Family Court on the certificate of marriage between
Marinay and Maekara.
Fujiki’s motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted
that the trial court "gravely erred" when, on its own, it
dismissed the petition based on improper venue. Fujiki stated
that the RTC may be confusing the concept of venue with the
concept of jurisdiction, because it is lack of jurisdiction which
allows a court to dismiss a case on its own. Fujiki
cited Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate Court 19 which held
that the "trial court cannot pre-empt the defendant’s
prerogative to object to the improper laying of the venue by
motu proprio dismissing the case."20 Moreover, petitioner
alleged that the trial court should not have "immediately
dismissed" the petition under Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC because he substantially complied with the provision.
On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration. In its Resolution, the RTC stated
that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies because the petitioner, in
effect, prays for a decree of absolute nullity of marriage. 21 The
trial court reiterated its two grounds for dismissal, i.e. lack of
personality to sue and improper venue under Sections 2(a)
and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. The RTC considered Fujiki as a
"third person"22 in the proceeding because he "is not the
husband in the decree of divorce issued by the Japanese
Family Court, which he now seeks to be judicially recognized,
x x x."23 On the other hand, the RTC did not explain its ground
of impropriety of venue. It only said that "[a]lthough the Court
cited Sec. 4 (Venue) x x x as a ground for dismissal of this
case[,] it should be taken together with the other ground cited
by the Court x x x which is Sec. 2(a) x x x."24
The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the
petition based on Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of
Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental.25 The Court in Braza
ruled that "[i]n a special proceeding for correction of entry
under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the
Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify
marriages x x x."26 Braza emphasized that the "validity of
marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be
questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the
proper party, and not through a collateral attack such as [a]
petition [for correction of entry] x x x."27
The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the
validity of marriage between Marinay and Maekara. The trial
court held that this is a "jurisdictional ground" to dismiss the
petition.28 Moreover, the verification and certification against
forum shopping of the petition was not authenticated as
required under Section 529 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Hence,
this also warranted the "immediate dismissal" of the petition
under the same provision.
The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor
General and the Letters of Marinay and Maekara
On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their
comment on the petition for review.30 The public
respondents, the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the
Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the NSO,
participated through the Office of the Solicitor General.
Instead of a comment, the Solicitor General filed a
Manifestation and Motion.31
The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that
the RTC’s "pronouncement that the petitioner failed to
comply with x x x A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC x x x be set aside" and
that the case be reinstated in the trial court for further
proceedings.32 The Solicitor General argued that Fujiki, as the
spouse of the first marriage, is an injured party who can sue
to declare the bigamous marriage between Marinay and
Maekara void. The Solicitor General cited Juliano-Llave v.
Republic33 which held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC does not apply in cases of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave, this
Court explained:
[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action
if he or she had only discovered during the connubial period
that the marriage was bigamous, and especially if the conjugal
bliss had already vanished. Should parties in a subsequent
marriage benefit from the bigamous marriage, it would not be
expected that they would file an action to declare the
marriage void and thus, in such circumstance, the "injured
spouse" who should be given a legal remedy is the one in a
subsisting previous marriage. The latter is clearly the
aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens
the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior
marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the
prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will always be a
reminder of the infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of
the prior marriage which sanctity is protected by the
Constitution.34
The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize
the Japanese Family Court judgment may be made in a Rule
108 proceeding.35 In Corpuz v. Santo Tomas,36 this Court held
that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be
made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special
proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is
precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a
particular fact."37 While Corpuz concerned a foreign divorce
decree, in the present case the Japanese Family Court
judgment also affected the civil status of the parties,
especially Marinay, who is a Filipino citizen.
The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court is the procedure to record "[a]cts, events and judicial
decrees concerning the civil status of persons" in the civil
registry as required by Article 407 of the Civil Code. In other
words, "[t]he law requires the entry in the civil registry of
judicial decrees that produce legal consequences upon a
person’s legal capacity and status x x x."38 The Japanese
Family Court judgment directly bears on the civil status of a
Filipino citizen and should therefore be proven as a fact in a
Rule 108 proceeding.
Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no
jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void marriage under Rule
108, citing De Castro v. De Castro39 and Niñal v.
Bayadog40 which declared that "[t]he validity of a void
marriage may be collaterally attacked."41
Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to
comply with the directive for them to comment on the
petition.42 Maekara wrote that Marinay concealed from him
the fact that she was previously married to Fujiki.43 Maekara
also denied that he inflicted any form of violence on
Marinay.44 On the other hand, Marinay wrote that she had no
reason to oppose the petition.45 She would like to maintain
her silence for fear that anything she say might cause
misunderstanding between her and Fujiki.46
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following legal issues:
(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage
can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment
nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or
her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of
bigamy.
(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize
the foreign judgment in a proceeding for cancellation
or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petition.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC)
does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment
relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is
a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v.
Republic,47 this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of
nullity or annulment of marriage "does not apply if the reason
behind the petition is bigamy."48
I.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating
to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen
of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the
foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be
more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted
in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24
and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of
Court.49 Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court
judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a
certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody of
the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign
country such as Japan, the certification may be made by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign
service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of office.50
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for
recognition of foreign judgment would mean that the trial
court and the parties should follow its provisions, including
the form and contents of the petition,51 the service of
summons,52 the investigation of the public prosecutor,53 the
setting of pre-trial,54 the trial55 and the judgment of the trial
court.56 This is absurd because it will litigate the case anew. It
will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments,
which is "to limit repetitive litigation on claims and
issues."57 The interpretation of the RTC is tantamount to
relitigating the case on the merits. In Mijares v. Rañada,58 this
Court explained that "[i]f every judgment of a foreign court
were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced
back on his/her original cause of action, rendering immaterial
the previously concluded litigation."59
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects
the civil status, condition and legal capacity of its parties.
However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To
extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines,
Philippine courts must determine if the foreign judgment is
consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory
laws.60 Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that "[l]aws
relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition
and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad." This is the rule of lex
nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine
State may require, for effectivity in the Philippines,
recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment
affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises personal
jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal capacity
of such citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a
marriage void does not require relitigation under a Philippine
court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know
the foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was
rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the
status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who
is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine
courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a
fact according to the rules of evidence.
Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a
foreign judgment or final order against a person creates a
"presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and
their successors in interest by a subsequent title." Moreover,
Section 48 of the Rules of Court states that "the judgment or
final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact." Thus, Philippine courts exercise
limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed
to delve into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a foreign
judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can
only be repelled on grounds external to its merits, i.e. , "want
of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact." The rule on limited review
embodies the policy of efficiency and the protection of party
expectations,61 as well as respecting the jurisdiction of other
states.62
Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,63 Philippine courts
have recognized foreign divorce decrees between a Filipino
and a foreign citizen if they are successfully proven under the
rules of evidence.64 Divorce involves the dissolution of a
marriage, but the recognition of a foreign divorce decree does
not involve the extended procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC or the rules of ordinary trial. While the Philippines does
not have a divorce law, Philippine courts may, however,
recognize a foreign divorce decree under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a
Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse
obtained a divorce decree abroad.65
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply
prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying
the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of
bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the
Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with
Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared
void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family
Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the
Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132,
Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the
Rules of Court.
II.
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires
proof of fact of the judgment, it may be made in a special
proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section
3 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] special proceeding is
a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right,
or a particular fact." Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts
of a person’s life which are recorded by the State pursuant to
the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of
public consequence such as birth, death or marriage,66 which
the State has an interest in recording. As noted by the
Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court declared
that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be
made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special
proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is
precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a
particular fact."67
Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in
any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status
of persons which has been recorded in the civil
register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or
correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional
Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil
registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the
Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy
because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to
Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file a
petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage
between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the
basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and
material interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage
he contracted and the property relations arising from it.
There is also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation
of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which
compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest
derives from the substantive right of the spouse not only to
preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances68) his most intimate
human relation, but also to protect his property interests that
arise by operation of law the moment he contracts
marriage.69 These property interests in marriage include the
right to be supported "in keeping with the financial capacity
of the family"70 and preserving the property regime of the
marriage.71
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by
the Constitution,72 but a spouse’s right in a marriage extends
further to relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights
and Obligations between Husband and Wife") of the Family
Code.73 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot "diminish, increase, or
modify" the substantive right of the spouse to maintain the
integrity of his marriage.74 In any case, Section 2(a) of A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC preserves this substantive right by limiting the
personality to sue to the husband or the wife of the union
recognized by law.
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a
spouse of a subsisting marriage to question the validity of a
subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the
contrary, when Section 2(a) states that "[a] petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be
filed solely by the husband or the wife"75—it refers to the
husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage. Under Article
35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from
the beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are
neither the husband nor the wife under the law. The husband
or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has
the personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC.
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous
marriages void from the beginning, is the civil aspect of
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, 76 which penalizes
bigamy. Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate
prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has an interest in
the prosecution and prevention of crimes.77 If anyone can file
a criminal action which leads to the declaration of nullity of a
bigamous marriage,78 there is more reason to confer
personality to sue on the husband or the wife of a subsisting
marriage. The prior spouse does not only share in the public
interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also
personally interested in the purely civil aspect of protecting
his marriage.
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is
violated, the spouse is clearly an injured party and is
therefore interested in the judgment of the suit.79 Juliano-
Llave ruled that the prior spouse "is clearly the aggrieved
party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the
financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior
marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the
prior spouse."80 Being a real party in interest, the prior spouse
is entitled to sue in order to declare a bigamous marriage
void. For this purpose, he can petition a court to recognize a
foreign judgment nullifying the bigamous marriage and
judicially declare as a fact that such judgment is effective in
the Philippines. Once established, there should be no more
impediment to cancel the entry of the bigamous marriage in
the civil registry.
III.
In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros
Occidental, this Court held that a "trial court has no
jurisdiction to nullify marriages" in a special proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entry under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court.81 Thus, the "validity of marriage[] x x x can be
questioned only in a direct action" to nullify the
marriage.82 The RTC relied on Braza in dismissing the petition
for recognition of foreign judgment as a collateral attack on
the marriage between Marinay and Maekara.
Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a
recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign
country.
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry
in the civil registry cannot substitute for an action to
invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent
circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards
of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and
other related laws. Among these safeguards are the
requirement of proving the limited grounds for the
dissolution of marriage,83 support pendente lite of the spouses
and children,84 the liquidation, partition and distribution of
the properties of the spouses,85 and the investigation of the
public prosecutor to determine collusion.86 A direct action for
declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also
necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the
Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic
Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of
entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial
Court "where the corresponding civil registry is located." 87 In
other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by
the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the
civil registry.
However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or
cancellation of a civil registry entry based on the recognition
of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of the foreign country. There is neither
circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards
of marriage under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of
Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign
judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action
for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign
judgment, which presupposes a case which was already
tried and decided under foreign law. The procedure in A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one
of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. Neither can
R.A. No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of the foreign court.
Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on
Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce
decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to
determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. The
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides
that "[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him
or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law." In Republic v. Orbecido,88 this
Court recognized the legislative intent of the second
paragraph of Article 26 which is "to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to
the Filipino spouse"89 under the laws of his or her country.
The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only
authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a foreign
divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not
allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on the
merits because it is tantamount to trying a case for divorce.
The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective
measure to address the anomaly that results from a marriage
between a Filipino, whose laws do not allow divorce, and a
foreign citizen, whose laws allow divorce. The anomaly
consists in the Filipino spouse being tied to the marriage
while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his
or her country. The correction is made by extending in the
Philippines the effect of the foreign divorce decree, which is
already effective in the country where it was rendered. The
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is based on
this Court’s decision in Van Dorn v. Romillo90 which declared
that the Filipino spouse "should not be discriminated against
in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served."91
The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a
marriage between a Filipino and a foreign citizen who obtains
a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of
bigamy. The Filipino spouse may file a petition abroad to
declare the marriage void on the ground of bigamy. The
principle in the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code applies because the foreign spouse, after the foreign
judgment nullifying the marriage, is capacitated to remarry
under the laws of his or her country. If the foreign judgment is
not recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be
discriminated—the foreign spouse can remarry while the
Filipino spouse cannot remarry.
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,
Philippine courts are empowered to correct a situation where
the Filipino spouse is still tied to the marriage while the
foreign spouse is free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding
Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts already have
jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the
Philippines to the extent that the foreign judgment does not
contravene domestic public policy. A critical difference
between the case of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a
ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with
Philippine public policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the
Family Code and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The
Filipino spouse has the option to undergo full trial by filing a
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy available to him
or her. Philippine courts have jurisdiction to recognize a
foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage, without
prejudice to a criminal prosecution for bigamy.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are
incompetent to substitute their judgment on how a case was
decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the "family
rights and duties, or on the status, condition and legal
capacity" of the foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign
judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question
of whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the
Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine
courts only decide whether to extend its effect to the Filipino
party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15
of the Civil Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1)
whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent with an
overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether
any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel
the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of notice
to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If
there is neither inconsistency with public policy nor adequate
proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by
default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity
of nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states
that the foreign judgment is already "presumptive evidence of
a right between the parties." Upon recognition of the foreign
judgment, this right becomes conclusive and the judgment
serves as the basis for the correction or cancellation of entry
in the civil registry. The recognition of the foreign judgment
nullifying a bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that
establishes a new status, right and fact92 that needs to be
reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an
inconsistency between the recognition of the effectivity of the
foreign judgment and the public records in the
Philippines.1âwphi1
However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a
bigamous marriage is without prejudice to prosecution for
bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.93 The
recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage is not a ground for extinction of criminal liability
under Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code.
Moreover, under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, "[t]he
term of prescription [of the crime of bigamy] shall not run
when the offender is absent from the Philippine archipelago."
Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no
longer sees the need to address the questions on venue and
the contents and form of the petition under Sections 4 and 5,
respectively, of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31
January 2011 and the Resolution dated 2 March 2011 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in Civil Case
No. Q-11-68582 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional
Trial Court is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition for
further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-22595 November 1, 1927
Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO,
administrator, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
ANDRE BRIMO, opponent-appellant.
Ross, Lawrence and Selph for appellant.
Camus and Delgado for appellee.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G.
Brimo is in question in this case.
The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of
partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased,
opposed it. The court, however, approved it.
The errors which the oppositor-appellant assigns are:
(1) The approval of said scheme of partition; (2) denial of
his participation in the inheritance; (3) the denial of the
motion for reconsideration of the order approving the
partition; (4) the approval of the purchase made by the
Pietro Lana of the deceased's business and the deed of
transfer of said business; and (5) the declaration that the
Turkish laws are impertinent to this cause, and the failure
not to postpone the approval of the scheme of partition and
the delivery of the deceased's business to Pietro Lanza
until the receipt of the depositions requested in reference to
the Turkish laws.
The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the
partition in question puts into effect the provisions of Joseph
G. Brimo's will which are not in accordance with the laws of
his Turkish nationality, for which reason they are void as
being in violation or article 10 of the Civil Code which,
among other things, provides the following:
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions,
in respect to the order of succession as well as to
the amount of the successional rights and the
intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is in question, whatever may be the
nature of the property or the country in which it
may be situated.
But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said
testimentary dispositions are not in accordance with the
Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence
showing what the Turkish laws are on the matter, and in the
absence of evidence on such laws, they are presumed to
be the same as those of the Philippines. (Lim and Lim vs.
Collector of Customs, 36 Phil., 472.)
It has not been proved in these proceedings what the
Turkish laws are. He, himself, acknowledges it when he
desires to be given an opportunity to present evidence on
this point; so much so that he assigns as an error of the
court in not having deferred the approval of the scheme of
partition until the receipt of certain testimony requested
regarding the Turkish laws on the matter.
The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to
prove such laws does not constitute an error. It is
discretionary with the trial court, and, taking into
consideration that the oppositor was granted ample
opportunity to introduce competent evidence, we find no
abuse of discretion on the part of the court in this particular.
There is, therefore, no evidence in the record that the
national law of the testator Joseph G. Brimo was violated in
the testamentary dispositions in question which, not being
contrary to our laws in force, must be complied with and
executed. lawphil.net
Therefore, the approval of the scheme of partition in this
respect was not erroneous.
In regard to the first assignment of error which deals with
the exclusion of the herein appellant as a legatee,
inasmuch as he is one of the persons designated as such in
will, it must be taken into consideration that such exclusion
is based on the last part of the second clause of the will,
which says:
Second. I like desire to state that although by law, I
am a Turkish citizen, this citizenship having been
conferred upon me by conquest and not by free
choice, nor by nationality and, on the other hand,
having resided for a considerable length of time in
the Philippine Islands where I succeeded in
acquiring all of the property that I now possess, it is
my wish that the distribution of my property and
everything in connection with this, my will, be made
and disposed of in accordance with the laws in
force in the Philippine islands, requesting all of my
relatives to respect this wish, otherwise, I annul
and cancel beforehand whatever disposition found
in this will favorable to the person or persons who
fail to comply with this request.
The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the
condition is that the instituted legatees must respect the
testator's will to distribute his property, not in accordance
with the laws of his nationality, but in accordance with the
laws of the Philippines.
If this condition as it is expressed were legal and valid, any
legatee who fails to comply with it, as the herein oppositor
who, by his attitude in these proceedings has not respected
the will of the testator, as expressed, is prevented from
receiving his legacy.
The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being
contrary to law, for article 792 of the civil Code provides the
following:
 Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or
good morals shall be considered as not imposed
and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any
manner whatsoever, even should the testator
otherwise provide.
And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly
ignores the testator's national law when, according to article
10 of the civil Code above quoted, such national law of the
testator is the one to govern his testamentary dispositions.
Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions
above cited, is considered unwritten, and the institution of
legatees in said will is unconditional and consequently valid
and effective even as to the herein oppositor.
It results from all this that the second clause of the will
regarding the law which shall govern it, and to the condition
imposed upon the legatees, is null and void, being contrary
to law.
All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their
dispositions and requests are perfectly valid and effective it
not appearing that said clauses are contrary to the
testator's national law.
Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is
directed that the distribution of this estate be made in such
a manner as to include the herein appellant Andre Brimo as
one of the legatees, and the scheme of partition submitted
by the judicial administrator is approved in all other
respects, without any pronouncement as to costs.
So ordered.
G.R. No. L-16749 January 31, 1963
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E.
CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN,
Heir of the deceased, Executor and Heir-appellees,
vs.
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.
M. R. Sotelo for executor and heir-appellees.
Leopoldo M. Abellera and Jovito Salonga for oppositor-
appellant.
LABRADOR, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance
of Davao, Hon. Vicente N. Cusi, Jr., presiding, in Special
Proceeding No. 622 of said court, dated September 14, 1949,
approving among things the final accounts of the executor,
directing the executor to reimburse Maria Lucy Christensen
the amount of P3,600 paid by her to Helen Christensen Garcia
as her legacy, and declaring Maria Lucy Christensen entitled
to the residue of the property to be enjoyed during her
lifetime, and in case of death without issue, one-half of said
residue to be payable to Mrs. Carrie Louise C. Borton, etc., in
accordance with the provisions of the will of the testator
Edward E. Christensen. The will was executed in Manila on
March 5, 1951 and contains the following provisions:
3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named
MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs. Bernard
Daney), who was born in the Philippines about
twenty-eight years ago, and who is now residing at
No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles,
California, U.S.A.
4. I further declare that I now have no living
ascendants, and no descendants except my above
named daughter, MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN
DANEY.
xxx xxx xxx
7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN
CHRISTENSEN, now married to Eduardo Garcia,
about eighteen years of age and who,
notwithstanding the fact that she was baptized
Christensen, is not in any way related to me, nor has
she been at any time adopted by me, and who, from
all information I have now resides in Egpit, Digos,
Davao, Philippines, the sum of THREE THOUSAND
SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P3,600.00), Philippine
Currency the same to be deposited in trust for the
said Maria Helen Christensen with the Davao Branch
of the Philippine National Bank, and paid to her at
the rate of One Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Philippine
Currency per month until the principal thereof as
well as any interest which may have accrued
thereon, is exhausted..
xxx xxx xxx
12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-
beloved daughter, the said MARIA LUCY
CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs. Bernard Daney), now
residing as aforesaid at No. 665 Rodger Young
Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., all the income
from the rest, remainder, and residue of my property
and estate, real, personal and/or mixed, of
whatsoever kind or character, and wheresoever
situated, of which I may be possessed at my death
and which may have come to me from any source
whatsoever, during her lifetime: ....
It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that the
executor in his final account and project of partition ratified
the payment of only P3,600 to Helen Christensen Garcia and
proposed that the residue of the estate be transferred to his
daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen.
Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed
by Helen Christensen Garcia, insofar as it deprives her (Helen)
of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child, she having
been declared by Us in G.R. Nos. L-11483-84 an acknowledged
natural child of the deceased Edward E. Christensen. The legal
grounds of opposition are (a) that the distribution should be
governed by the laws of the Philippines, and (b) that said
order of distribution is contrary thereto insofar as it denies to
Helen Christensen, one of two acknowledged natural children,
one-half of the estate in full ownership. In amplification of the
above grounds it was alleged that the law that should govern
the estate of the deceased Christensen should not be the
internal law of California alone, but the entire law thereof
because several foreign elements are involved, that the forum
is the Philippines and even if the case were decided in
California, Section 946 of the California Civil Code, which
requires that the domicile of the decedent should apply,
should be applicable. It was also alleged that Maria Helen
Christensen having been declared an acknowledged natural
child of the decedent, she is deemed for all purposes
legitimate from the time of her birth.
The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a
citizen of the United States and of the State of California at the
time of his death, the successional rights and intrinsic validity
of the provisions in his will are to be governed by the law of
California, in accordance with which a testator has the right to
dispose of his property in the way he desires, because the
right of absolute dominion over his property is sacred and
inviolable (In re McDaniel's Estate, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176
P. 2d 952, and In re Kaufman, 117 Cal. 286, 49 Pac. 192, cited
in page 179, Record on Appeal). Oppositor Maria Helen
Christensen, through counsel, filed various motions for
reconsideration, but these were denied. Hence, this appeal.
The most important assignments of error are as follows:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE DECISION OF
THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT THAT HELEN IS THE
ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILD OF EDWARD E.
CHRISTENSEN AND, CONSEQUENTLY, IN DEPRIVING HER OF
HER JUST SHARE IN THE INHERITANCE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY IGNORING
AND/OR FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THE EXISTENCE OF
SEVERAL FACTORS, ELEMENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
CALLING FOR THE APPLICATION OF INTERNAL LAW.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE
THAT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, PARTICULARLY
UNDER THE RENVOI DOCTRINE, THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY
OF THE TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION OF THE
DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED EDWARD
E. CHRISTENSEN SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OF
THE PHILIPPINES.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE
SCHEDULE OF DISTRIBUTION SUBMITTED BY THE
EXECUTOR IS CONTRARY TO THE PHILIPPINE LAWS.
V
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT
UNDER THE PHILIPPINE LAWS HELEN CHRISTENSEN
GARCIA IS ENTITLED TO ONE-HALF (1/2) OF THE ESTATE IN
FULL OWNERSHIP.
There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen
of the United States and of the State of California at the time of
his death. But there is also no question that at the time of his
death he was domiciled in the Philippines, as witness the
following facts admitted by the executor himself in appellee's
brief:
In the proceedings for admission of the will to
probate, the facts of record show that the deceased
Edward E. Christensen was born on November 29,
1875 in New York City, N.Y., U.S.A.; his first arrival in
the Philippines, as an appointed school teacher, was
on July 1, 1901, on board the U.S. Army Transport
"Sheridan" with Port of Embarkation as the City of
San Francisco, in the State of California, U.S.A. He
stayed in the Philippines until 1904.
In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the
United States and stayed there for the following nine
years until 1913, during which time he resided in,
and was teaching school in Sacramento, California.
Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines was
in July of the year 1913. However, in 1928, he again
departed the Philippines for the United States and
came back here the following year, 1929. Some nine
years later, in 1938, he again returned to his own
country, and came back to the Philippines the
following year, 1939.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the
foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and
approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice
to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their
case not covered by this stipulation of
facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was
interned by the Japanese Military Forces in the
Philippines during World War II. Upon liberation, in
April 1945, he left for the United States but returned
to the Philippines in December, 1945. Appellees
Collective Exhibits "6", CFI Davao, Sp. Proc. 622, as
Exhibits "AA", "BB" and "CC-Daney"; Exhs. "MM",
"MM-l", "MM-2-Daney" and p. 473, t.s.n., July 21,
1953.)
In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned once
more to California shortly after the making of his last
will and testament (now in question herein) which
he executed at his lawyers' offices in Manila on
March 5, 1951. He died at the St. Luke's Hospital in
the City of Manila on April 30, 1953. (pp. 2-3)
In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the deceased
is the Philippines, we are persuaded by the fact that he was
born in New York, migrated to California and resided there
for nine years, and since he came to the Philippines in 1913
he returned to California very rarely and only for short visits
(perhaps to relatives), and considering that he appears never
to have owned or acquired a home or properties in that state,
which would indicate that he would ultimately abandon the
Philippines and make home in the State of California.
Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many shades
of meaning from mere temporary presence to the
most permanent abode. Generally, however, it is
used to denote something more than mere physical
presence. (Goodrich on Conflict of Laws, p. 29)
As to his citizenship, however, We find that the citizenship
that he acquired in California when he resided in Sacramento,
California from 1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in the
Philippines, for the latter was a territory of the United States
(not a state) until 1946 and the deceased appears to have
considered himself as a citizen of California by the fact that
when he executed his will in 1951 he declared that he was a
citizen of that State; so that he appears never to have
intended to abandon his California citizenship by acquiring
another. This conclusion is in accordance with the following
principle expounded by Goodrich in his Conflict of Laws.
The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well be
taken to mean the same thing, a place of permanent
abode. But domicile, as has been shown, has acquired
a technical meaning. Thus one may be domiciled in a
place where he has never been. And he may reside in
a place where he has no domicile. The man with two
homes, between which he divides his time, certainly
resides in each one, while living in it. But if he went
on business which would require his presence for
several weeks or months, he might properly be said
to have sufficient connection with the place to be
called a resident. It is clear, however, that, if he
treated his settlement as continuing only for the
particular business in hand, not giving up his former
"home," he could not be a domiciled New Yorker.
Acquisition of a domicile of choice requires the
exercise of intention as well as physical presence.
"Residence simply requires bodily presence of an
inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires
bodily presence in that place and also an intention to
make it one's domicile." Residence, however, is a
term used with many shades of meaning, from the
merest temporary presence to the most permanent
 abode, and it is not safe to insist that any one use et
the only proper one. (Goodrich, p. 29)
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary
dispositions is defined in Article 16 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, which is as follows:
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property
is subject to the law of the country where it is
situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions,
both with respect to the order of succession and to
the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic
validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be
the nature of the property and regardless of the
country where said property may be found.
The application of this article in the case at bar requires the
determination of the meaning of the term "national law" is
used therein.
There is no single American law governing the validity of
testamentary provisions in the United States, each state of the
Union having its own private law applicable to its citizens
only and in force only within the state. The "national law"
indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted can not,
therefore, possibly mean or apply to any general American
law. So it can refer to no other than the private law of the
State of California.
The next question is: What is the law in California governing
the disposition of personal property? The decision of the
court below, sustains the contention of the executor-appellee
that under the California Probate Code, a testator may dispose
of his property by will in the form and manner he desires,
citing the case of Estate of McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176
P. 2d 952. But appellant invokes the provisions of Article 946
of the Civil Code of California, which is as follows:
If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where
personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow
the person of its owner, and is governed by the law
of his domicile.
The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's
opposition and is not denied. We have checked it in the
California Civil Code and it is there. Appellee, on the other
hand, relies on the case cited in the decision and testified to
by a witness. (Only the case of Kaufman is correctly cited.) It
is argued on executor's behalf that as the deceased
Christensen was a citizen of the State of California, the
internal law thereof, which is that given in the abovecited
case, should govern the determination of the validity of the
testamentary provisions of Christensen's will, such law being
in force in the State of California of which Christensen was a
citizen. Appellant, on the other hand, insists that Article 946
should be applicable, and in accordance therewith and
following the doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the
validity of the testamentary provision in question should be
referred back to the law of the decedent's domicile, which is
the Philippines.
The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by various
authors, thus:
The problem has been stated in this way: "When the
Conflict of Laws rule of the forum refers a jural
matter to a foreign law for decision, is the reference
to the purely internal rules of law of the foreign
system; i.e., to the totality of the foreign law minus its
Conflict of Laws rules?"
On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The
Michigan court chose to accept the renvoi, that is,
applied the Conflict of Laws rule of Illinois which
referred the matter back to Michigan law. But once
having determined the the Conflict of Laws principle
is the rule looked to, it is difficult to see why the
reference back should not have been to Michigan
Conflict of Laws. This would have resulted in the
"endless chain of references" which has so often
been criticized be legal writers. The opponents of the
renvoi would have looked merely to the internal law
of Illinois, thus rejecting the renvoi or the reference
back. Yet there seems no compelling logical reason
why the original reference should be the internal law
rather than to the Conflict of Laws rule. It is true that
such a solution avoids going on a merry-go-round,
but those who have accepted the renvoi theory avoid
this inextricabilis circulas by getting off at the second
reference and at that point applying internal law.
Perhaps the opponents of the renvoi are a bit more
consistent for they look always to internal law as the
rule of reference.
Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the
objectors to the renvoi plead that greater uniformity
will result from adoption of their respective views.
And still more strange is the fact that the only way to
achieve uniformity in this choice-of-law problem is if
in the dispute the two states whose laws form the
legal basis of the litigation disagree as to whether
the renvoi should be accepted. If both reject, or both
accept the doctrine, the result of the litigation will
vary with the choice of the forum. In the case stated
above, had the Michigan court rejected the renvoi,
judgment would have been against the woman; if the
suit had been brought in the Illinois courts, and they
too rejected the renvoi, judgment would be for the
woman. The same result would happen, though the
courts would switch with respect to which would
hold liability, if both courts accepted the renvoi.
The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two
instances: where the title to land is in question, and
where the validity of a decree of divorce is
challenged. In these cases the Conflict of Laws rule of
the situs of the land, or the domicile of the parties in
the divorce case, is applied by the forum, but any
further reference goes only to the internal law. Thus,
a person's title to land, recognized by the situs, will
be recognized by every court; and every divorce,
valid by the domicile of the parties, will be valid
everywhere. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 7, pp.
13-14.)
X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate,
domiciled in France, leaving movable property in
Massachusetts, England, and France. The question
arises as to how this property is to be distributed
among X's next of kin.
Assume (1) that this question arises in a
Massachusetts court. There the rule of the conflict of
laws as to intestate succession to movables calls for
an application of the law of the deceased's last
domicile. Since by hypothesis X's last domicile was
France, the natural thing for the Massachusetts court
to do would be to turn to French statute of
distributions, or whatever corresponds thereto in
French law, and decree a distribution accordingly. An
examination of French law, however, would show
that if a French court were called upon to determine
how this property should be distributed, it would
refer the distribution to the national law of the
deceased, thus applying the Massachusetts statute of
distributions. So on the surface of things the
Massachusetts court has open to it alternative course
 of action: (a) either to apply the French law is to
intestate succession, or (b) to resolve itself into a
French court and apply the Massachusetts statute of
distributions, on the assumption that this is what a
French court would do. If it accepts the so-
called renvoi doctrine, it will follow the latter course,
thus applying its own law.
This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented
which the conflict-of-laws rule of the forum refers to
a foreign law, the conflict-of-laws rule of which, in
turn, refers the matter back again to the law of the
forum. This is renvoi in the narrower sense. The
German term for this judicial process is
'Ruckverweisung.'" (Harvard Law Review, Vol. 31,
pp. 523-571.)
After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law
is to be resorted to as governing a particular case, the
further question may arise: Are the rules as to the
conflict of laws contained in such foreign law also to
be resorted to? This is a question which, while it has
been considered by the courts in but a few instances,
has been the subject of frequent discussion by
textwriters and essayists; and the doctrine involved
has been descriptively designated by them as the
"Renvoyer" to send back, or the "Ruchversweisung",
or the "Weiterverweisung", since an affirmative
answer to the question postulated and the operation
of the adoption of the foreign law in toto would in
many cases result in returning the main controversy
to be decided according to the law of the forum. ...
(16 C.J.S. 872.)
Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi",
has been advanced. The theory of the doctrine
of renvoi is that the court of the forum, in
determining the question before it, must take into
account the whole law of the other jurisdiction, but
also its rules as to conflict of laws, and then apply the
law to the actual question which the rules of the
other jurisdiction prescribe. This may be the law of
the forum. The doctrine of the renvoi has generally
been repudiated by the American authorities. (2 Am.
Jur. 296)
The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined and
the reasons for its application in a country explained by Prof.
Lorenzen in an article in the Yale Law Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-
1918, pp. 529-531. The pertinent parts of the article are
quoted herein below:
The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the
rules of the conflict of laws are to be understood as
incorporating not only the ordinary or internal law
of the foreign state or country, but its rules of the
conflict of laws as well. According to this theory 'the
law of a country' means the whole of its law.
xxx xxx xxx
Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the
Institute of International Law, at Neuchatel, in 1900,
in the form of the following theses:
(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country
as regards the application of foreign laws.
(2) Provided that no express provision to the
contrary exists, the court shall respect:
(a) The provisions of a foreign law which
disclaims the right to bind its nationals
abroad as regards their personal statute,
and desires that said personal statute shall
be determined by the law of the domicile, or
even by the law of the place where the act in
question occurred.
(b) The decision of two or more foreign
systems of law, provided it be certain that
one of them is necessarily competent, which
agree in attributing the determination of a
question to the same system of law.
xxx xxx xxx
If, for example, the English law directs its judge to
distribute the personal estate of an Englishman who
has died domiciled in Belgium in accordance with the
law of his domicile, he must first inquire whether the
law of Belgium would distribute personal property
upon death in accordance with the law of domicile,
and if he finds that the Belgian law would make the
distribution in accordance with the law of nationality
— that is the English law — he must accept this
reference back to his own law.
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its
conflict of laws rule, while the rule applied in In re
Kaufman, Supra, its internal law. If the law on succession and
the conflict of laws rules of California are to be enforced
jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate sphere, the
principle cited In re Kaufman should apply to citizens living in
the State, but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens as
are not domiciled in California but in other jurisdictions. The
rule laid down of resorting to the law of the domicile in the
determination of matters with foreign element involved is in
accord with the general principle of American law that the
domiciliary law should govern in most matters or rights
which follow the person of the owner.
When a man dies leaving personal property in one or
more states, and leaves a will directing the manner of
distribution of the property, the law of the state
where he was domiciled at the time of his death will
be looked to in deciding legal questions about the
will, almost as completely as the law of situs is
consulted in questions about the devise of land. It is
logical that, since the domiciliary rules control
devolution of the personal estate in case of intestate
succession, the same rules should determine the
validity of an attempted testamentary dispostion of
the property. Here, also, it is not that the domiciliary
has effect beyond the borders of the domiciliary
state. The rules of the domicile are recognized as
controlling by the Conflict of Laws rules at the situs
property, and the reason for the recognition as in the
case of intestate succession, is the general
convenience of the doctrine. The New York court has
said on the point: 'The general principle that a
dispostiton of a personal property, valid at the
domicile of the owner, is valid anywhere, is one of
the universal application. It had its origin in that
international comity which was one of the first fruits
of civilization, and it this age, when business
intercourse and the process of accumulating
property take but little notice of boundary lines, the
practical wisdom and justice of the rule is more
apparent than ever. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec.
164, pp. 442-443.)
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines pointed out as the national law is the internal law
of California. But as above explained the laws of California
have prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for
residents therein and another for those domiciled in other
jurisdictions. Reason demands that We should enforce the
California internal law prescribed for its citizens residing
therein, and enforce the conflict of laws rules for the citizens
domiciled abroad. If we must enforce the law of California as
in comity we are bound to go, as so declared in Article 16 of
our Civil Code, then we must enforce the law of California in
accordance with the express mandate thereof and as above
explained, i.e., apply the internal law for residents therein,
and its conflict-of-laws rule for those domiciled abroad.
It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there is no
law to the contrary in the place where the property is
situated" in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code refers to
Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and that the law
to the contrary in the Philippines is the provision in said
Article 16 that the national law of the deceased should govern.
This contention can not be sustained. As explained in the
various authorities cited above the national law mentioned in
Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in the
California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the
reference or return of the question to the law of the testator's
domicile. The conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946,
Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is
not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the
Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile can
not and should not refer the case back to California; such
action would leave the issue incapable of determination
because the case will then be like a football, tossed back and
forth between the two states, between the country of which
the decedent was a citizen and the country of his domicile.
The Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in the
conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the
question has to be decided, especially as the application of the
internal law of California provides no legitime for children
while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of
the Philippines, makes natural children legally acknowledged
forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.
The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156;
Riera vs. Palmaroli, 40 Phil. 105; Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil.
867; Babcock Templeton vs. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil. 130; and
Gibbs vs. Government, 59 Phil. 293.) cited by appellees to
support the decision can not possibly apply in the case at bar,
for two important reasons, i.e., the subject in each case does
not appear to be a citizen of a state in the United States but
with domicile in the Philippines, and it does not appear in
each case that there exists in the state of which the subject is a
citizen, a law similar to or identical with Art. 946 of the
California Civil Code.
We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased
Christensen, a citizen of California, is the Philippines, the
validity of the provisions of his will depriving his
acknowledged natural child, the appellant, should be
governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art.
946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the internal law of
California..
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed
and the case returned to the lower court with instructions
that the partition be made as the Philippine law on succession
provides. Judgment reversed, with costs against appellees.
G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.
PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA
BELLIS, oppositors-appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors
appellants.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees
E. A. Bellis, et al.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust
Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law,
from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila dated
April 30, 1964, approving the project of partition filed by the
executor in Civil Case No. 37089 therein.1äwphï1.ñët
The facts of the case are as follows:
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of
Texas and of the United States." By his first wife, Mary E.
Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children:
Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in
infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis
Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived
him, he had three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis,
Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three
illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis
and Miriam Palma Bellis.
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the
Philippines, in which he directed that after all taxes,
obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his
distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the
following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first
wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three
illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis,
Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the
foregoing two items have been satisfied, the remainder
shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and
second wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis,
Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis,
Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal
shares.1äwphï1.ñët
Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a
resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was
admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila
on September 15, 1958.
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the
will, paid all the bequests therein including the amount of
$240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E.
Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate children, Amos
Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis,
various amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of
their respective legacies, or a total of P120,000.00, which it
released from time to time according as the lower court
approved and allowed the various motions or petitions filed
by the latter three requesting partial advances on account
of their respective legacies.
On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its
administration, the executor submitted and filed its
"Executor's Final Account, Report of Administration and
Project of Partition" wherein it reported, inter alia, the
satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E. Mallen by the delivery
to her of shares of stock amounting to $240,000.00, and the
legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and
Miriam Palma Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00 each or a
total of P120,000.00. In the project of partition, the executor
— pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will
and Testament — divided the residuary estate into seven
equal portions for the benefit of the testator's seven
legitimate children by his first and second marriages.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam
Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions to the project
of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their
legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory
heirs of the deceased.
Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to
him, proof of service of which is evidenced by the registry
receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by the executor.1
After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other
pertinent pleadings, the lower court, on April 30, 1964,
issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving
the executor's final account, report and administration and
project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it
applied the national law of the decedent, which in this case
is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.
Their respective motions for reconsideration having been
denied by the lower court on June 11, 1964, oppositors-
appellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue of which
law must apply — Texas law or Philippine law.
In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor
even discuss, the doctrine of renvoi, applied by this Court
in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963.
Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent is a
national of one country, and a domicile of another. In the
present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both
a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his
death.2 So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law
rule providing that the domiciliary system (law of the
domicile) should govern, the same would not result in a
reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still
refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts
rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the
application of the law of the place where the properties are
situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here
involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence,
however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it
should not be presumed different from ours.3 Appellants'
position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As
stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their
arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls under
the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of
Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render
applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or
testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the
order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights;
(e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d)
the capacity to succeed. They provide that —
change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil
Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their purpose
to make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific
provision in itself which must be applied in testate and
intestate succession. As further indication of this legislative
intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039,
which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed
by the national law of the decedent.
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good
customs may be involved in our System of legitimes,
Congress has not intended to extend the same to the
succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically
chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional
rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions
must prevail over general ones.
Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed
two wills — one to govern his Texas estate and the other
his Philippine estate — arguing from this that he intended
Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming
that such was the decedent's intention in executing a
separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as this
Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a
provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties
shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and
not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national
law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article
10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code states said
national law should govern.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a
citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the
laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes.
Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of
the will and the amount of successional rights are to be
determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on
legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G.
Bellis.
Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby
affirmed in toto, with costs against appellants. So ordered.

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal

property is subject to the law of the country where
it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions,

both with respect to the order of succession and to
the amount of successional rights and to the
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may
he the nature of the property and regardless of the
country wherein said property may be found.

ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by

the law of the nation of the decedent.

Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph

three, of the Civil Code, stating that —

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or

property, and those which have for their object
public order, public policy and good customs shall
not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
agreed upon in a foreign country.

prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code

afore-quoted. This is not correct. Precisely,
Congress deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the
provisions of this and the next preceding article" when they
incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the
new Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial