March 2009

R. Lindgren

Assignment:

Look up information on the end of U.S. assistance to Pakistan following:

Its 1965 war with India

History of Pakistani-U.S. “Mutual Defense”

During the early 1950s, the threat of communist expansion loomed darkly over Southeast
Asia. When the Viet Minh crippled the French at Dien Bien Phu, American foreign
policymakers scrambled to stem Soviet influence in the region. Secretary of State John
Foster Dulles proposed an “alliance of the countries in the area designed to meet the
threat of ‘communist Russia and its Chinese communist ally’”1. On September 8, 1954,
the South East Asia Treaty Organization—a sister to the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization—was created by Australia, Great Britain, France, New Zealand, Pakistan,
Thailand, the Philippines, and the United States.

Pakistan, like all the other member countries, had its own motivations for joining the
alliance. The Pakistani government hoped to acquire weapons to strengthen its position
against India, reinforce its position in the case of Indian aggression, and gain the United
States as a powerful diplomatic ally in the treaty of mutual defense. Perhaps wary of
being dragged into the ongoing Kashmir conflict, the United States added a stipulation
that mutual defense was only guaranteed in the event of communist aggression.2 This was
neither the first nor the last of such agreements between Pakistan and the U.S. In the
March 1954 Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, the United States agreed to provide
economic and military assistance to Pakistan under the condition that any materials no
longer used exclusively for security, self-defense, or collective security arrangements
would be returned to the government of the United States.3 In Article 2 of the 1959
Bilateral Agreement of Cooperation, the U.S. reaffirmed its pledge from the Mutual
Defense agreement in 1954.

The Pakistani’s desire for weapons did not go unnoticed by the Indian government. On
February 24, 1954—the day before President Eisenhower announced that the U.S. would
be providing aid to Pakistan—the U.S. Ambassador to India, George Allen, spoke
publicly (and unsuccessfully) in favor of such a decision to assuage the apprehensions of
the Indians.

“…what we are proposing to do, and what Pakistan is

agreeing to, is not directed in any way against India. I am
confirming publicly that if our aid to any country, including
Pakistan, is misused and directed against another in
 aggression I will undertake immediately appropriate action,
both within and without the UN to thwart such actions.”4

The Indo-Pakistani War of 1965

March and April of 1965 witnessed a series of border skirmishes between Pakistan and
India over the disputed territory in the Rann of Kutch. After several weeks, the British
Prime Minister Harold Wilson persuaded both countries to accept a ceasefire and
arbitration. Delighted that the Pakistanis held their own against their bigger and more
powerful enemy, General Ayub Khan believed that the Indian army would not be able to
withstand a more concentrated Pakistani offensive.

In April, the Pakistani Army launched Operation Gibraltar, a mission to infiltrate the
disputed territories of Jammu and Kashmir with guerillas disguised as locals. The
insurgents attempted to incite an uprising to advance Pakistani territorial objectives. A
short time after the Pakistanis infiltrated the population, the plot was discovered.
Operation Gibraltar was a complete failure but India continued to report massive
Pakistani infiltrations of its territory. In response, Indian forces crossed the ceasefire line
on August 15 and the international border on September 6, marking the official start of
the war. Both parties engaged in aerial combat, tank battles, and firefights. This brief war
caused thousands of casualties and massive amounts of material damage; India and
Pakistan fought to a stalemate.

American Responses

Throughout the Indo-Pakistani disputes of 1965, the United States remained decidedly—
and for the Pakistanis, frustratingly—neutral. State Department personnel held strongly to
the reservations outlined in the mutual defense agreements signed with Pakistan since
1954 and refused to condone the Pakistani incursions into Kashmir. On April 30, the U.S.
Ambassador to India, Chester Bowles, proposed cutting off military aid to both nations
unless they accepted the British ceasefire proposal. His suggestion was based on
intelligence that the Pakistanis appeared “to be using MAP equipment and India,
equipment purchased from the U.S. prior to 1962.”5 The same day, Pakistan’s foreign
minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, met with the U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, Walter
McConaughy. McConaughy reiterated America’s unwillingness to provide military
equipment for this struggle and Bhutto responded that “he understood the U.S. concern
on MAP but hoped it recognized the attack on Pakistani territory involved.”6

After the Rann of Kutch border dispute, on June 1, 1965, Bowles wrote a policy
memorandum in which he said:

“…we have been losing influence in India to an extent that

may soon begin to jeopardize our interests throughout Asia.
This follows on a wave of Indian emotionalism and
 resentment of what has been seen by many Indians as a
great Pakistani victory made possible by Pakistan’s use of
U.S. tanks and other military equipment. Pakistan’s use of
U.S. equipment and our reluctance to publicly criticize
Pakistan has been considered by many Indians to
demonstrate that Pakistan’s frank interpretation of the U.S.-
Pakistan alliance relationship was directed against India
was essentially correct. Thus, both American intentions in
South Asia and our ability to pursue those intentions
effectively have been called into…question. It is suggested
that we separate economic from military aid and establish
criteria which apply to both countries equally.”7

Just five days later he sent a secret telegram to the White House, once again
recommending severing military aid to both India and Pakistan. He cited Indian radio and
newspaper reports of Pakistani forces in U.S. planes and tanks moving into Jammu as
cause for deep resentment among the Indian population.8

On September 6, the American Embassy in Karachi sent a telegram to the State

Department discussing a conversation with Pakistani President Ayub. When the U.S.
ambassador reprimanded the president for sending military equipment over the ceasefire
line in Kashmir, Ayub responded “with a wry smile and upraised palms and asked, ‘How
could we deny those people arms?’”9 The U.S. again reminded him that the military
equipment provided by the U.S. was only sanctioned for use against communist
aggression, but to no avail.

The next morning, McConaughy met again with Ayub and Bhutto. The Pakistanis
reiterated their desire for American support, referring to President Johnson’s 1959 visit to
Pakistan in search of peace.10 They claimed that Indian aggression had been unleashed
against India and now the United States had a responsibility to support their allies in
Pakistan. Their pleas fell on deaf ears. British and U.S. policymakers convened in
London to discuss the situation on September 8. Undersecretary of State George Ball
announced that Washington had “suspended the shipment of military supplies to both
warring nations”; the previous policy had been to delay major shipments but now the
U.S. would publicly announce its decision to suspend all arms sales to both parties. The
British Minister of State for Commonwealth Relations, Cledwyn Hughes, said that the
suspension of aid by the U.S. “would have a definite influence on the duration of the
fighting since Pakistan had only three weeks supply of arms.” 11 U.S. policy would
therefore benefit the Indians if the arms ban was applied equally, because the Indians had
more facilities to produce arms and ammunition.

Pakistani outrage was palpable. On September 10, Bhutto met with McConaughy again.
He said that if the U.S. adhered to this policy, its relations with Pakistan could never be
the same. “He termed the decision an act not of an ally and not even that of a neutral.”12
India was in a much more favorable position to withstand the ban, with greater domestic
production and reserves. Pakistan, heavily dependent on U.S. military leftovers, would be
unable to defend itself.13 Bhutto continued to advocate Pakistan’s actions, justified by
self-defense against Indian aggression, and expressed immense disappointment with the
decision of the U.S. McConaughy recounts trying to “stem Bhutto tirade” after listening
to the Pakistani bitterly recount past India cruelties.

Later that afternoon, when he realized that the U.S. intended to adhere to its arms control
ban, Bhutto requested to buy for cash the U.S. military supplies usually provided on a
grant basis. He said that the “Pakistanis would sell all their possessions, even their family
heirlooms in order to get the means to continue the struggle until the Indian invasion
repulsed and Kashmiri rights [were] established.” McConaughy noted that the “meeting
ended on a somber note with an oppressive feelings n my part that more ominous
developments may be in the air.”14

The American decision was interpreted as a great insult by the Pakistanis, who
considered the U.S. their ally. Refusal to provide aid to Pakistan crippled them in their
fight against India, a nation with munitions suppliers from the UK, France, and the
USSR. The UN Secretary General proposed a resolution to the conflict and this proposal
was offered to Bhutto; if he complied, the arms ban would be irrelevant. Bhutto
maintained his position that the Pakistanis would never surrender and would “fight with
their hands” if necessary. The last paragraph of McConaughy’s memorandum contained
his suggestion for economic sanctions by the UN to pressure both sides into negotiations.

Resolution

After several weeks, no real progress had been made by either side. Pakistan’s military
supplies were dwindling and they lacked replacement parts. India, however, remained
unable to secure a decisive victory. On September 22, the United Nations Security
Council passed a ceasefire resolution, demanding both parties return to pre-August 5
borders.15 The war ended the following day and the Soviet Union would later host
ceasefire negotiations in Tashkent. The U.S. weapons ban would remain in effect until
the start of Indo-Pakistani War of 1971.

1 Baber, Sattar, United States Aid to Pakistan: A case study of the influence of the donor
country on the domestic and foreign policies of the recipient. (Karachi, Pakistan: Ma’aref
Printers), 20-21

2 Baber, Sattar, United States Aid to Pakistan: A case study of the influence of the donor
country on the domestic and foreign policies of the recipient. (Karachi, Pakistan: Ma’aref
Printers), 22-23
3 Baber, Sattar, United States Aid to Pakistan: A case study of the influence of the donor
country on the domestic and foreign policies of the recipient. (Karachi, Pakistan: Ma’aref
Printers), 132

4 Baber, Sattar, United States Aid to Pakistan: A case study of the influence of the donor
country on the domestic and foreign policies of the recipient. (Karachi, Pakistan: Ma’aref
Printers), 47

5 NEA Phillips Talbot as quoted in “Indo-Pakistan Conflict: Information Memorandum

30 April 1965,” in Roedad Khan, ed. The American Papers: secret and confidential
India-Pakistan-Bangladesh Documents 1965-1973. (Karashi, Pakistan: Oxford
University Press, 1999), 6

6 Walter McConaughy as quoted in “Highlights of Foreign Minister Bhutto’s

Conversation with McConaughy on Rann of Kutch 30 April 1965,” in Roedad Khan, ed.
The American Papers: secret and confidential India-Pakistan-Bangladesh Documents
1965-1973. (Karashi, Pakistan: Oxford University Press, 1999), 4

7 Chester Bowles as quoted in “Summary of Bowles Memorandum on Unites State’s

Policy in South East Asia 1 June 1965,” in Roedad Khan, ed. The American Papers:
secret and confidential India-Pakistan-Bangladesh Documents 1965-1973. (Karashi,
Pakistan: Oxford University Press, 1999), 12-13

8 Chester Bowles as quoted in “Ambassador Bowles Telegram from American Embassy

in New Dehli: Indian Military and Political Objectives Unclear 6 June 1965,” in Roedad
Khan, ed. The American Papers: secret and confidential India-Pakistan-Bangladesh
Documents 1965-1973. (Karashi, Pakistan: Oxford University Press, 1999), 16
9 “Telegram from American Embassy in Karachi on how USG should respond to GOP’s
request for Action 6 June 1965,” in Roedad Khan, ed. The American Papers: secret and
confidential India-Pakistan-Bangladesh Documents 1965-1973. (Karashi, Pakistan:
Oxford University Press, 1999), 25

10

“McConaughy’s Meeting with Ayub” 7 June 1965,” in Roedad Khan, ed. The American
Papers: secret and confidential India-Pakistan-Bangladesh Documents 1965-1973.
(Karashi, Pakistan: Oxford University Press, 1999), 36

11 Walter McConaughy as quoted in “Memorandum of Conversation: Indo-Pakistan

Dispute 8 June 1965,” in Roedad Khan, ed. The American Papers: secret and
confidential India-Pakistan-Bangladesh Documents 1965-1973. (Karashi, Pakistan:
Oxford University Press, 1999), 41

12 Suspension of Military Aid and Shipments to Pakistan and India: Bhutto informed 10
June 1965,” in Roedad Khan, ed. The American Papers: secret and confidential India-
Pakistan-Bangladesh Documents 1965-1973. (Karashi, Pakistan: Oxford University
Press, 1999), 55

13 Baber, Sattar, United States Aid to Pakistan: A case study of the influence of the donor
country on the domestic and foreign policies of the recipient. (Karachi, Pakistan: Ma’aref
Printers), 60

14 Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Walter McConaughy as quoted in “Suspension of Military

Aid: Full Account of McConaughy’s Meeting with Bhutto 10 June 1965,” in Roedad
Khan, ed. The American Papers: secret and confidential India-Pakistan-Bangladesh
Documents 1965-1973. (Karashi, Pakistan: Oxford University Press, 1999), 58
15 http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unipombackgr.html